{"document_id": "1970_3_370_382_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. LTD.\n\nWESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. WORKERS UNION & ORS.\n\nJanuary 9, 1970\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND P. JAGANMOHAN B\n\nREDDY, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispuie-Union espousing cause of dis1nissed workn1an- Jj such workman should be member of the Union._U, P.' Jndustrial Di~ pules Act (28 of 1947). s. 4(k) and Indust, ial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 10-'At any time' scope ofefusaJ by Government to refer dispute for adjudioation-lf and }Vhen Govern1nent can reconsider decision.\n\nThe appellant terminated the service of a workman in 1957. At that time he -was not a member of the respondentunion.\n\nThe respondent however, espoused the cause of the workman and took up the matter beiore the Conciliation Officer.\n\nTwo of the union's officebearers ap .. peared before the Conciliation Officer but the Conciliation Officer did not recognise them as authorised agents of the uniOn, because, there were some disputes regarding their election.\n\nHe therefore recorded that the D conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with on the ground that . no authorised agent of the union, appeared before him at the proceedings.\n\nThe State Government assumed, that though the union had espoused the workman's cause, it had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceed~ .ings at all, and .refused to refe'r the industrial dipute for adjudication.\n\nIn 1962, the workman became a member of the respondent-union and the union again took up the inatter with the Government.\n\nAfter some E correspondence, in which it was pointed out that in fact two officers of the Union did appear at the conciliation proceedings, the State Govern ment, in 1963, refeited the dispute for adjudication.\n\non the question of the validity <; lf reference,\n\nHELD : (I) Under s. 4(k) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, if the State Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute F 1exists or is apprehended, it may, at any time, refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression 'at any time', does not confer an unfettered or arbitrary di-scretion on the Government. At whatever time the Government decides to refer a dispute for adjudication, ther~ must, at that time. exist an industrial dispute or such a dispute must be apprehended. [373 F;\n\n377 F-G]\n\n(2) Though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute, the other workmen may espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and that hey are directly and substantially interested jn the employment non-employment or conditions of employment of the concerned workman. Therefore, when the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged the test is whether the dispute referred to adjudication i-; one in which' the workmn or a substantial section of them have a direct\n\nnd substantial interest.\n\nThe espousal by the other workmen may be ;; it the time when the cause of the dispute occurs or later, because. the \\Vork men may not, at the time when the disp1:1te occurs, be sucientl9 organ_ised to espouse his ca•Js~ or there, mav not have been .a unu:n at ta.t time.\n\nSince no reference is C3temp:ated by s. 4(k) when. the d1s::iute 1s not an\n\nWJMCO V. WORKERS UNION 371\n\nindustrial dispute, Of, even if it is so, it no longer exists or is_ not appre .. bended, the existence of the community of interest, evidenced by the espousal converting an individual dispute into an industrial dispute, must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs.\n\nFurther, the community of interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or no.t of the union at the date when the cause occurred. The question of the \\\\'Ork\n\nman's membership has to be kept apart from the right of the other workmen to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under s. 4(k). In the present case, the r1?ference was competent because the fact that the workman was not a member of the union on the date \\\\:hen the cause of the dispute arose did not preclude o'r negative the existence of the community of interest, nor did it disable the other workmen, through their union, from making that dispute their own. [375 B-E, G-H; 176\n\nA-B, D; 382 AB, D-E)\n\nWorkmen v. Managemellt of Dimakuchi Tea Estate,\n\n[1958] S.C.R. 1156, Bombay Union of Journalists v.\n\nThe Hindu, Bombay,. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 893 Workmen of Indian Express (P) Ltd. v, The Management, [1969] I S.C. Cases 228, and Workmen v, Dharampal Premchand. [1965] 3 S.C, R. 394 followed,\n\nMuller & Phipps (India) (P) Lid. v. Their Employees Union [1967] 2 L.L.J, 222 and Workmen v. Jamadoba Colliery of Tata, Tata Iron& Steel Co, Lid. [1967] 2 L.L.J. 663, referred to.\n\nPadarthy Ratnam & Co. v. Industrial Tribunal,\n\n[1958] 2 L.L.J, 290, Shamsuddin v. State of Kera/a, [1961] I L.L.J, 77 and Khad1' G, ramodyog Bhawan Workers' Union v. E. Krishnan1urthy, A.LR. 1966 Punjab 173, overruled.\n\n(3) The Government's function is to refer a dispute for adjudication so that industrial relations nlay not continue to remain disturbed, and not to decide the merits of the dispute. Therefore, it cannot be held that once the Government has refused to refer a dispute to adjudication, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter, either be cause new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any. Other relevant consideration, and decide to make the. reference.\n\nWhere, however, it reconsiders its earlier decision and makes a reference it can do so only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage dr is apprehnded, and the reference must be with regard to only that industrial dispute, Further, though it does not affect the iurisdiction of the Government to make a reference, before doing so, the Goverqment should take into account the lapse ?f time and any inconvenience t<_> the employer, and should not allow its_elf to be stampeded into making i'eferences 11); cases of old .or stal~ disputes. or allow the revival of such disputes on the pressure o'f outside ngenc1es.\n\n[378 A-C; 381 1)-E]\n\nIn the present case, the Government's !efusal to make a reference at the earlier stage on the ground that the union ad not caed to appear at the conciliation proceedings, was based on a rn1sapprehens1on. Therefore, if the Government 1ubsequently found that its earlier decisio? w.as based on such a misapprehension, and on facts brought to its notice 1t reconsidered the matter ana decided to make the refcrene since the. dispute \\vas still subsisting, it could not be said that the excn::1se o! the _d1scrcttn \\Vas irnryrope'r, merely because, four vearr;, h:'id clao, ed ~1nce its earlier\n\ndecisio~ not to make the refer., ce. [381 F-H: 382 B-Dl\n\nState of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, [1953] S.C.R. 334, 346 and Sindhu A Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, [1968) I L.L.J. 834, 839, followed.\n\nGurumurthi v, Ramulu, [1958) 1 L.L.J. 20, Vasudeva Rao v. State of Mysore [1963] 2 L.L.J. 717, Rawalpindi Victory Tran.port Co. (P) Ltd.\n\nv. State of Punjab, [1964] 1 L.L.J. 644, Champion Cycle Industries v.\n\nState of U.P. [19641 I L.L.J. 724, Goodyear (India) Ltd., Jaipur v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, [19681 2 L.LJ.1 682 and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. v. In- B dustrial Tribunal, A.l.R. 1969 M.P. 174, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1914 of 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 12, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal C No. 301 of 1966.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, R. N. Banerje11, P. N. Tiwari and 0. C.\n\nMathur, for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg and S. Chakravarty, for respondents Nos. l and 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J. On May 9, 1956 the appellant-company appointed respondent 3 as a foreman on probation for a period of six months.\n\nOn expiry of that period the probationary period was extended from time to time and ultimately respondent 3 was transferred to the labour office of the company.\n\nOn May 29, 1957, while respondent 3 was still serving his probationary period, the company terminated his service.\n\nThe matter was thereupon taken up by respondent l before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Bareil!y, who registered the case as Case No. 83B/57. For the reasons hereinafter stated, no conciliation could be arrived at and the State Government declined to make a reference for adjudication under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). On the said refusal, respondent 3 filed a writ petition in the High Court for a mandamus, The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the decision of the State Government to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication was a matter of its discretion. By about the end of 1962 the respondent-union made further representation to the State Government and by its order dated August 28, 1963 the Government made a reference of the dispute re2arding the said termination of the service of respondent 3 to the Labour Court for adjudication.\n\nBy its order dated March 22, 1965 the Labour Court rejected the reference on the ground that there was no industrial dispute, and therefore, the reference was not maintainable. Respondents l to 3 thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by a learned Single Judge.\n\nAn appeal against the said. order filed by\n\nW!MCO v. WORKERS UNION (She/at, J.) 373\n\nthe appellant-company was dismissed.\n\nThis appeal, by special leave, JS directed agamst the order of the High Coun dismissing the appellant-company's writ petition.\n\nCounsel for .the appellant-company, in suppon of the appeal, raised the following points : ( 1) Was it possible for the respondent-umon to validly espouse the cause of respondent 3 when he was not a member at the date when his service was terminated '!\n\nEven if it was, was _there in fact an espousal so as to conven hii individual dispute into an industrial dispute '? ( 2) Do the words \"at any time\" in s. 4(k) of the Act have any limitations, or can the Govermnent refer a disput.~ for adjudicationafter the lapse of about six years, as in this case, after the accrual of the cause of the dispute '? ( 3) In what circumstances can the Government refer such a dispute for adjudication after it has once refused to do so?\n\nThe definition of 'industrial dispute' in s. 2(1) of the Act is in the same language as that ins. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nThe expression 'industrial dispute', therefore, must bear the same meaning as it is assigned to that expression in the Central Act. It is now well-settled by a long series of decisions that notwithstanding the wide language of the definition ins. 2(k) of the Central Act, the dispute contemplated there is not an individual dispute but one involving a substantial number of ' workmen. However, a dispute, though originally an individual dispute, may become an industrial dispute if it were to be espoused and made a common cause by workmen as a body or by a considerable section of them.\n\nSection 4(k) of the Act, there.fore, must be held to empower the Government to make a reference of such a dispute only for adjudication. It provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute for adjudication to a labour coun or to a tribunal depending upon whether the matter of the industrial dispute falls under one or the other Schedule to the Act.\n\nThe first question that falls for determination is whether where a dispute is originally an individual dispute but becomes an industrial one as a result of its being espoused. by a union or a substantial number of workmen, the concerned workman should have been a member of such union at the time when the cause of such dispute arises.\n\nIt appears that at one time there was a conflict of judicial opinion on this question. Some of the High Couns took the view that in order that an individual dispute may be converted into an industrial dispute on, as aforesaid, its being espoused by a substantial number of workmen, the concerned workman must be a member of the union at the time of the accrual of the cause of the dispute. Thus, in Padarthy Ratnam & Co. v.\n\nIndustrial\n\nL7Su~. CI/{NP)7'-?\n\nTribuna/(1) the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman might develop into an industrial dispute if the cause is espoused by a . union of which. he is a member, and that the membership of the union which would give it the jurisdiction to espouse his cause must be anterior to the date of the dismissal and not subsequent to it. A similar view was also taken by the High Courts of Kerala and Punjab. (see Shamsuddin v. State of Kerala(2) and Khadi Gramodyog Bhawan Workers' Union v. E. Krishnamurthy, Industrial Tribunal('). In a later decision, however, the High Court of Punjab appears to have taken a contrary view. In Muller & Phipps\n\n(]ndia) (P) Ltd. v. Their Employees' Union(') the dispute related to the retrenchment of a workman and the failure of the employer to re-employ him in spite of its having re-employed two other employees out of their turn as against the turn of the concerned workman.\n\nThe High Court rejected the employer's contention that the espousal of the union was not valid as it was made after the retrenched workman had ceased on his being retrenched to be a member of the union on the ground that if that contention were to be upheld it would mean that no union can ever espouse the cause of a retrenched workman.\n\nIn Workmen v. Jamadoba Colliery of Tata lron and Steel Co. Ltd.('), the union which espoused the cause of the workman came into existence after his dismissal.\n\nThe workman naturally became its member after his dismissal.\n\nThe Hi;; h Court disagreed with the Tribunal, which had rejected the reference, and held that even if, on the date of the dismissal of a workman, the dispute was an individual dispute, it may under some circumstances become an industrial dispute on the date of the reference and that the validity of the reference has to be judged on the facts as they stand on the date of the reference and not at the date of the dismissal. Therefore, even if there was no union at the date of the workman's dismissal to espouse his cause, if such a union comes into existence before the reference and the dismissed workman becomes its member and the union thereupon espouses his cause that would be sufficient. It also held that there was no principle in support of the view that the union must be in eixstence at the time of the dismissal.\n\nAfter the decision by this Court in Workmen v. Management o; Dimakuchi Tea Estate(') there can be no doubt that though the words \"anv person\" in the definition of an industrial dispute in s. 2 ( k) of the Central Act are very wide and would on a mere literal interpretation include a disoute relating to any person, considering the scheme and the objects of the Act all disputes are not industrial disputefand tl; iat a dispute becomes an industrial dis-\n\n11' 119581 2 L.L.J. 290.\n\nLl A.LR. 1966 Pun. 173.\n\n(5) [1%7] 2 L.L.J. 66).\n\n(2) [1961) I L.L.J. 77.\n\n(4) [1967] 2 L.L.J. 222.\n\n(6) [1958] S.C.R. 1156_\n\nWIMCO v. WORKERS UNION (Shelat, J.) 375\n\npute where the person in respect of whom it is raised is one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the parti.es to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. The question, therefore, which would arise in cases where the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged, is whether there was between the parties to the reference, i.e., the employer and his workmen, an industrial dispute.\n\nThe parties to the industrial dispute are obviously the parties to the reference, and therefore, the dispute must be an industrial dispute between such parties.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute, the workmen may make that dispute as their own, that is to say, espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and are directly and substantially interested in the employment, non-employment, or conditions of work of the concerned workman.\n\nThis premise presupposes that though at the date when the cause of the dispute arises that dispute is an individual dispute, such a dispute can become an industrial dispute if it is epoused by the workmen or a substantial section of them after the cause of the dispute, e.g., dismissal, has taken place.\n\nIt may be that at the date of such dismissal there is no union or that the workmen are not sufficiently organised to take up the cause of the concerned workman and no espousal for that or any other reason takes place at the time when such cause occurs.\n\nBut that cannot mean that because there was no such union in existence on that date, the dispute cannot become an industrial one if it is taken up later on by the union or by a substantial section of the workmen. If it is insisted that the concemed workman must be a member of the union at the date of his dismissal, the result would be that if at that period of time there is no union in that particular industry and it comes into existence later on then the dismissal of such a workman can never be an industrial dispute althou)Zh the. other workmen have a community of interest in the matter of his dismissal. and the cause for which or the manner in which his dismissal is brought about directly and substantially affects the other workmen. The only condition for an individual dispute turning into an industrial dispute, as laid down in the case o, f Dimakuchi Tea Estate( 1), is the necessity of a community of interest and not whether the concerned workman was or was not a member of the union at the time of his dismissal.\n\nThe parties to the reference being the employer and his employees, the test must necessarily be whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest even though such a dispute relates to a single workman.\n\nIt must follow that the existence of such nn interest. evidenced by the espousal by' them of the cause, must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at 1he date when the cause occurs, otherwise. as aforesaid, in some\n\nIll [1958! S.C'.R. 1156.\n\ncasei a dispute which was originally an individual one cannot be- A come an industrial dispute.\n\nFurther, the commuruty of. interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or not 'at the date when the cause occurred,. for, without his being a member the dispute may be such that other workmen by having a common interest therein would be justified in taking up the dispute as their own and espousing it.\n\nAny controversy on the questiQ!l as to whether it is necessary for a concerned workman to be a member of the union which has espoused his cause at the time when that cause arose has been finally set at rest by the decision in Bombay Union of Journalists\n\nv. The \"Hindu\", Bombay(') where this Court laid down that the test whether an individual dispute got converted into an industrial dispute depended on whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up and supported by the union of workmen of the employer against whom the dispute was raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of such workmen. (see also Workmen v. Mis Dharampal Premchand(') and .Workmen of Indian Express (P) Ltd. v. The Management('). The argument, therefore, that the reference in this case was not competent on the ground that the concerned workman was not a member of the union at the date when the cause giving rise to the dispute arose. and that therefore, the union could not have espoused the dispute to convert it into an industrial dispute is not correct and cannot be upheld.\n\nThe next question is whether the expression \"at any time\" in s. 4(k) means what its literal meaning connotes, or whether in the context in which it is used it has any limitations.\n\nCounsel for the company argued that the concerned workman was admittedly not a member of the respondent-union in the beginning of 1959 when the State Government refused to make the reference, that he became a member of the respondent-union in July 1962, that it was thereafter that the respondent-union revived the said dispute which had ceased to be alive after the Government's said refusal and that it was at the instance of the Union that the Government later on changed its mind and in August 1963 agreed to make the reference.\n\nThe contention was that the Government, having once declined to refer the dispute, could not change its mind after a lapse of nearly six years after the dispute arose and that though the expression \"at any time\" does not apparently signify any limit, it must be construed to mean that once the Government had refused to make the reference after considering the maiter and the employer thereupon had been led to believe that the dispute was not to be agitated in a tribunal and had consequently made his own arrangement. the Government cannot, on a further. agitation by the\n\n(1) [1962]3 S.C.R. 893,\n\n\n(3) 1%9• t S.C. Cases 228.\n\nunion, take a somersault and decide to refer it for adjudication. It was argued that if it were so, it would mean that a workman, who after termination of his service, has already obtained another_ employment,, can still go to the union, become its member and ask the union to agitate the dispute by espousing it.\n\nSuch an action, if permitted, would cause dislocation in the industry as when the employer has in the meantime made his own arrangement by appointing a substitute in place of the dismissed workman on finding that the latter had already found other employment. The legislature, the argument proceeded, could not, therefore, have used the words \"at any time\" to mean after any length of time.\n\nFrom the words used in s. 4(k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication.\n\nNo reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Government decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended. Therefore, the expression \"at any time\". though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report.\n\nBut the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can \"at any time\", i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication.\n\nThe expression \"at any time\" thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed.\n\nAs already stated, the expression \"at any time\" in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.\n\nNo reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence.\n\nIn the State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy( 1 ) this Court held on construction of s. 10(1) of the Central Act that the function of the appropriate Goveinment thereunder is an administrative function. It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispu(e, its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication so that the industrial relations bet-\n\n(1) [J9S3J S.C.R. 334, at 346,\n\nween the employer and his employees may not continue to remain dislurbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible.\n\nIn the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it, it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the lllatter either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference.\n\nBut where it reconsiders its earlier decision it can make ihe reference only if the qispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard t0 that and no other industrial dispute. (Cf. Sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal('). Such a view has been taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Allahabad.\n\nRajasthan, Punjab and' Madhya Pradesh. (see Gurumurthi (G.l\n\nv. Ramulu (K.) (') Vasudeva Rao v. State of Mysore(\") Raw.1/- pindi Victory Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v.\n\nState of Punjab(' J.\n\nChampion Cycle Industries v. State of U.P.('), Goodyear (India) Ltd., Jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal (6) and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd.\n\nv. Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur( 1). The reason given in these decisions is that th.~ fUnction of the Government either under s. l 0(1) of the Central Act or a similar provision in a State Act beinnistrative, principles such as res judicata applicable to judicial Acts do not apply and such a principle cannot be imported for consideration when the Government first refuses to refer\n\nand.later changes its mind. In fact, when the Government refuses to make a reforence it does not exercise its power; on the other hand it refuses to exercise its power and it is only when it. decide; to refer that it exercises its power.\n\nConsequently, the power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when it has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage.\n\nThere is thus a considerable body of judicial opinion according to which so long as an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that is so, the fact that it had earlier refused to exercise its power does not preclude it from exercising it at a later\n\nse. Jn this view, the mere fact that there has been a lapse of tilJie or that a party to the dispute was, by the earlier refusal, Jed\n\ntobelieve that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference.\n\nIt appears that there was a controversy before the High Court whether there was at all any espousal of the dispute by the respon-\n\n(ll 11968] 1 L, L.J. 834. 819.\n\n(2) [1958i 1 L.L.J. 20.\n\n(3) [1963! 2 L.L.J. 111. t4) [1964] 1 L.L.J. 644.\n\n(5) rt964] I L.L.J. 724.\n\n(6) [1968] 2 L.L.J. 682.\n\n(7) A.LR. [1969] M.P. 174.\n\ndent-union, and if there was, at what stage.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, got produced before it the record before the conciliation officer.\n\nStrictly speaking, in a proceeding for certiorari under Art. 226, the record which would be produced before the High Court would be that of the Tribunal whose order is under challenge.\n\nBut if the High Court got produced in the interests of justice the file of the conciliation officer which alone could show whether there was espousal by the union or not, no one could reasonably object to the High Court calling for that record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the stand of the union that it had taken up the cause of respondent 3 was correct or not.\n\nAs the High Court.has said, that file showed that on July 2, 1957 one Har Sahai Singh, the then President of the union, had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint, respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4, 1957 which was counter-signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably, therefore, on behalf of the union. The record also indicated that on that very day, i.e ..\n\nSeptember 4, 1957. the Conciliation Officer recorded an order that the conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with as \"no authorised agent\" of the union appeared before him. Presumably. the Conciliation Officer in course of time must have made his failure report. From these facts the following conclusions must\n\nem.rge : ( I) that the Conciliation Officer bad taken cognisance of the dispute, (2) that he took that dispute as h11ving been espoused by the union through its president. ( 3) that thereupon he fixed September 4, 1957 as the date for holding the conciliation proceedin.gs and informed the parties to attend before him, and ( 4) that as \"no authorised agent\" on behalf of the union appeared before him. he recorded that th.~ conciliation proceedings could not go on.\n\nThese facts clearly go to show that the then president of the union had not made the said complaint in his personal capacity but as the preident representing the union.\n\nThis is borne out to a certain extent by a subsequent resolution of the executive body of the union dated February 28, J 963 which recites that the executive committ.e of the union will continue to take up the cause of respondent 3 as it had been so far doing.\n\nBut Mr. Daphtary emphasised that even this resolution didmot mean that the union had taken up the cause of respondent 3 as its own since the resolution uses the word 'pairavi' and not espousinj! or sponsoring the workman's cause. Pairavi, according to him, means acting as the agent of a party to a proceeding and not beinir a party to the proceeding which would be the position had the union taken up th~ complaint as its own.\n\nTn our view we need not look at the said resolution in so narrow a manner, for, the facts taken as a whole indicate that the union had in fact taken up the cause of the workman.\n\nThe President evidently could not have countersigned the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1970] 3 S.c.Il.\n\nwritten statement of the concerned workman and the Conciliation Officer could not have given a notice to the union to appear before him and could not have recorded that he did not proceed with the conciliation proceedings as no authorised agent of the union appeared before him unless every one understood that the union had taken up the cause of the workman. The notice dated August 2,) 957 issued by the Conciliation Officer after the union Presicblt ., had lodged his said complaint is on record and shows that it was\n\nissued to the management and the union calling upon both of them to appoint their respective representatives on the conciliation board as required by the Government Otder dated July 14, 1954. It also shows that the Officer treated the dispute as having been espoused by th.e union as the notice recites the dispute as an industrial dispute.\n\nThe subse°quent factS Would seem to indicate that the Government declined to make. the reference presumably because of the report of the Conciliation Officer that in spite of the said notice no authorised agent of the union had appeared before him and therefore no conciliation had been possible. As alrea\"dy stated, a writ petition to compel the Government to make the reference proved unsuccessful.\n\nIt may be that the respondent-union may have decided to press for the reference after the concerned workman became its member.\n\nThat fact, however, is irrelevant for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Government under s. 4(k). One fact, however, is clear that the respondent-union carried on correspondence with the Labour Ministry and also passed the said resolution dated February 28. 1963. The correspondence which was carried on from about November 1962 shows that the union pressed the Government to make the reference and the Government ultimately made the reference in August 1963. That correspondence further shows that the Governmrnt at one stage pointed out that the union had in 1957 failed to appear before the Conciliation Officer although it had espoused the dispute and that that fact had influenced the Government's refusal then to refer the dispute for :1djudication. The. union pointed out (I) that at the time when the said complaint was lodged in 1957 before the Conciliation Otlic.er the union's president was one Varnrn. (2) that in the meantime elections for the union's office bearers took place when the said Har Sahai Choudhurv and one Girish Chandra Rharati were elected president and working-president respectively. (3) that the above-mentioned individuals appeared before the conciliation officer. but the said Varma did not, as he bad failed in the elections. ( 4) that dispute arose about the said elections and the Registrar of the Trade Unions refused to recognise the new office bearers. and (5) that the conciliation officer also refused to recllgnise the said Har Sahai Choudhurv and Bharati a< the dulv electe(I president and working president. and therefore. although both of\n\nthem attended the meeting fixed by !hat officer, the latter recorded that no authorised agent of !he union had appeared before him and no conciliation, therefore, could be arrived at. It thus appears from the correspondence that following the espousal of the said dispute by the union, two of !he office bearers of the union did appear before !he conciliation officer but were not recognised a~ the authorised agents of !he union on account of !he said disputes about the elections. If the Government, lherefore, had refused then to make the reference on !he ground that though the union . had espoused the workman's cause it had. not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings, the Government's decision refusing to make the reference was clearly on misapprehension .. If the Government subsequently found !hat its earlier decision wasbased' on such a misapprehension and on facts brought to its 11Qtiee it .. reconsiders the matter and decides to make !he reference it. is. difficult to say !hat it exercised the discretion conferred on it by . : s. 4(k) in any inappropriate manner. But that does not mean\"that'' if s. 4{k) is construed to mean that the Government can recbnl '.\"' sider its earlier decision, such a construction would result in unions' \"· indecing workmen to join them as members or to shift their membership from one to the other rival union on promises by such union to revive disputes which are already dead or forgotten and then press the Government to make a reference in relation to them.\n\nThere is no reason to think thai the Government would not consider !he matter properly or allow itself to be stampeded int(l makirt11: references in cases of old or stale disputes or reviving such disputes on the pressure of unions .\n\n. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make !he reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no . proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen.\n\nSuch a consideration would, we should think. be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion. it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it.\n\nThese are matters which the Government would have to take into account while decidin!! whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of\n\njustice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its juris diction under s. 4(k) of the Act.- Whether the intervening period mav be short or Ion!! would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore. in construing the exnression \"at anv time\" in s. 4(k) it would be impossible to lny down anv limits to it.\n\nIn the oresent case thou!!h nearlv four vears had gone by since the earlier decision not to make !he reference, if the Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1970] 3 .Ji.C.R.\n\nwas satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a misapprehension of facts, and therefore, required its reconsideration, neither its decision to do so nor its determination to make the reference 'can be challenged on the ground of want of power.\n\nThe fact that the dispute betweeoi the concerned workman and the management had become an industrial dispute by its having been espoused by the union since 1957 cannot be disputed.\n\nThe fact that the workman was then not a member of the union does not preclude or negative the existence of the community of interest nor can it disable the other workmen through their union from makin£ that dispute their own.\n\nThe fact that the Government refused then to exercise its power cannot mean that the dispuie had ended or was in any manner resolved.\n\nIn the absence of any mat.erial it is not possible to say that. with the refusal of the Government then and the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court in March 1959 the dispute, which was already an industrial \\!!spute, h\"d ceased to subsist or that on respondent 3 joining the union in July\n\nI 962 the union revived a dispute which was already dead and not in existence. His becoming a member in July 1962 was as immaterial to the power of the Government under s. 4 ( k) as the fact of his not being a member at the time when his cause was espoused in 1957 by the union and the dispute becoming thereupon an industrial dispute.\n\nThe question of his 111embership. therefore, !us to be kept apart from the right of the other workmen to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under s. 4(k). It may be that his becoming a member in 196 may have been the cause of the union's subsequent efforts to per; uade the Govem- 111ent to reconsider its decision and make a reference on proper facts being plaCed before it and its earlier misapprehensions removed. But that again has nothinl! to do with the jurisdiction of the Government under s. 4(k) of the Act.\n\nIn our view, the appellant-company fails on botfl the points and its appeal against the High Court's decision becomes unsustainable .\n\nAccordingly. we dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n. F", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. WORKERS UNION & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. WORKERS UNION & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 91, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 9, 1970\n\n[J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND P. JAGANMOHAN B\n\nREDDY, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 319, "end_char": 326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370, "end_char": 375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1787, "end_char": 1810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3090, "end_char": 3097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 893", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. N. Banerje11, P. N. Tiwari and 0."}}, {"text": "R. N. Banerje11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. N. Banerje11, P. N. Tiwari and 0."}}, {"text": "P. N. Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, R. N. Banerje11, P. N. Tiwari and 0."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7521, "end_char": 7531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7553, "end_char": 7567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg and S. Chakravarty, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg and S. Chakravarty, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7584, "end_char": 7598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg and S. Chakravarty, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J. On May 9, 1956 the appellant-company appointed respondent 3 as a foreman on probation for a period of six months."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 29, 1957, while respondent 3 was still serving his probationary period, the company terminated his service."}}, {"text": "Bareil!y", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was thereupon taken up by respondent l before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Bareil!y, who registered the case as Case No."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8383, "end_char": 8412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "August 28, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By about the end of 1962 the respondent-union made further representation to the State Government and by its order dated August 28, 1963 the Government made a reference of the dispute re2arding the said termination of the service of respondent 3 to the Labour Court for adjudication."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order dated March 22, 1965 the Labour Court rejected the reference on the ground that there was no industrial dispute, and therefore, the reference was not maintainable."}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10305, "end_char": 10312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10373, "end_char": 10402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10994, "end_char": 11006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12275, "end_char": 12303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tribuna/(1) the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman might develop into an industrial dispute if the cause is espoused by a ."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Kerala and Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12679, "end_char": 12711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was also taken by the High Courts of Kerala and Punjab. ("}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12872, "end_char": 12892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a later decision, however, the High Court of Punjab appears to have taken a contrary view."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14796, "end_char": 14800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dimakuchi Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17618, "end_char": 17638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only condition for an individual dispute turning into an industrial dispute, as laid down in the case o, f Dimakuchi Tea Estate( 1), is the necessity of a community of interest and not whether the concerned workman was or was not a member of the union at the time of his dismissal."}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19936, "end_char": 19943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21949, "end_char": 21956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23877, "end_char": 23885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25161, "end_char": 25209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view has been taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27374, "end_char": 27382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27932, "end_char": 27944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the High Court.has said, that file showed that on July 2, 1957 one Har Sahai Singh, the then President of the union, had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint, respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4, 1957 which was counter-signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably, therefore, on behalf of the union."}}, {"text": "Har Sahai Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27949, "end_char": 27964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the High Court.has said, that file showed that on July 2, 1957 one Har Sahai Singh, the then President of the union, had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint, respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4, 1957 which was counter-signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably, therefore, on behalf of the union."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28181, "end_char": 28198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the High Court.has said, that file showed that on July 2, 1957 one Har Sahai Singh, the then President of the union, had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint, respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4, 1957 which was counter-signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably, therefore, on behalf of the union."}}, {"text": "February 28, J 963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29459, "end_char": 29477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is borne out to a certain extent by a subsequent resolution of the executive body of the union dated February 28, J 963 which recites that the executive committ.e of the union will continue to take up the cause of respondent 3 as it had been so far doing."}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29623, "end_char": 29631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Daphtary emphasised that even this resolution didmot mean that the union had taken up the cause of respondent 3 as its own since the resolution uses the word 'pairavi' and not espousinj!"}}, {"text": "August 2,) 957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30699, "end_char": 30713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice dated August 2,) 957 issued by the Conciliation Officer after the union Presicblt .,"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31021, "end_char": 31034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had lodged his said complaint is on record and shows that it was\n\nissued to the management and the union calling upon both of them to appoint their respective representatives on the conciliation board as required by the Government Otder dated July 14, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31811, "end_char": 31818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 28. 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31967, "end_char": 31984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One fact, however, is clear that the respondent-union carried on correspondence with the Labour Ministry and also passed the said resolution dated February 28."}}, {"text": "Varnrn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32628, "end_char": 32634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "union pointed out (I) that at the time when the said complaint was lodged in 1957 before the Conciliation Otlic.er the union's president was one Varnrn. ("}}, {"text": "Har Sahai Choudhurv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32727, "end_char": 32746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) that in the meantime elections for the union's office bearers took place when the said Har Sahai Choudhurv and one Girish Chandra Rharati were elected president and working-president respectively. ("}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra Rharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32755, "end_char": 32777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) that in the meantime elections for the union's office bearers took place when the said Har Sahai Choudhurv and one Girish Chandra Rharati were elected president and working-president respectively. ("}}, {"text": "Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32933, "end_char": 32938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but the said Varma did not, as he bad failed in the elections. ("}}, {"text": "Bharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33213, "end_char": 33220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and (5) that the conciliation officer also refused to recllgnise the said Har Sahai Choudhurv and Bharati a< the dulv electe(I president and working president."}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34362, "end_char": 34369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34432, "end_char": 34436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35914, "end_char": 35921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36121, "end_char": 36128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37634, "end_char": 37638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37963, "end_char": 37970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38314, "end_char": 38321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_383_408_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "TWYFORD TEA CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 15, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nA. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]\n\nKerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act, 1960 (Ac! 17 of 1960) and the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Amendment Act 1961 (Act 19 of\n\n1967) , s. 3-Con.rtitution aJ India, Art. 14--Charge of unlfotm tax from\n\nplantauons alleged to be differently situated-Validity of tax-Cmpetency <>f Kerala legislature to levy land tax in absence of enabling entries in S.venth Schedule, Constitution of India.\n\nIn the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act 1960 (Act 17 of\n\n1960) there is a levy of additional tax on plantations. \"Plantations\" mean land used for growing cocoanut, Arecanut, Rubber, Coffee, Tea, Cardamom and Pepper.\n\nUnder s .. 3 of the Act, for each financial year a plantation tax additional to the basic tax charged on land tax under the Land Tax Act 1955 is payable at the rate mentioned in Schedule I of the Act, the said rate being Rs. 8 per acre.\n\nPlantations of 5 acres or below held by a person do not attract tax. For the purpose of finding oot the extent ot the plantation in acres held by a person a method of , calculation is laid down in Schedule II.\n\nAct 17 of 1960 was amended by the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Amendment Act 1967 (Act. 19 of 1%7). By the amending Act the word 'additional' is removed from all places and it is declared that the tax is additional to land revenue or any tax in lieu thereof, if any, payable in respect of such land. The unit of assessment is charged from acre to hectare, and the rate of tax in Schedule I is raised to Rs. 50/· per hectare. The tax is payable in respect of plantations of two hectares or more with an exemption ior the lirst hectare. According to the new Schedule II the extent of the plantation for the purpose of tax in the case Of cocoanut, arecanut, rubber, coffee and pepper plantations is arrived at by dividing the total number of trees, plants or vines standing thereon by a number, specified in each case. In the case of tea and cardamom the extent of the plantation is the extent of lands on which these plants are grown and have begun to yield crops.\n\nThe petitioner cOmpany was incorporated in India and the majority of its share-holders were Indians. It owned a tea estate in the Kuttikenam area .in the Peermade Hills in Kerala State. The company paid without protest the additional tax levied on plantation by Act 17 of 1960. When the rate became heavier as a result of th'l amendments made by Act 19 of 1967 the company field the present petitions under Art 32 of the Const:tution. The challenge was based mainly on Art. 14 of the Constiut lion. It was urged that there were differences of 'fertility and rainfall in the different areas where the plantations were situated.\n\nFiqurcs compiled by the Tea Board. were submitted to show the difference in yield between different estates. Relying on Moopi/ Nair'•<:ase it was argued that the uniform tax onunequals resulted in discrimination (a) as between the tea plantations themselves and .(b) as between se land tax was therefore no longer open to dispute.\n\nPer Shela! and Grover, JJ. (dissenting) .--The petitions must be allowed.\n\nLike MOOPil Nair's case the present case also was one where inequality emerged as a result of imposing an ad hoc tax uniformly levied without making any rational or intelligible classification. There is no indication in the Act and none was sought to be shown as to how and on what basis the uniform rate of Rs. 50 per hectare was fixed and whether it had any re!ference to the productive capacity of the lands. [406 D-FJ\n\n. As regards tea plantations, the tax is uniformly levied merely on the footing of the land being used for growing tea, witiJsut any regard to its potentiality, situation, the kind of tea which can s, ititably be grown at a particular place, its geographical and other features etc. No doubt, the State in exercise. of the taxing power can select persons and objects for taxation but if it is found that within the range\" of that selection the law operates unequally by reaJ; on either of classification or its absence, such a provision would be hit by the equality clause of Art. 14. [408 DJ\n\nEven among the selected plantations inequality a.s a result of uniformity of tax must result because it is possible that the user of the land for one specified purpose may give a better and a more valuable yield than the user of another land though situated in the same area for another specified purpose. This had happened in the case of tea plantation with which alone the present petitions were concerned.\n\nTherefore to the ex.tent that Act 17 of 1960 as amended by Act 19 of 1967 imposes the tax on holdings of tea plantations, it is violative of Art. 14 and therefore void.\n\ni408 D-F]\n\nMoopil Nair's case applied.\n\nCase-Jaw referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 135-137 of 196se this tax and even if it did have the competence it has followed a wrong method in im-\n\n-posin11: . addiiional land revenue without effecting proper settle-\n\n'(1) (1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 389\n\nmenL The next contention is that the Act is discriminatory in that it takes no account of differences in situation, fertility and yield between the plantations belonging to the same category.\n\nLastly it is contended that it is discriminatory inasmuch as it seeks to treat plantations of different kinds as if they were equal in all respects by reducing them to a common measure of hectares when it is not possible to do so regard being had to the different incomes derived from th.se plantations.\n\nWe shall take up these questions one by one.\n\nThe first question is of the competence of the State Legislature. There is no specific entry in the legislative Lists, Nos. 2 and 3 in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Land Tax Act 1955, as amended by the Travancore-Ccchin Land T; ix\n\n(Amendment) Act, X of 1957, was declared unconstitutional in its operative sections in K. T. Moopi/ Nair's( 1 ) case. Immediately afterwards the Kerala Land Tax Act, 196 l was passed following an Ordinance and that Act is now included in the 9th Schedule to the Cctitution at No. 38 and receives the protection of Art. 31-B.\n\nThe competency to impose land tax thus is no longer open to dispute.\n\nThe present Act is challenged on the same lines as the former Act and the argument is rested upon the principles accepted in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary to recall what was decided there.\n\nUnder the Land Tax Act, 1955 all lainds of whatever description and held under whatever tenure were to be charged and levied a uniform tax per acre. known as the basic tax.\n\nSection 7 of the Act, however, conferred a power on Government to exempt wholly or in part any land.\n\nThis Court considered the tax to be discriminatory because it paid no heed to quality or productive capacity of land and the tax was also Jield to be confiscatory since owners of unproductive land were liable to be eliminated by slow stages.\n\nThe power of exemption was also considered unreasonable because it enabled Government to pick and choose lands arbitrarily for grnnt of exemption.\n\nThe Jack of classification was considered to crat~ inequality. Sarkar, J. who dissented held that there was an attempt at classification according to areas, and the tax was levied because land in the State was held. and not because of its productivity.\n\nIn dealing with this case the arguments have been moulded round the observations in that case. In support of his contention that yield of tea varies from estate to estate and district to district (of which figures are already quoted in the petition) The Tea Statistics (1967-68) compiled by the Tea Board of India were also cited. It is hardly necessary to refer to the findings of the Tea Board because it may be assumed without discusion that there are differences. It may also be conceded that the uniform tax falls\n\n(1) [t961! 3 S.C.R. 77.\n\nL7Sup./70-t0\n\nmore heavily on some plantations than on others because the profits are widely discrepant.\n\nBut does that involve a discrimination?\n\nIf the answer be in the affirmative hardly. any tax direct or indirect would escape the same censure for taxes touch purses of different lengths and the very uniformity of the tax and its equal treatment would become its undoing.\n\nThe rich and the poor pay the same taxes irrespective of their incomes in many i11stances such as the sales-tax and the profession tax etc. It may be remembered that in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case the majority accepted the observations of S. R. Das C.J. in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others(') at page 299 to the following effect :\n\n\"A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of a]Jplying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions ail! to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification.\n\nAfter such scrutiny the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for\n\nuiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that; therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself.\"\n\nWe have always to see what the statute does to make for equality of tr.atment.\n\nThe contention here is that there is a uniform rate of tax per G hectare which every owner of a named plantation has to pay irrespective of the extent or value of the produce and, therefore, the law imposes a uniform tax burden on unequals.\n\nIn our opinit fr.eedom in classification. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivab_le basis which might support it.''\n\nAs Rcttschaefer said in his Constitutional Law at p. 668 :\n\n'\"A statute providing for the assessment of one type of intangible at its actual value while other intangibles are assessed at their face value does not deny equal pro- 1ec1ion even when both are subject to the same rate of tax.\n\nThe decisions of the Supreme Court in this field have permitted a State Legislature to exercise an exlremely wide discretion in classifying property for tax purposes so long as ii refrained from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes.\" (Emphasis added).\n\nThe burden is on a person complaining of discrimination.\n\nThe burden is provinl! not possible 'inequality' but hostile \"unequal\" treatment.\n\nThis is more so when uniform taxes are levied. It is\n\n(1) \\19631 IS.C.R. 404.\n\n(2) (1940) 309 U.S. 83;84 L.Ed. 590.\n\nnot proved to us how the different plantations can be said to be 'hostilely or unequally' treated.\n\nA uniform wheel tax on cars does not take into account the value of the car, the mileage it runs, or in the case of taxis, the profits it makes and the miles per gallon it delivers.\n\nAn Ambassador taxi and a Fiat taxi give dilierent outturns in terms of money and mileage.\n\nCinemas pay the. same show fee.\n\nWe do not take a doctrinaire view of equality.\n\nThe Legislature has obviously thought of equalising the tax through a method which is inherent in the tax scheme.\n\nNothing has been said to show that there is inequality much less 'hostile treatment'. All that is said is that the state must demonstrate equality.\n\nThat is not the approach.\n\nAt this rate nothing can ever be proved to be equal to another.\n\nThere is no basis even for counting one tree as equal to another.\n\nEven in a thirty years' settlement. the picture may change the very next year for some reason but the tax as laid continues.\n\nSiwai income is brought to land ievenue on the basis of number of tre.s but not on the basis of the produce.\n\nThis is worked out on an average income per tree and not on the basis of the yield of any particular tree er trees.\n\nWhat is meant by th.~ power to classify without unreasonably discriminating between persons similarly situated, has been stated in several other cases of this Court.\n\nThe same applies when the legislature reasonably applies a uniform rate after equalising matters between diversely situated i>rsons.\n\nSimply stated the Jaw is this: Differences in treatment must be capable c~ being reasonably explained in th.: iight of the object for hich the particular legislation is undertaken.\n\nThis must be based on some reasonable distinction between the cases differentially treated.\n\nWhen differential treatment is not reasonably explained and justified the treatment is discriminatory.\n\nIf different subjects are equally treated there must be some basis on which the differences have been equalised otherwise discrimination will be found.\n\nTo be able to succeed in the charge of discrimination. a person must establish conclusively that persons equally circumstanced have been treated unequally and vice versa.\n\nHowever. in Khandige Sham Bhat and others v. The Agric11/t11ral Income Tax Officer. at page 817 it was observed :\n\n\"If there is equality and uniformity within each group. the Jaw will not be condemned as discriminative though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others. so long as they are not singled out for special treatment.\n\nTaxation Jaw is not an excep- HI tion to this doctrine: vide Purshottam Govindji Ha/ai ---------\n\n(I) [1963] J S.C.R. 800.\n\n....\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (She/at, I.) 395\n\nv. Shree B. N. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay(') and Kunnathat Thatunni Moopi/ Nair v.\n\nState of Kera/a(').\n\nBut in the application of the principles, the courts, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to. the Legislature in the matter of classification, so long it adheres to the fundamental principl.es underlying the said doctrine.\n\nThe power of the Legislature to classify is of \"wide range and flexibility\" so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.\"\n\nTaking these principles into consideration we are satisfied that the law does not single out any particular plantation for hostile or unequal treatment. In fact it is nowhere proved in this case that tea has been discriminated against deliberately as between differ ent tea gardens, it is not possible to say that the differences in the yield is entirely due to natural circumstances and no other cause.\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible to say that there is discrimination not\n\nwithstanding the uniform rate for each plantation based on the actual crop yielding area.\n\nThe petitions must therefore fail. . They will be dismissed with costs.\n\nShelat, J.\n\nPetitioner No. l, a public limited company, of which the second petitioner is a shareholder, owns the Twyford Estate situate in Kuttikanam area in K.rala State.\n\nThe estate is a tea plantation admeasuring 1006 hectares (248(J acres). out of which 491 hectares (1214 acres) have tea plants.\n\nIn these petitions, the petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of the Kerala Plantations (Additional Tax) Act, XVII of I 960, as amended by the Kerala Plantations (Additional Tax) Amendment Act, XIX of 1967 (hereinafter reffered to as the Act).\n\nThe challenge is on the ground that the Act violates the petitioners' guaranteed rights under Arts. 14. 19 (1 )( f) and I g) and 31 ( 1 ) .\n\nBefore we set out the facts and the cantention; based thereon, it is necessary to recite briefly the hi!)lory of the legislation penaining to land taxation in the State.\n\nIn 1955, the Legislature of the .ln State of Travancore Cochin passed the Travancore-Cochfu. Land Tax Act, XV of\n\n\\ 955 which by ss. 4 and 5 imposed in respect of all lands, of whatever description and tenure, a uniform rate to be called the basic tax at the rate of 3 pies per cent per amnum in lieu of any existing tax in respect of the said land.\n\nWith the formation of the present State of Kerala under the reorganisation of States, the\n\n(I) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 887.\n\n(2) [1961] J S.C.R. 77.\n\nState Legislature passed the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, X of 1957 by which the expressions ·the State cf Kerala\" and \"the Land Tax Act'\" were substituted for the words \"the State of Travancore-Cochin\" and \"the Travancore- Cochin Land Tax Act\" respectively.\n\nThe amendment Act also addecl a new section, s. SA, which imer a/ia, provided for provisional assessment of the basic tax for lands so far not surveyed.\n\nThe constitutional validity of Act XV of I 955. as amended by Acr X of I 957. was challenged in this Court in Moopil Nair v.\n\nThe Sta:e of Kera/a(1). The Act was struck down by this Court, inter a/ia, on the ground of it> being violative of Arts. 1-l and 19 ( 1) (f).\n\nThe judgment of this Court strikin~ down the \\ct was pronounced on December 9. 1960.\n\nBefor.e the case of Moopil Nair(') was decided. the Kerala Legi; lature passed the impugned Act. XVII of 1960. which on receivin.g the Governor's assent. was published in the Gazette Extraordinary of August 24. 1960. Section 2!6) of the Act defineJ a \"plantation\" to mean land used for growing one or more of the seven categories of trees or plants set out therein. categC'r~ 5 ther.eci being tea piants.\n\nThus. the land used for growing a11y trees, pbnts or corps other than these seven categories is not suhject to the additional tax under the Act.\n\nSection 3 provides that there hall be charged. in respeot of the lands comprisd in plantations held by a person. an additional tax or plantation tax at the rate specified in Sch. I and the person holding such plantation shall te liabe to pay the plantation tax.\n\nSch. I to the Act lays down that the additional tax would not be payable if the agizregate extent of the plantation held by a person is below 5 acres.\n\nBut if it is 5 acres or more. the first two acres thereof would be exempt from the tax. and the remainder would be chargeable at the rate of Rs. 8 - per acre.\n\nSuh-s. 4 of s. 3 provides that for purposes of the assessment of plantation tax payable by a person under this Act. the extent of plantation held by him shall be determined in the manner specified in Sch. II. Section 3 ( 5) declares that the tax\n\nchared under this section shall be in addition to the basic tax payable under the Land Tax Act. 1955. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the returns relating to the plantations. the determination of the extent of plantation and the assessment of the tax. The rest of the provisions of the Act provide for such subjects as the provisional assessn1ent. notice of den1and. appeal and revision against asscssmen! orders. recovery of the tax. refund etc.\n\nSch. II provides that the extent of plantation held bv a person shall be deemed to be the aggregate of the following expressed in acres. namely :-\n\n( i) thf.! quotient obtained by dividing the total number of bearin_g cocoanut trees standing on all lands held by him by 85:\n\nft9611 J S.C.R. 77.\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. I\". KERALA (She/at, J.) 397\n\n(ii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of bearing arecanut trees standing on all lands held by him by 600;\n\n(iii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding rubber plants standing on all lands held by him by 180;\n\n(iv J the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding coffee plants standing on all lands held by him by 600;\n\n( v) the quotient obtaiw!d by dividini; the total number of yielding pepper vines standing on all lands held by him by 400.\n\n(vi J the ext em of lands ,_m which tea plants are grown which have begun to yield crops; and\n\n(vii) the extent of lands on which cardamom plants are grown which have begun to yield crops.\n\nProvided that where the total extent of land heid by a person, which is cultivated with the aforesaid crops, is less than the aggregate calculated as above, the actual extent alone shall be deemed to be th.e extent of plantations held by him.\n\nThough the Schedule lays down different quotients in respect of lands cultivated with cccoanut and arecanu\\ tree;. rubber and coffee plants and pepper vines, they cannot achieve equality of the burden of the tax as yieids of even the same crop cannot be equal or approximately equal by rea>ans of differences in the lands in one area from those in ether areas depending on their soil, situation and a number of other such factors.\n\nFurthermore, no explanation is forthcoming about the principle, if any, on which the quotient for each of the said categories was fixed and whether thev inter se work out reasonable equality among the plantations cultivating the said trees and plants. In the case of tea plants, the holder is liable to pay tax on the extent of lands on which they are grown irrespective of the number of tea olants which are or can be grown, their quality or their possible yield.\n\nThe Act was amended. as aforesaid, by Act XIX of 1967 by which the expression 'additional tax' was substituted by the word 'tax'. and in s. 4 instead of the measure for changing the tax being 5 acre> or more, th.~ measure now adopted was 2 hectares and mere.\n\nThe two new Schedules .. which were substituted for those in Act XVII of 1960 provided bv Sch. I that no tax would be payable if the aQQregate extent of plantation was below 2 hectares, but where it is 2 hectares or more. there would be no tax on the first one hectare but the rest of the land would be taxed at Rs. 50 per hectare.\n\nWith the subtitution of h.ctare as the meaure in\n\nplace of acre, the quotients were suitably modified in proportion of a hectare being equal to 2..175 acres.\n\nThus, under the Act, as amended by Act XIX of 1967, a holder of land, whose land is plantation, is now required to pay .Rs. 50 per hectare instead of Rs. 20 per hectare, over and above the basic tax payable by him\n\nund.r the Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended in 1957. The petitioner-company thus is Hable to pay Rs. 24,500/- as additional tax on its 491 hectares cultivate•d for tea plants over and above the basic tax payable by it.\n\nIt will be noticed that notwithstanding the reasons on which in Moopi/ Nair's(1) decision the Land Tax Act, XV of 1955 was struck down, no changes in the light of that decision were made in Act XVII of 1960 even when it was amended in 1967.\n\nIn consequence of Act XV of 1955 having been struck down as aforesaid, the Kerala Legislature passed a new Act, called the Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII 0f 1961, giving it a re'.rospective cfkct by s. I ( 3) thereof.\n\nThe Act was obviously passed in the light of, the observations made by this Court in Moopi/ Nair's case(1).\n\nSection 5 provided that there shall be charged a tax called \"basic\n\ntax· on all lands of whatever description and tenure. Sub-s. 3 of that section provided that the basic tax so charged shall be deemed to be public revenu.~ due on lands within the meaning of the Revenue Recovery Act. Section 6(1) laid down the rate of the bas'c tax.\n\nThe basic t3'<: was first fixed at Rs. 2/- per acre per annum. but subsequently changed to Rs. 9.94 P. per hectare. Section 6(2) provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. I. where a land-holder liable to pay basic tax proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority that the gross income from any land was less thar Rs. I 0 per acre per annum (now changed to Rs. 24. 70 P. per hectare), the basic tax payable on such land shall be at a rate fixed by the prescribed authority calculated at I/5th of the gross income from such land.\n\nThe second proviso to sub-s .. 2 laid down that the Government may. having regard to the potential productivity of any land used principally for growing cocoanut, arecanut, pepper, tea, coffee, rubber. cardamom. or cashew or any other special crop, plant or tea that might be specified by the Government by notification, levy and collect basic tax at the rate of two rupees per acre per annum on such land notwithstanding the fact that such crops, plants or trees have not begun to yield or bear and that for time being no income is made from the land or that the income made is less than ten rupees per acre per annum. Explanation (1) to s. 6 laid down that for the purpose of s. 6 gross income shall mean the actual gross income or the gross income that would be made from the land with due diligence, whichever was higher.\n\nThus, s. 6(2), the second proviso thereto and Explanatipns I and 3 to the section clearly disclose that this time the Legis- --\n\n(l) [19611 3 S.C.R. 77.\n\nTWYFORD TEA CO. V. KERALA (She/at, J.) 399\n\nlature taxed the land on the standard of potential productivity instead of the ad hoc levy originaily provided in the Act of 1955 and also removed the obiection as to the absence of any remedy against assessment by providing appeal and revision. The position, therefore, is that whereas under the Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII. of 1961, as amended in 1968 and 1969, the basic or land tax is levied on th.~ basis of potential productivity and yield, the tax as imposed by the impugned Act as a tax in addition to the basic tax is a uniform tax at a flat rate without any regard to the productivity of the land, potential or actual.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, , Pee rm a de Hills, where their estate is situate, falls roughly into two areas, the Kuttikanam area and the Periyar 0valley area. Though both these areas are situate in high ranges, they differ in the extent of their productivity and quality, the reason being that the Periyar valley area is the basin of Periyar river.\n\nThe difference in the fertility and the quality of soil in these two areas is sought to be illustrated by showing that Twyford estate situate in Kuttikanam area and Haileyburia estate situate in P.riyar valley area, though under common management, give different average yields. The average yield in 1967 per hectare in Twyford estate was 959 Kgs. while that of Haileyburia estate was 1542 Kgs. To show such differences also in other areas in the State and elsewhere the petitioners have furnished variom statistics.\n\nThese statistics first show that the average annual yield per hectare in the tea-growing areas in Madras. Mysore and Kerala for the year 1967 was 1394, 1178 and 1076 Kgs. respectively.\n\nThe all India average yield according to these figures was 1100 Kgs. per hectare per year.\n\nThe average of tea production per hectare in Kerala State thus compares favourably with that of the other tea growing regions as also with the all India average. Therefore, the tea planters in Kerala cannot \\:'.~ said to be backward or less forward-looking or less venturesome than those in the other regions.\n\nSecondly, these figures also show that the average yield in the different districts in Kerala itself varies from district to district ranging from about 350 Kgs. for the district of Ernakulam to as much as 1850 Kgs. for Trichur district.\n\nThe production figure for the whole of the Kerala Siate appears to have remained steady throughout 1965 to 1967 as it varies from about 43000 Kgs. to 44000 Kgs. These figures indicate that different areas in the State where tea is grown differ in a very large way in productivity and fertility. These figures are taken from the Reports of the Tea Board, and therefore, can be safely regarded as reliable.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit filed by the State these differences, no doubt, are not admitted.' To show that such differences do not exist only the example of one estate, Glenmari near Kuttikanam, is taken. It is urged that that estate has a larger production per hectare than the petitioners' estate though both happen to be situate\n\nin the same area.\n\nThe respondents, however, have frankly conceded that the fertility of the land and the differences in productivity of estates in differnt areas are not relevant, for, the impugned tax is levied with reference to the specified user to which the land is put and not to its productivity, potential or actual.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners contended that the tax charged under the Act is discriminatory and arbitrary, and therefore, violates Art. 14.\n\nThe argument was that the tax, being an ad hoc levy uniformly imposed, merely on the basis of the use of the land. for any one or more of the seven kinds of trees and plants selected by s. 2 ( 6 J cf the Act, without any classification and without any consideration to th.e situation, the kind of land, its potential productivity, water-supply. natural or artificial, and geographical features, falls unequally on the holders of the land.\n\nIt was submitted that this inequality arises as a result of the absence of any rational classification, and the Act, for that reason, suffers from the same infirmity for which in the Mcopil Nair's case(') this Court struck down the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended by Act X of 1957. The contention urged, on the other hand, on behalf of the State was that by selecting the seven kinds of plantations ins. 2(6), the Legislature has made an intelligible classification amongst holders of land, that that classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act, namely. to obtain additionai revenue by imposing tax in addition to the basic tax, that the Legislature in the matter of taxation has a wide discretion in selecting persons and properties for imposing a tax, that in exercise of its power to tax, it was entitled to levy the tax based on certain kinds of user of land and was net bound to make a further classification of the land according to its potential productivity, its situation, its geographical feature;, income and other such considerations.\n\nBefore we examine these contentions we think it expedient to consider first the principle: laid down by this Court in the matter of the power to levy taxes of the kind we have before us.\n\nIn Moppii Nair's case('), this Court laid down the foliowing principJe.s : (I) that Art. 14 read with Art. 13(2) applies to a taxing statute as much as to other statutes, and therefore, if he impugned statute, even though a taxing one, violates Art. 14, it has to be struck down as unconstitutional; (2) that the statute there impugn.ed, namely, the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended by Act X of 1957, imposed a uniform tax on all lands, whether productive or not. and without any reference to their income, actual or potential; ( 3) that since the Act in terms claimed by s. 3 thereof to be a general revenue settlement of the State, the tax beine one on land or land revenue had to be asses>ed and levied on the actual or potential productivity of the land sought\n\n(1) [1961] J S.C.R. 77.\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (She/at, J.) 40 l\n\nto be taxed ; in other words, such a tax has reference to the income actually made or which could have been made with due regard to its incidence, and ( 4) that the inequality writ large on the Act arose by reason of the absence of any classification of the land on which the tax was imposed.\n\nThe argument which appears to have appealed fo the learned dissenting Judge that the Act made a classification between holders of land according to the quantum of land held by them und that that classification was rea.onab!y linked w1tt1 the object of the Act to raise revenue for the State, failed to receive the approval of the rest of the Court.\n\nThe fact . that a person holds a large area of land and i3 taxed according to the a he holds cannot by itself mean that in taxing him he is meted out equal treatment as compared to a person who holds a lesser quantity of land but of a better and more productive quality, merely on the ground that both hold land and are taxed according to th~ quantity each -of them holds.\n\nA uniform tax without consideration of its incidence, when actually implemented must result in inequality of treatment amongst persons similarly situa•ed, and therefore, would be violative of Art. 14.\n\nIn The State of Alidhra Pradesh v. Nal/a Raja Reddy(') the relevant facts were as follows : Originally two differeint revenue systems prevailed in Andhra and Telengana.\n\nIn the former, th.~ priRciples of Ryotwari system prevailed which meant that lands were classified under two principal heads, wet and dry. Lands of similar grain values were bracketed together in orders called\n\n\"tarams\", each with its own rate of assessment, which was further adjusted in the case of dry lands with reference to the nature and quality of water supply.\n\nThis system prevailed since time; immemorial and by reason of its being equitable had general apriroval. In Telengana. the relative scale of soils wa1 classified in terms of annas.\n\nThe existing or former rates used to be taken as the basis for the purpose of resettlements and were adjusted having regard to altered conditions, such as the rise and fall of prices, increase in population etc. Besides, the settlement officers used to fix the rates after ascertaining what profit would be left to the cultivators.· Thus, under the system of a5sessment which prevailed in both the areas, the land revenue fixed varied according to the classification of soil based upon productivity. Later, the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Assessment (Standardisation) Act, 1952 and the Hyderabad Land Revenue (Special Assessment) Act, 1952 were passed to standardize the rates on the basis of price level.\n\nThese two Acts increased the rates by way of surcharge on the existing rates. In 1958, the Staie Government appointed a Committee to examine the existing system of rates of assessment. The Committee inter alia suggesied that assessment should be based on the quality and productivity of soils, the nature of water supply\n\n(I) [19671 3 S.C.R. 28.\n\nand the prices. The State Legislature then µassed the impugned Act, Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act, XXII of 1962, which was amended by Act XXIII of 1962. Under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, as amended, a new scheme was laid down in accordance with which an additional assessment at 7 5 % of the earlier assessment was charged.\n\nBut the proviso thereto laid down that the total assessment should not in any case be less than 50 nP. per acre per year, irrespective of the quality and productivity of th.e soil.\n\nEvery acre of dry land had thus to bear a minimum asse5sment of 50 nP. per acre per year. For wet lands also, a scheme was adoptect which took no account of the quality and productivity of the soil.\n\nThe Act was challenged on the ground of dirimination arisinr, from the absence of dassification as in the case of Moopil Nair('). In considering the challenge the Court observed :\n\n\"A statutory provision may offend Art. 14 of the Ccnstitution both by finding diff.erences where there arc none and by making no difference where there is one.\n\nDecided cases laid down two tests to ascertain whether a classification is permissible or not, viz., ( i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that the differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.\n\nThe said principles have been applied by this Court to taxing statutes. This Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v.\n\nThe State of Kera/a [(1961 )3 S.C.R. 77] held that the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution, as it ;:ibliged every person who held land to pay the tax at the fiat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable of yielding any income.\n\nIt was pointed out that that was one of the cases where the lack of classification created inequality.\"\n\nThe Court observed that in the case before it the whole scheme of ryotwari system was given up so far as the minimum rate was concerned. A fiat rate was fixed in the case of dry lands without anv reference to the quality or fertility of the soil, and in the case of wet lands. a minimum rate was fixed and it was sought to be justified by correlating it to the ayacut. The Court held that that scheme of classification was adopted without any reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved. namely. fixation and rationalisation of rates. and therefore. clearly offemled the equal protection clause.\n\n(1) 119611 J S.C.R. 77.\n\n• E\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (Shelat, J.) 403\n\nIn Khandige Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income Officer( 1) the Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Moopil Nails case(') and observed with regard to the provisions there\n\nimpugned :\n\n\"In order to judge whether a law was discriminatory what had primarily to be looked into was not its phraseology but its re'al effect. If there was equality and uniformity within each group, the law could not be discriminatory, though due to fortuitous circumstances in a peculiar situation some included in a class might get some advantage over others, so long as they were not sought out for special treatment. Although taxation laws could be no exception to this rule, the courts would, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diveEe elements permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification so long as there was no transgression of the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of classification. The power of the Legislature to classify must necessarily be wide and flexible so as to enable it to adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.\"\n\nThe principle emerging from these decisions is thus fairly wellsettled.\n\nWhile granting a fairly wide d!scretion to the legislature in the matter of fiscal adjustment, the Court will at the same time insist that the statute in question, like any other statute, should not infringe Art. 14 either by introducing unreasonable or irrational\n\ncla, sification between persons or properties similarly situated or by a lack of classification. Further, in examining the objection under Art. 14 the Court has not to go by the phraseology only of the provision under challenge, but its real impact on persons or properties.\n\nThe challenge urged on behalf of the p.titioners may now be examined in the light of these principles. soth the title and the preamble of Act XVII of 1960 in clear terms call the tax one in addition, as s. 3 ( 5) declares it, to the basic tax, payable on lands falling under its purview, i.e .. plantations, as defined bys. 2(6).\n\nA plantation, as defined by s. 2 ( 6), means the land used for any one or more of the seven types of trees and plants set out therein.\n\nThe tax is thus chargeable in respect of lands which are plantations and not the rest of the lands however much their income may be.\n\nApart from that, as stated in the State's counter-affidavit, th~ tax is imposed on the ground of the. particular use to which the land is put and not on the basis of its productivity or income, actual or potential. This is so, although it is a tax in addition to the basic or land tax levied under the Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII of 1961,\n\n(l) rt9631 3 S.C.R. 809. 817.\n\n(2) [196lj 3 S.C.R. 77.\n\nand although that basic tax under s. 6 of tlulf Act dep.znds upon the gross income yielded by the. particular land. It is true that under the second proviso to that section, if the land is used for growing any of the crops therein mentioned. the Government can impose, having 1egard to its potential procbictivity, the ba>ic tax at R>. 21per-acre, even though the land has not yt begun to yield or bear the crop and no income has yet begun to be made therefrom.\n\nBy subsequent amendment the rate was changed to Rs. 4.94 per hectare, but the principle of potential productivity was maintained. The additional tax imposed by Act XVII of 1960, on the other hand, is on the same land provided it is used for growing any one or more of the specified frees or plants, originally at the uniform rate of Rs. 8/- per acre but now enhanced by Act XIX of 1967 to Rs. 50/- per hectare, i.e., Rs. 20 per acre.\n\nAs already stated, the Amendment Act deleted the -word 'additional' but the deletion makes no. difference as the tax is still in addition to the basic or land tax and must, therefore, partake its character, both taxes being taxes in respect of th0 same land, where the land is plantation within s. 2 ( 6). Thus, so far as such lands are concerned, the basic tax on them is assessed according to their productivity or income.\n\nBut the tax under Act XVII of 1960, as amended by Act XIX of 1967, is imposed in respect of them as an ad hoc uniform tax, irrespective of the kind of their soil or their capacity etc. and only for the reason of their particular user, Prima facie, the incidence of such a tax by reason of its uniformity is bound to be unequal on persons similarly situated and would, therefore, be hit by the equality clause. in Art. 14. Even assuming that the basic tax is a revenue assessment and the additional tax is not, it would still make no difference in its unequal incidence on these whose lands by their particular user are plantations. In other words, the burden of the tax on persons situated in similar circumstances, i.e., those whose lands are plantations, would be unequal, depending upon the kind of soil, the geographical situation, water supply, elevation and other relevant factors touching the lands they hold. The additional tax is by no means low as it is, after the passing of the amendment Act XIX of 1967, Rs. 50 per hectare, equivalent to Rs. 20 per acre.\n\nA person holding LOOO acres of land of inferior soil would, by reason of such an ad hoc tax, be bound to be hit harder than the one holding 1,000 acres of ; uperior land with higher fertility or productiviiv.\n\nSuch a result would not occur if the land is classified and the incidence of the tax is _graded according_ to its productivity and other relevant factors.\n\nIn support of the Act it was argued that the impugned Act not only makes a classification between those who hold lands whkh are plantations and tho'se who hold lands which are not plantations, .bui also makes a further classification within that classification by the method provided for calculating the extent of plantations in Sch. II.\n\nThat argument does not appear to be\n\nTWYFORD rEA co. V. , KERALA (She/at, J.)\n\n40S\n\ncorrect. ·.·. The Schedule only provides the methods for calculating the extent of the plantations : (1 ) by means of quol!ents and\n\n(2) where tea and cardamom plants are cultivated by tlie actual extent of the land used for those purposes.\n\nBut the Schedule does not solve the dtfliculty. A piece of land in one a•ea may have a certain number of trees or plants of one or mme of the specified categories to make it a plantation.\n\nBut the incidence of the tax in respect of it would be unequal as compared to another land situate eisewhere by reason of the latter's better situation or fertility even if the number of plants or trees of the .specified kind are the same, depending upon the situation and the capacity of the two lands.\n\nIn such a case the very uniformity of the tax is bound to result in discrimination pn account of th.~ relative potentiality of the two lands not being taken into account,. and the lands not being classified accordingly.\n\nIt is, therefore, difficult to say that the Schedule, intended only for calculating the extent of the plantations, seeks to achieve equality of tr.atment between one kind of plantation and another or between planta; tiom of the same kind, if the principle of their yield or income, actual or potential, is not taken into account. How is it possible lo say that the uniform bured with costs.\n\n(I) [t963] l.S.C.R. 404.", "total_entities": 184, "entities": [{"text": "TWYFORD TEA CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TWYFORD TEA CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER\n\nJanuary 15, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nA. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 323, "end_char": 327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Tax Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I of the Act", "statute": "Schedule I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1967", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1318, "end_char": 1336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1634, "end_char": 1644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1967", "statute": "Amendment Act 1967"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811, "end_char": 1822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1967", "statute": "Amendment Act 1967"}}, {"text": "cOmpany", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2234, "end_char": 2241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner cOmpany was incorporated in India and the majority of its share-holders were Indians."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner cOmpany was incorporated in India and the majority of its share-holders were Indians."}}, {"text": "Kuttikenam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It owned a tea estate in the Kuttikenam area .in the Peermade Hills in Kerala State."}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It owned a tea estate in the Kuttikenam area .in the Peermade Hills in Kerala State."}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2626, "end_char": 2632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 S.C.Jt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3242, "end_char": 3279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 S.C.Jt\n\nHELD: Per Hidayatullah, G J., and Vaidialingam and Ray, IJ.-The A pe.titions must be dismissed. ·"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 S.C.Jt\n\nHELD: Per Hidayatullah, G J., and Vaidialingam and Ray, IJ.-The A pe.titions must be dismissed. ·", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3315, "end_char": 3327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 S.C.Jt\n\nHELD: Per Hidayatullah, G J., and Vaidialingam and Ray, IJ.-The A pe.titions must be dismissed. ·"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3332, "end_char": 3335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 S.C.Jt\n\nHELD: Per Hidayatullah, G J., and Vaidialingam and Ray, IJ.-The A pe.titions must be dismissed. ·"}}, {"text": "Moopi/ Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5306, "end_char": 5317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "395 CJ\n\nIn Moopi/ Nair's case this Court considered the tax therein impugned to be discriminatory because it paid no heed to quality or' productive capacity of land and the tax was also held to be confiscatory since owners of unproductive land were liable to be eliminated by slow degrees.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "[1967) 2 S.C.R. 679", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6724, "end_char": 6743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 S.C.R. 809", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7100, "end_char": 7119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Immediately after the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7369, "end_char": 7427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Moopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7526, "end_char": 7537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "957 was declared invalid by this Court in Moopil Nair's case, the Kerala Land Tax Act 1961 was passed following an ordinance.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Kerala Land Tax Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7550, "end_char": 7574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7713, "end_char": 7720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala Land Tax Act 1961", "statute": "the Kerala Land Tax Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Per Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Shela!"}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Grover, JJ. ("}}, {"text": "MOOPil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7908, "end_char": 7919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Like MOOPil Nair's case the present case also was one where inequality emerged as a result of imposing an ad hoc tax uniformly levied without making any rational or intelligible classification.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8902, "end_char": 8909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9641, "end_char": 9648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9656, "end_char": 9677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H M. C. Seta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9722, "end_char": 9734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. C. Seta/vad, Joy 1oseph, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; t,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9752, "end_char": 9760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. C. Seta/vad, Joy 1oseph, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; t,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9762, "end_char": 9776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. C. Seta/vad, Joy 1oseph, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan; t,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C, Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioriers."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9839, "end_char": 9852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9857, "end_char": 9872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. H!DAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9913, "end_char": 9928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VA!DIALINGAM and A. N. RAY, JJ.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "C. A. VA!DIALINGAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VA!DIALINGAM and A. N. RAY, JJ."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9991, "end_char": 10003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.\n\nDissenting Opinion of J. M. SHEMT and A. N. GROVER, JJ, was .delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are three petitions by Twyford Tea Company and one of its directors under Art.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "J. M. SHEMT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10033, "end_char": 10044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.\n\nDissenting Opinion of J. M. SHEMT and A. N. GROVER, JJ, was .delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are three petitions by Twyford Tea Company and one of its directors under Art."}}, {"text": "SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10085, "end_char": 10091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.\n\nDissenting Opinion of J. M. SHEMT and A. N. GROVER, JJ, was .delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are three petitions by Twyford Tea Company and one of its directors under Art.", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "Twyford Tea Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10145, "end_char": 10164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.\n\nDissenting Opinion of J. M. SHEMT and A. N. GROVER, JJ, was .delivered by SHELAT, J.\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are three petitions by Twyford Tea Company and one of its directors under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10196, "end_char": 10203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1967", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10392, "end_char": 10411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,02, 106.02 already paid as tax to the Kerala Government be ordered to be re-funded."}}, {"text": "Kuttikanam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10935, "end_char": 10945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It owns a tea estate in Kuttikanam area in the Peermade hiils in Kerala State."}}, {"text": "Periyar valley", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11357, "end_char": 11371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Periyar valley afe1\\ rouj!hly 60 sq."}}, {"text": "Parkins Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11612, "end_char": 11632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin;; to the petitioners' statement M/ s. Parkins Private Ltd., are the Managing Agents of Twyford Tea Company and also the Hai!eyburia Tea Estate."}}, {"text": "Hai!eyburia Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11694, "end_char": 11716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordin;; to the petitioners' statement M/ s. Parkins Private Ltd., are the Managing Agents of Twyford Tea Company and also the Hai!eyburia Tea Estate."}}, {"text": "Periyar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11764, "end_char": 11771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former is in Kuttikanam and the latter in Periyar area."}}, {"text": "Haileyburia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11936, "end_char": 11947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per hectare while Haileyburia produced 1461 to 184.5 kgs.", "canonical_name": "Haileyburia"}}, {"text": "Stagbrook", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-Examples are given of Penshurat, Karimtharuviestates under the same management and of Stagbrook and Cheenthalaar and other estates."}}, {"text": "Cheenthalaar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-Examples are given of Penshurat, Karimtharuviestates under the same management and of Stagbrook and Cheenthalaar and other estates."}}, {"text": "Heilcyburia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12452, "end_char": 12463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "963) with loss in i 966, while the profits of Heilcyburia ranged from Rs.", "canonical_name": "Haileyburia"}}, {"text": "Pariyar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12631, "end_char": 12638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "245.00 in 1966: This difference is attributed to the differences in fertility between the Kuttikanam and Pariyar areas."}}, {"text": "Vandiperiyar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12706, "end_char": 12718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners state that similar differences exist in the Vandiperiyar and Nelliampathy areas."}}, {"text": "Nelliampathy", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12723, "end_char": 12735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners state that similar differences exist in the Vandiperiyar and Nelliampathy areas."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13558, "end_char": 13579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13963, "end_char": 13974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I of the Act", "statute": "Schedule I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I of the Act", "statute": "Schedule I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14601, "end_char": 14611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 10, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16136, "end_char": 16150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had already paid between April 10, 1961 and October 18, 1968 a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had already paid between April 10, 1961 and October 18, 1968 a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kerala Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16874, "end_char": 16892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also complain of discrimination and question the legislative competency of the Kerala Legislature to impose plantation tax in the absence of a specific entry in, the 7th Schedule to the Constitution either in List II or III enabling the State Legislature to impose it."}}, {"text": "(1961) 3 S.C.R. 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17827, "end_char": 17845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18583, "end_char": 18599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Tax Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18625, "end_char": 18642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. T. Moopi/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18779, "end_char": 18791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Land Tax Act 1955, as amended by the Travancore-Ccchin Land T; ix\n\n(Amendment) Act, X of 1957, was declared unconstitutional in its operative sections in K. T. Moopi/ Nair's( 1 ) case.", "canonical_name": "K. T. Moopil Nair"}}, {"text": "Immediately afterwards the Kerala Land Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18810, "end_char": 18856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19006, "end_char": 19013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Immediately afterwards the Kerala Land Tax Act", "statute": "Immediately afterwards the Kerala Land Tax Act"}}, {"text": "K. T. Moopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present Act is challenged on the same lines as the former Act and the argument is rested upon the principles accepted in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case.", "canonical_name": "K. T. 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R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21389, "end_char": 21398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be remembered that in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case the majority accepted the observations of S. R. Das C.J. in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others(') at page 299 to the following effect :\n\n\"A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of a]Jplying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions ail!"}}, {"text": "Cardamom", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24479, "end_char": 24487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The yield of Cardamom also varies similarly."}}, {"text": "Highland Produce Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24518, "end_char": 24543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the Highland Produce Co. Ltd. the per acre yield varied from 5770 lbs."}}, {"text": "Cess Revision Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25925, "end_char": 25942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25975, "end_char": 25982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cess Revision Act", "statute": "Cess Revision Act"}}, {"text": "Telengana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26063, "end_char": 26072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That -Act was pased to brin1r uniformity in assessment of Land Revenue in the Telengana and Andhra areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26077, "end_char": 26083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That -Act was pased to brin1r uniformity in assessment of Land Revenue in the Telengana and Andhra areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26106, "end_char": 26120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That -Act was pased to brin1r uniformity in assessment of Land Revenue in the Telengana and Andhra areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "1967] 3 S.C.R. 2", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26231, "end_char": 26247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28718, "end_char": 28731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One principle on which our Courts (as indeed the Supreme Court in the United States) have always acted, is nowhere better stated then by Willis in his \"Constitutional Law\" page 587."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28739, "end_char": 28752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One principle on which our Courts (as indeed the Supreme Court in the United States) have always acted, is nowhere better stated then by Willis in his \"Constitutional Law\" page 587."}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28806, "end_char": 28812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One principle on which our Courts (as indeed the Supreme Court in the United States) have always acted, is nowhere better stated then by Willis in his \"Constitutional Law\" page 587."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29592, "end_char": 29599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30282, "end_char": 30316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was also observed in the same case of this Court at page 411 approving the dictum of the Supreme Court of the United States in Madden v. Kentucky(') :\n\n\"In taxation even more than in other fields, Legislafures pmsess the greate>t fr.eedom in classification."}}, {"text": "Rcttschaefer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30581, "end_char": 30593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Rcttschaefer said in his Constitutional Law at p. 668 :\n\n'\"A statute providing for the assessment of one type of intangible at its actual value while other intangibles are assessed at their face value does not deny equal pro- 1ec1ion even when both are subject to the same rate of tax."}}, {"text": "S. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31392, "end_char": 31397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shree B. N. Desai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34239, "end_char": 34256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (She/at, I.) 395\n\nv. Shree B. N. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay(') and Kunnathat Thatunni Moopi/ Nair v.\n\nState of Kera/a(')."}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35443, "end_char": 35449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shelat, J.\n\nPetitioner No.", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "K.rala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35602, "end_char": 35614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, a public limited company, of which the second petitioner is a shareholder, owns the Twyford Estate situate in Kuttikanam area in K.rala State."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36097, "end_char": 36105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Legislature of the .ln State of Travancore Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36328, "end_char": 36377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1955, the Legislature of the .ln State of Travancore Cochin passed the Travancore-Cochfu."}}, {"text": "Land Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36408, "end_char": 36420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36444, "end_char": 36455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Tax Act", "statute": "Land Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36709, "end_char": 36715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the formation of the present State of Kerala under the reorganisation of States, the\n\n(I) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 887."}}, {"text": "(1955] 2 S.C.R. 887", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36761, "end_char": 36780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36998, "end_char": 37024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Legislature passed the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, X of 1957 by which the expressions ·the State cf Kerala\" and \"the Land Tax Act'\" were substituted for the words \"the State of Travancore-Cochin\" and \"the Travancore- Cochin Land Tax Act\" respectively."}}, {"text": "Arts. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37478, "end_char": 37485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 9. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37573, "end_char": 37589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of this Court strikin~ down the \\ct was pronounced on December 9."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37809, "end_char": 37818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38144, "end_char": 38153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38723, "end_char": 38727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38731, "end_char": 38735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38928, "end_char": 38937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39068, "end_char": 39084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41721, "end_char": 41725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42561, "end_char": 42579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Moopi/ Nair's(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42832, "end_char": 42847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be noticed that notwithstanding the reasons on which in Moopi/ Nair's(1) decision the Land Tax Act, XV of 1955 was struck down, no changes in the light of that decision were made in Act XVII of 1960 even when it was amended in 1967.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43333, "end_char": 43342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Tax Act, 1955", "statute": "the Land Tax Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43459, "end_char": 43463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Tax Act, 1955", "statute": "the Land Tax Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43596, "end_char": 43616, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43618, "end_char": 43630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43785, "end_char": 43797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44864, "end_char": 44868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44903, "end_char": 44907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45058, "end_char": 45065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.riyar valley", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46426, "end_char": 46440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difference in the fertility and the quality of soil in these two areas is sought to be illustrated by showing that Twyford estate situate in Kuttikanam area and Haileyburia estate situate in P.riyar valley area, though under common management, give different average yields."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46847, "end_char": 46853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These statistics first show that the average annual yield per hectare in the tea-growing areas in Madras."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46855, "end_char": 46861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mysore and Kerala for the year 1967 was 1394, 1178 and 1076 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47520, "end_char": 47529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the district of Ernakulam to as much as 1850 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Trichur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47558, "end_char": 47574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for Trichur district."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48770, "end_char": 48777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48966, "end_char": 48970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mcopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49403, "end_char": 49414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was submitted that this inequality arises as a result of the absence of any rational classification, and the Act, for that reason, suffers from the same infirmity for which in the Mcopil Nair's case(') this Court struck down the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended by Act X of 1957.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Court struck down the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49430, "end_char": 49488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Moppii Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50497, "end_char": 50508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Moppii Nair's case('), this Court laid down the foliowing principJe.s : (I) that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50578, "end_char": 50585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50596, "end_char": 50606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50739, "end_char": 50746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50844, "end_char": 50880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51082, "end_char": 51086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "statute": "the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52556, "end_char": 52563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cess Revision Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54466, "end_char": 54483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54545, "end_char": 54556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cess Revision Act", "statute": "Cess Revision Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55304, "end_char": 55311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cess Revision Act", "statute": "Cess Revision Act"}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56005, "end_char": 56041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56053, "end_char": 56060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955", "statute": "the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Moopil Nails", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57191, "end_char": 57203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• E\n\nTWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA (Shelat, J.) 403\n\nIn Khandige Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income Officer( 1) the Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Moopil Nails case(') and observed with regard to the provisions there\n\nimpugned :\n\n\"In order to judge whether a law was discriminatory what had primarily to be looked into was not its phraseology but its re'al effect.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58477, "end_char": 58484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58674, "end_char": 58681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59014, "end_char": 59018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59170, "end_char": 59174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59840, "end_char": 59844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60999, "end_char": 61003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61543, "end_char": 61550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Trichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65418, "end_char": 65425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of such uniform imposition is that tea planters, who hold lands in Ernakulam, Trichur and Kottayam districts, would pay the same amount of tax per hectare although the average yield per hectare in these districts for the years 1965 to 1967 was about 350, 1825 and 1050 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Kottayam districts", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65430, "end_char": 65448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of such uniform imposition is that tea planters, who hold lands in Ernakulam, Trichur and Kottayam districts, would pay the same amount of tax per hectare although the average yield per hectare in these districts for the years 1965 to 1967 was about 350, 1825 and 1050 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Ernakulam district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65885, "end_char": 65903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difference in yield in these different districts must clearly .be due to the difference in the soil, situation and such other factors, for, it is nobody's case (at least not made out in the counter-affidavit of the respondents) that the cultivators in Ernakulam district use inferior seed or are less venturesome than those in Kottayam and Trichur districts."}}, {"text": "Kottayam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65960, "end_char": 65968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difference in yield in these different districts must clearly .be due to the difference in the soil, situation and such other factors, for, it is nobody's case (at least not made out in the counter-affidavit of the respondents) that the cultivators in Ernakulam district use inferior seed or are less venturesome than those in Kottayam and Trichur districts."}}, {"text": "Trichur districts", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65973, "end_char": 65990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difference in yield in these different districts must clearly .be due to the difference in the soil, situation and such other factors, for, it is nobody's case (at least not made out in the counter-affidavit of the respondents) that the cultivators in Ernakulam district use inferior seed or are less venturesome than those in Kottayam and Trichur districts."}}, {"text": "Cannanore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66125, "end_char": 66134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C!(?'<'l')/70-l I\n\ntare occurs also in other tea growing dfstricts, namely, Cannanore, Palghat, Kozhikode, Trivandrum and Quilon, whose average yield per hectare d!!ring the years 1965 to 1967 was 950,\n\n1490, 1575, 975 and 650 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Palghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66136, "end_char": 66143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C!(?'<'l')/70-l I\n\ntare occurs also in other tea growing dfstricts, namely, Cannanore, Palghat, Kozhikode, Trivandrum and Quilon, whose average yield per hectare d!!ring the years 1965 to 1967 was 950,\n\n1490, 1575, 975 and 650 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Kozhikode", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66145, "end_char": 66154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C!(?'<'l')/70-l I\n\ntare occurs also in other tea growing dfstricts, namely, Cannanore, Palghat, Kozhikode, Trivandrum and Quilon, whose average yield per hectare d!!ring the years 1965 to 1967 was 950,\n\n1490, 1575, 975 and 650 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Trivandrum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66156, "end_char": 66166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C!(?'<'l')/70-l I\n\ntare occurs also in other tea growing dfstricts, namely, Cannanore, Palghat, Kozhikode, Trivandrum and Quilon, whose average yield per hectare d!!ring the years 1965 to 1967 was 950,\n\n1490, 1575, 975 and 650 Kgs."}}, {"text": "Single Judge of the Kerala High Court repelled the contention as to the invalidity of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68269, "end_char": 68358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Meopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68402, "end_char": 68413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Thuttampara Planting Co. v. Tahsi/dar(2) a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court repelled the contention as to the invalidity of Act XVII of 1960 and held that the decision in Meopil Nair's case(') did not apply as by adopting the quotients in Sch.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69026, "end_char": 69030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Single Judge of the Kerala High Court repelled the contention as to the invalidity of Act", "statute": "Single Judge of the Kerala High Court repelled the contention as to the invalidity of Act"}}, {"text": "Division Bench of that very High Court held that what Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69298, "end_char": 69355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Division Bench held that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69496, "end_char": 69528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69586, "end_char": 69593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the Division Bench held that the Act", "statute": "But the Division Bench held that the Act"}}, {"text": "Moopi/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69885, "end_char": 69891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though these two decisions cited Moopi/ ,\\\"air's case('), neither of them considered the result of the lands being uniformly taxed without classifyinir them according to their potentiality so that the incidence of the tax may be .iust and equitable.", "canonical_name": "Moopi/ Nair's(1"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72247, "end_char": 72254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72905, "end_char": 72912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Andhta Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72946, "end_char": 72969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Andhta Pradesh.(')"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73571, "end_char": 73578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_409_414_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "NATIONAL COAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION\n\nMANMOHAN MATHUR\n\nJanuary 15, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nA. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]\n\nRetrospective Legislation-Acquisition held invalid by High Court as notificution required under s. 7 Coal IJearing Areas (Acquisition and De\"e-\n\nJopment) Act (20 of 1957) not issued-No_tificaAfon deetn!!d to hare been issued by provisions of Amending Act, 23 of.1969-Ef!ect.\n\nA notification stating that 1he respondent's lands \\Vere needed for prospecting caal, was issued under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894.\n\nNo objection under s. 5A of the Act was made by the respondent. Thereafter the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act. 1957. came into force. Under s. 28 of the 1957-Act, all notifications and objections, made under the Land Acquisition Act were deemed to be notifications and objections under the 1957-Act. Section 7 of 1957-Act requires the issue of a notification before acquisition under s. 9 ( 1) of that Act. In the present case, the Central Government acquired a certain area on behalf of the appellant under s. 9 o'f the 1957-Act, from the area notified under s. 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act without issuing th~ s. 7 notification.\n\nfhe respondent challenged the acquisition by a writ petiti.on and the High Court allowed it. While the appeal against the judgment of-the High Court was pending in this Court, the 1957-Act was amended hy the Coal Bearin~ Areas (Acquisition and Development) An1cndment Act, 1969. The consequences of the amendments introduced by the AmenJn1ent Act are that if no ohjction had been preferred under s. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act\n\nwihin the period specified, then it shall he deemed that a notification under s. 7 of the Act 1957-Act has been issued; that no objection to the acquisition of the land under s. 8 of the 1957-Act has been preferred; and that the Government could therefore make the acquisition under s. 9 of the 1957- Act. Also, the effect of a decision of a court was removed as if the amended Act was in force at all material time.\n\nHELD : Legislation making obligatory notifications fictional may not be proper, but since Parliament was competent to make such fictions, the acquisition could not be questioned. [414 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1639 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 15. 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 66 of 1965.\n\nJagadish Swarup, Solicitor-Genera/, S. K. Dho/akia amd R. H.\n\nH Dhebar, for. the appellants.\n\nW. S. Bar/ingay, D. p. Verma, R. Mahalingier and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bidayatullah, C.J.\n\nThe National Coal Development Corpora lion Ltd. appeals against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, November 15, 1965, in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. By the judgment under appeal the appellants are restrained' from carrying on depillaring operations underneath the land of the respondent Manmohan Mathur in village Chirimiri in District Surguja in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe facts are as follows : Chirimiri is a coal-bearing area.\n\nOn February 1, 1957 the Government of Madhya Pradesh, acting in exercise of the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 entrusted to it by the President under Art. 258 ( l) of the Constitution, issued notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act stating that the lands specified in Chirimiri village were needed for the prospecting of coal seams for development of collieries by the Central Government. On June 8, 1957 the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (XX of 1957) was enacted and was brought into force.\n\nOn Auguvernmnt may, as occasion requires, by order do anything which appears to it necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty : ..\n\nJn exercise of this power the State Government issued an order on May 6, .1950, authorising the Municipal Commissione(' of the City of Poona-(1) to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties, which are exercisable and to be performed by the Transport Committee under the said Act, until the first meeting of the Transport Committee as. constituted under the Act shall have been held; and (2) to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties,\n\nwhich are exercisable or to be performed by the Corporation in respect of a Transport Committee under the said Act, until the general ward elections shall have been held in accordance with r. stile provisions of the Act and the first meeting of the Corporation shall have been held.\n\n:~511 A contract relating to the purchase of \"goods\" exceeding rupees five hundred in value is to be made in the name of the Corporation by the-Transport Manager. It has to be in writing and has to be sealed in the presence of two members of the Transport Committee who sign in token of the seal being affixed in their presence.\n\nA formal contract incorporating the agreed terms between the plaintiff and the Corporation was not and could not be executed and sealed as required by the Act, for, at the relevant time elections of councillors to the Corporation had not been held, and no Transport Committee was constitu'ted as required by s. 25 of the Act and the powers of the Corporation were being exercised by the Commissioner pursuant to the transitory provisions.\n\nThe Commissioner was, it is true, competent to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the Transport Committee.\n\nBut under the rules in Ch, V the seal of the Corporation must be affixed in the presence of two members of the Transpori Committee who signed in token of the seal having been affixed to the contract.\n\nThe Act clearly provided bys. 74(2) that the contract which was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules shall not be binding on the Corporation. The contract was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, for, it was not sealed, and was by virtue of s. 74(2) of the Act not binding upon the Corporation.\n\nI Mr. :\\!hat! urged that the formalities relating to execution of the contract with the Corporation could not be complied with until a Transport Committee was constituted after election of Councillors of the Corporation l!Jld on that account the provisions relating to the form and manner of execution of the contract had no application to the contract in dispute. Any other view, counsel contended, rendercld. the Corporation incompetent to make contracts essential for the administration of the Corporation. Counsel also contended that the Corporation had not even a seal which could be affixed, because the form of the seal had not been approved by the Councillors. Counsel again said that even if the functions of the Transport {:ommittee could be exercised by the Ccimmissioner, a seal affixed in the preyence of the Commissioner and attested by him would not amount to compliance with the rules. In view of these provisions it was contended that the provisions of the Act relating to the form an_\\l manner of execution of contracts could only apply after the elections are held and the Corporation could comply with the provisions.\n\nPIIOO SIOHWA v. MUNICIPAL CORP. (S::.iil, f.) 421\n\nBy s. 5 of the Act the Corporation is a body corporate having a perpetua! succession and a common seul. Our attention has not been invited to any provision which even by impiicacion suggests that the Corporation may have a seal only after elections are held and the form of the seal is approved by the members of the Corporation. But the argument whether the Corporation had at the date of the contract a seal is not relevant. We are unable to hold that the provisions of ss. 73 and 74 and the relevant rule• in Ch. V\n\ndid not apply before the elections were held anu the statutory Committees were constituted. There is nothing in the transitory provisions which excludeS the operation of s. 7 4(2) of the Act.\n\nGranting, that it is not possible to comply with the rules, until the elections are held, there is no warrant for holding that the provisions of s. 7 4(2) '111'.ill n.:it apply and the Commissioner or the Transport Manager may enter into contracis without seal which are enforcea'ille at law, Jll)!Witbstanding the absolute terms. of the Act.\n\nIn our judgment there was no enforceable contract between the r, laintiff and the Corporation.\n\nThe claim for damages on the •.ooting that the Corporation committed a breach of contract was, D 'therefore, rightly rejected by the Trial Court and the High Court.\n\n_The plaintiff is not entitled to maintain a suit for price of the goods relying upon any contractual obligation of the Corporation.\n\nBut theflaintiff may still maintain hjs claim for compensation under s. 70 o the Contract Act which provides :\n\n\"Where a person lawfully does anything for another . person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.\"\n\nThat is not disputed by the Corporation. The Trial Court awarded to the plaintiff the invoice value. of the goods delivered by him. '.fhe learned !.udge was of the view that the plaintiff as the sole sellmg agent of motor spare parts\" for the manufacturers in the Bombay State, was entitled to the listed price with 12!% thereon because of the increase notified by the manufacturer. In the view of !he earned udge the price for which the plaintiff made out an mv01ce was 'reasonable and prOJ:!er\". The High Court held that the plaintiff may recover compensation equal to the \"fair price\" of the goods.\n\nIn our view the High Court was in error in holding that the B plaintiff is entitled not to the invoice value of the goods but only to \"the fair price\" of the goods. Under s. 70 of the ccro'.tract Act, a person lawfully delivering goods to another, and not intending to do so gratuitously, is entitled to demand that the goods delivered L7 S.1p. CI (NP)70-12\n\nshall be returned, or that compensation for the goods shall be made.\n\nCompensation would normally b~ the market price of the goods.\n\nBy refusing to return the goods, the person to whom the goods have been delivered cannot improve his position and seek to pay less than the market value of the goods. The High Court of Lahore in Secretary of State and Another v. G. T. Sarin & Company(') held that a person without an enforceable contract in his favour supplying goods to a Government Department is entitled to a money equivalent of the goods delivered assessed at the market rate prevailing on the date on whch the supplies were made.\n\nThe plaintiff had made out an invoice in respect of the goods delivered.\n\nThe Transport Manager accepted the goods 'on behalf of the Corporation and appropriated them. He had satisfied himself that the rates quoted. were \"proper rates\". The plaintiff was paid in respect of other goods supplied at the rates quotd in the price-list together with incidental charges.\n\nThe plaintiff was tile sole selling agent in the Bombay State and the additional 12t% which the plaintiff claimed on the listed price wa~ by reason of the increase in the price made by the manufacturers. There is no rea- son to hold that the invoice price was more than the market value of the goods. If it was the contention of the Corporation that the market rate was Jess than the invoice pricq it was open to the Corporation to lead evidence about the ruling rates at which the spare parts were sold in India by otlier agents of the manUfacturers. But no such attempt was made.\n\nThe plaintiff, in our judgment, was entitled to the market value of the goods at the date of supply, and, in our judgment, the invoice value was the prevailing market value of the goods.\n\nThe plaintiff is also entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from \"the date one month after the date of supply\" till the date of institution of the suit, and at 6 % on judgment from the date of the suit till payment.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the decree passed by the High Court and restore the decree passed by the Trial Court with the modification in the rate of interest set out earlier. In view of the partial success of the parties, . there will be no order as to costs in this Court and in the High Court.\n\nIn the Trial Court the plaintiff will be entitled to proportionate costs for the amount decreed and the Corporation will bear its own costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) I.L.R. 11 Lah. J7'.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "41S\n\nPILOO DHUNJISHAW SIDHWA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PILOO DHUNJISHAW SIDHWA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF POONA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF POONA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 93, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41S\n\nPILOO DHUNJISHAW SIDHWA v.\n\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF POONA\n\nJanuary 15, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND K. S, HEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conract-Formalities-Bornbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conract-Formalities-Bornbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act", "statute": "Conract-Formalities-Bornbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 421, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 605, "end_char": 611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the sole selling agent of motor spare parts for the manufacturers in the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "respondent-Corporation was constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725, "end_char": 730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The respondent-Corporation was constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act,\n\n1949", "statute": "The respondent-Corporation was constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act,\n\n1949"}}, {"text": "Act and the Rules relating to contracts made under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1125, "end_char": 1133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Rules relating to contracts made under the Act", "statute": "Act and the Rules relating to contracts made under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. C. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gagrat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Kotwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4326, "end_char": 4338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Kotwal and Naunit Lal, for the respo, n.tlent."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Kotwal and Naunit Lal, for the respo, n.tlent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J, Piloo Dhunjishaw Sidhwa-hereinafter called 'the _plaintiff'-carries on business in the name and style of Hind Motor Corporation at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Piloo Dhunjishaw Sidhwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4433, "end_char": 4456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J, Piloo Dhunjishaw Sidhwa-hereinafter called 'the _plaintiff'-carries on business in the name and style of Hind Motor Corporation at Bombay."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oii July 3, 1953 the plaintiff delivered certain goods required by the Corporation and submitted an inyoice for Rs."}}, {"text": "Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff then instituted an actiOl!l .in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6006, "end_char": 6026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation appealed to the High Court of Bombay against the decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the High Court the fair price of the goods was the \"landed cost and 40% thereo_n\" beside freight, insurance, packing and forwarding charges from Bombay to Poona."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Poona", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Poona was constituted on February 15, 1950 under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 59 of 1949."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7393, "end_char": 7410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Corporation of Poona was constituted on February 15, 1950 under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 59 of 1949."}}, {"text": "ss. 73, 74 & 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7641, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8758, "end_char": 8763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9363, "end_char": 9371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11295, "end_char": 11300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11304, "end_char": 11326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11740, "end_char": 11745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "statute": "Appendix IV to the Act"}}, {"text": "May 6, .1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12245, "end_char": 12257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It provided :\n\n\"If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act or, by reason of anything contained in this Act, to any other enactment for the time being in force, the State Gi;>vernmnt may, as occasion requires, by order do anything which appears to it necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty : ..\n\nJn exercise of this power the State Government issued an order on May 6, .1950, authorising the Municipal Commissione(' of the City of Poona-(1) to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties, which are exercisable and to be performed by the Transport Committee under the said Act, until the first meeting of the Transport Committee as."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13557, "end_char": 13562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14307, "end_char": 14315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 73 and 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16024, "end_char": 16037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16241, "end_char": 16245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16409, "end_char": 16413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17073, "end_char": 17078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18185, "end_char": 18190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Lahore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18677, "end_char": 18697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Lahore in Secretary of State and Another v. G. T. Sarin & Company(') held that a person without an enforceable contract in his favour supplying goods to a Government Department is entitled to a money equivalent of the goods delivered assessed at the market rate prevailing on the date on whch the supplies were made."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19883, "end_char": 19888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it was the contention of the Corporation that the market rate was Jess than the invoice pricq it was open to the Corporation to lead evidence about the ruling rates at which the spare parts were sold in India by otlier agents of the manUfacturers."}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_423_439_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "GCITIPULLA VENKATA SIVA SUBRAYANAM & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.\n\nJanuary 19, 1970 B\n\n[M .. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUI\\, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 96 to 106--Right ,•f private\n\ndfence-Scope of-Plea no: raised by accus2d-Duty vj Co1:rt, lVlien th?re is evidence showing right of privarc defence.\n\n'''ith rspe;; t to a kuilf!i., which \\Vas government propeny, certain persons who had .occupied a part of the land in the kunta, and the accused, were assering their respective claims, the former to the use of the land in the kunta for cultivation and latter. to the use of the kunta as a source. of irrigation. The occupie; s and accused belonged to opposite political factions.\n\nA suit \\Vas I11ed by the occupiers .and the civil court passed two orders of injunction, one restraining the accused from interfe.ring with the occupie!'s' possession, and the othe.r, restraining the uccupiers from opening sluices in the bund of the kunta. While the suit was pending the ·...iccupiers raised corps on their land and the accused raised a new bund.\n\nSince their crops. were being damaged as a result of the raising of the new bund, the occupiers approached the police authorities and tahsildar for the removal of the bund, but they did not give any effective help.\n\nThe accused were not \\Villing to allow the removal of the bund v1..-ithout\n\nany Government orde:. TOereupon, the occupiers and their supporters, numbering not less than twenty went to the. s9ot to remove the bund by force, but the accused were present at the spot determined not. to allow the bund to be, rem'Oved.\n\nIn the fight that ensued, the first accused. aged about 60 years, received ten injuries on the vital parts of his body and the. Civil Assistant Sugeon who attended on him thought it was qecessary to take a dying declaration from him. The second accused.who was about 50 years old, was also subjected to severe beating.\n\nSome of the other accu5ed also received injuries. The. tenth accused, who had a gun in his hand, and who was the son-in-law of the first accused, shot at the a'ctual aggressors and killed three of 1hem and iniured another.\n\nThe party of the occupiers asserted that they went to the scene of occurrence unarmed and with the intention of peacefully persuading the accused to remove the bund and that when beaten by the accused they snatched the sticks and spears from them and retaliated. The tenth accused put forth a\"\"\n\nplea Of alibi. The oher accused asserted. that the party of the. occupiers were the aggressors and that tf:ley acted 10 serf defence. Huld1ng that n was not material to consider whether the occupiers and their supporters had brought with them sticks or snatched them from the accused, that the accused had attacked first and that the injuries to the accused did not give. rise to any right of pivate defence, the High Court C.Jnvicted some of the accused for the offence 11ridr ss. 147 J T>.C .. o:ne. for the offence under s. 148 I.P .C., and the tenth accused for the offences of murder and\n\ng:ievous hurt with a dangrous weapon,\n\nJn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD (I) Whenthey went to the scene, rhe occupiers knew that determined not to allow the removal of the bund without an order rom determined not te a1tow the removal of the bund without a~ order rroi:n\n\nhe Gove-nment autiJorities.\n\nIn the circumstances the occupiers and their\n\nsupporters must have gone to the kunta fully armed, and it was not possible to accept their version. [434 E-G]\n\n(2) The occupiers moved in the matter only after the new bund was raised by the accused. They had ample opportunity of approaching public authorities to have the bund removed.\n\nWhen the occupiers and their supporters found that the. police were guilty of a grave dereliction of their duty, they could have approached the higher authorities or the civil court in which the suit was pending. Instead of having recourse to those steps they de.cided to go to the scene in large. numbers fully determined to remove the hund by force.\n\nWhen that attempt was foiled by the accused with sho•.v of force, the members of occupiers' party mi::rcilessly beat up some of the accused persons who were advanced in age.\n\nIn such a situation it \\Vas not possible for an average person placed in the position of the tenth. accused, to take a calm and objective view and calculate with arithmetical precision as to how much force would effectively serve the purpose of s.elf-defence and when to stop. He only used the gun against the real aggressors frum whom he apprehended grave danger to the lives of the other accused persons and to himself. Therefore, he was fully\n\njustffi.ed in using his glln in the exercise of the right of private defence against the party of the occupiers. [438 C-D, E-H; 439 A-El\n\nExcept as against acts of public servants acting in good faith a:nd when there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities, under s. 97 I.P.C., every person has a right to defend : (1) his own body and the body o[ any other person against any offence affecting the human body, and (2) the property of himself or of any other person against theft, robbery. mischief, of criminal trespass.\n\nSuch a right is basically preventive and not punitive, and, nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right.\n\nUnder s. 100 one of the circumstances in which the right of private defence of the body extends to the voluntary causing of death of the assailant, is, if he assault, which.occasions the exercise of the right, reasonably causes the apprehension that death or grievous hurt would otherwise be the consequences thereof. [437 B-D, E-F)\n\n(3.) When there is evidence proving that.a person accused of killing or injuring another acted in the exercise of the right of private defence. the court would not be justified in ignoring that evidence and convicting the accused merely because he had set up a defence of q/ibi and set forth a plea different from the right of private defence.\n\nCourts are expected to administer the law of private defence in a practical way with reasonable liberality so as to effectuate its underlying object.\n\nTherefore, the Court was not precluded from giving the tenth accused the benefit of the right of private de'{ence. [439 F-H]\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 8, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 636 of 1963 ..\n\nNurud-din Ahmed, A. V. Rangam, A. Vedavalli and D.\n\nH Gopala Rao, for the appellants.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the respondents.\n\nThe Jud grnent of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J. In this appeal by special leave directed agains~ the order of the Andhr.a Pradesh High Court, the only question canvassed on behalf of the appellants before us relates to the plea of private defence raised by them at the trial. The appellants who are ten in number were tried on as many as 22 charges by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Masulipatam and acquitted of all the charges. On appeal by the State against their acquittal there was a difference of opinion between the two Judges of the High Court constituting the Division Bench hearing the appeal.\n\nWhereas Sharfuddin Ahmed, J., upheld the order of acquittal on the basis of the plea of private defence, Mohd. Mirza, J., was of the opinion that the prosecution case was proved by overwhelming evidence. The case was in consequence laid before Basi Reddy, J., as provided bys. 429, Cr. P.C. That learned Judge accepted the prosecution case and convicted the appellants on some of the charges. He expressed his final conclusion thus :\n\n\"I shall now indicate the charges upon which the accused should be convicted and the sentences that should be imposed:\n\nOn charge no. 2 I would convict accused 1, 3 and 5 to 9 under section 147, I.P.C. and on charge no. 3 accussed 2, 4 and 10 and sentence each of accused 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default each to suffer six months' rigorous imprisonment. I would sentence each of accused 6 to 9 (who are farm servants) to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to suffer two months' rigorous imprionment. I would sentence accused 10 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years.\n\n2. On each of charges nos. 4, 5 and 6 which pertain to the three counts of murder, I would convict and sentence accused 10 to suffer imprisonment for life under section 302, I.P .C.. '\n\n3. On charge no. ii, I would convict and sentence accused no. 10 to suffer two years' rigorous imprisonment under section 326, I.P.C. for having caused grievous hurt to P.W. 6 by shooting at him with the gun.\n\n4. On charge no. 22, I would convict accused 10 under section 19 (a) of the Indian Arms Act and sentence him to suffer one year's rigorous imprisonment.\n\nI would direct all the sentences of imprisonment passed on accused 10 to run concurrently. I would uphold the order of acquittal on other charges.\n\nThe net result will be that accused l 0 will have to A undergo imprisonment for life; accused 1 to 5 will each have to pay a fine of Rs. 500; and accused 6 to 9 will each have to pay a fina of Rs. 100/-\".\n\nThe final order of the High Court on appeal followed the opinion expressed by Basi Reddy, J.\n\nThe charges on which the appellants 8 were convicted are these : ..\n\nSecondly : that you accused nos. 1, 3 and 5 to 9 along with accused nos. 2, 4 ans sllot at and asked his companions to come back. Accused nos. l to 9 started retreating towards the huts.\n\nDeceased no. 1 and P.W. I who was about JO yards southeast of the huts at that time went towards accused no. 10 challenging him to shoot if he dared and saying that they were prepared to be shot for a just caus:.\n\nAccused no. I 0 then stepped forward and fired at deceased r.o. l \"from a distance of about 10 yards.\n\nCrying out \"Abba'\" deceased no. 1 fell down and died on the spot.\n\nA pellet grazed the nose of P. W. 1 who was a couple of yards. '::t:hind deceased no. l and he too fell down.\n\nAccording to the prosecution version accused no. 2 hit P.W. l at the back as a result of which P.W. l also fell down unconscious.\n\nAccused no. 10 is stated to have fired another shot towards the west as a result of which P.W. 6 was injured.\n\nAccused no. 10 then re-loaded his gun and fired a shot towards the west and this hit deceased no. 2 who also fell down dead.\n\nThe fourth shot was fired by accused no. 10 in the northwestern direction which hit deceased no. 3 who was about 25 yards away from the huts and he too fell dowq dead. P.Ws. 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10 also received pellet injuries in the course of this firing.\n\nThis, broadly speaking, is the prosecution case.\n\nAccording to the defence version sought to be supported by four defence witnesses the gun used during the occurrence was brought by accused no. 1 who holds the necessary licence for this fire arm and it was he who used it in execcise of the right of private defence after accused [), OS. 2 to 4 had received injuries at the hand of about 200 or 300 communists who had come to the place of occurrence from the house of P.W. 12.\n\nThey were armed with sticks and spears and were also carrying their flag.\n\nThey were raising party slogans and shouting that Gottipulla people should be killed.\n\nThey tried forcibly to remove the bund and on being obstructed by accused nos. 2 to 4 and their servants working at their farm the occupiers and the communists gave a severe beating IQ the latter.\n\nAccused no. 1 came to the spot with his gun and fired at the aggressors in exercise of the right of private defence.\n\nAccused no. 10, according to this version, was not present at the spot.\n\nJn his statement under s. 342, Cr.P.C. this accused pleaded alibi by stating that he was at Sivapuram, Kadapa district on the fateful day having gone there weeks before and that he knew nothing about this occurrence; according to him he stayed in Sivapuram for .about one month and himself surrendered in\n\nhe Magi, trate's court on hearing that he was named as an accused in this case.\n\nThe trial court did not accep~ his plea of alibi nor did. the High Court accept it and we do not find any cogent ground for disagreeing with this conclusion.\n\nNow, the fac:ts in the background of which the question of right of private defence is to be considerd are that the Kunta was the property of the Government and it was registered as a source of irrigation in the year 1958 or 1959.\n\nThe occupiers were thus .cultivating the Kunta in an unauthorised manner.\n\nBoth sides had also secured injunction orders from, the civil court against their opponents and the. orders sec11red by the accused restrained the opposite party (plaintiffs in the suit) from cutting any breaches in the bund.\n\nThe accused no doubt seemed to have put up the present bund after the occupiers had grown their crops but it is clear that for a c-ouple of years previously there was insufficient rain and ther.~ was also no cultivation in the Kunta. The present bund was apparently raised on September 4, because it was on the morning of September 5, that the existence of the bund is stated to have been noticed by the occupiers.\n\nThereafter the occupiers approached the police authorities for assistance in getting th~ bund removed but unfortunately t)le matter was not dealt w:th by the authorities in an effective manner as they ought to have.\n\nHaviin, g failed in their attempt to have the bund removed, the occupiers with their communist helpers seem to have gone to the spot on the day of the occurrence to help themselves.\n\nUp to this stage there does not seem to be any controversy.\n\nThe only difference between the rival versions relates to the question, whether or not\n\nthe party of the occupiers was armed and their number.\n\nThe prosecution witnesse5> would have us believe that they (the occupiers) along with some of their friends and supporters had gone to the E Kunta unarmed to peacfully persuade the accused persons to remove the burn! and that ti)e accused persons beat them up with sticks and spears.\n\nThe occupiers, acting merely in self-defence, snatched the sticks and spears from some of the accused persons\n\nnd gave them a beating whereupon accused no. 10 used his gun. 1c'ldiscriminately firing at the party of the occupiers.\n\nThe accused, on the other hand, claimed that the pary of the occupiers; helped by prominent communists which far outnumbered the accused persons were anned with sticks and spears and. they forcibly tried to remove the bund and when the accused objeced they were beaten up.\n\nApprehending danger to their lives, the gun was used on behalf of the -party of the accused persons.\n\nIt was tlrns in exercise of the right of private defence that this gun was used.\n\nIt may at this stage be pointed out that the accused persons had also reported the matter to the police but on the plea that the police was siding with the occupiers and favouring them the accused persons filed a complaint ih the court of a Magistrate against 35 persons and both the cases were tried simultaneously.\n\nAs each side is blaming the other of being the aggressor and the witnesses for the prosecution deposing to the occurrence as eye witnesses are clearly interested in the occupiers the nature and\n\nextent of the injuries suffered by the men of the two factions would serve as more reliable material for arriving at the truth.\n\nIt is in this connection noteworthy that even according to the prosecution witnesses the party of the occupiers consisted of not les than 20 persons.\n\nWe may now tutn to the wound certificates of the accused persons.\n\nGottipulla Venkata Siva Subbarayanam, aged 60 years, accused no. 1, had 10 injuries on his person mainly on the head, base of the neck and the shoulders and dying declaration was considered necessary by the Civil Assistant Surgeon.\n\nGottipulla Bapaiah, aged about 50 years, accused no. 2 had the follow·\n\ning in juries on his person :\n\n1. A contusion 12\" in length x t\" with raised edges placed diagonally across the upper 1/3 of left half of the back, the lower and towards the spine and the upper end towards the shoulder.\n\nBrownish red in colour;\n\n2. A contusion brownish red in colour l\" in diameter situated on the right shoulder;\n\n3. Whole of the right shoulder joint swollen and brownish red im colour.\n\nMovemens at right shoulder joint restricted;\n\n4. A contusion bluish in colour 3\" in diameter on the outer aspect of upper t of the right arm;\n\n5. A contusion 6\"X !\" with raised edges situated diagonally across the right side back, the outer end towards the axilla and the upper end towards the neck.\n\nBrownish in colour;\n\n6. Whole of the right hand swollen and tender brownish red in colour;\n\n7. A lacerated injury 2\" x !\" scalp deep situated on the left parietal eminence 4\" above Pinna of left ear.\n\nClotted blood seen in the wound and is placed transversely;\n\n8. An incised wound transversly placed on the right ha!f of centre of occiput at the back of head 1 t\" x 1/ 4\" scalp deep.\n\nClotted blood found in the wound.\n\nX-ray report disclosed M.C. dislocation of right acromio c!avicular joint.\n\nGottipulla Seshayya, aged 50 years, accused no. 3, had two injuries on his person one of which was incised wound scalp deep situated diagonally on the front half of right parietal bone. Dying declaration was not considered necessary and he was discharged from the hospital on the 16th September, 1961 after six days.\n\nGottipulla Subba Rao, aged 48 xears, accused no. 4 had :i brownish red contusion with raised edges and small al\"a6ion 01erious offences this right extends to causing any harm other than death.\n\nThe right of private defence to the body commences as soon as reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed and it continues as long as the apprehension of danger to the body continues, The right of private defence of property under s. 103 extends, subject to s. 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrongdoer if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right is robbery, house-breaking by night, mischief by fire on any building etc., or if such offence is, theft, mis-\n\n(1) Cr!. A. No: 124 of 1965 decided on 27.11.1967.\n\n(2) Crl. A. No. 23of1960 decided on 30.10.1961.\n\nL 7Sup.Cl(NP) \\1 -13\n\nchief or house trespass in such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if the right of private defence is not exercised. This right commences when reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences and its duration, as prescribed in s. 105, in case of defence against criminal trespass or mischief, continues as Jong as the offender continues in the commission of such offence.\n\nSection 106 extends the right of private defence against deadly assault even when there is risk of harm to innocent persons.\n\nIn the case in hand it is undoubtedly true that the accused persons are found to have raised the bund after the rainfall of September 4, 1961. But it is indisputable that the occupiers had ample opportunity of approaching the public authorities concerned if they felt that their right had been encroached upon. It is noteworthy that the accused persons had accomplished the raising of the bund Jong before the occupiers noticed it. A civil suit had already been instituted by them as far back as 1957 in respect of their right to cultivate the Kunta.\n\nIn that suit a permanent injunction had been sought against the defendants and their agents etc., restraining them from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the disputed land.\n\nDamages amounting to Rs. 300/- were also claimed in that suit for loss suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of trespass alleged to have been committed by the defendants on the said land.\n\nThis suit was pending anhe time of the occurrence in question and as observed earlier in February, 1960 both sides had secured injunctions in this suit. The police authorities had also been approached by the occupiers with a complaint against the recent raising of the bund by the accused persons a couple of days prior to the present occurrence. If the Sub-Inspector concerned was guilty of grave dereliction of duty (as in our opinion he clearly was) the higher authorities could easily have been approached by the occupiers and their supporters. Even the civil court could have been. moved with a complaint that the accused persons were interfering with the occupiers' possession and enjoyment of the Kunta.\n\nBut instead of having recourse to these steps the occupiers and their supporters decided to go to the spot in large numbers folly determined to remove the bund by use of force. \\Vhen this attempt was foiled by the accused persons with show of force the party of the prosecution witnesses mercilessly beat up some of the accused persons who were advanced in age. This conduct on the part of the occupiers and their supporters was, in our opinion, sufficient, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of accused no. 10 that the victims of this assault would have been killed had he not exercised the right o.f private defence.\n\nThe use of the gun by accused no. 10 against the members of the opposite faction would thus seem to be justified.\n\nIt may be\n\nGOTTIPULLA v. A. P. STATE (Dua, J,) . .. -· 439 -·---\n\nA .· recalled that accused rio. 1 gt:onable liberality so as to effectuate its undei; lying object,. bearing in mind that the essential basic_ character of this right is preventive and not retributive.\n\nThe approach of the High_ Court in this matter, seems to us -- to be erroneous. We accordingly allow the appeal and acquit . the appellants. ·\n\nV.P.S. -Appeal allowed .", "total_entities": 131, "entities": [{"text": "GCITIPULLA VENKATA SIVA SUBRAYANAM & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GCTTIPULLA VENKATA SIVA SUBRAYANAM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 19, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 91, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 19, 1970 B\n\n[M .. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUI\\, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss."}}, {"text": "M .. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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{"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8613, "end_char": 8618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8750, "end_char": 8760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gabbilalakunta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9658, "end_char": 9672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 above, formed yourthe common object of such assembly viz : beating and the occupiers of Gabbilalakunta, committed an offence of assembly, viz. :"}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10520, "end_char": 10531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anne Ramarao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Anne Ramarao, son of Seetha Ramarao of Atkur by shooting him with a D.B.B 1 gun and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nFifthly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "Seetha Ramarao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10813, "end_char": 10827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Anne Ramarao, son of Seetha Ramarao of Atkur by shooting him with a D.B.B 1 gun and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nFifthly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "Atkur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10831, "end_char": 10836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Anne Ramarao, son of Seetha Ramarao of Atkur by shooting him with a D.B.B 1 gun and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nFifthly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10922, "end_char": 10933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10941, "end_char": 10958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bodapati China Anjaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11192, "end_char": 11214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Bodapati China Anjaiah s/o Danaiah of Mustabada by shootipg\n\nhim with a D.B.Bl gun and thereby committed an offence punishable under seetion 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nSixthly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11361, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Boddapati Lakshmaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Boddapati Lakshmaiah s/ o Kotaiah of Medaripalem, hamlet of Verudupavuluru by shooting him with a D.B.Bl gun and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nEleventhly: that you accused no."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11755, "end_char": 11766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11774, "end_char": 11791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kolli Nagabhushanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 12013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Kolli Nagabhushanam, son of Venkaiah of Davajigudem by means of a D.B.BI gun an instrument for shooting and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance and that the said act having been done in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly consisting of you all the accused herein, all of you are guilty of the offence under section 326 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance, or alternatively under section 326 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nTwentysecondly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "Venkaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12022, "end_char": 12030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Kolli Nagabhushanam, son of Venkaiah of Davajigudem by means of a D.B.BI gun an instrument for shooting and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance and that the said act having been done in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly consisting of you all the accused herein, all of you are guilty of the offence under section 326 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance, or alternatively under section 326 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nTwentysecondly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "Davajigudem", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12034, "end_char": 12045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 above, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Kolli Nagabhushanam, son of Venkaiah of Davajigudem by means of a D.B.BI gun an instrument for shooting and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance and that the said act having been done in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly consisting of you all the accused herein, all of you are guilty of the offence under section 326 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance, or alternatively under section 326 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance;\n\nTwentysecondly : that you accused no."}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12148, "end_char": 12159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12184, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12393, "end_char": 12404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12420, "end_char": 12430, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12441, "end_char": 12452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12454, "end_char": 12471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12521, "end_char": 12532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12543, "end_char": 12553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bl gun without licence under the Indian Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12772, "end_char": 12820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12871, "end_char": 12881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bl gun without licence under the Indian Arms Act", "statute": "Bl gun without licence under the Indian Arms Act"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12901, "end_char": 12909, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Surampalli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13258, "end_char": 13276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "about 11 acres known as Gabbilalakunta (hereafter to be referred as the Kunta) abciut one mile away from Surampalli village but within its limis."}}, {"text": "Surampalh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13367, "end_char": 13376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Kunta sei:ving as a tank is fed by rain water.. The _villae of Surampalh was a Mokhasa village in the erstwhile zammdan of Mirzapuram."}}, {"text": "Mirzapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13427, "end_char": 13437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Kunta sei:ving as a tank is fed by rain water.. The _villae of Surampalh was a Mokhasa village in the erstwhile zammdan of Mirzapuram."}}, {"text": "Shaik Madarsaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13843, "end_char": 13859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some poor landless persons like P.Ws 1 J and 14, Shaik Madarsaheb and Kandavalli Anandam, began cultivating a part of this Kunta and started raising wet and dry crops."}}, {"text": "Kandavalli Anandam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13864, "end_char": 13882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some poor landless persons like P.Ws 1 J and 14, Shaik Madarsaheb and Kandavalli Anandam, began cultivating a part of this Kunta and started raising wet and dry crops."}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 4, Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam, Gottipulla Bapaiah, Gottipulla Seshaiah and Gottipulla Subba Rao, who are the , former Mokhasadars have their lands measuring about 80 acres to the south of the Kunta.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subbarayanam"}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Bapaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14154, "end_char": 14172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 4, Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam, Gottipulla Bapaiah, Gottipulla Seshaiah and Gottipulla Subba Rao, who are the , former Mokhasadars have their lands measuring about 80 acres to the south of the Kunta.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Seshaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14174, "end_char": 14193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 4, Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam, Gottipulla Bapaiah, Gottipulla Seshaiah and Gottipulla Subba Rao, who are the , former Mokhasadars have their lands measuring about 80 acres to the south of the Kunta.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14198, "end_char": 14218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 4, Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbarayanam, Gottipulla Bapaiah, Gottipulla Seshaiah and Gottipulla Subba Rao, who are the , former Mokhasadars have their lands measuring about 80 acres to the south of the Kunta.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Kunta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14826, "end_char": 14831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the accused persons, however, their fields should receive water from the Kunta through sluices in its southern bund."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15307, "end_char": 15322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 4 from interfering with the possession of the occupiers and also claiming damages on the allegation that the defendants had spoiled their crops and an interim injunction was actually granted on August 21, 1957."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this application also the court, by an order dated August 29, 1957, granted a temporary injunction in the following terms :\n\n\"Pending disposal of this petition, the respondents are restrained from opening the sluices or outlets or cutting any breaches to the bund of the tank situated in S. No."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15851, "end_char": 15867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "44 if there is any bund .... \"\n\nOn February 3, 1960 the Court confirmed both the orders of injunction mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Kunta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15951, "end_char": 15956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land in the Kunta was not cultivated in the years 1958 to 1960 because of failure of rains."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16289, "end_char": 16306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit mentioned above was still pending when on September 4, 1961 it was adjourned to some other da!e."}}, {"text": "September 6, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17535, "end_char": 17552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the following day, September 6, 1961, P.W. 12, Yelamanchili Malikharjuna Rao, a medical practitioner at Surampalli and a leading member of the Communist Party was approached by the occupiers to assist them in representing to the authorities against the high-handed action of the Mokhasadars."}}, {"text": "Yelamanchili Malikharjuna Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17563, "end_char": 17592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the following day, September 6, 1961, P.W. 12, Yelamanchili Malikharjuna Rao, a medical practitioner at Surampalli and a leading member of the Communist Party was approached by the occupiers to assist them in representing to the authorities against the high-handed action of the Mokhasadars."}}, {"text": "Surampalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17620, "end_char": 17630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the following day, September 6, 1961, P.W. 12, Yelamanchili Malikharjuna Rao, a medical practitioner at Surampalli and a leading member of the Communist Party was approached by the occupiers to assist them in representing to the authorities against the high-handed action of the Mokhasadars."}}, {"text": "Mokhasadars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17795, "end_char": 17806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the following day, September 6, 1961, P.W. 12, Yelamanchili Malikharjuna Rao, a medical practitioner at Surampalli and a leading member of the Communist Party was approached by the occupiers to assist them in representing to the authorities against the high-handed action of the Mokhasadars."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18024, "end_char": 18041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1961 under the direction of the Police Sub-Inspector two police constables went to the Kunta with the object of getting the bund removed and if possible to bind over the parties."}}, {"text": "Charugulla Vijayaramarao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18529, "end_char": 18553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10, Charugulla Vijayaramarao, that the Sub-Inspector had directed the western bund to be removed so that water may flow westwards."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19190, "end_char": 19207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 9, 1961 the Sub-Inspector sent a head constable along with\n\nthe constable who had gone there on September 7, to enquire into the complaint made to the police earlier."}}, {"text": "s. 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20129, "end_char": 20141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gannavaram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20180, "end_char": 20190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the police party had left Surampalli on the evening of September 9, P. W s. 13 and 14 and some other occupiers proceeded to Gannavaram and approached some persons belonging to the Communist Party and apprised them of their plight."}}, {"text": "Katragadda Pedavenkatarayudu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20398, "end_char": 20426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of September 10, P.W. II, Katragadda Pedavenkatarayudu accompanied by P.W. 6, Koli Nagabhushanam, and Anne Rama Rao (deceased no."}}, {"text": "Koli Nagabhushanam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20450, "end_char": 20468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of September 10, P.W. II, Katragadda Pedavenkatarayudu accompanied by P.W. 6, Koli Nagabhushanam, and Anne Rama Rao (deceased no."}}, {"text": "Anne Rama Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20474, "end_char": 20487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of September 10, P.W. II, Katragadda Pedavenkatarayudu accompanied by P.W. 6, Koli Nagabhushanam, and Anne Rama Rao (deceased no."}}, {"text": "Mustabada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) went to Mustabada on their way to Surampalli."}}, {"text": "Chinna Anjayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20579, "end_char": 20593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At Mustabada they contacted Chinna Anjayya (deceased no."}}, {"text": "Pendyala Venkateswara Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20624, "end_char": 20649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) and P.W. 15, Pendyala Venkateswara Rao,."}}, {"text": "Madhukuluri Satyanarayana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20769, "end_char": 20794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the Panchayat Board Office at Surampalli they collei:ted P.W. 1, Madhukuluri Satyanarayana, P.W. 4, Kolampatta Venkata Subbayyachari, P.W. 5, Jasti Ramarao."}}, {"text": "Kolampatta Venkata Subbayyachari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20804, "end_char": 20836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the Panchayat Board Office at Surampalli they collei:ted P.W. 1, Madhukuluri Satyanarayana, P.W. 4, Kolampatta Venkata Subbayyachari, P.W. 5, Jasti Ramarao."}}, {"text": "Jasti Ramarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20846, "end_char": 20859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the Panchayat Board Office at Surampalli they collei:ted P.W. 1, Madhukuluri Satyanarayana, P.W. 4, Kolampatta Venkata Subbayyachari, P.W. 5, Jasti Ramarao."}}, {"text": "Garimella Subbarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20869, "end_char": 20887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 7; Garimella Subbarao, P.W. 8, Garimella Venkataiah, P.W. 9, Mukkala Veeraiah and deceased no."}}, {"text": "Garimella Venkataiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20897, "end_char": 20917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 7; Garimella Subbarao, P.W. 8, Garimella Venkataiah, P.W. 9, Mukkala Veeraiah and deceased no."}}, {"text": "Mukkala Veeraiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20927, "end_char": 20943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 7; Garimella Subbarao, P.W. 8, Garimella Venkataiah, P.W. 9, Mukkala Veeraiah and deceased no."}}, {"text": "B. Lakshmayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20964, "end_char": 20977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, B. Lakshmayya and also the six occupiers of the Kunta and two or three other persons."}}, {"text": "Y. Mallikarjuna Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 12, Y. Mallikarjuna Rao also arrived there."}}, {"text": "Garimella Subba Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22042, "end_char": 22061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that stage P. W. 5, Jasti Ramarao, P.W. 7, Garimella Subba Rao and some others who had come to mediate intervened but they were beaten by the accused."}}, {"text": "Gottipulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24245, "end_char": 24255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were raising party slogans and shouting that Gottipulla people should be killed.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24694, "end_char": 24700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24702, "end_char": 24708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sivapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24763, "end_char": 24772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. this accused pleaded alibi by stating that he was at Sivapuram, Kadapa district on the fateful day having gone there weeks before and that he knew nothing about this occurrence; according to him he stayed in Sivapuram for .about one month and himself surrendered in\n\nhe Magi, trate's court on hearing that he was named as an accused in this case."}}, {"text": "Kadapa district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24774, "end_char": 24789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. this accused pleaded alibi by stating that he was at Sivapuram, Kadapa district on the fateful day having gone there weeks before and that he knew nothing about this occurrence; according to him he stayed in Sivapuram for .about one month and himself surrendered in\n\nhe Magi, trate's court on hearing that he was named as an accused in this case."}}, {"text": "he Magi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. this accused pleaded alibi by stating that he was at Sivapuram, Kadapa district on the fateful day having gone there weeks before and that he knew nothing about this occurrence; according to him he stayed in Sivapuram for .about one month and himself surrendered in\n\nhe Magi, trate's court on hearing that he was named as an accused in this case."}}, {"text": "sec11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25632, "end_char": 25637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Haviin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26384, "end_char": 26390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haviin, g failed in their attempt to have the bund removed, the occupiers with their communist helpers seem to have gone to the spot on the day of the occurrence to help themselves."}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subbarayanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28606, "end_char": 28642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subbarayanam, aged 60 years, accused no.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Venkata Siva Subbarayanam"}}, {"text": "Gottipulla Seshayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30115, "end_char": 30134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gottipulla Seshayya, aged 50 years, accused no.", "canonical_name": "Gottipulla Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "16th September, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30395, "end_char": 30415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dying declaration was not considered necessary and he was discharged from the hospital on the 16th September, 1961 after six days."}}, {"text": "Korlagunta Narayana Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30753, "end_char": 30776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Korlagunta Narayana Rao, aged 35 years, accused no."}}, {"text": "sptember -16, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31309, "end_char": 31327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He too ret!lllined in the hospital for six das upto sptember -16, 1961."}}, {"text": "Thota Seethararnayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31330, "end_char": 31350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thota Seethararnayya, aged 40 years, accused no."}}, {"text": "Thota Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31450, "end_char": 31465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8, Thota Subba Rao, aged 22 years had only a contusion on right buttocks."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33434, "end_char": 33451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further held that the bilnd as it existed on September 5, 1961 had been raised by the accused persons but thete were sluices and vents in the Southern bund."}}, {"text": "Erracheuvu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33584, "end_char": 33594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court also found that water from Erracheuvu used to flow into the .bund of the Kunta from where it passed on to the fields of the accused nos."}}, {"text": "s. 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36096, "end_char": 36102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36104, "end_char": 36110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36998, "end_char": 37004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37058, "end_char": 37064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37066, "end_char": 37071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 96 to 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39180, "end_char": 39193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39195, "end_char": 39200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39287, "end_char": 39292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39388, "end_char": 39393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39435, "end_char": 39440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39864, "end_char": 39874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40309, "end_char": 40320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41388, "end_char": 41394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41415, "end_char": 41420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30.10.1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41751, "end_char": 41761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23of1960 decided on 30.10.1961."}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42093, "end_char": 42099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42239, "end_char": 42250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_440_444_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "J, S, BAJAJ & ORS. v.\n\nARJANDAS DAYARAM VACHHANI & ORS.\n\nJanµary 21, 1970 [S. M. SiKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND l, D. DUA, JJ.] 8 The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilil ; nay be produced by or on behalf of the dealer and making such further enquiry &s it may deem necessary, order that the dealer shall deposit forthwith into the Government treasury, the amount found to have been so collected by the dealer and not refunded prior to the receipt of the notice , aforesaid to the person from whom it had been collected.\n\n( 4) Where any amount so collected by the dealer and deposited by him into the Government treasury has already been refunded fo the dealer in pursuance of or as a result of any judgment, decree or order of any Tribunal, Court or authoritv, but the dealer has not refunded the amoun• to the person from whom he had collected it, the prescribed au:hority shall, notwithstanding such refund to the dealer, proceed to take action in accordance with the provisions of sub-section ( 3) for securing deposit of such amount.\n\n( 5) Where any such amount has not been refunded to the dealer before the commencement of this Act but a refund has been directed by a Court, Tribunal or authority, the amount shall, notwithstanding such direction, be deemed 'to be a deposit made in pursuance of an order under sub-section ( 3). (6)\n\n( 7) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or contract, when any amount is deposited by a dealer in comµlianoe \\\\lith an order under sub-section ( 3) or sub-section ( 4) or is deemed, under sub-section\n\n( 5), to have been so deposited, such deposit shall constitute a good and complete discharge of the liability of the dealer in respect of such amount to the person from whom it was collected.\n\n( 8) The. person from whom the dealer has collected the amount deposited in pursuance of an order under sub-section ( 3) or suh-section ( 4) or deemed, under sub-si:ction ( 5), to have been so deposited shall be entitled to apply to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner for refund of the amount to him and the said authority shall allow the refund if it is satisfied that the clairrt is in order :\n\nProvided that no such refund shall be allowed unless the application is made before the expiry of the period within which the applicant could have claimed the amount from the dealer by a civil suit had his liability not been di.charged in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (7) :\n\nProvided further that no claim for such refund shall be rejected without giving the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard.\n\nOn July 31, 1963, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Truces, Shahabad Circle, issued a notice under s. 20A ( 3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, requiring the assessee to show cause why an amount of Rs. 23,990-11-0 being the sales-tax on the railway freight which had become refundable under the order of assessment be not forfeited.\n\nThe assessee in reply contended, iltter alia, that s. 20A of the Bihar Sales Tax Act was ultra vires the State Legislature and that in any case it had no application to his case.\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes rejected the contention and passed an order directing that the amount of Rs. 23,990-11-0 do stand forfeited to. the Government and further directert the plea that the State Lgislature is comoetent. to legislate for demanding Payment of or retaining amounts recovered by a rey:istered dealer but which are not due as sales-tax to the State.\n\n(!) [1953J S.C.R. 106°.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General contended that in any event the impugned provision is not of the nature which this Court was concerned to inbrpret in Abdul Quader's case('). He said, that whereas in Abdul Quader's case(') the Court dealing with a case in which the State Legislature enacted a law authorising the State to recover and appropriate to itself amounts collected by a dealer on the representation that he-the dealer-was entitled to recoup himself for payment of sales-tax which he was not liable to pay, in the present case the amount either collected or retained by the State from the dealer is to be held for the benefit of the person from whom it has been improperly collected. On that account, the Advocate-General contended, the Legislature exercised its power for setting up machinery for compelling refund of amounts collected by the dealer under the authority of the Legislature which he could not in law collect.\n\nCounsel argued that Entry 54 List II authorises the State Legislature to legislate for collection of an amount which has been improperly collected by a registered dealer as tax on behalf of the State and for refunding the amount to the pers® from whom it has been improperly collected.\n\nThis argume:nt proceeds upon two assumptions : ( 1) that under the Bihar Sales Tax Act the purchaser of goods is liable to pay sales-tax to the State, and the registered dealer collects 1he tax from the purchaser as an agent of the State; and ( 2) that the amount recovered from the registered dealer under s. 20A is intended only to be refunded to the person from whom it has been collected by the registered dealer, and the State is merely an agency for enforcing the obligation of the dealer.\n\nThe first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959. Bys. 3 charge of tax lies upon every dealer whose gross turnover during a period not exceeding twelve months immediately preceding exceeds the specified amount. The expression \"gros!; turnover\" is defined in s. 2(k) as meaning \"the aggregate of the: amounts of sale-prices received and receivable by a dealer, during any given period, in respect of sale of goods (. . . ) \", and the expression \"sale-price\" is defined in s. 2(q) as meaning \"the amount payable to a dealer as valuable consideration in respect of the sale of goods\". By sub-s. (2) of s. 3 tax is made payable by a dealer on sales made inside the State, and when the dealer sells goods, the price received by him for sale of goods forms a component of the gross turnover and the dealer is liable to pay tax on the turnover.\n\nThe Act does not impose liability to pay tax upon the purchaser either directly or indirectly .. Under s. 7, it is true, the taxable.turnover of a dealer is determined to be that part of the gross turnover which remains\n\n(I) ]1964] 6 S.C.R 867.\n\nA -\n\n,._\n\nASHOKA MARKETING v. BIHAR (Shah, /,) 463\n\nafter deducting several items including the amount of sales-tax actuaJ!y \"collected as such\", along with the sale-price received or receivable in respect of sale of goods. It is implicit that the dealer may recover from the purchaser in addition to the value of the goods a certain amount which he will have to pay as tax on that value.\n\nThe price payable by the purchaser on that account is the value of the goods and the amount paid for recouping the dealer for payment of tax.\n\nThe Act enables the dealer to pass on the liability of sales-tax to the purchaser and if by invoice or otherwise the dealer charges in respect of the goods sold by him the value of the goods and the tax which he may have to pay on the value, sales-tax will be computed on the value of the goods and not on the .total amount paid by the purchaser. 'the amount payable by the purchaser is however the consideration paid by him for purchasing the goods.\n\nThe dealer may apportion the value of the goods and the sales-tax payable by him on the sale to the State. 1f he does so, he is liable to pay sales-tax onl, y on the value and not on the amount of tax collected by him which he is payaple as sales-ta; x to the State. If he does not apportion the value and the tax, , he is liable to pay sales-tax on the total amount received by him, calcnlated at the appropriate rate.\n\nIn either case the liability to pay tax under the Act lies upon the dealer : he does not collect any tax for and on behalf of the Government.\n\nThe dealer may recover from the purchaser the tax payable by him as part of the price, but on that account the purchaser is not the person liable to pay tax on the sale to the.State.\n\nA provision which enables the dealer to pass on the liability for payment of tax is incidental to legislation for sales-tax. Hut we are unable to hold that a provision under which a dealer is called upon to pay to, the State an amount which has been collected by him on a representation-express or implied-that an equal amount is payable by him under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, is a provision incidental to the power to levy \"tax on sale or purchase of goods\" within the meaning of Entry '54 List II of the Seventh Schedule.\n\nEntry 54 List II, of the Seventh Schedule, comprehends the power to impose tax, to prescribe machinery for collecting the tax, to designate officers by whom the liability may be imposed and to prescribe the authority, obligation and indemnity of the officers.\n\nThe State Legislature may under Entry 54 List II be competent to enact a law in respect of matters necessarily incidental to \"tax on, the Sale and purchase ' of goods\".\n\nBut a provision compelling a dealer who has deliberately or erroneously recovered an amount from the purchaser on a representation that he is entitled to recover it to recoup himself for payment of tax, to pay over that amount to the State cannot, in our judgment, be rel!llrded as necessarily incidental to Entry 54 List II. In effect the provision is one for levying an amount as tax\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhich the State is incompetent to levy. A mere device cannot be permitted to defeat the provisions of the Constitution by clothing . the claim in the form of a demand for depositing the money with the State which the dealer has collected, but which he was not entitled to collect.\n\nThe learned Advocate General contended that sub-s. ( 8) of s. 20A authorises the person from whom the dealer has collected the amount deposited in pursuance of an order under sub-ss, (3), ( 4) , or deemed to have been so deposited under sub-s, ( 5 ) , to apply to the prescribed authority for refund of the amount to him and the authority is obliged, if satisfied about the claim, to make that refund. The power to demand an amount collected by the dealer applies to transactions governed by the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, as well as to the pre-existing Acts. There is no period of limitation prcsc:ribed within wl>ich the demand for payment of amounts collected by !he dealer may be made.\n\nBut an application for refund is to be made before the expiry of the period within which the purchaser could have claimed the amount from the dealer by a civil suit.\n\nIn the light of the scheme of the Act and the various provi!; ions made, it would be futile to expect that a purchaser would normally be able to enforce the liability of the State to pay the amount collected by the dealer and which is deposited or deemed to be deposited with the Government. The period of limitation does not commence to run from the date on which the money is deposited or deemed to be deposited into the Government treasury but from the date on which the purchaser may be entitled to file a suit against tl1e dealer in a civil court.\n\nThe State is in law under no obligation to hold the amount as trustee for the purchaser. The amount to be recovered or approwiated remains part of the Consolidated Fund of the State and becomes the property of the State.\n\nSub-section (8) of s. 20A. in our judgment, does not alter the true nature of the demand or appropriation which can be made under sub-ss. ( 3), ( 4) & ( 5) of s. 20A.\n\nThe intention underlying sub-ss. (3), 1 (4) & (5) is to enable the State to collect from the dealer tax which the State is not entitled to levy and lo appropriate it to itself except in the very rare cases in which. the purchaser may approach the State and be able to satisfy that be has a claim that the c:laim is in order. and that it is within limitation.\n\nNotwithstanding the addition of sub-s. ( 8), in our judgment, the amount received by the State or appropriated by the State con- ' , tinues to have the character of a tax collected which the State is not entitled to wllect.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General contended that assuming !hat the first proviso of sub-s. ( 8) of s. 20A which prescribes the period of limitation is indicative of the nature of the claim, that proviso\n\nASHOKA MARKETING v. BIHAR (Shah, /.) 465\n\nalone may be declared ultra vires, and the remaining provisions declared valid. But the first proviso to sub-s. ( 8) does not invest the recovery with the character of tax : the provisions of sub-ss. ( 3), ( 4) and ( 5) iittvesr the recovery with the nature of a levy of tax which the State is not entitled to collect, and sub-s. ( 8) is me•ely an attempt to disguise the true nature of the claim. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the contention of the learned Advocate-General.\n\nIt was then contended !hat the power to legislate in respect of recovery of the amount collected by a dealer which in law he is not entitled to collect, falls within Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III.\n\nThese entries are in the Concurrent List and provide :\n\n\"6. Transfer of property oilier than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents.\n\n7. Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of ontracts, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land.\n\n13. Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Ci vii Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration.\"\n\nWe fail to. appreciate how power to legislate in respect of Entries 6, 7 and 13 would authorise the State Legislature to legislate in respect of recovery from the dealer o! an amount which the dealer was in law not entitled to collect, but which he has collected. The power to legislate in respect of sub-ss. ( 3), ( 4) and ( 5) of s. 20A does not fall under Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III expressly, nor can it be said that the power to legislate is necessarily incidental to the power cqntained in Entries 6, 7 and 13 List Ill. As already pointed,\n\nout, this Court in the judgment in Abdul Quade r's ca5e ( 1 ) has clearly held that the State has no power to legislate for recovering amount which is collected by-the tax-payer in order to recoup himself for payment of tax which under the law he is not bound to pay. Even though the competence of the State to legislate was not sought to be supported under Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III, the decision of the Court plainly implies that the State has no such power under any Entry in the third List.\n\nOn the view we have expressed, we do not deem it necessary to express any opinion on the second ques\\ion. We may observe that validty of sub-ss. (1 ) and ( 2) of s. 20A has not been challenged.\n\nH We are, of the view that the appeal must be allowed, and the petition of the assessee must be granted. It is declared that sub-\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1970] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nss. ( 3), ( 4) and ( 5) of s. 20A are ultra vires the State Legislature.\n\nAs a corcifiary thereto sub-ss. ( 6) and ( 8) shall be ed invalid . . The assessce will. be entitled to its costs fo. this Court and th•\n\nHigh Court. There will be one hearing fee in C.As. 2004 and 2005 of 1966.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "ASHOKA MARKETING LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ashoka Marketing Ltd.-hereinafter", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 809, "end_char": 819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1184, "end_char": 1195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1362, "end_char": 1373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1443, "end_char": 1459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1509, "end_char": 1515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3154, "end_char": 3160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1964] 6 S.C.R. 867", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3479, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, H. K. Puri for K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3782, "end_char": 3792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, H. K. Puri for K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, H. K. Puri for K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and U. P. Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and U. P. Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgmemt of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nAshoka Marketing Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the assessee'-returned for the year 1956-57 under the Bihar Sales\n\nTax Act, 1947, an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ashoka Marketing Ltd.-hereinafter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 4013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgmemt of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nAshoka Marketing Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the assessee'-returned for the year 1956-57 under the Bihar Sales\n\nTax Act, 1947, an amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ashoka Marketing Ltd.-hereinafter"}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 2, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated April 2, 1961 the Appellate Authority set aside the order directing inclusion of the railway freight in the turnover, and ordered that the assessment be revised."}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales\n\nTax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales\n\nTax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "July 31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 31, 1963, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Truces, Shahabad Circle, issued a notice under s. 20A ( 3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, requiring the assessee to show cause why an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shahabad Circle", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 31, 1963, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Truces, Shahabad Circle, issued a notice under s. 20A ( 3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, requiring the assessee to show cause why an amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8724, "end_char": 8730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9011, "end_char": 9017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee then move4 a pet1t1on before the High Court of Patna under A1t. 226 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Truces and for consequential orders restraining recovery of the amount."}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9964, "end_char": 9970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 10003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10099, "end_char": 10105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10865, "end_char": 10870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10929, "end_char": 10934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "1st May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11150, "end_char": 11163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any order of an officer or tribunal or judgment, decree or order of a Court, every person who has collected or collects on or before the 1st May, 1950,\n\nany amount by way of tax otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall pay over to the Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed the amount so collected by him, and in default of such payment the said amount shall be recovered from him as if it were arrears of land revenue.\""}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11511, "end_char": 11516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13070, "end_char": 13075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abdul Quader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Abdul Quader's , asc(') this Court hold that in exercise of the power under Entry 54 List II, the State Legislature is incompetent to enact a law authorising the State Goveqament to call upon a dealer to pay an amount which he has collected from the purchaser cf goods under a sa]e, to recoup himself for payment of tax which he i!:", "canonical_name": "Abrlul Quader"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13698, "end_char": 13703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Advocate General for the Stae of Bihar, however."}}, {"text": "Abrlul Quader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14176, "end_char": 14189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contends that the legislation which is not of the nature which this Court was called upon / to interpret in Abrlul Quader's case(') falls within Entry 54 List II and that in any event it falls within Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List Ill.\n\nCounsel strongly relied upon the judg; nent of this Court in The Orient Paper Mill's case(').", "canonical_name": "Abrlul Quader"}}, {"text": "Orient Paper Mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14367, "end_char": 14384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contends that the legislation which is not of the nature which this Court was called upon / to interpret in Abrlul Quader's case(') falls within Entry 54 List II and that in any event it falls within Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List Ill.\n\nCounsel strongly relied upon the judg; nent of this Court in The Orient Paper Mill's case(')."}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R. 867", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14433, "end_char": 14452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14631, "end_char": 14637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14720, "end_char": 14736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15195, "end_char": 15200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15309, "end_char": 15329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Orissa issued writs directing the amount of tax collec:ted by the State to be refunded."}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15485, "end_char": 15491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15863, "end_char": 15869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16856, "end_char": 16862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16924, "end_char": 16931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18734, "end_char": 18740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18928, "end_char": 19011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19221, "end_char": 19228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 2(q)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19434, "end_char": 19441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19562, "end_char": 19566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19905, "end_char": 19909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959", "statute": "The first assumption is plainly contrary to the scheme of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "1964] 6 S.C.R 867", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20028, "end_char": 20045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22286, "end_char": 22302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22330, "end_char": 22346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23505, "end_char": 23511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25099, "end_char": 25105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25239, "end_char": 25245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25927, "end_char": 25933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27563, "end_char": 27569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abdul Quade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27818, "end_char": 27829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3), ( 4) and ( 5) of s. 20A does not fall under Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III expressly, nor can it be said that the power to legislate is necessarily incidental to the power cqntained in Entries 6, 7 and 13 List Ill. As already pointed,\n\nout, this Court in the judgment in Abdul Quade r's ca5e ( 1 ) has clearly held that the State has no power to legislate for recovering amount which is collected by-the tax-payer in order to recoup himself for payment of tax which under the law he is not bound to pay.", "canonical_name": "Abrlul Quader"}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28447, "end_char": 28453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28679, "end_char": 28685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_467_480_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS.\n\n~· THE MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST BENGAi,\n\nAND OTHERS February 2, 1970 (M .. HiDKYATULLAH, C.J.,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nK. S. HEGDE, A. N. G, ROVER, A. N. RAY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.] ' .\n\nIndian Income.Tax Act (ll of 1922), ss. 46 and 47-Liability agreed to be .id by instclments, and in default of single instalment entire balanc:e. exigible-Asressment orders in terms. of agreement-Demand noticesissu£'d-Default in instahnent-Recovery proceeding after more than one year of the default but before the last instalment due-Whether claint bcrred.\n\nAn agreement was signed between the Revenue and the assessees fix ... ing the assessees' income-tax liability for several past years, and fixing instalments for its payment.\n\nThe last instalment was payable on March 31, 1957. It was also stipulated that on the breach of a single instalment the whole amount would become exigible. The Income-tax Officer made the assessment orders in acco'rdance with the agreement.\n\nThese orders and demand notices to pay the amount by March 31, 1953 were sent to the assessees in September 1952 with letters stating that if there was no default in payment of the instalment due on March 31, 1953, further extension of time for paying the balance will be granted.\n\nThe assessees filed revisions under s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 against the orders of assessment.\n\nThe Commissioner held the assessments were properly made as they were made in accordance with the settlement after the assessees' disclosure.\n\nLater the earlier agreement for payment by instalments was varied. The main variation in the second agreement was that the penalty was reduced and smaller instalments were fixed. In March 1956 certificate's under s. 46(2) of the Act were issued and notices under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 were served.\n\nOn the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.) The certificates were not barred by time.\n\nThe assessment order reproduced the agreement as part of it and the agreement therefore became the assessment order.\n\nUnder the assss ment order a notice of demand was sent to pay the money of the first ms-- talment by March 31, 1953.\n\nOn breach of it the whole, amount was said to be exigible and the demand in respect of that was also made. The assessees, therefore, became defaulters on the failure to pay the first instalment.\n\nS:nce instalments were 2ranted, cl. (iY) Of the proviso to S. 47(7) applied.\n\nThat clause does not mention about the exigibility of the whole amount or exigibility of any particular instalment.\n\nIt only says that if instalments are granted time of one year ending w.ith the end of the financial year is to be calculated from .the date on wh.ich the last instalment is payable.\n\nThe language of cl. (1v) of the proy1~0 was unfortunate in expressing this intent and has now been C 1951/52\n\nSmt. Champa Kumarj's hut-and ..\n\nRajendra Singh Singhi Narendra Singh Singhi Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd.\n\nf\"olt1/ lax\n\nRs. 5,28,817-11\n\nRs. 9,30,498-03\n\nRs. 9,93,816-15\n\nRs. 43,99,712-11\n\nThe Company paid th.e followmg sums by way of tax : E\n\nFeruary I, Jq,52 Aprill, 1952 ..\n\nApril 2'.!, 1952\n\nRs. 1.50,000\n\nRs. 90,000\n\nRs. 1,22,000\n\nNarendra Singh Singhi paid the following sums by way of tax :\n\nFebruary I, 1952 April I, 1952\n\n. .\n\nRs. 1,50,000\n\n. .\n\nRs. 60.000 April 22, 1952 . .\n\nRs. 48,000\n\nSmt. Champa Kumari paid the following sums by way of tax :\n\nApril 1, 1952 . .\n\nRs. 1,00,000\n\nApril I, 1952 . . . .\n\nRs. 40,000 April 22, 1952 Rs. 32,000\n\nRajendra Singh Singhi paid the following sums by way of tax :\n\nApril 1, 1952 April I, 1952 Rs. f,5J,000\n\nRs. 60,000 April 22, 1951 Rs. 48,000\n\nOn April 22, 1952 they signeJ the agreement. By that date the position in the payment of instalments had reached item ( c) above showing Rs. 9,50,000 lll> due on March 31, 1953.\n\nCHAMPA V. REVE1'UE BOAiD (Hidaya1:,;;,./1, C.J.) 471\n\nOn August 29, 1952 the Income-Tax Officer made several assessment orders in respect of the asscssrnen• yean; 1947-48 to 1951-52. Each.such order included the following:\n\n\"In accordance with .s.\n\n(7) and brought it within the proviso to clause (iv).\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was right in holding that the certificates were issued within the period of limitation prescribed by law and were not barred by time. The first four appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nThe other appeals need not be considered since special leave was granted against the main order and those appeals themselves have failed.\n\nThe remaining four appeals against order refusing certificate are accordingly dismissed as infructuous with no separate order as to costs.\n\nHegde, J.-These appeals should be allowed, as in my opinion the impugned certificate is barred under sub-s. (1) of s. 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (in short 'the Act').\n\nThe facts of the case are fully set out in the judgment of my Lord, the Chief Justice.\n\nHence there is no need to state them over again.\n\nUnder the agreement entered into between the assessees and the department, if the assesees fail to pay any one or more of the instalments fixed, the entire tax became recoverable forthw!th.\n\nAd!Uittedly the assessees failed to pay the instalments as stipulated m the agreement and therefore it was open to the department to recover the entire arrears of tax.\n\nIt is true that the default clause in the agreement was intended for the benefit of the department and therefore under the law of contract, it was open to the department to waive that Clause and sue for the recovery of the various instalments as and when they fell due. But that aspect of the quetiQII is not relevant for considering the true\n\nscope of sub-s. (7) of s. 46.\n\nSection 46 creates a special machinery for the recovery of arrears of tax.\n\nSection 46 is found in Ch. IV of the Act which deals with recovey of tax and penalties.\n\nSection 45 prescribes, when an assessee becomes a defaulter.\n\nThe main part of that section says :\n\n\"Any mnount specified as payable in a notice of demand under sub-section (3) of section 23A or under section ~9 or an order under section 31 or section 33, shall be paid within the time, at the place and to the person men1ioned in the notice. or order or if a time is not so mentioned, then on or before the first day of the second month following the date of the service of the notice or order, and any assessee failing so to pay shall be deemed to be in default, provided that, when an assessee has presented an appeal undef section 30, the Income-tax Officer. may in his discretion treat the assessee as not being in default as long as such appeal is undisposed of.\"\n\n(The proviso to that section and the explanation are not relevant for our present purpGse).\n\nFor finding out whether an assessee is a defaulter or not, all that we have to see is whether he has failed to comply with the\n\nproviions of s. 45. If he has.Uild to comply with the demand made in accordance with the provisions in s. 45 within the time mentioned therein then he is 'defaulter' within the meaning of 'the Act'. Unless the assessee is a defaulier, no action can be taken against him under s. 46.\n\nNon-fulfLment of the terms of the agreement does not amount to a default under s. 45. Therefore the first thing we have to see is when the assessees became defaulters.\n\nFor deciding that question reference to the agreement is irrelevant. Admittedly demand notices under s. 29 had bee!Drissued\n\nto the assessees on September 22, 1952 in respect of the entire tax due from them.\n\nTherefore they became defaulters as soon as they failed to comply with those demands.\n\nThis takes .. us to s. 46.\n\nSub-s. (1) of s. 46 says : . \"When an assessee is in default in making a payment of income-tax, the Income-tax Officer may in his discretion dimct that, in addition to the amount of the arrears, a sum not exceeding that amount shall be recovered f:rom the assessee by way of penalty.\"\n\nThe default referred fo in this sub-section is necessarily a default under s. 45.\n\nThat much is obvious froin the scheme of Ch. VI.\n\nNow let us read sub-s. (7) of s. 46. It is as follows :\n\nCHAMPA v. REVENUE BOARD (Hegde, J.) 479\n\n\"Save in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 42 or to the proviso to section 45, no proceedings for the recovery of any sum payable under this Act shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the last day of the financial year in which any demand is made under this Act :\n\nProvided that the period of one year herein referred to shall ~\n\n(iv) where the sum payable is allowed to be paid by instalments, from the date on which the last of such instalments was due\".\n\nIf we read the impugned sub-s. (7) of s. 46, it is clear that no proceedings for the recovery of any sum payable under the Act can be commenced after the expiration of one year froI!l the last day of the financial year in which any demand is made under the Act. In the instant case, the demands in question were made on September 22, 1952. Therefore the recovery proceeding's should have been commenced before 31st March 1953 but actually. they were commenced on March 14, 1956.\n\nHence they are prime. facie barred.\n\nThis talces us to sub-cl. (iv) of the proviso to sub-s. (7) of s. 46.\n\nUnder that proviso where the sum payable is allowed to be paid by instalments, the one year prescribed in sub-s. (7) of s. 46 will be. computed from the date on which the last of such )nstalments\n\nwas due.\n\nThe expression \"was due\" does not appear. to be grammaticalfy correct. It should have been \"is due\".\n\nThis correction has been made in the corresponding provision of the 1961 Indian Income• Tax Act; but that error is immaterial for our present purpose.\n\nThe words \"was due\" can only mean \"is due\" even under the Act. For finding out when the sum claimed 'was due', we must again go back to s. 45.\n\nIn view of the demand notices issued in September 1952 and sum became due when the assessees became defaulters and therefore the recovery proceedings under the Act should have been initiated before March, 1954.\n\nThe same having not been initiated before that date, the proceedings .in question must be held to have been barred.\n\nIn my opinion for finding out the date on which the last instalment was due, we cannot fall back on the agreement between the assessees and the revenue.\n\nChapter V of the Act has nothing to do with the agreement between the assessees and the revenue.\n\nThe expression \"was due'~ in s. 46(7) has reference to the tax which is due in accordance with the provisions in ss. 45 and 46,\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above I allow these appeals. A\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, Civil Appeals Nos. 564, 566, 568 and 570 of 1966 (arising from the common judgment and orde:r of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High a Court, December 10, 1963) are dismissed with costs.\n\nThe other appeals are also dismissed as infructuous with no separate order as to costs.\n\nY.P.", "total_entities": 155, "entities": [{"text": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST BENGAi,\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 199, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I. D. DuA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 46 and 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last instalment was payable on March 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1035, "end_char": 1049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These orders and demand notices to pay the amount by March 31, 1953 were sent to the assessees in September 1952 with letters stating that if there was no default in payment of the instalment due on March 31, 1953, further extension of time for paying the balance will be granted."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1315, "end_char": 1335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1727, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Act were issued and notices under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act were issued and notices under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "the Act were issued and notices under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1973, "end_char": 1985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.)", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 1998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.)"}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.)"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.)"}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2016, "end_char": 2019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question whether the certificates were barred by limitation under s. 4 7 (I) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 this Court,\n\nHELD : (Per Hidayatullah, C. J., Shah, Grover, Ray and Dua, JI.)"}}, {"text": "S. 47(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Per Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 3999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "476 G-\n\n477 DJ\n\n(Per Hegde, J. dissenting)- ;--,.]f an assessee fails to comply with the demand made in aC'.cordance with the provision in s. 45 within the time mentioned therein then he is 'defaulter' within the meaning of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4374, "end_char": 4379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4659, "end_char": 4667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5189, "end_char": 5209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 46(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5317, "end_char": 5325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 45 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5404, "end_char": 5417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELJCATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "478 A-G; 479 F-H]\n\nCIVIL APPELJCATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special )eave ; from the judgments and orders dated December 10, 1963 and November 24, 1964 of the Calcutta High Court, in appeals from Original Orders Nos."}}, {"text": "G\n\nM. C. Chagla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "139 to 142 of\n\n1~~ G\n\nM. C. Chagla, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji."}}, {"text": "P. N. Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "139 to 142 of\n\n1~~ G\n\nM. C. Chagla, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6066, "end_char": 6082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "139 to 142 of\n\n1~~ G\n\nM. C. Chagla, P. N. Tiwari, I. B. Dadachanji."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6087, "end_char": 6096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Jagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. Gopalakrishnan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. Gopalakrishnan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. Gopalakrishnan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6293, "end_char": 6308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, A. N.\n\nGROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DUA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "J. c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, A. N.\n\nGROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DUA, JJ."}}, {"text": "A. N.\n\nGROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, A. N.\n\nGROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DUA, JJ."}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, A. N.\n\nGROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DUA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "I. D. DuA, JJ."}}, {"text": "HIDAYA- TULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6389, "end_char": 6403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYA- TULLAH, C.J., K. S. HEGDE, J. gave a dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Hidayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "469\n\nHidayalullah, C.J.-This judgment shall dis~ of Civil Appeals 564-571 of !", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6792, "end_char": 6806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, four are against the common judgmem and order of a Division llench of the Calcutta High Court, December 10, 1963, dismissing 4 appeals (139-142 of\n\n1959) from the order of a lc.1rned single Jud11e, April 23, 1959 in Writ Petitions 159-162 of 1958."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6892, "end_char": 6909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining four appeals are against the order, November 24, 1964, refusing to certify the case as Iii for appeal to this Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 6989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dalchand Singhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7043, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows : One Dalchand Singhi held a prospecting license in the erstwhile Koree State (now in Madhya\n\nPradesh)."}}, {"text": "Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows : One Dalchand Singhi held a prospecting license in the erstwhile Koree State (now in Madhya\n\nPradesh)."}}, {"text": "Bahadur Singh Singhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7150, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His son Bahadur Singh Singhi took a mining lease and started a colliery known as Jhagrakhand Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Bahadur Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7290, "end_char": 7317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1942 a private limited Company called the Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd. was started with an authorised capital of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bahadur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7407, "end_char": 7420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur Singh divided equaily the 2400 shares bdwecn himself and his 3 sons Rajendra Singh Sin)!,", "canonical_name": "Bahadur Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Singh Sin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur Singh divided equaily the 2400 shares bdwecn himself and his 3 sons Rajendra Singh Sin)!,", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "Birendra Singh Singhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7537, "end_char": 7558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hi, Nafln.lrn Singh Sing.hi ana Birendra Singh Singhi."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur Singh Singhi died on July 7, 1944 leaving a will-Letters of Administration with the will annexed were granted in 1945."}}, {"text": "Narendra Singh Singhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7967, "end_char": 7988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The register of Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd. was reetified and showed thereafter 900 shares in the name of Narendra Singh Singhi and Rajendra Singh Singhi and 6600 shares in the mime of Birendra Singh Singhi.", "canonical_name": "Narendra Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Singh Singhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7993, "end_char": 8014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The register of Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd. was reetified and showed thereafter 900 shares in the name of Narendra Singh Singhi and Rajendra Singh Singhi and 6600 shares in the mime of Birendra Singh Singhi.", "canonical_name": "Rajendra Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "December 12, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8099, "end_char": 8116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Birendra Singh Singhi died on December 12, 1950 leaving a widow Smt."}}, {"text": "Champa Kumari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8138, "end_char": 8151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Kumari and two minor sons Ashok Kumar Singhi, Chandn1 Kumar Singhi and also a minor daughter.", "canonical_name": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Singhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Kumari and two minor sons Ashok Kumar Singhi, Chandn1 Kumar Singhi and also a minor daughter."}}, {"text": "Chandn1 Kumar Singhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8191, "end_char": 8211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Kumari and two minor sons Ashok Kumar Singhi, Chandn1 Kumar Singhi and also a minor daughter."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on July 3, 1951."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The shareholders and the company then disclosed on July 31, 1951 a concealed income ol Rs."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 28, 1951 the Commissioner of Income-tax offered to withdraw prosecutions if the Company and the shareholders agreed to pay taxes due on a total income of Rs."}}, {"text": "Champa Kumarj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10122, "end_char": 10135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Kumarj's hut-and ..\n\nRajendra Singh Singhi Narendra Singh Singhi Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd.\n\nf\"olt1/ lax\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Singh Singhi Narendra Singh Singhi Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champa Kumarj's hut-and ..\n\nRajendra Singh Singhi Narendra Singh Singhi Jhagrakhand Collieries Ltd.\n\nf\"olt1/ lax\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "Narendra Singh Singhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10452, "end_char": 10473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,22,000\n\nNarendra Singh Singhi paid the following sums by way of tax :\n\nFebruary I, 1952 April I, 1952\n\n. .", "canonical_name": "Narendra Singh Singhi"}}, {"text": "August 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11147, "end_char": 11162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHAMPA V. REVE1'UE BOAiD (Hidaya1:,;;,./1, C.J.) 471\n\nOn August 29, 1952 the Income-Tax Officer made several assessment orders in respect of the asscssrnen• yean; 1947-48 to 1951-52."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11726, "end_char": 11744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 22, 1952 the Income-tax Officer (Companies District I), Calcutta sent the following Jetter to each asses see."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer (Companies District I), Calcutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11749, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 22, 1952 the Income-tax Officer (Companies District I), Calcutta sent the following Jetter to each asses see."}}, {"text": "Champa Kumari Singhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11867, "end_char": 11887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The one sent to Smt Champa Kumari Singhi may alone be quoted here as an example :\n\n\"'From:\n\nSri V. Satyamurti, M.A., B.L..\n\nIncome Tax Officer, Companies District L Calcutta.", "canonical_name": "CHAMPA KUMARI SINGm & ORS"}}, {"text": "V. Satyamurti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11943, "end_char": 11956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The one sent to Smt Champa Kumari Singhi may alone be quoted here as an example :\n\n\"'From:\n\nSri V. Satyamurti, M.A., B.L..\n\nIncome Tax Officer, Companies District L Calcutta."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13072, "end_char": 13077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13085, "end_char": 13099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Similar notices of demand for excess Profits Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 25, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13352, "end_char": 13366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 25, 1953 the appellants filed applications for revision under s. 33-A of the Income Tax Act against the orders of assessment and application of s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13420, "end_char": 13425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Similar notices of demand for excess Profits Act", "statute": "Similar notices of demand for excess Profits Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13502, "end_char": 13507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Similar notices of demand for excess Profits Act", "statute": "Similar notices of demand for excess Profits Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 31, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14197, "end_char": 14211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,60,000 on March 31, 1954, and similar instalments each year for six years."}}, {"text": "December 27. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14292, "end_char": 14309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aJ!reement was revised on December 27."}}, {"text": "31. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14363, "end_char": 14371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.60,000 on March 31."}}, {"text": "March 14. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14481, "end_char": 14495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 14."}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14515, "end_char": 14523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14553, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14590, "end_char": 14594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14602, "end_char": 14642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "January 5, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nobj, ction was overruled on January 5, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14942, "end_char": 14947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 46(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15041, "end_char": 15049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913", "statute": "the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15057, "end_char": 15084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "G Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The G Union of India thereupon filed several revisions before the Board of Revenue under s. 53 of the Public Demands Recovery Act."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15224, "end_char": 15229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15887, "end_char": 15892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petitions were beard by Sinha J, and were dismissed on April 23, 1959."}}, {"text": "Mookerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16143, "end_char": 16151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were heard by Mookerji and Sen, JJ who, by the common judgment now under appeal in four of tbes.:"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16156, "end_char": 16159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were heard by Mookerji and Sen, JJ who, by the common judgment now under appeal in four of tbes.:"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16292, "end_char": 16303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cbagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(1) of the Constitution were also rejected and have given rise to the other four appeals before us:\n\nMr. Cbagla who argued these appeals submitted the question of Iimitatiltn at the forefront and then attempted to argue the merits such as the interpretation of the agreements and the re liance placed on them in the High Court and distribution pro rata of the amounts paid on March 31, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16986, "end_char": 16991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16999, "end_char": 17026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 1 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17093, "end_char": 17104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17500, "end_char": 17510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17533, "end_char": 17543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20879, "end_char": 20895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was payable in different instalments, from 1952 to 31st March, 1957."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21597, "end_char": 21613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The monies payable on 31st March, 1953, 31st March, 1954, 31st March 1955, 31st March 1956 and 31st March 1957 shall be applied pro rata towards the tax liability of the party of the first part and the parties of the second part mentioned in Schedule \"Y\" hereto."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21615, "end_char": 21631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The monies payable on 31st March, 1953, 31st March, 1954, 31st March 1955, 31st March 1956 and 31st March 1957 shall be applied pro rata towards the tax liability of the party of the first part and the parties of the second part mentioned in Schedule \"Y\" hereto."}}, {"text": "31st March 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The monies payable on 31st March, 1953, 31st March, 1954, 31st March 1955, 31st March 1956 and 31st March 1957 shall be applied pro rata towards the tax liability of the party of the first part and the parties of the second part mentioned in Schedule \"Y\" hereto."}}, {"text": "31st March 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The monies payable on 31st March, 1953, 31st March, 1954, 31st March 1955, 31st March 1956 and 31st March 1957 shall be applied pro rata towards the tax liability of the party of the first part and the parties of the second part mentioned in Schedule \"Y\" hereto."}}, {"text": "Section 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22594, "end_char": 22607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22616, "end_char": 22630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Public Demands Recovery Act and Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22670, "end_char": 22722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22787, "end_char": 22807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .contention of the appellants is that the letters of the 22nd September, 1952 (one of which has been reproduced above as a sample) were accompanied by the notices of demand and on the breach of the payment of the instalment of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23480, "end_char": 23485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Demands Recovery Act and Revenue Recovery Act", "statute": "Public Demands Recovery Act and Revenue Recovery Act"}}, {"text": "March 31,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23722, "end_char": 23737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whenever instalments are granted the period of limitation counts from the last instalment and here it would be one year from March 31,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23918, "end_char": 23932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the certificate was issued on March 14, 1956 and, therefore, it was well within the period of limitac of staff of Ex-Company Railways, who are exempted from passing the examination, the date on which they are declared lit for promotion to the rank of Accountant or Inspector should be considered as the date of their passing. On receipt of the result of the above examination each railway administration should immediately hold a selection test of the candidates declared successful along with any eligible ex- Company or ex-State Railway Staff, who may be asked to appear before the selection board in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Railway Board from time to time.\n\nWhile the selection board will determine in the case of the ex-Company or ex-State Railway staff, their suitability for promotion as accountant/Inspctor before placing them on the panel, no candidate who has qualified in the said examination will be declared ineligible for promotion as a junior Accountant/Inspector, the selection board only assigning a suitable place to each such candidate in order of merit.\n\nThe staff placed on the panel in any year wiJI rank senior to those empanelled in subseq11ent years.\n\n20. Date of passing the Departmental Examinmion/ Test to regu/.ate seniority :-\n\n(a) Except as provided for in sub-paragraph (b) below, seniority of two or more railway servants, who pass the departmental examination/test on different dates, not treated as one continuous examination, will be regulated entirely qy the date of passing the examination or test.\n\n(b) The seniority of Accounts Clerks, Grade I and Stock Verifiers is to be determined with reference to their substantivt! or basic seniority in Grade II irrespective of the dates they qualify for promotion as Clerks Grade I by passing the examination prescribed for the purpose.\n\n21 . Seniority on promotion to non-selection posts :-\n\nPromotion to non-selection posts shall be on the basis\n\n~·~ se_niority-cwn-suitability being judged by the authority corhpetcnt to fill the post, by oral and/or written\n\ntest or a departn1ental examination as considered ne: cessary and the record Of service.\n\nThe only exception to this would be iu cases where for administrative convenience, which should be recorded in wr:ting, the competent author.ty considers ii u;:e>sary to app<'iut a railway servant otlir than the seniormoc.t suitable railway servant to o•c; qte in a short term vcancy not exceding two 1non~: ... as a rule , and 4 inonths in µny case.\n\nThis \\Viii. hO\\\\.ever, not give the rail\\i.ay servant\n\nayadvantage not otherwise due to him.\"\n\nAppendix 2, in addition 'lo the syllabus for the examination provides:\n\n. \"3. The examination will.be-qonducted by the Head of-each office, who will also decide the intervals at which it should be held.\n\n4. (l!) .Normally no railway ser\\\"dnt will be permitted to take the examination more than ihree, but the Financial Adviser and Chief Accoupts Officer may in deserving cases -premit a candidate to take the examination for a fourth time, and, in very exceptional cases, the General Manager may permit a candidate to take the examination or the fifth .and the last time.\n\n~,, (b) No railway servant, who'lfas less'than six months\" service in a Railway Accounts' Office or who has not a reasonable chance of passirg the examination will be allowed to ,'jppear in the cxarpination prescribed in this Appendix.\n\nIn excptional circumstances, the condition regarding six months' minimum service may be waived by the General Manager.\n\n(c) Temporary railway servants may be permitted to sit for the examination but it should be clearly understood that the passing of this examination will not give them claim for absorption in te permanent cadre.\n\n(d) A candidate who fails in the examination but shows marked excellence by obiaining not less than 50% in any subject may be exempted from further e.xamination in that subject in subsecj1/ent examination.\"\n\nIt is quite clear that para 49 does l)Ot confer any right to immediate promotion on those Grade II'.c!erks who pass the qualifying Appendix 2 examination.\n\nThe Only benefit which accrues to\n\nthem is that one hurdle is removed from their way and they become eligible for being considered for promotion to Grade I.\n\nThis promotion is governed by the test of seni'}rity-cum-suitability.\n\nAIJ those who qualify for promotion are treated at par fov this purpose and they are grouped together as constituting one class.\n\nThe fact that one person has qualified earlier in point of time does not by itself clothe him with a preferential claim to promotion as againsi those who qualify later.\n\nThis examination is cQilsidered to be a continuous examination and as is clear from para 17 success at this examination does not constitute the basis of seniority which continues to be dependent on the substantive or basic seniority in Grade II.\n\nThe question which directly arises for determination is : does the procedure laid down in these instructions violate: the petitioners' right as guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 16 ? The State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency and other qualifications for securing the best service for being eligible for promotion in its different departments.\n\nIn the present case the object which is sought to be achieved by the provisions reproduced earlier is the requisite efficiency in the Accounts Department of the Railway establishment.\n\nThe departmental authority is the proper judge of its requirements.\n\nThe direct recruits and the promotees like the petitioners, in our opinion, clearly constitute different classes and this classification is sustainabie on intelligiQ!e differentia which has a reasonable connection with the object of efficiency sought to be achieved.\n\nPromotion to Grade I is guided by the consideration of senioritycum-merit.\n\nIt is, therefore, difficult to find fault with the provision which places in one group all those Grade II clerks who have qualified by passing the Appendix 2 examil)ation. The fact that the promotees from Grade II who have officiated for some time are not given the credit of this period when a permanent vacancy arises also does not attract the prohibition contained in Arts. 14 and 16. It does not constitute any hostile discrimination and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.\n\nIt applies uniformly to all members of Grade II clerks who have qu; tlified and become eligible. The onus in this case is on the petitioners to establish discrimination by showing that the classification does not rest upon any just and reasonable basis.\n\nThe difference emphasised on behalf of the petitioners is too tenuous to form the basis of a serious argument.\n\nTheir challenge, therefore, fails.\n\nThe decision in Mervyn Coutindo\n\nv. Collector of Customs, Bombay(') on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the H petitioners dealt with a different problem though the principle\n\n\nA of law laid down there seems to go against the petitioners' submission.\n\nIt was expressly observed that there is no inherent vice in the principle of fixing seniority by rotation in a case when a service is composed in fixed proportion of direct recruits and promotees.\n\nThe distinction between direct recruits and promotees as two sources of recruitment being a recoginised difference, nor obno- B xious to the equality clauses, the provisions which concern us cannot be struck down on the ratio of this decision.\n\nThe petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but without costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nPetition dismissed", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "GANGA RAM & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GANGA RAM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 2, 1970\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.,\n\nJ. C, SHAH,\n\nK. S. HEGDE,\n\nA. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND I. 0."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. 0. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4115, "end_char": 4122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4202, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Singh for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4402, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, .l."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kashmiri Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution Kashmiri Lal, petitioner no."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7530, "end_char": 7548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7835, "end_char": 7842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7864, "end_char": 7871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8032, "end_char": 8039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8776, "end_char": 8791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18064, "end_char": 18079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19303, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_490_494_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "GOPI & ORS. v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 3, 1970\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.] B\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 165 & 166(3)- Power of officer of a police station to conduct search of premises located in the jurisdiction of another police station-Recording of reasons of search-Presurnption in favour of official acts under s. 114 Evidence Act, 1872-Bona tides of search-Right of private defence against police party.\n\nOn the basis of a First Information Report regarding loss df a buffalo lodged at police station, Chhainsa, the Sub-Inspector of that police station sought to search the house of the appellants situated in the jurisdiction o'( police station, Dankaur.\n\nThe appellants and several others resisted the search and caused injuries to the police party, for which they were prosecuted under varioLJ5 sections of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellants along \\Vith certain others were convicted by the trial court and their appeals were disallowed by the High Court.\n\nBy special leave they appealed to this Court. contending : (i) that the officer of a police station cannot carry out a search in the jurisdiction of another police. station without the permission o'f the Station House Officer of that station; in the present case the reason given by the Sub-Inspector for not taking such permission, nan1ely, that the local police was in league with the appeUants did not satisfy the terms of s. 166(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (ii) that the search '\"'as. also illegal for the reason that the Sub-Inspector be fore attempting 1he search did not record his reason5 as required by ss. 165 & 166 of t'e Code; (iii) that being illegal the search was not bona fide: (iv) that thie appellants \\Vere entitled to the right of private de'fence since the~ thought that the raiding party were decoits dre5sed as policemen.\n\nHELD : (i} In the case of stolen cattle, time is of the essence, becau5e once the animal is removed and mixed up with others, it is very difficult to spot it in the big herds common in these places. 'fherefore if the police officer had reason to believe that the police officers at Dankaur \"ould take their own time because they were mixed up with the accused party. he had full jurisdiction in taking recourse to sub-s. (3) of s. 166 and to carry out the seHrch himself. !493 G-I-IJ\n\n(ii) No questions y; ere put to the Sub-Inspector to elicit from him \\\\hether the reasons 'for the search were recorded or not.\n\nRegard being had to the regularity of official acts it must be presumed that the Sub- Jnspector must haye taken the precaution to record his reasons. [494 A]\n\n(iii) Jn the circumstances of the case the search was legal and bona fide. [494 Bl\n\n(iv) The accused \\i.:ere in'tormed by the Sub-Inspector that it was the police party \\vhich had come and they had no reason to attack the police party either as dacoits or in self-defence in any other form. [494 CJ ff\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No 159 of 1967.\n\nA Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 28, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 1964.\n\nAnil Kumar Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta, for the appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. The appellants are five in number who were proscuted originally with 11 others under diverse sections of the Indian Penal Code which included sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and ss. 333 and 353 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOf the original 16 accused in the case, 11 were acquitted in the Court ct Session. The High Court, on appeal, confirmed their convictions with some modifications and reduced the sentences passed on them.\n\nAs a result of the High Court's judgment, one of the appellants Gopi stands convicted . under s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment and under s. 148 of the Indian Penal Code with a like sentence, the two sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.\n\nOthers are convicted only under s. 147 of the Indian Penal Code and have been sentenced to imprisonment already undergone by them which we are told was in the neighbourhood of two weeks.\n\nThey now appeal by special leave against their conviction and sentences.\n\nThe facts of the case are as follows.\n\nIn November 1963 a she-buffalo belonging to one Rajbir cl village Chbainsa, police station Chhainsa in the district of Gurgaon (then a part of Punjab and now a part of Haryana) was stolen.\n\nRajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThere are certain allegations that Gopi and Munshi demanded a sum of Rs. 200 for the return of the buffalo, that the amount was paid but the buffalo was not returned.\n\nWe are not concerned with the truth cf this statement.\n\nA report of theft of buffalo was lodged at police station Chha1nsa on November 26, 1963. The report was sent to Sub- Inspector Kesar Singh (P.W. 1) wno was then at another village and he proceeded in the company of three constables and some other villagers to Gunpara.\n\nFrom the village he took with him two other persons Rajey and Chander.\n\nThe police party was armed with rifles. a revolver and /athis.\n\nThey reached the house o.f Gopi and Munshi at about 11-30 p.m. and found them sleeping in front of their house.\n\nGopi and Munshi were woken up by the police and were informed that the police party had come to search\n\nfor the buffalo.\n\nThe prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram.\n\nThe injury to Jodhra Ram was caused with a farsa on the head a:nd had fractured his skull.\n\nLater, the police party, when it was withdrawing, was again waylaid and the allegation is that Kesar Singh was wrongfully confined at Naurangpur.\n\nHe was then rescued by Mulaim Singh, a constable cf police station Dankaur and Kesar Singh thf the Code but then there is section 166 also to be read.\n\nUnder sub-s.1'-of that section a police officer may invoke the assistance of a police station house officer of another jurisdiction and ask him to <;!induct the search.\n\nIt is submitted that this is what the sub-inwector Kesar Singh ought to have done.\n\nThe powers of the police station house officer, however, are not confined to this only,-oecause sub-s. 3 of the same section gives the right and authg; ity to the police station house officer to conduct search in the i11tisdiction of another police station house officer if he has reasO!I\" to believe that delay would be occasioned by requiring the officer in charge the other police station to cause the search to bei'nade and as a result evidence of the commission of the offen~-would be concealed or destroyed.\n\nThis is what the sub-inspector Kesar Singh seems to have done.\n\nHis explanation was that the police of Dankaur were mixed uo with the accused who had stolen the buffalo and therefore he took it upon himself to conduct the search and recover the buffalo. The explanation in our opinion is believable because no police officer would ordinarily go into another jurisdiction unless there are compelling reasons to do so.\n\nA buffalo had been stolen a few weeks before and nothing had been done to recover it. In these circumstances the sub-inspector Kesar Singh might well have believed that unless he took some instant actjon, the buffalo would never be found.\n\nTherefore his action was with due care and attention and cannot be said to be ma/a fide.\n\nIt was argued however that the sub-section is limited to avoidance of delay and there was no case made out here that there was likelihood of delay if the police station house officer of Dankaur had been inv:ted to conduct the search.\n\nIn our opinion in the case of stolen cattle, tim~ is of the essence, because once the animal is removed and mixed up with others, it is very difficult to spot it in the big herds common in these places. Therefore if the police officer had reason to believe that the police officers at Dankaur would take their own time because they were mixed up with the accused party, he had full jurisdiction in taking recourse to sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 166 and to carry out the search himself.\n\nIt was contended before us that he ought to have recorded his reasons in writing as required by s. 165 and also by s. 166. But\n\nno question appears to have been put to the sub-inspector to elicit from him whether the reasons were recorded or not. Regard being had to the regularity of official acts, we are entitled to presume that the sub-inspector must have taken the precaution to record his reasons.\n\nIn any event, we cannot hold this against the prosecution, because there is no material on which we can proceed.' We are there.fore satisfied that the search in this case was bona fide and was conducted legally by Kesar Singh in another jurisdiction, because he hacl reason to believe that evidence, namely, the buffalo was likely to be lost if he did not take prompt action. The accused were informed by him that it was the police party which had come and they had no reason to attack the police party either as dacoits or in self-defence in any other form. . The offence of the appellants is therefore amply brought home to them.\n\nWe see no reason to interfere.\n\nThe appeal fails and will be dismissed.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal diSmissed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "GOPI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOPI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nFebruary 3, 1970\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 165 & 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 366, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 373, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dankaur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 703, "end_char": 710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of a First Information Report regarding loss df a buffalo lodged at police station, Chhainsa, the Sub-Inspector of that police station sought to search the house of the appellants situated in the jurisdiction o'( police station, Dankaur."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 165 & 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2304, "end_char": 2310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 28, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3159, "end_char": 3175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Kumar Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3177, "end_char": 3188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Kumar Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Uma Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3193, "end_char": 3202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Kumar Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3301, "end_char": 3313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. The appellants are five in number who were proscuted originally with 11 others under diverse sections of the Indian Penal Code which included sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and ss.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3507, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 333 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3569, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gopi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the High Court's judgment, one of the appellants Gopi stands convicted .", "canonical_name": "Gopi"}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3997, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4139, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chbainsa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November 1963 a she-buffalo belonging to one Rajbir cl village Chbainsa, police station Chhainsa in the district of Gurgaon (then a part of Punjab and now a part of Haryana) was stolen."}}, {"text": "Gurgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November 1963 a she-buffalo belonging to one Rajbir cl village Chbainsa, police station Chhainsa in the district of Gurgaon (then a part of Punjab and now a part of Haryana) was stolen."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November 1963 a she-buffalo belonging to one Rajbir cl village Chbainsa, police station Chhainsa in the district of Gurgaon (then a part of Punjab and now a part of Haryana) was stolen."}}, {"text": "Rajbir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Munshi"}}, {"text": "Gunpara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bulandshahr district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4725, "end_char": 4745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report of theft of buffalo was lodged at police station Chha1nsa on November 26, 1963."}}, {"text": "Kesar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report was sent to Sub- Inspector Kesar Singh (P.W. 1) wno was then at another village and he proceeded in the company of three constables and some other villagers to Gunpara."}}, {"text": "Rajey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village he took with him two other persons Rajey and Chander."}}, {"text": "Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5321, "end_char": 5328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village he took with him two other persons Rajey and Chander."}}, {"text": "Gopi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5422, "end_char": 5426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They reached the house o.f Gopi and Munshi at about 11-30 p.m. and found them sleeping in front of their house.", "canonical_name": "Gopi"}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They reached the house o.f Gopi and Munshi at about 11-30 p.m. and found them sleeping in front of their house.", "canonical_name": "Munshi"}}, {"text": "Kesar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram."}}, {"text": "Mohar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram."}}, {"text": "Sri Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5882, "end_char": 5889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram."}}, {"text": "Jodhra Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram."}}, {"text": "Naurangpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the police party, when it was withdrawing, was again waylaid and the allegation is that Kesar Singh was wrongfully confined at Naurangpur."}}, {"text": "Mulaim Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was then rescued by Mulaim Singh, a constable cf police station Dankaur and Kesar Singh thn the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 301.\n\nOOLLECTOB. V. IBRAHIM & 00, (Shah, J,) 499\n\nA By this Article the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory df India i_s declared free.\n\nUnder it, a. retriction upon the legislative power of Parliament and State Legislature IS imposed\n\nby the Constitution.\n\nThe guarantee of the freedom is not in the abstract but to individuals. Within the limits of Arts. 304 and 305 there could be legislative restrictions upon the individuals' right to freedom of trade, but not, by executive action. [503 D-F; 504 D-EJ\n\nB Commonwealt/l of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales, LR. [1950] A.C. 235, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1285 to 1309 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated C June 23, 1965 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 34 to 58 of 1965.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nK. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respon- D dent (in C.A. No. 1304 of 1966).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nThese appeals are filed with special leave against the order of the High Court o;( Andhra Pradesh declaring G.O.M.\n\nNo. 2976 dated December 30. 1964 \"null, void and ultra vires ...\n\nThe respondents are dealers in sugar and other commodities and carry on their business in the cities o.f Hyderabad and Secunderabad.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh issued the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, in exercise of the power conferred bys. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Under that order no person may carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued by the specified authority.\n\nGrant and renewal of licence could be refused only on grounds reduced to writing and after giving opportunity to the party to state his case.\n\nThe respondents were granted licences under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963.\n\nShortly thereafter the Central Government, in exercise of the power conferreJ under snb-r. (2) of r. 125 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, promnlgated the Sugar Control Order, 1963.\n\nBy that order a recognized dealer was defined as a person carrying on the business of purchasing. selling or distributing sugar and licensed under the order relating to the licensing of sugar dealers for the time being in force in a State.\n\nThe order provided for placin~ restrictions on sale, or agreement to sell or delivery by the producers. for controlling the production. sale, grading, packing. making delivery, distribution etc. of sugar\n\nby the producers or recognised dealers, for regulating the movement of sugar, for fixation of its prices, for allotment of quotas, for delivery of such quotas and for other incidental matters.\n\nThe respondents being holders of licqnces under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, were treated as recognized dealers under the Sugar Control Order, 1963.\n\nThe State Government allocated quotas of sugar received from the Central Government for distribution in different areas and nominated licensees or dealers to take delivery of the allotted quotas from the factories.\n\nOn December 30, 1964 the State Goverrunent ordered that the sugar quota allocated to \"the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad\" be given in its entirety to the Greater Hyderabacf Consumers Central Co-operative Stores, Ltd., Hyderabad.\n\nOn that account the respondents who held licences under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Licensing Order for distribution of sugar and were also recognized dealers under the Sugar Control Order, 1963, were by an executive fiat prevented from carrving on their business in sugar.\n\nThe respondents moved petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of the order.\n\nThe State resisted the petitions principally on the ground that the order made by the State Governme.nt was in conformity with the provisions of the Sugar Control Order and was issued in pursuance of the policy laid down by the Central Goverlllllent to entrust the work of distribution of sugar exclusively to cooperative societies and thereby to eliminate in the public interest the agency of private dealers in lifting and distributing sugar. It was urged that the respondents could not seek any relief complaining of infraction-of their rights under Arts. l4 and 19 because the emergency declared by the President in October 1962 had not been withdrawn.\n\nThe petitions were heard by Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.\n\nThe learned Judge held that the executive order was not supµorted either by the provisions of the Sugar Control Order, 1963, issued by the Central Government, or by the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 196i3, that the step taken by the Government was not permitted by law; that as a result of the order of the Government the licences held by the respondents were cancelled without following the procedure laid down in cl. 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order; and that the provisions of the order could not be circumvented by executive instructions and since the order discriminated between the respondents and the Central Consumers Cooperative Stores in that it conferred a mono- ]:>Oly in disregard of the subsisting rights of the respondents and amounted to \"hostile and invidious\" discrimination in the admi-\n\nCOLLECTOR v. !BRAHIM & CO. (Shah, J.)\n\n50 I\n\nA nistration of the Sugar Control Order.\n\nHe further held that since the Government had not taken action under the Defence of India Rules or under any Control Order made under those Rules, the respondents were not debarred tinder Arts. 358 & 359 of the Constitution from claiming protection against impairment of their rights by the order issued by the State. In appeal to a Division B Bench of the High Court the grou, nds on which the decision was recorded by Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., were confirmed.\n\nIn these appeals counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh has not contended that the impugned order could be issued either under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, or the Sugar Control Order, 1963, issued by the Central Government.\n\nIndisputably it is an executive order made by the State Government. The State Government it is claimed acted in pursuance of the policy of the Central Government to distribute sugar through cooperative societies.\n\nBut the order was still unauthorised. Under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the State Government had issued an order for distribution. of sugar through licensed dealers and the respondents had obtained licences in that behalf.\n\nTheir licences could only be cancelled after making the enquiry according to the procedure prescribed by cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order.\n\nThe respondents were also recognised dealers within the meaning of the Sugar Control Order issued by the Central Government.\n\nThe rights of the respondents could not be taken away by an executive order in a manner plainly contrary to the provisions .of the statutory orders.\n\nIt is true that under Art. 352 of the Constitution, the President declared a state of emergency on October 26, 1962. By Art 358 while a proclamation of emergency is in operation, nothing in Art, 19 shall restrict the power of the State (as defined in Part III) to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take.\n\nBy Art. 359 the President is authorised, where a proclamation of emergency was in operation, to declare that the right to move any court for the enforceme.nt of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation was in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order.\n\nOn the issue of the proclamation ot emergency the State is. for the duration of the emergency, competent to enact legislation, notwithstanding that it impairs the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThe State is also competent to take executive action which the State would, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19 of the Constitution, be competent to take. The impugned order in this case was issued while the proclamation of emergency\n\nwas in operation.\n\nThe respondents could not challenge the validity of any law enacted by the State Legislature so long as the proclamation of emerge, ncy was in operation, on the ground that it impaired the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19.\n\nThey could not also challenge any executive action which, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19, the State was competent to take.\n\nIn the present case, the State did not enact any legislation impairing the ; fundamental right of the respondents to carry on business which is guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g), they proceeded to make a1n executive order.\n\nBut the executive order immune from attack is only that order which the State was compete, nt, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19, to make. Executive action of the State Government which is otherwise invalid is not immune . from attack, merely because a proclamation of emergency is in operation when it is take, n.\n\nSince the order of the State Government was plainly contrary to the statutory provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order and the Sugar Control Order, it was not protected under Art. 358 of the Constitution:\n\nNor had it the protection under Art. 359.\n\nOn November 3, 1962 the President issued an order in exercise of the power under\n\nArt. 359, that \"the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 14, article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause :E ( 1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October, 1962. is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 ( 4 oi 1962) or ny rule or order made thereunder.\" Only if the impugned order was shown to be made under the authority reserved by the Defence of India Ordinance or rules made thereunder. the jurisdiction of the Court r to entertain a petition for impaitment of the guarantee under Art. 14 may be excluded.\n\nBut the action was not shown to be taken under the Defence of India Ordinance or under the rule or order made thereunder.\n\nAgain it may be pointed out that under Art. 301 the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India is declared free.\n\nThat freedom is declared in the widest terms and applies to all forms of trade, commerce and intercourse.\n\nBut it is subject to certain restrictions o; f which Arts. 304 and 305 are relevant.\n\nIt is provided by Art. 304 : \"Notwithstanding anything in article 30 I or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law-\n\n( a) ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\nCOLLECTOR V. IBRAHIM&; CO. (Shah, J.) 503\n\nA ( b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade. commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest :\n\nProvided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause ( b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.\"\n\nIt is also provided by Art. 305 that the existing law or laws which may be made by the State providing for State monopolies, i.e. relating to any matter as is referred to in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. ( 6) of Art. 19, are outside the guarantee of Art. 301.\n\nIn the present case the State had not assumed a monopoly to deal in sugar.\n\nIt had granted monopoly to a Central Consumers Cooperative Stores which was not a corporation owned or controlled by the State within the meaning of Art. 19 ( 6) (ii) . The order was challenged on the ground that it trenches upon the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 301 of the Constitution.\n\nBy Art. 304 even by legislature restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within the State may only be imposed, if such restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest and the Bili or amendment is introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State with the previous sanction of the President.\n\nObviously the guarantee under Art. 301 cannot be taken away by executive action. The guarantee under Art. 301 which imposes a restriction upon legislative power of the Parliament or the State\n\nLegislature and the declaration of freedom is not merely an abstract declaration.\n\nThere is no reason to think that while placing a restriction upon legislative power the Constitution guaranteed freedom in the abstract and not of the individuals.\n\nArticle 301 of the Constitution is borrowed almost verbatim from s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12 of 1900. In dealing with the contention that no individual right was guaranteed by s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act the Judicial Committee in Commonll'ea/th of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales(') observed at p. 305 :\n\n\"The necessary implicatiens of these decisions (James v. Cowan-(1932) A.C. 542-and James v.\n\nThe Commonwealth of Austra/ia-(1936) A.C. 578) are important.\n\nFirst may be mentioned an argument strenuously maintained on this appeal that s. 92 of the Constitution does not guarantee the freedom of individuals.\n\nYet James was an individual and James vindicated his freedom in hard won fights.\n\n0) L.R. t950 A. C. 235:\n\nClearly there is here a misconception.\n\nIt is true as has been said more than once in the High Court, that s. 9Z does not create any new juristic rights but it does give the citizen of State or Commonwealth, as the case may be, the right to ignore, and, if necessary, to call on the judicial power to help him to resist, legislative or executive action which offends against the section. And this is just what James successfully did.\"\n\nOur Constituent Assembly borrowed the concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse from the Australian Constitution.\n\nIt is true that the limitations upon the amplitude of the guarantee are not expressed in s. 92 of the Australian Constitution, as are to be found in our Constitution.\n\nAgain, there is no guarantee in the Australian Constitution of a fundamental right to carry on trade.\n\nBut this departure from the scheme of the Australian Constitution f the Secretariat performing ministerial duties. [523 G-524 BJ\n\nN. Raghavendra Rao v. Deputy Co1nmissioner, South Kanara, Manga- 1ore. [1964) 7 S.C.R. 549 and Union of India & Anr. v. P. K. Roy & Ors.\n\n11968) 2 S.C.R. 186, applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 458 of 1969.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated July 1, 1968 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1499 of 1966.\n\nM. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Viet Kumar and J. R. Nanavati, for the appellants.\n\nS. T. Desai, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, fot respondent No. 1.\n\nS. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos. 2 to 148.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nCertain officers in the ministerial branch of the Secretariat Service of the State of Gujarat moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for an order directing the State Gover, nment to treat its order dated August 19, 1966 as \"illegal, void and of no effect\" and to forbear from enforcing its order treating the persons whose nanies were specified in the annexure to the order. as servants of the \"Secretariat cadre\".\n\nThe High Court of Gujarat granted the petitio.n and declared the order dated August 19, 1966, invalid.\n\nWith certificate granted by the High Court this appear has been filed.\n\nPrior to November 1, 1956, the appellants were holding permanent posts in the ministerial service of the Secretariats of the Part B State of Saurashtra and the Part C State of Kutch. By virtue of s. 8 of the States Reorganization Act 37 of 1956 the new State of Bombay, which included the territories of the States of Saurashtra and Kutch, was formed.\n\nSection 115 of the States Reorganisation Act made provisions relating to services other than All-India Services.\n\nBy sub-s. (1) of s. 115 it was enacted, inter a/ia, that every person who immediately before the appointed day was serving in connection with the affairs of any of the existing States specified therein shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been. allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the successor State to that existing State.\n\nBy the proviso to sub-s. (7) it was provided that conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of a, ny person allotted to another State shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government.\n\nSection 116 provided for the continuance of officers in the same posts.\n\nBy s. 117 power was conferred upon the Central Government to give directions to any State Government that may appear to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of ss. 114, 115 and 116 of the Act.\n\nUnder the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the appellants were allotted to serve in colljllection with the affairs of the new State of Bombay. In exercise of the powers under Art. 309 of the Constitu!ion, the Government of Bombay sanctioned certain rules called \"The Allocated Government Servants' (Absorption, Seniority, Pay & Allowances) Rules, 1957\". Those rules governed the servants who were allotted to the State of Bombay on reorganisation.\n\nA large majority of the members of the ministerial branch of the Secretariat of the States of Saurashtra and Kutch were, it appears, unwilling to be posted in the Secretariat of the new State of Bombay.\n\nThe, y were accordingly posted in the districts of the former States of Saurashtra and Kutch.\n\nUnder Act 11 of 1960 called \"The Bombay Reorganisaticm Act\" the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra were carved out of the territory of the new State of. Bombay.\n\nUnder s. 81. provisions relating to services other than All-India Services were made and by s. 82 provisions as to the continuance of officers in the same posts was made.\n\nBy s. 83 power was given to the Central Government to give directions to the States.\n\nThose provisions were substan- .tially the same as the provisions of ss. 115, 116 and 117 of the\n\nStates Reorganisation Act, 1956. The appellants were allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Gujarat under s. 81 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act.\n\nThe newly constituted State of Gujarat finding a dearth of experienced officers in the Secretariat transferred the appellants at diverse times between the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 to the Secretariat of the State of Gujarat and assigned them duties in <:Onnection with the Secretariat Service.\n\nOrders were issued from time to time fixing their scales of pay and seniority.\n\nApparently the Public Service Commission raised some objections about an attempted integration between the officers who were originally serving in the Secretariat Service, and those who were posted from the districts.\n\nUltimately on August 19, 1966, the State Government issued the o:rder to the following effect :\n\n\"The questiol'J. of regularising the appointment to various posts in the Secretariat Department on and after 1st May 1960 of the drafted persons was under the consideration of Government for some time.\n\nGovernment is now pleased to direct, in consultation with the Gujarat Public Service Commission, that the persons shown in the accompanying statement should be treated to have been regularly appointed in the posts shown against their names in column-4 of the statement with effect from the date shown in column-5 in the Departments mentioned in column-3 of the statement.\n\n2. As regards fixation of their pay and seniority orders have already been issued in Government Resolution General Administration Department No. SCT-\n\n1161-F, dated 25th April, 1961 and Government Resolution General Administration Department No. SCT-\n\n1162-KH, dated 14th March 1964. The Departments are requested to fix their pay and seniority accordingly.''\n\nAppended to the order was a list of 90 persons designating the departments iin which they were posted, posts to which appointed and the dates from which they were appointed.\n\nThe officers of the Secretariat who before the date of the order . constituted the ministerial service then filed the petition out of which this appeal arises challenging the validity of the order of the Government.\n\nThe petition was founded on three grounds : ( 1) that the order violated r. 138 of the Recruitment Rules framed by the Government of Bombay in 1957; (2) that the order violated the proviso to cl. ( 6) of s. 81 in that it altered the conditions of service of the applicants; and (3) that it violated the provisions of the Allocated Government Servants' (Absorption, Seniority, Pay & Allowances) Rules, 1957.\n\nCounsel for the applicants conceded before the High Court that the transfer of the former Saurashtra 11nd Kutch States Secretariat personnel to the Gujarat Secretariat per se was not open to objection.\n\nThe High Court did not consider whether the Saurashtra and Kutch States secretariat personnel had \"any rights flowing on account of absorption 11nd integration of service under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 or the Allocated Government Servants' Rules, 1957 .\" But the High Court held that since the impugned order purported to amalgamate the former Saurashtra and Kutch States personnel with the Gujarat Secretariat Service contrary to the terms of r. 138 of the Recruitment Rules. and the Governmept had no authority to vary the method of recruitment provided by the statutory r. 138 of the Recruitment Rules which was mandatory, the orders of transfer to the Secretariat which was not made in the process of integration could not operate as absorption under the Allocated Government Servants' (Absorption, Seniority. Pay & Allowances) Rule~. 1957. The High Court also observed that when the ministerial service employees of the former Saurashtra and Kutch States Secretariats were absorbed in the districts, integration of the services was complete and any transfer thereafter to the Secretariat could not and did not amount to absorption in equivalent posts.\n\nIt is necessary first to examine the scheme of ss. 115 & 116 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Section 115 was intended to provide for the conditions of service of employees who ilnmediatelv before November 1, 1956 were serving i; n connection with the affairs o.f a State and were allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of another State.\n\nPower to fix the conditions of service was reserved exclusively to the Central Government.\n\nFor that purpose the Central Government was authorised to establish one or more Advisory Committees to advise the Government on the division and integration of the services in the new States and for ensuring fair and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the\n\n,520\n\n\\ ·,~., i-;.:~~· -~\\ ;> ;·\n\n;· '~··.'I . :·-.- / \"'\" -i\n\n,' SUPREME , cOURT REPORTS\n\n[1970] 3 S.C.R. \\\" '.. . .. \\\\ ·,. '-\n\n'-<: provisions f s.· 115 and for proper consideratlonof any r; p; sen- Ao . tatio°'made by those persons.\n\nBy the proviso to sub-s. (7) s. 115 a guarantee was_ given to every allotted public servant that his conditions of service shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government.' Section 116 provided for the continuance of officers in equivalent posts. This Court in N. Raghavendra Rao v. Deput;:y. Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore(1) held that the effect of sub-s. (7) of s. ll 5 is to preserve the power of the State to make rules under Att; 309 of the Constitution, but the proviso imposes a limitatiqn on the exercise of that power; the !imitation is that the State cannot vary the conditions of service applicable immediately before November 1, 1956, to the disadvantage of persons mentioned in sub-ss.\n\n(1) & (2) of s. 115. In the view of the Conn the broa.d purpose underlying the proviso to s. 115 (7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of service shall not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government, that is, before embarking on varying the conditions of servfce, the State Governments should obtain the concurrence of the Central Government. ·\n\nIn Union of India & Anr. v. P. K. Ro, v & Ors.(2) this Court held that it is the duty of the Central Government ta integrate the services, but the State may be asked to prepare a provisional gradation list provided the Central Government maintains its . control over it.\n\nIt is clear that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day in the case of any person who is allotted to anot.her State cannot be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. This protection could not be removed by the rules made by the State subsequent to November 1, 1956, U; nless the previous approval of the Central Government was obtained thereto. It is true that the ministerial service personnel in the states of Saurashtra and Kutch, after they were allotted to the State of Bombay were posted and assigned duties in various districts in Saurashtra and Kutch.\n\nBut in the absence of evidence to show that the previous approval of the Ct; ntral Government was obtained, their right to be absorbed in equivalent posts in the new State of Bombay and later in the.State of Gujarat was not thereby affected. It appears that there has not been any equivalence established between the posts in the Secretariats of the States of Saurashtra and Kutch and the posts 'in the new State of Bombay and later in the State of Gujarat to which the members of the ministerial service of the Secretariats of former Saurashtra and Kutch States were allotted.\n\nThe mere fact that they were posted\n\n(I) [1964] 7 S.C. R. 549.\n\n(2) [1968[ 2 S. C. R. 186.\n\n- 1\n\nand continued to render service in the Districts will not in ur\n\njudment, affect the right of the personnel to be absorbed in the eqmvalent posts m the Secretariat and on terms not disadvarita-· geous to those they were already entitled except with the previous approval of the Central Government. ·\n\nB It was conced, and rightly! that the State has the authority to transfer, subiect to the Consl!tution and the rules made under Art. 30? any public servant to render service which by his training and aptitude he was competent to do.\n\nTransfer of the personnel from the States o.f Saurashtra and Kutch to the Secretariat in the St~ of. Gujarat. and assignment of duties performable by the c mm1stenal staff m the Secretariat cannot be challenged, and that\n\nbecause they were posted between 1956 and 1960 in the Districts they.will not e dprived <_>f their statutory right under s. 115(7)\n\npros?. Postu; ig m te districts was and must rema.\\n purely\n\nprov1s10nal~ unhl final mtegration is made by the Central Government.\n\nIt is common ground that no such final integratiO!ll had been made by the Central Government, _ D.\n\nTwo grounds appealed to the High Court in deciding the case against the appellants : ( 1) that the appellants were trimsferred to the Secretariat of the State of Gujarat, but they were not absorbed in the ministerial service of the Secretariat of the State of Gujarat.\n\nIn the view of the High Court there was merely \"regularisation'' of the appointment of those persons for the purpose of performing service in the Secretariat; and (2) that the order dated.August 19, 1966 was contrary to the Recruitment Rules, 1957.\n\nIf it be grainted that the State was competent to transfer and did transfer the appellants to perform service in connection with F the affairs of the State in the Secretariat, it is difficult to hold that when the State \"regularised\" the service of the appellants in the secretariat with the consent of the Public Service Commission there was no absorption under the Absorption Rules.\n\nIt is true that the expression \"absorption\" has not been used in !he oi:cier, but that will not justify an inference that there was no mtentton to absorb G the former Saurashtra Kutch States personnel in the Secretariat. In the absence of determination of equivalent posts unde~ ,, the orders of the Central Government, !he State of Gujarat was ' competent, as a matter of provisional arrangem:nt to ab~rb e former Saurashtra and Kutch States personnel l\\1l the mm1stenal establishment of the Gujarat State Secretariat.\n\nIn terms the order says that the persons named therein \"should be treated to have 8 . been regularly appointed in the posts shown against their nam:s\n\nitn column-4 of the statement\" appended to the order.\n\nThat, In our judgment, amounted to absorption.\n\nOriginal r. 13 8 o.f the Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939, was deleted and the following rule was -substituted on May 22, 1957. The relevant part of the rule reads:\n\n\"138. The ministerial staff in the Secretariat and attached offices is divided into two Divisions.\n\n(a) Upper; and (b) Lower.\n\n(i) Superintendents : Appointments shall be made by promotion from among Senior Assistants.\n\n(ii) Senior Assistants : Appointments shall be made\n\nby promotion from among J u, nior Assistants. c\n\n(iii) Junior Assistants : Appointments shall be made either:-\n\n(a) by nomination on the results of a competitive\n\nexamination held by the Bombay Public Service Commission, or n\n\n(b) by promotion from among members of the Lower Division.\n\nProvided that not more than one out of every four vacancies in the psts of Junior Assistants shall ordinarily be filled by promotion.\n\n(2) To be eligible for appointment by nomination .a candidate must :-\n\n(i) hold a degree in Arts, law, science, Agriculture or commerce o.'. a recognised University or possess an equivalent qualification;\n\n(ii) have attained the age of 18 years; and\n\n(iii) not have attained the age of 30 years in the case of members of the Lower Division appointed on the recomme, ndation of the commission and who have graduaied while in service and in a, ny other case 24 years on the first day of the month immediately following month in which the posts are advertised by the Commission.\n\nH. Lower Division\n\n(b) Clerb, clerk-typists, typists: Appointments shall be made by nomination on the results of a competi- tive examination held by the Commission.\n\nA Provided that suitable members of Class IV services\n\nwho while in that service, have passed the Secondary School Certificate Exai; nination or an examination recognised by Government as equivalent to that examination, shall be eligible for appointment to the posts of clerks by promotion.\n\n(2) To be eligible for appointment by nomipation, a candidate must :-\n\n(i) have passed the secondary school certificate examination or an examination recognised by Government as equivalent to that examination;\n\n(ii) have attained the age of 18 years; and\n\n(iii) not have attained the age of 23 years on the first day of the month immediately following the . month in which the posts are advertised by the Commission.\n\nA candidate• for the post of clerk-typist or typist must, also be able to type neatly and accurately at a ininimum speed of 40 wor.ds per minute.\n\nThe High Court held that recruitment to the ministerial staff in the Secretariat could only be by nomination or by promotion from among members of-the Lower Division, nomination being on the result o.f a competitive examination held by the Public Service\n\nCommission and promotion being from the subordinate staff. Jn view of this rule, according to the High Court, it was inot open to the State Government to adopt any other method of recruitment of the members of the ministerial staff.\n\nCounsel for the appellants contended that r. 138 only dealt with the existing servants anc! did not prevent any additional members from being amalgamated in the ministerial staff in the Secretariat.\n\nHe also contended that the recruitment did not amount to admission of an officer for the first time in the service. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to consider these arguments. Assuming that r. 138 requires the State to follow a certain method for recruitment to the ministerial service, that rule made under Art. 309 of the Constitution cannot take away the statutory right vested in the personnel of the former Saurashtra and Kutch States which they acquired under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, to hold posts in the new State which were equivalent and on terms which were not, unless the previous approval of the Central Government was\n\nobtained, disadvantageous.\n\nSince the arrangement which is made by the Government of the State of Gujarat must be regarded as provisional and to enure so long as the Central Government does not make a final decision, it is not open to the officers of the Secretariat to challenge the authority of the Govemment of Gujarat either to transfer officers from the Districts and to post and l!SSi~ them duties in the Secretariat or to fix their pay and senionty among the officers in the Secretariat perfonning ministerial duties.\n\nThe appeal .must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court must be set aside. The petition filed by the respondents Nos. 2 to 148 will stand dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs throughout.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "M. D. SHUKLA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. D. SHUKLA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 6, 1970\n\n[J. C. SIL\\H AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 115, 116, 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States Reorganisation Act", "statute": "States Reorganisation Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 81, 82 & 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "statute": "Bombay Reorganisation Act"}}, {"text": "Pennanent employees of Saurashtra and Kutch States allotted to Bombay State afer passing of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 717, "end_char": 781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1076, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of s, 8 of the States Reorganisation Act 37 of 1956 the new State of Bombay which included the territories elf the States of Saurashtra and Kutch was formed."}}, {"text": "Kutch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1176, "end_char": 1181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of s, 8 of the States Reorganisation Act 37 of 1956 the new State of Bombay which included the territories elf the States of Saurashtra and Kutch was formed."}}, {"text": "s. 115(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1201, "end_char": 1210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939", "statute": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1339, "end_char": 1348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939", "statute": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1574, "end_char": 1592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bv the proviso to s. 115(7) it was provided that 'conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person allotted to another State shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government'."}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939", "statute": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939", "statute": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Rearuitment Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "ss. 114, 115 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2082, "end_char": 2088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large majority of the members elf the ministerial branch of the Secretariats of the State of Saurasht•a and Kutch were unwilling to be posted in the Secretariat of the new State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2507, "end_char": 2532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2559, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960 the States elf Gujarat and Maharashtra were carved out of the territory of the new State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2571, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Bombay Reorganisation Act 11 of 1960 the States elf Gujarat and Maharashtra were carved out of the territory of the new State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Sections 81, 82 and 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2644, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 115, 116 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2714, "end_char": 2734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State elf Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State elf Gujarat transferred the appellants from the districts to the Secretariat~ After consulting the Public Service Commission it issued on August 19,\n\n19~6 an order\"relrising\" the services of the app.ellants and fixing their pay and semonty."}}, {"text": "August 19,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3011, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State elf Gujarat transferred the appellants from the districts to the Secretariat~ After consulting the Public Service Commission it issued on August 19,\n\n19~6 an order\"relrising\" the services of the app.ellants and fixing their pay and semonty."}}, {"text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3577, "end_char": 3641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guja", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4126, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court noted that no equivalence had been established between the posts in the Secretariats of the States of Saurashtra and Kutch and the posts in the new State of Bombay or later in Guja:rat and that there had been no integration df the services by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "State df Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F]\n\nIn the absence of determination of equivalent posts under the orders of the Central Government, the State df Gujarat was competent, as a matter of provisional arrangement to absorb the former Saurashtra and Kutch States personnel in the ministerial establishment of the Gujarat State Secretariat."}}, {"text": "Gujarat State Secretariat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4967, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F]\n\nIn the absence of determination of equivalent posts under the orders of the Central Government, the State df Gujarat was competent, as a matter of provisional arrangement to absorb the former Saurashtra and Kutch States personnel in the ministerial establishment of the Gujarat State Secretariat."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gujarat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5932, "end_char": 5950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the arrangement which was made by the Gujarat Government must be regarded as provisional and to ensure so Jong as the Central Government did not make a finaJ dcision, it was not open to the officers of \"the Secretariat to challenge the authority of the Government of Gujarat either to transfer officers from the Districts and to post and assign them f the Secretariat performing ministerial duties. ["}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6147, "end_char": 6168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the arrangement which was made by the Gujarat Government must be regarded as provisional and to ensure so Jong as the Central Government did not make a finaJ dcision, it was not open to the officers of \"the Secretariat to challenge the authority of the Government of Gujarat either to transfer officers from the Districts and to post and assign them f the Secretariat performing ministerial duties. ["}}, {"text": "[1964) 7 S.C.R. 549", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1968) 2 S.C.R. 186", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6748, "end_char": 6760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Viet Kumar and J. R. Nanavati, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6762, "end_char": 6776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Viet Kumar and J. R. Nanavati, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Viet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6778, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Viet Kumar and J. R. Nanavati, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. R. Nanavati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6793, "end_char": 6807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Viet Kumar and J. R. Nanavati, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, fot respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, fot respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, fot respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 6989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nCertain officers in the ministerial branch of the Secretariat Service of the State of Gujarat moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for an order directing the State Gover, nment to treat its order dated August 19, 1966 as \"illegal, void and of no effect\" and to forbear from enforcing its order treating the persons whose nanies were specified in the annexure to the order."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nCertain officers in the ministerial branch of the Secretariat Service of the State of Gujarat moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for an order directing the State Gover, nment to treat its order dated August 19, 1966 as \"illegal, void and of no effect\" and to forbear from enforcing its order treating the persons whose nanies were specified in the annexure to the order."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7603, "end_char": 7619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to November 1, 1956, the appellants were holding permanent posts in the ministerial service of the Secretariats of the Part B State of Saurashtra and the Part C State of Kutch."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7991, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8078, "end_char": 8084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114, 115 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8945, "end_char": 8965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8989, "end_char": 9020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9188, "end_char": 9208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitu!ion, the Government of Bombay sanctioned certain rules called \"The Allocated Government Servants' (Absorption, Seniority, Pay & Allowances) Rules, 1957\"."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9894, "end_char": 9899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "Under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10063, "end_char": 10068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 115, 116 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10244, "end_char": 10275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10353, "end_char": 10369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Gujarat under s. 81 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10376, "end_char": 10381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nStates Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the\n\nStates Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Secretariat of the State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10605, "end_char": 10640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The newly constituted State of Gujarat finding a dearth of experienced officers in the Secretariat transferred the appellants at diverse times between the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 to the Secretariat of the State of Gujarat and assigned them duties in <:Onnection with the Secretariat Service."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11025, "end_char": 11040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately on August 19, 1966, the State Government issued the o:rder to the following effect :\n\n\"The questiol'J. of regularising the appointment to various posts in the Secretariat Department on and after 1st May 1960 of the drafted persons was under the consideration of Government for some time."}}, {"text": "1st May 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11217, "end_char": 11229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately on August 19, 1966, the State Government issued the o:rder to the following effect :\n\n\"The questiol'J. of regularising the appointment to various posts in the Secretariat Department on and after 1st May 1960 of the drafted persons was under the consideration of Government for some time."}}, {"text": "Gujarat Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11373, "end_char": 11406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government is now pleased to direct, in consultation with the Gujarat Public Service Commission, that the persons shown in the accompanying statement should be treated to have been regularly appointed in the posts shown against their names in column-4 of the statement with effect from the date shown in column-5 in the Departments mentioned in column-3 of the statement."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12641, "end_char": 12646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 115 & 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14264, "end_char": 14277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14285, "end_char": 14316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14318, "end_char": 14329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15201, "end_char": 15207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15397, "end_char": 15408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15945, "end_char": 15951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16022, "end_char": 16028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17135, "end_char": 17150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the ministerial service personnel in the states of Saurashtra and Kutch, after they were allotted to the State of Bombay were posted and assigned duties in various districts in Saurashtra and Kutch."}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C. R. 549", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17850, "end_char": 17870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18336, "end_char": 18343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18785, "end_char": 18794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19522, "end_char": 19545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20258, "end_char": 20274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he State of Gujarat was ' competent, as a matter of provisional arrangem:nt to ab~rb e former Saurashtra and Kutch States personnel l\\1l the mm1stenal establishment of the Gujarat State Secretariat."}}, {"text": "Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 22, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20855, "end_char": 20867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Original r. 13 8 o.f the Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules, 1939, was deleted and the following rule was -substituted on May 22, 1957."}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21367, "end_char": 21399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\n(iii) Junior Assistants : Appointments shall be made either:-\n\n(a) by nomination on the results of a competitive\n\nexamination held by the Bombay Public Service Commission, or n\n\n(b) by promotion from among members of the Lower Division."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24218, "end_char": 24226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24380, "end_char": 24411, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24626, "end_char": 24660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the arrangement which is made by the Government of the State of Gujarat must be regarded as provisional and to enure so long as the Central Government does not make a final decision, it is not open to the officers of the Secretariat to challenge the authority of the Govemment of Gujarat either to transfer officers from the Districts and to post and l!SSi~ them duties in the Secretariat or to fix their pay and senionty among the officers in the Secretariat perfonning ministerial duties."}}, {"text": "Govemment of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24856, "end_char": 24876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the arrangement which is made by the Government of the State of Gujarat must be regarded as provisional and to enure so long as the Central Government does not make a final decision, it is not open to the officers of the Secretariat to challenge the authority of the Govemment of Gujarat either to transfer officers from the Districts and to post and l!SSi~ them duties in the Secretariat or to fix their pay and senionty among the officers in the Secretariat perfonning ministerial duties."}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_525_529_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "r A\n\nGOVINDA KADTUJI KADAM & ORS. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA February 9, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]\n\nCade of Criminal Procedure, (5 of\n\n1898) & 411-Hig Court- Appeal-Su1111nary distnissal-Duty to indicate views on points raised.\n\nThe four appellants along with K, were jointly tried and convicted for offences under s. 147 !PC. They all jointly appealed to the High Coun by one memorandum of appeal. The High Court admitted the appeal on behalf of K, and dismis'°d in limine the appeal on beba]'[ of the appellants.\n\nIn appeal to this Court. the appellants challenged the order dismissing in lbnine the appeal on their behalf, when the appeal of K, co-accused, was admitted for hearing on merits after notice to the State.\n\nHELD : When an appeal in the High Court raises a serious and substantial point which is prinza jacie arguable it is improper for that court to dismiss it summarily without giving some indication of its view on the points raised. The interest n depends. is not declared final.\n\nR. C. COOPER \\\". UNION 533\n\nA [Since the Act was declan~mpulsorily acquii:ed. [577 H-578 DJ\n\nThe aal and V. J. Francis, for intervener No. 1.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for intervener No. 2.\n\nS. Mohan Kumaramangalam and A. V. Rangam, for intervener No. 3.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General, Bihar, R. K. Garg a.nd D. P. Singh, for interevener No. 4.\n\nH V. K. Krishna Menon, M. R. K. Pillai and D. P. Singh, for intervener No. S. · -\n\nA P. Ram Reddy and P. Parameswara Rao, for intervener No. 6.\n\nM. C. Chag/a, San, tosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for intervener No. 7.\n\nThe Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ. was delivered by SHAH, J. A. N. RAY, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.\n\nShah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution, and are on that account invalid.\n\nIn India there was till 1949 no comprehensive legislation governing banking business and banking institutions. The Central Legislature enacted the Banking Companies Act 10 of 1949 (later called \"The Banking Regulation Act\") to consolidate. and amend the Jaw relating to certain matters concerning banking.\n\nBy s. 5 (b) of that Act, \"banking\" was defined as meaning \"the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise\"; and by s. 5 ( c) a \"banking company\" meant \"any company which transacts the business of banking in India\". By s. 6 it was enacted that in addition to the business of banking as defined in s. 5 (b) a banking company may engage in one or more of the forms of business specified in els. (a) to ( o) of sub-s. (1). By sul:>-s. (2) of s. 6 banking companies were prohibited from engaging \"in any form of business other than those referred to in sub-section . ( 1) \". The Act applied to commercial banks, and enacted provisions, amongst others, relating to prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment; minimum paid-up capital and reserves; regulation of voting rights of shareholders and election of Board of Directors; H prohibition of charge on unpaid capital; restriction on payment of dividend; maintenance of a percentage of assets; return of unclaimed deposits; and accounts and balance sheets. It also enacted provisions authorising the Reserve Bank to issue directions\n\nto and for trial of proi; eedings against the Banks and for speedy disposal of winct¥ig , up proceedings of Banks.\n\nThe Banking Regulation Act was amended by Act 58 of 1968, to give effect to the policy of \"social control\" over commercial banks. Act 58 of 1968 provided for reconstitution of the Boards of Directors of commercial banks with a Chainnan who had practical experience of the working of a Bank or financial, economic and business administration, and with a membership not less than - 51 % consisting of persons having special knowledge or practical experience in accountancy, agriculture and rural economy, banking, cooperation, economics, finance, law and small-scale industry. The Act also provided that no loans shall be granted to any director of the Bank or to any concern in which he is interested as Managing Director, Manager, employee, or guarantor or partner or in which he holds substantial interest. The Reserve Bank was invested with power to give directions to commercial banks and to appoint directors or observers in the interest of depositors or proper management of the Banking Companies, or in the interest of Banking policy (which expression was defined by s. 5 (ca) as \"any policy which is specified from time to time by the Reserve Bank in the interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth, having due regard to the interests of the depositors, volume of deposits and other resources of the bank and the need for equitable allocation and the efficient use of these deposits and resources\".\n\nThe Reserve Bank was also invested with power to remove managerial and other personnel from office and to appoint additional directors, and to issue directions prohibiting certain activities in relation to Banking Companies. The Central Government was given power to acquire the business of any Bank if\n\nit failed repeatedly to comply with any direction issued by the Reserve Bank under certain specific provision in regard to any - F matter copcerning the affairs of the Bank and if acquisition of the Bank was considered necessary in the interest of the depositors or in the interest of the banking policy or for the better provision of credit generally or of credit to any particular section of the community or in a particular area.\n\nDuring the last two decades the Reserve Bank reorganised the banking structure.\n\nA number of units which accounted for a small section of the ban king business were amalgamated under directions of the Reserve Bank.\n\nThe total number of commercial banking institutions was reduced from 566 in 1951 to 89 in 1969, 73 scheduled and 16 non-scheduled.\n\nIn exercise of the authority conferred by the State Bank of India Act 21 1955 the undertaking of the former Imperial Bank of India was taken over by a public corporation controlled by the\n\nCentral Government. The State Bank took over seven subsi diaries under authority conferred by Act 38 of 1959. There\n\nwer~ in June .1969 14 commercial banks operating in India each havmg. deposits exceeding Rs. 50 crores.\n\nThe following is an analysis of the commercial banking structure in India in June 1969:\n\nState Bank of India\n\nSubsidiaries of State Bank\n\nNo.of Banks No. of Offices\n\n1,566\n\nDeposits Credit (in crores) (in crores)\n\n948 967\n\nC oflndia 7 888 291 219 Indian scheduled commerc1aI banks (each with deposit exceeding Rs. 50 cores)\n\nBanks incorporated in\n\n14 4,130 2,632 1,829\n\nD foreign countries 15' 130 478 385\n\nOther Indian Scheduled Banks\n\nNon-scheduled commercial Banks\n\n*Only 13 were operating.\n\n1,324 296 197\n\n216 28 16\n\nLate in the afternoon of July 19, 1969 (which was a Saturday) the Vice-President (acting as President) promulgated, in exercise of the power conferred by cl. ( 1) of Art. 123 of the Constitution, Ordinance 8 of 1969 transferring to and vesting the undertaking of 14 named commercial banks in corresponding new banks set up under the Ordinance. The long little of the Ordinance read as follows :\n\n\"An Ordinance to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the undertakings of certain banking companies in order to serve better the needs of development of the economy in conformity with national policy and objectives and for matters cQllJ1ected therewith or incidental thereto.\"\n\nBy s. 2 \"banking company\" was defined as not including .a foreign company within the meaning of s. 591 of the Compames Act,\n\n1956. An \"existing bank\" was defined bys. 2(b) as meaning \"a banking company specified in column 1 of the First Schedule, being a company the deposits of which, as shown in the return as on the last Friday of June, 1969, furnished to the Reserve Bank\n\nunder section 27 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, were not less than rupees fifty crores\". In the Schedule to the Act were included the names of fourteen commercial banks :\n\n1. The Central Bank of Iadia Ltd.\n\n2. The Bank of India Ltd.\n\n3. The Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\n4. The Bank of Baroda Ltd.\n\n5. The United Commercial Bank Ltd.\n\n6. Canara Bank Ltd.\n\n7. United Bank of India Ltd.\n\n8. Dena Bank Ltd.\n\n9. Syndicate Bank Ltd.\n\n10. The Union Bank of India Ltd.\n\n11. Allahabad Bank Ltd.\n\n12. The Indian Bank Ltd.\n\n13. The Bank of Maharashtra Ltd.\n\n14. The Indian Overseas Bank Ltd.\n\nThese banks are hereinafter referred to as the named banks.\n\nA \"corresponding new bank\" was defined in relation to an exist ing bank as meaning \"the body corporate specified against such bank in column 2 of the First Schedule\". Bys. 2(g) it was provided that the words and expressions used in the Ordinance and not defined, but defined in the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, had the meaning respectively assigned to them in that Act. Thereby the definitions of \"banking\" and \"banking company\" in s. 5 (b) and s. 5 ( c) of the Banking Regulation Act were incorporated i11 the Ordinance. The principal provisions of the Ordinance were :-\n\n( 1) Corporations styled in the ordinance \"corresponding new banks\" shall be established, each such corporation having paidup capital equal to the paid-up capital of the named bank in relation to which it is a corresponding new bank.\n\nThe entire capital of the new bank shall stand vested in the Central Govern l ment. The corresponding new banks shall be authorised to G carry on and tranact the business of banking as defined in cl.\n\n(b) of s. 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and also to engage in one or more forms of business specified in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 6 of that Act.\n\nThe Chairman of. the named bank holding office immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance shall be the' Custodian of the corresponding new bank. The gene- H ral superintendence and direction of the affairs and business of a corresponding bank shall be vested in the Custodian, who shall be the chief executive officer of that bank.\n\n(2) The undertaking within or without fadia of ever; numd bank on the commencement of the Ordinance shall stand transferred to and vested in the corresponding new bank. The expression \"undertaking\" shall include all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges, and all property, movable and immovable, cash balances, reserve fund investments and all other rights and interests arising out of such property as are immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance in the ownership, possession, power or control of the named bank in relation to the undertaking, including all books of accounts, registers, records and all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto. It shall also include all borrowings, liabilities and obligations of whatever kind then subsisting of the named bank in reiation to the undertaking. If according to the Jaw of any foreign country, the provisions of the Ordinance by themselves do not effectively transfer or vest any asset or liability situated in that country in the corresponding new bank, the affairs of the named bank in relation to such asset or liability shall stand entrusted to the chief executive officer of the corresponding new bank with authority to take steps to wind up the affairs of that bank. All contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements, powers of attorney, grants of legal representation and other instruments of whatever nature subsisting or having effect immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance, and to which the named bank is a party or which are in favour of the named bank shall be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the corresponding new bank, and be enforced or acted upon as fully and effectively as if in the place of the named bank the corresponding new bank is a party thereto or as if they are issued in favour of the corresponding new bank.\n\nIn pending suits or other proceedings by or against the named bank, the corresponding new bank shall be substituted in those suits or proceedings.\n\nAny reference to any named bank in any Jaw, other than the Ordinance, or in any contract or other instrument shall be construed as a reference to the corresponding new bank in relation to it.\n\n(3) The Central Government shall have power to frame a scheme for carrying out the provisions of the Act. and for that purpose to make provisions for the corresponding new banks relating to capital structure. constitution of the Board of Directors, manner of payment of compensation to the shareholders, and matters incidental, consequential and supplemental. Corresponding new banks shall also be guided in the discharge of their functions by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may give.\n\n( 4) On the commencement of the Ordinance, every person holding office as Chairman, Managing Director, or other Director of a named bank, shall be deemed to have vacated office, and A all officers and other employees of a named bank shall become officers or other employees of the corresponding new banks. Every named bank shall stand dissolved on such date as the Central Government may by notification in that behalf appoint.\n\n( 5) The Central Government shall give compensation to the B named banks determined according to the principles set out in Second Schedule, that is to say,-\n\n( a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be determined in accordance with such agreement;\n\n(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central C Government shall refer the matter to the Tribunal within a period of three months from the date on which the Central Government and the existing bank fail to reach an agreement regarding the amount of compensation.\n\nCompensation so determined shall be paid to each named bank in marketable Central Government securities.\n\nFor the purpose of determining compensation, Tribunals shall be set up by the Central Government with certain powers of a Civil Court.\n\n(6) The Central Government shall 'have power to make such orders not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance which may be necessary for the purpose of removing defects.\n\nUnder the Ordinance the entire undertaking of every named commercial bank was tak.n over by the corresponding new bank, and all assets and contractual rights and all obligations to which the named bank was subject stood transferred to the corresponding new bank. The Chairman and the Directors of the Banks vacated their respective officers.\n\nTo the named banks survived oniy the right to rec:eive compensation to be determined in the manner prescribed.\n\nCompensation, unless settled by agreement, was to be determined by the Tribunal, and was to be given in marketable Government securities. The entire business of each named bank was accordingly taken over, its chief executive officer ceased to hold office and assumed the office of Custodian of the corresponding new bank, its directors vacated, office; and the services of the administrative and other staff stood transferred to the corresponding new bank. The /llamed bank had thereafter no assets, no business, and no managerial, administrative or other staff, ii was incompetent (I) use the word \"Bank\" in its name, because of the provisions contained in s. 7 (1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and was liable to be dissolved by a notification of the Central Government.\n\nPetitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance were lodged in this Court on July 21, 1969.\n\nBut fore the petitions could be heard by this Court, a.Bill to enact provisions relating to acquisition and transfer. of undertakings of the existing banks was introduced in the Parhament, and was enacted on August 9, 1969, as \"The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969\". The Jong title of the Act was in terms identical with the long title, of the Ordinance. By sub-s. ( 1) of s. 27 of the Act, Ordinance 8 of 1969 was repealed. In the First Schedule were included the names of the 14 banks named in the Ordinance in juxtapositien with the names of the corresponding new banks.\n\nBy sub-s. (2) of s. 1, the Act came into force on July 19, 1969, and the undertaking of every named bank was deemed, with effect from that date, to have vested in the corresponding new bank. Bys. 27(2), (3) and (4) actions taken or things done under the Ordinance inconsistent with the provisions of the Act were not to be of any force or effect, and no right, privilege, obligation or liability was to be deemed to h; tve been acquired, accrued or incurred under the Ordin.ance.\n\nThe general scheme of the Ordinance relating to the transfer to and vesting in the corresponding new bank of the undertaking of each named bank, payment of compensation, and management of the corresponding new bank, remained unaltered. The Act departed from the Ordinance in certain matters :\n\n(I) Under the Act the named banks remain in existence for certain purposes and they are not liable to be dissolved by order of the Government. If under the laws in force in any foreign country it is not permissible for a banking company. owned or controlled by Government, to carry on the business of banking in that country, the assets, rights, powers, authorities and privi!eg.es and property, movable and immovable, cash balances and investments of any named bank operating in that country shall not vest in the corresponding new bank. The directors of the named banks shall remain in office and may register transfers or transmission of shares; arrive at an agreement about the amount of compensation payable under the Act or appearing before the Tribunal for obtaining a determination as to the amount of compensation; distribute to shareholders the amount of compensation received by the Bank under the Act for the acquisition of its undertaking; carry on the business of banking in any country outside.India if under the law in force in that country any bank,. owned or controlled by Gov-· ernment, is prohibited from carrying on the business of banking there; and carry on any business other than the business of banking. The Central Government has power to authorise the corresponding new bank to advance the amount required by the named bank in connection with the functions which the directors may perform.\n\nReference to any named bank in any Jaw, or in any\n\ncontract or other instrument shall be construed as a reference to 4 the corresponding new bank in relation to it, but not in cases where the hamed bank may carry on any business and in relation to that business.\n\n( 2) Prip.ciples for determination of compensation and the manner of payment are modified. ll)terim compensation may be paid to a named bank if it agrees to distribute to its shareholders in accordance with their rights and interests. A major change is made in the principles for determining compensation set out in\n\nSch. II. BY Explanation I to cl. ( e) of Part I of Sch. II, the value of any land or buildings to be taken into account in valuing the assets is to be the market value of the land or buildings, but where such market value exceeds the \"ascertained value\", that \"ascertained value\" is to be taken into account, and by Explanation II the \"ascertained value\" of any building wholly occupied on the\n\ndate of the commencement of the Act is to be twelve times the amount of the annual rent or the rent for which the building may reasonably be expected to be let out from year to year, and reduced by one-sixth of the amount of the rent on account of maintenance and repairs, annual premium paid to insure the building against risk of damage or destruction, annual charge, if any, on the building, ground rent, interest on any mortgage or other capital charge on the building, interest on borrowed capital if the building has been acquired, constructed, repaired, reinewed or re-constructed with borrowed capital, and the sums paid on account of land revenue or E other taxes in respect of such building. ( 3) The Central Government may reconstitute any corresponding new bank into two or more corporations; amalgamate any corresponding new bank with another banking institution; transfer the whole or any pari of the undertaking of a corresponding new bank to any other banking institution: or transfer the whole or any part of the undertaking of any other banking institution to a corresponding new bank. The Board of Directors of the corresponding new banks are to consist of representatives of the depositors of the corresponding new bank. employees of such banks, farmers. workers and artisans to be elected in the prescribed man- . ner and of other persons as the Central Government may appoint.\n\n( 4) The profits remaining after making provision for bad and doubtful debts. depreciation in assets, contributions to staff and superannuation funds and ail other matters for which provision is necessary under any law. th.~ corresponding new bank shall transfer the balance of profits to the Central Government.\n\n( 5) Provision of law relating to winding up of corporations H do not apply to the corresponding new banks, and a correspondini: new bank may be ordered to be liquidated only by the order of the Central Government.\n\nThe petitioner challenges tb.e validity of the Ordinance and the Act on the following principal grounds :\n\n(i) The Ordinance promulgated in. exercise of the power under Art. 123 of the Constitution was invalid, because the condition precedent to the exercise of the power did not exist;\n\n(ii) That in enacting the Act the Parliament encroached upon the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and to that extent the Act is outside the legislative competence of the _Parliament;\n\n(iii) That by enactment of the 1 Act, fundamentaY rights of the petitioner guaranteed by the Constitution under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) & (g) and 31 (2) are impaired;\n\n(iv)\n\n(v)\n\nThat by the Act the guarantee of freedom of trade under Art. 301 is violated; and That in any event retrospective operation given to Act 22 of 1969 is ineffective, since there was no valid Ordinance in existence. The provision in the Act retrospectively validating infringement of the fundamental rights of citizem was not within the competence of the Parliament. That sub-sections (1) & (2) of s. 11 and s. 26 are invalid.\n\nThe Attorney-General contended that the petitions are not maintainable, because no fundamental right of the petitioner i& directly impaired by the enactment of the Ordinance. and the Act, or by any action taken thereunder. He submitted that the petitioner who claims to be a shareholder, director and holder of deposit and current accounts with the Banks is not the owner of the property -0f tb.e undertaking , taken over by the corresponding new banks and is on that account incompetent to maintain the petitions complaining that the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the constitution were impaired.\n\nA company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property' of the Company is not the property of the shareholders. A shareholder has merely an interest in the Company arising uner its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the H purpose of liability, and by a share in the profit.\n\nAgain a director . of a Company is merely its agent for the purpose of management.\n\nThe holder of a deposit account in a Company is its creditor : he is not the owner of any specific fund lying with the Company. A\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.ll.\n\n:shareholder, a depositor or a director may not therefore be entitled A to move a petition for infringement of the rights of the Company, unless by the action impugned by him, his rights are also infringed. -\n\n_ By a petition praying for a writ against infringement of fundamental rights, except in a case where the petition is for a writ of habeas corpus and probably for infringement of the guarantee under Arts. 17, 23 and 24, the petitioner may seek relief in respect of his own rights and notof others. The shareholder of a Company, it is rue, is not the owner of its assets; he has merely a right to participate in the profits of the Company subject to the contract contained in the Articles of Association. But on that account the petitions will not fail.\n\nA measure executive or legislative may impair the rights of the Company alone, and not of its shareholders; it may impair the rights of the shareholders and not of the Company : it may impair the rights of the shareholders as well as of the Company. Jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief cannot be denied, when by State action the rights of the individual shareholder are impaired, if that action impairs the rights of the Company as well.\n\nThe test in determining whether the sharebolder's right is impaired is not formal: it is essentially qualitative: if the State action impairs the right of the shareholders as well as to the Company, the Court will not, concentrating merely upon the technical operation 9f the action, deny itself jurisdiction to grant relief.\n\nThe petitioner claims that by .the Act and by the Ordinance the rights guaranteed to him under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution are impaired.\n\nHe says that the Act and the Ordinance are without legislative competence in that they interfere with the guarantee of freedom of trade and are not made in the - public interest; that the Parliament had no le)!islative competence\n\nto enact the Act and the President had no power to promulgate F the Ordinance, because the subject-matter of the Act and the Ordinance is (partially at least) within the State List; and that the Act and Ordinance are invalid because thev vest the undertaking of the named banks in the new corporations without a public purpose and without setting out principles and the basis for determination and payment of a just equivalent for the pro perty expropriated.\n\nHe says that in conseciuence of the hostile discrimination practised by the State the value of his investment in the shares is substantially reduced, his right to receive dividend from his investment has ceased, and he has suffered great financial loss, he is deprived of the right as a shareholder to carry on business through the agencv of the Company, and that in respect of the deposits the obligations of the corresponding new banks not of his choice are substituted without his consent.\n\n(l) (1954] S. C. R. 674.\n\nIn Dwarkadas Shrlnivas v. The Sho/apur Spinning &: Weaving Co. Ltd, and Others(') this Court held that a p, refereince shareholder of a company is competent to maintain a suit challenging the validity of the \"Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance\" 2 of 1950 (which was later replaced by Act 27 of 1950), which deprived the Company of its property without payment of compensation within the meaning of Art. 31. Mahajan, J., observed :\n\n\"The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders are in imminent danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the enforcement of this Ordinance, the direct injury being the amount of the call that they are called upon to pay and the consequent forfeiture of their shares,\"\n\nDas, J., in the same case examined the matter in some detail and observed at p. 722 :\n\n\"The impugned Ordinance, . . . directly affects the preference shareholders by imposing on them this liability, or the risk of it, and gives them a sufficient interest to challenge the validity of the Ordinance, . . . . Certainly he can show that the Ordinance ' under which these persons have been appointed was beyond the legislative competence of the authority which made it or that the Ordinance had not been duly promulgated. If he can, with a view to destroy the locus standi of the persons who have made the call, raise the question of the invalidity of the Ordinance . . . , I can see no valid reason why, for the self same purpose, he should not be permitted to challenge the validity of the Ordinance on the ground of its unconstitutionality for the breach of the fundamental rights of the .company or of other persons.\"\n\nA similar view was also taken in Chiranjit Lal Chowduri v.\n\nThe Union of India(') by Mukherjea, J., at p. 899, by Faz! Ali, J., at p. 876, by Patanjali Sastri, J., at p. 889 and by Das, J., at p. 922.\n\nThe judgment of this Court in The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Others v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatna111 & Ors. (2 ) has no bearing on this question. In that case in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution the State Trading H Corporation challenged the infringement of its right to hold property and to carry on business under Art. 19 (l)(f) & (g) of -\n\n- -\n\n(I) (19501 S. C. R. 869.\n\n(2) (1964] 4 $.C.R. 99.\n\nthe Constitution and this Court opined that the Corporation not being a citizen was incompetent to enforce the rights guaranteed by Art. 19. Nor has the judgment in Tata Engineering and Loco motive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors.(') any bcaril)g on the question arisiag in these petitions. In a petition under Art. 32, of the Constitution filed by a Company challenging the levy of sales-tax by th.e State of Bihar, two shareholders were also im pleaded as petitioners. It was urged on behalf of the shareholders that in subsiance the interests of the Company and of the shareholders were identical and the shareholders were entitled to maintain the petition.\n\nThe Court rejected that contention, observing that what the Company could not achieve directly, it could not relying upon the. \"doctrine of lifting the veil\" achieve indirectly. The petitioner seeks in this case to challenge the in fringement of )1is own rights and not of the Banks of which he is a shareholder and a director and with which he has accounts-. current and fixed deposit.\n\nIt was urged that in any event the guarantee of freedom _of trade does not occur in Part III of the Constitution, and the peti tioner is not 1111titled to mainrain a petition for breach of that guarantee in this Court. But the petitioner does not seek by these petitions to. enforce the guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce in Art 301: he claims that in enacti, ng the Act the Parliament has violated, a constitutional restriction imposed by Part XIII of its legislative power and in determining the extent to which his fundamental freedoms are impaired, the statute which the Parliament is incompetent to enact must be ignored.\n\nIt is not necessary to consider whether Art. 31A (l)(d) of the Constitution bars thepetitioner's claim to enforce his rights as a director.\n\nThe Act prima facie does not (though the Ordinance purported to) seek to extinguish or modify the right of the peti tioner as a director : it seeks to fake away expressly the right of the named Banks to carry on banking business, while reserving their right to c.arry on business other than banking.\n\nAssuming that he is not entitled to set up his right to enforce his guaranteed rights as a director, the petition will not still fail.\n\nThe prelimi- nary objection raised by the Attorney-General against the maintainability of the petitions must fail.\n\n\"I. Validity of Ordinance 8 of 1969-\n\nPower to issue Ordinance is by1Art. 123 of the Constitution vested in t!Je President. Article 123 provides :\n\n\" ( 1) If at any tiine, except when bot!J Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that OJ [1964J 6 s.c.a. ass.\n\ncircumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him tci requite.\n\n(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance-\n\n(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions; and\n\n(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.\n\nExp/anation.-Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause. ( 3} If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.\"\n\nUnder the Constitution, the President being constitutional head, normally acts in all matters including the promulgation of an Ordinance on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Whether in a given case the President may decline to be guided by the advice of his Council of Ministers is a matter which need not detain us.\n\nThe Ordinance is promulgated in the name of the President ll!ld in a constitutional sense on his satisfaction: it is in truth promulgated on the advice of his Council of Ministers and on their satisfaction.\n\nThe President is under the Constitution not the repository of the legislative power of the Union, but with a view to meet extraordinary situations demanding immediate enactment of laws, provision is made in the Constitution investing the President with power to legislate by promulgating Ordinances.\n\nPower to promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to the President to require is exercised-( a) when both Houses of Parliament are not .in session; (b) the provision in tended to be made is within the competence of the Parliament to enact; and ( c) the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. Exercise of he power is .strictly conditioned.\n\nThe clause relating to\n\n560 SUPREME COUil T llBPOR TS [1970] 3 S.C.!l.\n\nthe satisfaction is composite: the satisfaction relates to tho exist A ence of circumstances, as well as to tho necessity to take immediate action on account of those circumstances. Determination by the President of the existence of circumstances and the necessity to take immediate action on which the satisfaction depends, is not declared final.\n\nThe Attorney-General contended that the condition of satisfaction of the President in both the branches is purely subjective and the Union of India is under no obligation to disclose the exist ence of, or to justify the circumstances of the necessity to take immediate action.\n\nHe relied upon the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhagat Singh v.\n\nThe King Emperor('); King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma('). and upon a &cision of the Federal Court in Lakhi Narayan Das v.\n\nThe Province of Bihar(8 ), which interpreted the analogous provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, conferring upon the Governor.\n\nGeneral in the first two cases, and upon the Governor of a Province in the last case, power to issue Ordinances.\n\nHe also relied upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay('). ·\n\nThe Attorney-General said that investment of legislative power upon the President being an incident of the division of sovereign functions of the Union and a \"matter of high policy\", the expression \"the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which ren&r necessary for him to take immediate action\" is incorporated as a guidance and not as a condition of the exercise of power. He invited our attention to the restraints inherent in the Constitution on the exercise of the. power to promulgate Ordi nance in els. ( 1 > & (2) of Art. 74; els. (3) & ( 4) of Art. 75 and Art. 361, and submitted that the rule applicable to the interpre tation of parliamentary statutes conferring authority un officers of the State to act in a prescribed manner on being satisfied about the existence of certain circumstances is inept in determining the true perspective of the power of the head of the State in situations of emergency. 1\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala contended that the Presi dent is not made by Art. 123 the final arbiter of .the existence of the conditions on which the power to promulgate an Ordinance may be exercised. Power to promulgate an Ordinance being conditional, counsel urged, this Court in the absence of a provi sion-express or necessarily implicit in the Constitution-to the contrary, is competent to determine whether the power was exer cised not for a collateral purpose, but on relevant circumstances\n\n(1) L. R. 58 I. A. 169.\n\n(2) L. R. 72 !. A. 57.\n\n(3) [1949) F. C. R. 693.\n\n(4) L. R. 76 I. A. S7.\n\nwhich, prima facie, establish the necessity to take immediate action. Counsel submitted that the rules applicable fo the inter pretation of statutes conferring power exercisable on satisfaction of the specified circumstances upon the President and upon ofli cers of the State, are not different.\n\nThe nature of the power to perform an official act where the authority is of a certain opinion, or that in his view certain circumstances exist or that he has reasonable grounds to believe, or that he has reasons to believe, or that he is satisfied, springing from a constitutional provision is in no manner different from a similar power under a parliamentary statute, and no greater sanctity n\\ay attach to the exercise of the power merely because the source of the power is in the Constitution and not in a parliamentary statute.\n\nThere is, it was urged, nothing in the constitutional scheme which supports the contention that the clause relating to satisfaction is not a condition of the exercise of the power.\n\nCounsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Barium Chemical Ltd. and Another v. The Company Law Board and Ors.(1) and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal and Anr;(2) upon the decisions of the House of Lords in Padfield & Others v.\n\nMinister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others('); and of the Judicial Committee in Dura, vappah v.\n\nFernando and Others('); Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne('); Ross- Clunis v. Papadopoul/os('), and contended that the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhagat Singh's case(') and Benoari Lal Sarma' s case (') interpreted a provision which was in sub\n\nstance different from the provision of Art. 123, that the decision in Lakhi Narayan Das's case(9 ) merely followed the two judg ments of the Judicial Committee and since the status of the President under the Constitution qua the Parliament is not the same as the constitutional status of the Governor-General under the Gov ernnv.mt of India Act, 1935, the decisions cited have no bearing on the interpretation of Art. 123.\n\nThe Ordinance has been repealed by Act 22 of 1969, and the question of its validity is now academic. It may assume sig nificance only if we hold that Act 22 of 1969 is valid.\n\nSince the Act is, in our view, .invalid for reasons hereinafter stated, we accede to the submission of the Attorney.General that we need express no opinion in this case on the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court to examine whether the condition relating to satisfaction of the ; i\"resident was fulfilled.\n\n1. [1966] Supp. s.c.R. 311.\n\n3. [1968J 1 All E. R. 694.\n\n5. L.R. (1951] A.C. 66.\n\n7. L.R. 58 I.A. t69.\n\n9. (1949] F.C.R. 693,\n\n2. (1969] 3 S.C.R. 108.\n\n4. L.R. (1967] A.C. 337.\n\n6. (1958] 2 All E.R. 23.\n\n8, L.R. 72 I.A. 57.\n\nL8SupCij70-6", "total_entities": 317, "entities": [{"text": "RUS1'0M CAVASJEE COOPER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUS1'0M CAVASJEE COOPER\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 10, 1970\n\n(J. C. SHAH,\n\nS. M. SIKRI,\n\nJ. M. SHELAT, B\n\nV, BHARGAVA,\n\nG. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY,\n\nI. D. DUA AND A. N. RAY, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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Shanti/al Mangaldas the Court observed : [\"Sitabati Devi] unanimously held that the validity of the Act relating to acquisition and requisition cannot be questioned on the ground that it offended Art, 19(l)(f) and cannot be decided by the criterion .under Article 19(5) \", [621 C. 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V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56405, "end_char": 56418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani, for the petitioner (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "Niren De", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56467, "end_char": 56475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-Gener(Jl, Jagadish Swarup, So/icitor- Genera/, M. C. Seta/vad, C. K. Daphtary, R. H. Dhebar, R. N.\n\nS{lt:hthey and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in W.P. No.", "canonical_name": "Niren De"}}, {"text": "Jagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56496, "end_char": 56511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Attorney-Gener(Jl, Jagadish Swarup, So/icitor- Genera/, M. C. Seta/vad, C. K. Daphtary, R. H. Dhebar, R. N.\n\nS{lt:hthey and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. 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Ram Reddy and P. Parameswara Rao, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "P. Parameswara Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57533, "end_char": 57551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. · -\n\nA P. Ram Reddy and P. Parameswara Rao, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57576, "end_char": 57586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, San, tosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for intervener No.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Chagla"}}, {"text": "tosh Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57595, "end_char": 57610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, San, tosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57615, "end_char": 57631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, San, tosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "J. c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57672, "end_char": 57682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ."}}, {"text": "s. M. Snoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57684, "end_char": 57694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ."}}, {"text": "J. M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57696, "end_char": 57708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ."}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57711, "end_char": 57722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "I. D. DuA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57809, "end_char": 57818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of J. c. SHAH, s. M. Snoo, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.", "canonical_name": "I. D. DUA"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57841, "end_char": 57845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SHAH, J. A. N. RAY, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57892, "end_char": 57896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57901, "end_char": 57934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57979, "end_char": 58005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Bank of Baroda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58011, "end_char": 58030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Union Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58036, "end_char": 58060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Centq1l Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58182, "end_char": 58208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. Rustom Cavasjee Cooperhereinafter called 'the petitioner'-holds shares in the Central Bank of India Ltd., the Bank of Baroda Ltd., the Union Bank of India Ltd., and the Bank of India Ltd., and has accounts-current and fixed deposit -with those Banks : he is also a director of the Centq1l Bank of India Ltd. By these petitions he claims a declaration that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 8 of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969, and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 which replaced the Ordinance with certain modifications impair his rights guaranteed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58380, "end_char": 58444, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58547, "end_char": 58566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58777, "end_char": 58790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58821, "end_char": 58843, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58932, "end_char": 58936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59125, "end_char": 59129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59228, "end_char": 59232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59306, "end_char": 59310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59448, "end_char": 59452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60259, "end_char": 60281, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61328, "end_char": 61332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bank of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62847, "end_char": 62870, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62909, "end_char": 62931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the authority conferred by the State Bank of India Act 21 1955 the undertaking of the former Imperial Bank of India was taken over by a public corporation controlled by the\n\nCentral Government."}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63301, "end_char": 63320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following is an analysis of the commercial banking structure in India in June 1969:\n\nState Bank of India\n\nSubsidiaries of State Bank\n\nNo.of Banks No."}}, {"text": "Art. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63899, "end_char": 63907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64417, "end_char": 64421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 591", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64510, "end_char": 64516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Compames Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64524, "end_char": 64536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64645, "end_char": 64659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Compames Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Compames Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64797, "end_char": 64807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Compames Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Compames Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64815, "end_char": 64843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Bank of Iadia Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64976, "end_char": 65002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Bank of Iadia Ltd.\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65038, "end_char": 65063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab National Bank Ltd.\n\n4."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65100, "end_char": 65127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United Commercial Bank Ltd.\n\n6."}}, {"text": "Canara Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65132, "end_char": 65148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Canara Bank Ltd.\n\n7."}}, {"text": "United Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65153, "end_char": 65178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "United Bank of India Ltd.\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Dena Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65183, "end_char": 65197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dena Bank Ltd.\n\n9."}}, {"text": "Syndicate Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65202, "end_char": 65221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syndicate Bank Ltd.\n\n10."}}, {"text": "Union Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65231, "end_char": 65255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union Bank of India Ltd.\n\n11."}}, {"text": "Allahabad Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65261, "end_char": 65280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad Bank Ltd.\n\n12."}}, {"text": "Indian Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65290, "end_char": 65306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Bank Ltd.\n\n13."}}, {"text": "Bank of Maharashtra Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65316, "end_char": 65340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bank of Maharashtra Ltd.\n\n14."}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Bank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65350, "end_char": 65375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Overseas Bank Ltd.\n\nThese banks are hereinafter referred to as the named banks."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65588, "end_char": 65602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65720, "end_char": 65748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65871, "end_char": 65875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65884, "end_char": 65888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65901, "end_char": 65923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66455, "end_char": 66459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66467, "end_char": 66495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66577, "end_char": 66581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Regulation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70234, "end_char": 70249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central C Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 70441, "end_char": 70461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 5) The Central Government shall give compensation to the B named banks determined according to the principles set out in Second Schedule, that is to say,-\n\n( a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be determined in accordance with such agreement;\n\n(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central C Government shall refer the matter to the Tribunal within a period of three months from the date on which the Central Government and the existing bank fail to reach an agreement regarding the amount of compensation."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72202, "end_char": 72206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banking Regulation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72218, "end_char": 72246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72325, "end_char": 72406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 21, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72436, "end_char": 72449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance were lodged in this Court on July 21, 1969."}}, {"text": "August 9, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72660, "end_char": 72674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of undertakings of the existing banks was introduced in the Parhament, and was enacted on August 9, 1969, as \"The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969\"."}}, {"text": "Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72684, "end_char": 72748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72868, "end_char": 72873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance", "statute": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72927, "end_char": 72941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance", "statute": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73087, "end_char": 73091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance", "statute": "Petitions challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78339, "end_char": 78347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78541, "end_char": 78557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78777, "end_char": 78795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78895, "end_char": 78903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79234, "end_char": 79239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79244, "end_char": 79249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79823, "end_char": 79842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79910, "end_char": 79923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 17, 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80910, "end_char": 80929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82132, "end_char": 82151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83832, "end_char": 83839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83841, "end_char": 83848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., observed :\n\n\"The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders are in imminent danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the enforcement of this Ordinance, the direct injury being the amount of the call that they are called upon to pay and the consequent forfeiture of their shares,\"\n\nDas, J., in the same case examined the matter in some detail and observed at p. 722 :\n\n\"The impugned Ordinance, . . ."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84149, "end_char": 84152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., observed :\n\n\"The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders are in imminent danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the enforcement of this Ordinance, the direct injury being the amount of the call that they are called upon to pay and the consequent forfeiture of their shares,\"\n\nDas, J., in the same case examined the matter in some detail and observed at p. 722 :\n\n\"The impugned Ordinance, . . ."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85153, "end_char": 85162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was also taken in Chiranjit Lal Chowduri v.\n\nThe Union of India(') by Mukherjea, J., at p. 899, by Faz!"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85182, "end_char": 85190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was also taken in Chiranjit Lal Chowduri v.\n\nThe Union of India(') by Mukherjea, J., at p. 899, by Faz!"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85210, "end_char": 85226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, J., at p. 876, by Patanjali Sastri, J., at p. 889 and by Das, J., at p. 922."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85478, "end_char": 85485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State Trading H Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85510, "end_char": 85537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution the State Trading H Corporation challenged the infringement of its right to hold property and to carry on business under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85627, "end_char": 85634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85842, "end_char": 85849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86024, "end_char": 86031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 86123, "end_char": 86128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, of the Constitution filed by a Company challenging the levy of sales-tax by th.e State of Bihar, two shareholders were also im pleaded as petitioners."}}, {"text": "Art 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87096, "end_char": 87103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87439, "end_char": 87447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88217, "end_char": 88228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91203, "end_char": 91217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General contended that the condition of satisfaction of the President in both the branches is purely subjective and the Union of India is under no obligation to disclose the exist ence of, or to justify the circumstances of the necessity to take immediate action."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91624, "end_char": 91653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92454, "end_char": 92461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92482, "end_char": 92489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92494, "end_char": 92502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 92869, "end_char": 92879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala contended that the Presi dent is not made by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92925, "end_char": 92933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L. R. 58 I. A. 169", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 93354, "end_char": 93372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1949) F. C. R. 693", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 93403, "end_char": 93422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93444, "end_char": 93446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94975, "end_char": 94987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Barium Chemical Ltd. and Another v. The Company Law Board and Ors.(1) and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal and Anr;(2) upon the decisions of the House of Lords in Padfield & Others v.\n\nMinister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others('); and of the Judicial Committee in Dura, vappah v.\n\nFernando and Others('); Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne('); Ross- Clunis v. Papadopoul/os('), and contended that the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhagat Singh's case(') and Benoari Lal Sarma' s case (') interpreted a provision which was in sub\n\nstance different from the provision of Art."}}, {"text": "Benoari Lal Sarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95002, "end_char": 95019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Barium Chemical Ltd. and Another v. The Company Law Board and Ors.(1) and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal and Anr;(2) upon the decisions of the House of Lords in Padfield & Others v.\n\nMinister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others('); and of the Judicial Committee in Dura, vappah v.\n\nFernando and Others('); Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne('); Ross- Clunis v. Papadopoul/os('), and contended that the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhagat Singh's case(') and Benoari Lal Sarma' s case (') interpreted a provision which was in sub\n\nstance different from the provision of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95113, "end_char": 95121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lakhi Narayan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95144, "end_char": 95161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "123, that the decision in Lakhi Narayan Das's case(9 ) merely followed the two judg ments of the Judicial Committee and since the status of the President under the Constitution qua the Parliament is not the same as the constitutional status of the Governor-General under the Gov ernnv.mt of India Act, 1935, the decisions cited have no bearing on the interpretation of Art."}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95409, "end_char": 95424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95487, "end_char": 95495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "(1949] F.C.R. 693", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 96091, "end_char": 96108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1969] 3 S.C.R. 108", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 96114, "end_char": 96133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. (1967] A.C. 337", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96139, "end_char": 96159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.R. (1967] A.C. 337."}}, {"text": "L.R. 72 I.A. 57", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 96191, "end_char": 96206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_662_679_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "R. C. COOPER v. UNION (Ray,/.) 661\n\nA 1969 is invalid and the action taken or deemed to be taken in exercise of the powers under the Act is declared unauthorised.\n\nPetition No. 222 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. in these three petitions.\n\nK.B.N.\n\nDEV KANTA BAROOAH\n\nGOLOK CHANDRA BARUAH & ORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1970\n\n(S. M. SIKRI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (34 of 1951), s. 123(4)-Statements in leaflet-Com1nent on educational qualificaiions of candidate-Staten1ent of facts and expression of opinion on the political position of candidate-If amounts ro corrupt. practice.\n\nThe first respondent studied for his intermediate examination in two colleges one after the other, but never s.at for the examination. He en- C tered government service as a clerk.\n\nSome. time after 1943 he resigned from service and joined the military contract business which was being carried on by his brothers.\n\nJn 1952, though he was a member of the Congress party, he. stood for election against the Congress candidate after promising not to do so. Thereafter, he became Chairman of a Municipality and during his tenure as such,- several thousand rupees were taken away from the Treasury on signatures re5embling the first respondenfs signature. and Some persons were prosecuted. Also, while be was Chair- I) man, he issued an order to the effe.ct that salarie~ of sv.eepers were to be paid by the head clerk. In November 1964, the first respondent resigned his chairmanship. The head clerk, instead of paying the sweepers. in December, misappropriated the money. When the misapprQpriation was discove'red\n\nby the Vice-Chairman, the head clerk committed suicide in December 1964.\n\nIn the 1967 election, the first respondent again Mood for election. to the State Legislature against the Congress candidate, once again breaking his written promise not to do so.\n\nHoy,; ever, the appellant was dee- E Jared elected. The first respondent challenged the election of the appel-.\n\nIant.\n\nOne of the. grounds in the election petition was that the following false statements as to the personal character of the first respondent, reasonably calculated to prejudice his prospects of election. had been published in. a leaflet with the con&ent of the appellant :\n\n(I) That the first respondent 'after rolling from several colleges failed to pass the intermediate examination;' F\n\n(2) that during the first respondent's tenure as Chairman there were instances of corruption and chaos; and that the criminal case in connection with the taking of money from the treasury was pending hearing at the time of the publication of the leaflet;\n\n(3) that 'at that tin1e' the head clerk committed suicide; and\n\n( 4) that by taking military contracts he helped the British Goverrunent in India during the 1942-movement and by his standing for election against Congress candidates he was guilty of 'treachery' Desadrohita) and 'bach of faith' (Vishll'asghatakta).\n\nOn the question whether statements constituted corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,\n\nHELD : (1) In an election it is open to a candidate to show that hi> H rival candidate is lacking in knowledge and education and that he is not capable of managing the affairs in a public body. The statement in the leaflet only stated that he failed to pass the examination and not that he\n\nfailed at the examination. There was a slight exaggeration when the leaflet referred to several colleges, but it could not be held to be a false statement affecting the personal character, or conduct of the first respondent.\n\n[668 B-E]\n\n(2) The imputation was as to the mismanagement of the affairs of the Municipality by the first respondent, indicating that he was not a good administrator and not, that be was himself corrupt. That part of the statement that the criminal case was then pending, though incorrect, did not cast any as person on the conduct or character of the first respondent. [669 H; 670 A-Bl ( 3) The expression 'at that time' interpreted literally would mean that the suicide was committed while the first respondent was the Chairman, which was not true, because, be had resigned earlier. But since the opportµnity for the bead clerk to misappropriate the money occurred while the first respondent was the Chairman, it must be held that the allegation made in the clause is also substantially correct. Further, there was no suggestion in the statement . that the first respondent himself was corrupt or that the suicide was the result of his personal corruption..\n\n[67.2 F-HJ ( 4) The vernacular words used for 'treachery' and 'breach of faith' though harsh, were not such as to lead the voters to think that the first respondent had a low moral character. The leaflet was published in reply to the fir.t respondent's leaflet as to why he left the Congress, giving reasons as to why he was expelled from the Congress. Care was taken to give the facts from which inferences were being drawn and the voters\n\ncould very well perceive for themselves whether the inference, which was drawn and expressed in strong terms, was justified or not.\n\nThe treachery or breach of faith towards the country refers to the first respondent's help to the British by taking military contracts at about the time of the 194 2-movement, and his treachery or breach of faith towards the Congress ha's reference to his standing fdr election as against the Congress nominee. Therefore, since the facts were given and only inferences were drawn, the words used at the time of putting down the inferences must be held, to be only expressions of opinion, on the first respondent's political position and do not themselves connote any statement of facts involving moral depravity. Hence, the publication of the leaflet, cannot be held to cqnstitute corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act. (667 D-E, 673\n\nC-F, H; 674 H; 675 A, D, F-G; 676 D-EJ Guruii Shrihari Baliram Jivatode v. Vithal Rao and Ors. (1961] 1 S.C. Cases 82 an.d Inderlal v.\n\nBal Singh, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R.\n\n114. followed.\n\nKumara Nand v. Bri; mohan Lal Sharma, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 12 distinguished and explained:\n\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1701 of 1968.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated July 4, 1968 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Election Petition No. 3 of 1967.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant.\n\nP. K. Chalterjee, R. B. Datar, B. M. Mahanto and Rathin Das. for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Dev Kanta Barooah, was declared elected at the las~ General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Assam in 1967, defeating the four rival candidates who are respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal.\n\nRespondent No. l, Golok Chandra Baruah, filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on various grounds, including a charge that false statements as to the personal character of respondent No. 1 had been published with the consent of the appellant, th'lS constituting a corrupt practice under section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\").\n\nThis is the only ground which has been accepted by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland and the election of the appellant has been set aside on this ground. In this appe~, consequently, the only question that falls for decision is whether the High Court was right in setting aside the election of the appellant on the ground of corrupt practice having been committed within the meaning of s. 123(4) of th.e Act.\n\nThis corrupt practice was alleged by respondent No. 1 to have been committed by the appellant by publication of a leaflet which is, for convenience, reproduced below :-\n\n\"Why Golok Barna was driven away from the Congress?\n\n(Picture of a pair of bullock with yoke) Humble submission,\n\nOne leaflet bearing full of downright falsehood and false allegation with the Caption \"Why I have left the Congress\" has been published and distributed by Sri Golok Chandra Barna in the Samaguri Constituency.\n\nThe patriot voters of Samaguri have sufficient experience and political consciousness.\n\nThey would not believe the abominable and false publicity of Shri Golok Barna .. Still for the knowledge of the public a brief description of the activities of public life of Shri Barna has been published. From that it will be understood that\n\nSri Golok Barua is not an actual congress man.\n\nHe is a driven-out congressman wearing a mask.\n\nI. Golok Barua after rolling from several Colleges failerl to pass the I.A. and at first became a copyist at the Katchery and thereafter became a Clerk.\n\nAt the mass-movement of '42 he earned some money by doing Military Contracts.\n\n2. In 1952 by entering in the Congress sought nomination from the Congress from the Samaguri Constituency.\n\nThe Congress did not give him nomination as in :he '42 Movement he helped the British and revolted against the Country.\n\nAfter breach of promise he was badly defeated by standing against Shrimati Usha Barthakur who was a Congress nominee.\n\n3. Again by entreaties he joined the Congress and <'n the sudden death of Late Pratap Chandra Sarma Shri Golok Barua became the Chairman of Nowgong '.\\fonicipality.\n\nPlease note some of the instances of injustice and chaos during his tenure of Office.\n\n(Ka) During his time several thousand Rupees were taken away from the Treasury unlawfully on signatures resembling to those of his signatures.\n\nThe matter is now pending for hearing.\n\n(Kha.) When a huge amount of money withdrawn from the National Savings was misappropriated the Govt.\n\nExaminer of Accounts declared Sri Golok Barna alone as guilty.\n\n(Ga) At that time also on account of corruption in the Municipality alone late Dharmeswar Sarma the then Head Clerk of his time had to commit suicide.\n\n(Gha) While Sri Go!ok Barua was the Chairman at night like dn1nkard went to the Ex-Chairman Dr.\n\nBirendra Kishore Guha and not finding Dr. Guha behaved his wife and daughter unmannerly.\n\nAfter that assaulted Dr. Guha with shoes in presence of many persons.\n\nOn that offence Sri Golok Barua was compelled to resign his Chairmanship by the Executive Committee of the District Congress Committee.\n\n4. This time Sri Golok Barua sought for nominanation from the Congress as a candidate to the Parliament from Kaliabar Constituency and a candidate to the Legislative Assembly from the Barhampur Constituency\n\nBut the Congress refused to give nomination due to his conduct and Character and due to his treachery towards the Country and the Congress.\n\nOut of that grudge he, again, by breaking his written promise to the effect that he would not go against the Congress if he was not given nomination by the Congress, has stood as a non-party candidate again from the Samaguri Consthuency and he has published untrue and false propaganda against the Congress.\n\n5. Due to the offence of the treachery he has been compie.tely driven away from the Congress for a period of sixyears by the Assam Provincial Congress Committee.\n\nAs a matter of fact Sri Golok Barua has been driven out from the Congress.\n\nThese facts have been published for the knowledge of he vigilant and patriot electors of Samaguri.\n\nNowgong.\n\n5-2-67\n\nNowgong District Congress Election Committee.\"\n\nThe original leaflet was in Assamese and the above version of it is in accordance with the official translation prepared in the paper book.\n\nDuring the course of arguments, however, it was brought to our notice that, at some places, the translation did not correctly represent the meaning conveyed in Assamese, so that the Assamese words were read out to us.\n\nFurther, our attention was also drawn to the translation accepted by the learned Judge of the High Court who tried the election petition and who had some knowledge of Assamese language.\n\nWe shall indi cate later where we consider that the translation reproduced above cannot be accepted as correctly representing the text in Assamese language.\n\nThe ground taken in the election petition was that this leaflet contained false statements as to the personal character or conduct of respondenc No. 1 which were reasonably calculated t0 pre judice his prospects of being elected in this election.\n\nThe learned trial Judge held that some of the statements of fact made in the leafl.et did relate to the personal character or conduct of respondeni No. 1 and that, except for two such statements which were proved to be true, they were false to the knowledge of the appellant.\n\nIt was .also held that this leaflet had been published and distributed with the consent of the appellant, so that the election of the appellant was set aside.\n\nIn this appeal, Mr. Daphtary. appearing on behalf of the appellant, challenged the decision of the High Court in two respects.\n\nThe firsi contention raised by him was that the statements in this leaflet, which have been held\n\nto be false, did not relate to tJ:ie personal character or conduct of respondem No. 1, and that the statements which did relate to the personal character or conduct of respondent No. 1 were proved to be true, so that the provisions of s. 123(4) of the Act were not attracted.\n\nThe second contention was that the High Court was not right in holding that this leaflet had been publish ed and distributed with the consent of the appellant.\n\nSince, after hearing arguments of learned counsel for both parties, we have come to the view that the first point raised by Mr. Daphtary must be accepted, we did not consider it necessary to hear counsel on the second point relating to proof of consent of the appellant to the publication of this leaflet.\n\nThe leaflet purports to have been published on behalf of the N owgong District Congress Election Committee.\n\nIt is admitted that respondent No. 1 wanted to be sponsored as the candidate for the Legislative Assembly by the Congress Party in this general election.\n\nThe Congress Party, however, sponsored the candi dature of the appellant, whereupon respondent No. 1 stood for election as an independent candidate.\n\nIn this background, respondent No. 1 issued a leaflet explaining why he had left the Congress and it was in reply tc that leaflet that the Nowgong District Congress Election Committee issued the leaflet in question.\n\nThe leaflet, thus, begins with the caption \"Why Golok Barna\n\nwas driven away from the Congress ?\" The leaflet thereafter purports to give the reasons why he was expelled from the Congress, and the facts stated in it are divided into five paragraphs.\n\nThe first paragraph mentions that respondent No. 1 after roll ing from several Colleges failed to pass the Intermediate Exami nation and at first became a copyist at the Kachery and there\n\nafter became a Clerk.\n\nAt the mass-movement of 1942, he earned some money by doing Military Contracts.\n\nThe High Cour! has held that this paragraph amounts to publication of false statement covered by s. 123(4) of the Act inasmuch as it is incorrect that respondent No. 1 rolled from several colleges and that at the mass movement of 1942 he earned some money by doing military contracts.\n\nThe evidence disdosed that respondent No. 1 studied for his Intermediate Examination in only two Colleges one after the other and did not move from college to college.\n\nIt was also found as a fact that he did not pass the Intermediate Arts Examination and that the reason was that he could not appear at the Examination at all due to the death of his father.\n\nHe did not fail at that examination.\n\nThe further finding was that he himself was in government service at the time of. the movement of 1942. so that he could not have done any military contract work in\n\nthat year.\n\nIt was only later on that he resigned and joined the\n\nmilitary contract business which was being carried on by his two brothers.\n\nThe High Court was of the view that the publication of these statements was bound to lower respondent No. l in the opinion of the voters and, consequently, this publication amounted to a corrupt practice.\n\nAs urged by Mr. Daphtary, we are unable to agree that the publication of the facts in this paragraph can be held to amount to false statements as to the personal character or conduct of respondent No. l. In an election, it is always open to a candidate to show that his rival candidate is Jacking in knowledge in education and is not capable of managing the affairs properly irt any public body.\n\nThe intention in the first part of paragraph l of the leaflet was to inform the voters of the educational qualifications of respondent No. l. He did move from one college to a second one during his period of study for the Intermediate Arts Examination. May be, that there is a slight exaggeration when the leaflet mentions that he rolled from several colleges; but such an exaggeration is quite natural on occasions when canvassing is going on for an election.\n\nIt is to be noted that the leaflet does not state that respondent No. l failed at the Intermediate Arts Examination.\n\nAll it says is that he failed to pass that Examination which has been admitted as being perfectly true by respondent No. l himself.\n\nHe failed to pass, beClluse he did not appear at the examination.\n\nSuch a statement cannot, in our opinion, be held to be a false statement affecting the personal character or conduct of respondent No. l.\n\nThe second part of this paragraph can be conveniently dealt with while discussing the facts mentioned in paragraph 2.\n\nIn paragraph 2 of the leaflet, the reason why the Congress did not give him nomination is given.\n\nIt is stated, that in the 1942 movement. he helped the British and revolted against the country.\n\nThe expression \"revolted against the country\" is a translation for the Assamese word \"Deshdrohita\" ( m-1~;;;).\n\nIt is true that the High Court has come to the finding of fact that in 1942 respondent No. I was in government service working as a Clerk and it was qnly later on, after 1943, that he actively participated in the business of his brothers of taking military contracts for the British.\n\nThe trend of the evidence.· however, shows that his brothers had been carrying on the military contracts business even earlier than 1943.\n\nEven for the later period, respondent No. 1 tried to deny that he actually participated in the military contract business with his brothers; but, when cross-examined in detail and confronted with a power of attorney in his favour, he had to make admissions which clearly show that he was\n\ntaking part in that business.\n\nIt appears to be quite likely that, even before he actually resigned government service and joined the business of his brothers, he may have been assisting them, so that the allegation that he helped the British in 1942 movement by taking military contracts cannot be said to be a false statement; at best, there may be a slight errors about the period during which he did that work.\n\nAgain, the aspect that he was helping the British by taking military contracts relates to a reflection on his political conduct in siding with the British Government rather than joining the Congress which was carrying on a movement against the British for achieving independence of the country.\n\nIt was in this background that his activities were described by using the word \"Deshdrohita\" in this pamphlet.\n\nWhether it amounted to \"deshdrohita\" or not may be a disputed question.\n\nMembers of the Congress, who were carrying on the agitation against the British for achieving independence of the country, could very legitimately think that any one who helped the British at that time was guilty of \"deshdrohita\" inasmuch as his activities. were against the interests of our country.\n\nThis expression was also, there.fore, used to describe the nature of his activities which, in fact, related to the political situation at tha! time.\n\nIt cannot be said that this paragraph reflects on the personal character or conduct of respondent No. 1, as there is no imputation of any depravity or immorality in this paragraph.\n\nParagraph 3 is the principal paragraph in which the conduct of respondent No. 1 has been criticised.\n\nAdmittedly, he was the Chairman fo the Nowgqng Municipality, and the principal part of this paragraph asks the voters to note some of the instances of injustice and chaos during his tenure of office.\n\nIn Assamese, the two words which have been translated as \"injustice\" 'and \"chaos\" were \"Durniti\" ( 'l:f;; fu ) and \"Arajakta\" (ilf\\nr; i; m).\n\nOur attention was drawn by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 to the statement of Devendra Nath Bora. the writer of this leaflet, where he stated that he meant by these words \"corruption\" and \"lack of administration\".\n\nThe High Court took these words to mean \"corruption\" and \"anarchism\"\n\nas these are the English words used in the judgment of the High Court.\n\nIt may, hol\\'ever, be noted that, in this part, it is not stated that respondent No. I himself was corrupt.\n\nThe imputation only is that, during his tenure of office, there were instances of corruption and chaos.\n\nThereafter, thci four instances are given.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be held that the leaflet was intended to convey to the readers that respondent No. 1 was himself corrupt.\n\nThe impression that. would be expected to be created would be that b.e !hat his administration as Chairman of the Municipality was no unsatisfactory that corruption and chaos prevailed in the affairs of the Municipality.\n\nThe imputation,\n\ntherefore, was as to mis-management of the affairs of the Municipality by respondent No. 1, indicating that he was not a. good administrator.\n\nThe leaflet was not intended to convey to the . voters any reflection on the personal character of respondent No. 1.\n\nIn clause (Ka), the instance given is that, during his time, several ihousand rupees were taken away from the Treasury unlawfully on signatures resembling his signatures and that the matter was still pending for hearing when the leaflet was issued.\n\nMr. Daphtary drew our attention to the admissions made by respondent No. 1 himself when he was in the witness-box ihat several thousand rupees were, in fact, dra~ from the Treasury in the municipal accounts on the basis of some cheques containing signatures which resembled the signature of respondent No. 1.\n\nIn substance, therefore, the truth of the statement contained in this clause is admitted.\n\nThe only part of the statement in this clause, whieh is found to be incorrect, is that the maaer was pending for hearing even at the time of the election.\n\nIt appears that the criminal case relating to that incideni had been decided earlier. The part of the statement, which was not true, did not, by itself, contain any statemeni relating to the conduct or character of respondent No. 1.\n\nThe first sentence, which cast reflection on respondent No. 1 by indicating that the management of the affairs of the Municipality in his time was not good and successful, has been admitted to be true.\n\nConsequently, this clause cannot be held to constitute corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act. ·\n\nIn clauses (Kha) and (Cha), there are, undoubtedly, statements which reflect on the personal character and conduct of respondent No. 1.\n\nClause (Kha) mentions that, when a huge amount of money withdrawn from the National Savings was misappropriated, the Government Examiner of Accounts declared Sri Golok Barua alone as guilty.\n\nThe word \"guilty\", in fact, is not the correct translation for the Assamese word which was \"Daee\"\n\n~ The learned Judge of the High Court translated this word as \"responsible\" in his judgment, which appears to us to be correct.\n\nThe learned Judge also held that the allegation contamed in this clause has been proved to be true. The report of the Government Examiner of Accounts was brought to our notice.\n\nIn that report, the Auditor wrote :-\n\n\"The entire responsibility for their encashment and credit to the fund rests with him and the fact that the accounts were maintained by the Head Assistant does not absolve the Chairman of his responsibility in thjs connection. The Chairman, Sri G. C. Barua, stands\n\nfully liable for the loss, which should be recovered from him now.\"\n\nThe contents of clause (Kha) do not go beyond what was found by the Auditor in his report, the relevant part of which has been reproduced by us above.\n\nIt is true that this statement, to some extent, reflects on the personal character of respondent No. 1 inasmuch as it states that he was held responsible for the mis\n\nappropriated money; but, that being a true fact, its publication has rightly been held by the High Court not to amount to corrupt practice.\n\nSimilarly, in clause ( Gha), there is mention of an incident when respondent No. l, while Chairman of the Municipality, is alleged to have gone at night like a drunkard to the house of Ex Chairman, Dr. Birendra Kish ore Guha, and, not finding Dr.\n\nGuha, \"behaved with his wife and daughter unmannerly''. It is further stated that, after that, he assaulted Dr. Guha with shoes in the presence of many persons, and that, on that offence, he was compelled to resign the Chairmanship by the Executive Committee of the District Congress Committee.\n\nThe High Court has held that the facts stated in this clause are also true.\n\nThe only point .that Mr. Chatterjee, counsel for respondent No. l, could urge was that, according to the evidence of the daughter of Dr.\n\nGuha, there was no misbehaviour with the wife and the mention of the wife in this clause was intended to convey an idea of some immoral behaviour on the part of respondent No. 1 which is not supported by any statement of fact.\n\nWe have examined the evidence of the daughter, Miss Sipra Guha alias Miss Lily Guha, who related what happened during that night.\n\nAccording to her, she and her mother were inside the house when some one knocked at the door calling out \"Dr. Guha, Dr. Guha\".\n\nAt the instance of her mother, she opened the door and the gentleman who was there caught hold of her clothes just under the neck and pulled her towards him.\n\nAt this, she shouted for her mother who came to the scene and recognised respondent No. 1.\n\nRespondent No. 1 then angrily asked where Dr. Guha was and whether he was inside the house.\n\nHer mother replied to him that her father had gone to see the J atra performance.\n\nShe also got angry and protested against his being there at such a time.\n\nShe also found smell of alcohol coming from the mouth of respondent No. 1.\n\nThe version given by this witness seems to fully justify the statement contained in clause (Gha).\n\nThe mention of the wife is with reference to unmannerly behaviour towards her.\n\nIt does not say that any attempt was . made by him to. assault her.\n\nThe- High Court was, therefore, quite correct in recording the finding that these allegations contained in this clause were ti'ue and, not\n\nbeing false statements, they could not constitute corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act.\n\nThere remains clause (Ga) of paragraph 3 in which it is stated that, at that time also, on account of corruption in the Municipality alone, late Dharmeswar Sarma, the then Head Clerk of his time, . had to commit suicide.\n\nSome of the ingredients of this clause have been found by the High Court to be incorrect.\n\nThe facts found show that, while respondent No. 1 was Chairman, he issued an order to the effect that the salaries of sweepers were to be paid by the Head Clerk instead of the Accountant who was to hand over the money for that purpose of the Head Clerk Respondent No. 1 resigned the Chairmanship in November, 1964 and his resignation was accepted on 21st November, 1964.\n\nIt was subsequently in the month of December, 1964 that the salary of the sweepers was not paid by the Head Clerk, Dharmeswar Sarma, who had received the money for this purpose.\n\nUnder the orders of respondent No. 1, the payments had to be made by the Head Clerk in the presence of the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman or some other member nominated for the purpose by the Chairman.\n\nThe Vice- Chairman held Dharmeswar Sarma responsible for the money when he found that the sweepers had not been paid and, thereupon, directed Dharmeswar Sarma to make good the shortage and pay up all the sweepers by 1 p.m. on 10th December, 1964 positively, failing which legal action would be taken against him.\n\nThis order was not carried out and, instead, on 10th December, 1964, Dharmeswar Sarma committed suicide.\n\nThese facts, no doubt, indicate that the statements made in clause (Ga) of paragraph 3 are not strictly correct. The main allegation that Dharmeswar Sarma, the Head Clerk, committed. suicide and that it was the result of corruption which was going on in the Municipality are borne out by the facts found.\n\nThe expression used \"at that time\" in this clause, if interpreted literally, would mean that the suicide was committed while respondent No. 1 was himself the Chairman which is not true inasmuch as he had resigned earlier.\n\nIt is, however, to be noted that the opportunity for Dharmeswar Sarma to misappropriate the money occurred only because of an order which had been passed earlier by respondent No. 1 while he was Chairman of the Municipality.\n\nIn these circumstances, it has to be held that the allegation made in this clause is also substantially eorrect. The allegation was intended to convey that there was corruption in the Municipality at the time when respondent No. 1 was the Chairman and that it was so has been found to be true.\n\nThere was no suggestion in this clause that respondent No. 1 himself was corrupt and that the suicide was the result of his personal corruption.\n\nThus, this part of the\n\nleaflet ulso cannot constitute corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act.\n\nThen, we come to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the leaflet in which the main objection is to the mention of his treachery towards the country ano the Congress.\n\nIn paragraph 4, it is sta:ed that the Congress refused to give nomination due to his conduct and character and due to his treachery towards the country and the Congress, while paragraph 5 states that, due to the offence of treachery, he had been completely driven away from the Congress for a period of six years by the Assam Provincial Congress Committee.\n\nThe word \"treachery\" is a translation for the Assamese word \"Vishwasghatakta\" (f'ITT'Tcff) which probbly can be more appropriately translated as \"breach of faith\", though treachery may also be one of the translations for this word.\n\nOn the face of it, the_ treachery or breach of faith towards the country again refers to his help to the British by taking military contracts at about the time of the movement of 1942, while his treachery or breach of faith towards the Congress has reference to his standing as a candidate against the Congress nominee in the earlier election as, well as in this election.\n\nLearned counsel for respondent No. 1 urged that. the terms used iri this leaflet, viz., \"Deshdrohita\" and \"Vishwasghatakta\" are very strong terms and are bound to be taken by voters in such a light that they would have a low opinion about the character of respondent No. 1.\n\nIt is, however, to b~ noted that these words have been used in the context of facts on the basis of which the writer of this leaflet thouht that respondent No. 1 had been guilty of \"Deshdrohita\"\n\nand \"Vishwasghatakta\".\n\nIt is, therefore, really an expression of opinion about respondent No. 1 based on facts.\n\nThese words do not themselves connote any statement of fact which can be said to be false.\n\nIn this .connection, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 relied on the decision of this Court in Kumara Nand v. Brijmohan Lal Shwma, (1) where, in a poem, the candidate was described as the \"greatest of all thieves\", The Court held that this description was not a mere opinion and that, when the candidate was called the greatest of all thieves, a statement of fact was being made as to his personal character or conduct.\n\nThere are two features which distinguish that case from the case before us.\n\nFirst, a statement that a person is a thief clearly imputes to him moral depravity, while statements saying that ho has committed \"Deshdrohita\" or \"Vishwasghatakta\" only reflect on his conduct in tho political field and do not bring in any elcmnt of moral depravity.\n\nSecondly, in that case, no facts were given from which an inference might have been sought to be drawn that\n\n\nLBSup.Cl/70-13\n\nthe candidate was the greatest of all tl!ieves, while, in the case before us, objectionable words have been used after giving the facts, on the basis of which it was held that the conduct of respondent No. l had been undesirable so as to be described as \"Deshdrohita\" and \"Vishwasghatakta\".\n\nCounsel for the appellant, in this connection, relied on a passage at page 91 of Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, 6th Edition, which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"But the following have been held not to be within tl!e provision :- a statement which imputed that the candidate was a traitor, and was one of certain persons who were in correspondence with the enemy shortly before the South African war broke out in 1899.\" This passage is based on the decision in Ellis v. The National\n\nUnion of Conservative and Constitutional Association, 109 L.T.\n\nJo. 493 which book has not been available to us.\n\nBased on the same case, it is stated in note (a) at page 227 under paragraph 394 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Volume 14, that:\n\n\"The words 'Radical traitors' were held to be not within the provision, as being a statement of opinion rather than of fact.\" Counsel for respondent No. 1, however, drew our attention to the fact that in the case of Kumara Nand~) this Court did not rely on Parker's version of the decision on the ground that in Rogers on Elections, Vol. II, 20th Edn., at page 368, the facts given indicated that there was no statement of fact with respect to the candidate himself that he was a traitor and all that was said was that Radical members of the House of Commons were in correspondence with the Boers and the candidate happened to be one of the Radical members.\n\nOn this ground, the Court did not choose to accept the dictum repro.duced by Parker.\n\nIt, however, appears that, even in Rogers on Elections, it was mentioned, in addition to the facts noted in that case by this Court, that \"any false statements were of opinion only and not of fact\".\n\nThis part of the sentence in Rogers on Elections does . not seem to have been brought to the notice of the Court.\n\nIt appears that, apart from the allegation that Radical members of the House of Commons were in correspondence with the enemy, there must have been an inference drawn that the candidate was a traitor and it is with reference to this last statement that Rogers mentions that the false statements were held to be matters of opinion only and not of fact. In any case, even if we do not rely on the principle laid down in that case in England, we are\n\nsill of the view that, in the present case where the statements\n\nO) !19671 2 s.c.R. 121.\n\nof fact are given and only inferences are drawn, the words used at the time of putting down the inferences have to be held to be expressions of opinion and not statements of fact.\n\nReliance was also placed on behalf of respondent No. 1 on the quotation from the decision in T. K. Gangi Reddy v. M. C.\n\nAnjan1eya Reddy(') reproduced in the case of Sheopat Singh v.\n\nRam Pratap(') which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The words 'personal character or conduct' are so clear that they do not require further elucidation or definition.\n\nThe character of a person may ordinarily be equated with his mental or moral nature.\n\nConduct connotes a person's actions or behaviour ...... What is more damaging to a person's character and conduct than to state that he instigated a murder and that he was guilty of violent acts in his political career?\"\n\nThis view expressed in that case is also not applicable to the case before us, because here the objectionable words have been very clearly and obviously used as inferences drawn by the writer from statements of fact given in the leaflet itself.\n\nReference was also made by counsel for respondent No. 1 to the decision of this Court in Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal & Others(') where it was held that the leaflets in question clearly implied that the candidate had misappropriated the fund collected by him, and this was held to be a statement of fact constituting a corrupt practice under s. 123(4) of the Act.\n\nIn that case, again, the imputation was of a nature that affected the personal character of the candidate indicating that he had been dishonest in misappropriating money, while, in the case before us, no such facts have been found.\n\nIt is quite clear that these words \"Deshdrohita\" and \"Vishwasghatakta\" have been used in this leaflet only to bring into light the conduct of respondent No. I which was adverse to the policies of the Congress and, at one stage, against the interests of the country.\n\nPossibly, milder words could have been used to describe his conduct on those occasions, but even the use of strong words is not very unnatural at the time of elections.\n\nIn judging whether the use of such words can be held to be a corrupt practice, we have to keep in view the principles indicated by this Court, how such document should be read, m the case of Ku/tar Singh\n\nv. Mukhtiar Singh(').\n\nThe Court held:\n\n\"The principles which have to be applied in construing such a document are well-settled.\n\nThe document must be read as a whole and its purport and effect deter-\n\n0) !1960] 22 E.L.R. 261.\n\n(2) [1965] I S.C.R. m. 179.\n\n\n(4) (1964] 7 S.C.R.490.\n\nmined in a fair, objective and reasonable manner.\n\nIn reading such documents, it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that when election meetings are held and appeals are made by candidates of opposing political parties, the atmosphere is usually surcharged with partisan feelings and emotions and the use of hyperboles or exaggerated language, or the adoption of metaphors, and the extravagance of expression in attacking one another, are all a part of the game, and so, when the question about the effect of speeches delivered or pamphlets distributed at election meetings is argued in the cold atmosphere of a judicial chamber, some allowance must be made and the impugned speeches or pamphlets must be construed in that light.\n\nIn doing so, however, it would be unreasonable to ignore the question as to what the effect of the said speech or pamphlet would be on the mind of the ordinary voter who attends such meetings and reads the pamphlets or hears the speeches.\"\n\nExamined on these principles, it would be clear that the words that were used, though harsh, were not such as to lead the voters to think that respondent No. 1 had a low moral character.\n\nCare was take.n to give the facts from which inferences were being drawn and the voters could very well perceive for themselves whether the inference, which was drawn and expressed in these strong terms, was justified or not. Schofield in his book on Parliamentary Blee tions, 2nd Edition, at page 437, has reproduced a quotation from a decision o{ Darling, J., in Cumberland ( Cockermouth Division) Case('), where he said:-\n\n\"You must not make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate; if you do, it is an illegal practice. It is not an offence to say something which may be severe about another person nor which may be unjustifiable nor which may be derogatory unless it amounts to a false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or condu :t of such candidate; there is a great distinction to be drawn between a false statement of tact which affects the personal character or co, nduct of a candidate and a false statement of fact which deals with the political position or reputation or action of the candidate. If that were not kept in mind, this statute would simply have prohibited at election times all sorts of criticism which was not strictly true relatinp; to the political behaviour and opi\n\nnions of the candidate.\n\nThat i~ why it carefully pro vides that th.e false statements in order to be an illegal\n\n(I) [1901] ! 0' M. & H. 1!!.\n\npractice, must relate to the personal character and personal conduct.\"\n\nThis passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Guruji Shrihari Baliram Jivatode v. Vithalrao and Others('). It is to be noted that Darling, J., held that a false statement of fact, which deals with the political position or reputation or action of a candi. date, cannot be held to be a corrupt practice.\n\nThe ililputations that have been made in paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the leaflet and which have been found to be false in the case before us clearly relate to the political position, reputation or action of respondent No. !. A similar distinction was also drawn by this Court in the case of lnder Lal v. Lal Singh(').\n\nAll these cases clearly indicate that imputations o.f the type which are in question in the leaflet before us and which may, to some extent, be false or inaccurate cannot be held to be false statements as to the personal character of. respondent No. 1 and cannot, therefore, constitute corrupt prac'tice under s. 123 ( 4) of the Act.\n\nThe only statemnts, which did relate to the personal character of respondent No. !, have been found to be true.\n\nIn support of his argument, counsel for respondent No. 1 drew our attention to the evidence of some of the witnesses examined on his behalf in order to show what was the reaction of this leaflet on the various voters. P.W. 2, Shashi Nath Bardoloi, stated that his own reaction was that this leaflet had very much scandalised res'. pondent No. 1 and, when asked what he remembered about the leaflet, he mentioned that respondent No. 1 could not pass the Intermediate Examination, though he rolled from College to College, whereafter he joined as a copyist and then became a clerk at Nowgong Court, that there was an allegation that somebody withdrew some money from the treasury with the forged signature of respondent No. 1 about which a case was pending, and that, for his fault, one Head-clerk o.f the Municipality committed suicide.\n\nIt is to be noticed that none .of the facts given in the leaflet casting reflection on the personal character of respondent No. 1 seem to have impressed him or stuck in his mind.\n\nHe also stated that some persons, who were going to vote for respondent No. !, decided not to do so after the issue of this leaflet; but, when asked to name eve, n one of those persons, he could not do so.\n\nThe evidence of the next witness P.W. 3, Golok Chand Saikia, is even more unsatisfactory, because he did not give his own reaction to the leaflet at al! and only stated that, a.fter its publication, most of the people who were in favour of respondent No. 1 cha, nged\n\ntheir minds about respondent No. 1, but, again, he coultl not give\n\n(I) [1969] I S.C. Cases 82.\n\n(2) [1962] 3 Supp. S.C.R. 114.\n\nthe name of even one single person who wanted to vote for respondent No. 1 and did not in fact do so.\n\nP.W. 4 is Bhola Ram Das.\n\nAccording to his evidence, he carried the impression that this leaflet had stated that respondent No. 1 had misappropriated some money from the Congress and, consequently, he changed his mind about giving vote to him on receipt of this leaflet.\n\nO, n the face of it, there is nothing at all in the leaflet to justify his inference, as there was no suggestion at all of any misappropriation of money by respondent No. 1, much less money belonging to the Congress. He purported to state that he had read the leaflet himself, though, when cross-examined and asked if he could read Assamese, he admitted that he was almost illiterate.\n\nThe , next witness P.W. 5, Hara Kanta Bora, also stated that, on readirtg the leaflet, he got the impression that respondent No. 1 was a man of bad character, the main impression which was carried by him being that respondent No. 1 had some bad relationship with the wife of Dr. Guha.\n\nTo test the veracity of this witness, he was asked which candidate he had worked for in this election and he stated that he had worked for the appellant, having been appointed as his polling agent. When further cross-examined, he was unable to state what the duties of a polling agent were, while evidence has been led to prove that a.no.ther person of the same name had worked as polling agent of the appellant.\n\nThis leads to the inference that this witness falsely posed to be the polling agent of the appellant and no reliance can, therefore, be placed on the evidence of such a witness.\n\nThe last witness, whose evidence was brought to our notice, is P.W. 6 Liladhar Barua who stated that, on reading this leaflet, he gathered the impression that respondent No. I was a man of bad , character and that it was also stated in it that respondent No. 1 took the side of the military and committed atrocities on the people in 1942 moveme, nt period. In his case, again, the mention of commission of atrocities in 1942 movement could not have been inferred from any statement at all contained in the leaflet. Counsel for respondent No. 1 stated that the witness k, new that atrocities were committed iri 1942 and, consequently, he drew this inference from the mention of respondent No. 1 in connectio, n with that movement stating that he had sided with the British.\n\nThis witness was scarcely five years old in 1942 and he could not have any recollection of atrocities committed about the year 1942, so that the suggestion made by counsel for respondent No. 1 offers no explanation.\n\nIt is clear that all these witnesses have merely tried to favour , the case of respondent No. 1 and their evidence relating to the impression created by the leaflet is of no value at all. In the circumstances, the view we have formed above on our own assess-\n\nA ment of the material co, ntained in thi~ leaflet does not require to be revised on the basis of this evidence.\n\nThe publication of the leaflet, as we have held above, cannot be held to constitute corrupt practice under s. 123 ( 4) of the Act.\n\nThe appeal is, consequently, allowed, the decision of the High B Court is set aside and the election petition is dismissed with costs in both Courts.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "DEV KANTA BAROOAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 283, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEV KANTA BAROOAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOLOK CHANDRA BARUAH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 311, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOLOK CHANDRA BARUAH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 345, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 366, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 369, "end_char": 401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 416, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2789, "end_char": 2794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a leaflet with the con&ent of the appellant :\n\n(I) That the first respondent 'after rolling from several colleges failed to pass the intermediate examination;' F\n\n(2) that during the first respondent's tenure as Chairman there were instances of corruption and chaos; and that the criminal case in connection with the taking of money from the treasury was pending hearing at the time of the publication of the leaflet;\n\n(3) that 'at that tin1e' the head clerk committed suicide; and\n\n( 4) that by taking military contracts he helped the British Goverrunent in India during the 1942-movement and by his standing for election against Congress candidates he was guilty of 'treachery' Desadrohita) and 'bach of faith' (Vishll'asghatakta)."}}, {"text": "Desadrohita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a leaflet with the con&ent of the appellant :\n\n(I) That the first respondent 'after rolling from several colleges failed to pass the intermediate examination;' F\n\n(2) that during the first respondent's tenure as Chairman there were instances of corruption and chaos; and that the criminal case in connection with the taking of money from the treasury was pending hearing at the time of the publication of the leaflet;\n\n(3) that 'at that tin1e' the head clerk committed suicide; and\n\n( 4) that by taking military contracts he helped the British Goverrunent in India during the 1942-movement and by his standing for election against Congress candidates he was guilty of 'treachery' Desadrohita) and 'bach of faith' (Vishll'asghatakta)."}}, {"text": "Vishll'asghatakta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a leaflet with the con&ent of the appellant :\n\n(I) That the first respondent 'after rolling from several colleges failed to pass the intermediate examination;' F\n\n(2) that during the first respondent's tenure as Chairman there were instances of corruption and chaos; and that the criminal case in connection with the taking of money from the treasury was pending hearing at the time of the publication of the leaflet;\n\n(3) that 'at that tin1e' the head clerk committed suicide; and\n\n( 4) that by taking military contracts he helped the British Goverrunent in India during the 1942-movement and by his standing for election against Congress candidates he was guilty of 'treachery' Desadrohita) and 'bach of faith' (Vishll'asghatakta)."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3052, "end_char": 3090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 12", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6110, "end_char": 6128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumara Nand v. Bri; mohan Lal Sharma, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 12 distinguished and explained:\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6252, "end_char": 6290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Mohan Kumaramangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Nandy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6466, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. K. Nandy, V. J. Francis, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chalterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chalterjee, R. B. Datar, B. M. Mahanto and Rathin Das."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chalterjee, R. B. Datar, B. M. Mahanto and Rathin Das."}}, {"text": "B. M. Mahanto", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6592, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chalterjee, R. B. Datar, B. M. Mahanto and Rathin Das."}}, {"text": "Rathin Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6610, "end_char": 6620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chalterjee, R. B. Datar, B. M. Mahanto and Rathin Das."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6687, "end_char": 6695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Dev Kanta Barooah, was declared elected at the las~ General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Assam in 1967, defeating the four rival candidates who are respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Dev Kanta Barooah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Dev Kanta Barooah, was declared elected at the las~ General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Assam in 1967, defeating the four rival candidates who are respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "DEV KANTA BAROOAH"}}, {"text": "Golok Chandra Baruah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6930, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, Golok Chandra Baruah, filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on various grounds, including a charge that false statements as to the personal character of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "GOLOK CHANDRA BARUAH & ORS"}}, {"text": "section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7229, "end_char": 7243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam and Nagaland", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the only ground which has been accepted by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland and the election of the appellant has been set aside on this ground."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7720, "end_char": 7729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Golok Barna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7919, "end_char": 7930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to have been committed by the appellant by publication of a leaflet which is, for convenience, reproduced below :-\n\n\"Why Golok Barna was driven away from the Congress?", "canonical_name": "Golok Barna"}}, {"text": "Golok Chandra Barna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Picture of a pair of bullock with yoke) Humble submission,\n\nOne leaflet bearing full of downright falsehood and false allegation with the Caption \"Why I have left the Congress\" has been published and distributed by Sri Golok Chandra Barna in the Samaguri Constituency.", "canonical_name": "GOLOK CHANDRA BARUAH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Samaguri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The patriot voters of Samaguri have sufficient experience and political consciousness."}}, {"text": "Barna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8398, "end_char": 8403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They would not believe the abominable and false publicity of Shri Golok Barna .. Still for the knowledge of the public a brief description of the activities of public life of Shri Barna has been published."}}, {"text": "Golok Barua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8574, "end_char": 8585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From that it will be understood that\n\nSri Golok Barua is not an actual congress man.", "canonical_name": "Golok Barna"}}, {"text": "Shrimati Usha Barthakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9194, "end_char": 9217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After breach of promise he was badly defeated by standing against Shrimati Usha Barthakur who was a Congress nominee."}}, {"text": "Pratap Chandra Sarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9326, "end_char": 9346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again by entreaties he joined the Congress and <'n the sudden death of Late Pratap Chandra Sarma Shri Golok Barua became the Chairman of Nowgong '.\\fonicipality."}}, {"text": "Golok Barua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9352, "end_char": 9363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again by entreaties he joined the Congress and <'n the sudden death of Late Pratap Chandra Sarma Shri Golok Barua became the Chairman of Nowgong '.\\fonicipality.", "canonical_name": "Golok Barna"}}, {"text": "Nowgong", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9387, "end_char": 9394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again by entreaties he joined the Congress and <'n the sudden death of Late Pratap Chandra Sarma Shri Golok Barua became the Chairman of Nowgong '.\\fonicipality."}}, {"text": "Dharmeswar Sarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9929, "end_char": 9945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Ga) At that time also on account of corruption in the Municipality alone late Dharmeswar Sarma the then Head Clerk of his time had to commit suicide."}}, {"text": "Go!ok Barua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10018, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Gha) While Sri Go!ok Barua was the Chairman at night like dn1nkard went to the Ex-Chairman Dr.\n\nBirendra Kishore Guha and not finding Dr. Guha behaved his wife and daughter unmannerly.", "canonical_name": "Golok Barna"}}, {"text": "Birendra Kishore Guha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10099, "end_char": 10120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Gha) While Sri Go!ok Barua was the Chairman at night like dn1nkard went to the Ex-Chairman Dr.\n\nBirendra Kishore Guha and not finding Dr. Guha behaved his wife and daughter unmannerly.", "canonical_name": "Birendra Kish ore Guha"}}, {"text": "Assam Provincial Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11180, "end_char": 11215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Due to the offence of the treachery he has been compie.tely driven away from the Congress for a period of sixyears by the Assam Provincial Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "Nowgong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nowgong."}}, {"text": "5-2-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11404, "end_char": 11410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-2-67\n\nNowgong District Congress Election Committee.\""}}, {"text": "Nowgong District Congress Election Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-2-67\n\nNowgong District Congress Election Committee.\""}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12870, "end_char": 12878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal, Mr. Daphtary."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13311, "end_char": 13320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N owgong District", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13882, "end_char": 13899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leaflet purports to have been published on behalf of the N owgong District Congress Election Committee."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15093, "end_char": 15102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, the aspect that he was helping the British by taking military contracts relates to a reflection on his political conduct in siding with the British Government rather than joining the Congress which was carrying on a movement against the British for achieving independence of the country."}}, {"text": "Devendra Nath Bora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20711, "end_char": 20729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to the statement of Devendra Nath Bora."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23199, "end_char": 23208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. C. Barua", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24242, "end_char": 24253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman, Sri G. C. Barua, stands\n\nfully liable for the loss, which should be recovered from him now.\""}}, {"text": "Birendra Kish ore Guha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24994, "end_char": 25016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, while Chairman of the Municipality, is alleged to have gone at night like a drunkard to the house of Ex Chairman, Dr. Birendra Kish ore Guha, and, not finding Dr.\n\nGuha, \"behaved with his wife and daughter unmannerly''.", "canonical_name": "Birendra Kish ore Guha"}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25438, "end_char": 25448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only point .that Mr. Chatterjee, counsel for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sipra Guha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25831, "end_char": 25841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have examined the evidence of the daughter, Miss Sipra Guha alias Miss Lily Guha, who related what happened during that night."}}, {"text": "Lily Guha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25853, "end_char": 25862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have examined the evidence of the daughter, Miss Sipra Guha alias Miss Lily Guha, who related what happened during that night."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27076, "end_char": 27085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21st November, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27762, "end_char": 27781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 resigned the Chairmanship in November, 1964 and his resignation was accepted on 21st November, 1964."}}, {"text": "10th December, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28391, "end_char": 28410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vice- Chairman held Dharmeswar Sarma responsible for the money when he found that the sweepers had not been paid and, thereupon, directed Dharmeswar Sarma to make good the shortage and pay up all the sweepers by 1 p.m. on 10th December, 1964 positively, failing which legal action would be taken against him."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29859, "end_char": 29868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32957, "end_char": 32963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the appellant, in this connection, relied on a passage at page 91 of Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, 6th Edition, which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"But the following have been held not to be within tl!e provision :- a statement which imputed that the candidate was a traitor, and was one of certain persons who were in correspondence with the enemy shortly before the South African war broke out in 1899.\""}}, {"text": "South", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33275, "end_char": 33280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the appellant, in this connection, relied on a passage at page 91 of Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, 6th Edition, which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"But the following have been held not to be within tl!e provision :- a statement which imputed that the candidate was a traitor, and was one of certain persons who were in correspondence with the enemy shortly before the South African war broke out in 1899.\""}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33594, "end_char": 33601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Based on the same case, it is stated in note (a) at page 227 under paragraph 394 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Kumara Nand~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33847, "end_char": 33859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, however, drew our attention to the fact that in the case of Kumara Nand~) this Court did not rely on Parker's version of the decision on the ground that in Rogers on Elections, Vol."}}, {"text": "Rogers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34944, "end_char": 34950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that, apart from the allegation that Radical members of the House of Commons were in correspondence with the enemy, there must have been an inference drawn that the candidate was a traitor and it is with reference to this last statement that Rogers mentions that the false statements were held to be matters of opinion only and not of fact."}}, {"text": "s. 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36655, "end_char": 36664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schofield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39226, "end_char": 39235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schofield in his book on Parliamentary Blee tions, 2nd Edition, at page 437, has reproduced a quotation from a decision o{ Darling, J., in Cumberland ( Cockermouth Division) Case('), where he said:-\n\n\"You must not make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate; if you do, it is an illegal practice."}}, {"text": "Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39349, "end_char": 39356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schofield in his book on Parliamentary Blee tions, 2nd Edition, at page 437, has reproduced a quotation from a decision o{ Darling, J., in Cumberland ( Cockermouth Division) Case('), where he said:-\n\n\"You must not make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate; if you do, it is an illegal practice."}}, {"text": "Cumberland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39365, "end_char": 39375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schofield in his book on Parliamentary Blee tions, 2nd Edition, at page 437, has reproduced a quotation from a decision o{ Darling, J., in Cumberland ( Cockermouth Division) Case('), where he said:-\n\n\"You must not make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate; if you do, it is an illegal practice."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41439, "end_char": 41445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shashi Nath Bardoloi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41803, "end_char": 41823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2, Shashi Nath Bardoloi, stated that his own reaction was that this leaflet had very much scandalised res'."}}, {"text": "Nowgong Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42159, "end_char": 42172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 could not pass the Intermediate Examination, though he rolled from College to College, whereafter he joined as a copyist and then became a clerk at Nowgong Court, that there was an allegation that somebody withdrew some money from the treasury with the forged signature of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Golok Chand Saikia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42842, "end_char": 42860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of the next witness P.W. 3, Golok Chand Saikia, is even more unsatisfactory, because he did not give his own reaction to the leaflet at al!"}}, {"text": "Bhola Ram Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43311, "end_char": 43324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 4 is Bhola Ram Das."}}, {"text": "Hara Kanta Bora", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43986, "end_char": 44001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , next witness P.W. 5, Hara Kanta Bora, also stated that, on readirtg the leaflet, he got the impression that respondent No."}}, {"text": "Liladhar Barua", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44908, "end_char": 44922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last witness, whose evidence was brought to our notice, is P.W. 6 Liladhar Barua who stated that, on reading this leaflet, he gathered the impression that respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46310, "end_char": 46316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_680_688_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "JOINT COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, HARBOUR DIV. II, A\n\nMADRAS\n\nYOUNG MEN'S INDIAN ASSOCIATION (REG.) MADRAS &:\n\nORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J, C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER,\n\nA. N, RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]\n\nMadras General Sther there is no sale which would be exigible to tax. in •pite of the definition of 'sale' in s. 2(n) read with Exp. I of the Act. [686 G]\n\nIn proprietary clubs where some of the sharholders are not members or some of the members are not shareholders. the .members are not owners of, nor interested in, the property of the olubs.\n\nUnlike proprietary clubs the case of a members' club is analogous to that of an agent investing his own monies for preparing things for the consumption of the principal and later recouping himself for the ex:penes incurred. Therefore. in the present case, even though the clubs arc distinct legal entities they were only acting as agents for members in the matter of supply of various preparations to them and no sale would be involved as the. element of transfer would be completely absent. [685 A-B, 686 HJ\n\nCos111opo/itan Club, Madras v. District Co1111nert.:ial Tax Officer, Tripllcane (1952) I M.L.J. 401; Dep11ty Conunercial Tax Officer TripU'cane Dil'ision. Madras v. Cos111opolitan Club, l.L.R. [1955] Mad. 10-1-~. GraU\n\nv. Ev<1ns. [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 37J. Trebanog Working Men's Club and lnsli fllti! Ltd. v. Macdonald [1940] I A.E.L.R. 454, Bengal Nr.gp11r Cotton Ji, fills ('/uh, Rajnandangaon v. Sales Tax Officer Raip11r & Anr. 8 S.T.C.\n\n781. Ce11111ry C/11h & Anr. v. State of My.wre. 16 S.T.C. 38. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Enfiend India Ltd. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 421, and Inland Revenue Co111n1issioners v. Westleigh Estate Co. Lki.\n\nSanze v.\n\nSo11th Behar Railway Co. Ltd. [1924] I K.B. 390, referred to.\n\n(Per Shah, J. concurring) : The analogy of cases decided under the Licensing Act in the United Kingdom concerning the supply by clubs of alcoholic drinks to their members is not appropriate. \\.Vhether refreshments, beverages and other articles supplied by members' club fdr consideration, to its members, are in law sold depends upon the circumstancesin which the transaction takes place.\n\nIn each case the liability to tax of the transaction will depend upon its strictly legal form.\n\nIf an incorporated members' club supplies its property to its members at a fixed tariff the transaction would readily be deemed to be one for sale, even if the transaction is-on a non-profit basis: such a transaction would be liable to sales tax.\n\nWhere, ho\\.\\'ever, the club is merely acting on behalf of the members to make available to them refreshments, beverages and other articles, the, transaction will not be regarded as a sale, for the club is the agency through \\vhich the members have arranged that the refreshments, beverages and other articles should be made available.\n\nThe test in each case is whether the club transfers property . belonging to it for a price or the club acts as an agent for making available property belonging to its members. t687 G, 688 Bl\n\nState of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. [1959] S.C.R. 379, Duke of West Minster v. Inland Revenue Co1n1nissioner, 19 T.C. 490, Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Com'missioner of Income-tax, Madras. L.R. 67 I.A. 394, Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Motors & General Stores (P) Ltd., 66 J.T.R. 692 S.C. and Commissioner of 1\"co1itetax Gujarat v. B. M. Kharwar, 72 J.T.R. 603 S.C., referred to. In the present case on the findings recorded, the respondents \\\".Ire not transferring property belongin.g to them but were merely acting as agents for and on behalf of the members and hence, the transactions \\Vere not sales and could not therefore be subject to sales tax under the Act. [688 DJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1724 to 1727 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgments and orders dated November 23, 1962 and November 4, 1963 of the Madtas High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 129, 130. and 181 of 1960 and Writ Appeal No. 275 of 1963.\n\nM. C. Chagla and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nD. Narsaraju and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos.1724, 1725 and 1727 of 1967).\n\nP. Ram Reddy, P. Parameswara Rao and A. V. V. Nair, for the respondent (in S.A. No. 1726 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., K. s. HEGDE,\n\nA. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DuA, was delivered by GROVER, J. J. C. SHAH gave a separate opinion.\n\nGrover, J. These appeals .by certificate are directed against a common judgme.nt of the Madras High Court in petitions filed\n\nunder Art. 226 of the Constitution by the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, the Young Men's Indian Association, Madras and the Lawley Institute Ootacamund challenging the proceedings relating to their assessment to sales tax under the Madras General Sales\n\nTax Act, 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\", for supplying food, A snacks, beverages and other articles to their members or their guests. It was held by the High Court that each of these clubs could not be regarded as a \"dealer\" within the meaning of s. 2(g) read with Explanation I of the Act nor was any \"sale\" involved in the aforesaid activity of the club within the meaning of s. 2(n) read with Explanation I of the Act.\n\nThe Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, is a social recreation club which was started originally in the year 1873 as an unincorporated association. In 1934 it was registered under s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act 1913 as a non-profit earning institution. Its objects, as disclosed in the memorandum of association, are mainly to promote and facilitate social intercourse, discussion amongst its members etc. The articles of association provide that the members for the time being only constitute the club. It maintains an establishment for preparing and supplying refreshment to its members. It has been found by the High Court and has not been disputed that the articles necessary for the aforesaid purpose are purchased by the club in the market and the preparations are made within its premises at the direction of a committee. The preparations are supplied to the members at such prices as are fixed by the committee.\n\nA member is allowed to bring guests with him but if any article of food is consumed by the guest it is the member who has to pay for the same.\n\nThe Young Men's Indian Association is a society registered under the Societies' Registratio~ Act 1860. It has, for its objects, the improvement of the moral and physical standards etc. of the students. The association provides certain facilities in the shape of a library with a reading room apart from residential and recreational facilities. There is a mess together with a canteen serving the needs of the members. Any member can bring a guest but the duration of his stay in the hostel or of enjoying the benefit of the preparations or bever'!JleS is limited and restricted by the rules.\n\nIt is the member who has to pay the charges for any articles consumed by his guest. The employees of the association purchase the various articles required for supplying the refreshments etc. and the cost and the expenses incurred therefor inclusive of the salaries of cooks, servers and others are totalled up and divided among the members participating in the me; s. No profit is made by the association in pr.oviding these amenities to its members.\n\nThese facts as found in the judgment of the High Court arc not disputed.\n\nThe Lawley Institute came into existence by a deed of trust dated September 15, 1911 entered into between the Maharaja of Bibbli and the Collector of Nilgiris and others. The management of the Institute vests absolutely in the board of trustees.\n\nIt is\n\nintended to serve its members only and no person other than a member is entitled to participate in the amenities provided by the Institute. The supplying of refreshments and meals to members constitute one of such amenities.\n\nThese facts are altogether uncontroverted.\n\nIt appears that in the State of Madras levy of sales tax was first made in 1939.\n\nThe statute as it stood then contained the definition of \"dealer'' in s. 2(b).\n\nA dealer was defined as \"any person who carried on any business of buying, or selling goods\" with the following Explanation :\n\n\"a cooperative society, a club, a firm or any association which sells goods to its members is a dealer within the meaning of this clause\".\n\nThe Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, which had been pa3ing tax since 1939 filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution which was disposed of by Mack J,, in Cosmopolitan Club, Madras v.\n\nD . District Commercial Tax Officer, Trip/icane ('). According to the learned Judge the supply of refreshments in a members' club purchased out of the club funds and composed of members' subscription was not a transfer of property from the club as such to a member nor did the club do any trade or business in purchasing from outside the requirements of members and supplying the same E to them at a fixed charge. The levy of sales tax on such supply of refreshments was hekl to be illegal.\n\nA division bench to whom an appeal was taken confirmed the abovejudgment (Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Triplicane Division, Madras v. The Cosmopolitan Club(').\n\nThe definition of \"dealer\" in s. 2(g) of the Act is in the following terms :\n\nF \"dealer\" means any person who carried on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods, directly or otherwise whether for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration and includes-\n\n(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)\n\n................. ... .................... .................... ....................\n\n. Explanation-I.\n\nA society including a cooperative society, club or firm or an association which, whether or not in the course of business, buys, sells or distributes goods from or to its members for cash or for deferred\n\n(I) [1952] I M.L.J. 401.\n\n(2) l.L.R. (1955] Mad. 1042.\n\npayment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, shall be deemed to be a dealer for the purpose o~ this Act; Explanation II. ............. \"\n\nThe definition of sale as given in s. 2(n) reads: ·\n\n\"sale\" with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means every transfer of the property in goods, by one person to another in the course of business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration ................... , ... \"\n\nExplanation I. \"The transfer of property involved in the supply or distribution of goods by a society (including a cooperative society) club, firm or any association to its members, for cash, 'or for deferred payment, or other valuable consideration, whether or not in the course of business shall be deemed to be a sale for the purpose of this Act\".\n\n\"Turnover\" is defined to mean :\n\n\"the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold or supplied or distributed by a dealer, either directly or through another on his own account or on account of others whether for cash or for deferred payment or for other valuable consideration ........... \"\n\nIt is common ground that for the levy of sales tax there must be a sale of refreshments, beverages and other preparations by the tlub to its members. If there is no transfer of property involved in the supply or distribution of goods by a club it would not fall within Explanation I contained in the definition of sale in s. 2(n) nor can the club be regarded as a dealer within s. 2(g) read with Explanation I. '\n\nThe law in England has always been that members' clubs to which category the clubs in the present case belong cannot be made si; bject to the provisions of the Licensing Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club property Including the excisable liquor.\n\nThe supply of liquor to a member at a fixed prjce by the clnb cannot be regarded to be a sale. If, however, liquor is supplied to and paid for by a person who is not a bona fide member of the club or his duly authorised agent there would be a sale. With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn.\n\nWhere such a club has all the characteristics of a members' club consistent with its incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder and every ''Shareholder is a member, no licence need be taken out if liquor\n\nis supplied only to the members. If. some of the shareholders are nut members or some of the members are not shareholders that would be the case of a proprietary club and would involve sale.\n\nProprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The supply to them of food or liquor though at a fixed tariff is a sale.\n\n(See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 5, pp. 280-281.) The principle laid down in Graff v. Evans(') had throughout been followed. In that case Field J., put it thus :\n\n\"I think the true construction of the rules is that the members were the joint owners of the general property in all the goods of the club, and that the trustees were their agents with respect to the general property in the goods\".\n\nThe difficulty felt in the legal property ordinarily vesting in the trustees of the members' club or in the incorporated body was surmounted by invoking the theory of agency i.e. the club or the trustees acting as agents of the members.\n\nAccording to Lord Hewart (L.C.J.} in Trebanog Working Men's Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald('), once it was conceded that a members' club did not necessarily require a license to serve its members with , intoxicating liquor it was difficult to draw any distinction between the various legal entities which might be entrusted with the duty of holding the property on behalf of members, be it an individual or a body of trustees or a company formed for the purpose so long as the real interest in the liquor remained in the members of the club. What was essential was that the holding of the property by the agent or trustee must be a holding for and on behalf of and not a holding antagonistic to members of the club.\n\nIn the various cases which came to be decided by the High Courts in India the view which had prevailed in England was accepted and applied. We may notice the deCisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Club, Rajnandangaon v. Sales Tax Officer Raipur & Another(') and of the Mysore High Court in Century Club & Another v. The State of Mysore & Anr.(4). In the former it was held that the supply to the member of a member>' club registered under s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act 1913 of refreshments purchased out of club funds which consisted of members' subscription was not a transfer of property from the club as such to a member and the club was not liable to sales tax under the C.Pc & Barar Sales Tax Act 1947 in respect of such supplies of refreshment. The prin ciple adverted to in Trebanog Working Men's Club(') was adopted\n\n(I) [1882] 8 Q. B. D. 373.\n\n(2) [1940] I A.E.L.R. 454.\n\n(3) 8 S. T. C. 781.\n\n(4) 16 S. T. C. 38.\n\nand it was said that if the agent or a trustee supplied goods to the members such supplies would not amount to a transaction of sale.\n\nThe Mysore court expressed the same view that a purely member's club which makes purchases through a Secretary or manager and supplies the requirements to members at a fixed rate did not in law sell these goods to the members.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed on a decision of this court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer & Am'. v.\n\nEnfiend India Ltd. ( 1). In that case the Explanation to s. 2(g) was found to be intra vires and within the competence of the State legislature. The judgment proceeded on the footing that when a cooperative society supplied refreshments to its members for a price the following four constituent elements of sale were present : (1) parties competent to contract; (2) mutual consent; (3) thing, the absolute or general property in which is transferred from the seller to the buyer and ( 4) price in money paid or promised. The mere fact that the society supplied the refreshments to its members alone and did not make any profit was not considered sufficient to establish that the society was acting only as an agent of its members.\n\nAs a registered society was a body corporate it could not be assumed that the property which it held was the property of which its members were owners. The English decisions were distinguished on the ground that the courts in those cases were dealillg with matters of quasi criminal nature.\n\nIt appears that in England even in taxation laws the position of a members' club though incorporated has been recognised to. be quite different.\n\nIn Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Westleigh Estate Co. Ltd.('); Same v. South Behar Railway Co. Ltd. and Same v. Eccentric Club Pollock M.R. dealing with the case of the Eccentric Club pointed out that the members' club was only structurally a company and it did not carry on trade or business so as to attract the Corporation Profits Tax.\n\nThe essential question, in the present case, is whether the supply of the various preparations by each club to its members involved a transaction of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1930. The State Legislature being competent to legislate only under Entry 54, List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution the expression \"sale of goods\" bears the same meaning which it has in the aforesaid Act. Thus in spite of the definition contained in s. 2 ( n) read with Explanation I of the Act if there is no transfer of property from one to another there is no sale which would be exigible to tax. If the club even though a distinct legal entity is only acting as an agent for its members in the matter of supply of various preparations to them no sale would be involved\n\n(I) [1968) 2 S.C.R. 421.\n\n(2) [1924] l J(. B. 390.\n\nas the element of transfer would be completely absent. This position has been rightly accepted even in the previous decision of this Court.\n\nThe final conclusion of the High Court in the judgment under appeal was that the case of each club was analogous to that of an agent or mandatory investing his own monies for preparing things for consumption of the principal, and later recouping himself for the expenses incurred. Once this conclusion on the facts relating to each club was reached it was unnecessary for the High Court to have expressed any view with regard to the vires of the Explanations to s. 2(g) and 2(n) of the Act. As no transaction of sale was involved there could be no levy of tax under the provisions of the Act on the supply of refreshments and preparations by each one of the clubs to its members.\n\nThe appeals must fail and are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nShah, J.\n\nWhere general property in goods belonging to a person is under a contract transferred to another for a price paid or promised, the transaction is a sale. The State Legislature has under the Constitution power to legislate under Entry 54 List II in respect of taxes on sale or purchase of goods and the expression\n\n\"sale\" has the same meaning it bears in the Sale of Goods Act,\n\n1930 : see State c1 Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. ( 1 ). A transaction which is not of the nature of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, cannot, therefore, be subjected to tax under a law enacted in exercise of power under Entry 54 List II.\n\nWhether refreshments, beverages and other articles supplied by a Member's Club for consideration to its members are in law sold depends upon the circumstances in which the transaction takes place. In each case the liability to tax of the transaction will depend upon its strictly legal form. If an incorporated members' club supplies its property to its members at a fixed tariff, the transaction would readily be deemed to be one for sale, even if the transaction is on a non-profit basis; such a transaction would be liable to sales tax. Where, however, the club is merely.acting on behalf of the melllbers to make available to them refreshments, beverages and other articles, the transaction will not be regarded as a ale, for the club is the agency tllrough which the members have arranged that the refreshments, beverages and other articles should be made available. The test in each case is whether the\n\n(I) [1959} S.C.R. 379.\n\nclub transfers property belonging to it for a price or the club acts A as an agent for making available property belonging to its members.\n\nIn my judgment, the analogy of the cases. decided under the Licensing Act in the United Kingdom concerning the supply by clubs o.f alcoholic drinks to their members is not appropriate. In 8 a criminal trial or a quasi-criminal proceeding, the Court is entitled to consider the substance of the transaction and determine the liability of the offender. But in a taxing statute the strict legal position as disclosed by the form and not the substance of. the transaction is determinative of its taxability : see Duke of West Minister v. Inland Revenue Commissioners('); Ba11k of Chittinad Minster v. Inland Revenue Commissioners('); Bank of Chittinad C Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v.\n\nMotors & Geneml Stores(P) Ltd.('); and Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v.\n\nB. M.\n\nKhanvar(').\n\nIt appears on the tindings recorded by the High Court that the clubs or associations sought to be rendered liable in these appeals D were not transferring property blonging to them but were merely acting as agents for and on behalf of the members. They were not selling goods but were rendering a service to their members.\n\nI agree therefore that the appeals must fail.\n\nY.P.\n\n(I) 19 T.C. 490. 519.\n\n(2) L. R. 67 I. A. 394.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(3) 66 l.T.R. 692 S.C.\n\n(4) 72 I.T.R. 603 S.C.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "JOINT COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, HARBOUR DIV. II, A", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JOINT COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, HARBOUR DIV. II, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "YOUNG MEN'S INDIAN ASSOCIATION (REG.) MADRAS &:\n\nORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "YOUNG MENS INDIAN ASSOCIATION (REG.) MADRAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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Nair, for the respondent (in S.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. Parameswara Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5306, "end_char": 5324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, P. Parameswara Rao and A. V. V. Nair, for the respondent (in S.A. No."}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy, P. Parameswara Rao and A. V. V. Nair, for the respondent (in S.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. s. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., K. s. HEGDE,\n\nA. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY and I. D. DuA, was delivered by GROVER, J. J. C. SHAH gave a separate opinion.", "canonical_name": "K. S. HEGDE"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., K. s. HEGDE,\n\nA. N. GROVER, A. 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SHAH gave a separate opinion."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Young Men's Indian Association, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5748, "end_char": 5786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution by the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, the Young Men's Indian Association, Madras and the Lawley Institute Ootacamund challenging the proceedings relating to their assessment to sales tax under the Madras General Sales\n\nTax Act, 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\", for supplying food, A snacks, beverages and other articles to their members or their guests."}}, {"text": "Lawley Institute Ootacamund", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution by the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, the Young Men's Indian Association, Madras and the Lawley Institute Ootacamund challenging the proceedings relating to their assessment to sales tax under the Madras General Sales\n\nTax Act, 1959, hereinafter called the \"Act\", for supplying food, A snacks, beverages and other articles to their members or their guests."}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explanation I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6194, "end_char": 6218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explanation I of the Act", "statute": "Explanation I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Explanation I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cosmopolitan Club, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, is a social recreation club which was started originally in the year 1873 as an unincorporated association."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explanation I of the Act", "statute": "Explanation I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6536, "end_char": 6561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Young Men's Indian Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Young Men's Indian Association is a society registered under the Societies' Registratio~ Act 1860."}}, {"text": "Lawley Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lawley Institute came into existence by a deed of trust dated September 15, 1911 entered into between the Maharaja of Bibbli and the Collector of Nilgiris and others."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1911", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lawley Institute came into existence by a deed of trust dated September 15, 1911 entered into between the Maharaja of Bibbli and the Collector of Nilgiris and others."}}, {"text": "Bibbli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lawley Institute came into existence by a deed of trust dated September 15, 1911 entered into between the Maharaja of Bibbli and the Collector of Nilgiris and others."}}, {"text": "Nilgiris", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8681, "end_char": 8689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lawley Institute came into existence by a deed of trust dated September 15, 1911 entered into between the Maharaja of Bibbli and the Collector of Nilgiris and others."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in the State of Madras levy of sales tax was first made in 1939."}}, {"text": "s. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9207, "end_char": 9214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mack", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9629, "end_char": 9633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution which was disposed of by Mack J,, in Cosmopolitan Club, Madras v.\n\nD ."}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10356, "end_char": 10363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11242, "end_char": 11249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12493, "end_char": 12500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12549, "end_char": 12556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there is no transfer of property involved in the supply or distribution of goods by a club it would not fall within Explanation I contained in the definition of sale in s. 2(n) nor can the club be regarded as a dealer within s. 2(g) read with Explanation I. '\n\nThe law in England has always been that members' clubs to which category the clubs in the present case belong cannot be made si; bject to the provisions of the Licensing Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club property Including the excisable liquor."}}, {"text": "Field", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13953, "end_char": 13958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Field J., put it thus :\n\n\"I think the true construction of the rules is that the members were the joint owners of the general property in all the goods of the club, and that the trustees were their agents with respect to the general property in the goods\"."}}, {"text": "Hewart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14467, "end_char": 14473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Lord Hewart (L.C.J.} in Trebanog Working Men's Club and Institute Ltd. v. Macdonald('), once it was conceded that a members' club did not necessarily require a license to serve its members with , intoxicating liquor it was difficult to draw any distinction between the various legal entities which might be entrusted with the duty of holding the property on behalf of members, be it an individual or a body of trustees or a company formed for the purpose so long as the real interest in the liquor remained in the members of the club."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15240, "end_char": 15245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the various cases which came to be decided by the High Courts in India the view which had prevailed in England was accepted and applied."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15347, "end_char": 15372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may notice the deCisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Club, Rajnandangaon v. Sales Tax Officer Raipur & Another(') and of the Mysore High Court in Century Club & Another v. The State of Mysore & Anr.(4)."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15475, "end_char": 15492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may notice the deCisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Club, Rajnandangaon v. Sales Tax Officer Raipur & Another(') and of the Mysore High Court in Century Club & Another v. The State of Mysore & Anr.(4)."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15645, "end_char": 15650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Barar Sales Tax Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15892, "end_char": 15916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Trebanog Working Men's Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15991, "end_char": 16018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prin ciple adverted to in Trebanog Working Men's Club(') was adopted\n\n(I) [1882] 8 Q. B. D. 373."}}, {"text": "Mysore court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16272, "end_char": 16284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mysore court expressed the same view that a purely member's club which makes purchases through a Secretary or manager and supplies the requirements to members at a fixed rate did not in law sell these goods to the members."}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16677, "end_char": 16684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Barar Sales Tax Act 1947", "statute": "Barar Sales Tax Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18312, "end_char": 18334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18590, "end_char": 18594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act 1930"}}, {"text": "Explanation I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18610, "end_char": 18634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968) 2 S.C.R. 421", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18918, "end_char": 18937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(g) and 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19569, "end_char": 19585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explanation I of the Act", "statute": "Explanation I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20237, "end_char": 20254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20406, "end_char": 20423, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L. R. 67 I. A. 394", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22788, "end_char": 22806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_689_693_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "KHUSHAL KHEMGAR SHAH & ORS. v.\n\nKHORSHED BANU DADIBA BOATWALLA AND ANR.\n\nFebruary 12, 1970\n\n(J.C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A, N. GROVER, JJ.)\n\nPartnership Act .1932-Sections 14, 39, 42, 46 and 55-Goodwill-- Nature of. ·\n\nLegal representatives of a partner-If entitled to share in good-will of a firm continuing after death of a partner.\n\nD who was one of eight par'tners in a firm, died on February 20, 1957.\n\nBy virtue of a provision in the partnership deed, the business of the firm. was continued by the surviving partners. The respondents, being the widow and son of D commenced an action for an account of the partnership between D and the surviving partners, praying for an order for the payment of the amount determined to be due to D at the time of his death ..\n\nA single judge of the High Court passed a preliminary decree directing that an account be taken of the partnership as on. February 20, 1957.\n\nA Division Bench, in appeal, modified the decree holding that the respondents were entitled only to interest at 6o/o p.a. on the amount of D's share in the assets of the partnership, including good-will.\n\nIn appear to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants. that the respondents as legal representatives of D were not entitled to a share in the value of the good-will of the firm because good-will may be taken into account only when there is a dissolution and not otherwise; and. furthermore, because D had agreed that his interest in. the good-will wduld cease after his death and the business shall be continued by the surviving_ partners.\n\nHELD : Dismissing the appeal, It could not be held that in interpreting a deed of partnership, business whereof, it is stipulated shall be continued by the surviving partners after the death of a partner, the Court will not award to the legal representatives of the deceased partner a share. in the goodwill in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary. The good-will of a firm is an asset of the firm.\n\nIn interpreting the deed of partnership, t~~ Court wi1l insist upon some indication that the right to a share in the assets is, by virtue of the agreement that the surviving partnerS are entitled to carry on the busine, ss. on the death of the partner, to be extinguished.\n\nIn the absence of a provision expressly made or clearly implied,. the normal rule that the share of a partner in the asse.ts devolves upon his legal representatives will apply to the good-will as well as to other assets. [693 F-H] There is no indication in . ._ 55 of the Partnership Act that goodwill may be taken into account only when there is a general dissolution of the firm, and not when the reprensentatives of a partner claim his share in the firn1, which by express stipulations is to continue not with •landing the death \"f a partner. Ncir do ss. 39, 42 and 46 of the Act support such a contention. [691 Fl Hunter v. Dowling, [1895] 2 Ch. D. 233; Smith v. Nelson 96 Law Times Reports 313; Bachubai and L.A. Watkins v. Shamji Jadowji, I.L.R. 9 Born. 536; referred to.\n\nL8Sup.Cl170-14.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1201 of A 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 24, 1965 of the Bombily High Court in Appeal No. 79 of 1963.\n\nF. S. Nariman, K. D. Mehta and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Chag/a and A. K. Vema, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Dadiba Hormusji Boatwalla was one of the eight partners of Messrs Meghji Thobhan & Company-a firm of Muccadams and cotton brokers. Boatwalla died. on February 20, 1957. By virtue of cl. 8 of the deed of partnership the business of the firm was continued by the surviving partners. Khorshed and Nariman-widow and son respectively of Boatwallaobtained letters of adininistration to the estate of Boatwalla and commenced an action in the High Court\" of Bombay for an account of the partnership between Boatwalla and the surviving partners and for an order paying to the plaintiffs the amount determined to be due to Boatwalla at the time of his death.\n\nThe suit was resisted by the surviving partners-who will hereinafter be called 'the defendants'. Tarkunde, J., passed a preliminary decree dec-\n\nI:iring that qua Boatwalla the partnership stood dissolved on February 20, 1957, but not in respect of the surviving partnfs, and directed that an account be taken of the partnership upto February 20, 1957. ainst that decree the defendants appealed under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.\n\nIn appeal the High Court modified the decree. The learned Judges held that the plaintiffs , were not entitled to an account in the profits and losses of the firm after the death of Boatwalla, nor to exercise an option under s. 37 of the Partnership Act, but that the plaintiffs were entitled only to interest at six per cent. per annum on the amount found due as Boatwalla's share in the assets of the partnership includg the goodwill.\n\nThey furthoc declared that the interest of Boatwalla in the firni ceased on February 20, 1957, and deleted the direction with regard to the dissolution of the firin as between Boatwalla and the defendants.\n\nWith special leave, this appeal has been filed by the defendants.\n\nThe defendants contend that the plaintiffs as legal representatives of Boatwalla were not entitled to a share in the value of the goodwill of the firm because the goodwill of a firm may be taken into account only when there is a dissolution of the firm and in any event because Boatwalla had agreed that his interest in the goodwill shall cease on his death and the business shall\n\n...\n\nK. 1':. SHAH v. KHORSHED (Shah, J.) 691\n\nbe continued by the surviving partners. The defendants do not challenge the decree of the High Court awarding to the plainffs\n\nBoatwalla's share in the assets of the firm other than goodw11! : they contend that in the goodwill of the firril. the plaintiffs had no share.·\n\nBy section 14 of the Partnership Act, 1932, it is enacted that:\n\n\"Subject to contract between the partners, the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interest in properly originally brought into the. stock of the firm or acquired, by purchase or otherwJSe, by or for the .firm or for the purposes and in the course of the business of the finn; and includes also the goodwill of the business.\"\n\nGoodwill of the firm is expressly declared to be the property of the firm.\n\nCounsel for the \n\nbe examined previously.\n\nThe deposition of Ram Chander, Assistant Surgeon, a defence witness was not typed out and made a part of the record although his deposition was noted by the steno-typist in the note book. The order of dismissal was passed by the Deputy Inspector General without considering this evidence. Besides the above, the evidence of well placed officers like Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, Sub Divisional Magistrates and others who had testified to the respondent's efficiency, honesty and reliability were totally ignored.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge held that the charge framed against the respondent was vague and indefinite and the enquiry was. unfair and inadequate because some of the authors of the reports adverse to the respondent, though available, were not produced to enable the rHpondent to cross-examine them. that oral and. documentary evidence sought by the respondent was withheld and. as such no reasonable opportunity of defence was afforded to him.\n\nIn the result he held that the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution had been violated and the order of dismissal was inoperative.\n\nThe High Court did not agree that the charge was vague but focussed its attention mainly on the question as to whether tliere had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of Art. 311 and whether the enquiry conformed to the principles of fairplay and natural justice. Considering the Service Rules already mentioned the High Court observed that there was no dispute that reports till J 940 were generally favourable to the plaintiff.\n\nIn our view reports earlier than 1944 should not have been considered at all inasmuch as he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in that year.\n\nIt is unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they could\n\nhave overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the efficiency bar in 1944. I! will be noted that there was no specific complaint in either of the two years and at best there was only room for suspicion regarding his j:>ehaviour.\n\nIt further appears from the judgment of the High Court ba.sed mainly on the lengthy finding of the Superintendent of Polle~, Bishambar Das dated 25th May 1950 that from 1942 to Apnl 1945 the respondent got 'A' class r7ports. though ~~ .super!or offi- .cers were not certain as regards his honesty.\n\nHis mtegnty was considered to be doubtful in the succeeding reports up to 3 lSt December 1946. As regards the first half of 194 7 the Superintendent of Police had noted that he was not in a position to make any remark about his honesty as he ltad not seen the respondent's work at any police station. The Deputy Commissioner however remarked that his work was quite sati!factory and he was honest.\n\nFor the remaining part of 1947 he received an 'A' report from the District Superintendent of Police who also stated that the respondent seemed to be honest and competent\n\nThere can be no doubt that the 19-48 report was a very damai:- ing one and if the allegations contained therein had any substratum of truth the respondent could be dismissed from service on the strength of the charges based on those allegations alone.\n\nBut, as already noted, the respondent was cleared of this charge.\n\nThe High Court opined that the enquiry officer, Bishambar Das, should not have neglected to summon five officers who made reports about the respondent and were available for examination at the enquiry. They were Chunilal Malhotra, Choudhry Roshan Lal, Deputy Commissioner, Shri Ismail. Shri. Holiday and Shri Sant Prakash Singh• According to the High Court the defence of the respondent in the enquiry being that the reports against him were based upon no sufficient data and/ or were made partly because of the poisoning of the mind of the District Superintendent of Police by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on communal considerations the only way the respondent could 'have substantiated his defence version would be by putting questions to the reporting officers if made available during the enquiry. One\n\nof the above officers Shamsher Singh was actually examined as the respondent's witness in the sui\\ and his evidence showed that he had left the column for honesty in the report for 1946• blank as be had not seen the respondent at his work.\n\nThis evidence wen. to show that if lie had been examined by the enquiry officer a portion of the report taken in consideration against the respondent would have been found to be without substance.\n\nAnother ufficer. Chunilal Malhotra though not examined before the enquiry\n\nPUNJil v. CHUNI LAL (Mitter, /,) 701\n\nA Olicer was called in defence in the suit. All that he could say was that he bad received complamts .against l'ISt but he did not remember whether they were .oral or m wnting. 'I1le\n\nHigh Court justifiably col1UDC]lted th.at there was no sufficit reason for the ehquiry officer refusmg to summon Chunilal Malhotra.\n\nOn an overall consideration of the facts, the High a Court took the view that :\n\n\"The approach of the enquiry officer was such that whatever be the testimony of other witnesses, it could not undo the efh>cg of the reports-made by the superior officers about the . plaintiff.\" c In other words the enquiry officer shut his mind to the testimony\n\nafforded by a large number of witnesses including a Deputy Commissioner, Under Secretary, two Superinteudents of Police, a few Magistrates and some Deputy Superintendents of Police who had given evidence about the respondent's reputation and work. ·\n\nFurther the High ourt took the view that thc:i remarks of the D Deputy lnspector Ge11-eral of Police against the res.pendent in the 1948 that he was not worth being retained m service had influenced the entire approach of the enquiry officer who was a subordinate to the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The Deputy Superintendent of Police Lekhraj examined. at the hearing of the suit by the respondent and te whom another enquiry against I the respondent had been entrusted earlier by Bishambar Das, the inquiry officer, told the court that when he (Lekhraj) exonerated the respondent in the other enquiry, Bishambar Das had sent for him and told him that the hier authorities wanted to take serious action to the extent of dismissal of the respondent.\n\nIn our view the High Court arrived at the correct conclusion and on the facts of this case it is impossible to hold that the respondent had been given reasonable opportunity of conducting hi! defence before the enquiry officer.\n\nFrom what we have stated it is clear that if the e11at rules of natural justice required that he should have a right to cross-examine all the persons who\n\nhad sworn affidavits supporting the allegations made against him.\n\nIn our opinion the above observation regarding the limit of the right to cross-examine dissociated from the context in which it was made cannot help the appellant.\n\nAlthough the case _ is governed by Art. 311 as it stood prioi to its amendment in 1963 the respondent could not be deprived of an effective right to make representation against t~- action of dismissal.\n\nIn our opinion, refusal of the right to examine witnesses who had made general remarks against his character and were available for examination at the inquiry amounted to denial of a reasonable opoprtunity of showing cause against the action.\n\nIn the result we hold that the High Court came to the correct conclusion and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEWAN CHUNI LAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEWAN CHUNI LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 16, 19'70", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nDEWAN CHUNI LAL\n\nFebruary 16, 19'70\n\n[J. M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, J1.J Constitution of India, Art."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gurgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was a Sub-l!jSpector of Police and had served as such in various places which are no,, V in Pakistan before being posteq to Gurgaon in 1948."}}, {"text": "October 12, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 989, "end_char": 1005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 12, 1949 he was served with a charge sheet setting forth extracts from his confidential character roll imputing inefficiency and lack of probity while in service from 1941 to 1948."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1999, "end_char": 2007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal to this Court by the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3383, "end_char": 3389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. C. Maha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4056, "end_char": 4066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Maha; an, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and B. Datta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4109, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and B. Datta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of_ the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nBy this ppeal the State of Punjab challenges the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court upholding the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon declaring that the dismissal of the respondent from service was illegal and inoperative."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of_ the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nBy this ppeal the State of Punjab challenges the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court upholding the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon declaring that the dismissal of the respondent from service was illegal and inoperative."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of_ the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nBy this ppeal the State of Punjab challenges the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court upholding the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon declaring that the dismissal of the respondent from service was illegal and inoperative."}}, {"text": "Montgomary", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9606, "end_char": 9616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1945 he was transferred to Montgomary and got a 'B' report and his honesty was characterised as doubtful."}}, {"text": "Muzaffargarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10379, "end_char": 10391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "confidential reports of the year 1946, the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffargarh, stated that he was not honest and was very poor on parade."}}, {"text": "Multan R•nge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10482, "end_char": 10494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Inspector General Multan R•nge gave him a third warning."}}, {"text": "Rasaunt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10988, "end_char": 10995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The S.P. further remarked that\n\n\"Thi~ ocer fell to unhd of depths of moral degradal!On m corrupt .practices while posted to City\n\n Rewari inasmuch as he changed the opium recovered by him earlier with Rasaunt for Rs."}}, {"text": "25th May 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11774, "end_char": 11787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th May 1950 Bishambar Das, Superintendent of Police made a report that the char_ge had been fully brought home to the respondent and it was suggested that he should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Bishambar Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11788, "end_char": 11801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th May 1950 Bishambar Das, Superintendent of Police made a report that the char_ge had been fully brought home to the respondent and it was suggested that he should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Shamsheer Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the reports for the period May 27, I 946 to 30th June 1946 and the rest of the year the same had been made by Shamsheer Singh and Sadat Ali, Superintendents of Police of\n\nMuzaffargarh."}}, {"text": "Sadat Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13389, "end_char": 13398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the reports for the period May 27, I 946 to 30th June 1946 and the rest of the year the same had been made by Shamsheer Singh and Sadat Ali, Superintendents of Police of\n\nMuzaffargarh."}}, {"text": "sUlllmon A. L. Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14204, "end_char": 14225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further complaint was made that the enquiry officer did not care to sUlllmon A. L. Chopra, the Rehabilitation Inspector and Captain Chuni Lal, Ex-military man although they had been allowed t0>\n\nbe examined previously."}}, {"text": "Chuni Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14268, "end_char": 14277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further complaint was made that the enquiry officer did not care to sUlllmon A. L. Chopra, the Rehabilitation Inspector and Captain Chuni Lal, Ex-military man although they had been allowed t0>\n\nbe examined previously."}}, {"text": "Ram Chander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14374, "end_char": 14385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deposition of Ram Chander, Assistant Surgeon, a defence witness was not typed out and made a part of the record although his deposition was noted by the steno-typist in the note book."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15377, "end_char": 15385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15654, "end_char": 15662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Considering the Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15748, "end_char": 15777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bishambar Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court opined that the enquiry officer, Bishambar Das, should not have neglected to summon five officers who made reports about the respondent and were available for examination at the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Chunilal Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17911, "end_char": 17928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Chunilal Malhotra, Choudhry Roshan Lal, Deputy Commissioner, Shri Ismail."}}, {"text": "Choudhry Roshan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17930, "end_char": 17949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Chunilal Malhotra, Choudhry Roshan Lal, Deputy Commissioner, Shri Ismail."}}, {"text": "Ismail. Shri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17977, "end_char": 17989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Chunilal Malhotra, Choudhry Roshan Lal, Deputy Commissioner, Shri Ismail."}}, {"text": "Holiday", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17991, "end_char": 17998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holiday and Shri Sant Prakash Singh• According to the High Court the defence of the respondent in the enquiry being that the reports against him were based upon no sufficient data and/ or were made partly because of the poisoning of the mind of the District Superintendent of Police by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on communal considerations the only way the respondent could 'have substantiated his defence version would be by putting questions to the reporting officers if made available during the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Sant Prakash Singh•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18008, "end_char": 18027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holiday and Shri Sant Prakash Singh• According to the High Court the defence of the respondent in the enquiry being that the reports against him were based upon no sufficient data and/ or were made partly because of the poisoning of the mind of the District Superintendent of Police by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on communal considerations the only way the respondent could 'have substantiated his defence version would be by putting questions to the reporting officers if made available during the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Shamsher Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18535, "end_char": 18549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One\n\nof the above officers Shamsher Singh was actually examined as the respondent's witness in the sui\\ and his evidence showed that he had left the column for honesty in the report for 1946• blank as be had not seen the respondent at his work."}}, {"text": "Chunilal Malhotra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18969, "end_char": 18986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunilal Malhotra though not examined before the enquiry\n\nPUNJil v. CHUNI LAL (Mitter, /,) 701\n\nA Olicer was called in defence in the suit."}}, {"text": "Lekhraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20321, "end_char": 20328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Superintendent of Police Lekhraj examined."}}, {"text": "Ori&sa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21437, "end_char": 21454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant relied on two decisions of the Ori&sa High Court in support of his cootention that it was not necessary to examine the authors of the confidential reports against the respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23631, "end_char": 23651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On those facts the High Court of Orissa, after discussin1t this -position, took the view that although insufficient for the establishment of a criminal charge the position was different in 'the case of departmental enquiries where punishment could be based merely on general reputation for corrupt conduct."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23975, "end_char": 23992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our view there was no flaw in the enquiry which the Orissa High Court was called upon to examine in that case and the above dictum of the High Court was not really called for."}}, {"text": "Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24280, "end_char": 24337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24400, "end_char": 24410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act", "statute": "Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act"}}, {"text": "Bafshi Ghulam Mohammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24999, "end_char": 25021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts befoie it the Court came to the conclusion that no case had been made by Bafshi Ghulam Mohammad tl>at rules of natural justice required that he should have a right to cross-examine all the persons who\n\nhad sworn affidavits supporting the allegations made against him."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25395, "end_char": 25403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_704_707_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "C::HINNAMUTHU GOUNDER AND ORS. ETC. v.\n\nP. A. S. P.EltUMAL CHETrIAR\n\nF e/Jru•ry Hi, 1 '70 [J. c. SHAH, K. s. HEGllE Am> A. N. GllOVER, JJ.]\n\nMadras Cultivating Tenants -,,..tection Act (Mad, 25 of 1955), ss. 3(2) (Ii) and 6A-Scope of.\n\nThe respondent, who was the occupancy ryot of an inam village, filed a suit for eviction of his lessees, the appellants (who were the cultivating tenants) , and for possession of the land. The appellants set u, occupancy C rights in themselves as a defence. The lower courts and the High Court 'found that the appellants wilfully denied the title of the respondent. and decreed the suit.\n\nOn the question of the jurisdiction of the civil ceurt to try the suit,\n\nHELD : Under s. 6A of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, the civil court is iounll te transfer a suit for possession to the o Revenue Divisional Officer only if the defendant proves that he is a culti vating tenant entitled to the ltenefits under the Act, that is, if he proves the existence of both the conllitioas, namely : (a) that he is a cultivatin1 tenant, and (b) that he is eatitlell te the llenefits unller the Act. Under s. 3(2)(d) of the Act, however, a tenant cannot claim the llenefits under the Act if he wilfully denies the title of the landlord. Therefore, as !Ao appellants became disentitled to the llenefits unller the Act, the civil court E was competent to try the suit. [706 D-F]\n\nThe fact that the civil court has to decide initially some questions wi!hin the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court does not aft'eot the interpretation of s. 6A. [706 F-G]\n\nV. Kuppuswami &: Ors, v.\n\nSri Subramaniaswami Devuthanam at Thiruvidakkazhi bv its Trustets K.ct\n\n(Act 1 of 1908) as originally enacted.\n\nThe plaintiff claimU that he and his predecessors in title were ryots under the inaadars of the village and that the defendants were lessees aa.d were only under-tenants.\n\nThe defence of the defendants who are appellants before us was that the plaintiff and his predecessor in title were land-holders and not ryots and that the defendants had occupancy rights by long possession and by virtue of the provisions of the aforesaid Act.\n\nThe trial court, the lower appellate court and the High Court have negatived the contentions of the appellants.\n\nIt has been concurrently found that the plaintiff and his predecessors were ryots under the inamdar and that the appellants were only undertenants under leases granted by the predecessors in title of the plaintiff.\n\nIn other words it has been held that the plaintiff is !he occupancy tenant and that the defendants were mere cultivating tenants.\n\nIn order to determine the point which has been pressed before us it is unnecessary to state other facts.\n\nThe sole question on which arguments have been addressed is whether the civil court had jurisdiction to decree the suit in respect of possession in the presence of the provisions of tl1e Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955 (Act XXV of\n\n1955) hereinafter called the Act. Section 2(a) defines \"cultivating tenant\" to mean a person who carries on personal cultivation on any land under a tenancy agreement and includes any person who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy agreement as also the heirs of suh person.\n\nAccording to the provisions of s. 3 no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from the holding at the instance of the landlord whether in execution of a decree or order of a court or otherwise; but that is subject to subsec. (2) which contains the various contingencies in which the tenant cannot claim the protection of the Act. Clause ( d) which appears in the exceptions reads \"who has wilfully denied the title of the landlord to the land\".\n\nAccording to Explanation I a denial of the landlord's title under the bone fide mistake of fact is not wilful within the meaning of the aforesaid clause.\n\nSections 6 and 6-A are material for our purpose and may be reoroduced : LllupCl/70-15\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1970] 3 S.C.R.\n\nS. 6 \"No civil court shall, except to the extent specified in section 3 ( 3), have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which t.he Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.\"\n\nS. 6A ''If in any suit before any Court for possession of, or injunction~ relation to, any land, .it is proyed, by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant 1s a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of this Act, the Court shall not proceed with the trial of the suit but shall transfe~ it to the Divisional Officer who shall thereupon deal with and dispose of it as though it were an application under this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such an application and the apolicant.\"\n\nThe clear import of s. 6A is that in any suit before any civil court for possession if the defendant proves not only that he is a. cultivating tenant but also that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act the civil court is bound to transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer and cannot proceed to try and dispose it oi itself. In the present case it has been found by the High Court as also by the trial court that the appellants had wilfully denied the title of the respondent who is the landlord.\n\nThey thus become disentitled to the benefits under the Act.\n\nConsequently the civil court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and there was no question of its transferring the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer.\n\nThere has been a consisl\\:nt course of decisions of the Madras High Court that in order to attract the applicability of s. 6-A both the conditions must co-exist, namely, the defendant must be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and he should be entitled to the benefits of the Act. If both these conditions are not satisfied no question of any transfer under s. 6-A will arise. The civil court may have to determine, for the purpose Of coming to the conclusion, whether a suit has to be transferred under s. 6-A, certain questions which are within the .iurisdiction of the revenue court under the Act. But that cannot affect the interpretation of the words \"cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act\". In V. Kuppuswami & Others v. Sri Subramaniaswami Devasthanam at Tiruvidakkazhi by its Truslees Kanak!13abhai Pillai and Muthurama/inga Chettiar & Others(1 ) this view was clearly expressed by the Madras High Court.\n\nIn a later Bench decision in M. S. Ramachandra Sastrigal v. Kuppuswami Vanniar( 2) the existence of a third condition was also\n\nhould be quashed.\n\nThe High Court at Patna held that calling for a charge-sheet by a Magistrate meanstaking cognizance of the. case and then summoning the accused through the police, and, therefore, it did not amount to interference with the police investigation.\n\nThe High Court at Patna referred to two divergent views expressed by the.High Courts. The views of the High Courts at Calcutta and Madras are that the Magistrate has no such power whereas the views of the High Courts at Bombay and Patna are to the contrary.\n\nThe High Court at Patna did not see any reason to depart from the view of that Court.\n\nIt has been emphasised in several decisions that it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the. law imposes on. them the duty of enquiry. (See Emperor v.\n\nNazir Ahmed)(').\n\nTh'is Court in the case of H. N. Rishbud v. State of De/hi(2) said that investigation is primarily an ascertainment of facts _and circmhstances of a case and the proceedings in an investigation are conducted by the police officer. Chapter XlV of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information to the police and their powers to investigate. The investigation carried on by the .police results either in release of accused when evidence is deficient or sending the case to the Magistrate when the evidence is sufficient.\n\nIt should also be remembered that when a person is released by the police because there is not sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a magistrate a bond is taken to the effect that if and when so required he will appear before a magislrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report.\n\nThe provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code do not empower the magistrate to ask the police to submit a charge-sheet.\n\nIf, however, the magistrate is of opinion that the report submitted by the police requires fqrther investigation the magistrate n1ay\n\norder investigation under section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Directing a further investigation is entirely different from asking the police to submit a charge-sheet.\n\nFurthermore, section 190 ( 1 )( c) of the Criminal Procedure Code empbwers\n\n(1) 711. A. 203!\n\n(2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1150.\n\nthe magistrate to take cognizance of an offence notwithstanding a contrary opinion of the police.\n\nThese provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, to which I have referred, indicate two broad features; first, the formation of an opinion in an investigation is left to the police; and, secondly, the magistrate exercises judicial functions in dealing with the report submitted by the police.\n\nThis question came up for consideration in the case of Abhi11andan Jha and Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra(') where it was held that it was for the police to form their opinion and the final step in the investigation was to be taken only by the police and no other authority.\n\nAs to the powers of the magistrate it is said that he cannot call upon :he police to >ubmit a charge-sheet when they have sent a report, that there is no case for sending up the accused for trial because that would be dictating to the police to fom1 opinion in accordance with that of the magistrate. Such a course is not desirable. That is why the Magistrate can call for a further investigation ..\n\nThe decision of the High Court is erroneous. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 14 November, 1964 is quashed. The appeal is allowed.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n0) A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 117.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "HA VILDAR KUER SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAVILDAR KUER SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71 6\n\nR. N. CHATI'ERJI v.\n\nHA VILDAR KUER SINGH\n\nFebruary 19, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 156(3) and 190(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "InspectorGencral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 515, "end_char": 531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "submitted a repdrt to the Deputy InspectorGencral under whom the investigation was carried on, to the effect that there was insufficient evidence against the Appellant and furthermore that the Respondent's case against the Appellant was false."}}, {"text": "section 156(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 190(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goburdhun, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2082, "end_char": 2085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from the Judgment dated 18 November, 1967 of the High Court at Patna."}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal from the Judgment dated 18 November, 1967 of the High Court at Patna."}}, {"text": "24 March, i 964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in short are that on account of an occurrence at the platform of Muzaffarpur Railway Station on 24 March, i 964 two cases were instituted before the Railway Police."}}, {"text": "2 April, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2 April, 1964 the respondent filed a \"protest petition\" against the final report of the police. _"}}, {"text": "14 November, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14 November, 1964 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order directing the police to submit the charge-sheet under sections 353/379 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant went up before the Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur in revision against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and asked for a reference to the High Court."}}, {"text": "High Courts at Calcutta and Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5496, "end_char": 5530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The views of the High Courts at Calcutta and Madras are that the Magistrate has no such power whereas the views of the High Courts at Bombay and Patna are to the contrary."}}, {"text": "High Courts at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The views of the High Courts at Calcutta and Madras are that the Magistrate has no such power whereas the views of the High Courts at Bombay and Patna are to the contrary."}}, {"text": "Chapter XlV of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6246, "end_char": 6288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 156(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7151, "end_char": 7165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XlV of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Chapter XlV of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7317, "end_char": 7328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S. C. R. 1150", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7526, "end_char": 7573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_720_723_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "SHIVAPPA & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF MYSORE February 19, 1970\n\n[M. HmAYATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.] B\n\n~1rdian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 1 l4-Reco1ery of properly front posle.HlOn of accused soon after con11nission of a dacoits-fresumption to be\n\ndr~11·11-Whether (.' preJu1nption of participation in dacoity or of lesser\n\nv.(tence •\n\n. T\\VO carts loaded ith cloth returning alongwith others from a weekly village market \\\\'ere looted by 20 or more pei'sons.\n\nThe houses of 20 persons including the 14 _appellants wer:e searched and the looted cloth\n\n\\\\\"<\\S \"recovered from their possession.\n\nThey_ were tried and held guilty under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court dismissed their appeals. In appeal by special leave to this Court their only contention was that in the absence of other evidence conncctini? them. \\\\Tith the dacoity. the presumption to be dra\\vn frony the possessio~ of stolen clothes ought to have been one under s. 411 of he Indian Penal Code or at the most under s. 412 of the Indian Penal Code and not of complicity' in the crime oi Jacoity. It \"as urged that since s. 114 of the Evidence Act did not\n\nlay down definitely the presumption to he dra\\l; n in a given set of circumsrances it was neccssarr ahvays to start \\\\1th the lesser presumption and dra\\\\· the higher presumption only \\Vhen there y; as some other evidence to shO\\\\' the complicity of the persons in the crime itself.\n\nHELD : Jf there is other evidence to connect an accused with the crin1c itself. hO\\\\'cvcr small. the finding of the stolen property \\\\'ith him is\n\n-.~ piece of evidence \\\\'hich connects him further \\vith the crime. There is then no question of presumption.\n\nThe evidence strengthens tfie other evidence alread~ against him. It is only when the accused cannot be con\n\ni\" stronger than' if there is a large gap of time.\n\nDisposal of the fruits of crin1e that the presun1ption may he dra\\\\'n. fn \\vhat circumstances the one presumption or the other may he dra\\\\'O \\\\'ill differ from case to case\n\n[722DJ \\Vhen the discoverv of the fruits of crin1e is made in1mediately after 1hc commission of thC crin1e the presun1ption of compJicity in the ci\"ime\n\nncctcd . with the c'rime except by reason of possession of the fruits of crime tequires the fiqding of a person ready to receive them an4 the short\n\nncss of time. the nalure of the propefty \\1lhich is disposed of, that is to saY. its quality and character deteirn1in.e \\vhcrher the person \\vho had the gOods in his Possession received then1 fron1 another or v.'as himself lh.: thief or dacoit. [722 FJ\n\nIn the present case the offence \\Yas con1n1itted at night by as many as ~O persons or more. Shortly after the offence the houses of 20 person..; \"ere searched and large quan.tities of the stolen goods \\Vere found in their houo;; es.\n\nIt was impossible that these :!O pcn; ons \\\\ere n1e.rely receivers ... 1f\n\ntolen property fron1 some other :!O persons \\\\\"ho v.ere the Uecoits. It \\\\\"as\n\nlcgirimate therefore to raise the presumption in this case that the persons ,, ith horn the goods v.ere found \\Vere the dacoits themselves. [723 A-Bl CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1967.\n\nSHIVAPPA v. MYSORE (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 721\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 24, 1967 of the High Court of Mysore in Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 19.65.\n\nA. S. R. Chari and R. V. Pillai, for the appellants.\n\nShyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are 14 appellants who appeal against their conviction under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code and sentences of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of\n\nRs. 1,000/- passed on them. Originally 20 persons were tried and convicted for the same offence and received a like sentence. 14 alone have appealed to this Court.\n\nThe incident which took place on July 28, 1962 . was theft by dacoity of certain cotton pieces from two carts within the limits of Lingsugar Police Station a! about 11-30 p.m.\n\nThe facts are that two traders in cloth sent their wares in carts for sale. The cartmen halted after the market was over on\n\nthe way for food.\n\nThereafter six carts left for Mudgal at about 10 p.m. When the carts reached a Na/a called Heri Halla about three miles from Lingsugur at about 11-30 p.m., 20 persons are said to have approached the carts and pelted stones. It was a d; irk night and the assailants were not identified. It appears that four out of the six carts escaped, but two carts were looted. The police investigated the case and arrested the 20 persons who were accused in the case as being the culprits involved in this incident.\n\nIt is not necessary to go into rest of the case or the evidence on which the case of dacoity was established, because dacoity as such is not challenged before us.\n\nThe accused were convicted on the sole evidence of having in their possession pieces of cloth which were later identified to belong to the traders. Searches took place between July 30, 1962 and August 17, 1962. In these searches clot]] which was undoubtedly stolen at the time of the dacoity was found in their houses.\n\nThe High Court and the Court below drew from this the conclusion that the appellants - were themselves the dacoits, and convicted them accordingly under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 100/-.\n\nIn this appeal, the only contention raised by Mr. A. S. R.\n\nChari is that the presumption that they wre dacoits ought not to have been drawn since the circumstances do not adri1it the drawing of such a presumption in the case. According to Mr. Chari. the presumption to be drawn ought to have been one under s. 411\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1970] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof Indian Penal Code or at the most under ~· 412. of th~ Indian\n\nPenal Code but not of complicity in the: cnme of dac01ty. .He contends that the circumstances under which the one presumption or the other may be drawn under s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act have not been stated by law and therefore it is necesary always to start with the leser presumption and draw the higher presumption only whm thre is so11;1e ot.her evidence t? show t.he complicity of the persons 1~ the cnme 1tslf. A.ccordmg to bun there is no other evidence m the case which pomts to the complicity of the 14 appellants in the crime of dacoity and therefore as they cannot be suspected to be dacoits themselves, the only presumption to be drawn is one of receivers of stolen property or as receivers of property which was stolen in a dacoity.\n\nIn our opinion, the law advocated by Mr. Chari is not corrct.\n\nIf there is other evidence to connect an accused with the cnme itself, however small, the finding of the stolen property with him is a piece of evidence which connects him further with the crime.\n\nThere is then no question of presumption. The evidence strengthens the other evidence already against him.\n\nIt is only when the accused cannot be connected with the crime except by reason of possession of the fruits of crime that the presumption may be drawn.\n\nIn what circumstances the one presumption or the other may be drawn, it is not necessary to state categorically in this case. It all depends upon the circumstances under which the discovery of the fruits of crime are made with a particular accused. It has been stated on more than one occasion that if the gap of time is too large, the presumption that the accused was concerned with the crime itself gets weakened. The presumotion is stronger when the discovery of the fruits of crime is made immediately after the crime is committed. The reason is obvious.\n\nDisposal of the fruits of crime requires the finding of a person ready, to receive them and the shortness of time, the nature of the property which is disposed of, that is to say, its quantity and its character determine whether the person who had the goods in his possession received them from another or was himself the thief or the dacoit.\n\nIn some cases there may be other elements which may point to the way as to how the presumption may be drawn.\n\nThey need not be stated here for they differ from case to case. (In the present case, the goods stolen were a large quantity of cloth taken for sale to the market. These goods were . not sold and were being taken back to the dealers by the cartmen.) A large number of persons said to be 20 in number pelted stones at the cartmen and looted the property.\n\nImmediately afterwards a n?mber of searches were made and the )!OOds were found with vanous persons who were prosecuted as offenders and they have been presumed to be involved in the dacoity itself. It may be\n\nSHIVAPPA V. MYSORE (Hidayatul/oh, C.J.) 723\n\nnoticed that from each person a large number of goods of the same type such as 20 choli ieces or ten pieces of cloth were found. (It is impossible to think that within the short time available, these goods could have been easily disposed of to receivers of stolen property or could be placed in the custody of friends till such time as the original offenders could take them away.) The time gap in some cases is as short as two days and in some others it is not more than five days. In two cases only the time gap is about 19 days. Even then we think that the time gap is too short for original off!lnders to have disposed of the property to these appellants or to have left the goods in their custody ll such time as the original offenders could have taken them away.\n\nWe are; therefore, satisfied that the proper inference was drawn in this case. It must not be forgotten that the offence was committed at night by as many as 20 persons or more.\n\nThe houses of 20 persons were searched and large quantities of the stolen goods were found in their houses. It is impossible to think that these 20 persons were merely receivers of stolen property from some other 20 persons who were the dacoits. It is legitimate therefore to raise the presumption in this case that the persons with whoin the goods were fod were the dacoits themselves.\n\nThis presumption has been drawn and in our opinion . rightly in this case.\n\nThe conviction was therefore correct in all the circumstances of the case.\n\nAs regards the sentence, the offence no doubt was serious.\n\nBut no injury beyond one appears to have been caused. Therefore we think that a sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment will meet the ends of justice in this case.\n\nThe sentence is reduced to three y_ears' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe sentence of fine will starid: The appeal is allowed to this extent'.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "SHIVAPPA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIVAPPA V. 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DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 648, "end_char": 665, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 412", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1013, "end_char": 1030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3305, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIVAPPA v. MYSORE (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 721\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 24, 1967 of the High Court of Mysore in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and R. V. Pillai, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "A. S. R. Chari"}}, {"text": "R. V. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and R. V. Pillai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3436, "end_char": 3447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3514, "end_char": 3526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. These are 14 appellants who appeal against their conviction under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code and sentences of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "s. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3613, "end_char": 3630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lingsugar Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3988, "end_char": 4012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was theft by dacoity of certain cotton pieces from two carts within the limits of Lingsugar Police Station a!"}}, {"text": "Mudgal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter six carts left for Mudgal at about 10 p.m. When the carts reached a Na/a called Heri Halla about three miles from Lingsugur at about 11-30 p.m., 20 persons are said to have approached the carts and pelted stones."}}, {"text": "Lingsugur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4303, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter six carts left for Mudgal at about 10 p.m. When the carts reached a Na/a called Heri Halla about three miles from Lingsugur at about 11-30 p.m., 20 persons are said to have approached the carts and pelted stones."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5022, "end_char": 5035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Searches took place between July 30, 1962 and August 17, 1962."}}, {"text": "August 17, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5040, "end_char": 5055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Searches took place between July 30, 1962 and August 17, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. S. R.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal, the only contention raised by Mr. A. S. R.\n\nChari is that the presumption that they wre dacoits ought not to have been drawn since the circumstances do not adri1it the drawing of such a presumption in the case.", "canonical_name": "A. S. R. Chari"}}, {"text": "Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Chari."}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5787, "end_char": 5804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6007, "end_char": 6013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian\n\nPenal Code", "statute": "Indian\n\nPenal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6021, "end_char": 6040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SHIVAPPA V. MYSORE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8702, "end_char": 8720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be\n\nSHIVAPPA V. MYSORE (Hidayatul/oh, C.J.) 723\n\nnoticed that from each person a large number of goods of the same type such as 20 choli ieces or ten pieces of cloth were found. (", "canonical_name": "SHIVAPPA V. MYSORE"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_724_733_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "MATHURALAL\n\nKESHAR BAI AND ANOTHER February 20, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J:\n\nMortgage-Mortgagee given possession of mortgaged house-Leasing house to mortgagor under rent note executed simultaneously with mortgage deed-Preliminary decree passed in suit. for enforcement of mortgage-.- Application for final decree time barred-Subsequent suit for ejectment pf lnortgagor filed by niortgagee whether maintainable-Rights of mortgagee whether merged in preliminary decree-Relevance of Limitation ACt, 1908, s. 28.\n\nOn July 29, 1945 the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant mortgaged his house in Ratlam to K for a sum of Rs. 3,100 with possession.\n\nAccording to the deed of mortgage interest would run on the said sum at Rs. C>-10-0 per cent per annum till realisation. The period elf redemption was two years.\n\nSimultaneously with the mortgage a rent note was executed by and between the parties under which the mortgagor was to continue to occupy the premises at a rental of Rs. 20/ - per month. The rent note provided inter alia that if the executant (i.e. mortgagor) made default in payment of two months' rent the mortgagee would be entitled to get him evicted.\n\nThe mortgagee was also entitled to increase or decrease the rent and the executant was to vacate the house whenever asked to do so. K filed a suit on his mortgage in 1954 and a preliminary decree was passed in hie favour.\n\nOn his death his legal representatives were substituted in his place on record.\n\nFor some reason no application for a final decree for sale of the property was made within the period fixed under the Limitation Act. The application for this purpose made by the executors to the estate elf K was dismissed on July 29, 1960 as barred by limitation. On December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 19, 1957 till November 28, 1960. The trial judge dismissed the suit. In first appeal the plaintiff's claim was allowed in full. The High C'.ourt in second appeal maintained the decree of the appellate court.\n\nAppeal by special leave was filed in this Court against the High Court's judgment. It was contended by the appellants that : (i) The rent note\n\n~ecuted simultaneously with the mortgage was a mere device to secure payment of interest and did not represent an independent transaction.\n\nFL!rther it did not create any relationship of landlord and tenant; (ii) The plaintiffs'' right as mortgagee merged in the decree and execution thereof being barred by the Jaws di limitation the plaintiffs had lost all their rights;\n\n(iii) The mortgage beingextinguished the mortgagor could not bring a suit for redemption on account of s. 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908.\n\nHELD : The appeal must be dismissed. ( 1) The contents of the documents executed by the parties showed that the relationship between the parties was not simply that of a mortgagee and mortgagor-the creditor also had the rights of a landlord qua his tenant besides other rights conferred on him which were greater than those possessed by an ordinary landlord. [728 F]\n\nIn all such cases the leasing back of the property arises because of the mortgage with possession. It cannot however be held that the mortgagee 724\n\nMATHURALAL v. KESHAR BM tMitter, J.) 725\n\ndoes not secure to himself any rights under the deed of lease but must proceed on his mortgage in case the amount secured to him under the deed of lease is not paid. If the security is good and considered to be sufficient by the mortgagee there is no reason why he should be driven .to file a .suit on his mortgage when he can file a suit for realisation of the' moneys due under the rent note. The position of the creditor is strengthened where as in the present case, the interest on the amount of the mortgagee is not the same as the rent fixed. If during the continuance of the security the mortgagee wanted to sue the mortgagor on the basis of the rent note and take possession himsel1I or to induct some other tenant thereby securing to himself the amount which the mortgagor had covenanted to pay, there could be no legal objection to it.\n\nUnder the provisions of 0.34 r. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure he could deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem excepting by proceeding on his mortgage. It m, ay be (without a final opinion being expressed on the poin.t) that a mortc gagee who secured decree for payment of rent cannot put the property to sale fO£ realisation of the amount decreed, but there cas be no <>bjretion to his suing for possession. if the rent note entitles him to do so.\n\nSo long u the; mortgagor has a right to redeem the mortg8ge he can always pay off tbe mortgagee 'and get back pos9e5sion. This position would continue so long as the property is not sold under a :final decree for sale under the provisions of 0. 34 C.P.C. [732 D-G]\n\nLa/chand v. Nenuram, LL.R. 12 , Rajasthan, 947, approved.\n\nHari/al Bhagwanii v. Hemshanker, A.l.R. 1958 Bombay 8, Ramnarain\n\nv. Sukhi, A.l.R. 1957 Patna 24, Umeshwar Prasad v. Dwarika Prasad, A.I.R. 1944 Patna 5, Ganpat Ruri v. Mad. Asraf Ali, A.I.R. 1961 Patna 133 arid Jankidas v. Laxminarain, I.LR. 7 Rajasthan 268, referred to.\n\n(ii) Since the mortgagee had only lost his right to recover the money by sale of the mortgaged property, his security otherwise remaining intact, and the mortgagor also continued to have his right to redeem the property, the contention on behalf of the appellant that the rights of the mortgagee merged in the prelimirrary decree could not be accepted. [732 HJ\n\n(iii) If the mortgagee had an independent right on the strength of the rent note which continued to be in force notwithstanding that the period for a final decree for sale had expired; there could be no extinction of .his right to sue for possession because of s. 28 of the Limitation Act. [733 C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 774 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 6, 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 327 of 1963.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.\n\nJanardan Sharma, for the respondents.\n\nThe. Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave fron.i a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 6th February 1967 dismissing a Second Appeal by the appellant before this Court against\n\na decree passed by the Additional District Judge of Ratlam for ejectment of the appellant from a house mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant to one Kesharimal for Rs. 3,100 and further decreeing a claim for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 731-35 and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 20 per month until eviction.\n\nThe relevant facts are as follows. On July 29, 1945 Mathuralal, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, mortgaged his house , in Ratlam to Kesharimal for a sum of Rs. 3,100 with possession.\n\nThe deed of mortgage contained the following terms :-\n\n1. That interest would run on Rs. 3,100 at Rs. 0-10-0 per cent per mensem till realisation.\n\n2. The period of redemption would be two years.\n\n3. Duri, ng the period of mortgage \"the tenant as may be shall execute the rent notes in favour of the mortgagee and whatever rent shall be realised will be credited in lieu of interest and if the amount of rent shall exceed the amount of interest, the difference shall be deducted from the original sum due, but if the amount of interest shall exceed the amount of i.nterest, the difference shall be deducted from the original sum due.\" But if the amount of interest shall exceed the amount of rent, then the mortgagor shall pay it.\n\n4. Notwithstanding any vacancy during the period of the mortgage the rent would continue.\n\n5. During the period of the mortgage an accol!Jllt of the rent and interest shall be settled after every six months.\n\n6. The mortgagor undertook to keep the house in repairs during\n\nthe period of the mortgage and in default of ; epairs by him the F mortgagee was to be entitled to execute the necessary repairs and add the cost to his dues.\n\n7. \"The burden of the mortgage money shall be on the mortgaged house.\n\nIn case the amol!Jllt is not realised from the house, the moragagee shall have a right to take steps to realise his money\" from the mortgagor and his property of every kind.\n\nOn the same day the mortgagor executed another document in favour of the mortgagee reciting that his house in Ratlam was mortgaged with possession to the creditor who was \"having its possession\" and the mortgagor had taken the same on rent at Rs. 20 per month on the following terms :-\n\n1. The executant would pay the rent every month regularly and in default of payment of two months' rent the mortgagee would be entitled to get him evicted.\n\n2. The executant would white-wash and repair the house and keep it in good condition.\n\n3. Kesharimal would be entitled to increase or decrease the rent.\n\n4. The executant would vacate the house whenever asked to B do so.\n\n5. The executant would hand over possession of the house in the same condition in which he had received it.\n\nKesharimal filed a suit on his mortgage in 1954 a; nd a preliminary decree for sale for the amount of Rs. 5,637-6-0 besides interest at the rate of Rs. 0-10-0 per cent per mensem for six months on the sum of Rs. 3,600 was duly passed The defendant was directed to pay the full amount of the decree before .the 24th May 1955 and in case of his doing so the property was to be released from the mortgage and the plaintiffs were to hand over all the documents which they had in their possession, but in case of failure to pay the plaintiffs would be entitled to file an application for the execution of the decree and get the property auctioned; 'and in case of non-satisfaction of the decree by the sale, the plaintiffs were to be at liberty to recover the balance of the decretal claim by a personal decree against the defendant.\n\nIt appears that Kesharimal had died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record and the preliminary decree passed in their favour. Whatever be the reason no application for a final decree 'for sale of the property was made withm the period fixed under the Limitation Act. The application for this purpose made by the executors to the estate of Kesharimal was dismissed on July 29, 1960 as barred by !imitation.\n\nOn December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment against the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 29, 1957 till November 28, 1960.\n\nAn amount of Rs. 731-75 was arrived at by totalling the rent for the period mentioned and mesne profits from 29th November 1960\n\nto 26th December 1960 at the same rate and incidental charges and expenses and deducting therefrom the rent for two months which was barred by the lapse of time the plaintiffs asked for a decree for ejectment and further mesne profits.\n\nThe trial Judge dismissed the suit.\n\nBut on appeal this was set aside and the plai.nltiffs' claim allowed in full.\n\nThe High Court in Second Appeal maintained the decree of the appellate court.\n\nThe points urged by counsel for the appellant before us were :\n\n1. The rent note executed simultaneously with the mortgage was a mere device to secure payment of interest and did not record\n\nan independent transaction. Further it did not create any relation- A ship of landlord and tenant.\n\n2. The plaintiffs' right as mortgagee merged in the decree and execution thereof being barred by the laws of limitation the plaintiffs had lost all their rights.\n\n3. The mortgage being extinguished the mortgagor could not bring a suit for redemption.\n\nBefore examining the contentions urged we propose to note the substance of the two documents and what the parties sought to achieve thereby. It is clear that the mortgage was with possession of the house and that the mortgagee wanted to make sure of Rs. 20\n\nper month irrespective of the fact as to whether the mortgagor or some other person occupied the house and notwithstanding any vacancy during the period of the mortgage. The sum of Rs. 20 per mcinth which the mortgagee wanted to ensure payment of every month exceeded the interest stipulated for by Rs. 0-10-0 per month.\n\nThere was to be no decrease in this amount even if the mortgagor were to repay a portion of the principal.\n\nThe mortgagee had further the right to increase or decrease the rent and the mortgagor covenanted to vacate the property whenever the mortgagee asked for possession.\n\nIn other words if the mortgagee chose to go into possession himself, the mortgagor would be entitled to have Rs. 20 p.m. credited towards the dues on the mortgage so long as he continued in possession.\n\nEven during the period of redemption when the mortgagee could not have sued for the mortgage money he still had a right to evict the mortgagor in case the latter defaulted in_ payment of Rs. 20 a month for two months.\n\nIt would appear that the relationship between the parties was not simply that of a mortgagee and mortgagor : the creditor also had the rights of a landlord qua his tenant besides other rights conferred on him which were greater than those possessed by an ordinary landlord.\n\nThere can be no doubt that by leasing the property back to the mortgagor in the way mentioned above the mortgagee tried to e, nsure the regular payment of interest but his rights were not limited to that alone.\n\nIn case he decided to go into possession himself the only remedy left to the mortgagor was to sue for redemption. This right under the Limitation Act of 1908 was to enure for 60 years from the date of the mortgage and the mortgagor had not lost his right to redeem notwithstanding the passing of the preliminary decree in the mortg'age suit.\n\nThe mortgage security cQlltinued even after the passing of the said decree : if the mortgagee had continued in possession of the property after the passing of the preliminary decree and did not apply for a final decree, he would only lose his right to recover the mortgage money\n\nby sale of the property unless he applied for that purpose within the period of limitation fixed by the Limitation Act.\n\nAfter the mortgagee had lost his right to apply for a final decree for sale, he did not lose his status as a mortgagee : he only lost his remedy to recover the mortgage money by sale.\n\nThe mortgagor did not lose his right to redeem.\n\nI We may now examine the authorities which were cited at the Bar i.n aid of the respective contentions.\n\nIn aid of his first proposition Mr. Mukherjee relied principally on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Bari/a/ Bhagwanji v. Hemshanker(') and Ramnarai11 v. Sukhi(').\n\nThe facts of the Bombay case were as follows.\n\nThe defendant-appellant mortgaged with possession the house in suit for Rs. 7 ,500/- on August 23, 1952.\n\nUnder the deed of mortgage the principal amount was to carry interest at 9% and both principal and interest were charged on the mortgaged property.\n\nA portion of the house was already in the occupation of the plaintiff as the defendant's tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 15 and another portioo was let out to one Mansukhlal at the rate of Rs. 17 p.m., the defendant himself occupying the remaining part of the house.\n\nSimultaneously with the mortgage a rent note was executed on thip same day in respect of the portion of the house in the defendant's occupation which was leased back to him by the plaintiff for a term of six months at the rate of Rs. 24-4-0 per month.\n\nThe plaintiff sued the defendant for possession of the said portion and for arrears of rent on the strength of the rent note.\n\nThe defence was that the rent note was a nominal document executed for securing payment of interest and that no relationship of landlord and tenant was created.\n\nIt was contended that the principal money and interest were to be realised from the mortgaged property and a suit for rent alone which was in reality interest would not lie. It was held by the High Court that the fact that the two documents had varying periods of operation would not make acy difference in the determination of the question as to whether they formed part of the same transaction or not. Further the rent to be realised from the tenant Mansukhlal was to be credited towards interest and the significant circumstance was that the rent payable by the defendant under the rent note was fixed with a viw to making up the interest on the mortgage sum at 9%. Although the mortgage deed recited that the plaintiff could let out the property to anyone he liked but as the property was already wh9lly occupied, the High Court took the view that the question of leasing it out to another tenant was not \\n contemplation of the parties.\n\nAs a result of the above findings the court held that the rent note was a mere device for securing payment of interest.\n\nReliance was placed on Rflmnarain v.\n\nSukhi(') and it was held that although the decree for eviction of\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1958 Bombay 8.\n\n(2) A.l.R.1957 Patna 24.\n\nLIOSupCI(NP) '70-~\n\nthe defendant from the suit property could not stand, that awarding . arrears of rent was to be maintained.\n\nIn Ramnarain v. Sukhi(') an application was made by the defendant for setting aside the decree of the Small Causes court evicting him.\n\nThe defendt had executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the plaintiff and by a kerayanama executed on the same day had taken back the house on a rent of Rs. 6 per month from the plaintiff. He had not paid any rent for over three years and the suit was brought for recovery of arrears of rent for the said period. It was his contention that the agreemCU!t between the parties WllS not for execution of a usufructuary mortgage but one of a simple mortgage. It was further contended on his behalf that the mortgage and the kerayanama were one and the same transaction and no relationship of la.ndlord and tenant was created and the ijara term having expired the plaintiff's remedy to recover the house rent which represented the interest the mortgage money could only lie under s. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe High Court referred to several decisions and came to the conclusion that the intention of the parties was that the mortgagee would not get possession of the mortgaged property but would only get interest on the amount advanced in the shape of rent so long as the lease continued and the amount payable under the kerayanama was interest on the mortgage money and not rent for use and occupation of the mortgaged property. The mortgage bond and the kerayanama being part of the same transaction the mortgagee in execution of his decree for mqney obtained in respect of the so:-called rent of the house against the mortgagor would not be entitled to execute the decree for arrears of rent by sale of the property, as such a case would be governed by 0. 34 R. 14 Civil Procedure Code. In the result the claim of the creditor in excess of 9% p.a. was rejected but as the defendant had been in occupation of the house, although under an invalid lease, he was directed to pay compensation to the plaintiff for use and occupation of the house for the period of his occupation.\n\nReference may also be made to the case of Umeslnvar Prasad\n\nv. Dwarika Prasad(\").\n\nIn this case the mortgagor executed a usufructuary mortgage of certain properties for Rs. 14,400 for a period of seven years.\n\nSoon therefter the mortgagee leased back the entire property to the mortgagor for a period of about seven years at the annual rent of Rs. 432 which was equal to the interest on the sum advanced.\n\nIt was held by the Patna High Court that the mortgage bond and the lease deed were parts of the same trMsaction and the fact that the periods of the two deeds were not identical was immaterial and the case was governed by 0. 34 r. 14\n\n(l) A.I.R. 1957 Patna 24.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1944 Patna 5.\n\nA and as such the mortgagee could not execute the decree for arrear of rent by sale of equity of redemption.\n\nIn Ganpat Ruri v. Md. Asraf Ali(') the plaintiff had filed a suit claiming arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 20 per mo.nth in respect of a house which had been given to him by the defendant in usufructuary mortgage by a registered document, the property being let out to the defendant on lease on the same day at the monthly rent of Rs. 20. Applying the test as to whether on a reasQ!lable construction of the two documents the property given in security was not only for the principal amount secured under the bond but also for the interest accruing thereupon, the court held that the transactions were two different transactions and for this reliance was placed on the fact that no rate ol interest was prescribed in the bond and Rs. 20 p.m; could not possibly be treated as interest due on the principal amount of Rs. 500.\n\nIn contrast with the above cases reference may be made to the case of Jankidas v. Laxminarain('). Jiti this case the plaintiffs who were usufructuary mortgagees of a house gave a lease of it to the defendant mortgagor on rent and put the lessee in posses1ion thereof on the same day.\n\nThe rent remaining unpaid the plaintiff filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. Ultimately however the High Court of the former State of Marwar granted a decre for arrears of rent but refused the prayer for ejectment. The plaintiff thereupon filed the suit in 1953 claiming arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 126/- for three years preceding the date of the suit.\n\nThe suit was resisted by the defendant who, among other pleas, contended that the suit was barred by 0. II r. 2 C.P.C.\n\nThere was said that although the mortgage aintI the deed of lease represented one transaction that would not mean that no tenancy came into existence by the execution of the deed of lease.\n\nIt was . held that the right which arose to the mortgagees to sue for rent was an ndependent obligatio~ though it might be part of the same transact10n in the seinse that it was brought into existence bv an arrangement madeat the same time for a common purpose. ·\n\nIn La/chand v. Nenuram( 8 ) the defendants had executed a mortgalle iin favour of the plaintiffs agreeing to pay interest at 8 % p.a: which came. to Rs. 27-8-0 per month.\n\nThe mortgagors had\n\ndel!red possesSJOn to th~ mortgagees and a registered qabuliat\n\nrec11in~ that they were takmg on lease the property described at a monthly rental of Rs. 27-8-0.\n\nThe lower courts took the view that the mortgage deed was a rent note and part and parcel of the same transaction and the plaintiffs were not qn1itled to get a decree for\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1961 Patna 133.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 7 Rajasthan :68.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 12 Rajasthan ,947;\n\nejectment on the basis of the rent note. Rejecting this the Rajasthan A High Court observed at p. 952 :\n\n\"Whether the two documents represent one transaction or two different trainsactions, a court of law should be anxious to give effect to the terms in both the documents instead of being unduly critical about them. . . . Having secured the possession of the mortgage, the mortgagee is further entitled to lease it out even to the mortgagor.\n\nIt is in the interest of the mortgagor that the property is leased out to him as he can better look after it.\n\nThere is nothing objectio, nable in this, nor is ttiere any statutory prohibition for such transactions. '\\ow if the parties do this by executing proper documents, it is the duty of the court of Jaw to give effect to them.\"\n\nThe reasoning of the Rajasthan judgmerit seems to be logical and commends itself to us.\n\nIn all such cases the leasing back of the property arises because of the mortgage with possession but we find ourselves unable to hold that the mortgagee does not secure to himself any rights under the deed of lease but must proceed on his mortgage in case the amount secured to him under the deed of lease is not paid. If the security is good and considered to be sufficient by the mortgagee 'there is no reason why he should be driven to file a suit on his mortgage when he can file a suit for realisation of the moneys due under the rent note.\n\nThe position of the creditor is strengthened where as in this case the interest on the amount of the mortgage is not the same as the rental fixed.\n\nIf during the continuance of the security the mortgagee wants to sue the mortgagor on the basis of the rent note aind take possession himself or to induct some other tenant thereby securing to himself the am,, unt which the mortgagor had covenanted to pay, there can be no iegal objection to it.\n\nUnder the provisions of 0. 34 r. 4 he cannot deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem excepting by proceeding on his mortgage. Although we express no final opinion on this point it may be that a mortgagee who secures a decree for payment of arrears of rent cannot put the t>roperty to sale for realisation of the amount decreed but there can be no objection to hi.> suing for possession if the rent note entitles him to do so. So long as the mortgagor had a right to redeem the mortgage he can always pay off the mortgagee and get back possession.\n\nThis position would continue so Jong as the property is not sold under a final decree for sale under the provisions of 0. 34 C.P.C.\n\nIn our opinion the second contention put forward on behalf of the appellant has no force.\n\nThe rights of a mortgagee do not meroe in his rights under the preliminary decree for sale.\n\nalredy mentioned, the mortgagee Jost his right to recover the money\n\nA by sale of the mortgaged property; otherwise his security remained\n\niintact and the mortgagor continued to have his right to redeem the property.\n\nAs regards the third point the only statutory provision to which a reference was made was section 28 of the Limitation Act of 1908 B which provided that :\n\n\"At the determination oi the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.\"\n\nIf the right of the mortgagee arose on the strength of the rent JI.Ole which continued to be in force notwithstanping that the period for applying for a final decree for sale had expired, there could be no extinction of his right to sue for possession because of s. 28 of the Limitation Act.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "MATHURALAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MATHURALAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KESHAR BAI AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KESHAR BAI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MATHURALAL\n\nKESHAR BAI AND ANOTHER February 20, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J:\n\nMortgage-Mortgagee given possession of mortgaged house-Leasing house to mortgagor under rent note executed simultaneously with mortgage deed-Preliminary decree passed in suit."}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Limitation ACt", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 508, "end_char": 522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 29, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29, 1945 the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant mortgaged his house in Ratlam to K for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ratlam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 623, "end_char": 629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29, 1945 the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant mortgaged his house in Ratlam to K for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1617, "end_char": 1631, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 29, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for this purpose made by the executors to the estate elf K was dismissed on July 29, 1960 as barred by limitation."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 19, 1957 till November 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1913, "end_char": 1931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 19, 1957 till November 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1937, "end_char": 1954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 19, 1957 till November 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2753, "end_char": 2758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2766, "end_char": 2786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5875, "end_char": 5880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5888, "end_char": 5902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Janardan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave fron.i a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 6th February 1967 dismissing a Second Appeal by the appellant before this Court against\n\na decree passed by the Additional District Judge of Ratlam for ejectment of the appellant from a house mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant to one Kesharimal for Rs."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge of Ratlam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave fron.i a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 6th February 1967 dismissing a Second Appeal by the appellant before this Court against\n\na decree passed by the Additional District Judge of Ratlam for ejectment of the appellant from a house mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant to one Kesharimal for Rs."}}, {"text": "Kesharimal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6599, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave fron.i a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 6th February 1967 dismissing a Second Appeal by the appellant before this Court against\n\na decree passed by the Additional District Judge of Ratlam for ejectment of the appellant from a house mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant to one Kesharimal for Rs."}}, {"text": "Mathuralal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6817, "end_char": 6827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29, 1945 Mathuralal, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, mortgaged his house , in Ratlam to Kesharimal for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "MATHURALAL"}}, {"text": "Duri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Duri, ng the period of mortgage \"the tenant as may be shall execute the rent notes in favour of the mortgagee and whatever rent shall be realised will be credited in lieu of interest and if the amount of rent shall exceed the amount of interest, the difference shall be deducted from the original sum due, but if the amount of interest shall exceed the amount of i.nterest, the difference shall be deducted from the original sum due.\""}}, {"text": "24th May 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9454, "end_char": 9467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,600 was duly passed The defendant was directed to pay the full amount of the decree before .the 24th May 1955 and in case of his doing so the property was to be released from the mortgage and the plaintiffs were to hand over all the documents which they had in their possession, but in case of failure to pay the plaintiffs would be entitled to file an application for the execution of the decree and get the property auctioned; 'and in case of non-satisfaction of the decree by the sale, the plaintiffs were to be at liberty to recover the balance of the decretal claim by a personal decree against the defendant."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10271, "end_char": 10285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10581, "end_char": 10599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 27, 1960 the said executors filed a suit for ejectment against the appellant alleging that the rent for the premises had remained unpaid from September 29, 1957 till November 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "29th November 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "731-75 was arrived at by totalling the rent for the period mentioned and mesne profits from 29th November 1960\n\nto 26th December 1960 at the same rate and incidental charges and expenses and deducting therefrom the rent for two months which was barred by the lapse of time the plaintiffs asked for a decree for ejectment and further mesne profits."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13642, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14234, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14612, "end_char": 14621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In aid of his first proposition Mr. Mukherjee relied principally on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Bari/a/ Bhagwanji v. Hemshanker(') and Ramnarai11 v. Sukhi(')."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14665, "end_char": 14682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In aid of his first proposition Mr. Mukherjee relied principally on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Bari/a/ Bhagwanji v. Hemshanker(') and Ramnarai11 v. Sukhi(')."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14885, "end_char": 14900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 ,500/- on August 23, 1952."}}, {"text": "Mansukhlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 and another portioo was let out to one Mansukhlal at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18134, "end_char": 18139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18147, "end_char": 18171, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18937, "end_char": 18957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19673, "end_char": 19689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Patna High Court that the mortgage bond and the lease deed were parts of the same trMsaction and the fact that the periods of the two deeds were not identical was immaterial and the case was governed by 0."}}, {"text": "High Court of the former State of Marwar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21276, "end_char": 21316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately however the High Court of the former State of Marwar granted a decre for arrears of rent but refused the prayer for ejectment."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21647, "end_char": 21652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajasthan A High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22784, "end_char": 22806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting this the Rajasthan A High Court observed at p. 952 :\n\n\"Whether the two documents represent one transaction or two different trainsactions, a court of law should be anxious to give effect to the terms in both the documents instead of being unduly critical about them. . . ."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25265, "end_char": 25270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25765, "end_char": 25775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25783, "end_char": 25797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26266, "end_char": 26271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26279, "end_char": 26293, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_734_739_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "PANCHAMAL NARAYAN SHENOY\n\nBASTHI VENKATESHA SHENOY\n\nFebruary 20, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J B\n\nMysi>re Rent Control Act (Mys. 22 of 1961), s. 21(l)j-Reasonably and bona fide required for immediate demo/ition...:...Whether has reference to condition of p'l'emises.\n\nUnder s. 21(1)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 the court may on an application order the recovery of possession of any premises in favour of the landlord, if \"the premises are reasonably . and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of enacting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished,\". The respondent-landlord applied under s. 21 ( 1 )(j) for eviction of the tenantsappellants, claiming that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by him for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting of a\n\nnew building, that the premises were old and were not suitable for continued occupation. The respondent claimed to have obtained the necessary D licence and to have made all preparations for demolishing the existing building and erecting new building. The appellants-tenants contested the claim. The Rent Controller accepted the respondent-landlord's claim and ordered eviction, which in appeal, and further revision to the High Court was upheld. In appeal to this Court for the appellant-tenant, it was contended that unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it required immediate demolition and reconstruction, no eviction of the tenant could be onlered under s. 2l(l)(j).\n\nRejecting this contention and dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The requirement contemplated under clause (j) of the proviso to sub-s. (I) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to\n\nthe condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that be reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the F old one.\n\nNo doubt, whether the landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged in the . light of the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard. [737 G, HJ\n\nIn considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that G may be taken into account in favour Of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. [738 DJ\n\nNeta Ram v. liwan Lal, [1962l Supp. 2 S.C.R. 623, referred to.\n\nMeltsin Bhai v. Hale & Company, (1964) II M.L.J. 147, contra observation disapproved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1552 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 8, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1964. .\n\nM. C. Chag/a and R. Gopalaktishnan, for the appellant.\n\nM. R. Ramamurthi, S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for the respondent.\n\nThe J udgmt1D't of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. 1his appeal, by special leave, is against the judgment of the Mysore High Court, dated June 8, 1966 in Civil Revision Petition No. 1118 of 1964.\n\nThe respondent land-lord filed an application, dated July 6, 1962 unde.r s. 2l(l)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (Mysore Act XXII of 1961) (hereinafter called the Act) before the Rent Controller for evictiqn of the tenants (the appellants herein) on the ground that the premises were reasonably 3illd bonafide required by him for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting of a new building. According to the respcndent the premises were old and were jllOt suitable for continued occupatmn.\n\nThe respcndent had also stated in his application that he had obtained the necessary licence for erecting a new building after demolition of the existing building and that he had made all preparations for demolition aind erection of new buildings on the site.\n\nThe appellant-tenant contested the claim of the landlord on several grounds. He pleaded that the premises were not old and that it was quite suitable for occupation and it does not require any re-construction or remodelli\\Ilg.\n\nThe allegations that the building was old and required to be re-constructed were not bona fide and had been made by the landlord only as a pretext for evicting the tenant. The tenant further pleaded that the requirement of the landlord was neither reasonable nor bona fide. In any eveint, the tenant claimed that he should be entitled to be paid the value of the improvements that had been effected by him.\n\nThe Rent Controller, by his order dated January 22, 1964 accepted the claim of the rllSpOl!dent and ordered eviction of the appell3!1t granting the tenant one ~10nth's ime for deliveriing vacant possess10n.\n\nThough the Consultmg Engmeer who gave evidence as P.W. 2 on behalf of the respondent had stated that the building was over 60 years old but nevertheless it could go qit for about 15 years more, the Rent Controller actually found that the building was more than 50 years old and that it was an old-fashioned one.\n\nHe further found that when the landlord desired to pull it down\n\n3!1d put up a modern building thereon, it could inot under the c1rcumstances, be said that his claim was not bona fide oi: reasonable\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 3 s.c.R.\n\nand that the intention of the landlord in pulling down the building and erectiing a new one to get a better return was certainly understandable. The Rent Controller further found that the landlord had proved that he had sufficient means to construct the building and that he had also obtained the necessary sanction from the Municipality concerned for recqnstruction of the building. In view of all these circumstances, the Rent Controller found that the requirement of the landlord was quite reasonable and oona fide. Regarding the claim of the tenant for payment of improvements before eviction is ordered, the Rent Cqntroller found that such a claim, even if established, could not stand in the way of the landlord getting possession of the premises.\n\nUltimately the application filed by the landlord was allowed.\n\nThe findings recorded by the Rent Controller were confirmed by the learned District Judge, by his judgment dated October 19, 1964 in A.S. No. 43 of 1964 taken before him by the tenant.\n\nThe revision filed by the appellant before the High Court was rejected by order dated June 8, 1966.\n\nMr. Chagla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the interpretation placed by all the Courts on s. 21(1)(j) of the Act was erroneous.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel, Uillless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it required immediate demolition and re-construction, no eviction of the tenant could be ordered under s. 21 (l) (j) of the Act.\n\nOn the findings of the Courts, based upon the evidence of the Engineer, that though the building was old it could continue to exist for another 15 years, it should have been held that the conditiQDS mentioned in s. 21 ( 1) (j) were not attracted to justify an order of eviction of the ten'ant.\n\nMr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that in order to attracts. 21(1) (j) it was not necessary that the landlord should establish that the condition of the building was such that it required to be demolished immediately.\n\nOn the other hand, the sub-section made it clear that the requirement contemplated was that of the landlord and once his requirement had been held by all the Courts to be reasonable and bona fide, the order passed for eviction of the tenant was fully justified.\n\nHaving due regard to the scheme of the Act, we are satisfied that the interpretation placed upon s. 21 ( 1) (j) by the High Court is correct.\n\nSection 21(1), while placing a general embargo against a landlord from evicting a tenant, recognises, in its proviso the circumstances under which a landlord could seek recovery of\n\nPANCHAMAL v. BASTHI (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 737\n\npossession of a premises.\n\nThe ground upon which Ihe landlord asked for eviction, in the present case, was based on s. 21 ( 1 )(j).\n\nThe material provision is as follows :\n\n\"21. (1) Notwithstanding 3illylhing to Ihe contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or olher authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant ;\n\nProvided that the court may on an application made to it, make 3j1l. order for Ihe recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-\n\n(j) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by Ihe laindlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished;\n\nAccording to Mr. Chagla, the words 'reasonably and bona fide required', occurring in this clause, must be interpreted to have reference to the condition of the. building, the demolition of which is sought to be made and those words have no reference to any intention entertained by the landlord. The mere fact that a landlord may bona fide and reasonably entertain an idea of demolishing the building 3i1ld reconstructing the same with a view to putting the property to a more profitable use after construction, will not satisfy the requirements of the said clause.\n\nThat is, according to the learned counsel, the condition of the building must be such that it is immediately necessary to demolish it, in which case alone eviction under cl. (j) could be ordered.\n\nWe are not incliined to accept this construction sought to be placed by the appellant on the clause in question.\n\nThe proviso to s. 21 ( 1) enumerates the various circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover possession of the property from his tenant.\n\nThe requirement contemplated under clause (j) of the proviso to sub-s. ( 1) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of Ihe building as such.\n\nWhat is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy\n\nthe Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for Ihe immediate purpose of demolishing it and the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one.\n\nNo doubt, as to whether the landlord's requirement is reason-\n\n73~ SUPREME COUl.T REPORTS\n\n[1970] 3 S.C.R.\n\nable and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding circum- A stances, which will include his means for recQ!lstruction of the\n\nbuilding, and other steps aken by him in that regard.\n\nIn considering the reasonable anJ bona fide.requirement of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition 3llld reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the B landlord.\n\nIn our opinion, it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. That the cqndition of the property rriay be such which requires immediate demolition is emphasized in cl. (k) of the proviso.\n\nWhen such a specific provision has been made in cl. (k), the condition C of the building cannot come into the picture nor could it have been dealt with again in cl. (j). So the requirement under cl. (j) is that of the landlord ajDd cannot have any reference to the building.\n\nThis Court, in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal(') in interpreting no doubt a slightly differently worded provision in s. 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B.K. (8 of 2006 BK) held that one of the circumstances which could be taken into account in considering the requirements of the landlord with reference to the existing building is 'the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction'. In the case before us all the Courts have concur~\n\nrtly held. that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that he had obtained the necessary sanctioo from the municipality concerned and that the landlora had also the means for reconstruction of the building. If the landlord does not commence demolition of the premises withi/rr the period specified in the order of the Court, the tenant is given a right under s. 26(1) to issue a notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy the premises from which he had been evicted and also to apply to the Court for relief if the landlord does not comply with his request.\n\nAgain under s. 27, the tenant has got a right to occupy the new building on its completion provided lie satisfies the requirements contained in that section.\n\nUnder s. 28 ( 1), the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant from whom he had received a notice under s. 27 the date on which the erection of the new building will be completed from which date the tenant will be entitled to occupy the same.\n\nMr. Chagla has referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Company( 2 ). The.section which came up for consideration before the Madras High Court was s. 14(3) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,\n\n1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) which was as follows:\n\n(!) [1962] Supp. 2 s.c.R. 623.\n\n(2) [1964] 2 , M.LJ. 147.\n\n\"14(1)(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possessiO)ll of the building to the landlord before a specified date.\"\n\nThat clause is substantially similar to s. 21(1 )(i) of the Act.\n\nIn the Madras case it is seen tht the building from which the tenant was sought to be evicted was in good condition and there was no danger of its falling for another 20 years though the building was old. Under those circumstances when the landlord applied under s. 14(1) (h) of the Madras Act for eviction on the ground that he wished to demolish the building for the purpose of erecting a new building thereon, the High Court affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Court declining relief to the landlord.\n\nThough the learned Judge states that landlords may bona fide require such buildings, particular:y old buildings in their own interest for demolitiQil and reconstruction, he holds that it is equally possible that the mere fact that a building is old may be taken advantage of by a landlord to put forth such pretext, his real object being ulterior and not bona fide for the purpose of reconstruction.\n\nWe have no hesitation in agreeng with the_ learned Judge's observation that the landlord must prove the reasonableness and bona fide nature of his requirement.\n\nBut, if the learned Judge intended to lay down a proposition of law that under s. 14(1)(b) of the Madras Act, similar to s. 21 ( l)(j) of the Act a landlord ca1:1not recover possession of the property for the purpose of reconstruction so as to put the property to a more profitable use, we are of the view that the decision of the Madras High Court must be considered to be erroneous. There is absolutely no _justification for putting such a narrow interpretation on the clause in question.\n\nMr. Chagla further urged that before his client is evicted his claim for compensation should have been considered by the Rent Controller. It is enough to say that, as pointed out by the High Court, that claim does not arise for consideration in these proceedings.\n\nWe may also state that a further contention regarding the nlidity of the notice to quit issued by the landlord which was taken before the High Courr and held against the appellant. has not been canvassed before us.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner/appellant undertaken to vacate the premises within a month from today.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "PANCHAMAL NARAYAN SHENOY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PANCHAMAL NARAYAN SHENOY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BASTHI VENKATESHA SHENOY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BASTHI VENKATESHA SHENOY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PANCHAMAL NARAYAN SHENOY\n\nBASTHI VENKATESHA SHENOY\n\nFebruary 20, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J B\n\nMysi>re Rent Control Act (Mys."}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 21(1)(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961", "statute": "the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Gopalaktishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a and R. Gopalaktishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. R. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. Ramamurthi, S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. S. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. Ramamurthi, S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. Veerappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3324, "end_char": 3335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. Ramamurthi, S. S. Javali and M. Veerappa, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3405, "end_char": 3417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J udgmt1D't of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. 1his appeal, by special leave, is against the judgment of the Mysore High Court, dated June 8, 1966 in Civil Revision Petition No."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mysore Act XXII of 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3691, "end_char": 3714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 22, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rent Controller, by his order dated January 22, 1964 accepted the claim of the rllSpOl!dent and ordered eviction of the appell3!1t granting the tenant one ~10nth's ime for deliveriing vacant possess10n."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6664, "end_char": 6680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The findings recorded by the Rent Controller were confirmed by the learned District Judge, by his judgment dated October 19, 1964 in A.S. No."}}, {"text": "June 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The revision filed by the appellant before the High Court was rejected by order dated June 8, 1966."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chagla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the interpretation placed by all the Courts on s. 21(1)(j) of the Act was erroneous."}}, {"text": "s. 21(1)(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7465, "end_char": 7470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramamurthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7552, "end_char": 7562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that in order to attracts."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8157, "end_char": 8162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8203, "end_char": 8216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10173, "end_char": 10178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12056, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12828, "end_char": 12836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006", "statute": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006", "statute": "the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13200, "end_char": 13205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13298, "end_char": 13303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13486, "end_char": 13503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chagla has referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Company( 2 )."}}, {"text": "s. 14(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13620, "end_char": 13628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21(1 )(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14189, "end_char": 14201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14222, "end_char": 14228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Madras case it is seen tht the building from which the tenant was sought to be evicted was in good condition and there was no danger of its falling for another 20 years though the building was old."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14478, "end_char": 14486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15366, "end_char": 15377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15408, "end_char": 15413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_740_744_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "THE ALOTE ESTATE & ANR.\n\nR. B. SETH HIRALAL KAL YANMAL & ORS\n\nFebruary 20, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nCompany-Shares in Conipany-Allotment in consideration of al/ottee .transferring land to Co1npany--Jf in winding up proceedings enquiry can be 1nade into value of land ll'ithout rectification of Company's registration.\n\nThe Appellants were allotted 18,000 fully paid up shares in a company in consideration of transferring 6,000 acres of agricultural )and to the con1pany for cultivation o'f sugar-cane. After a petition was filed for \\\\'inding up the company, two joint Liquidators were appointed and they took steps to settle the list of contributories. While these proceedings were pending an application was filed by Respondent No. 1 praying that an enquiry be made in respect of the price paid by the Appellant for the 6,000 acres of land. It was urged that such enquiry would show the value of the land to be well below the consideration for which the shares were allotted and that the Appellants would therefore be liable as contributories in respect of the difference.\n\nThe company Judg.., held that in a proceeding for winding up and while settling the list of contributories it was not open to go behind the transaction entered into at the time of the formation of the company and that the consideration which had been freely accepted by the company could not be challenged as being inadequate in the absence of any allegation of fraud.\n\nHowever. the Division Bench, in appeal. held that an inquiry would be necessary as there ,,,.as an indication that the allottees of the shares had paid only a fraction of the nominal value.\n\nOn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Allowing the appeal,\n\nIt cannot be disputed that a shareholder of fully paid up •hares will not be placed on the list of contributories or made to contribute towards the assets of the company unless the register is rectified and it is determined in appropriate proceedings that he is not a fully paid up shareholder.\n\nNo steps were taken by the liquidators to have the register rectified or the contract entered into by the company with the appellants avoided by means of appropriate proceedings. Even in the application filed by respondent No. 1 there was no allegation of fraud.\n\nThe facts stated related more to inadequacy of price or consideration and not to its being illulory or the like.\n\nThe learned sin, gle judge. was therefore right and the Division Bench was in error in directing an inquiry i_nto the question whether the appellants had paid consideration which was inadequate. [743 F, 744 CD]\n\nIn re Innes & Co., Limited, [1903] 2 Ch. Div. 254, 262, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1010 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 9, 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 24 of 1962.\n\nS. V. Gupte, N. D. Karkhanis and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for theappellants.\n\nMohan Behari Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, C. P. Lal and N. N. Sharma, for respondents e Nos. 2 to 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the division bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversing the order of the Company Judge in an application made by respo, ndent No. 1 for an inquiry into the allegation that the consideration for 18,000 shares of the Vikram Sugar Mills Ltd. (now under liquidation) valued at Rs. 18 lakhs was not fully paid up by the shareholders, namely, the present appellants.\n\nThe facts may be succintly stated.\n\nAppella; nt No. I, the A!ote Estate, was a firm consisting of two partners at the material time.\n\nIt came into existence in 1944 when Vikram Sugar Mills Ltd., hereinafter called the \"company\", was proposed to be floated. The two partners of the firm were His Highness Col. Sir Vikramsingh Rao Pawar, Ruler of the State of Devas (Senior) and R. K. N.\n\nGajapati Raju of Vaizagapatnam who died sometime in 1946 with the result that the firm was dissolved.\n\nIn 194 7 the ruler of Dewas\n\n(senior) was taken in adoption by Her Highness the Senior Dowager Maharanisaheba of Kohlapur. He assumed the uame and title of His Highness Maj. Gen. Sir Shahaji Chhatrapati Maharaja of Kohlapur.\n\nAfter the constitution of the firm called the Alote Estate, the company was incorporated in February 1944. The firm held extensive agricultural land which was suitable for cultivation o{ sugarcane. It had transferred 6,000 acres out of its holding to the company in lieu of 18,000 fully paid shares of Rs. 100/- each which were registered in the name of the firm.\n\nRespondent No. I was originally a director of the company.\n\nHe made a proposal for advancing debenture loan of Rs. 20 lakhs to the company which proposal was accepted by the Board of Directors as also .at an e-xtraordinary general meetmg of. the company on September 16, 1946.\n\nHe was appointed Managmg Agent of the company.\n\nOn the same date at the meeting the shareholders of the company passed a resolution that out of 6,000 acres of land\n\nacquired 'hy the company from the Alote Estate 2,000 acres selected by respondent No. 1 or his representative be returned and retransferred to the Estate.\n\nIn consideration of such transfer ~,000 shars were to be surrendered by the Estate. Effect was given to this resolution and in the list of shareholders the number of shares held\n\n-.--.-_-;-,.'..;'~- '\";\n\n. . -.i._-_.'.,•_~-· . -~- \"- /'/ • .::-- • < __ --.; _-_._ ~---r .\n\n~ ·,,~-~-\\' ··-\\ .:'.-.:\n\nI>;\\~-·, t ; • ,\\- - ' '742 .• ,\n\n' .. SUPREME. COURT REPORTS . • [1970] 3 s:c.R -'.. ,, ' . ·\" ;_. ---.-. ~-·->--~------ . '~)\n\n- . _- ~- ,_ .. - - ' --- ' . lly the firm was shown 'as 9,000 instead of 18,000 subject to confirmation by the court. A resolution was passed on October 27, 1947 for reduction of the capital from 60 lakbs to Rs. 35 lakhs. The court was 'also moved for. giving permission for reduction of the capital. On January 23, 1950, Prabhakar Paiashuramji Pandit-·\n\na shareholder-filed before .the High Court a petition under ss. 166 and 162 of the Compa, nies Act 1913 for winding up the company ..\n\nOn April 2, 1951 two joint liquidators were appointed.\n\nThe liquidators took steps to settle the list of contributories and objections were raised by His Highness the Maharaja of Kohlapur as also by the firm against inclusion of their names in that list. While these proceedings were pending an application was filed by respondent No. 1 on October 31, 196 l praying that an inquiry be made in .respect of the price paid for 6,000 acres. of land before the allotment of. the shares and \"to hold the-Alote Estate and His Highness the Maharaja of Kohlapur liable as contributories to the extent of money's worth not found to have been fully paid in addition to and independently of the liability for Rs. 9 lakhs\" which according to the joint liquidators was the amount of liability of the Maharaja as a contributory. It was alleged, inter alia, that on an average the price per 'acre paid for 6,000 acres of land before the allotment of the shares was approximately Rs. 30.\n\nOn that basis the Maharaja and the Alote Estate were liable as contributories in the sum of Rs. 16 lakhs as the shares weie not fully paid by value\n\nin kind.\n\nThe Maharaja and the Alote Estate in reply took up th~ E position that in the absence of rectification of register by appropriate action they were not liable to pay as contributories because they held shares which were fully paid up.\n\nAs regards the company's resolution to give up 2,000 acres out of 6,000 acres and reduce the value of shares allotted to 9 lakhs it was maintained that the same was an independent transaction and its effect could be considered only in appropriate proceedings in accordan.ce with law.\n\nThe learned Company Judge by his order dated July 31, 1962 held that in a proceeding for winding up and while settling the list of contributories it was not open to go behind the transaction entered into at the time of the formation of the company and that the consideration which had been freely accepted by the company could not be challenged as being inadequate 1n the absence of any allegation of fraud. He was further of the view that the contention of respondent No. 1 that the valuation of the land was Rs. 30 and not Rs. 300 per acre could not be inquired into and it w'as not necessary to consider whether such inquiry was barred by limitation in view of s. 235 of the Act.\n\nIt was, however, observed that if the allegation of respondent No. 1 was that the A!ote Estate as an officer of the company was guilty of misfeasance or breach Y the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara-h.ereinafter called 'the Sabha'-against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declaring that the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam [Madhya Pradesh Coal Cess (Validation) Act] 18 of 1964 does not \"give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies and 9 pies per ton under the notifications\" issued by the Independent Mining Local Board on December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947 respectively, \"nor to anything done in pursuance of those notifications\".\n\nThe Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, a Board constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act 4 of 1920, resolved on Marc!! 12, 1935 to levy a H cess under s. 51 of the Act at the rate of 3 pies per ton on coal extracted within the area.\n\nSanction of the local Government was obtained to that levy.\n\nOn December 22, 1943, the rate !\"\" I\n\nwas enhanced to 4 pies per ton: it was enhanced on July 29, 1946 to 7 pies per ton and on July 19, 1947 the cess was enhanced to 9 pies per ton.\n\nThe Central Provinces Local Self- Government Act 4 of 1920 was repealed with effect from June 11, 1948 by the C.P. and Berar Local Government Act 38 of 1948.\n\nBy s. 192 of Act 38 of 1948 it was enacted, inter alia that all rules, bye-laws and orders made, notifications and notices issued. taxes imposed or assessed, cesses, fees, tolls or rates levied under Act 4 of 1920 and in force immediately before the commencement of Act 38 of 1948 shall continue to be in force and shall be deemed to have been respectively made, issued, granted, imposed or assessed, levied and taken under Act 38 of 1948, and all rates, taxes and cesses due to the Independent Local Board shall be deemed to be due to the Sabha to whose area they pertain.\n\nThe levy of coal cess by the Sabha was challenged by the Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Others on diverse grounds in petitions filed in this Conrt under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nThis Court rejected the petitions holding that Act 4 of 1920 had received ihe assent of the Governor-Gnereal and its validity was\n\nnot liable to be challenged and that \"on a proper interpretation of s. 51 of the Act th© levy of coal cess was not excluded from the purview of the local authority.\" It was also held that the levy of the cess was valid even after the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution of India, in view of s. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 277 of the Constitution.\n\nBut the Court declined to allow the petitioners to urge that the increase in the rate of tax by resolutions in the years 1943, 1946 and 1947 was invalid: Amaigamated Coal-fields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara(').\n\nValidity of the enhanced levy was then challenged in petitions filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by the Amalgamated Coal-fields Ltd. and Others.\n\nIn appeals against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, this Court held that since neither the Act nor the Rules prescribed a ceiling on the levy, the expression \"first imposition\" occurring in s. 51 (2) would include every increase of the levy after its initial imposition and the increased levy would require the previous sanction of the Local Government and such sanction not being there, the levy at the rate of 9 pies per ton was illegal.\n\nThe Court accordingly allowed the appeals and orjlered that the appropriate directions be issued restraining the Janapada Sabha from recovering the tax at a rate higher than 3 pies per ton and also restraining the Sabha from recovering any additional tax in respect of the years for which\n\n(1) f1962] I S.C.R. l.\n\ntax had already been assessed against the petitioners : The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara(').\n\nTo rectify the defect pointed out by this Court in the imposition of the cess, the Legislature of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam Act 18 of 1964. Bys. 2(a) \"Board\" means \"the Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920 (IV of 1920), and its successor body, the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara, constituted under the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948 (XXXVIII of 1948)\".\n\nSectin 2(b) defines \"cess\" as meaning \"'a cess imposed by the lndependem Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, or its successor body, on coal, coal dust or coke, from time to time, as the case may be, produced or manufac tured at the mines, so1d for export outside the State, or sold otherwise than for export by rail within the territorial jurisdiction of !he said Board'', and by s. 2(c) \"enactment\" is defined as meaning \"the Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920 (IV of 1920), or the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948 (No. XXXVIII of 1948), as the case may be, and rules made thereunder\".\n\nBy s. 3 it is provided:\n\n\"(!) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, cesses imposed, assessed or collected or purported to have been imposed, assessed or collected -by the Board in pursuance of the notifications/notices specified in the Schedule shall. for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been, validly imposed, assessed or collected as if the enactment under wh.ich they were so issued stood amended at all material times so as to empower the Board to issue the said notifications/notices and accordingly :-\n\n(a) all acts, proceedings or things done or taken by the Board or by any officer of the Board in connection with the imposition, assessment or collection of such cess shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law;\n\n(b) any cess imposed or assessed in pursuance of the said notifications/notices before the 20th day of May, 1964 but not collected before such date may be recovered (after assessment of the cess where necessary) in the manner provided therefor;\n\n(c) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any Court against the Board or any person\n\nor authority whatsoever for the refund of any cess so paid; ( d) no Court shaU e.nforce any decree or order directing the refund of any cess so paid.\n\n(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in sub-ction (1) shall be construed as preventing any person-\n\n(a) from questioning in accordance with the provisions of the enactment, the assessment of such cess for any period.\n\n(b) for claiming refund of the cess paid to him in excess of the amount due from him under the enactn1ent.\"\n\nIn the Schedule, notificaitons dated December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947, enhancing the rate of cess were referred to.\n\nThe levy of coal cess validated by the provisions of Act 18 of 1964 was again challenged by the Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and other producers of coal, by petitions filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nIt was claimed by the petitioners that Act I 8 of 1964 was \"ultra vires and ineffective\", and the notices issued pursuant thereto were liable to be quashed.\n\nDixit, C.J., and Pandey, J., who heard the petitions differed.\n\nIn the view of the learned Chief Justice the Amending Act which purported to amend Act 4 of 1920 by seeking to empower the Mining Board to issue the notifications specified in the Schedule to the Act without reviving the Act of 1920 was ineffective, and that in any event the Act did not validate the levy of coal cess which had been imposed under the three notifications.\n\nPandey. J., ex\" pressed a contrary view.\n\nHe held that the provisions of s. 3 of Act 18 of 1964 were not invalid, \"nor were they ineffective\". The petitions were then referred to Shiv Dayal, J.\n\nThe learned.\n\nJudge agreed with Dixit, C.J., and held that Act 18 of 1964 did not give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies or 9 pies per ton under the notifications issued by the Independent Mining Local Board nor to anything done in\n\npursuance of those notifications.\n\nThe preamble of the Act states that it is \"An Act to validate the imposition and collection of cess on coal by certain local authorities\". Act 18 of 1964 is a taxing statute whiclj purports to rectify the defects pointed out by this Court.\n\nThis Court declared invalid the levy of cess by the Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, at a rate exceeding three pies per ton. . If\n\nthe Act does not by the plain language used therein carry out the object, the Court will not be justified in supplying deficiencies in the Act.\n\nAs observed by Rowlatt, J., in Cape Brand.v Syndi care v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue('):\n\n\"In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.\n\nThere is no room for any intendment: There is no equity about a tax.\n\nThere is no presumption as to a tax.\n\nNothing is to be read jn, nothing is to be implied.\n\nOne can only look fairly at the language used.\"\n\nThese observations were approved by the House of Lords in Cana dian Eagle Oil Co. Ltd. v. King('). This Court has also adopted the same rule in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ajax Products Ltd.(\"); and Com111issioner of Income-tax v. B. M. Kharwar(4).\n\nThe relevant words which purport to validate the imposition, assessment and collection of cess on coal may be recalled : they are \"cesses imposed, assessed or collected by the Board in pursuance of the notifications/notices specified in the Schedule shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been validly imposed, assessed or collected as if the enactment under which they were so issued stood amended at all material time~ so as to empower the Board to issue the. said notifications/notices,.. Thereby the enactments, i.e., Act 4 of 1920 and the Rules framed under the Act pursuant to which the notifications and notices were issued, must be deemed to have been amended by the Act.\n\nBut the Act does not set out the amendments intended to be made in the enactments.\n\nAct 18 of 1964 is a piece of clumsy drafting.\n\nBy a fiction it deems the Act of 1920 and the rules framed thereunder to have been amended without disclosing the text or even the nature of the amendments.\n\nMr. B. Sen appearing on behalf of the Sabha contended that the intention of the Legislature was to repeal with retrospective effect sub-s. (2) of s. 51 of Act 4 of 1920.\n\nBys. 51 of Act 4 of 1920 it was provided :\n\n\"( 1) <; ubject to the provisions of. ay law or. enactment for the time being in force, a D1stnct Council may, by a resolution passed by a majority of no.t less tan two-thirds of the members present at a special meeting convened for the purpose, impose any tax, toll or rate\n\n(I) 12 T.C. 358.\n\n(l) 55 I.T.R. 74l (S.C.l\n\n(2) 27 T.C. 205 (H.L.l.\n\n\n.JANAPADA SABHA V. CENTRAL.PROVINCES (Shah, J.) 75!\n\n(2) The first imposition of any tax, toll or rate under sub-section (1) shall be subject to the previous sanction of the Provincial Government.\n\nBut the Act in terms is liniited in its application to the Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, and its successor body the Jamapada Sabha, Chhindwara constituted under Act 38 of 1948, and only in respect of the three notifications specified in the Schedule.\n\nObviously the Act limited to one local Board in its application and to certain specific notifications cannot operate to repeal the clause insofar as it applied to other Boards.\n\nThe nature of the amendment made in Act 4 of 1920 has not been indicated.\n\nNor is there anything which enacts that the notifications issued without the sanction of the State Government must be deemed to have been issued validly under s. 51(2} without the sanction of the Local Government. On the words used in the Act, i~ is plain that the Legislature attempted to ovecrule or set aside the decision of this Court. That, in our\n\njudgment, is not open to the Legislature to do under our constitutional scheme.\n\nIt is 'open to the Legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but fo is not open to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powe.rir in a matter brought before i~ shall be deemed to be ineffecive and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court.\n\nThis Court in The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.'s(') case held that the cess was not validly imposed and levied because the sanction of the State Government was not obtained at the time of enhancing the rate of levy of tax.\n\nThat judgment was binding between the parties and also by virtue of Art. 141 binding on all Courts in the territory Y the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara-h.ereinafter called 'the Sabha'-against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declaring that the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam [Madhya Pradesh Coal Cess (Validation) Act] 18 of 1964 does not \"give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies and 9 pies per ton under the notifications\" issued by the Independent Mining Local Board on December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947 respectively, \"nor to anything done in pursuance of those notifications\"."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4942, "end_char": 4959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">Y the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara-h.ereinafter called 'the Sabha'-against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declaring that the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam [Madhya Pradesh Coal Cess (Validation) Act] 18 of 1964 does not \"give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies and 9 pies per ton under the notifications\" issued by the Independent Mining Local Board on December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947 respectively, \"nor to anything done in pursuance of those notifications\"."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4961, "end_char": 4974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">Y the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara-h.ereinafter called 'the Sabha'-against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declaring that the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam [Madhya Pradesh Coal Cess (Validation) Act] 18 of 1964 does not \"give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies and 9 pies per ton under the notifications\" issued by the Independent Mining Local Board on December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947 respectively, \"nor to anything done in pursuance of those notifications\"."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">Y the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara-h.ereinafter called 'the Sabha'-against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declaring that the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam [Madhya Pradesh Coal Cess (Validation) Act] 18 of 1964 does not \"give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the rate of 4 pies, 7 pies and 9 pies per ton under the notifications\" issued by the Independent Mining Local Board on December 22, 1943, July 29, 1946 and July 19, 1947 respectively, \"nor to anything done in pursuance of those notifications\"."}}, {"text": "Board constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Marc!! 12, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5213, "end_char": 5228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, a Board constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act 4 of 1920, resolved on Marc!!"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5252, "end_char": 5257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Board constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act", "statute": "Board constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self-Government Act"}}, {"text": "June 11, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5669, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Provinces Local Self- Government Act 4 of 1920 was repealed with effect from June 11, 1948 by the C.P. and Berar Local Government Act 38 of 1948."}}, {"text": "Berar Local Government Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5742, "end_char": 5748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Local Government Act", "statute": "Berar Local Government Act"}}, {"text": "Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6371, "end_char": 6398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The levy of coal cess by the Sabha was challenged by the Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Others on diverse grounds in petitions filed in this Conrt under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6466, "end_char": 6473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Local Government Act", "statute": "Berar Local Government Act"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Local Government Act", "statute": "Berar Local Government Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6959, "end_char": 6965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6973, "end_char": 7002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Amalgamated Coal-fields Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7372, "end_char": 7400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Validity of the enhanced levy was then challenged in petitions filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by the Amalgamated Coal-fields Ltd. and Others."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7618, "end_char": 7623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Legislature of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To rectify the defect pointed out by this Court in the imposition of the cess, the Legislature of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam Act 18 of 1964."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8691, "end_char": 8717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(a) \"Board\" means \"the Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, constituted under the Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920 (IV of 1920), and its successor body, the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara, constituted under the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948 (XXXVIII of 1948)\"."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8741, "end_char": 8795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lndependem Mining Local Board, Chhindwara", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8879, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sectin 2(b) defines \"cess\" as meaning \"'a cess imposed by the lndependem Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, or its successor body, on coal, coal dust or coke, from time to time, as the case may be, produced or manufac tured at the mines, so1d for export outside the State, or sold otherwise than for export by rail within the territorial jurisdiction of !"}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9441, "end_char": 9445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Local Government Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "20th day of May, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10371, "end_char": 10392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been, validly imposed, assessed or collected as if the enactment under wh.ich they were so issued stood amended at all material times so as to empower the Board to issue the said notifications/notices and accordingly :-\n\n(a) all acts, proceedings or things done or taken by the Board or by any officer of the Board in connection with the imposition, assessment or collection of such cess shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law;\n\n(b) any cess imposed or assessed in pursuance of the said notifications/notices before the 20th day of May, 1964 but not collected before such date may be recovered (after assessment of the cess where necessary) in the manner provided therefor;\n\n(c) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any Court against the Board or any person\n\nor authority whatsoever for the refund of any cess so paid; ( d) no Court shaU e.nforce any decree or order directing the refund of any cess so paid."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11375, "end_char": 11407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The levy of coal cess validated by the provisions of Act 18 of 1964 was again challenged by the Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and other producers of coal, by petitions filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11652, "end_char": 11657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixit, C.J., and Pandey, J., who heard the petitions differed."}}, {"text": "Pandey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11669, "end_char": 11675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixit, C.J., and Pandey, J., who heard the petitions differed."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were then referred to Shiv Dayal, J.\n\nThe learned."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13131, "end_char": 13138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Rowlatt, J., in Cape Brand.v Syndi care v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue('):\n\n\"In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14735, "end_char": 14741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. B. Sen appearing on behalf of the Sabha contended that the intention of the Legislature was to repeal with retrospective effect sub-s. (2) of s. 51 of Act 4 of 1920.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14877, "end_char": 14882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".JANAPADA SABHA V. CENTRAL.PROVINCES", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15292, "end_char": 15328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".JANAPADA SABHA V. CENTRAL.PROVINCES (Shah, J.) 75!"}}, {"text": "Jamapada Sabha, Chhindwara", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15620, "end_char": 15646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Act in terms is liniited in its application to the Independent Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, and its successor body the Jamapada Sabha, Chhindwara constituted under Act 38 of 1948, and only in respect of the three notifications specified in the Schedule."}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17178, "end_char": 17186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17230, "end_char": 17235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141 binding on all Courts in the territory y Regulation\n\n15. and (ii) whether although the or.appropriated or misapplied the funds of the Society dishonestly to benefit himself or his relations and friends. The appellate Court certified that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court under Art. 134(t)(c), but, the order granting the certific&te did not \"disclose on its face what exactly was the difficulty of the appellate Court and what question of outstanding difficulty this Court was to settle.\n\nin appeal to this Court, F\n\nHELD: (I) The acquittal of the co-accused was not based on the finding that there was no falsification of accounts or embezzlement.\n\nTherefore, the appellant could n.ot contend that no offence was committed because of the acquittal of the co-accused. [773 G-DJ\n\n(2) On the finding of the appellate court, it was not a mere civil liability of the appellant. The appellant's manner of dealing with the money entrusted to his custody constituted criminal breach of trust.\n\nThe Directors had no authority under the bye-laws to give any directions contrary to the bye-la\\VS and so, could not ratify the violation of the bye-laws.\n\nAny resolution ratifying the use of trust money contrary_ to the directions contained in the bye-Jaws would not validate, the breach of the bye-laws.\n\n[7750; 776 A-CJ\n\n- (3) There was no misjoinder of charges and no prejudice was caus-ed to the appellant. [776 F]\n\n( 4) . The appellate Court should not have granted the certiJicate, under Art. 134(\\)(c) in the present case. The word 'certify' in \"the Article\n\npostulates the exercise of judicial discretion by the appellate Court and the certificate shcuid ordinarily show on the face of it that the discretion was invokcM ano properly exercisCd.\n\nThis Court should be in a position to koow that the appellate Court has not acted mechanically but bas appli\"\n\nits n1ind. n certificate under this clause is impermissible on questions of fact. \\Vhen the case does not disclose a substantial question of law or principle the certificate granted by the appellate Court is liable to be revoked by this Court, though such. pl'in1a facie non-disclosure would not by itse\\t :mtomatically invalidate the ccr'ificate. [777 A-Cl\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1967 of the Judicial Commissioner's Court Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Appeal Case No. 8 of 1963.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, J. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.\n\nPursuant to a complaint by Shri Joy Shanker Bhattacharyya, the appellant Sushi! Kumar Gupta was tried in the court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Tripura on the following charges :\n\n\" ( 1) That you in between the month of September, 1958 and July, 1959 at Agartala P. S. Kotwali being a servant viz. Secretary in the employment of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd., and in such capacity entrusted with certain property to wit a total sum of Rs. 18,200 being the fund of the Society committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the said property and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 408 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.\n\nSecondly : that you in between the period of September, 1958 and July, 1959 at the same place being a Secretary in the employment of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Lid., wilfully and with intent to defaud, falsified certain books and other relevant apers. to wit cash book etc., which belonged to the said society, your employer and thereby commiited an offence punis)lable under s. 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.\"\n\nAs the appellant was tried jointly along with five others who have been. acquitted and as it. was arged on behalf of the appellant that m view of the acqutttal of his co-accused'the appellant\n\nalso should have been acquitted, the charges against them may also be reproduced :\n\n\"That Sushi! Kumar Gupta, Secretary of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd., in between the period of September, 1958 and Jufy, 1959 at Agartala p.s. Kotwali committed the offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 18,200 and that you the aforesaid persons at the same place and time abetted the said Shri Sushi! Kumar Gupta in the commission of the same offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the said amount which was committed in consequence of your abetment and that you hii_ve thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 109, I.P.C. read with s. 408, I.P.C. and within my cognizance.\n\nSecondly : that Shri Sushi! Kumar Gupta, Secretary of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd. in between the period of -September, 1958 and July, 1959 at Agartala p.s. Kotwali committed the offence of falsificaiion of accounts and that you the aforesaid persons at the same place and time abetted the said Shri Sushi! Kumar Gupta in the commission of the same offence of falsification of account which was committed in consequence of your abetment and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 109, I.P.C. read with s. 477-A of the I.P.C. and within my cognizance.\"\n\n\"The trial court acquitted all the six accused persons. An appeal against the acquittal of all of them was preferred under s. 417 (3), Cr. P.C. in the court of the Judicial Commissioner, Tripura.\n\nThat court allowed the appeal against S. K. Gupta only and dismissed it as against the others.\n\nS. K. Gupta was held guilty of the offence of criminal breach of trust under s. 408, I.P.C. and also of the offence of falsification of accounts under s. 477-A, l.P.C. regarding the sum of Rs. 18,200. He was sentenced under each count to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, the sentences to be concurrent.\n\nThe convict S. K. Gupta has appealed to ibis Court on certificate granted under Art. 134 ( 1 )( c) of the Constitution. The order granting the certificate does not disclose on its face what exactly the difficulty of the court of the Judicial Commissioner is and precisely what question of outstanding difficuliy this Court is desired to settle. On behalf of the appellant his learned advocate Shri Ramamurthy, however, addressed elaborate arguments questioning the order of the learned Judicial Commissioner allowing\n\nthe appeal against the appellant S. K. Gupta's acquittal. His challenge was based on three main contentions.\n\nThe fourth point that the learned Judicial Commissioner erred in law in considering Ex. P-59 to be admissible ii} evidence, in disagreement with the trial court, according to which it was hit by s. 24, Indian Evidence Act, was not allowed to l;>e argued in this Court because this ground was not taken in the grounds of appeal.\n\nThe first contention seriously pressed on behalf of the appellant is that in view o( the acquittal of his co-accused who were tried along with him the court of the Judicial Commissioner was wrong in law in holding that there was falsification of accounts and embezzlement of the funds of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society.\n\nThis submission is unacceptable.\n\nThe acquittal of the other co-accused as affirmed by the learned Judicial Commissioner is not based on the finding that there was no falsification of accounts and no embezzlement of the funds of the Society.\n\nS. K. Gupta, appellant, it may be pointed out was the Secretary of the Society since April 13, 1957 when the first general meeting of the Society was held and was in that capacity entrusted with its funds. He worked as such till August 10, 1960.\n\nHe was accordingly responsible for the cash and maintenance of current accounts of the Society during the period in question.\n\nTurning to the Bye-laws of the Society, bye-law no. 41 prescribes the duties of the Secretary. According to this bye-law ihe Secretary has inter alia :\n\n\"(3) To make disbursement and to obtain vouchers and to receive payments and pass receipts, under the general or sp.cial orders of the Board of Direciors on this behalf from time to time.\n\n( 4) To keep all accounts and registers required by the rules.\n\n(13) To countersign cash book in token of the balance being correct and to produce the cash balance whenever called upon to do so by the Chairman or any person authorised to do so ..\n\nIn the absence of the Secretary the Board of Directors may authorise the Manager to perform the duties of the Secretary.\n\nThe Board of Directors may also authorise the Manager to perform any of ihe duties of the Secretary to facilitate H the working of the Society.\n\nReceipts passed on behalf of the Society shall be sigJned by the Secretary.\n\nShare certificates and otherdocuments shall be signed by the Secretary and one member of Board of Directors jointly.\"\n\nByelaw 42 contains directions regarding advances against pro- .duce of goods and clause ( 1) of this byelaw provides :\n\n\"(1) The Board of Directors shall, at the beginning of the session, fix the amount of advance, indicating the percentage of the market price of produce or goods pledged with the society, that may be granted to a member. Such limits may be fixed for difierent commodities and varied from time to time according to fluctuation in markets or otherwise.\n\nIt shall also be competent for the Board of Directors to call on a borrower at any time before the due date to repay a portion of the loan or advance issued or to produce additional security for the outstanding Joan or advance withln a time fixed by them, if in their opinion, there is fall or likely to be a fall in the market value of the produce or goods pledged.\"\n\nUnder byelaw 44 loans may be granted to members in suitable \"Cases on such terms and conditions as regards individual and maximum limits, repayment of loan, rate of interest thereon etc., as may be fixed by the Board of Directors from time to time. According tci the learned judical Commissioner \"the overall picture\" emerging from the evidence on the record, to quote his own words, it :\n\n\"(1) A sum of Rs. 18,200/- was said to have been disbursed in 1958 and 1959.\n\n(2) It was said to have been repaid in the last week of June, 1959 towards the end of the co-operative year of 1959 and Jong after the maximum period of 6 months allowed by rule 42 ( 4) of the byelaws.\n\n(3) The same amount was again said to have been disbursed in a few days in the first week of July commencing with the next cooperative year (1959-60),\n\n( 4) Except the 2nd and 4th respondents, the others were not members of the Co-operative Society and in this regard the !st respondent disregarded sub-rule ( 1) of r. 42 of the byelaws.\n\n( 5) The I st respondent did not obtain any general or special orders of the Board of Directors to make the disbursements and violated sub-rule ( 1) of r. 42 of Ext.\n\nP-41.\n\n(6) Ext. P-56 and P-59 show that the alleged collections of the monies in June 1959 was false and that the accounts were got up.\n\n(7) The fact that a discount Qf Rs. 10/- was paid to cash a cheque on 29-6-1959 shows that the society had B no funds on that day.\n\n(8) None of the alleged loanees was a Jute grower and no jute was deposited in th\" godowns of the society before the advances were made and in this regard the mandatory provisions of sub-r. (2) of r. 42 were also disregarded by the 1st respondent.\n\n( 9) A number of adjustments were made in the Accounts to show that the sum of Rs. 18,200/- was disbursed.\n\n(10) The three persons to whom ultimately the amounts were said to have been disbursed are interested in the 1st respondent. The 4th respondent C. C. Das Gupta is a relation of the 1st respondent and proved by P. Ws 1, 6 and 8 and as admitted by the 4th respondent himself in Ext. P-56. The 3rd respondent Sudhir Ranjan Roy is a servant of D.W. 1 who is a co-Director of the Match Factory and friend of the 1st respondent. The 3rd respondent Haradhan Deb was appointed by the 1st respondent in the C.M.S. The 3rd respondent was also an employee of the C.T.S. of which the 1st respondent was a Director.\"\n\nOn the basis of these observations the appellant was held to have committed criminal breach of trust and to have either misappropriated or misapplied the funds of the Society dishonestly to benefit himself of his relations and friends.\n\nCounsel failed to point out any legal infirmity in the final conclusion drawn in the impugned order from the overall picture. Indeed, counsel, after a faint attempt to find fault with this conclusion felt constrained to admit that the money had been advanced against the rules of the Society and also to the persons not entitled to it, his only contention in support of the appeal being that it did not constitute a criminal offence and that in any event the Board of Directors of the Society having ratified the advances, the foundation for the criminal charge must be deemed to have disappeared.\n\nWe are unable to agree.\n\nH The offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with property or with dominion over it. dishonestly misappropriates it, or converts it to his own use, or dishonestly uses it or disposes it Qf, in violation\n\nof any direction of law prescribing the .mode in which the trust is to be discharged, or of any lawful contract, express or implied, made by him touching such discharge, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do.\n\nThe appellant's manner of dealing with the money entrusted to his custody clearly constitutes criminal breach of trust.\n\nCounsel was not able to point out any provision which empowers the Directors to prescribe the mode of making advances, which violates or is in breach of, or contrary to the Byelaws. If the Directors possess no authority to give any directions contrary to the byelaws they can scarcely claim or assume power to ratify violation of the Byelaws in the matter of dealing with the trust money.\n\nOur attention was not drawn to any over-riding provision conferring power on the Board of Directors to ratify use of the trust money contrary to the directions contained in the Byelaws. Exhibit P-27, the resolution of . the Board of Directors dated January 10, 1960, on which reliance in support of the argument was placed, merely states \"investments made by the Secretary uptodafo are hereby approved\" without pointing out the provisions under which such approval could validate breaches of the Byelaws.\n\nIncidentally it may be mentioned that the learned Judicial Commissioner also entertained some suspicion about the manner in which the meeting, in which this resofotion was passed, was held.\n\nThis contention of the counsel must, therefore, be repelled.\n\nIn the last submission the counsel made a grievance against the joint trial of several accused persons on several items of embezzlement According to him there was a misjoinder of charges which vitiated the trial.\n\nIn our opinion, charges under s. 408 and s. 4 77-A, Indian Penal Code, could, in the circumstances of this case, be tried together and the joint trial of all the accused was proper and lawful. Our attention was not drawn to any provision of law against the legality of the joint trial. In any event no failure of justice in consequence of the joinder of charges was pointed out, with the result that the question of misjoinder of charges must be held to be of little conseq11ence at the stage of appeal. ·\n\nBefore closing we may point out, as has repeatedly been said by this Court, that there is normally no right of appeal to this Court in criminal matters except in cases provided by Art. 134 (l)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Clause (c) of this Article empowers the High Court to certify cases to be fit for appeal to this Court. The word \"certify\" is a strong word; it posiulates exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court and the certificate should ordinarily show on the fce of it th.at the discretion was invoked and properly exercised. This Court should be in a position to know that the High Court has not acted mechanically\n\nbut has applied iis mind. A certificate under this clause is impermissible on questions of fact and when a case does not disCiose a substantial question of law or principle then the certificate granted by the High Court is liable to be revoked by this Court, though such prima facie non-disclosure would not by itself automatically invalidate the certificate. In the case in hand no substantial question of law or principle was made out'at the bar and the certificate wa5 clearly misconceived though it vaguely states that sevei:al questions of law are involved. The appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nuosupCIQ'!PJ70I-s", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JOY SHANKAR BHATIACHARYYA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JOY SHANKAR BHATIACHARYYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA\n\nJOY SHANKAR BHATIACHARYYA\n\nFebruary 23, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 408 and 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 408 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 848, "end_char": 853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 134(t)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(\\)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2739, "end_char": 2753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3690, "end_char": 3706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, J. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3726, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, J. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.\n\nPursuant to a complaint by Shri Joy Shanker Bhattacharyya, the appellant Sushi!"}}, {"text": "Joy Shanker Bhattacharyya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3899, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.\n\nPursuant to a complaint by Shri Joy Shanker Bhattacharyya, the appellant Sushi!", "canonical_name": "JOY SHANKAR BHATIACHARYYA"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDua, J.\n\nPursuant to a complaint by Shri Joy Shanker Bhattacharyya, the appellant Sushi!", "canonical_name": "SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Assistant Sessions Judge, Tripura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3985, "end_char": 4018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Gupta was tried in the court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Tripura on the following charges :\n\n\" ( 1) That you in between the month of September, 1958 and July, 1959 at Agartala P. S. Kotwali being a servant viz."}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4517, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Lid", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4697, "end_char": 4747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly : that you in between the period of September, 1958 and July, 1959 at the same place being a Secretary in the employment of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Lid.,"}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4960, "end_char": 4966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sushi! Kumar Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was arged on behalf of the appellant that m view of the acqutttal of his co-accused'the appellant\n\nalso should have been acquitted, the charges against them may also be reproduced :\n\n\"That Sushi!", "canonical_name": "SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Gupta, Secretary of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd., in between the period of September, 1958 and Jufy, 1959 at Agartala p.s."}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5883, "end_char": 5889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5891, "end_char": 5896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5908, "end_char": 5914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6474, "end_char": 6479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6672, "end_char": 6678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Judicial Commissioner, Tripura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6713, "end_char": 6743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. in the court of the Judicial Commissioner, Tripura."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That court allowed the appeal against S. K. Gupta only and dismissed it as against the others.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Gupta"}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 6999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ramamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant his learned advocate Shri Ramamurthy, however, addressed elaborate arguments questioning the order of the learned Judicial Commissioner allowing\n\nthe appeal against the appellant S. K. Gupta's acquittal."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7708, "end_char": 7719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant his learned advocate Shri Ramamurthy, however, addressed elaborate arguments questioning the order of the learned Judicial Commissioner allowing\n\nthe appeal against the appellant S. K. Gupta's acquittal.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Gupta"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7987, "end_char": 8006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8406, "end_char": 8452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention seriously pressed on behalf of the appellant is that in view o( the acquittal of his co-accused who were tried along with him the court of the Judicial Commissioner was wrong in law in holding that there was falsification of accounts and embezzlement of the funds of the Tripura Central Marketing Co-operative Society."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Gupta, appellant, it may be pointed out was the Secretary of the Society since April 13, 1957 when the first general meeting of the Society was held and was in that capacity entrusted with its funds."}}, {"text": "August 10, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He worked as such till August 10, 1960."}}, {"text": "29-6-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12349, "end_char": 12358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10/- was paid to cash a cheque on 29-6-1959 shows that the society had B no funds on that day."}}, {"text": "C. C. Das Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12912, "end_char": 12927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondent C. C. Das Gupta is a relation of the 1st respondent and proved by P. Ws 1, 6 and 8 and as admitted by the 4th respondent himself in Ext."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Ranjan Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13074, "end_char": 13091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 3rd respondent Sudhir Ranjan Roy is a servant of D.W. 1 who is a co-Director of the Match Factory and friend of the 1st respondent."}}, {"text": "Haradhan Deb", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13210, "end_char": 13222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 3rd respondent Haradhan Deb was appointed by the 1st respondent in the C.M.S. The 3rd respondent was also an employee of the C.T.S. of which the 1st respondent was a Director.\""}}, {"text": "C.M.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13266, "end_char": 13272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 3rd respondent Haradhan Deb was appointed by the 1st respondent in the C.M.S. The 3rd respondent was also an employee of the C.T.S. of which the 1st respondent was a Director.\""}}, {"text": "C.T.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13320, "end_char": 13326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 3rd respondent Haradhan Deb was appointed by the 1st respondent in the C.M.S. The 3rd respondent was also an employee of the C.T.S. of which the 1st respondent was a Director.\""}}, {"text": "January 10, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Board of Directors dated January 10, 1960, on which reliance in support of the argument was placed, merely states \"investments made by the Secretary uptodafo are hereby approved\" without pointing out the provisions under which such approval could validate breaches of the Byelaws."}}, {"text": "s. 408", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16236, "end_char": 16240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16247, "end_char": 16264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16882, "end_char": 16890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_778_787_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "R. D. AGARWALA & ANR. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ANR.\n\nFebruary 23, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE,\n\nA. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]\n\nPractice and Pi-ocedure-Single Judge deciding iniportant questions and suo motu granting certificate 'under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution-\n\nPro_.,, riety.\n\nWrit petitions involving. important questions of law came up before C a single Judge of the High Court.\n\nHe was requested by the parties to refer the cases to a Divisional Bench.\n\nInstead of doing so he disposed them of himself, and suo n1otu granted a certificate under Art. 132(1) of 1he constitution for appeal to this court.\n\nHELD : The action of the Judge though technically permissible wa-; improper, because, either the Judge should have referred the case<; to a Bench, or alloY.ied the P.arties to pursue their right of appeal to a D Bench against the decision of the single Judge, without short circuiting tht right by passing on the cases to this Court. [779 E-G)\n\nCIVIL APP ELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2634 of 1969 and 63 of 1970.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated December 5, E 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 220 and 725 of 1968.\n\nC.A. No. 2634 of 1969.\n\nSarjoo Prasad, Prem Nath Chadda, K. L. Mehta, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M. G. Gupta and Sona Bhatiani, for the appel- F !ants.\n\nR. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Govind Das and B. P. Singh, for intervener No. 1.\n\nM. C. Chagla, K. K. Jain, Bishamber Lal and H. K. Puri, for intervener no. 2.\n\nC.A. No. 63 of 1970.\n\nR. V. S. Mani .. for the appellants.\n\nS. P. Nayar, for respQndent No. 1.\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and Sona Bhatiani for respondents Nos. 3 and 4. . '\n\n,..\n\nR. D. AGARWALA v. UNION (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 779\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayalullah, C.J.\n\nThis order will govern the disposal of Civil Appeals Nos. 2634 of 1969 and 63 of 1970. These two appeals arise out of two writ petitions filed in the High Coun of Delhi which were disposed of by a common judgment delivered by a le3rned single Judge on December 5, 1969. The appeals have been brought on certificate granted suo motu by the learned single Judge under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution of India.\n\nWhile granting the certificate, the learned single Judge observed that at an earlier stage in the case, request was made to him to refer these two petitions for decision to a Bench, because important questions were involved in them. At that time, the learned Judge felt that since there was a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. Union of India and another(') there was no need to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The learned Judge goes on to say in the order granting certificate that at the time of the hearing, he found that several questions arose before him which were not covered by the Rajasthan decision. He probably felt that as the points which he had to decide were not considered by this Court in any earlier decision and a• he had decided the case sitting singly, he should grant certificate .mo motu for appeal to this Court.\n\nIn our opinion, and we say it respectfully, the learned Judte was error in not making a reference to a Bench when he found that important questions of law were arising before him: Even if he did not make any reference, he should have allowed the parties to take an appeal in the High Court itself under the provisions pertaining to appeals against decisions of a single Judge. Tke practice of deciding the case sitting singly and giving a certificate under Art. 132(1) for appeal to this Court although technically correct, is 111 improp.r practice. Ii is the right of the party to file an appeal in the High Court itself against the decision of the single Judge and that right should not be shOrt-circuited by passing Ol\\ the case io the Supreme Court for decision. We think we should not endorse this practice which would create a bad precedent in India. We accordingly cancel the certificate and leave the parties free to file an appeal in the High Court, it they so desire. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nCertificate Cancelled .\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1969. Raj. 281.\n\nT. N. RAGHUNATHA REDDY\n\nMYSORE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY\n\nFebruary 24, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BKARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]\n\nMotor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939-'Kolar Scheme' approved and published by Mysore State Government under s. 68-D of Act-'Existing perniit holder' lVithin meaning of cl. (d) of scheme-Who is Agreement between Mysore and Andhra Governments for counter-signing each other perniits\n\nfor inter-State routes-Such agree1nent whether overrides Chapl:?r IV-A of Acr.\n\nIn 1959 the States of Mysore and Andhra Pradesh entered into a reciprocal arranaement agreeing thereby that certain permits issued by the Transport Authorities of one State should be counter-signed by those of\n\nthe other. Under s. 43(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Government of Mysore issued directions to the State Transport Authority to give effect to the above arrangement. On April 25, 1968 the Regional Transport Authority Cuddapah, Andhra Pradesh issued a permit to the appellant for the Cilddapah-Bangalore inter-State route under s. 63 of the Act, which was to be valid up to May 13, 1971. The appellant then applied to the State Transport Authority in Mysore for counter-signature of his permit.\n\nBy then the Government of Mysore had by its order dated 25-1-1968 approved under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, a scheme called the 'Kolar scheme'. That scheme provided for exclusive operation by the Mysore State Transport Undertaking of stage-carriages on the notified routes.\n\nUnder the scheme existing permit holders' could continue to operate inter-State routes except that their permits would be ineffective' for the overlapping portions of the notified routes. On March I, 1968 the Mysore State Transport Undertaking applied under s. 68F(l) to operate buses on the notified routes.\n\nIn December 1968 the Regional Transport Authoritv resolved to give effect to the scheme from 1-1-1969. Meanwhile the appellant's application for counter-signature came up before the Mysore State Transport Authority on July 6, 1968. By that time, however, writ petitions had been filed in the High Court, challenging the 'Kolar scheme' and the Court had made interim orders staying the operation of the. scheme.\n\nIn that situation the State Transport Authority, Mysore granted to the appellant counter-signature on his permit, expressly subject to the decision of the High Court as to the validity of the scheme.\n\nOn. October 7, 1968 the High Court dismissed the said writ petitions and upheld the validity of the scheme.\n\nThereupon the State Tran.sport Authority issued a notice to the appellant to surrender the counter-signature slip and stop running the buses.\n\nThe appeJlan.t chaHenged this order in a \\vrit petition under Art. 226 of 'the Constitution. The petition being dismissed he appealed by special leave to this Court. rhe appellant contended inter alia that : (i) the counter-signature on the appeUant's pcrn1it could not be canoelled as he was an •existing permit holder' under cl. (d) of the scheme and for this purpose the crucial date \\Vas 1-1-1969 when the order under s. 68F(2) came into effect; (ii) Inter-State agreement overrides the provisions of Chapter JV-A of the Act\n\nHELD : (i) Assuming, without deciding, that the date of publication is not tbi\" appropriate date, the date on which the transp0rt undertaking\n\napplies under s. 68F(l) for a permit must be the date \\Vilh rcfernce to which the. expression \"existing permit holder\" must be interpreted. The application by the State. Transport Undertaking in. the present cases \\Vas made on March l, 1968. If this was the crucial date, the appellant was\n\nnot an \"existing permit holder\" because he did not obtain his counter signature till July 1968. [785 C-D]\n\nAbdul Gafoor v. State Mysore, [1962] I S.C.R. 909, applied.\n\nSri SatJanarayana Transports (P) Lui. Guntur v. Andhra Prades/i\n\nState Road Transport Corporation, C.A. No. 347 of 1961 dt. 30·10-1961, distinguished.\n\n(ii) Even if the crucial date be taken as January 1, 1969 as contpat v. Jagmal, (1963) Punj. L.R. 652; Amar Singh v. Stat,, of Punjab, I.L.R. [1967] 2 Punj. & Har. 120; Mam Raj v. Srate of Punjab, I.L.R. [1969] 2 Punj. & Har. 680; distinguished.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 116 and 190 to C 214 of 1968.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights; and Civil Appeals Nos. 2356 and 2357 of 1966 and 1508 to 1514 and 1471 of 1968.\n\nD Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 1, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 715 of 1963 etc.\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and Sona Bhatiani, for the petitioners (in all the petitioners) and the appellants (in C.As.\n\nNos. 1508 to 1514 of 1968).\n\nE. C. Aganval, for respondents Nos. 5 and 6 (in W.P. No. 116 of 1968) and respondent no. 5 (in W.P. Nos. 191 and 209 of 1968 and C.As. Nos. 1508 to 1514 and 1471of1968).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. The common question that arises for con- F sideration in all these writ petitions filed under Art. 32 and the civil appeals, on certificates granted by the High Court, is whether a tenant, in order to claim the right of purchase as against the landowner, under s. 18 ( l) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Act X of 1953) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), should have been in continuous ocupations of the land comprised G in his tenancy for a minimum period of six years, on the date when the Act came into force (April 15, 1953), or on the date when he files the application for purchase to the concerned authority under the Act. A subsidiary point also arises for consideration viz., whether the person who claims the right to purchase, should have been a tenant on the date when the Act came into H force.\n\nThe circumstances under which these writ petitions and appeals arose, may be briefly stated.\n\nWe shall first take up for consideration Civil Appeal No. 2356 of 1966.\n\nRespondents 2 and 3, who are the tenants under the appellant land-owner, in this appeal, filed on January 10, 1961 betore the Assistant Collector, I Grade, Fazilka, an application under s. 18 ( 1) of the Act for purchase from their land-lord 19 acres and 7 kanals of land comprised in their tenancy.\n\nTheir case was that they had been in continuous occupation of the land comprised in their tenancy for a minimum period of six years and, as such, they were entitled to purchase the land.\n\nTheir claim was resisted by the appellant land-owners on the ground that it was only those tenants who had completed a continuous period of six years of tenancy prior to the commencement of the Act who were entitled to purchase the land under s. 18 ( 1) of the Act and as the applicants did not satisfy that test, the application was not maintainable. The Assistant Collector, by his order dated March 29, 1961 over-ruled the objections of the land-owners and held that the application filed by the tenants was maintainable as similar purchase applications had been entertained without regard to ainy date of completion of six years of continuous tenancy and in this view the matter was directed to be posted for further hearing.\n\nThe appellants challenged this order of the Assistant Collector by an appeal taken before the Collector, Ferozepore. The Collector, by order dated June 9, 1961 reversed the order of the Assistant Coliector and held that no tenant who had not been in continuous possession for six years on the commencement of the Act could apply, under s.18 (1) of the Act, for purchasing the property and that the six year period should have been completed at the time the Act came into force. In this view he held that the application filed by the tenants was not maintainable.\n\nThe tenants carried the matter in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, J ullundur Division, who, by his order dated December 14, 1962 agreed with the Collector and dismissed the appeal. The tenants went in revision before the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, who, by his order dated April 24, 1963 reversed the orders of the Collector and the Additional Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner held that the right of purchase under s. 18 (1) of the Act could be exercised by a tenant whose tenancy existed on the date of the commencement of the Act and who has been in continuous occuption of the land comprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six years on the date of the application for the purchase of the land and the land has not been inCluded in the reserved area of the land-owner.\n\nThe Financial Commissioner further held that a tenant who. on\n\nthe date of the application for purchase, own or holds land exceeding the permi; s1ble area will not be entitled to purchase the land under his tenancy.\n\nAfter setting aside the orders of the Collector and the Additional Commissioner, the matters were remanded to the Assistant Collector, Fazilka, for a decision on merits.\n\nThe appellants-land owners filed Civil Writ No. 715 of 1963 in the High Court of Punjab to quash the orders of the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab.\n\nThe tenants of certain other properties had also filed applications for purchase and their landlords had filed Civil Writ No. 716 of 1963 before the Punjab High Court. Both these Civil Writ Petitions were disps ed of by common judgment of th~ High Court, dated October\n\nI, 1963. After a consideration of the scheme of the Act and in particular the provisions of s. 18, the High Court held that to have the benefit of s. 18(1) (i), the tenants must be in continuous occupation of the land under their tenancies for a period of six years on the date of making the application for purchase under that section. Accordingly the High Court agreed with the views expressed by the Financial Commissioner on this point and left open for consideration by the Assistant Collector certain other aspects that appear to have been pressed on behalf of the tenal!lts.\n\nCivil Appeals No. 2356 of 1966 and 2357 of 1966 are directed against the orders passed in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 715 and 716 of 1963 respectively.\n\nSimilarly, a group of eight civil writ petitions had been filed by other land-owners before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging the orders passed by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, upholding the right of the tenants to purchase the lands concerned. Civil Appeals Nos. 1471 of 1968 and 1508 to 1514 of 1968 are directed against the orders passed by the High Court dismissing those writ petitions.\n\nCertain other land-owners had contested the maintainability of applications filed by their tenants for purchase under s.18 (1) and had made request to the concerned authorities to stay the proceedings and await the decision of this Court in Civil Appeals No. 2356 and 2357 of 1966. Apart from questioning the maintainability of the application filed by the tenants and the jurisdiction of the authorities to entertain those applications, certain other contentions had also been taken by the landlords.\n\nStay of proceedings asked for by the land-owners was declined by the authorities and finally, by the Financhl Comm; ssioner, Revenue, by his order dated Febmary 29, 1968.\n\nAgainst this common order Writ Petitions Nos.- 116 of 1968 and 190 to 214 of 1968 have been filed, under Art. 32. In those Writ Petitions\n\nthe jurisdiction of the authorities to entertain the applications under s. 18, filed by the tenants, arises for consideration.\n\nAt the outset we may state that in all these matters we are giving our decision only regarding the interpretation of s. 18 of the Act with special reference to the points mentioned at the beginning of this judgment, and any other matters which may arise for consideration in these proceedings are left open to be :ldjudicated upon by the appropriate authorities concerned, before whom proceedings may be pending.\n\nOn behalf of the land-owners, Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar, learned counsel, after a reference to the material provisions of the Act, urged that the interpretation put on s. 18 by the High Court is agaihst the entire scheme of the statute and that such an interpretation will defeat the very object and purpose for which the Act had been passed. Counsel pointed out that the Act clearly indicated that the lands treated as surplus area were exclusively intended for being utilised for re-settlement of tenants already ejected from the land or who were liable to be ejected under s. 9 ( 1 )( i) of the Act. He further pointed out that if the test of six years' continuous occupation, dealt with under s. 18 of the Act, is considered to be satisfied with reference to the date when the application for purchase is made by a tenant, as held by the High Court, there will be a conflict between s. 10-A and s. 18.\n\nCounsel finally urged that having regard to the scheme of the Act, continuous possession for a minimum period of 6 years under s. 18 of the Act must be such possessi0t11 on the date the Act came into force viz., April 15, 1953 and tenants who did not satisfy this condition were not entitled to exercise the right of purchase under s. 18.\n\nMr. S. V. Gupte, learned counsel appearing for the tenants, on the other hand pointed out that the object of the Act was to put a ceiling on the extent of property that could be held by a tenant or a landlord and for stabilising tenancies of long duration and confer on such tenants the right of pre-emption and a right of purchase. . Counsel pointed out that the' Act did not snap the relationship of landlord .and tenant, but, on the other hand, tried to maintain the same. There was no prohibition, he pointed out, anywhere in the Act against creation of new tenancies after April 15, 1953. He further urged that the scheme of the Act clearly indicated that apart from other rights, a right of purchase was given to a tenant who was in actual polications on similar line5 against two other tenants also. After the decision of the tribunl!-1 had been given he did µot pursue the matter further which means that he abandoned his claim with regard to the lands in their tenancies. Respondent No. 1 has a holding with an area of little over 11 acres. It is incomprehensible how the appellant could seek to satis_fy the requirements of s.\n\n42(c) by demanding the entire area from respondent No. 1 alone.\n\nWe, however, do not wish to express any final opinion on the scope and ambit of s. 42(c) because we are satisfied that the appl!'.llant was not entitled to raise any ontention based on the aforesaid provision as no foundation was laid for doing so in the pleadings or at any prior stage except before the High Court. We concur in the view of the tribunal that respondent No. 1 became a statutory owner of the land in his tenancy by virtue of s. 46(1) of the Act with effect from April 1, 1961 even though he did not take steps to purchase that land from the appellant under s. 43. The operation of s. 46(1) could not be affected by the subsequent insertion of sub-s. (14-A) in s. 43 which did not have retrospective operation.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and it is dismissed. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "MADHARAO RAJESHlVAR DESHPANDE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADHARAO RAJESHWAR DESHPANDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHANKER SlNGH &: OllS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANKER SlNGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2-4, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MADHARAO RAJESHlVAR DESHPANDE\n\nSHANKER SlNGH &: OllS.\n\nFebruary 2-4, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 41, 42, 43 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 715, "end_char": 720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 838, "end_char": 846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43(14A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43(14A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1308, "end_char": 1318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468, "end_char": 1476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1692, "end_char": 1698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1702, "end_char": 1707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1, 1966 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2329, "end_char": 2335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Bombay High Court dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case is governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act (Vidhatbha & Kutch area) Act 99 of 1958 which came into force on December 30, 1958, hereinafter called \"the Act\". ,"}}, {"text": "ss. 43(14A) and 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2996, "end_char": 3017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l that he had become an owner of the said field on April 1, 1961 under s. 46 of the Act and dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3408, "end_char": 3413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Tahsildar was confirmed by the Deputy Collector (Tenancy Appeals) and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to whom the matter was taken in appeal and revision respectively."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 1, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4125, "end_char": 4138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act as originally enacted was amended by Act 2 of 1962 which came into force on March 1, 1962."}}, {"text": "Sections 38, 39 and 39A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 42 to 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5218, "end_char": 5228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5363, "end_char": 5368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act 2 of 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6157, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (c) was deleted by Act 2 of 1962 which came into force on _March l, 1962."}}, {"text": "March l, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (c) was deleted by Act 2 of 1962 which came into force on _March l, 1962."}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6213, "end_char": 6223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 19, 20, 21, 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6987, "end_char": 7005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7543, "end_char": 7548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7648, "end_char": 7653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7742, "end_char": 7752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7953, "end_char": 7963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8071, "end_char": 8081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8310, "end_char": 8315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43(14A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vidarbha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal went into the scheme of the Act and also considered the Ceiling on Holdings Act which was in force in the Vidarbha Region."}}, {"text": "ss. 46 and 49A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8941, "end_char": 8955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1,\n\n1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9633, "end_char": 9647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he did not take steps to acquire the same he still became a statutory owner of that land by virtue of s. 46 with effect from April 1,\n\n1961."}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10326, "end_char": 10332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April I, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 did not apply under the relevant provisions of the Act for purchasing the land comprising his tenancy he became an owner thereof by virtue of the provisions of s. 46(1) and no tenancy rights were left which could be deemed to have been surrendered under s. 14A which came into existence after April I, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10852, "end_char": 10860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aprill, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11034, "end_char": 11046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had become a statutory owner on Aprill, 1961 was upheld."}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 30,\n\n1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 30,\n\n1958 the appellant had no land whatever with him in his possession."}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11724, "end_char": 11732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12041, "end_char": 12049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12169, "end_char": 12177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12216, "end_char": 12223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This situation continued upto March 1, 1962 when the amending Act came iinto force."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12430, "end_char": 12435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43(14-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12446, "end_char": 12457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12713, "end_char": 12718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12829, "end_char": 12837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13859, "end_char": 13868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14370, "end_char": 14378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14502, "end_char": 14507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14526, "end_char": 14534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_815_818_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "RAMJI DAS & ORS.\n\nTRILOK CHAND ETC.\n\nFebruary 25, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nU.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction A.cl (U.P. of 1947), s. 3-Permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Ofjicer- Validity if can be challenged in suit for eviction.\n\nThe appellant-landlord applied to the Rent Control & Eviction Officer under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for a decree in ejectment against the respon dent-tenant. The officer granted the permission, holding that the need of the appellant to occupy the premises was bona fide and genuine. This order was confirmed in a revision application by the Additional Commissioner. The appellant then terminated the tenancy by notice and filed suits in the Civil Court for ejectment and arrears of rent The trial court decreed the suits, which were confirmed by the appellate court. But in second appeal, the High Court observed that it was incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider the needs of the tenant, and since he refused to consider the tenant'!I needs the permission was invalid, and the appellant's suits were liable to be diomissed. In appeal, this Court,\n\nHELD : The decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not in the suits filed by the appellant open to objection.\n\nThe proceeding under s. 3(2) before the District Magistrate or before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, who exercioes his powers as delegated under the Act, and before the Commissioner under s. 3(3) of the U.P.\n\n(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act are quasi-judicial in character. By sub-section ( 4) of s. 3 of the Act the decision of the Commissioner under suf>.s. (3) of s. 3, subject to any order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F of the Act, is declared final.\n\nThe respondent did not prefer any petition before the State Government under s. 7-F of the Act and on that account the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, exercising powers of the Commissioner under s. 3 ( 3), became final.\n\nFinality df the order declared by s. 3 ( 4) and s. 16 of the Act does not exclude the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue an appropriate writ quashing the order. But subject to interference by the High Court, the decision must be deemed final and is not liable to be cballen.ged in any collateral proceeding. [817 B-D]\n\nEven granting that the Additional Commissioner reached a wrong conclusion, the decisionwas not without jurisdiction and the only avenue for correction is the one provided by the Act, i.e. by approaching the State Goverment under s. 7-F. [817 HJ\n\nAsa Singh v. B. D. Sanwa/ & Ors. AJ.R. 1969 All. 474, held inapplicable.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE f!JRI$1)!CT!ON : Civil Appeals Nos. 1463 and 1464 of 1969\n\nSUP&EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1970] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAppeals by special leave from .the judgment and order dated January 31, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeals Nos. 1197 and 1198 of 1967.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, P. Parameswara Rao, K. C. Dua and S. M.\n\nGrover, for the appellants (in 'eoth the appeals).\n\nJ. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nA common question arises in these two appeals, and we will therefore dispose it of by this common judgment.\n\nThe appellant is the owner of a house at Shamli in District Muzaffarnagar in U.P., and the respondent is the tenant of that house.\n\nThe appellant applied to the Re.nt Control and Eviction Officer under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, for permission to file a suit for a decree in ejectment against the respondent. By order dated June 4, 1965, that Olllcer granted the permission, holding that the need of the appellant \"to occupy the premises was bona fide and genuine\". This order was confirmed in a revision application by the Additional Commissioner. The appellant then terminated the tenancy of the respondent in respect of the premises by a notice as required by\n\nlaw and filed two suits in the Court of the Munsif, Kairana, for ejectment and for payment of arrears of rent. The Trial Court a decreed the suits holding that the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was with \"jurisdiction and was not mala fide\".\n\nThe decrees were confirmed in appeal to the District Court at Muzaffarnagar, But second appeals filed by the respondent before the High Court of Allahabad were allowed and the appellant's suits were dismissed. , The High Court observed that F the only question argued before the Court related to the invalidity of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.\n\nThe High Court further observed that since a Full Bench judgment of the Court had held in Asa Singh v. B. D. Sanwal and Others(') that \"while granting permission under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the District Magistrate is bound to consider also the need of the tenant for the accommodation, if such a case is set up by him\", and it was incumbent on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider \"the needs of the tenant\" ·. before ma.king the order sanctioning institution of a suit in ejectment, and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer having \"refused to \"; onsider the needs of the tenant the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot l:?e said to be valid permission\" ..\n\nAccordingly the High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1969 All. 474.\n\nRAMJI DAS V. TRILOK CHAND (Shah, J.)\n\nSIT\n\nthe appellant's suits. With special leave, these two appeals are pre-- ferred;\n\n- The proceeding before the District Magistrate under s. 3 ( 2) and before the Commissioner under s. 3(3) of the U.P. (Temporary)' Control of Rent and Eviction Act are quasi-judicial in character.\n\nB Bys. 3(4) of the Act the decision of the Commissioner under sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 3; subject to any order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F of the Act, is declared final. The respondent did not prefer any petition before the State Government under s. 7-F of the Act' and on that account the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, exercising powers of the Commissioner under s. c 3(3), became final. Section 16 of the Act provides that no order made under the Act by the State< Government or the District Magis-· trate shall be called in question in any Court. It is true that the finality of the order d(!clared by s. 3 ( 4) and s. 16 will not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue an appropriate writ quashing the order. But subject to inteference by the High Court, the D decision must be deemed final and is not liable to be challenged in any collateral proceeding.\n\nIn our view, the High Court was in error in holding that the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was, in the suits filed by the appellant, open to the objection that the Officer did not consider the \"needs of the tenant\". The Rent Control and Eviction\n\nOfficr had jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Even if we assume that he committed an error in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the error could be corrected only in a proceeding under s. 7-F of the Act by approaching the State Government and by way of a writ petition to the High Court, but the order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and confirmed by the Additional Commissioner could not be challenged in the suit.\n\nMr. Goyal appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the validity of an order which has been made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, may be challenged in the suit. Reliance in that behalf was. placed upon Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Ram Chand & Anr.(1).\n\nBut in reaching an erroneous conclusion the Rent Control and Eviction Officer does not act in a manner contrary to the rules of natural justice. The Rem:t Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to decide the case.\n\nGranting that he reached a wrong conclusion, the decision was not without jurisdiction and the only avenue for cotrection is the one provided by the Act, i.e., by approaching the State Government under s. 7-F. If the State,\n\nen [t96SJ 3 s.c.R: 21s\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 3 S.CJl.\n\nGovernment was not moved, the order became final and was not A liable to be challenged in the suits filed by the appellant.\n\nThe decision of the AlJahabad High Court in Asa Singh's case(') has no application, for it was reached in a case in which a special appeal was filed in a proceeding arising out of a writ petition. It was apparently not a case in which the validity of the per- B mission given by the authority exercising power under s. 3 of the Act was sought to be challenged in a suit instituted by the landlord.\n\nWe need express no opinion on the question whether the High Court was right in talcing the view it has done in Asa Singh's case(').\n\nThe appeals are therefore allowed and the decree passed by C the High Court is set aside and the decree of the District Court is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals allowed,\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1969 All. 474.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "RAMJI DAS & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMJI DAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TRILOK CHAND ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TRILOK CHAND ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 25, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 25, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nU.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction A.cl (U.P. of 1947), s. 3-Permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Ofjicer- Validity if can be challenged in suit for eviction."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1382, "end_char": 1389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1555, "end_char": 1562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1677, "end_char": 1681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1747, "end_char": 1751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811, "end_char": 1815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2118, "end_char": 2122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2132, "end_char": 2137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2654, "end_char": 2658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, P. Parameswara Rao, K. C. Dua and S. M.\n\nGrover, for the appellants (in 'eoth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. Parameswara Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3029, "end_char": 3047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, P. Parameswara Rao, K. C. Dua and S. M.\n\nGrover, for the appellants (in 'eoth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, P. Parameswara Rao, K. C. Dua and S. M.\n\nGrover, for the appellants (in 'eoth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nGrover", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, P. Parameswara Rao, K. C. Dua and S. M.\n\nGrover, for the appellants (in 'eoth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3138, "end_char": 3151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3241, "end_char": 3245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nA common question arises in these two appeals, and we will therefore dispose it of by this common judgment."}}, {"text": "Shamli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3401, "end_char": 3407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the owner of a house at Shamli in District Muzaffarnagar in U.P., and the respondent is the tenant of that house."}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the owner of a house at Shamli in District Muzaffarnagar in U.P., and the respondent is the tenant of that house."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the owner of a house at Shamli in District Muzaffarnagar in U.P., and the respondent is the tenant of that house."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3591, "end_char": 3629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Court at Muzaffarnagar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decrees were confirmed in appeal to the District Court at Muzaffarnagar, But second appeals filed by the respondent before the High Court of Allahabad were allowed and the appellant's suits were dismissed. ,"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decrees were confirmed in appeal to the District Court at Muzaffarnagar, But second appeals filed by the respondent before the High Court of Allahabad were allowed and the appellant's suits were dismissed. ,"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4915, "end_char": 4947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "RAMJI DAS V. TRILOK CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMJI DAS V. TRILOK CHAND (Shah, J.)\n\nSIT\n\nthe appellant's suits."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5802, "end_char": 5834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6125, "end_char": 6129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7294, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7544, "end_char": 7549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Goyal appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the validity of an order which has been made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, may be challenged in the suit."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8283, "end_char": 8287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AlJahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8514, "end_char": 8534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the AlJahabad High Court in Asa Singh's case(') has no application, for it was reached in a case in which a special appeal was filed in a proceeding arising out of a writ petition."}}, {"text": "Asa Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the AlJahabad High Court in Asa Singh's case(') has no application, for it was reached in a case in which a special appeal was filed in a proceeding arising out of a writ petition."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_819_825_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT AT\n\nAHMED ABAD\n\nMRS. ARUNDBATI BALKRISHNA February 25, 1970.\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nWealth Tax Act (27 of 1957), ss. 1(e) (iv) and 5(1)(vii)-Receipt of share from trust funds-When 'annuity'-Jewellery intended for personal use-Whether exempt.\n\nThe assessee was an individual.\n\nShe was entitled for her life, to an aUquot share of the income arising from the funds settled on trust by three trust deeds and received payments of such share.\n\nShe also possessed jewellery, intended for her personal use, of the value of Rs. 80,000.\n\nOn the questions : ( 1) whether the payments to the assessee were annuities falling within the scope of s. 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, whose value could not be included in the computation of her net wealth; and (2) whether the value of the jewels was exempt under s. 5(1)(viii).\n\nHELD: (1) Under the trust deeds, the assessee was not entitled to any fixed sum of money. Therefore, the payments to the assessee under the trust deeds could not be considered as annuities and hence, she was not entitled to the benefit of s. 2(e)(iv). [824 B-F]\n\n. Ahmed G H. Arifj v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 19 followed Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Mr3, Dorothy Martin, (1968) 60 I.T.R. 586, approved,\n\n(2) Under. s. 5 there are four provision• dealing with jewellery, namely, (a) jewellery intended for the personal use of the assessee- •· 5(1) (viii}, (b) jewellery which forms an heir loom-s. 5(1) (xiii),\n\n(c) jewellery in the possession of any ruler-s. 5(1) (xiv); and (d) jewellery in general-s. 5(1)(xv), Under s. 5(1)(xv), as it stood in 1958-59, every assessee was entitled to deduct a sum of Rs. 25,000 from out di the value of the jewellery whether the same was intended for personal use or not; but under s. 5 (I) (viii) the value of all the jewellery intended for the personal use. of the assessee stands excluded in the computation of the net wealth Of an assessee.\n\nTherefore, the jewellery in the present case is exempt under s. S(l)(viii). [825 D, E-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1991 1992, 2010 and 2011 of 1968.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated October 9, 1967 of the Gujarat High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 3 of 1964.\n\nB. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C. A. Nos. 1991 and 1992 of 1968) and the respondent (in C. As. Nos. 2010 and 2011 of 1968).\n\nN. A. Palkhivala and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in A C. As. Nos. 1991 and 1992 of 1968) and the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 2010 and 2011 of 1968).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under s. 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) arise from a reference under s. 27(1) of the Act to the High Court of Gujarat. Therein four questions were referred to the High Court for its opinion. These four questions really gave rise to two questions of law viz. ( 1) whether under the three trust deeds referred to therein the assessee got annuities falling within .the scope of s. 2( e)\n\n(iv) ? and (2) whether the value of the jewels owned by the assessee was exempt under s. 5(l)(viii) in computing the net wealth of the assessee ?\n\nThe asseiee is an individual and the assessment years with which we are concerned in these appeals are 1957-58 and 1958- 59, the corresponding valuation dates being December 31, 1956 and December 31, 1957.\n\nBy a deed of settlement dated September 7, 1945 the father of the assessee settled certain shares of the Indian Companies of the estimated va.lue of R..s. 5,50,325/- upon trust for the benefit of his two sons and his daughter, the assessee. By another deed of settlement dated October 12, 1945 he settled certain other shares upon trust for the benefit of the assessee and her two brothers.\n\nAll the terms of the two trust deeds relevant for our present purpose are identical.\n\nBy a deed of settlement dated September 3 0, 1945, the mother-in-law of the assessee settled upon t'rust a sum of Rs. 3,88,931/- and shares of some Indian Companies of the aggregate market value of Rs. 11,81,670/-.\n\nTheassessee is one of the beneficiaries named in that deed. The assessee also possessed jewellery of the value of Rs. 80,000/-\n\nAs regards the payments to be ma.de to the assessee under the afore-mentioned three trust deeds, the contention of the assessee is that under each of those deeds, she has o'nly a right to an 'annuity' and the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lumpsum grant and hence in viow of s. 2 ( e)(iv), the value of those annuities cannot be included in the computation of her net wealth.\n\nAs regards the jewellery her case is that they are articles of her personal use and therefore their value cannot be taken into consideration in ascertaining her net wealth.\n\nShe contends that the value of those jewellery is exempt under s. 5(1)(viii). The Wealth Tax Officer rejected both those contentions and assessed her after including in her net wealth the value of the benefits receivable by her under\n\nCOMM!l. WEALTH TAX v. ARUNDHATI (Hegde, ].) 821\n\nthe trust deeds in question as well as the value of the jewellery minus Rs. 25,000/-, deduction !\\iven under s. S(l){xv) as it stood at the relevant tinle.\n\nAgainst that order the assessee went up in appeal t11 the Assistant Appellate Commissioner. That officer agreed with the conclusions reached by the Wealth Tax Officer and he accordingly dismissed the appeal of the assessee. Thereafter th• assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The. Tribunal held that the payments to be made to the assessee under the trust deed executed by her mother-in-law is an 'annuity' entitled to exemption under s. 2( e) (iv).\n\nAs regards the payments to be made to the assessee under her father's settlement deeds, it opined that as the as•essee was entitled to withdraw from the trust fund at her own discretion after she attained majority and after she gave birth to one child,. one half of the corpus, to that extent commutation was possible. Therefore to the extent of one half of the value of the annual payments to be made to her under those deeds, the assessee was not entitled to exemption under s. 2(e)(iv) but she was entitled to exemption as regards the other half.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under s. S(l)(viii) i.e. in respect of the value of the jewellery.\n\nOne a reference under s. 27(1), the High Court of Gujarat held that the payments to be made to the assessee under the three settlement deeds do not come within s. 2(e)(iv) but the value of the jewellery is exempt under s. S(l)(viii). Both the assessee as well as the Revenue have appealed against that decision.\n\nWe shall first take up the contention of the assessee that the payments to be made to her under the trust deeds are annuities which by the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lumpsum grant and hence are within the scope of s. 2(e)(iv). If those payments fall within the scope of that provision, they cannot be considered as the assets of the assessee and therefore their value cannot be reckoned in determining her net wealth under s. 2(m). Under s. 3, the charging section, only the net wealth of an assessee can be brought to tax. Hence we have to examine the terms of the settlement deeds to find out whether the benefits conferred on the assessee by any or all of those deeds can be considered as annuity.\n\nAs stated earlier the two settlement deeds executed by the father of the assessee are expressed more or less in identical language. It was conceded at the bar that whatever construction we may place on one, would be equally applicable to the other. Therefore we shall take up.the deed executed on September 7. 1945 by the father of the assessee. Under cl. 3 of that deed it is provided that the trustees, after deducting from tht it1c9me of the\n\nshares in question, all costs and expenses incurred in or about the administration of the trust, should at the end of every calendar year pay the whole residue to the assessee and her two bothers in equal shares. But after the death of the assessee her helfs are not entitled to any share in that income.\n\nTherein provision is made by the settlor for disposition of the corpus of the trust. But it is provided that notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the deed of Trust after assessee attained majority and after the birth of her first child when and so often as might be required by the assessee, the trustees are required to pay a portion of the corpus of the trust fund not exceeding in the whole one-half thereof to the assessee and this payment of the corpus was to be absolutely freed and discharged from the trust and provisions of the trust deed. The other provisions of the trust deed are not relevant for our present purpose.\n\nUnder the trust deed executed by the assessee's mother-in-law on December 30, 1945, the husband of the assessee and her two brothers-in-law were constituted as the Trustees.\n\nUnder cl. (a) of that deed, the trusts were required to pay the income of the trust fund after deducting the expenses to the assessee during her life-time. The rest of the clauses in that trust deed relate to disposition of the corpus to different beneficiaries after the life time of the assessee.\n\nIt is clear from the terms of the three trust deeds referred to earlier that the assessee had a life interest in each of those funds.\n\nFurther under the trust deeds executed by her father, she was also entitled to a portion of the corpus under certain circumstances.\n\nThe question for decision is whether the benefits obtained by the assessee under those deeds can be held to come within s. 2(e)(iv).\n\nThe expression \"annuity\" is not defined in the Act. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 32 at p. 534 (paragraph 899), the meaning of the. word \"annuity\" is explained thus :\n\n\"An annuity is a certain sum of money payable yearly either as a personal' obligation of the grantor or out of property not consisting exclusively of land.\" In Jarman on Wills at p. 1113 \"annuity\" is defined thus :\n\n\"An annuity is a right to receive de anno in annum a certain sum; that may be given for life, or for a series of years; it may be given during any particular period, or in perpetuity; and there is also this singularity about annuities, that, although payable out of the personal assets they are capable of being given for the purpose of devo'. lution, as real estate; they may be given to a man and his heirs, and may go to the heir as real estate.\"\n\n' •\n\nA In Williams on Executors and Administrators \"annuity\" is described as a yearly payment of a certain fixed sum of money granted for life or for years charging the person of the grantor only.\n\nIn Bignold v. Giles,('), Kindersley V. C. described \"annuity\" in these words :\n\n\"An annuity is a right to receive de anno in annum a certain sum; that may be given for life, or for a series of years; it may be given during any particular period, or in perpetuity; and there is also this singularity about annuities, that alth.ough payable out of the personal assets, they are ca12able of being given for the purpose of devolution, as real estate; they may be given to a man and his heirs, and may go to the heir as real estate-- so an annuity may be given to a man and the heirs of his body; that does not, it is true, constitute an estate tail, but that is by reason of the Statute De Donis, which contains only the word 'tenements', and an annuity, though a hereditament, is 11ot a tenement; and an annuity so given is a base fee.\"\n\nProceeding further the learned judge observed :-\n\n\"But this appears to me at least clear; that if the gift of what is called an annuity is so made, that, on the face of the will itself, the testator shows his intention to give a certain portion of the dividends of a fund, that is a very different thing; and most of the cases proceed on that footing.\n\nThe ground is, that the Court construes the intention of the testator to be, not merely to give an annuity, but to give an aliquot portion of the income arising from a certain capital fund.\" illustrations of annuity given in s. 173 of the Indian Succession Act also show that it is a right to receive a specified sum and not an aliquot share in the income arising from any fund or property. Ordinarily an annuity is a money payment of a fixed sum annually made and is a charge personally on the grantor.\n\nOn an analysis of the relevant clauses in three trust deeds, it is clear the assessee wrui given thereunder a share of the income arising from the funds settled on trust. Under those deeds she is .not entitled to any fixed sum ofmq.ney. Therefore it is not possible to hold that the payments that she is entitled to receive under those deeds are annuities. She has undoubtedly a life interest in those funds. In Ahmed G. H. Arif! v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta('), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the right of a person to receive under a wakf an aliquot\n\n(I) (1859) Ch. 4 Drew 345; (Revised Reports 113 p. 390).\n\n(2) 59. I.T.R. 230.\n\n:share of the net income of the wakf property is an 'asset' within .the meaning of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and the capital value of such a right is assessable to wealth tax.\n\nTherein the Court repelled the contention that the right in question was an 'annuity'.\n\nTbis decision was approved by this CQurt in Ahmed G. H. A riff & Ors. v. Commr. of Wealth Tax, Calcutta(') and the same is bind ing on us.\n\nA similar view was taken by another Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v.\n\nMrs.\n\nDorothy Martin.(').\n\nIn that case under the will of the assessee's father the assessee was entitled to receive for her life the annual interest accruing upon her share in the residuary trust fund. The Wealth Tax Officer included the entire value of the said share in the assessable wealth of the assessee and subjected the same to tax under s. 16(3) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. That order was confirmed by the Assistant Appellate Commissioner but the Tri bunal in appeal excluded the same in the computation of the net wealth of the assessee. On a reference made to the High Court, it was held that on a construction of the various clauses in the will, the assessee was entitled to an aliquot share in the general income of the residuary trust fund and not a fixed sum payable periodically as \"annuity\" and, te.refore, the value of her share was an asset to be included in computing his net wealth. These decisions in our view correctly lay down the legal position. In this view it is not necessary to consider whether the income receivable by the assessee under those deeds either wholly or in part is capable of being commuted into a lumpsum grant.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above we agree with the High Court that payments to be made to the assessee under the three trust deeds cannot be considered as annuities and hence she is not entitled to the benefit of s. 2(e)(iv).\n\nThis takes us to the question whether the High Court was F right in its view that the value of the assessee's jewellery should not be taken into consideration in determininz her net wealth.\n\nThe Tribunal has taken the view and the High Court has agreed with that view that the jewellery in question are articles intended for the personal use of the assessee. As mentioned earlier those jewels were valued at Rs. 80,000/ -; out of that amount Wealth tax Officer deducted Rs. 25,000/ • Ullder s. 5(l)(xv). The asses G see claims that in view of s. 5(1)(viii), the value of those jewels cannot be included in the computation of her net wealth. Section 5(1 )(viii) reads: · \"5. (1) Wealth-tax shall not be payable by the assessee in respect of the following assets, and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assesee- H\n\n(1) [197.J] 2 S.C.R. 19.\n\n(2) [1968] 69, J.T.R. 586.\n\n(viii) furniture, household utensils, wearing apparel, provisions and other articles intended for the personal or household use of the assessee.\"\n\nThere is no dispute that the jewels in question were :intended for the personal use of the assessee; but it is said on behalf of the revenue that s. 5 (1 )(viii) does not apply to jewels as those articles are specifically provided for under s. 5(1)(xv). On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the assessee that s. 5(1)(xv) deals with jewellery which are not intended for personal use of the assessee such as heirloom or other jewellery which are retained as valuable assets or intended for the use of persons other than the assessee whereas s. 5(l)(viii) takes in only such jewellery as are intended for personal use of the assessee. We think the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee is the correct one. It is well known that the jewellery is widely used as articles of personal use by the ladies in this country specially by those belonging to the richer classes. That being so jewellery intended for the personal use of the assessee comes within the scope of s. 5(1 )(viii). But the jewellery mentioned in s. 5 ( 1 )(xv) need not be articles intended for personal use of the assessee. That provision deals with jewellerv\n\nin general. The two provisions deal with different classes of jeweflery. That is made further clear by s. 5(1)(xiii) which says that Wealth Tax shall not be payable by assessee in respect of any drawings, paintings, photographs, prints and other heirloom not falling within cl. (xii) and not intended for sale but not including jewellery. If the contention that the jewellery is exclusively dealt with by s. 5 ( l)(xv) is correct then there was no occasion for the legislature to refer to jewellery in s. 5(1)(xiii). From an analysis of the various provisions in s. 5, it appears to us that therein there are four provisions dealing with jewellery viz. ( 1 ) jewellery intended for personal use of the assessee-s. 5(1 )(viii); (2) jewellery that is heirloom-s. 5(1)(xiii); (3) jewellery in the possession of any ruler-s. 5(1)(xiv) and (4) jewellery in general-s. 5(1)(xv).\n\nUnder s. 5(1)(xv) as it stood at the relevant time every assessee was entitled deduct a sum of Rs. 25 ,000/- from out of the value of the jewellery in her possession whether the same was intended for her personal use or not but under s. 5(1 )(yjjj) the value ot all the jewellery intended for the personal use of the assessee stands excluded in the computation of the net wealth of an assessee.\n\nF?r th~ reasons. mentioned aove we think the High Court was nght m answenng the question relating to the value of the jewellery in favour of the assessee.\n\nIn the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed-no costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nLIOSup Cl/70-8", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT AT\n\nAHMED ABAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MRS. ARUNDBATI BALKRISHNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MRS. ARUNDHATI BALKRISHNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 25, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 95, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARUNDBATI BALKRISHNA February 25, 1970."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 1(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696, "end_char": 707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 715, "end_char": 735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1121, "end_char": 1132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 19", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1205, "end_char": 1223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1569, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1632, "end_char": 1643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1831, "end_char": 1835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C. A. Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C. A. Nos."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. K. Aiyar and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C. A. Nos."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in A C. As."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2469, "end_char": 2481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in A C. As."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2645, "end_char": 2650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under s. 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) arise from a reference under s. 27(1) of the Act to the High Court of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2824, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.\n\nThese appeals by certificate under s. 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) arise from a reference under s. 27(1) of the Act to the High Court of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "s. 2( e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3199, "end_char": 3212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "September 7, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of settlement dated September 7, 1945 the father of the assessee settled certain shares of the Indian Companies of the estimated va.lue of R..s. 5,50,325/- upon trust for the benefit of his two sons and his daughter, the assessee."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3619, "end_char": 3623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "October 12, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3744, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By another deed of settlement dated October 12, 1945 he settled certain other shares upon trust for the benefit of the assessee and her two brothers."}}, {"text": "September 3 0, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3975, "end_char": 3994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of settlement dated September 3 0, 1945, the mother-in-law of the assessee settled upon t'rust a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2( e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5776, "end_char": 5784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6269, "end_char": 6280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7061, "end_char": 7072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7270, "end_char": 7277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 7. 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7846, "end_char": 7863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore we shall take up.the deed executed on September 7."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 30, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the trust deed executed by the assessee's mother-in-law on December 30, 1945, the husband of the assessee and her two brothers-in-law were constituted as the Trustees."}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9900, "end_char": 9907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn."}}, {"text": "Jarman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10169, "end_char": 10175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jarman on Wills at p. 1113 \"annuity\" is defined thus :\n\n\"An annuity is a right to receive de anno in annum a certain sum; that may be given for life, or for a series of years; it may be given during any particular period, or in perpetuity; and there is also this singularity about annuities, that, although payable out of the personal assets they are capable of being given for the purpose of devo'."}}, {"text": "Kindersley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10899, "end_char": 10909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bignold v. Giles,('), Kindersley V. C. described \"annuity\" in these words :\n\n\"An annuity is a right to receive de anno in annum a certain sum; that may be given for life, or for a series of years; it may be given during any particular period, or in perpetuity; and there is also this singularity about annuities, that alth.ough payable out of the personal assets, they are ca12able of being given for the purpose of devolution, as real estate; they may be given to a man and his heirs, and may go to the heir as real estate-- so an annuity may be given to a man and the heirs of his body; that does not, it is true, constitute an estate tail, but that is by reason of the Statute De Donis, which contains only the word 'tenements', and an annuity, though a hereditament, is 11ot a tenement; and an annuity so given is a base fee.\""}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12287, "end_char": 12293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12301, "end_char": 12322, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13065, "end_char": 13084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta('), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the right of a person to receive under a wakf an aliquot\n\n(I) (1859) Ch."}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13319, "end_char": 13339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14086, "end_char": 14094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14102, "end_char": 14122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15110, "end_char": 15121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15667, "end_char": 15680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1 )(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15765, "end_char": 15784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16308, "end_char": 16312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16403, "end_char": 16414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16477, "end_char": 16488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16707, "end_char": 16720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1 )(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17183, "end_char": 17187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xiii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17402, "end_char": 17415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17704, "end_char": 17708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xiii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17801, "end_char": 17814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17862, "end_char": 17866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1 )(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18010, "end_char": 18024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xiii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18057, "end_char": 18070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xiv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18179, "end_char": 18190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1 )(yjjj)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18407, "end_char": 18421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_826_829_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "GOPI KRISHNA KANORIA\n\nDRAUPADI SAHAYA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 23, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nBihar Tenancy Act, 1885, ss. 10, 155 and 178(1)(c)-Bihar Land Re- .forms Act, 1950--Mokurrari tenure held under registered document prior to Act of 1885---0n failure to observe conditions of tenure under the instrument notice given for cancellation of tenure and suit filed }or ejectnient,,.-Bihar Act of 1950 vesting tenure in State-Whether clai1n of proprietor to full compensation lay when hi~ notice of cancellation of tenure did not comply with terms of s. 155 of 1885 Act-Effect of ss. 10 and 178(1)(c).\n\nThe respondents held from the appellant certain land on Mokurrari tenure (permanent lease) created under a registered instrument dated •October 29, 1885. According to the said document the proprietor was <:ompetent to cancel the lease in the event of a default in the payment of\n\nfour successive kists by the tenure holder.\n\nOn the failure of the respondents to pay four successive kists the appellant on June 22, 1953 served on them a notice terminating and cancelling the Mokurrari tenure. During the pendency of the suit which was filed by the appellant in September Il953 it was declared that the Mokurrari tenure became vested in the State of Bihar with effect from July 26, 1954 under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.\n\nThe plaint was amended and certain parties were added. The appellant claimed that he was entitled to the entire compensation which was tO be received from the State. The trial court held that on account of the failure df the appellant to give a notice to the respondents under s. 155 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 the respondeqts continued to be the tenure holders till the tenure vested in the State and therefore the appellant was not entitled to the full compensation.\n\nThe High Court upheld the order of the trial court. In appeal by certificate the appellant relied on s. 10 of the Act which it was claimed made -s. 155 inapplicable, in a case like the present, where the contract was made before the Act of 1885.\n\nHELD : Section 10 simply provides tnat the holder of a permanent tenure shall not be ejected except on the ground that he has broken a condition on breach of which he is liable to be ejected under the terms of\n\nthe contract. Section 178 ( 1 )( c) says categorically that even though the contract has been made before the passing of the Act the landlord cannot eject a tenant otherwise' than in accordance with its provisions. Section 155 places a bar against a suit being entertained unless the requirements laid down therein have been satisfied. Therefore even though under s. IO G the appellant became entitled to eject the respondents on account of the breach of the condition relating to payment of rent the condition prece dent for a suit being entertained by a court was the notice served in the prescribed manner speci'fying the breach v.rhich was capable of remedy and in which the tenant should have been required to remedy the same or in any case to pay reasonable compensation for the breach.\n\nIf the tenant had failed to comply within a reasonable time with that request then alone the suit was maintainable.\n\nEven if under the proviso to .s. 10 the H contract which was entered into before the commencement of the Act could contain conditions which \\Vere inconsistent with the provisions of the Act that did not dispense with the requirements of s. 155 of the Act\n\nA which had to be satisfied before any suit could be entertained.\n\nAs the notice which had been served by the appellant did not comply with the provisions of s. 155 the courts below rightly negatived his claim to the entire compensation nioru:y. (829 C-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 27, 1961 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 459 of 1956.\n\nB. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No. 1.\n\nU. P. Singh, for respondent No. 11.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate against a judg ment of the Patna High Court in a suit instituted by the appellant for arrears of Mokurrari rent and cess with interest for four kists ·\n\nand for khas possession by evicting the respondents. In the alternative the appellant asked for the payment of compensation money in respect of Mokurrari tenure which had vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950.\n\nBy means of a registered instrument dated October 29, 1885 the then proprietor of four villages had created a Mokurrari tenure (permanent lease) in favour of Frederick Richard Simson and George Venes.\n\nThe appellant had acquired the proprietory in terest in the villages by purchase and similarly the respondents had acquired the Mokurrari tenure. In the registered instrument there WaS a clause that in the {!Vent Of a default in payment of four SUCcessive kists the proprietor would be competent to cancel the Mokurrari patta.\n\nThe respondents did not pay four successive kists which had become due in June 1952, September 1952, December 1952 and March 1953. On June 22, 1953 the appellant served a notice terminating and cancelling the Mokurrari tenure in terms of .the c.lause relating to cancellation. During the pendency of the smt which was filed by the appellant in September 1953 it was declared that the Mokurrari tenure became vested in\n\nte State of Bih:Uwith effect from July 26, 1954 under the provisions of the B1har Land Reforms Act 1950.\n\nThe plaint was amended and certain parties were added.\n\nThe controversy was mainly confined to the question of pavment of compensation.\n\nAccording to the appellant he was entitled to the entire compensation which was to be received from\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1970) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA the State.\n\nThe respondents maintained that no notice had been given under s. 155 of the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885, hereinafter called the \"Act\", and, therefore, the appellant could not sue for ejectment. Before the trial court it was admitted that the appellant did not serve a notice as contemplated under s. 155 of the Act. It was, however, contended that section was not applicable.\n\nThe trial court found that there had been a breach of the covenant B relating to payment of rent which had resulted in forfeiture but inasmuch as the appellant did not follow the procedure prescribed by s. 155 the respondents continued to be the tenure-holders till the tenure vested in the State. The appellant was, therefore, not entitled to the entire compensation money including tht of the tenure. The High Court upheld the decision of the trial court on C the point.\n\nSection 10 of the Act is in the following terms :\n\n\"A holder of a permanent tenure shall not be ejected by his landlord except on the ground that he has broken a condition on breach of which he is, under the terms of a contract between him and his landlord, liable to be ejected: Provided that where the contract is made after the commencement of this Act, the condition is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nSection 178(l)(c) provides that nothing in any contract between a landlord and a tenant made before or after the passing of the Act shall entitle a landlord to eject a tenant otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 155(1) may also be reproduced.\n\n\"A suit for the ejectment of tenllillt, on the ground- ( a) ............................... .\n\n(b) that he has broken a condition on breach of which he is, under the terms of a contract between him and the landlord, liable to ejectment,\n\nShall not be entertained unless the landlords has served, in the prescribed manner, a notice on the tenant specifying the particular misuse or breach complained of, and where the misuse or breach is capable of remedy, requiring the tenant to remedy the same, and, in any case, to pay reasonable compensation for the misuse or breach, and the tenAnt has failed to comply within a reasonable time with that request.\"\n\nIt has been contended by Mr. B. Sen for the appellant that by virtue of the proviso to s. 10 the requirement of consistency\n\nof conditions with the provisions of the Act is limited to contracts made after the commencement of the .Act. In the present case the registered instrument was executed before the commencement of the Act. On a true construction of s. 10 and by necessary implication this freedom from the applicability of or consistency with the provisions of the Act is absolute and unqualified and the effect of the proviso is that any condition imposed by any of the provisfons of the Act is excluded whenever there is a case where the contract has been entered jnto before the commencement of the Act. It has been i; mphasised that s. 10 is a specific provisio11 relating to permanent tenures and it cannot be restricted or curtailed. by the general provisions of s. 178 ands. 155 of the Act.\n\nIn this manner the applicability-of s. 155 has been sought to be excluded.\n\nNow s. 10 simply provides that the holder of a permanent tenure shall n.ot be ejected except on the ground that he has broken a condition on breach of which he is liable to be ejected under the teims of the contract. Section 17 8(1 )( c) says categorically that even tho_ugh the contract has been made before the passing of the Act the landlord cannot eject a tenant otherwise than in accordance with its provisions. Section 155 places a bar against a suit being entertained unless the requirements laid down therein have been satisfied.\n\nTherefore even though under s. 10 the appellant became entitled to eject the respondents on account of the breach of the condition relating to paYITlent of rent the condition precedent for a suit being entertained by a court was the notice served in the prescribed manner specifying the breach which was capable of remedy and in which the tenant should have been required to remedy the same or in any case to pay reasonable compensation for the breach. If the tenant had failed to comply within a reasonable time with that request then alone the suit was maintainable. Even if under the proviso to s. 10 the contract which was entered into before .the commencement of the Act could contain conditions which were inconsistent with the provisions of the Act that did not dis!Jense with the requirements of s. 155 of !he Act whic_h .had to be satisfied before any suit could be entertmed. As the notice which had been served by the appellant did not comply with the provisions of s. 155 the courts below rightly negatived his claim to the entire compensation money.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismis8ed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "GOPI KRISHNA KANORIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOPI KRISHNA KANORIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DRAUPADI SAHAYA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DRAUPADI SAHAYA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 23, 1970\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 10, 155 and 178(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 573, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 178(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "June 22, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1030, "end_char": 1043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the failure of the respondents to pay four successive kists the appellant on June 22, 1953 served on them a notice terminating and cancelling the Mokurrari tenure."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1273, "end_char": 1278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the suit which was filed by the appellant in September Il953 it was declared that the Mokurrari tenure became vested in the State of Bihar with effect from July 26, 1954 under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "July 26, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the suit which was filed by the appellant in September Il953 it was declared that the Mokurrari tenure became vested in the State of Bihar with effect from July 26, 1954 under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1338, "end_char": 1366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 1994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2315, "end_char": 2326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3242, "end_char": 3247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3626, "end_char": 3632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the notice which had been served by the appellant did not comply with the provisions of s. 155 the courts below rightly negatived his claim to the entire compensation nioru:y. (829 C-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 27, 1961 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "U. S. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "Santok Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3996, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant c Sarjoo Prasad, U. S. Prasad, Santok Singh and U. P. Singh,\n\nfor respondent No."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGrover, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by certificate against a judg ment of the Patna High Court in a suit instituted by the appellant for arrears of Mokurrari rent and cess with interest for four kists ·\n\nand for khas possession by evicting the respondents."}}, {"text": "October 29, 1885", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4611, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By means of a registered instrument dated October 29, 1885 the then proprietor of four villages had created a Mokurrari tenure (permanent lease) in favour of Frederick Richard Simson and George Venes."}}, {"text": "Frederick Richard Simson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By means of a registered instrument dated October 29, 1885 the then proprietor of four villages had created a Mokurrari tenure (permanent lease) in favour of Frederick Richard Simson and George Venes."}}, {"text": "George Venes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By means of a registered instrument dated October 29, 1885 the then proprietor of four villages had created a Mokurrari tenure (permanent lease) in favour of Frederick Richard Simson and George Venes."}}, {"text": "Land Reforms Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5600, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 6015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6209, "end_char": 6215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "Section 178(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7189, "end_char": 7206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8475, "end_char": 8480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8863, "end_char": 8868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8995, "end_char": 9001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9318, "end_char": 9328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9668, "end_char": 9673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10238, "end_char": 10243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10444, "end_char": 10450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10617, "end_char": 10623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_830_836_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "MATHURA PRASAD BAJOO JAISWAL & ORS.\n\nDOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY\n\nFebruary 26, 1970\n\n(J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] B\n\nCode of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), s. 11-Jurisdiction of Court-Erroneous decision-If res judicata.\n\nThe appellant obtained lease of an open land for constructioµ of buildings.\n\nAfter the constructions, the appellant applied 'for determination of standard rent under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.\n\nThe application was rejected holding that the provi C sions of the Act did not apply to open land let for construction. This view \\ras confirmed by the High Court. Sometime thereafter in another case the High Court held that the question whether the provisions of the Act applied to any particular lease must be determined on its terms and a building lease in respect of an open plot was not excluded from the provisions of the Act solely because open land may be used from residence or educational purposes only after a structure is built thereon.\n\nRelying upon this judgment, 1hc appellant filed a fresh application for determining the D standard rent. The Trial Judge rejected the, application holding that question of the applicability of the Act was res judicata since it had been finally decided by the High Court between the same paq.ies in respect of the same land in the earlier proceeding for fixation of standard rent.\n\nThe order was confiimed by first appellate court and on further appeal by the High Court.\n\nHELD : The judgment did not operate as res judicata.\n\nA question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision o'f the Court.\n\nIf by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the decision will not, operate as res judicata.\n\nSimilarly by an erroneous\n\n0decision if the Cotirt assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the decision will not operate as res judicata be hrcen the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent F litigation is the same or other\\vise.\n\nIn determining the application of the rule of res judicnta the court is not concerned \\vith the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment.\n\nThe matter in issue. if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier pro ceedins by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened.\n\nA nlixed question o'f law and fact determined in the earlier ptoceeding be G t\\\\een the same parties may not, for the me reason, bequestioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression ''the matter in issue\" in s. 11, Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e., the facts on which the right is claimed ot denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue.\n\nWhere. however, the question is one purely of la\\\\' and it rcb.tes to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning: son1ething which is illegal, by resort to the rule o'f res H judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of th.at order because of the rule of res judicata. for a rule of procedure can.not supersede the law of the land.\n\nIf the decision in the previous proceeding be regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule elf law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, in derogation of the rule declared by the 'Legislature. f835G-836 Fl\n\nParllzasardhi Ayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar, I.LR. 5 Mad. 304, Chamanlal v. Bapubhai, I.LR. 22 Born. 669, Kanta Devi v. Kalalvati, A.LR. 1946 Lah. 419, Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Keda1 Nath Haldar, I.LR. 56 Cal. 723, and Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd.\n\nv. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, 1926 A.C. 94, approved.\n\nChandi Prasad v. Maharaja Mahendra Mahrndra Singh, I.L.R. 23 All. 5, disapproved.\n\nBindeshwari Charan Singh v. Bagesl11vari, Charan Singh, L.R. 63 I.A. 53, doubted._\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1061 and 1627 to 1629 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 9, 10, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Revision Applications Nos. 1428, 1427, 1430 and 1676 of 1961.\n\nM. C. Chagla, J. L. Hathi, K. L. Hathi and K. N. Bhat for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nR. P. Bhat, Janendra Lal, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nUnder an indenture dated August 2, 1950, Dossibai-respondent in this appeal-granted a lease of 555 sq. yards in village Pahadi, Taluka Borivli to Mathura Prasad-appellant herein-for constructing buildings for residential or business purposes. The appellant constructed buildings on the land. He then submitted an application in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, District Thana, that the standard rent of the land be determined under s. 11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The Civil Judge rejected the application holding that the provisions of .the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947, did not apply to open land let for constructing buildings for residence, education, business, trade or storage.\n\nThis order was confirmed on September 28, 1955, by a si, ngle Judge of the Bombay High Court in a group of revision applications : Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeeblwv\n\nv. Hi11goo Manohar Missar: Nos. 233 to 242 of 1955.\n\nBut in Vinayak Gopa/ Limaye v. Laxman Kashinath Athavale(1) the High Court of Bombay held that the question whether s. 6(1) 0f\n\nthe Act applies to any particular lease must be determined on its terms and a building lease in respect of an open plot is not exduded from s. 6(1) of the Act solely because open land may be A used for residence or educational purposes only after a structure is built thereon. Relying upon this judgment, the appellant filed a fresh petition in the Court of the Small Causes, Bombay, for an order determining the standard rent of the premises. The application was filed in the Court of Small Causes because the area in which the land was situated had since been included within the• B limits of the Greater Bombay area. The Trial Judge rejected the application holding that the question whether to an open piece of land let for the purpose of constructing buildings for residence. education, business or trade s. 6 ( 1) of the Act applied was res judicata since it had been finally decided by the High Court between the same parties in respect of the same land in the earlier proceeding for fixation of standard rent. The order was confirm- C ed by a Bench of the Court of Small Causes and by the High Court of Bombay. With special leave, the appellant has appealed to this Court.\n\nThe view expressed by the High Court of Bombay in Mrs.\n\nDossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Hingoo Manohar Missar (Civil) Revision Application No. 233 of 1955 (decided on September 28,\n\n1955) was overruled by this Court in Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jee; eebhoy v. Khemchand Gorumal & Others('). In the latter case the Court affirmed the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Vinayak Gopal Limaye's case(2 ).\n\nBut all the Courts have held that the earlier decision of the High Court of Bombay between the same parties and relating to the same land is res judicata.\n\nSection 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enacts the general rule of res judicata, insofar as it is relevant, provides :\n\n\"No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter ilirectly and substantially in issue has been ilirectly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title, in a Court comtent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.\" The Civil Judge, J uni()r Division, Borivli, was competent to try the application for determination of standard rent, and he held thats. 6(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, did not apply to open land let for construction of residential and business premises.\n\nThe rule of res judicata applies if \"the matter directly and substantially in issue\" in a suit or proceeding was ilirectly and sub-\n\nstantially in issue in the previous suit between the same parties and had been heard and finally decided by a competent ort.\n\nThe Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, dcided the applcat!on\n\nbetween the parties to the present procec:dmg for detenrunation of standard rent in respect of. the ame p1ec: of land let for con struction of buildings for res1denllal or busmess purposes. The High Court has held that a decision of a comtent Court may operate as res judicata in respect of not only an lSSUe of fact, but mixed issues of Jaw and fact and even abstract questions of law.\n\nIt was also assumed by the High Court that a decision relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to ntertain or not to e1_1teain a proceeding is binding and conclusive between these parlles m res pect of the same question in a later proceeding.\n\nBut the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of pro cedure : it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties s<:> as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of Jaw and fact and relating to the right in dispute bet ween the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in an other proceeding between the same parties : the \"matter in issue\" may be an issue of fact, an issue of JaW, or me of mixed law and fact.\n\nAn issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be re-0pened between them in another proceeding.\n\nThe previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata : the reasons for the decision are not res judicata.\n\nA matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claimof right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto.\n\nA pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the deterniination of the transaction which is the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transactions which is the source of 'the right is res judlcata.\n\nA previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision : the decision of law cannot be dissociated_ rom the decision on facts on which the right is founded.- A decJS10n on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor\n\nwhen the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.\n\nThe authorities on the question whether a decision on a question of law operates as res judicata disclose widely differing views.\n\nIn some cases it was decided that a decision on a question of law can never be res judicata in a subsequent proceedimg between the same parties : Parthasardhi Ayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar('); Chamanlai v. Bapubhai('); and Kanta Devi v. Kalawati( 3 ).\n\nOn the other hand Aikman, J., in Chandi Prasad v. Maharaja Mahendra Mahendra Singh(') held that a decision on a question of law is always res judicata.\n\nBut as observed by Rankin, C.J., in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haldar(') :\n\n\"Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with as though they were all the same. Questions of procedure, questions affecting jurisdiction, questions of limitation, may all be questions of law. In such questions the rights of parties are not the only matter for consideration.\"\n\nWe may analyse the illustrative cases relating to questions of law, decisions on which may be deemed res judicata in subsequent proceeding. In Bindeshwari Charan Singh v.\n\nBageshwari Charan Singh( 6 ) the Judicial Committee held that a decision of a court in a previous suit between the same parties that s. I 2A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act 6 of 1876 which renders void a trainsaction to which it applies was inappljcable, was res judicata.\n\nIn that case the owner of an impartible estate, after his estate was\n\nreleaed from management, executed a maintenance grant in favour of his minor son B, but without the sanction of the Commissioner as required by s. l 2A of the Act. B on attaining majority sued his father and brothers for a maintenance grant at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per annum.\n\nThe claim was decreed, and the plaintiff was awarded a decree for a grant of Rs. 4,000 inclusive of the previous grant of 1909, and the Court held that the grant of 1909 was valid in law.\n\nThe father implemented the decree and made an additional maintenance grant upto the value of the decreed sum. In an action by the sons of B's brothers challenging the two grants on the plea that the grants were illegal and not binding upon them, the Judicial Committee held that the plea was barred as res judicata in respect of both the grants-in respect of the first because there was an express decision on the validity of the first grant in the earlier suit, and in respect of the second the\n\n(I) I.LR. 5 Mad. 304.\n\n(2) I.LR. 22 Born. 669.\n\n(3) A.LR. [1946] Lah. 419.\n\n(4) I.LR. 23 All. 5.\n\n(5) l.L.R. 56 Cal. 723.\n\n(6) LR. 63 I.A. 53. ·\n\ndecision in the first suit was res judicata as to the validity of the second grant which was made in fulfilment of the obligation under the Court's decision. The Judicial Committee held that in respect of the first grant, the decision that s. 12A did not apply to the grant, was res judicata, and in respect of the second grant the construction between the same parties of s. 12A was res judicata.\n\nValidity of the second grant was never adjudicated upon in any previous suit; the second grant was held valid because between the parties it was decided that to the grant of maintenance of an impartible zamindari s. 12A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act had no application. This part of the judgment of the Judicial Committee is open to doubt.\n\nWhere the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties : Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee's case('). It is ol:!vious.that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different.\n\nIn a case relating to levy of tax a decision valuing property or determining liability to tax in a different taxable period or event is biinding only in that period or event, and is not binding in the subsequent years, and therefore the rule of res judlcata has no application; see Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill(').\n\nA question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. Rankin, C.J., observed in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee's case(') :\n\n\"The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has been finally decided.\"\n\nA question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata.\n\nSimilarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata bet-\n\n(l) l.L.R. 56 Cal. 723.\n\n(2) [1926] A.C. 94.\n\nween the same parties,_ whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.\n\nIt is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicota the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment.\n\nThe matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subseguent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened.\n\nA mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding betwe.en the same parties where the cause of actiqn is the same, for the expression \"the matter in issue\" in s. 11 Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between -the parties, i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination -Of that issue.\n\nWhere, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or .a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule -Of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.\n\nIn the present case the decision of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent, is, in view of the judgment of this Court, plainly erroneous : see Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy v. Khemchand Gorumal & Others('). If the decision in the previous proceeding be regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature.\n\nThe appeals are allowed, and the orders passed by the High Court and the Court of Small Causes are set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the Court of First Instance to deal with and dispose them of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs throughout.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 928.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "MATHURA PRASAD BAJOO JAISWAL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MATHURA PRASAD BAJOO JAISWAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY\n\nFebruary 26, 1970\n\n(J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 424, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2762, "end_char": 2785, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 63 I.A. 53", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, J. L. Hathi, K. L. Hathi and K. N. Bhat for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, J. L. Hathi, K. L. Hathi and K. N. Bhat for the appellants (in all the appeals).", "canonical_name": "J. L. Hathi"}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4394, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, J. L. Hathi, K. L. Hathi and K. N. Bhat for the appellants (in all the appeals).", "canonical_name": "J. L. Hathi"}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, J. L. Hathi, K. L. Hathi and K. N. Bhat for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. P. Bhat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Bhat, Janendra Lal, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Janendra Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Bhat, Janendra Lal, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gagrat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Bhat, Janendra Lal, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Bhat, Janendra Lal, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nUnder an indenture dated August 2, 1950, Dossibai-respondent in this appeal-granted a lease of 555 sq."}}, {"text": "Dossibai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4659, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J.\n\nUnder an indenture dated August 2, 1950, Dossibai-respondent in this appeal-granted a lease of 555 sq."}}, {"text": "Taluka Borivli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "yards in village Pahadi, Taluka Borivli to Mathura Prasad-appellant herein-for constructing buildings for residential or business purposes."}}, {"text": "Mathura Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "yards in village Pahadi, Taluka Borivli to Mathura Prasad-appellant herein-for constructing buildings for residential or business purposes."}}, {"text": "Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, District Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4950, "end_char": 5016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then submitted an application in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, District Thana, that the standard rent of the land be determined under s. 11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 28, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5430, "end_char": 5448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was confirmed on September 28, 1955, by a si, ngle Judge of the Bombay High Court in a group of revision applications : Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeeblwv\n\nv. Hi11goo Manohar Missar: Nos."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was confirmed on September 28, 1955, by a si, ngle Judge of the Bombay High Court in a group of revision applications : Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeeblwv\n\nv. Hi11goo Manohar Missar: Nos."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5682, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Vinayak Gopa/ Limaye v. Laxman Kashinath Athavale(1) the High Court of Bombay held that the question whether s. 6(1) 0f\n\nthe Act applies to any particular lease must be determined on its terms and a building lease in respect of an open plot is not exduded from s. 6(1) of the Act solely because open land may be A used for residence or educational purposes only after a structure is built thereon."}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5734, "end_char": 5741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5886, "end_char": 5893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Court of the Small Causes, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6095, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon this judgment, the appellant filed a fresh petition in the Court of the Small Causes, Bombay, for an order determining the standard rent of the premises."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6353, "end_char": 6359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was filed in the Court of Small Causes because the area in which the land was situated had since been included within the• B limits of the Greater Bombay area."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 28,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "233 of 1955 (decided on September 28,\n\n1955) was overruled by this Court in Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jee; eebhoy v. Khemchand Gorumal & Others(')."}}, {"text": "Vinayak Gopal Limaye", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7295, "end_char": 7315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the latter case the Court affirmed the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Vinayak Gopal Limaye's case(2 )."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7526, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, J uni()r Division, Borivli", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Civil Judge, J uni()r Division, Borivli, was competent to try the application for determination of standard rent, and he held thats. 6(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, did not apply to open land let for construction of residential and business premises."}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8612, "end_char": 8649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, dcided the applcat!on\n\nbetween the parties to the present procec:dmg for detenrunation of standard rent in respect of."}}, {"text": "Aikman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12196, "end_char": 12202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand Aikman, J., in Chandi Prasad v. Maharaja Mahendra Mahendra Singh(') held that a decision on a question of law is always res judicata."}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12350, "end_char": 12356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as observed by Rankin, C.J., in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haldar(') :\n\n\"Questions of law are of all kinds and cannot be dealt with as though they were all the same."}}, {"text": "LR. 63 I.A. 53", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14331, "end_char": 14345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14590, "end_char": 14596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14723, "end_char": 14729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14962, "end_char": 14968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15237, "end_char": 15264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties : Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee's case(')."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17869, "end_char": 17874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17875, "end_char": 17898, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 928", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19316, "end_char": 19335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_837_845_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS\n\nCHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS February 26, 1970\n\n[S. M. S!KRI AND V. BHARGAYA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 372(1)-Ru/er by order applying law of prinzogeniture to one Jagir and 1naking it impartible-lf Order legislative and therefore valid.\n\nL had two sons, G and M. L. and h.is elder son G were granted a Jagir by the then Ruler of Kotah, jointly in their names, in lieu ell a debt which the Ruler owed to them. This property was treated as property of the joint family of L. The name of M, the second son born after the grant, was also mutated against the Jagir villages.\n\nThe names of the descendants of G and M were from time to time similarly mutated against the Jagir and this Jagir as well as other property of the joint family was managed for some time by the eldest member belonging to either branch of the family.\n\nThe respondent C was a descendant of G and claimed in 1937 before the Revenue Commissioner that as the eldest son in the eldest branch he alone had the right over the Jagir according to the custom and usage in Rajputana and, consequently, mutation in the records should be in his name alone.\n\nOn a report by the Revenue Commissioner, the Ruler passed an order on 22nd January, 1938, directing that the Jagir, like all other Jagirs in the State should be given the status of an irnpartible estate and should be liable to render 'Cbakri' and 'Subchintki' to the Ruler. It was further ordered that the Jagir would be governed by the rule of primogeniture, so that C alone would be held to be Jagirdar.\n\nThe appellants, who were the descendants of M, sought partition oi all the family properties including the villages in the Jagir. Although the Trial Court dismissed the suit, on appeal, the High Court granted a decree in respect of other properties but upheld the dismissal of the suit in so far as the appellants had claimed a share in the Jagir.\n\nThe appellants claimed that the Jagir having been joint Hindu property, their rights as successors-in-interest of M could not be defeated by the order of Ruler dated 22nd January, 1938, and consequently, the appellants were entitled to thei\"r proper share in the Jagir. It was contended that all orders passed by an . .independent and sovereign Ruler do not have the force of law. It is only those orders which purport to lay down a law for the State which cannot be challenged and which would remain in force even after the merger of the Kotah State in India and, after the enforcement of the Constitution, under Art. 372 of the Constitution. It was submitted that, when passing the Order dated 22nd January, 1938, the Ruler was only exercising executive powers df directing mutation of names and was not exercising any legislative po\\vers.\n\nHELD : Dismissing the appeal.\n\n(i) The High Court was right in holding that the villages in .the Ja_gir, at the time when the suit for partition was instituted, were 1mparttble\n\nproperty governed by the law of primogeniture and C alone could be treated as the owner of these villages.\n\n(ii) The very nature of the Order, which changed the law applicable .to the Jagir, indicated that it was a legislative act and not a mere executive order. The Ruler did not purport to lay down that the Jagir was already governed by the rule of primogeniture; what he did was to apply the rule of primogeniture to this J agir for future.\n\nSuch an order could only be made in exercise of his prerogative Of laying down the law for the State.\n\nThe mere fact that it was laid down for one single Jagir and was not a general law applicable to others in the State was imrr.aterial, because it does n'ot appear that there were any other similar Jagirs which also required alteration of the law applicable to them. [843 B-D]\n\n(iii) Although no special procedure of law-making was adopted by the Ruler When making this Order, that circumstance could not change the nature of the Order specially when there was nothing to indicate that there was any recognised procedure of law-making in the Kotah State at that time. [844 F-G]\n\nRaikumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v. State of Orissa and Another [1964] 7 S.C.R. 112; ref\"Ted to.\n\nState of Guiara! v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwa/a [1964] 6 'S.C.R. 461 and Maior Raniit Singh Rao Pha/ke \"· Smr. Raia Bal Sahiba\n\n(dead) by her legal representatives and Vice Versa Civil Appeal Nos. 982 and 983 of 1964 deci\\led on 18th July, 1967 ; distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1370 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and decree dated February 16, 1966 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 86 of 1958.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant.\n\nD. V. Patel, Janendra Lal, and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J.\n\nTh!s appeal arises .<; mt of a suit for partition of properties in the family of one Lala11 Ramchandra who was the G common ancestor of the parties to the suit. .. He had twndents are the descendants of Govindraoji, the principal one bemg Chandrakant Rao who was defendant No. 1 in the suit.\n\nThe appellants sought H partition of all the family properties, including eight villges known as \"the sarola Jagir\" whic~ w_ere situated. i°; th_e ersh1le State. of Kota.\n\nThe trial Court d1sm1ssed the smt 1n its entirety, holdmg\n\nthat none of the properties in suit was ancestral property.\n\nOn appeal by the present appellants, the High Court of Rajasthan upheld the dismissal of ihe suit insofar as the appellants had claimed a share in the eight villages fanning the Sarola Jagir, while the suit in respect of the other properties was decreed and a preliminary decree passed in respect of those properties.\n\nThe appellants have come up to this Court in this appeal, by certificate granted by the High Court, against the order of the High Court refusing to grant partition of the eight villages of the Saro la J agir.\n\nIn order to appreciate the point raised in this appeal the history of this J agir in this family may be recited briefly. Lalaji Ramchandra and his eldest son Govindraoji were awarded this Jagir by means at a Parwana dated 8th April, 1838 issued by His Highness Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah.\n\nIt appears that the Maharao had contracted debts with the family of Lalaji Ramchandra even in the time of his ancestors and, at the relevant time, the amount of debt exceeded Rs. 9 lakhs.\n\nThis debt was guaranteed by the British Government. In lieu of this debt, this Jagir, which was already being enjoyed by La!aji Ramchandra with certain limitations, was g[ven jointly to him aind his son Govindraoji, stating that it was being conferred in perpetuity and as always to remain from sons to grandsons and was to be free from all taxes which were being exacted up to that time, such as Barar and Sewai. At the same time, Govind Rao executed a deed of release by which he accepted the adjustment of the amount due from the Maharao aga\\nst this grant of Jagir.\n\nThese documents thus show that this Jagir was originally granted by Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah, jointly in tl!e names of Lalaji Ram Chandra and his son, Govindraoji in lieu of the debt which the Maharao owed to them.\n\nSubsequently, this property was treated as property of the joint family of Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal the second son of Lalaji Ramchandra, was born after this gr[llit and his name was also mutated against the J agir villages. On the death of Govindraoji, the name of his adopted son, Ganpat Raoji, was brought in, while Motilal, the uncle, managed the property on behal.f of the family.\n\nMotilal executed a will in respect of his properties, including these villages, specifically stating that half of this Prroperly raised in the trial Court by amendment of the pleadings in the plaint, if necessary, and should be considered and decided by that Court.\n\nIt will be for that court to give a fresh decision whether the appellants are entitled to claim a share in the compensation money received in lieu of these eight villages under Rajasthan Act VI of 1952.\n\nThe result is that this appeal is dismissed, subject to the modification that the case will go back to the trial Court for deciding the question whether the plaintiffs/appellants can claim a share in the compensation money or not, as indicated above.\n\nCosts of this appeal shall . abide the decision on this claim of the plaintiffs/ appellants to a share in the compensation money.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAYVANT RAO AND OTHERS\n\nCHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS February 26, 1970\n\n[S. M. S!KRI AND V. BHARGAYA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kotah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L had two sons, G and M. L. and h.is elder son G were granted a Jagir by the then Ruler of Kotah, jointly in their names, in lieu ell a debt which the Ruler owed to them."}}, {"text": "Rajputana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent C was a descendant of G and claimed in 1937 before the Revenue Commissioner that as the eldest son in the eldest branch he alone had the right over the Jagir according to the custom and usage in Rajputana and, consequently, mutation in the records should be in his name alone."}}, {"text": "22nd January, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1214, "end_char": 1232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a report by the Revenue Commissioner, the Ruler passed an order on 22nd January, 1938, directing that the Jagir, like all other Jagirs in the State should be given the status of an irnpartible estate and should be liable to render 'Cbakri' and 'Subchintki' to the Ruler."}}, {"text": "Kotah State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only those orders which purport to lay down a law for the State which cannot be challenged and which would remain in force even after the merger of the Kotah State in India and, after the enforcement of the Constitution, under Art."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2454, "end_char": 2459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only those orders which purport to lay down a law for the State which cannot be challenged and which would remain in force even after the merger of the Kotah State in India and, after the enforcement of the Constitution, under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C.R. 112", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maior Raniit Singh Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwa/a [1964] 6 'S.C.R. 461 and Maior Raniit Singh Rao Pha/ke \"· Smr."}}, {"text": "Raia Bal Sahiba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raia Bal Sahiba\n\n(dead) by her legal representatives and Vice Versa Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and decree dated February 16, 1966 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Regular First Appeal No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4622, "end_char": 4632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4662, "end_char": 4675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakravarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, Janendra Lal, and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Janendra Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4729, "end_char": 4741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, Janendra Lal, and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4747, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, Janendra Lal, and B. R. Agarwala, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J.\n\nTh!s appeal arises ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5648, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the present appellants, the High Court of Rajasthan upheld the dismissal of ihe suit insofar as the appellants had claimed a share in the eight villages fanning the Sarola Jagir, while the suit in respect of the other properties was decreed and a preliminary decree passed in respect of those properties."}}, {"text": "Lalaji Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalaji Ramchandra and his eldest son Govindraoji were awarded this Jagir by means at a Parwana dated 8th April, 1838 issued by His Highness Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah.", "canonical_name": "Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal"}}, {"text": "Govindraoji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalaji Ramchandra and his eldest son Govindraoji were awarded this Jagir by means at a Parwana dated 8th April, 1838 issued by His Highness Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah.", "canonical_name": "Govindraoji"}}, {"text": "8th April, 1838", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6358, "end_char": 6373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalaji Ramchandra and his eldest son Govindraoji were awarded this Jagir by means at a Parwana dated 8th April, 1838 issued by His Highness Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah."}}, {"text": "Maharao Ramsingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalaji Ramchandra and his eldest son Govindraoji were awarded this Jagir by means at a Parwana dated 8th April, 1838 issued by His Highness Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This debt was guaranteed by the British Government."}}, {"text": "La!aji Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In lieu of this debt, this Jagir, which was already being enjoyed by La!aji Ramchandra with certain limitations, was g[ven jointly to him aind his son Govindraoji, stating that it was being conferred in perpetuity and as always to remain from sons to grandsons and was to be free from all taxes which were being exacted up to that time, such as Barar and Sewai.", "canonical_name": "Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal"}}, {"text": "Govind Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7053, "end_char": 7063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time, Govind Rao executed a deed of release by which he accepted the adjustment of the amount due from the Maharao aga\\nst this grant of Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Govindraoji"}}, {"text": "Jagir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7184, "end_char": 7189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time, Govind Rao executed a deed of release by which he accepted the adjustment of the amount due from the Maharao aga\\nst this grant of Jagir."}}, {"text": "Lalaji Ram Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents thus show that this Jagir was originally granted by Maharao Ramsingh, Ruler of Kotah, jointly in tl!e names of Lalaji Ram Chandra and his son, Govindraoji in lieu of the debt which the Maharao owed to them.", "canonical_name": "Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal"}}, {"text": "Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7491, "end_char": 7516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, this property was treated as property of the joint family of Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal the second son of Lalaji Ramchandra, was born after this gr[llit and his name was also mutated against the J agir villages.", "canonical_name": "Lalaji Ramchandra Motilal"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Raoji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7699, "end_char": 7711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Govindraoji, the name of his adopted son, Ganpat Raoji, was brought in, while Motilal, the uncle, managed the property on behal.f of the family.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Raoji"}}, {"text": "Motilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Govindraoji, the name of his adopted son, Ganpat Raoji, was brought in, while Motilal, the uncle, managed the property on behal.f of the family."}}, {"text": "Ganpatraoji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7946, "end_char": 7957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "perty belonged to Ganpatraoji, while half would belong to his adopted son, Purshottam Raoji.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Raoji"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Raoji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8003, "end_char": 8019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "perty belonged to Ganpatraoji, while half would belong to his adopted son, Purshottam Raoji.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Raoji"}}, {"text": "Chandrakant Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Ganpat Raoji, the name of his eldest son Chandrakant Rao was mutated while Purshottam Raoji in the capacity of the eldest member of the family, started managing the propety.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Chandra.kant Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9003, "end_char": 9019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandra.kant Rao desired that his name alone should be shown as the holder of this Jagir and, on 22nd October, 1937, gave a statement before the Revenue Commfssioner claiming that the eldest son in the eldest branch had the right over the J agir according to the custom and usage in Rajputana and, consequently, mutation in the records should be in his name alone.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "22nd October, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9100, "end_char": 9118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandra.kant Rao desired that his name alone should be shown as the holder of this Jagir and, on 22nd October, 1937, gave a statement before the Revenue Commfssioner claiming that the eldest son in the eldest branch had the right over the J agir according to the custom and usage in Rajputana and, consequently, mutation in the records should be in his name alone."}}, {"text": "Kota", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9462, "end_char": 9466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report was sent by the Revenue Commissioner and the matter was dealt with by the Maharao of Kota himself in Mehakma Khas."}}, {"text": "Mehakma Khas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9478, "end_char": 9490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report was sent by the Revenue Commissioner and the matter was dealt with by the Maharao of Kota himself in Mehakma Khas."}}, {"text": "Chandrakant Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim of the plaintiff in this suit was that the Jagir having been joint Hindu family property, the rights of the plaintiffs, who are the successors-in-interest of Purshottam Raoji, cannot be defeated by the order of the Maharao dated 22nd January, 1938 and, consequently, the appellants together with the proforma respondents who are also descendants of Purshottam Raoji are entitled to 1/2 share, whereas the other 1/2 share only can be claimed by the contesting defendants, including Chandrakant Rao who are dei; cendants of Ganpatraoji.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Kota", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10703, "end_char": 10707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the trial Court and the High Court have held that, after the order of the Maharao of Kota dated 22nd January, 1938, this 1agir came to be governed by the rule of primogeniture, with the result that Chandrakant Rao alone was the owner of this property, while all other members of the family could only claim maintenance out of this property."}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11510, "end_char": 11512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharao of Kota", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11890, "end_char": 11905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In deciding this question, the crucial point is that the Maharao of Kota was an independent and sovereign Ruler whose orders in his State were law."}}, {"text": "Kota State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only those orders which purport to lay down a law for the State which cannot be .challenged and which would remain in force even after the merger of the Kota State in India and after the enforcement of the Cqilstitution under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12539, "end_char": 12547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandrakant", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on which the other J agirs wpre granted The Order then proceeds to take notice of the fact that, though the mutation should have been in the name of Chandrakant after the death of Ganpat Rao, a practice had developed of entering more than one person as the holders of this Jagir.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13741, "end_char": 13751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on which the other J agirs wpre granted The Order then proceeds to take notice of the fact that, though the mutation should have been in the name of Chandrakant after the death of Ganpat Rao, a practice had developed of entering more than one person as the holders of this Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Raoji"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15196, "end_char": 15210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These directions given by the Ruler clearly show that, thoug4 the proceedings came to him on the basis of a report for directions as to the mutation entry to be made on the death of Purshottam Rao, he proceeded to lay down the principles wjJich were to govern this Jagir thereafter.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Raoji"}}, {"text": "Chandra Kant Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15701, "end_char": 15717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Jagir had in the past been joint family property, it was to be thereafter impartible property governed by the 1 we of primogeniture and Chandra Kant Rao as the eldest member of the senior branch was to be the sole Jagirdar.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA KANT RAO~\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Maharao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15828, "end_char": 15835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was, therefore, a case where the Maharao exercised his powers of laying down the law with respect to tWs Qn:e single Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Maharao"}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the effect of a Sanad granted by the Ruler of Dhenkanal State had to be considered and the question arose whether the Sanad could be treated as exist\\ng law within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16565, "end_char": 16571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16974, "end_char": 16982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd January. 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17679, "end_char": 17697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, even if these principles are applied to the case before us, it has to be held that the Order of the Maharao dated 22nd January."}}, {"text": "Kola State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21645, "end_char": 21655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no law of the Kola State which could be held to be contrary to the Order dated 22nd January, 1938."}}, {"text": "Maharno", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22035, "end_char": 22042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that no special procedure of law-making was adopted by the Maharno when making this Order; but that circumstance cannot change the nature of the Order specially when there is nothing to indicate that there was any recognised procedure of Jaw-making in the Kola State at that time.", "canonical_name": "Maharao"}}, {"text": "Kola State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22232, "end_char": 22242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that no special procedure of law-making was adopted by the Maharno when making this Order; but that circumstance cannot change the nature of the Order specially when there is nothing to indicate that there was any recognised procedure of Jaw-making in the Kola State at that time."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22673, "end_char": 22682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, appears that, during the pendency of the suit, Jagirs were resumed in Rajasthan including this Jagir which stood in the name of Chandrakant Rao and cash compensation was paid in respect of it."}}, {"text": "18th July, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22898, "end_char": 22913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "982 and 983of1964 decided on 18th July, 1967."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Act VI of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Act VI of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24982, "end_char": 25006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_846_853_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "NAGAR RICE & FLOUR MILLS & ORS. v.\n\nN. TEEKAPPA GOWDA & BROS. & ORS.\n\nFebruary 27, 1970 _\n\n[J.C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nRice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (21 of 1958)-Shifting of existing rice mill to new site-Prior permission under s. 8(3') (c) how far necessary-Cons.iderations in giving such permission--Another mill situated near new site objecting that it8 business would be adversely affected-Objection whether sustainable under Art. 19(1)(g) of Constitution- Locus standi of party making such ob; ection.\n\nAccording to s. 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, no owner of a rice mill \"shall without the previous permissin of the Central Government, change the location of the whole or any p_art of that rice mill in respect of which licence has been granted under s. 6\".\n\nThe lands and buildings of the appellants' rice mill in the State of Mysore were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the award expressly recited that the appellants were entitled to remove the machinery of the mill.\n\nThe appellants were allotted a new site by the Mysore Government. After obtaining sanction from the Tehsildar the appellant shifted their machinery to the new site. Thereafter the Director o\"f Fo.. 366: Robertson v. :Wini.Her of Pen.\\ions, [1949J I K.B. 217; f'al mouth Board Construction Co. Ltd. v. Howell, [1950J I All. E.R. 538, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2130 and 2131 of 1969.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 16, 19. 1969 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil G Application No. 41 of 1969 and S.C.A. No. 1774 of 1969.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Suresh A. Shroff, P. C. Bhartari and 0. C.\n\nMathur, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nH. R. Gokhale, N. H. Gurshani and N. N. Keswani, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nB. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\n856 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\nThe , .; Jgme!Il.t of the Court was delivered by Civil Appeal No. 2130 of 1967\n\n[1970] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nShah, J. The High Court of Bombay dismissed in limine a petition filed by the Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company'-for the issue of a writ restraining the respondent Municipality from enforcing the provisions of the Maharashtra M:micipalities Act 40 of 1965 relathig tu the k1y, assessment, collection recovery of octroi and in particular s. l 05 and ss. 136 to 144 thereof, and from enforcing the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1967, and from actiiig upon resolutions passed by ilie Municipal Council dated September 9, 1968 and September 13, 1968, and from levying, assessing, collecting, recovering or taking any other step uinder the Act, rules or the resolutions, and for an order restrainin~ the Municipality of Ulhasnagar from levying, assessing:, collecting any octroi on the goods imported by the Company within the limits of the Municipal Couincil for a period of 7 years from the date of its first imposition. With special leave, the Company has appealed against the order rejecting the petitiOI!..\n\nThe Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. It set up its factory in 1956, within the limits of village Shahad, Ta!uka Kalyan, oin a site purchased trom the State of Bombay, and within an area known as the 'Industrial Area'.\n\nNo octroi duty was then payable in respect of goods imported by the Company into the Industrial Area for use in the manufacture of its products.\n\nOn October 30, 1959, the Government of Bombay issued a notification announcing its intention to constitute a Municipality for certain villages, including the Industrial Area.\n\nThe Company and other manufacturers who had set up their plants and factories objected to the proposed constitution of the Municipal Area.\n\nOn September 20, 1960, the State of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Mu, nicipality including the area in which the Industrial Area was included.\n\nRepresentations were then made by the Company and other manufacturers for excluding the Industrial Area from the Ulhasnagar Municipal District Area.\n\nOn April 27, 1962 the Government of Maharashtra (the new State of Maharashtra having bce.n constituted under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960) proclaimed that the Industrial Area be excluded from the Municipal jurisdiction.\n\nThe District Municipality then made a representation to the Uovernment of Maharashtra that the proclamation dated April 27, 1962, be withdrawn by the Government. The Municipality agreed to exempt the existing factories viz., the Company and other manufacturers whose factories were then existing in the Industrial Area from payment of octroi for a period of seven years from the date of levy of octroi and for exempting new industrial units from payment of octroi for\n\na similar period from the date of establishmll!lt. The Government of Mahaiashtra acceded to the request of the Municipalit)' to retain the Industrial Area within the local limits of the Municipality.\n\nOn August 24, 1963, the District Municipality passed a rcsolu tion to implement the agreement. It was resolvec! that the Municipality \"agrees to give a concession to the existing factories by exempting them from the payment of octroi for a period of 7 years from the date of levy of octroi tax and by exempting new factories from the payment of the octroi tax for a period of 7 years from the date of their establishment as recommended by the Government of Maharashtra\".\n\nOn October 31, 1963,. the Government of Maharashtra issued a notification withdrawing the proclamation dated April 27, 1962, and the Industrial Area became pan of. the. Ulhasnagar Municipal District. Relying upon the assurance and undertakiag given by the Municipality the Company claims that it had expanded its activities and commenced manufacturing new products by setting up addi tional plant which it would not have done \"but for the cons given, assurances arid representations made and agreement arrived at on May 21, 1963\".\n\nOn September 10, 1965, the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Municipalities Act which repealed the Bombay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901. The notification declaring the area of the former District Municipality of Ulliasnagar into the Ulhasnagar Municipality became effective as from June 15,\n\n1966. The Ulhasnagar Municipality took over as successor to the Ulhasnagar Distrit Municipality, the assets and the affairs of that body. On September 9, 1968 the Ulhasnagar Municipality resolved \"to levy minimum rates of octroi duty as shown.in columns 4 and 6 on all items shown in Sch. I to the Rules\", and by resolution dated September 13, 1968, the Municipality 'adopted with effect from January 1, 1969, the rates for the imposition of octroi duty on the goods imported for use, sale and consumption within the Municipal Council limits.\n\nAt a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\" The Municipality ignoredthe advice arid resolved that the Government of Maharashtra be informed that the Municipality would consider afresh on L10Sup.Cl(NPJ70-10\n\n-~:- --:·,.'.,,,..--:-'\"\": ',\\\n\n~· ' ~. -'. -;\"'-\n\n\\ ' ~- _,: ·-,' \\. 858 .. \\\n\n\". ·-. SUPREME .. COURT\n\n-------;\n\nREPORTS . ..__:JI9_7~]1...s.c.R. '.. . ( merits-; any representation of a tax-payer fo~'exemption from pay- A \" ment 'of octroi, and if any such representation was made by the factories situate in the Industrial Area, the Council.would consider the same and truce such action as it would deem fit.:·. Thereafter the Municipality sought to levy octroi duty and to recover from the Company octroi duty amounting to approximately Rs. 15 lakhs per annum. ..\n\n B\n\nThe Company moved a petition before the High Coun of Born- . bay under Art. 226 of the Constituti order as to costs in this Court. Cos!S in the High Court will be costs in the cause.\n\nSince we have gr; mted special leave against the order dismissing the petition, we do not deem it necessary to consider whether the order, rejecting the application for certificate was erroneous.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2131 of 1969 is therefore dismissed.\n\nY.P.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "CENTURY SPINNING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY\n\nLTD_. AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CENTURY SPINNING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD. AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ULHASNAGAR MlJl'UCIPAL COUNCIL AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ULHASNAGAR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1970 -\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. .N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lndla, Art."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. .N. GROVER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2038, "end_char": 2046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suresh A. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Suresh A. Shroff, P. C. Bhartari and 0."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6245, "end_char": 6259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Suresh A. Shroff, P. C. Bhartari and 0."}}, {"text": ". C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6265, "end_char": 6277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Suresh A. Shroff, P. C. Bhartari and 0."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, N. H. Gurshani and N. N. Keswani, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. H. Gurshani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, N. H. Gurshani and N. N. Keswani, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. N. Keswani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, N. H. Gurshani and N. N. Keswani, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6416, "end_char": 6428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6617, "end_char": 6621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. The High Court of Bombay dismissed in limine a petition filed by the Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company'-for the issue of a writ restraining the respondent Municipality from enforcing the provisions of the Maharashtra M:micipalities Act 40 of 1965 relathig tu the k1y, assessment, collection recovery of octroi and in particular s. l 05 and ss."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. The High Court of Bombay dismissed in limine a petition filed by the Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company'-for the issue of a writ restraining the respondent Municipality from enforcing the provisions of the Maharashtra M:micipalities Act 40 of 1965 relathig tu the k1y, assessment, collection recovery of octroi and in particular s. l 05 and ss."}}, {"text": "Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. The High Court of Bombay dismissed in limine a petition filed by the Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company'-for the issue of a writ restraining the respondent Municipality from enforcing the provisions of the Maharashtra M:micipalities Act 40 of 1965 relathig tu the k1y, assessment, collection recovery of octroi and in particular s. l 05 and ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 136 to 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7006, "end_char": 7020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7682, "end_char": 7743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shahad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It set up its factory in 1956, within the limits of village Shahad, Ta!uka Kalyan, oin a site purchased trom the State of Bombay, and within an area known as the 'Industrial Area'."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7858, "end_char": 7873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It set up its factory in 1956, within the limits of village Shahad, Ta!uka Kalyan, oin a site purchased trom the State of Bombay, and within an area known as the 'Industrial Area'."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 30, 1959, the Government of Bombay issued a notification announcing its intention to constitute a Municipality for certain villages, including the Industrial Area."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 30, 1959, the Government of Bombay issued a notification announcing its intention to constitute a Municipality for certain villages, including the Industrial Area."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8392, "end_char": 8410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960, the State of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Mu, nicipality including the area in which the Industrial Area was included."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960, the State of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Mu, nicipality including the area in which the Industrial Area was included."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8455, "end_char": 8470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960, the State of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Mu, nicipality including the area in which the Industrial Area was included."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1960, the State of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Mu, nicipality including the area in which the Industrial Area was included."}}, {"text": "Ulhasnagar Municipal District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8736, "end_char": 8765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Representations were then made by the Company and other manufacturers for excluding the Industrial Area from the Ulhasnagar Municipal District Area."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8776, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27, 1962 the Government of Maharashtra (the new State of Maharashtra having bce.n constituted under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960) proclaimed that the Industrial Area be excluded from the Municipal jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8795, "end_char": 8820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27, 1962 the Government of Maharashtra (the new State of Maharashtra having bce.n constituted under the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960) proclaimed that the Industrial Area be excluded from the Municipal jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8886, "end_char": 8917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uovernment of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Municipality then made a representation to the Uovernment of Maharashtra that the proclamation dated April 27, 1962, be withdrawn by the Government."}}, {"text": "Government of Mahaiashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9525, "end_char": 9550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Mahaiashtra acceded to the request of the Municipalit)' to retain the Industrial Area within the local limits of the Municipality."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 24, 1963, the District Municipality passed a rcsolu tion to implement the agreement."}}, {"text": "31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1963,."}}, {"text": "Ulhasnagar Municipal District", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10312, "end_char": 10341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ulhasnagar Municipal District."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10659, "end_char": 10671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon the assurance and undertakiag given by the Municipality the Company claims that it had expanded its activities and commenced manufacturing new products by setting up addi tional plant which it would not have done \"but for the cons given, assurances arid representations made and agreement arrived at on May 21, 1963\"."}}, {"text": "10, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10688, "end_char": 10696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 10, 1965, the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Municipalities Act which repealed the Bombay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901."}}, {"text": "Legislature of the State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 10, 1965, the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Municipalities Act which repealed the Bombay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901."}}, {"text": "Ulliasnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10920, "end_char": 10931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification declaring the area of the former District Municipality of Ulliasnagar into the Ulhasnagar Municipality became effective as from June 15,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "June 15,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10990, "end_char": 11004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification declaring the area of the former District Municipality of Ulliasnagar into the Ulhasnagar Municipality became effective as from June 15,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "Ulhasnagar Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11010, "end_char": 11033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ulhasnagar Municipality took over as successor to the Ulhasnagar Distrit Municipality, the assets and the affairs of that body."}}, {"text": "Ulhasnagar Distrit Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11064, "end_char": 11095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ulhasnagar Municipality took over as successor to the Ulhasnagar Distrit Municipality, the assets and the affairs of that body."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11141, "end_char": 11158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 9, 1968 the Ulhasnagar Municipality resolved \"to levy minimum rates of octroi duty as shown.in columns 4 and 6 on all items shown in Sch."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11330, "end_char": 11348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to the Rules\", and by resolution dated September 13, 1968, the Municipality 'adopted with effect from January 1, 1969, the rates for the imposition of octroi duty on the goods imported for use, sale and consumption within the Municipal Council limits."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11393, "end_char": 11408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to the Rules\", and by resolution dated September 13, 1968, the Municipality 'adopted with effect from January 1, 1969, the rates for the imposition of octroi duty on the goods imported for use, sale and consumption within the Municipal Council limits."}}, {"text": "December 24, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\""}}, {"text": "Munici- G pal Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\""}}, {"text": "November 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11690, "end_char": 11707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\""}}, {"text": "December 10, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\""}}, {"text": "Ulhasnagar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11876, "end_char": 11895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Munici- G pal Council considered the letters writteiti by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the Ulhasnagar District Municipali!I and conti, n'ued to remain within the local limits of the Municipality, and \"advised the H Municipality to pass a resolµtion confirming such exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor.\""}}, {"text": "High Coun of Born- . bay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12885, "end_char": 12909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nThe Company moved a petition before the High Coun of Born- ."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12916, "end_char": 12924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13168, "end_char": 13176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17025, "end_char": 17032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court held that the following observations made by Denning, J., in Robertson v.\n\nMinister of Pensions(') applied in Tndia :\n\n\"The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that_ doctrine has long been\n\nexploed."}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18231, "end_char": 18238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be sufficient to observe that in appeal from that judgment\n\n(Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd.) Lord Simonds observed after referring to the observations of Denning, L.J. :\n\n''The illegality of an act is the same whether the action has been !"}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19062, "end_char": 19069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gokhale appearing on behalf of the Municipality urged that the petitioin filed by the Company apparently raised questions ol fact."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19321, "end_char": 19329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_862_871_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LIMITED A\n\nDIE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL\n\nTAXES & ANOTifER\n\nMarch 2, 1970 B\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND\n\nI. D. DUA, JJ.]\n\nCentral Sales Tax A.ct, 1956-Trucks maaufactured In Biliar said from producer's stockyards in other States-Thoug/J agreement u•ith dealers envisaged fir1n advance orders, actual sales by allocat(o11 froni stockyards- /I inter-state sa/es--Wltetlzer S.T.O. bound to examine each transaction or C declde on general basis of silnilar transactions.\n\nThe appellant carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar. It did not have any stockyard in the State but maintained such stockyards in different States for the purpose cl{ effective distribution of vehicles among its dealers. A form of agreement between the appellant and its dealers provided that• the company agreed to sell and supply from its Works at Jamshedpur or from its stockyanls D outside the State vehicles to the dealer which would be allotted to the dealer by the Company at its discretion. In another provision it was laid down that by the 15th of each month the dealer shall mail to the company his •latements containing firm orders for purchases to be effected during the next succeeding month.\n\nIn the course of its assessment to sale< tax for the years 1964-65 and 1965-66. the appellant claimed that as the demand for the vehicles far ex• E ceeded the production, no firm orders as envisaged in the dealership agree. ment had in fact been received. The actual procedure followed by the appellant was that the sales office of the app<:!ant in Bombay, after taking into account the production schedule nnd requirements in Jiffcrent States, instructed the factory to transfer stocks o'f vehicles to the stockyards in the various States by Stock Transfer Authorisations in which the model of the chassis and the number of units were mentioned. The stocks availabJe F in the stockyards were distributed from time to time to dealers taking care to ensure that the over-an supply to the dealers in any State \\vas in propor .. lion to the number of orders pending with the dealer on May I, 1963 or on the basis of the off-take by the dealer during the year ending Septemher 30, 1961 as required by the Commercial Vehicl\"' (Di; tribution and Sale) Control Order, 1963.\n\nFor this purpose allotments were made to the dealer for each month by an allocation Jetter by the sale• office. It wa; claimed that the trans'fer of the vehicles from the factory to the various G stockyards was a continuous process and was not related to the require¥ ment of any particular customer; that there tvas no connection between the Stock Transfer Authorisation and the allocation Jetter. It was the stock .. yard inchargc \\.\\'ho appropriated the rt:'quired number of vehicles to the contract of sale out of the stocks available with him. This was done after a delivery order had been addressed by the sales office at Bomll'ay to the ; tockyard incharge for delivery of stated number of vehicles of specified model to a particular dealer. Till such appropriation of vehicles.. it was 11\n\na1ays open to the company to allot anv vehiCfe t<' any purchaser or to tran!\\fer the vehicles from the !itockynrd in one State to a stockyaJd in an other State.\n\nHowever, the respondent Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act on all the vehicles which moved to the stockyards in the States other than Bihar from Jamshedpur. The appellant challenged the assessment orders in petitions filed under Article 226 but these were dismissed by the High Court. On appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The order of the High Court and that df the Assistant Commissioner must be set aside.\n\n(i) The explanation of the procedure followed by the appellant which prima facie seemed to be business-like and plausible, together with the proved absence of any firm -0rders, indicated that the allocation letters and the statements furnished by the dealers did not by themselves bring about transactions of sale within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Central Sales Tax Act. It appeared from the material on record that generally the oompletion of the sales to the dealers did no: take place at Jamshedpur and the final steps in the matter of such completion were taken at the stockyards. E\\(en on the assumption that anv orders had been. received by the appellant they could not be regarded as .anything but mere offers in view of the specific terms in the dealership agreement according to which it was open to the appellant to supply or not to supply the dealer with any vehicle in response to such orders.\n\nThere were, therefore, no firm con tracts which occasioned the movement df vehicles out of the State of Bihar. [870 D-871 Bl\n\n(ii) Another serious infirmity in the order of the Assistant Commis-. sioner was that instead of looking into each transaction in order to find out whether a completed contract df sale had taken place which could be brought to tax only if tb.e movement of vehicles from Jamshedpur had been occasioned under a convenant or incident of that contract, the Assistant Commissioner made bis order on. the general basis that all transactions were of a: similar nature. The Assistant Commissioner was bound to examine each individUal transaction and then decide whether it constituted an Inter-State 'sale exigible to tax under tbe provisions of the Act.\n\n[8781 CJ\n\nTata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Bombay v. S. C. Sarkar & Ors. [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379, Ben Gann Nilgiri Plantations Co. Cooncor & OtJ1ers v.\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2105 and 2106 of 1969.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated July l, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 993 of 1968 and 72 of.1969.\n\n'N. A. Palkhivala, Sant P. Mehta, P. C. Bhartari, and B.\n\nDatta, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General, State Sarwar A Ii and U. P. Singh, for the respondents appeals).\n\nThe Judgment o, f the Court was delivered by\n\nof Bihar, S. (in . both the\n\nGrover, J; The only P<>int for detennination in these appeals. by certificate is whether certain sales of motor vehicles manufac-\n\n864 SUPJ.BWB COUJ.T J.BPOl.TS [1970] 3 s.c.R..\n\nA tured by the appellant were inter-atate.sales and were liablo to t, ax\n\nunder the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, hCrelllaftcr called \"the Act\".\n\nThe appcllant carries on the buainels of JD!Ulufacturing inter alia Tata M~ Benz trucks and bu.sal, chassis, i:rarts and accessories thercot at Jams!w1pur in the State of • These B are sokho the Government of India, the State Transport, Corporations, commercial and induatrial undertalcingJ and other persons.\n\nThese appeals relate to the •88C!ISmenta made by the Auistant Commissioner of 'Commercial Taxes, hereinafter called the \"Alaiatant Commissioner\", with rcprd to the assessment periods April 1, 1964 to March 31, 1965 and April I, 1965 to March 31, c\n\n1966. As the points are cOmm.oo to botR the appeals we shall deal with the facts relating to the second period, namely, April l, 1965 to Match 31, 1966.\n\nThe appellant did not maintain any stockyard in the State of Bihar but in dilfercnt States stockyards were &eing maintained since Decembec 1964. This, it is stated, was done for the pur- D pose of more ellective distributi!'lt of the vehicles particularly among the network of dealers. These stockyards were rated\n\nby the appellant's own personnel and the sales of the vchiclos, it is claimed, were elfectCd to the dealers as well as to the other u5crs in the different States from the stockyards. The dispute relates\n\nonly to the assessment made in respect of the vehicles which moved 1 from the manufacturing plant ill J amshedpur to the stockyards in diflerent States in the country. The sales tax was duly paid in accordance with the respective State laws on the sales ellected from the stockyards there.\n\nThe As. mcecrral part of a single transaction.\n\nIt is difficult to see what . contrnits the High Court had in mind because none have been shown to u.1 even by the learned Advocate General for the State.\n\nHe al5o relied largely .:m the findings of the Assistant Commissioner and urged that they were not open to re-examination.\n\nThe explanation of the procedure followed by the appellant Which prima facie seems to be business-like and pl.ausible together with the proved absence of any firm orders lends support to the argument pressed on its behalf that the allocation letters and the statements furnished by the dealers did not by themselves bring about transactions of sale within the meaning of s: 2 (g) of the Act.\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner himself found that sometimes •he vehicles were sent from the works at Jamshedpur even before an allocation letter had been issued.\n\nIt would appear from the inaterials placed before us that generally the completion of the sales to the dealers did not take place at J amshedpur and the final steps in the matter of such completion were taken at the stockyards.\n\nEven if the appellant took into account \\he requirements of the dealers which it naturally was expected to do when the vehicles were moved from t}\\e work; s to the stockyards it was not necessary that the number of vehicles allocated to the dealer should necessarily be delivered to him.\n\nThe appropriation of the -.•ehicles \\Vas done at the stockyards through specification of the engine and the chassis number and it was open to the appellant till then to allot any vehicle to any purchaser and to transfer the vehicles from one stockyard to another.\n\nEven the Assistant Commissioner found that on some occasian vehicles had been moved from stockyard in one State to a stockyard in another State. It is not possible to comprehend how in -the above situation it could be held that the movement of the vehicles from the works to the stockyards was occasioned bv any covenant or incident of the contract of sale.\n\nAs regard< the so called firm orders it has already been pointed out that none have been . shown to\n\n~- E\n\nhave existed in respect of the relevant periods of assessment. Even <>n the assumption that any such orders had been received by the appellant they could not be regarded as anythmg but mere offers in view of the specific terms in Exh. I (the dealership agreement) according to which it. was open to the appellant to supply or not to supply the dealer with any vehicle in response to such order.\n\nWhat was, therefore, relevant was the acceptance of firm orders occasioning the movement of vehicles out of the State of Bihar.\n\nAnother serious infinnity in the order of the Assistant Commissioner was (a matter which even the Advocate General quite fairly had to concede) that instead of looking into each transaction in order to find out whether a completed contract of sale had taken place which could be brought to tax only if the movement of vehicles from Jamshedpur had been occasioned under a convenant or incident of that contract the Assistant Commissioner based his order on mere generalities.\n\nIt has been suggested that all the transactions were of similar nature and the appellant's\n\nrepresenttive had himself submitted that a specimen trans1ction alone need be examined.\n\nIn our judgment this was a wholly wrong procedure to follow and the Assistant Commissioner, on whom the duty lay of assessing the tax in accordance with Jaw, was bound to examine each individual transaction and then decide whether it constituted an inter-State sale exigibJe to tax under the provisions of the Act.\n\nConsequently the appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court and that of the Assistant Commissioner is set aside in so far as it relates to the assessments in dispute in the present appeals.\n\nIt will be open to the Assistant Commissioner to make a fres~ assesment n accord.ance. with law.\n\nTe appellant shall be entttled to costs mcurred m this Court One hearing fee.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TATA ENGINEERING & LOCOMOTIVE CO. LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nDIE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL\n\nTAXES & ANOTifER\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 2, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LIMITED A\n\nDIE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL\n\nTAXES & ANOTifER\n\nMarch 2, 1970 B\n\n[J. C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND\n\nI. D. DUA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 605, "end_char": 615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant carried on the business of manufacturing trucks in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual procedure followed by the appellant was that the sales office of the app<:!ant in Bombay, after taking into account the production schedule nnd requirements in Jiffcrent States, instructed the factory to transfer stocks o'f vehicles to the stockyards in the various States by Stock Transfer Authorisations in which the model of the chassis and the number of units were mentioned."}}, {"text": "Jiffcrent", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual procedure followed by the appellant was that the sales office of the app<:!ant in Bombay, after taking into account the production schedule nnd requirements in Jiffcrent States, instructed the factory to transfer stocks o'f vehicles to the stockyards in the various States by Stock Transfer Authorisations in which the model of the chassis and the number of units were mentioned."}}, {"text": "Septemher 30, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stocks availabJe F in the stockyards were distributed from time to time to dealers taking care to ensure that the over-an supply to the dealers in any State \\vas in propor .. lion to the number of orders pending with the dealer on May I, 1963 or on the basis of the off-take by the dealer during the year ending Septemher 30, 1961 as required by the Commercial Vehicl\"' (Di; tribution and Sale) Control Order, 1963."}}, {"text": "Bomll'ay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was done after a delivery order had been addressed by the sales office at Bomll'ay to the ; tockyard incharge for delivery of stated number of vehicles of specified model to a particular dealer."}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3601, "end_char": 3612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act", "statute": "Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act", "statute": "Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes levied tax under the Central sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4133, "end_char": 4154, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R. 379", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "'N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5830, "end_char": 5847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'N. A. Palkhivala, Sant P. Mehta, P. C. Bhartari, and B.\n\nDatta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Sant P. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'N. A. Palkhivala, Sant P. Mehta, P. C. Bhartari, and B.\n\nDatta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5864, "end_char": 5878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'N. A. Palkhivala, Sant P. Mehta, P. C. Bhartari, and B.\n\nDatta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nDatta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5884, "end_char": 5893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'N. A. Palkhivala, Sant P. Mehta, P. C. Bhartari, and B.\n\nDatta, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General, State Sarwar A Ii and U. P. Singh, for the respondents appeals)."}}, {"text": "State Sarwar A Ii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 5990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General, State Sarwar A Ii and U. P. Singh, for the respondents appeals)."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General, State Sarwar A Ii and U. P. Singh, for the respondents appeals)."}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "J amshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute relates\n\nonly to the assessment made in respect of the vehicles which moved 1 from the manufacturing plant ill J amshedpur to the stockyards in diflerent States in the country."}}, {"text": "P'atna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8272, "end_char": 8289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the P'atna High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8296, "end_char": 8304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 24, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8835, "end_char": 8851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 24, 1968 the appel- H !"}}, {"text": "Jariishedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9042, "end_char": 9054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ant addressed a detailed communication giving the entire procedure which was bting followed in the matter of sales of motor vehicles sent to dilfercni Stales from the works at Jariishedpur."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9260, "end_char": 9274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 13, 1968 he made e assessment order in which he created a demand for Rs."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9570, "end_char": 9578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9682, "end_char": 9695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution challenging the above order as also the assessment on similar lines for the period April 1, 1964 to March 31, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9699, "end_char": 9713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution challenging the above order as also the assessment on similar lines for the period April 1, 1964 to March 31, 1965."}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11350, "end_char": 11357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11783, "end_char": 11790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11848, "end_char": 11852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15945, "end_char": 15948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15970, "end_char": 15979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May l, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18099, "end_char": 18110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stocks available in the stockyards were distributed from time to time to dealers takillg care to ensure that the overall supply to the dealers in any State would be in proportion to the number of orders pending with the dealer on May l, 1963 or on the basis of the off-take by the dealer during the year ending September 30, 1962 as required by the Control Order."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18180, "end_char": 18198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stocks available in the stockyards were distributed from time to time to dealers takillg care to ensure that the overall supply to the dealers in any State would be in proportion to the number of orders pending with the dealer on May l, 1963 or on the basis of the off-take by the dealer during the year ending September 30, 1962 as required by the Control Order."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21253, "end_char": 21258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant further showed and this was accepted that 15 vehicles from the Delhi stockyard wec transferred to Karna!"}}, {"text": "Karna! stockyard", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21288, "end_char": 21304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant further showed and this was accepted that 15 vehicles from the Delhi stockyard wec transferred to Karna!"}}, {"text": "June 14, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21699, "end_char": 21712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He proceeded to regard the statements which were required to be furnished to the dealers in accordance with the letter dated June 14, 1963 addressed by the appellant to them as firm orders within the meaning of the relevant clause in the dealership agreement."}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21914, "end_char": 21923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22092, "end_char": 22101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_872_877_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "CBAJURAM\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU I: KASllMlll\n\nMarch 3, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAVATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAV AND I. D. DUA, JI.)\n\nlammu & Kashrrnr Prtventiv• D•t•ntion Act, 19~Dettntion raukr s. 3(2) road with s. 5-Detenu's right to make repr-ntation ii t/ejuted i/ grounds not explllined IP him in language understood by him or if grounds are vague-Detention becomes illegal.\n\nThe petitioner was detained under the order of the District Maaiatrate.\n\nJammu passed under s. 3(2) read withs. S of the Jammu & Kaabmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 on March 30,\n\n1969. He filed a petition under Art, 32 challenging his detention. Later he withdrew the ori&inal\n\npetition and with the leave of the court filed another. In Ibis petition it was urged that the grounds of detention supplied to him were m F.qlilh which he as an illiterate person did not undentand; they wexe also not eJJy to the second petition.\n\nHELD: (i) It is absolutely necessary that when dealing with a detenu who cannot read or understand English language or any language at all, that the grounds of detention should be explained to him as early as poui\n\nble in the language he understands so that he can avail himself of the statutory right of making a representation. To hand over to him a docu ment written in English and to obtain his thumb-impression on it in token of his having received the same does not comply with the requirements of r the Jaw which gives a very valuable right to the detenu to make a represen tation. [877 BJ\n\n(ii) The endonement on the copy ken of his having understood the same, he affixed his thumb impression thereon.\n\nIn answer to the allegation that the grounds were 5ervi:d on him five days after Baishakhi, the affidavit does not seek to controvert it but only says that the detention order was duly read over to the detenu and the contents of the order explained to him in he language he understood.\n\nTherefore the claim of the Government is that on both the occasions, that is to say, when the detention order was served on him and also when the grounds were handed over to him, the contents of the documents were read over to him and translated to liim in the language he understood (Urdu) and therefore there was compliance with the provisions of the law.\n\nNow, if we accept the affidavit of the Government, it is obvious that the affidavit of the detenu must be false.\n\nContrary-wise, if we accept the affidavit of the detenu, we must reject the material placed before us on behalf of the Government. In view of the contradictory nature of these two affidavits, we went into the matter very closely and satisfied ourselves which of the two affidavits is acceptable, giving all the benefit of doubt to the detenu, To begin with, the order of detention had an endorsement on it that the order should be communicated to Chaju by reading over the same to him.\n\nThis was probably done because we find an endorsement of the Station House Officer that he had read it over to him in Urdu.\n\nThe thumb impression on this document docs not state that: it is the thumb impression of Chaju, but as he has not raised a controversy about it, we accept it as his.\n\nIn contrast to this order, the grounds of detention did not have an enddrsement that the grounds should be explained to Chaju in the language he understood. In the affidavit in answer to the first petition, the grounds were filed but there was no endorsement on the copy of the grounds showing that it had been so read to him in Urdu and that he was explained the contents. Mr.\n\nSachthey, however brought to our notice the original file in which the copy of, the rounds which was served upon the detenu has an endorsement in Urdu that thev had been read over and fully explained. to him in Urdu. re is a thumb impression and against the thumb impression is noted that it is that of Chaju.\n\nThe date is April 6, i969.\n\nThe question is wh!ther in view of this endorsement we must hold that Chaju was properly explained the grounds of detention in Urdu which he understands. In our judgment, we cannot accept these documents at their face value. To beitln with. the three endorsements on the copy, that is to say, (a) that the document was read over to him ill Urdu, (b) the thumb impression ·\n\nand ( c) the note that it is the thumb impression of Chaju, are in A two different inks if not three.\n\nThis raiSed a suspicion, that these might have been written later around the thumb impression taken from Chaju as was done when the order of detention was served on him. It may be recalled that at that time also there was an endorsement in English that it had been read over to him, but nothing had been written around the thumb impression of Chaju B whether in Urdu or otherwise to show that the thumb impression was that of Chaju.\n\nWe looked carefully at the affidavit filed in this Court which is a cyclostyled document. We find in para 6 a correction in a very significant place.\n\nThis correction has been made by typing certain words in the place between two lines with an oblique showing that it is an omission.\n\nThe words beneath C those added ..yords have been erased although some of them in part still appear.\n\nNow it is significken of his having understood the same, he affixed his thumb impression thereon.", "canonical_name": "CHAJli RAM"}}, {"text": "Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nSachthey, however brought to our notice the original file in which the copy of, the rounds which was served upon the detenu has an endorsement in Urdu that thev had been read over and fully explained."}}, {"text": "April 6, i969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date is April 6, i969."}}, {"text": "Chaju B", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11566, "end_char": 11573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be recalled that at that time also there was an endorsement in English that it had been read over to him, but nothing had been written around the thumb impression of Chaju B whether in Urdu or otherwise to show that the thumb impression was that of Chaju.", "canonical_name": "CHAJli RAM"}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15626, "end_char": 15658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15917, "end_char": 15922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu was questioned by us and he expressed a desire that he may not be released in Delhi because he has no means of going back."}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_878_880_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "[M.\n\nG. R. BAQUAL\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR March 4, 1970\n\nH!DAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH,.\n\nK. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.l\n\nCivil Servicfficer, junior to others, 8elected for a post equivalent to a higher post-Whether amounts to seniority over others--ScofU of such selection.\n\nThe appellanf and respondents 2, 3 and 4 were superintendents in tho State Secretariat service, the appellant being junior to the th= respon dents.\n\nIn 1959, the appellant was appointed as Personal Assistant to the Chairman of the Legislative Council, and shortly thereafter, the three respondents were pro1noted as Under Secretaries.\n\nIn 1963, the appellant was transferred to the Secretariat as Under Secretary.\n\nIn 1964, the three respondents were promoted as Deputy Secretarie<.\n\nOn the question, whether by appointment as P.A. to the Chairman of the Legislative Council the appellant was senior to the respondents, and hence, was entitled to be also appointed as Deputy Secretary,\n\nHELD : Under the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Council Secretariat (Regulation and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1959, a P.A. to the Chairman df the Legislative Council is equated to a P.A. to a Minister who is equated to an Under Secretary.\n\nBut, in the present case, the appellant was not promoted to the post of P.A. to the Chairman. He was only selected to serve as P.A. and such selection did not confer on him any privilege beyond holding that post as long as the Chairman would have him.\n\nUnder r. 24 of the Rules also, it is the substantive oost that matters and there the appellant was junior to the respondents. (879 E-F,\n\nG-H; 880 A-BJ .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1584 of 1968.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 21, 1966 of the J ammu and Kashmir High Court in Writ Petition No. 40 of 1965.\n\nA. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,\n\nfor the appelll\\nt.\n\nG N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthe, v and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1. ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah C.J.\n\nThis appeal arises from the judgment and order of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, December 21 1966 H dismissing a petition under Art. 32(2-A) of the Jammu & Kash: mir Constitution filed by the petitioner/appellant G. R. Baqual\n\nG. R. BAQUAL v. :t. &-K. STATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 879\n\nA for certain reliefs on the ground that be J:ias been discriminated against and -punished without rect>urse to statutory provis10s and procedure.\n\nThe facts of the case are as .follows :\n\nThe appellant who, is a Graduate of. the Punjab University entered the Secretariat service of the Janunu & Kashmir State OI) Novembed!,, JJ946 as a clerk.\n\nLater he was promoted as Superm, tendent on September 26, 1957 and was holding a grade of Rs. 150-15-300 \\revised 200-20-300-25-400).\n\nHe was then appointed as Persorial Assistant in gazetted rank in the grade of Rs. 200-400 (revised 250-25-350-30-500) and became P.A. to the Chairman of the Legislative Council by his order dated October 23, 1959. The appellant was then transferred to the Civil Secretariat as an Under-Secretary on September 30, 1963 under Government orders in the same grade of Rs. 250-500.\n\nHe claimed seniority against other Under-Secretaries when on Apnl 14,. 1964, the Government promoted four Under-Secreta~ to the - post of Deputy Secretaries in the pay scale of Rs. 450-800 which included three of the respondents in this appeal.\n\nHe was not promoted and he , claimed that he was so entitled both on his seniority and under the statutory rules.\n\nThe case of the appellant is almost entirely based upon his appointment as Personal Assistant to the Chahman of the Legislative Council which is equated with an Under-Secretary under E the Jammu & Kashmir Legislative Council Secretariat (Regulation and cQllditions of Service) Rules, 1959. Under these rules, a.PA. to the Chainnan of the'Leislative Council is equated to a P.A. to a Minister and he is in his tum equated with an Under- Secretary and enjoys the same scale of pay.\n\nThis scale of pay is certainly higher than the scale of pay \\which the Superintendent\n\ngeL~.\n\nIt was admitted before us that the appellant was not senior to the other Superintendents in the substantive post of Superintendent.\n\nIn other words, if everything had been equal, he would be junior to respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and would take his tum for\n\npromoton after them.\n\nHe claims seniority on the basis of his deputation as P.A. to the Chairman of the Legislative Council and his supposed equation to an Under-Secretary.\n\nAs a matter of fact, he was not promoted as_Under-Secretl!lry.\n\nHe was orily selected to serve as P.A. and that carried the pay and the gazetted rank.\n\nIt happens frequently in service that such selections are ma~ prticularly. in. Secrarial line by Ministers, Chairman of Legislative Council or Speaker. Even in this Court such selections are made of persons to serve as Secretaries to the Hon'ble Judges. 1:llis selectiori carr!es more pay while it lasts and gives a rank which the holder en1oys as a gazetted officer, but. it does\n\n880 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n[1970) 3 S.C.R.\n\nnot confer any more privilege. In matters of proml)tion and rankiqg, the substantive posts matter, anli here, the . appellant admits that he was junior to the others. . His appointment to a post which in emoluments was equal to that of an Undor-Secre-. tary was not in the regular line. It was by selection and could not therefore confer on him any privilege beyond holding that pC!St\n\nas long as the Chairman of the Legislative Council would have him as his Personal Assistant.\n\nThe appellant tried to prove his case by referen'ce to rule 24 of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956. But that rule also says that the seniority of a person has. reference to the service, class, category or grade with reference to wbicli the question bad arisen and that such seniority shall be determined by the date of his first appointment in such class, service, category or. grade as the case may be. Here the service on. which emphasis should be placed is the post of Superintendent and there, the appellant admiis that he is junior to respondents 2, 3 and 4.\n\nTherefore, neither on the basis of the statutory rule nor on t'1e . basis of any practice or convention is he entitled to.seniority fro'll\n\nthe post of Superintendent to the next grade.\n\nHe must take his tum in accordance with bis seniority as Superintendent which was his substantive po>t when his depuhtion began.\n\nWe see no force in this appeal which sh~'.I be dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismi.ised", "total_entities": 20, "entities": [{"text": "G. R. BAQUAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. R. BAQUAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[M.\n\nG. R. BAQUAL\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR March 4, 1970\n\nH!DAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH,."}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1838, "end_char": 1849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,\n\nfor the appelll\\nt."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1851, "end_char": 1866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,\n\nfor the appelll\\nt."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,\n\nfor the appelll\\nt."}}, {"text": "G N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthe, v and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1932, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthe, v and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G N. S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthe, v and B. D. Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah C.J.\n\nThis appeal arises from the judgment and order of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court, December 21 1966 H dismissing a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32(2-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2184, "end_char": 2196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. R. Baqual", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32(2-A) of the Jammu & Kash: mir Constitution filed by the petitioner/appellant G. R. Baqual\n\nG. R. BAQUAL v. :t. &-K. STATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 879\n\nA for certain reliefs on the ground that be J:ias been discriminated against and -punished without rect>urse to statutory provis10s and procedure.", "canonical_name": "G. R. BAQUAL"}}, {"text": "October 23, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200-400 (revised 250-25-350-30-500) and became P.A. to the Chairman of the Legislative Council by his order dated October 23, 1959."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3119, "end_char": 3137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was then transferred to the Civil Secretariat as an Under-Secretary on September 30, 1963 under Government orders in the same grade of Rs."}}, {"text": "Apnl 14,. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3258, "end_char": 3272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He claimed seniority against other Under-Secretaries when on Apnl 14,."}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_881_893_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "MANAGEMENT OF ADVANCE INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nSHRI GURUDASMAL & ORS.\n\nMarch 4, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.j\n\nConstitution of India; 1950, 1th Sch. List I Entry BO-Word 'State' in Entry-Whether includes 'Union Ti:rritories' after passing of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956-Adaptation of Laws (No. I) Order 1956 enlarging definition of 'State' in s. 3(5B) of General Clauses Act, IB97 to include Union Territorits-Efject of Order-Power of President to pass Order after expiry of period specified in Art. 372(2) of Constitu- ,.tion-Power is-sustained under nelV Art. 372-A.\n\nSpecial Police Establishment Act 25 of 1946 as amended in 1952-· I'urporling to cteate Special Police Force \"in Delhi '-Such fr>rce whether \"belonging to\" a 'State' within meaning of Entry BO-Consent of State Government to extetision of powers of Special Police Establisohment- Pr.oof-Consent already given in respect of certain offences subsists after new offences added by fresh notification.\n\nEntry BO in List I of the 7th Sch. tffthe Constitution of India 1950 corresponding to entry 39 in the Federal List of the Government of Inia Act, 1935, empowered the Central Legislature inter alia to extend the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force 'belonging to' any State to any area outside that State. with the consent of the State in which such area was situate.\n\nUnder the Constitution as originally adopted the States in the Indian Union were specified as Part A, B & C States and certain territories as part D territories. - By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment Act), 1956 the distinction between Part A & B States was abolished and Part C States and Part D tetritories came to be described as Union Terriories. The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 25 of 1946 was passed under entry 39 of :he Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935. As adaoted in 1950. the Ion~ title of the Act referred to Soecial Police Force 'for the State of Delhi'. After th~ Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act '26 df 1952 the long title referred to a Special Police Force 'in Delhi'. The Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order\n\n1956 substituted the words 'Union Territofies' in place of Part 'C' States in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.\n\nOn November 6, 1956 Notifjcation No. 7 /5/55-AVD wa. issued by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act enabling the Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia offences under ss. 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nBy memorandum No. DPE/1260/6554-V, dated July 2, 1960, the Government of Maharashtra purported to express its consent to the extension to the State of Mah, rashtra of the oowers of Delhi Police Establishment to investigate into the offences mentioned in the Central Government Notification aforesaid dated November 6, 1956 and subsequent not; fications dated February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.\n\nThe aooo1lant comoany was charged in a comulaint filed by Incom~-tax Officer (Section X Contrail, Bombay with offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B read with s. 409 df the Indian Panel Code. The case was reo; s•ered by the Suoerintendent of Police, Soeci>l Police Establishment, Delhi and investiation thereof was ordered to be conducted in the State of Maharashtra by an lnspectm under the Establishment. The appellant filed .• writ ,\n\npetition under Art. 226 of lhe Constitution challenging the power of the Special Police Establishnt to investigate the case in the State of Maharashtra. The petition being dismissed, an appeal with certificate was filed in this Court. The contentions rai•ed on behalf of the appellant which fell for consideration were:\n\n(i) that Act 25 of 1946 when it was made applicable to Union Territories as a result of Adaptation Order No. 3 of 1956 was thereby cut adrift from entry 80 which referred only to 'States'\n\n(ii) that the enlargement of the definition of 'State' in s. 3(58) of the General Clauses Act to include Union Territories as respects the period after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution was not effectively made by Adaptation Order (No. I) 1956 because the power of the President under Art. 372(2) expired in 1953; (iii) that Act 25 of 1947 as amended in 1952 purpoted to create a special police force in Delhi, and the Act was not thus not in accord with entry 80 in which the phrase used was 'belonging 'to any State,\"; (iv) that tlie consent of the Maharashtra Govemmen( to the Central Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending to the State of Maharashtra, the power qf the State Police Establishment to investigate cases under s. 409 and s. 477A of the Indian Penal Code was not proved to have been obtained; (v) that in any case no fresh consent 'for the investigation of these oftences was obtained when by Notification dated February 18, 1963 the Delhi Special Police Establishment was empowered to investigate in Maharashtra certain other offenceS in addition to those mentioned in the earlier notifications.\n\nHELD: (i) After the amendment of s. 3(58) of :he General Clauses Act by the Adaptation Order (No. 1) of 1956 the word 'State' in entry 80 of List I must be read as respects any period after the commencement of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution so as to include 'Union Territories'. Therefore, members of a police force belonging to the Union Territory of Delhi could have their power and jurisdiction extended to another State with the consent of the Government of that State. ' Adaptation Order No. 3 of 1956 did not have the effect of taking Act 25 of 1946 outside the ambit of entry 80. (890 Cl\n\n(ii) The power Pro- •\n\nvince or of the Chief Commissioner should be obtained to the extension before the powers would be exercised.\n\nOrdinance No. XXII of 1946 was repealed by the Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946 (XXV of 1946) which re-enacted the provisions of the Ordinance. This Act was adapted and amended on more than one occasion.\n\nFirst came the Adaptation L of Laws Order 1950, enacted under clause 2 of Art. 372 of the Constitution on January 26, 1950.\n\nIt made two changes.\n\nThe. first was throughout the Act tor the words \"Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi\" the woras \"State of Delhi\" were subStituted and for the word \"Provinces\" the words \"Part A and C States\" were substituted. This was merely to give effect to the establishc ment of \"States\" in place of provinces under the scheme of our Constitution.\n\nNext came the changes introduced by Part 'B States (Laws) Act, 1'51 (Act III of 1951). They were indicated in the schedule to that Act.\n\nThose changes removed the words 'in the States' in the long title and the preamble.\n\nThe purpose of this was to remove reference to the States in the phrases \"for the extension to other areas in the 'States\".\n\nThe more significaht changes came in 1952 by the Delhi Special Police Establishment\n\n(Ame11dment) Act 1952 (XXVI of 1952) .. In the long title (after the \"Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950) the words were :\n\n''An Act to make provision for the constitution of a special police force for the State of Delhi for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning Departments of the Central Government etc.\"\n\nAfter the amendment the words read :\n\n\"An Act to make provision for the constitution of a special poice force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in Part C States ...\n\nSimilar changes were also made in the preamble and in s. 3 the reference to Departments of Government was also deleted.\n\nThe G change from 'for the State of Delhi' to 'in Delhi' was the subject of comment in the High Court.\n\nTo that we shall refer later.\n\nIn 1956 the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 was enacted. Previously the Constitution specified the States as Parts A, B and C States and some territories were specified in Part D in the First Schedule.\n\nBv the amendment the distinction between Parts A and B was abolished.\n\nAll States (11reviously Part A and B States) were shown in the First Schedule under the\n\n...\n\nD • E\n\nheading 'The States' and Part C States and Part D territories were all described as Union Territories.\n\nThereupon an Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 was passed and in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 all references to 'Part C States' were replaced by the expression 'union territory'.\n\nAnother significant change made by the Amending Act was to remove from s. 2 the words 'for the State of Delhi', and all references to offences by the words 'committed in connection with matters concerning Departments of the Central Government' were deleted.\n\nThe resulting position. in 1956 may thus be stated by quoting the pertinent sections :\n\n\"Section 2 (I) Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861, the Central Government may ccmstirute a special police force to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment. . . for the investigation of offence~ notified' under section 3.\n\n(2) Subject to any orders which the central Government may make in this behalf, members of the said police establishment shall have throughout in relation to the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers have in connection with the investigation of offences committed therein.\n\n(3) Any member of'the said police establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to any orders which the Cenfral Government may make in this behalf, exercise in any of the powers of the officer in charge of a police station In the area in which he is for the time being and when so exercising such powers shall, subject to any such orders as aforesaid, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station discharging\n\nth~ functions of such an officer within the limits of his station.\"\n\n\"Section 3. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette. specify the offeqces or class of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment.\"\n\n\"Section 5 (1) The Central Government may by order extended to any area (including Railway areas) the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation of any qffences or classes of offences specified in a notification tinder section 3.\"\n\n\"Section 6. Nothing contained in section 5 sha]] be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special\n\nPolice Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdicuou in any area in (a State not being a Union territory or railway area) without the consent of the Government of that State.\"\n\nThe remaining sections need not be quoted here as they follow the scheme of the earlier ordinances and confer powers, junsdiction etc. equal to those of the regular police.\n\nThose provisions are not in dispute.\n\nAfter the passing of the 1946 Act a numbet of notifications succeeded which notified the offences which the Special Police '- Establishinent could investigate. On November 6, 1956 (Notn.\n\nNo. 7 /5/55-A VD) was issued under s. 3 cf the Act of 1946. It enabled the Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia offences t1nder sections 409 and 4 77-A of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nA memorandum (No. DPE/1260/6554-V) dated July 2, 1960 shows that the Government of Maharashtra consented to the D Delhi Special Police Establishment exercising powers and Jurisdiction in the State of Maharashtra in respect of offences mentioned in notifications of the Government of India dated November 6, 1956, February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.\n\nThe first notification has been referred to already.\n\nThe remaining three notifications were notJrought to our notice.\n\nA doubt raised in the High Court and before us , that the Government of Maharashtra had not considered the matter or that the consent was not properly given, is sufficiently answered by the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra dated July 18, 1968 in which it is clearly stated that the Chief Minister hacl considered the matter and given his consent and that under the Rules of Business he was quite competent to do so.\n\nNo argument has been advanced before tis which entitles the appellant to go behind the memorandum and the affidavit.\n\nThere is a presumption of regularity of official acts and even apart from it, the memorandum and the affidavit clearly establish that the consent was given.\n\nIt is. however, urged that the Government of India on February 18, 1963 issued another notification (No 25/12/62- A VD-IT) which superseded the earlier notification No. 25/7 /60- A VD dated January 21, 1961.\n\nFrom this it is argued that the earlier notification to which consent was given by the Maharashtra Government had all been revoked and fresh consent ws thereore, necessary and has not been proved. In our judgment this 1s an argument of no avail.\n\nIt is true that if sections 409 and\n\nA 4 77-A LP .C. were newly added, consent of the Government of Maharashtra would have been necessary. But the Maharashtra Government had on more than one OCClosion consented to the investigation in the State of Maharashtra of the offences.\n\nThe notifications mentioned those offences afresh With some other offences. In so far as the newly added offences are concerned, B the argument would have s9me validity bl\\t not in respect of offences already assented to. We find no force in the argument since we consider the new notification as merely restating !he old notification after including some other offences in the new notification.\n\nThis brings us to the two main arguments.\n\nThe first is that after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act which removed the description 'Part C States' from the Constitution and introduced the expression 'Union Territories' the present entry 80 of the Union List (corresponding to entry 39 of the.Federal Legislative List of the Government of India Act of 1935) cannot be read as enabling the power to be exercised in respect of a police force belonging to the Union Territories such as Delhi.\n\nEntry No. 80 may be read here : •\n\n\"80. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to any area outside that State, but not so as to enable the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that State without the consent of the Government of the State in which such area is situated; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to railway areas outside that State.\"\n\n. This entry speaks of a 'police force belonging to any State' and not of a police force belonging to the Union Territory.\n\nThe adaptation of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956 by substituting 'Union territories' in place of 'Part C States', it is said, cut the Act adrift from the entry under which the power could alone be exercised.\n\nThis power is limited in extent, it is argued, and cannot be used except as specifically conferred and it applies to a police force belongi, ng to a State and not Union territory.\n\nIn reply the provisions of the General Clauses Act, as adapted by Adaptation Order !No. 1) were brought to our notice.\n\nSection 3(58) of the General Clauses Act was aC!apted to read :\n\n\"State\"-\n\n(a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) U lSupCl(NP)/70-12\n\n(b)\n\nAct 1956 shall mean a Part A State, a Part B\n\nStat~ or a 'Part C State; and\n\nas respects any period after such commencement. shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Unil Police Establishment, Delhi and investiation thereof was ordered to be conducted in the State of Maharashtra by an lnspectm under the Establishment."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3(58)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3975, "end_char": 3983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3991, "end_char": 4010, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372(2) expired in 1953; (iii) that Act 25 of 1947 as amended in 1952 purpoted to create a special police force in Delhi, and the Act was not thus not in accord with entry 80 in which the phrase used was 'belonging 'to any State,\"; (iv) that tlie consent of the Maharashtra Govemmen( to the Central Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending to the State of Maharashtra, the power qf the State Police Establishment to investigate cases under s. 409 and s. 477A of the Indian Penal Code was not proved to have been obtained; (v) that in any case no fresh consent 'for the investigation of these oftences was obtained when by Notification dated February 18, 1963 the Delhi Special Police Establishment was empowered to investigate in Maharashtra certain other offenceS in addition to those mentioned in the earlier notifications."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4670, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 477A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4713, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372(2) expired in 1953; (iii) that Act 25 of 1947 as amended in 1952 purpoted to create a special police force in Delhi, and the Act was not thus not in accord with entry 80 in which the phrase used was 'belonging 'to any State,\"; (iv) that tlie consent of the Maharashtra Govemmen( to the Central Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending to the State of Maharashtra, the power qf the State Police Establishment to investigate cases under s. 409 and s. 477A of the Indian Penal Code was not proved to have been obtained; (v) that in any case no fresh consent 'for the investigation of these oftences was obtained when by Notification dated February 18, 1963 the Delhi Special Police Establishment was empowered to investigate in Maharashtra certain other offenceS in addition to those mentioned in the earlier notifications."}}, {"text": "s. 3(58)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5090, "end_char": 5098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 372A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5911, "end_char": 5938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(58)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "statute": "Seventh Amendment Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "[1968) 2 S.C.R. 103", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Kishore Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kishore Sen's case to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6400, "end_char": 6408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seventh Amendment Act, 1956", "statute": "Seventh Amendment Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "July 2, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "893 E-F]\n\n(iv) There is a presumption oi regularity of official acts but even apart 'from it the memorandum of the Government of Maharashtra dated July 2, 1960 and the affidavit filed by the lender Secretary to the Government clearly established that the consent of the Government of Maharashtra to the notifications of the Central Government mentioned therein was duly given. ["}}, {"text": "February 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "888 F]\n\n(v) If by the notification dated February 18, 1963 ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 409 and 477A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and B. Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and B. Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D Jagadish Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Melita and\n\nR~ N.\n\nSachthey, for the respundents."}}, {"text": "R. L. Melita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8214, "end_char": 8226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Melita and\n\nR~ N.\n\nSachthey, for the respundents."}}, {"text": "R~ N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8232, "end_char": 8247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Melita and\n\nR~ N.\n\nSachthey, for the respundents."}}, {"text": "llidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8314, "end_char": 8327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by llidayatullah, C.J. On a corn, plaint, J anuar1 30, J 968 by the Income Tax Officer (Section X Central) Bombay, of the Commission of Offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 477A and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8495, "end_char": 8501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8509, "end_char": 8526, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8611, "end_char": 8620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "409, 477A and 120B read with s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code a case was registerd by the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, New Delhi.. Investigation was entrusted to an Inspector under the Establisbment."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8714, "end_char": 8731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was to be made in Maharashtra State."}}, {"text": "Management of' Advance Insurance Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8787, "end_char": 8835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, which is a limited company, call~ the Management of' Advance Insurance Company Limited, thereupon filed a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8870, "end_char": 8878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Delhi challenging the right of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the case."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was disposed of on October 18, 1968 by the High Court ordering its dismissal."}}, {"text": "are concerned todav with the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "was passed when the Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9853, "end_char": 9901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 10020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the Province", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any part of l:lritish India to any area in another Governor's Province or Chief Commissioner's Province, but not so as to enable the police of one part to exercise powers and Jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent of the Government of the Province or the Chief Commissioner as the case may be; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any unit to railway areas outside that unit.\""}}, {"text": "s. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11804, "end_char": 11810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 12, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11964, "end_char": 11977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 12, 1943 the Governor."}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12075, "end_char": 12080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12424, "end_char": 12437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It extended to the whole of British India and came i:nto force at once."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12471, "end_char": 12475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12761, "end_char": 12765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12907, "end_char": 12911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act which was continued in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13384, "end_char": 13402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ordinance would have lapsed on September 30, 1946."}}, {"text": "25, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13430, "end_char": 13438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before that on September 25, 1946 another ordinance of the same name (No."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13943, "end_char": 13947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13997, "end_char": 14007, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14297, "end_char": 14306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14351, "end_char": 14355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14521, "end_char": 14525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14978, "end_char": 14986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 14998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946", "statute": "the Delhi Police Establishment Act 1946"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372 of the Constitution on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15112, "end_char": 15150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first was throughout the Act tor the words \"Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi\" the woras \"State of Delhi\" were subStituted and for the word \"Provinces\" the words \"Part A and C States\" were substituted."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16423, "end_char": 16427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16822, "end_char": 16836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16973, "end_char": 16987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17181, "end_char": 17224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Another significant change made by the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17311, "end_char": 17362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17382, "end_char": 17386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another significant change made by the Amending Act", "statute": "Another significant change made by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17659, "end_char": 17668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another significant change made by the Amending Act", "statute": "Another significant change made by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17673, "end_char": 17721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17891, "end_char": 17900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17939, "end_char": 17957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Subject to any orders which the central Government may make in this behalf, members of the said police establishment shall have throughout in relation to the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers have in connection with the investigation of offences committed therein."}}, {"text": "Cenfral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18416, "end_char": 18434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Any member of'the said police establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to any orders which the Cenfral Government may make in this behalf, exercise in any of the powers of the officer in charge of a police station In the area in which he is for the time being and when so exercising such powers shall, subject to any such orders as aforesaid, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station discharging\n\nth~ functions of such an officer within the limits of his station.\""}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18804, "end_char": 18813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19001, "end_char": 19010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19275, "end_char": 19284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19289, "end_char": 19298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19321, "end_char": 19330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Special\n\nPolice Establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19375, "end_char": 19410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing contained in section 5 sha]] be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special\n\nPolice Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdicuou in any area in (a State not being a Union territory or railway area) without the consent of the Government of that State.\""}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20005, "end_char": 20009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20116, "end_char": 20134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20147, "end_char": 20164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D Delhi Special Police Establishment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20279, "end_char": 20315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DPE/1260/6554-V) dated July 2, 1960 shows that the Government of Maharashtra consented to the D Delhi Special Police Establishment exercising powers and Jurisdiction in the State of Maharashtra in respect of offences mentioned in notifications of the Government of India dated November 6, 1956, February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27, 1957."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20917, "end_char": 20930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A doubt raised in the High Court and before us , that the Government of Maharashtra had not considered the matter or that the consent was not properly given, is sufficiently answered by the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra dated July 18, 1968 in which it is clearly stated that the Chief Minister hacl 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"end_char": 21868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22270, "end_char": 22272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Federal Legislative List of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22811, "end_char": 22866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Special Police Establishment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23650, "end_char": 23688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24107, "end_char": 24126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3(58)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24196, "end_char": 24209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24217, "end_char": 24236, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24548, "end_char": 24562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25310, "end_char": 25329, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25446, "end_char": 25457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25473, "end_char": 25481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25588, "end_char": 25607, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General 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SHAH, K. s: 'HEGoE '.ANo A. N. GRovER, JJ.J\n\n' Hindu La11-Wlzet/1er full 011•11ership acquired by widow under s. 14(1) of Hindu Succession :A.ct defeasib/e by adOption 1nade afte1 the enllc:unent, -\n\nA Hindu died leaving behind his widow and daughters.\n\nThe properties le{t behind by the deceased were' inherited by the widow, and they \\Vere in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force.\n\nSubsequent to the enforcement of the Act, she adopted a son and thereafter settled a part of the property on one of the daughters. The_ adopted son challenged the validity of the settlen1ent deed contehdiuj? that the adoption must be deemed to relate back to the death of the 'vidow's husband and therefore she was incompetent to make the impugned alienation.\n\nRejecting the contention1 this Court;\n\nHELD :-The rights conferred 'on a Hindu female under s. 14(1) of the Act are not restricted or limited IJy any rule of Hi.ndu law.\n\nThe section plainly says that the property possessed by a Hindu female on the date the Act came into force \\\\'hether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof. The provision makes .a clear departure (rom the Hindu litw -texts or rules.\n\nThose texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intendment of the provision. [897 F-GJ\n\n'The fiction of relation back in the case of adoption under Hindu friw is 'based on Hindu la\\v texts or rules or at any rate it is based ou interpretation of Hil.'ldu la\\\\·.\n\nTherefore. by virtue of s. 4 of the Act that rule ceased to hh.ve effect from the date the Act came into force '''ith respect to any n1atter for which provision is made under the Act. [896 F-Gl\n\nYan1unabai and Ant v. Rani !11aharr.j Shreedlu1r M<1haraj anfi a11r.\n\nF A.T.R. 1960 Born. 463; approved.\n\nShrinivr.s Krislianarao Kango v. Naray'an Derji Kongo a11d ors. r1955] 1 S.C.R. p. 1; Krishna111urthi J.'nsudeorao Deshpande v. Dlrrun•araj, [1%1] 1 S.C.R. 813, referred to.\n\nSuk/11n111 and anl\". v. Gauri Shat; kar and anr. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 4i6 referred to.\n\nCiv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and Decree dated September 3. 1963 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1021 of 1960.\n\nB. Datta, for the appellant.\n\nH M. Srinivasall, K. N. Ba/as11brama11ian and Lily Thomas, for respondent No. 1.\n\nP. \"AMMAL \\', RAMAL!NGAM (Hegde, J.) 89 5\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJ:legde, 1.\n\nThe question for decision in this appeal by certificate is whether the full ownership conferred on aHindu femak under s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (to be hereinafte1 referred to as the Actl is defeasible by the adoption made by her to. her deceased .husba!ld after the Act came into force.\n\nThe fdcts relevant for the purpose of deciding that question of law may now lie stateion holding that the adootion of the plaintiff must be deemed to relate back to the date of the death of Somasundara Udayar and therefore Sellathachi W?~ incompetent to make the-impugned alienation.\n\nThis correctness of this findin!! is in issue in this arpeal. ' -\n\nAccording to Hindu law texts as interpreted by courts-, on adoption _by a Hindu widow, the adopted son acquires all the rights of an mirasa son and those rights relate ba9k to the date of the death of the adootive father-see Shri11i1'as Krish11arac• Ka11go v. Narayan Devji Kango and ors.('). Hence the estate held by a widow was a defeasible 'estate.\n\nTi)e same is the case with a person possessing title defeasible on adoption: not only hfs titk but also the title of all persdns claiming under hiJ11 will be\n\n(t) [1955! l S.C.R. p. I.\n\nSVPREME COVRT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R.\n\nextinguished on adoption-see Krishnamurthi V asudeorao Deshpande v. Dhruwaraf('). In fact under the Benaras School of Mitakshra rule where a male coparcener is not entitled to alienate even for value his undivided interest in the coparcenary property without the consent of the other coparceners, the alienation effected 'by a sole surviving male coparccner can be successfully challenged by a person adopted subsequent to the alienation.\n\nThe fiction of relation back has been given full effec~ by courts and consequences spelled out a5 if the fiction is a fact.\n\nThe adopted son is deemed for all practical purposes, subject to some minor exceptions, to have born as an aurasa son on the date his adoptive father died. Admittedly but for the relevant provisions in the Act the settlement in favour of the appellant could have afforded no basis for resisting the claim of the adopted son.\n\nTherefore we have to see whether the provisions of the Act have effected any change in the law as regards the fiction referred to.\n\nSection 4( 1) of the Act provides :\n\n\"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-\n\n( a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custoln or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;\n\n(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.\"\n\nIt is undisputed that the fiction of relation back in the case I' of adoption under Hindu law is based on Hindu law texts or rule <;>r at any rate it is based on interpretation of Hindu law. Theretore that rule ceased to have effect from the date the Act came into force with respect to any matter for which provision is made . under the Act.\n\nHence we have to see whether the matter dealt with under s. 14 (1) impinges on the rule of adoption relating C back to the date of death of the adoptive father.\n\n. doption is a ode of affiliation which con.ers a right of mhentance under Hindu law.\n\nUnder that Jaw a widow in the absence of any preferential heir succeeded to the estate of her deceased husband but she took only an estate known as widow's H estate.\n\nAfter her death the property devolved on the nearest\n\n\nP. AMMAL v. KAMAL!NGAM '(Hegde, J.) 197\n\nreversioner of her husband. Section 14(1) of the Act made an important departure in that respect.\n\nThat section provides :\n\n\"Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencemt of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.\"\n\nThe explanation to the section is not necessary for our present purpose.\n\nIt was conceded at the bar that Sellathachi was in possession of the property in dispute on the date the Act came into force.\n\nBy virtue of the aforesaid provision, she became the full owner of the property on that date. From a plain reading of s. 14(1l, it is clear that the estate taken by a Hindu female under that provision is an absolute one and is not defeasible under any circumstance. The ambit of that estate cannot be cut by any\n\ni.ext, rule or interpretation of Hindu law.\n\nThe presumption of continuity of law is only a rule of interpretation. That presumption is inoperative if the language of the concerned statutory provision is plain and unambiguous.\n\nThe fiction mentioned earlier is abrogated to the extent it conflicts with the rights conferred on\n\na Hindu female under s. 14( 1) of the Act. In Sukhram and anr.\n\nv. Gauri Shankar and anr. (1) this Court held that though a male member of a Hindu family governed by the Benaras School of Hindu .law is subject to restrictions qua alienation of his interest in the joint family property but a widow acquiring aii interest in\n\nthat property by virtue of Hindu Succession Act is not subject to any such restrictions.\n\nThis Court held in S. S. M11nna Lal v ..\n\nS. S. Rajkumar and ors. (2) that by virtue of s. 4 of the Act the legislature abrogated the rules of Hindu law on all matters in respect of which there is an express provision in the Act. In our opinion the rights conferred on a Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act are not restricted or limited by any rule of Hindu law.\n\nThe section plainly says that the property possessed by a Hindu female 0!1 the date the Act came into force whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held h\\' her as full owner thereof.\n\nThat provision makes a clear depn:- ture from the Hindu law texts or rules.\n\nThose texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intendment of ti provision.\n\nIn our judgment the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not right in limiting the scope of s. 14! 1) by taking the aid of the fi, tion ''lentioncd earlier.\n\nThat in our opinion ;,, wholly impe 1iss! .Je.\n\nOn the point under consideration the\n\n(1) [1968]\n\nJ ,, C.R.476.\n\n(2) [1962] J Supp. S.C.R. 41X.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) 3 s.c.R.\n\ndecision of the Bombay High Court in Yamunabal and anr. v.\n\nRam Maharaj Shreedhar Maharaj and anr. {1) lays down the law correctly.\n\nIn the result we allow this appeal and set aside the decree nnd judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.\n\nThe 1st respondent will pay the Court fee payable by the appellant in this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nY.P.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1960 Born. 463.\n\n- A", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "PUNITHAVALLI AMMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUNITHAVALLI AMMAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMALINGAM (MINOR) AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMALINGAM (MINOR) AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "e. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. s: 'HEGoE '.ANo A. N. GRovER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vere in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 411, "end_char": 469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 941, "end_char": 949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vere in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "Vere in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 S.C.R. 4", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2115, "end_char": 2132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2332, "end_char": 2340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Datta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H M. Srinivasall", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. Srinivasall, K. N. Ba/as11brama11ian and Lily Thomas, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Ba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2380, "end_char": 2388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. Srinivasall, K. N. Ba/as11brama11ian and Lily Thomas, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M. Srinivasall, K. N. Ba/as11brama11ian and Lily Thomas, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "RAMAL!NGAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. \"AMMAL \\', RAMAL!NGAM (Hegde, J.) 89 5\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJ:legde, 1."}}, {"text": "legde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2533, "end_char": 2538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. \"AMMAL \\', RAMAL!NGAM (Hegde, J.) 89 5\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJ:legde, 1."}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2662, "end_char": 2670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2698, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Somasundra Udayar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2937, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fdcts relevant for the purpose of deciding that question of law may now lie stateion holding that the adootion of the plaintiff must be deemed to relate back to the date of the death of Somasundara Udayar and therefore Sellathachi W?~ incompetent to make the-impugned alienation."}}, {"text": "Somasundara Udayar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t division bench of th~ High Court of Madras reversed that deci- >ion holding that the adootion of the plaintiff must be deemed to relate back to the date of the death of Somasundara Udayar and therefore Sellathachi W?~ incompetent to make the-impugned alienation.", "canonical_name": "Somasundara Udayar"}}, {"text": "Section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7140, "end_char": 7145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act", "statute": "Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act"}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act", "statute": "Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act"}}, {"text": "Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencemt of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7720, "end_char": 7820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sukhram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sukhram and anr."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9442, "end_char": 9447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9947, "end_char": 9964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not right in limiting the scope of s. 14!"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10005, "end_char": 10010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Succession Act", "statute": "Hindu Succession Act"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_899_902_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "NAGARMAL TEKRIWAL\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 4, 1970\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ,]\n\nBihar Foodgrains Dealer's Licensing Order, 1966, Para, 3(2)-Presumption from storage of foodgrains when to be drawn-Exemption for agriculturists.\n\nEvidence Act, 1812-Lease-deeds even if not registered can be used in criminal case for collateral purpose-Oral evidence not lo be rejected on mere ground that it is of next-door neighbours.\n\nOn search of the appellant's premises foodgrains above quantities permitted under the Bihar Foodgrain Dealer's Licensing Order 1966 were found. He was prosecuted under s. 7 of the Essential .Commodities Act for violation of cl'. 3 QI the Order. The appellant produced oral and documentary evidence to show that he was an agl'iculturist and therefore the presumption under cl. 3(2) of the order that he had' stored the foodgrains for sale could not be drawn against him. The documentary evidence aforesaid consisted of lease deeds executed by the appellant and his brother in favour of lessees. The oral evidence showed that he and his brother were in possession of 80--90 bighas of land on which the foodgrains found in his possession were grown.\n\nThe documentary evidence was. rejected by the trial Rlagistrate on the ground that the leasedeeds not being registered were not admissible in evidence under s. 49 of the Registration Act. The Sessie>ns Judge in appeal did not 'rely on the lease.deeds for the reason that such documents could be brought into existence at any time. Both the trial magistrate and the Sessions Judge rejected the oral evidence as unreliable because it was given by persons who were next door neighbours and as· such interested in the appellant.\n\nThe appellant's revision petition before the High Court was summarily rejected.\n\nBy special leave he appealed to this Couict.\n\nHELD : ( i) Cl. 3 ( 2) of the Or\\ler expressly excludes bona fide consumers and agriculturists from the presumption to be drawn from proof of storage. only. It is obvious that the sub-01ause speaks of storage for sale as a dealer although the words 'as a deale<' are not there because storage has reference to business as a dealer and that is the essence of the order. The fiction in the second sub-clae must becarried to its\n\nloc~ conclusion, [902 Bl\n\n(ii) No doi.ibt the lease-deeds were not registel'ed\" but in a criminal\" case it had to be seen whether they were genuine or not and whether an inference of innocence could be based on them They served the collateral purpose of showing that the> lands about which the witne8ses spoke. orally were held by him for purposes of cultiVJltion. [902 DI\n\n(iii) There is no reason why the evidence of a nex\\ door neighbour should be rejected unless there is something intrinsically wrong witll it.\n\n[902 E-FJ (iv)The tOtal circumstances in the case showed that the appellant was in fact carrying on agricultural operations. He executed a number of lease-ate of Maharashtra, [1~70] 3 S.C.R. 525 and Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal [1964] 3 S.C.R 237, followed. 2n. followed.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leav.e from the order .dated December 5, 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1444 of 1966.\n\nThe appellant did not appear.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and s: /'. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment ol the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against the judgen~ f te J:li~ Court of Bombay dated 5 December, 1966 d1sm1ssmg m limme the appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 16 August, 1966 passed by the Sessions Judge Sholapur.\n\nThe High Court by an order datCd 3 April 1967 also refused leave to appeal to this Court. '\n\nThe appellant was accused No. I.\n\nHe was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nBroadly stated, the charge against the appellant was that he in conspiracy with his brother, accused No. 2 committed murder\n\nof Revansidhappa Shivappa Patil and Mahadeo Sidran Patil.\n\nThe B defence of both the appellant and his brother was one of total denial.\n\nThe right to prefer an appeal from sentence of Court of Sessions is conferred by section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right to appeal is one both on a matter of fact and a matter of J.aw.\n\nIt is only in cases where there is a trial by jury that the C right to appeal is under section 418 confined only to a matter of law.\n\nThis Court in several decisions dealt with section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the rights of the appellant thereunder. Reference may be made to one of the earlier decisions of D this Court in Mushtak Hussain v. Tire State of Bombay(') and the recent decision in Govinda Kadtuji Kadam & Or.•.' v.\n\nState of Maharashtra(') where several previous decisions of this Court have been noticed.\n\nThe following principles emerge from the decisions; first, the Appellate Court undoubtedly has power of summary dismissal; E secondly, if the appeal raises arguable and substantial points the High Court should give reasons for rejection of appeal; thirdly, rejection of an appeal by using only one word of dismissal causes difficulties and embarrassment in finding out the reasons which weighed with the High Court in dismissal of the appeal in limine; fourthly this Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal(') F held that the High Court should not summarily reject criminal appeals if they raise arguable and substantial points.\n\nAs to what is an arguable and a substantial point may be illustrated with reference to a few decisions.\n\nIn Nara.van Swami v. State of Maharashtra(') this Court stated G that a ground in preferring an appeal from the judgment of the Sessions Court that a gross illegality was committed in relying upon the evidence given by a co-accused in a dacoity case and using the answers given by him as a co-accused against the accused appellant would be a substantial question.\n\nAgain it was noticed that denial of an opportunity to a:n appellant in a dacoity H\n\n(I), {1953] S.C.R. 809.\n\n(J) [19641 l S.C.R. 237.\n\n(2) !1970] 3 S.C.R. 525.\n\n(4) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 88.\n\nSIDDANNA V. MAHARASHTRA (Ray, J.) 911\n\ncase of being heard as required under section 479A of the Criminal Procedure Code would be an arguable point.\n\nin an unreported decision of this Court in Bhanwar Singh v.\n\nState of Rajasthan('), it was held that failure to consider the position in which the appellant was placed when his immediate superior admittedly ordered him to bring out the currency notes which were required not for the purpose of investigation of any case but only for the purpose of being shown to a person whom the sub-inspector wanted to help in laying down a new trap would be a substantial ground in a conviction under Prevention of Corruption Act and section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIn another unreported decision of this Court in Vishwa1J0th Shankar Beldar v. State of Maharashtra(') it was said that if the trial Judge did not accept the witness as a wholly truthful witness in the light of reports sent by police officers and his statement under section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and remarked that a portion of the evidence was clearly an improvement it was necessary for the High Court to consider the evidence afresh.\n\nIn another unrepotted earlier decision of this Court in Bashir -Husain Peshimani v.\n\nThe State of Maharashtra(') the offences alleged were under the Indian Penal Code, the Sea Customs Act, 1887 and the Foreign Exc\\lange Regulation Act, 1947 in respect of gold alleged to have bee, n brought into India in pursuance of a conspiracy.\n\nThere was oral testimony of accomplices.\n\nThat evidence was held by the trial Court to have been corroborated by the actual finding of gold from the place of one of the accused.\n\nAnother piece of evidence was the recovery of duplicate set of keys at the residence of accused No. 2.\n\nReliance was placed by the trial court on the confession of the appellant which had been retracted as corroborative evidence of the accomplice witnesses.\n\nIn preferring appeal to the High Court the grounds urged were that there were serious infirmities in the evidence and the manner in which the keys were recovered was open to objection.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal in limine: This Court remitted the matter back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law by expressing the view that these were arguable points. In the same case ir was said that it would be open to the appellant to canvass before the High Court in appeal every point even on a question of fact in his favour to demolish by reference to other material the evidence that had been used against him.\n\nIn the preseni case, one of the contentions of the appellant in the appeal preferred was that the appellant was charged under\n\nJ) Criminal Appeal No. 38of1969 decided on 17 September, 1969.\n\n(2) Criminal Appeal :No. 95of1969 dececided on 18 September 1969.\n\n(3) Criminal Appeal No. 262of1968 decided on 20 Dcchml:er, 19f8.\n\nsection 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of both the Patils in furtherance of the common intention of the appellant and accused No. 2 and on accused No. 2 bing acquitted the appellant could not be convicted with the aid of section 34. ln aid of that contention reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Prabhakar Navale v. State of Bombay(') and Krishna G. Patil v. State of Maharashtra(').\n\nAnother contention raised in the appeal was that it would be an error to hold that there was inititnacy between the appellant and Nilava wife of Babanna on the evidence of third parties when neither Babanna or Nilava gave evidence.\n\nWe have only referred to two contentions amongst several others to illustrate both arguable and substantial matters of law and of fact.\n\nIn the present case the High Court dismissed the appeal by a single word and it is not possible to know the reasons which persuaded the High Court to dismiss the appeal.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed.\n\nThe order of dismissal of the appeal is set aside.\n\nThe matter is sent back to the High Court for fresh con; ideration on hearing the parties.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n----------·----\n\n(I) A.LR. 1963 S.C. 51.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1963 S.C. 1413.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "SIDDANNA APPARAO PATIL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIDDANNA APPARAO PATIL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SIDDANNA APPARAO PATIL\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMarch 6, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND l D. DuA, JJ.J\n\n909."}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l D. DuA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.C.R 237", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1303, "end_char": 1321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1575, "end_char": 1590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and s: /'."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment ol the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by special leave against the judgen~ f te J:li~ Court of Bombay dated 5 December, 1966 d1sm1ssmg m limme the appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 16 August, 1966 passed by the Sessions Judge Sholapur."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2070, "end_char": 2081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2092, "end_char": 2102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2110, "end_char": 2127, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Revansidhappa Shivappa Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2297, "end_char": 2325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 committed murder\n\nof Revansidhappa Shivappa Patil and Mahadeo Sidran Patil."}}, {"text": "Mahadeo Sidran Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2330, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 committed murder\n\nof Revansidhappa Shivappa Patil and Mahadeo Sidran Patil."}}, {"text": "section 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 418", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2718, "end_char": 2729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2808, "end_char": 2819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1970] 3 S.C.R. 525", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 88", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SIDDANNA V. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SIDDANNA V. MAHARASHTRA (Ray, J.) 911\n\ncase of being heard as required under section 479A of the Criminal Procedure Code would be an arguable point."}}, {"text": "section 479A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5150, "end_char": 5167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5786, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5840, "end_char": 5860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In another unrepotted earlier decision of this Court in Bashir -Husain Peshimani v.\n\nThe State of Maharashtra(') the offences alleged were under the Indian Penal Code, the Sea Customs Act, 1887 and the Foreign Exc\\lange Regulation Act, 1947 in respect of gold alleged to have bee, n brought into India in pursuance of a conspiracy."}}, {"text": "17 September, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7207, "end_char": 7225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "38of1969 decided on 17 September, 1969."}}, {"text": "18 September 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7275, "end_char": 7292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "95of1969 dececided on 18 September 1969."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7361, "end_char": 7372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7383, "end_char": 7393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7401, "end_char": 7418, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nilava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7934, "end_char": 7940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another contention raised in the appeal was that it would be an error to hold that there was inititnacy between the appellant and Nilava wife of Babanna on the evidence of third parties when neither Babanna or Nilava gave evidence."}}, {"text": "Babanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7949, "end_char": 7956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another contention raised in the appeal was that it would be an error to hold that there was inititnacy between the appellant and Nilava wife of Babanna on the evidence of third parties when neither Babanna or Nilava gave evidence."}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_913_919_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "CHAMAN LAL\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 6, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 499 and 500-Plea of justification under exception.\\· 1, 8 and 9 of s. 499-Scope of-When docu111ents privileged,\n\nThe appellant, who was the President of the local Municipal Com mittee. was convicted under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code on a complaint that he had made defamatory remarks in respect of the character of the complainant, a Nurse attached to the Civil Dispensary, at a public meeting; that he wrote a letter to the Civil Su'rgeon which contained defamatory statements against he•r character and also repeated the defamatory allegations before the Civil Surgeon.\n\nThe appellant's plea of justification under excptions 1, 8 and 9 of s. 499_ I.P.C. was rejected by the trial court and his appeal to the High Court was also dis missed.\n\nOn appeal to this Court\n\nHELD : On the facts, the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nIn order to come within the First Exception to s. 499 it has to be established that what has been imputed concerning the respondent is true and the publication of the imputation is for the public good.\n\nThe onus of plroving these two ingredients was on the appellant but he tota1ly\n\nailed to establish these pleas.\n\nOn the contrary, the evidence showed that the imputation concerning the respondent was not true but was motivated by animus of the appell'111t against the rf the person making it, or of !lny other person, or for the pubhc good.\n\n' c\n\nF -\n\nThe letter written by the appellant dated 2 August, 1962 which was marked as Exhibit P.W. 4/ A, inter alia, states, \"It\n\nis a matter of grave concern and consideration that Smt. Bishan Kaur, Nurse Dai attached with Civil Dispensary is earning very bad reputation having illegal relations with one Shri Prakash Chand. a cycle repairer of Sujanpur.\n\nA meeting of the Co-ordinate Civic-body of Sujanpur was convened, to create civic sense .... on 29 July at 8 A.M. in the Town Hall wherein leading men bf all communities were present.\n\nThe issue about the character of Smt. Bishan Kaur was discussed in open house and the public felt this point seriously.\n\nThe matter has been brought to the notice of the worthy Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur personally by me on 1 August, 1962 and he assured to take immediate action against her.\n\nI feel my assumption to bring to your notice and request for immediate transfer of her in the public interest\"\n\nThe appellant claimed that the residents of Ward-5 of Sujanpur had submitted a complaint in writing dated 25 July, 1962 against the serious misbehaviour of the respondem Bishan Kaur and that allegations were made against the character of Bishan Kaur in that application.\n\nThe appellant further claimed that the said application marked Exhibit D.W. 1/ A was read by the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Sujanpur at the meeting on 29 July, 1962.\n\nThe further defence of the appellant was that a resolution was passed at that meeting requesting the appellant to approach the higher authorities regarding the said application and it was pursuant to that resolution that the appellant wrote the letter dated 2 August; 1962 forming the subject matter of the complaint. The resolution on which the appellant relied was marked as Exhibit D.C.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that good faith of the appellant was established by two features; first that as President he had to act in public interest, and, secondly, large number of people who signed the application and passed the resolution were present at the meeting on 29 July, 1962 and there were allegations against the respondent.\n\nIt was, therefore, said by counsel for the appellant that the appellant acted not only in good faith but also for public good.\n\nPublic good is a question of fact.\n\nGood faith has also to be established as a fact.\n\nThe concurrent findings of fact by the Sessions Court and the High Court with. regard to meeting on 29 July 1962 are three fold; first that there was no record of the proceedings of the meeting c alleged to have been held on 29 July, 1962 at the Town Hall of Sujanpur.\n\nIt was not therefore dependable to rely only on the oral evidence of the complainant that the appellant had defamed the complainant at the meeting, and, therefore, benefit of doubt\n\nwas given to the appellant on that charge.\n\nThe sceond finding is that the application dated 29 July, l \"62 alleged to have been made by the residents of Sujanpur and further alleged to have been 'ead ovrr by the Secretary of the Municipal Committee at the meet- . ·ng on 29 July, 1962 was a manufactured document.\n\nThirdly, the resolution alleged by the appellant to have been passed by the residents of Sujanpur at the meeting on 29 July, 1962 was also a forged document.\n\nOne of the reasons given by both the Courts for rejecting both the application and the resolution from consideration was that none of these alleged documents was put to any of the prosecution witnesses some of whom admittedly attended the meeting on 29 July, 1962.\n\nThe genuineness of the.documents was rightly disbelieved.\n\nIn the background of these findings of fact the plea of good faith of the appellant that he wrote the letter dated 2 August, 1962 pursuant to the application and the resolution of the residents of Sujanpur loses all force and has no foundation.\n\nIn order to establish good faith and bona fide it has to be seen first the circumstance under which the letter was written or words were uttered: secondly. whether there was any malice: thirdly, whether the appellant made any enquiry before he made the allegations; fourthly. whether there are reasons to accept the version that he acted with care and caution and finally whether there is preponderance of probability that the appellant acted in good faith.\n\nThe appellant said that he verified the allegations and then wrote the letter forming the subject matter of the complaint.\n\nThe appellant has not given any evidence as to what steps he took for verifying the allegations.\n\nOn the contrary, it appears to be established on evidence that during five years preceding the letter written by the appellant to the Civil Surgeon there was not a single instance or occasion of any complaint against the respondent Bishan Kaur.\n\nThe further finding is that the appellant in defence sought to produce witnesses who tried to establish that the respondent was a woman of doubtful virtues.\n\nThree of the witnesses on behalf of the appellant were a potato chop seller, a tongawala and a petty shop-keeper and they went to the extent of sayh1g that they had illicit connections with her.\n\nThese defence witnesses were disbelieved.\n\nThat also proved that the appellant did not act in good faith.\n\nThe appellant was the President o! the Municipal Committee and it would not be an act of good faith or prudence and caution to rely on such persons as a tongawala or a petty shop-keeper in making allegatio.ns against the character o.f the respondent.\n\nF -\n\nCounsel for the appeilant relied on Exhibits D.A. and DB. and submitted that the High Court c:1d not talce these two letters into consideration in finding out tl1e good faith of the appellant Exhibit D.A. is dated 18 September, 1962 and is a letter addrs\n\nsed by the Civil Surgeon to the appcllam. Exhibit D.B. is ir memorandum by the residents of Sujanpur to the Civil Surge •n\n\nand bears the date 27 August, 196'.:. In Exhibit D.B. !he alleged signatories wrote to the Civil SurgeOJ, rhat they had to attend the enquiry by the Civil urgeon in.co rhe conduct of Bishan Kaur and that the enquiry was at thtdemand of the general public and further that there were complaints against the respondent and 'it was not desirable to retain such a person on the noble job of a nurse.\n\nThe letter of the Civil Surgeon dated 1 September, 1962 was that a large number of people were present and bulk of them expressed their views against Biishan Kaur and some of the persons met the Civil Surgeon subsequent to the enquiry at his office.\n\nThe High Court found that some of the persons who submitted the alleged representation against the respondent to the Civil Surgeon later on Ct'ntroverted the allegations against the respondent awl th is evidence established that the complainant was an ordinary nurse awl that is ho\"' the appellant had manoeuvred discussion f die. ;,,_,1; ilainant's -:haracter at the enquiry before the Civil Surge.:m on 27 Augu; t, 1962.\n\nThe appellant cannot rely on Exhibit D.B. dated 27 August, 1962 to estao1i.; h good faith in writing the letter dated 1 August,\n\n1962. Furthermore, Exh'bi: D.B. which is alleged to have been written by tht rc, idents of S\"rrnpur was not proved by calling persons who are alleged to have signed.\n\nDocuments do not prove rhemselves.\n\nExhibit D.B. wa> not proved by the persons who are alleged' to have signed the rnme nor was the truth of statements contained in Exhibit D.B. prc; ved.\n\nThe enquiry made by the Civil S1rgeon on 27 August, l %2 was found by the High Court to have been engineered by the private animus of the appellant against the respondent by sending some residents to-the place of enquiry.\n\nThis finding not only disproves good faith but establishes total lack of care and prudence on the part of the appellant.\n\nThe letter written by the appellant indicates that the appellant wac. setting his seal of approval to matters contained in that letter.\n\nThere is no proof that the appellant made any enquiry about the matters before he \\vrote the letter.\n\nThere is no evidence that the appellant acted with reasonable care.\n\nOn the contrary, circumstances suggest that the appellant acted without any sense of responsibility and propriety. The. appellant was a President of the Municipal Committee and there he was. required to act .with utmost orudence and caution.\n\nIn order to come within the First Exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code it has to be established that what has\n\nen impud con?ern!ng the respo':1dent is true and the publication of the imputation 1s for the pubhc good.\n\nThe onus of proving these two ingredients, namely, truth of the imputation and the publication of the imputation for the public good is on the appellant.\n\nThe apJJP, llant totally failed to establish these pleas.\n\nOn the contrary, the evidence is that the imputation concerning the respondent is not true but is motivated by animus of the appellant against the respondent. ·\n\nThe Eighth Exception to section 499 of the Indian Penal Code indicates that accusation in good faith against the person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter or the accusation is not defamation.\n\nWe have already expressed the view that there is utter lack of good faith in accusation.\n\nThe Ninth Exception states that if the imputation is made in good faith for the protection of the person making it or for another person or for the public good it is not defamation.\n\nThere is no evidence whatever to support the plea that the imputation was for the public good.\n\nThe accusation was not also made in good faith.\n\nGood faith requires care and caution and prudence in the background of context and circumstances. The position of the person making the imputation will regulate the standard -Of care and caution. Under the Eighth ExceptiQD statement is madeby a person to another who has authority to deal with the subject matter of the complaint whereas the Ninth Exception deals with the statement for the protection of the interest of the person making it.\n\nInterest of the person has to be real and legitimate when communication is made in protection of the interest of the person making it.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that the communication to the Civil Surgeon was privileged, because as the President of the Municipal Committee be had to write to the Civil Surgeon\n\nabout the work of the complainant.\n\nIt will be a question of . fact as to what the duty of the appellant was in relation to the work of the respondent in making a statement to the Civil Surgeon.\n\nThis plea was not taken and there is no evidence to support it.\n\nFurthermore, the privilege extends only to a communication upon the subject with respect to which the privilege xtends and the privilege can be claimed in exercise of the right or safeguard of the interest which creates the privilege. In the present case, the concurrent findings of fact repel any suggestion of protection of the interest of the appellant in making the insinuations contained in the letter forming the subject matter of the com- . plaint. There is also no matrial to sow as t? ow the letter was written by the appellant m protection of his mterest.\n\nA \"\"(\n\nF '!.\n\n,, .\n\nThe letter writttn by the appellant contains imputations and insinuations against the character of the respondent.\n\nOne of the allegations was that a cycle repairer was on intimate terms with the respondent.\n\nThis was a serious allegation against the character of the respondent. The appellant made baseless and reckless allegations.\n\nThey are baseless because they have not been proved.\n\nThey are reckless because the appellant claimed to qe the President of the Municipal Committee but he acted in a totally irresponsible manner by havillg gone out of his way to make the allegations against the character of a poor and helpless\n\nwidow.· The appellant was a man.of power and wealth.\n\nThat is all the more why he should have acted with restraint and decorum. He failed in both. There was po good faith.\n\nThe appellant .cannot be said to have acted in public good.\n\nCounsel for the appellant submitted that if there was a reduction of sentence from three months to two , months that would save him from disqualification.\n\nThere is no merit in that submission.\n\nThis is not a case where th~ should be a reduction of sentence\n\nparticularly when the Courts have found facts which dispel any , semblance of good faith and indicate on the contrary lack of prudence and dignity with which a person occupying the office of tlie President should act.\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The appellant is directed to surrender to the bail bond to undergo the unexpired term of his imprisonment\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "LAL\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 6, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHAMAN LAL\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 6, 1970\n\n[A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code, 1860, ss."}}, {"text": "A. N. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 499 and 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 985, "end_char": 991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Purthirinorc", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2664, "end_char": 2676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purthirinorc,\n\nthe privilege extends only to a communication upon the subject with resM pect to which the privilege extends and the privilege can be claimed in exer .. cise of the right or safeguard of the interest which creates the privilege."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3412, "end_char": 3425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3511, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 26 May, 1967."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRay, J. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 26 May, 1967."}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3690, "end_char": 3701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3726, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bishan Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case started on a complaint filed by Bishan Kaur on 23 October, 1963.", "canonical_name": "Biishan Kaur"}}, {"text": "Chaman Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3997, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint was that the appellant Chaman Lal who was at that time Pre.sident of Municipal Committee, Sujanpur in the District of Gurdaspur had made defamatory remarks against her character at a public meeting held at Sujanp_ur on 29 July, 1962 aild that he further wrote a letter on 2 August, 1962 to the Civil Surgeon, Gurdaspur which contained defamatory statements against her character and further that on 27 August, 1962 the appellant repeated those defamatory allegations before the Civil Surgeon.", "canonical_name": "CHAMAN LAL"}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prakash Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Kaur, Nurse Dai attached with Civil Dispensary is earning very bad reputation having illegal relations with one Shri Prakash Chand."}}, {"text": "Sujanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a cycle repairer of Sujanpur."}}, {"text": "Gurdaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter has been brought to the notice of the worthy Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur personally by me on 1 August, 1962 and he assured to take immediate action against her."}}, {"text": "29 July, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The resolution on which the appellant relied was marked as Exhibit D.C.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that good faith of the appellant was established by two features; first that as President he had to act in public interest, and, secondly, large number of people who signed the application and passed the resolution were present at the meeting on 29 July, 1962 and there were allegations against the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bishan Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary, it appears to be established on evidence that during five years preceding the letter written by the appellant to the Civil Surgeon there was not a single instance or occasion of any complaint against the respondent Bishan Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Biishan Kaur"}}, {"text": "1 September, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11626, "end_char": 11643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of the Civil Surgeon dated 1 September, 1962 was that a large number of people were present and bulk of them expressed their views against Biishan Kaur and some of the persons met the Civil Surgeon subsequent to the enquiry at his office."}}, {"text": "Biishan Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11738, "end_char": 11750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter of the Civil Surgeon dated 1 September, 1962 was that a large number of people were present and bulk of them expressed their views against Biishan Kaur and some of the persons met the Civil Surgeon subsequent to the enquiry at his office.", "canonical_name": "Biishan Kaur"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12778, "end_char": 12780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13691, "end_char": 13702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_920_930_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nTHE LONAVLA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY OF LONA VLA,\n\nDISTRICT POONA, BY ITS CHIEF OFFICER, AND\n\nANOTHER March 9, 1970.\n\n[S. M. SIKRI AND V. BHAR.GAVA, JI.]\n\nBombay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901-S. 59 Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act 18 of 1905-S. 13-Scope of-Collection of taxes from railway as consolidated tax under cl. (c) second proviso instead of separate tnxes under the other provisions of the two SiCtiOnl -V alid.f.''\n\nThe respondent Municipality, which at the time vfu governed by the Bombay District Municipal Act 3 of 1901 levied a tax on lands and buildings situated within its municipal limits at 4 per cent of the annual rental value.\n\nHowever, no such tax was levied on the buildings and lands of the G.l.P. Railway situated within its limits in view of s. 135 of the Indian Railways Act. 9 of 1890. In 1914, the Government of India issued a notification under s. 135 persuant to which the G.I.P. Railway admmistration was required to pay house tax to the respondent.\n\nUpto 19! he respondent municipality used to draw water from the Railway's res.::rvoft' but constructed its own reservoir during that year.\n\nBoth prior to 1:1d after this date, no water rate was charged by the respondent municipality from. the railway.\n\nOn 4th May, 1916 the res:iondent promulgated new rules for taution and instead of charging separate house tax under s. 59(1)(i) or a general water rate under s. 59(1 )(viii) of the Act of 1901, it decided to charge a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings and lands in accordance with clause (c) of the proviso to s. 59(i). Although the respondent demanded this consolidated tax from the railway in respect of its lands and buildings, the railway resisted payment contending that under the notification of 1914, house tax only was payable by it.\n\nOn 26th July, 1917, the Government of India issued a fresh notification under s. 135 of the Railways Act whereby the railway administration was rendered liable to pay what was described as \"tax on lands and buildings\".\n\nThereafter the respondent charged the railway the consolidated tllx until some time in 1927 when the G.I.P. railway was taken over by the Government. In the rules pondent Municipality had by that time been consi tituted into a Borough.\n\nUnder these rules the exemption in respect of Government propeny was deleted.\n\nIn pursuance of these amended rules the respondent started collecting from the railway the consolidated tax assessed as a rate on its buildiniz:s and lands which was by then being levied under the provisions of s.73 of the Act of 1925 that were similar to those of s.59 of the Act of 1901.\n\nIn 1940 the railway administration preferred an appeal under s. 110 of the Act of 1925 against one of the demand n\"tices. Although the\n\n• UNION v. LONAVLA MUNICIPALITY\n\n92I\n\nFirst Court- \"Set aside the demand notice, a_u\"-; ppel --~-; eventually dismissed by the High Court with the remark that the proper 'remedy to be sought was by means of a suit. The Union of India which -had become the owner of the railway, field a suitin November 1954 for refund of the entire_ amount which was collected by the respondent from the railway in pursuance of the rules of 1931.\n\nThe Trial Court granted a decree holding that the levy of this tax was void inasmuch as, under the notification issued on the 26th July, 1917, only the rate on lands and buildings was payable by the Railway Administration.\n\nOn appeal, the High.\n\nCourt disagreed with the trial court and set aside the decree. 011 appeal to _ this Court by a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nHELD : Dismissin!!. the appeal, On the prc:iper-- interpretation of the language used in two Acts, ihe Ru!es, the notification, and taking into account the circumstances under which the notification of 1917-was issued, the only conclusion that could be arrived t was that the Railway was made liable tQ the consolidated tax. ·\n\nIt is true that all taxes 3re not rates; bt all !rates are taxes. A rate on buildings and lands is a tax on buildings; so also any other tax assessed as a rate on buildings and lands becomes a tax on buildings -and lands.\n\nIt \\\\oas not possible to accept the submission of the appellant that the ex:.. pression \"tax on buildings and lands\" used in the notification of 26th July, 1917 could only refer to a rate on buildings and lands under clause (i) of s. 59( I) and would not cover the consolidated tax referred to in_ clause\n\n(c) of the second proviso.\n\nAlthough the tax under clause (c) of the second proviso is not identical with, and is different in nature from, the rate on buildings and 1ands imposed under clause_ (i), that circumstance does not imply that it is not a tax on buildings and lands. The mere use of the word ••consolidated\" cannot make any difference to this. interplre~ tation.\n\nThe intentionappears to be that, thoughthe funicipality was empowered to impose four different kinds of taxes, it was permitted under clause (c) of the second proviso to simplify matters by having a single tax on buildings and lands in lieu of those multiple :::;.xes. Su..:n sin; le tx\n\nhad to be assessed as a rate on buildings and lands. This being the nature, it obviously -becomes a tax on buildings and lands, so that the notification of 26th July, 1917 clearly makes the Railway liable to payment ot this tax. The, position_ under the Act of 1925 is exactly the same where also the language of clause ( c) to the second proviso is identical with that contained in the Act of 1901, so that the liability imposed on the Railway bv the notification of the Government dated 26th July, 1917 unders.135(1) of the Railways Act continued even under the Act of 1925. [927 B-Hl ·\n\nBorough Municipality, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabcd Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1939 Born. 478; Raza Buland Sugar Co.\n\nLtd. Rampur v. Municipal Board. Rampur, A.l.R. 1962 Allti. 81: M11r.icipal Council, Cuddappch v. M. & SM. Ry. Co. Ltd., A.IR 1929 Mad. 746: and Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmeda~ bad,, [19641.~ S.C.R. 608; referred to.\n\ncMi. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1641 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated March 10, 11, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No: 26 of 1958 from Original Decree.\n\nL!OSip CI(NP)/70-14\n\nL. M. Singhvi and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, Y. S.\n\nChitale, Janendra Lal and B.\n\nAgarwala, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered. by\n\nBhargava, J.\n\nThe Union of India, as the owner of the Central Railway, instituted a suit for refund of Rs. 2,76,967 I - collected as tax from the Railway Administration by the respondent Municipality during the period from 1931 till the institution of the suit in November, 1954. The facts leading up to the suit are that the G.l.P. Railway, which was a Private Company, had land situated within the limits of the respondent Municipality.\n\nOn this land, stood the railway station, their Water Reservoir at Bhusi, bungalows of Officers, and certain other buildings.\n\nThere were also vacant lands and some lands on which. railway lines were laid out. In this area, which belonged to the G.1.P. Railway, the Railway. Company itself built roads, supplied water from its Bhusi Reservoir, arranged for the lighting, and provided other services.\n\nIn fact, up to the year 1916, the Railway used to supply water even to the Municipality from its Bhusi Reservoir on payment.\n\nThe Municipality was governed, at that time, by the Bombay District Municipal Act No. 3 of 1901 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act of 190 l \") under which a tax on lands and buildings situated within the municipal limits used to be charged @ 4 per cent of the annual rental value, but no tax was levied on the buildings and lands of the G.l.P. Railway in view of section 135 of the Indian Railways Act No. 9 of 1890. In the year 1914, the Government of India issued a notification under s. 135 of the Railways Act declaring that the Adlllinistration of the G.l.P. Railway shall be liable to pay, in aid of the funds of the local authorities set out in the Schedule, the taxes specified against each of those authorities. Against the name of Lonavla Municipality, which is the respondent n this case, the tax mentioned was house-tax.\n\nThus, the exemption granted to the Railway Administration was taken away by this notification in respect of house-tax and house-tax became payable by the G.I.P. Railway to the respondent.\n\nIn 1916, the respondent constructed its own water reservoir and became independent of the Railway for water supply, but no water rate was charged from the Railway even thereafter, though water charges for actual quantities of water supplied in three of the bungalows was charged from the occupants of the bungalows.\n\nThe rest of the Railway Colqny continued to be supplied with water from the Railway Reservoir at Bhusi.\n\nOJI 4th May, 1916, the respondent promulgated new rules for taxation and, instead of charging separate house-tax and water rate it decicled to charge a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on\n\nUNION v. LONAYLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, /.) 923\n\nbuildings and lands in accordance with clause (c) .of the proviso to section 59(1) of the Act of 1901. Thereafter, 1t appears that the respondent deman_ded this consolidated tax from the Railway in respect of the Railway lands and buildings. The Railway felt that, since, under the notification of 1914, house-tax only was payable by the Railway Administration, there was no justification for the respondent to charge consolidated tax from it and, consequently, protested against this payment. Thereafter, on 26th July, 1917, the Government of India issued a fresh notification under s. 135 of the Railways Act, whereby the Railway Administration was rendered liable to pay what was described as \"tax on lands and buildings\".\n\nOn the issue of this notification, the respondent started charging the G.I.P. Railway this consolidated tax and this continued until some time in the year 1927 by which time the G.I.P.\n\nRailway was taken over by the Government and became a Government undertaking. In the Rules promulgated on 4th May, 1916, the consolidated tax described as a general rate on buildings and lands was not chargeable on government property.\n\nRelying on this provision in the Rules, an objection was raised that the charge of the tax was illegal when the Railway had become government property.\n\nSubsequently, the respondent Municipality amended its Rules and promulgated fresh Rules on the 6th October, 1931. By this time, the respondent Municipality had been constituted into a Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act No. 18 of 1925 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act of 1925\"). These new Rules were thus promulgated under this Act of 1925. Under these Rules, the exemption in respect of government property to the charge of the general rate on buildings and lands, which was contained in the Rules of 1916, was deleted and all lands and buildings within the Municipal Borough became chargeable irrespective of their being owned by the Government. A separaJ.e clause was incorporated giving certain exemptions, but, since they do not affect the case before us, they need not be mentioned. In pursuance of these Rules of 1931, the respondent started collecting the consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings and lands of the Railway from it.\n\nIn the year 1940, the Railway Administration preferred an appeal under section 110 of the Act of 1925 against one of the demand notices issued in respect of this tax on the 6th October, 1940.\n\nThis appeal came up before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Western Division, Poona, who held that the levy of this consolidated tax was ultra vires and set aside the demand notice. On a revision by the respondent under section 111 of the Act of 1925, the District and Sessions Judge set aside the order of , he Sub-Divisional Magistrate, holding that the imposition of the tax was valid.\n\nAgainst this decision, the Railway Administration filed a revision\n\nbefore the High Court of Bombay under section 115 of the Code A of Civil Procedure. The High Court, on 12th February, 1945, refused to exercise its sp_ecial powers under section 115, C.P.C., with the further remark that the proper remedy to be sought was by means of a suit.\n\nUnder these circumstances, the Union of India, which had come to be the owner of this Railway under the name of the Central Railway, filed the suit on 27th November, 1954 for refund of the entire amount which was collected by the respondent from the Railway in pursuance of the Rules of 1931. The trial court held that the levy of this tax was void inasmuch as, under the notification issued on the 26th July, 1917, only the rate on lands and buildings was paya]?le by the Railway Administration. The suit for the refund filed by the Union of India was, on this ground, decreed. On appeal, the High Court disagreed with the trial court and held that even the consolidated tax was payable in view of the notification of 26th July, 1917, so that the tax had been rightly collected.\n\nThe High Court, thereupon, set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.\n\nIt is against this decree that the Union of India has come up in this appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution.\n\nIn order to appreciate the submissions made by counsel for parties in this appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of section 59 of the Act of 1901 and of section 73 of the Act of 1925 which are as follows :-\n\n\"Section 59 of the Act of 1901.\n\n59. (1) Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf, any Municipalitymany impose, for the purposes of this Act, any of the following taxes, that is to say,\n\n( i) a rate on buildings or lands or both, situate within the municipal district;\n\n(vii) a general sanitary cess for the construction or maintenance, or both construction and maintenance of public latrines, and for the removal and disposal of refuse; ·\n\n(viii) a general water-rate or a special water rate or\n\nbot~ for watr supplied by the Municipality, which may be nnposed m the form of a rate assessed on buildings\n\nUNION v. LONAVLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 925\n\nand lands, or in any other form, including that of charges for such supply, fixed in such mode or modes, as shall be best adapted to the varying circumstances of any class of cases or of any individual case;\n\n(ix) a lighting tax;\n\nProvided further that-\n\n(c) the Municipality in lieu of imposing separately any two , or more of the taxes described in clauses (i), (vii), (viii) and (ix) may impose a consolidated tax as- , sessed as a rate on buildings or lands, or both situate within the municipal District.\"\n\n\"Section 73 of the Act of 1925\n\n. '73. (1) Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf and to the provisions of sections 75 and 76, a municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act any of the following taxes, namely :-\n\n(i) a rate on buildings or lands or both situate within the municipal borough;\n\n(viii) a general sanitary cess for the construction and maintenance of public latrines, and for the removal and disposal of refuse;\n\n(x) a general water-rate or a special water-rate or G both for water supJ:>lied by the municipality, which may be imposed in the form of a .rate assessed on buildings and lands or in any other form, including that of charges for such supply, fixed in such mode or modes as shall be best adapted to the varying circumstances of any class of cases or of any individual case;\n\n(xi) a lighting tax;\n\nProvided further that-\n\n(c) the municipality in lieu of imposing separately ' any two or more of the taxes described in clauses (i), (viii), (x) a.nd (xi) may impose a consolidat~ tax ases sed as a rate on buildings o~ lands or both situated within the municipal borough;''\n\nIn the year 1914, the respondent Municipality had only levied a rate on buildings l!nd.lands under clause (i) of s. 59(1) of the Act of 1901.\n\nThere was no question of imposing a general or special water rate as the respondent had no water works of its own and was taking water supply from the G.I.P. Railway.\n\nIt was in these circumstances that the notification was issued by the Central Government dated the 13th May, 1914 making the Railway Administration liable to py house-tax to the Municipality of Lonavla. The notification was obviously intended to make the Rai!Way liable to pay the tax which had been imposed as a rate on buildings and lands under s. 59(l)(i) of the Act, of 1901 by the respondent.\n\nSubseqJ!ently, in the year 1916, the respondent Municipality not only arranged for water supply and imposed a general water rate, it proceeded to make rules for imposition of a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings and lands under clause (c) of the second proviso to s. 59(1) in lieu of the existing tax imposed as a rate on buildings and lands under clause (i) as well as the water rate imposed under clause (viii) of s. 59(1).\n\nThereafter, the Central Government issued the notification dated 26th July, 1917 under s. 135(1) of the Railways Act making the G.I.P. Railway liable to tax on buildings and lands imposed by the Lonavla Municipality. It is to be noted that, in this notification, the Government used the word \"tax\" and not the word \"rate\". The tax imposed under s. 59(1) was described as \"a.rate on buildings and lands\". If the intention of the Government had been that the G.l.P. Railway should be liable to that tax only, it could have used the word \"rate\" instead of the word \"tax\" in the notification.\n\nIn fact, if the notification had been left untouched, the liability of the G.I.P. Railway would have continued to be in respect of the rate on buildings or lands because of the erlier notification of 1914, under which the Railway had been made liable to House-tax.\n\nThe notification of 26th July, 1917 made the Railway liable to tax on buildings and lands obviously because the Government intended that the Railway should be liable to the consolidated tax tinder clause (c) of the second proviso to s. 59(1).\n\nClituse (c) permits the imposition of a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings or lands, or both. The moment a tax is assessed as a rate on buildings or lands, it naturally becomes a tax\n\n. '\n\nF •\n\n. ,\n\nUNION v. LONAVLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 927\n\non building and lands.\n\nThe fact that it was a consolidated tax was immaterial. It was this consolidated tax which was intended to be made payable by the G.I.P. Railway when the Central Government used thei expression \"tax on buildings and lands\" in plce of the earlier words \"House Tax\" and chose not to refer to the hability being in resp!lCt of a rate on buildings and lands. It is true that all taxes are not rates; but all rates are taxes.\n\nA rate on buildlligs and lands is a tax on buildings, so . also any other tax assessed as a rate on , build ings and lands becomes a tax on buildings and lands. We are unable to accept the submission mad\\: by counsel for the appellant that the expression \"tax on buildings and lands\" used in the notification of 26th July, 1917 could only refer to a rate on buildings and lands under clause (i) of s. 59(1) and would not cover the consolidated tax referred to in clause (c) of the second proviso. It is true, as urged by him, th.at the tax under clause (c) of the second proviso is not identical with, and is different in nature from, the rate on buildings and lands imposed under clause (i), but that cir-\n\nD cumstance does not imply that it is not a tax on buildings and lands. The mere use of the word \"consolidated\" cannot make any difference to this interpretation. It is also significant that clause\n\n(c) of the second proviso does not purport to lay down that the consolidated tax win be the sum-total of the taxes described in clauses (i), (vii), (viii) and (ix).\n\nThe consolidated tax envisaged by that clause is in lieu of separate imposition of any two or more of the taxes described in clauses (i), (vii), (viii) and (ix) which means that the power to impose this consolidated tax has been given for the purpose of substituting it for the multiple taxes which could be imposed under those clauses. This consolidated tax cannot, therefore, be held to be of the same nature as the taxes in all those clauses.\n\nThe intention appears to be that, though the Municipality was empowered to impose four different kinds of\n\ntxes,_ it was permittaj nder :lause (c) of the second proviso to s!lllphfy matters by hav1ng a smgle tax on buildings and lands in lieu of those multiple taxes. Such a single tax had to be assessed as a rate on buildings and lands. This being the nature, it obviusly becomes a tax on buildings and lands, so that the notification of 26th July, 1917 clearly makes the Railway Hable to pay- G ment of this tax. The position under the Act of 1925 is exactly e se whe!e also the language of clause (c) to the second pro- .v!So s t~?en~1cal with that contained in the Act of 1901, so that the .11ab1hty imposed on the Railway by the notification of the Government d.ated 26th July, 1917 under s. 135(1) of the Railways Act continued even under the Act of 1925.\n\nH It is als~ ignficant. to note that the Rules, which were framed by the Mumc1pahty under the Act of 1901 and by the Municipal Borough later under the Act of 192S which were promulgated on\n\n928 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [1970] 3 S.C.ll\n\nthe 4th May, 1916 and the 6th October, 1931 respectively, described the tax as a general rate on buildings and lands in rule 1. It is true that, in the heading of the Rules, the expression used was that \"the Rules were for the levy of a consolidated rate on buildings and lands\", but, . in the main provision, the tax was described only as \"a general rate on buildings aind lands\". A general rate on buildings and lands is obviously a tax on buildings and lands and would, therefore, be covered by the notification of the Central Government dated 26th July, 1917.\n\nApart from this interpration which we have arrived at on the basis of the language used in the two Acts, the Rules, and the notification of the Central Government, there are two circumstances which indicate that this must be the correct construction of the notification issued by the Central Government. The first circumstance is that, when this notification was issued, the only tax which was being imposed by the Lonavla Municipality which the Central Government could have intended should become payable by the G.l.P. Railway was the consolidated tax under clause ( c) of the second proviso.\n\nThere was no other tax which could have been coverd by this notification.\n\nIn fact, the notification would be meaningless if we were to hold that this consolidated tax is not covered by the expression \"tax on buildings and lands\".\n\nThis notification was issued while the earlier notification of 1914 was already in existence and, if the intention was to cover only the rate mentioned in clause (i) of s. 59(1), there was no need to .issue this fresh notification as the liability of the Railway to pay that tax already existed under that notification of 1914.\n\nThe second circumstance that we can take notice of is the -- historical background in which this notification of 26th July, 1917 was issued.\n\nIt appears that, after the Rules for imposition of F this consolidated tax came into force in 1916, the Municipality demanded payment of this consolidated tax from the G.I.P. Railway. Thereupon, the Agent of the G.l.P. Railway Company wrote a letter to the Secretary, Railway Board, Simla, on the ls! December, 1916, stating that the Company did not agree that it should pay the new consolidated tax as it com- G prised a house tax and a water rate.\n\nThe Company had its own arrangements for the supply of water and it was obviously unfair that it should be called upon to pay any tax which includes a water rate, when no municipal water was being consumed by the Railway at Lonavla.\n\nThe Secretary, Railway Board, forwarded this letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, General H Department, with a letter dated 12th December, 1916, enquiring whether the Agent's information was correct and, if so, whether the Bombay Government had any remarks to offer on the gent's\n\n ..\n\nUNION v. LONAYLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 929\n\ncontentions. On 11th May, 1917, the Secretary to'the Government of Bombay replied to the Secretary, Railway Board, pointing out that, originally, the Municipality proposed to levy a general water rate on all houses, in addition to the existing house tax, but, . on representations from property ownes of Lonavla and Khandalla, it had decided to impose a consolidated rate on buildings and lands in lieu of the house-tax and the proposed general water rate. Consequently, they were levying, in lieu of housetax, a consolidated rate, which included a general water rate, on a sliding scale, on all propertis situated within the municipal limits. The water rate imposed was not intended to cover expenses on any service rendered in the nature of a general tax as opposed to a service tax.\n\nIn equity, the Railway Company's property in Lonavla had no better right to exemption than the properties of private individuals who, although they did not take private pipe connections, were paying the general water rate.\n\nIn these circumstances, a reauest was made ta the Secretary, Railway Board, to move the Government of India to declare the Administration of the G.l.P. Railway liable to pay to the Lonavla Municipality the consolidated tax on buildings and lands in lieu of the housetax in respect of the railway properties situated within the municipal limits.\n\nIt was suggested that the Schedule annexed to the notification dated 13th May, 1914 may be amended accordingly.\n\nIt was in pursuance of this move by the Bombay Government thar the notification of 26th July, 1.917 was issued by the Central Government. That the notification of 26th July,\"1917 was issued ill' pursuance of this correspondence is clarified by the Memorandum dated' 17th August, 1917, with which a copy of the new notificatin was forwarded by the Government of India, Railway Department (Railway Boatd) to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay.\n\nThese circumstances, in which the notification of 16th July, 191 T\n\n. F }vas issued, make it plain that the Government of India, when they ed the expression \"tax on buildings and lands\" in the notification, mtended to make the G.I.P. Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules of 1916 .\n\n. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Borough Municipality, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd.(') on interpretation of section 73 and 11 O of the Act of 1 ~25 also supports the view that we have taken above. The\n\nquetton that al'qse in that case was whether the right of an appear envisaged by usi~.g.the expression \"in the case of a rate on buildings or lands or both m. sectton 110 could be availed of in respect of a gen.era! water rate imposed under clause (x) of section 73(1) which described that tax as ll general water rate imposed in the form of a\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1939 Born. 478.\n\n:rate assessed on buildings and lands. It was held that there was no\n\n.distinction between a rate on buildings or lands and a tax in the form of a rate assessed o.n buildings or lands. In the case before us, on that analogy, a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings . and lands cannot be distinguished from a tax on buildings and lands.\n\nReference may also be made to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co., Ltd. Rampur v. Mun, icipal Board, Rampur(') where it was held that a water rate is a tax on buildings and lands and is not, in fact, a service tax chargeable in respect of water supplied. Counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in Muni'cipal Council, Cuddappah v. M & S. M. Ry. Co. Ltd. (2); but that case is of no assistance as it turned on the special language which had been used in the Act and the notification which came up for consideration in that case. In fact, the expression that had to be interpreted was\n\n\"property tax\" and not \"tax on buildings and lands\". We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that much assistance cannot be derived from the decision of this Court in Patel Gordhandas -Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad(8 ) which was relied upon by the High Court. However, as we have held .above, on the proper interpretation of the language used in the two Acts, the Rules, and the notification, and taking into account the drcumstances under which the notification <>f 1917 was issued, the only conclusion that cain be arrived at is that the Railway was made liable to this consolidated tax, so that the decision of the High Court is perfectly correct.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 83.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1929 Mad. 746.\n\n(3) [1964) 2 S.C.R. 608\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nA f\n\n- E", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE LONAVLA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY OF LONA VLA,\n\nDISTRICT POONA, BY ITS CHIEF OFFICER, AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE LONAVLA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY OF LONAVLA, DISTRICT POONA, BY ITS CHIEF OFFICER, AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nTHE LONAVLA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY OF LONA VLA,\n\nDISTRICT POONA, BY ITS CHIEF OFFICER, AND\n\nANOTHER March 9, 1970."}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay District Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay District Municipal Act", "statute": "Bombay District Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act", "statute": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act", "statute": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 813, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1914, the Government of India issued a notification under s. 135 persuant to which the G.I.P. Railway admmistration was required to pay house tax to the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act", "statute": "Bomoay Municipal Boroughs Act"}}, {"text": "4th May, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1251, "end_char": 1264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4th May, 1916 the res:iondent promulgated new rules for taution and instead of charging separate house tax under s. 59(1)(i) or a general water rate under s. 59(1 )(viii) of the Act of 1901, it decided to charge a consolidated tax assessed as a rate on buildings and lands in accordance with clause (c) of the proviso to s. 59(i)."}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1 )(viii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1406, "end_char": 1421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1572, "end_char": 1580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th July, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1808, "end_char": 1823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th July, 1917, the Government of India issued a fresh notification under s. 135 of the Railways Act whereby the railway administration was rendered liable to pay what was described as \"tax on lands and buildings\"."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1909, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "6th October, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent Municipality amended its rules and promulgated fresh rules on 6th October, 1931 under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 18 of 1925 under which enactment the resj>ondent Municipality had by that time been consi tituted into a Borough."}}, {"text": "s.73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2976, "end_char": 2980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LONAVLA MUNICIPALITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the\n\n• UNION v. LONAVLA MUNICIPALITY\n\n92I\n\nFirst Court- \"Set aside the demand notice, au\"-; ppel --~-; eventually dismissed by the High Court with the remark that the proper 'remedy to be sought was by means of a suit."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3411, "end_char": 3425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India which -had become the owner of the railway, field a suitin November 1954 for refund of the entire amount which was collected by the respondent from the railway in pursuance of the rules of 1931."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6070, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6723, "end_char": 6736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L!OSip CI(NP)/70-14\n\nL. M. Singhvi and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L!OSip CI(NP)/70-14\n\nL. M. Singhvi and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, Y. S.\n\nChitale, Janendra Lal and B.\n\nAgarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Y. S.\n\nChitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, Y. S.\n\nChitale, Janendra Lal and B.\n\nAgarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Janendra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, Y. S.\n\nChitale, Janendra Lal and B.\n\nAgarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nAgarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, Y. S.\n\nChitale, Janendra Lal and B.\n\nAgarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nBhargava, J.\n\nThe Union of India, as the owner of the Central Railway, instituted a suit for refund of Rs."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6923, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nBhargava, J.\n\nThe Union of India, as the owner of the Central Railway, instituted a suit for refund of Rs.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA"}}, {"text": "G.l.P. Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7231, "end_char": 7245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading up to the suit are that the G.l."}}, {"text": "Bhusi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7411, "end_char": 7416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this land, stood the railway station, their Water Reservoir at Bhusi, bungalows of Officers, and certain other buildings."}}, {"text": "G.1.P. Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7590, "end_char": 7604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this area, which belonged to the G.1.P. Railway, the Railway."}}, {"text": "section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8374, "end_char": 8386, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lonavla Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8614, "end_char": 8634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the name of Lonavla Municipality, which is the respondent n this case, the tax mentioned was house-tax."}}, {"text": "section 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9629, "end_char": 9642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10144, "end_char": 10150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10170, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "G.I.P. Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10358, "end_char": 10372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the issue of this notification, the respondent started charging the G.I.P. Railway this consolidated tax and this continued until some time in the year 1927 by which time the G.I.P.\n\nRailway was taken over by the Government and became a Government undertaking."}}, {"text": "G.I.P.\n\nRailway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10465, "end_char": 10480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the issue of this notification, the respondent started charging the G.I.P. Railway this consolidated tax and this continued until some time in the year 1927 by which time the G.I.P.\n\nRailway was taken over by the Government and became a Government undertaking."}}, {"text": "Municipality amended its Rules and promulgated fresh Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10892, "end_char": 10950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipality had been constituted into a Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These new Rules were thus promulgated under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11898, "end_char": 11909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These new Rules were thus promulgated under this Act", "statute": "These new Rules were thus promulgated under this Act"}}, {"text": "6th October, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12000, "end_char": 12017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1940, the Railway Administration preferred an appeal under section 110 of the Act of 1925 against one of the demand notices issued in respect of this tax on the 6th October, 1940."}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Western Division, Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12051, "end_char": 12101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal came up before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Western Division, Poona, who held that the levy of this consolidated tax was ultra vires and set aside the demand notice."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12238, "end_char": 12249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12487, "end_char": 12507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision, the Railway Administration filed a revision\n\nbefore the High Court of Bombay under section 115 of the Code A of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12514, "end_char": 12525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12579, "end_char": 12598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, on 12th February, 1945, refused to exercise its sp_ecial powers under section 115, C.P.C., with the further remark that the proper remedy to be sought was by means of a suit."}}, {"text": "section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12646, "end_char": 12657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12659, "end_char": 12664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "27th November, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under these circumstances, the Union of India, which had come to be the owner of this Railway under the name of the Central Railway, filed the suit on 27th November, 1954 for refund of the entire amount which was collected by the respondent from the Railway in pursuance of the Rules of 1931."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13723, "end_char": 13734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13894, "end_char": 13904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13931, "end_char": 13941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13987, "end_char": 13997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15206, "end_char": 15216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 75 and 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15365, "end_char": 15383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16476, "end_char": 16484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16744, "end_char": 16762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that the notification was issued by the Central Government dated the 13th May, 1914 making the Railway Administration liable to py house-tax to the Municipality of Lonavla."}}, {"text": "13th May, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that the notification was issued by the Central Government dated the 13th May, 1914 making the Railway Administration liable to py house-tax to the Municipality of Lonavla."}}, {"text": "Lonavla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16868, "end_char": 16875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that the notification was issued by the Central Government dated the 13th May, 1914 making the Railway Administration liable to py house-tax to the Municipality of Lonavla."}}, {"text": "s. 59(l)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17021, "end_char": 17032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17503, "end_char": 17511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17601, "end_char": 17610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17618, "end_char": 17630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lonavla Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17709, "end_char": 17729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the Central Government issued the notification dated 26th July, 1917 under s. 135(1) of the Railways Act making the G.I.P. Railway liable to tax on buildings and lands imposed by the Lonavla Municipality."}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17859, "end_char": 17867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18603, "end_char": 18611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19721, "end_char": 19729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21638, "end_char": 21647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21655, "end_char": 21667, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23503, "end_char": 23511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24088, "end_char": 24093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Railway Company wrote a letter to the Secretary, Railway Board, Simla, on the ls!"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24580, "end_char": 24586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary, Railway Board, forwarded this letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, General H Department, with a letter dated 12th December, 1916, enquiring whether the Agent's information was correct and, if so, whether the Bombay Government had any remarks to offer on the gent's\n\n ..\n\nUNION v. LONAYLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 929\n\ncontentions."}}, {"text": "12th December, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24630, "end_char": 24649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary, Railway Board, forwarded this letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, General H Department, with a letter dated 12th December, 1916, enquiring whether the Agent's information was correct and, if so, whether the Bombay Government had any remarks to offer on the gent's\n\n ..\n\nUNION v. LONAYLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 929\n\ncontentions."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24729, "end_char": 24746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary, Railway Board, forwarded this letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, General H Department, with a letter dated 12th December, 1916, enquiring whether the Agent's information was correct and, if so, whether the Bombay Government had any remarks to offer on the gent's\n\n ..\n\nUNION v. LONAYLA MUNICIPALITY (Bhargava, J.) 929\n\ncontentions."}}, {"text": "11th May, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24858, "end_char": 24872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th May, 1917, the Secretary to'the Government of Bombay replied to the Secretary, Railway Board, pointing out that, originally, the Municipality proposed to levy a general water rate on all houses, in addition to the existing house tax, but, ."}}, {"text": "Khandalla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25158, "end_char": 25167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on representations from property ownes of Lonavla and Khandalla, it had decided to impose a consolidated rate on buildings and lands in lieu of the house-tax and the proposed general water rate."}}, {"text": "26th July, 1.917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26395, "end_char": 26411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in pursuance of this move by the Bombay Government thar the notification of 26th July, 1.917 was issued by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "26th July,\"1917 was", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26475, "end_char": 26494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the notification of 26th July,\"1917 was issued ill' pursuance of this correspondence is clarified by the Memorandum dated' 17th August, 1917, with which a copy of the new notificatin was forwarded by the Government of India, Railway Department (Railway Boatd) to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "17th August, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26578, "end_char": 26595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the notification of 26th July,\"1917 was issued ill' pursuance of this correspondence is clarified by the Memorandum dated' 17th August, 1917, with which a copy of the new notificatin was forwarded by the Government of India, Railway Department (Railway Boatd) to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26739, "end_char": 26759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the notification of 26th July,\"1917 was issued ill' pursuance of this correspondence is clarified by the Memorandum dated' 17th August, 1917, with which a copy of the new notificatin was forwarded by the Government of India, Railway Department (Railway Boatd) to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "16th July, 191 T\n\n. F", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26812, "end_char": 26833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These circumstances, in which the notification of 16th July, 191 T\n\n."}}, {"text": "Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26996, "end_char": 27093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27127, "end_char": 27144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Bombay High Court in Borough Municipality, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd.(') on interpretation of section 73 and 11 O of the Act of 1 ~25 also supports the view that we have taken above."}}, {"text": "section 73 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27260, "end_char": 27277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules", "statute": "Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 73(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27609, "end_char": 27622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules", "statute": "Railway liable to the consolidated tax which had been imposed by the Municipality under the Rules"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28123, "end_char": 28143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co., Ltd. Rampur v. Mun, icipal Board, Rampur(') where it was held that a water rate is a tax on buildings and lands and is not, in fact, a service tax chargeable in respect of water supplied."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28414, "end_char": 28431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in Muni'cipal Council, Cuddappah v. M & S. M. Ry."}}, {"text": "[1964) 2 S.C.R. 608", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29514, "end_char": 29533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_931_945_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "P. SIRAJUDDIN ETC.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS ETC.\n\nMarch 9, 1970\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND G. K, MITTER, JJ.J\n\nCade of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), Chapter XI-Investigation by Vigilance Department-Duty to follow procedure in Code-Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947), s. 5(1) (b)-Scope of.\n\nOn March- 1, 1964, the Chief Minister of the State received a petition containing allegations of corruption against the appellant (a Superintending Engineer) and the Chief Minister asked the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to make enquiries.\n\nOn March 10, 1964, the Director submitted a note containing serious aspersions on the appe1lant and 'the\n\nChief Minister ordered further investigation.\n\nThe Director of Vigilance registered an inquiry on 15th April, 1964, and a Deputy Sugerintendent of Police of the Vigilance Department was asked to make the inquiry.\n\nThe Deputy Superintendent of Police made a thorough and searching inquiry.\n\nHe examined a large number of persons including 18 public servants and even enquired into and took down statements of persons who\n\nwere supposed to have provided the appellant with articles of food worth trifling sums of money, a long timebefore.\n\nHe recorded self incriminat ing statements of -a number of persons and secured their signatures thereto.\n\nWith respect to two officers, who were lhe subordinates of the appellant, he even gave certificates of immunity from any action that might be taken against them for the part played by them in aiding the appellant. On June 27, 1964, he lodged a first information report, with respect to offences under ss. 161 and 165 J.P.C., and s. 5(1) (a) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.\n\nHe investigated into the offences theniafter, and filed the charge sheet before the Special Judge.\n\nThe appellant made an application for discharge under s. 251-A, Cr.P.C., on the g!rounds of discrimination between him and other officers who were given palrdon and, gross irregularities in the investigation. The\n\nSpecial Judge held. that though there was no basis for charging the appellant under s. 165, J.P.C., or under s. 5(2). read withs. 5(!)(b). of the Prevention of Corruption Act. a charge could be framed against him under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1) (d). The appellant thereafter moved the High Court,\n\nThe High Court held : (I) that the investigation started on 15th Aplril 1964 when the Director of Vigilance registered an inquiry (2) that the taking of signed and self-incriminating statements from various \\vitnesses was in violation of ss. 161 to 164 Cr.P.C.; (3) that the Special Judgo erred in directing the framing of the charge without excluding thoe statements from. ccinside\\'ation; and (4) that the Special Judge should take up the matter once again after excluding from consideration those statements.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (I) Though technicallv investigation did not commence on J5th April 1964 but started onlv after the formal first information report was lodged on June 27, 1964, there were serious irregularities during the\n\ninquiry and investigation. which caused prejudice to the appellant. The A directions given by the High Court were, however, sufficient in the circumstances of the case. (945 DJ\n\nThe Directorate of Vigilance and Anti.Corruption be'came a police station for the purposes ol the Criminal Procedure Code only by a notification dated 25th May 1964.\n\nTherefore, the inquiry before that date was not an investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code, but there was no warrant for the Vigilance Department, which was in the charge of a senior B police officer, to disregard the provisions of ss. 162 and 163 of the Code.\n\nUnder s.161(3) of the Code a police officer is empowered to reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of investigation and s. 162(1) lays down that such a statement is not to be signed by the maker thereof. Section 163 (I) lays an embargo on the investigating authority using any inducement, threat or promise to the, maker.\n\nThe reason for these provisions is to secure a fair investigation into the !acts and circumstances. of the cas eand to see th\"t an O\" 'alous police C officer may not misuse his position by getting a statement signed by the maker in order to pin him down to it.\n\nAlso, immunity from prosecution and the grant of a pardon were not in the discretion of police authorities. 1940 A-H: 941 AB, D, Fl\n\nIn the present case, the officers who were given immunity must have made the self-incriminating statements because ari oral assurance of D immunity was given before they made the statements, that is, the statements were given as a result of an inducement.\n\nThere can be no excuse for the Vigilance Department for proceeding in the manner adopted merely because the first information report had not been lodged.\n\nAs soon as it , , became clear to them on March 10, 1964, that the appe11ant appeared to be guilty of serious misconduct, it was their duty to lodge such a report and proceed further in the investigation according to Ch. XIV of the Code.\n\nTheir omission to do so cannot but prejudice the aQoellant and the State E ought not to be allowed to take shelter behind the pTea that although the steps taken in the enquiry befdre the first information was lodged were grossly irregular and unfair, the appellant could not eomplain, because. there W'S no infraction of the rules after lodging the first information repdrt. [942 D-G: 943 C-HJ\n\n( 2) If it be a fact that it was the appellant, who as the head of the department, was actively responsible for directing the commission of F offences by his subordinates in a particular manner, he cannot be allowed to take the plea that the subordinates should also be joined as co-accused with him. (944 DJ\n\n(3) Under s. S(l)(b). a public servant would be guilty of the offence of criminal misconduct if he h!lbitually accepts any valuable thing for inadequate consideration not only from outsiders who are likely to be concerned in any proceedin, g or business, transacted or about to be G transacted by the public officer but also from any subordinate or any !Other person who is connected with the official functions of the public servant.\n\nTherefore, in this case. a charge could also be framed under - s. 5 ( 1) (b). if there was material. (945 ACl\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals 233 to 235 of 1966, and 9 to 11 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1966 d. the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 390 of 1965 etc.\n\n.. c\n\nM. C. Chagla, Amjad Nainar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in Cr. As. Nos. 233 to 235 of 1966) and respondent No. 1 (in Cr. As. Nos. 9 to IL of 1967).\n\nS. Govind Swaminathan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, A. V. Rangam, K. S. Ramaswami Thevar, N. S.\n\nSivan, for the respondents (in Cr. As. Nos. 233 to 235 of 1~66) and the appellants (in Cr. As. Nos. 9 to 11 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J, These six appeals arise out of certificates granted by the High Court of Madras arising out of two Writ Petitions and a petition under ss. 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed in that court by P. Sirajuddin, the appellant in the first set of appeals. It is not necessary to give an outline of these petitions as the salient features theof appear sufficiently from the judgment of the High Court and the substance thereof is dealt with hereafter. '\n\nThe facts are as follows. The appellant was the Chief Engineer, Highways and Rural Works, Madras having risen from the status of a District Board Engineer in which capacity he joined service in the year 1935. He attained the age of 55 years on March 14, 1964 on which date he was asked to hand over charge of his office to one Shiv Shankar Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras.\n\nHe expected to be retained in service up to the age of 58, a privelege said to be normally accorded to persons physically and otherwise fit for public service. It appears that on March 1, 1964 a copy of a petition concerning him and dated February 28, 1964 addressed to the Minister, Public Works by one Rangaswami Nadar was received by the Chief Minister of the State.\n\nIt is said that apart therefrom allegations about want of rectitude of the appellant had already reached the Government. The Chief Minister asked the Director of Vigilance nd Anti-Corruption to make confidential enquiries. On March 10, 1964 Government received a note from the said officer which cast serious aspersions on the appellant's reputation and mentioned quite a few instances of his lack of probity.\n\nThe endorsement of the Chief Minister on the note read : .\n\nSecretary, P.W.D. I had this (petition already mentioned) from the Director of Vigilance. This may be immediately looked into. I have asked the Director to pursue the investigation further.\"\n\nThereupon the Chief Secretary orally ordered a full-fledged enquiry .in the matter and the Deputy Superintendent of P.olice, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption one G. K. Ranganathan, was asked to make a personal enquiry and report under the supervision of\n\nR. N. Krishnaswamy. The Director of Vigilaince registered an enquiry numbering 8/HD/64 on 15th April, 1964. That the enquiry was taken up with great keenness appears from a note of Ranganathan to the effect he would require the assistance of two Inspectors to assist him. There dm be no doubt that the enquiry launched by the Vigilance and Ariti--Corruption Departmentwas a very thorough and searching , one.\n\nA very large number of persons were examined by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption officers including 18 public servants who spoke to matters touching the allegations against the appellant. Statements in writing signed by the makers were taken from no less than nine public servants regarding\n\nthe above and two of them, namely, S. Sivasubrahmanyam and S.\n\nChidambaram were given certificates assuring them immunity from prosecution for the part played by them in rendering aid to the . C appellant in the 'ilection\n\n. '\n\nof additional evideince by way of recovery of valuable things which he had obtained from his subordinates by various illegal means and. in ad!lition more incriminating evidence was likely to be forthcoming during the investigation.\n\nSanction !o prosecute the appellant was obtained on September 27, 1964 and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the court of the Special Judge, Madras on October 5, 1964 numbered as C.C. No. 10 of 1964.\n\nNo less than 47 witnesses had been examined during the investigation following the first information report and at least nine of them had been previously examined at what was termed as .a \"prelimi- nary. or detailed enquiry\".\n\nNo less than 19 malpractices were alleged against him in different paragraphs of the charge sheet and the appellant was charged with having obtained for himself or for members of his family various valuable things from his subordinates by corrupt and illegal means and by abusing his position as a public servant. The charges were for offences already mentioned.\n\nIn the enquiry the appellant was supplied with copies of re-· cords on which the prosecution proposed to rely including the statements recorded by the investigating officer which according to the appellnt showed prima facie that a number of public se1vants who had given the statements were themselves responsible for commission of various offences including falsification of accounts and forgery of public records.\n\nBefore the Special Judge the appellant moved an application for discharge under s. 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the charges against him were groundless. In that application he also complained : (a) that the instances alleged against him related mostly to his personal matters unconnected with his official functions; (b) that none of the items referred to in the charge had been handed over to or delivered to him for the purpose of securing an advantage in order to attract s. 5(1)(d) read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and (c) that on the admitted statements of the public servants they were liable to be charged with various offences and he had been greatly prejudiced by discriminatory treatment.\n\nWhile holding that there was no basis of charging the appellant under s. 1651.P.C. or under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Judge held that a charge could H be framed against him under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Act. He observed that the \"investigating officers evidently felt that if they arraigned the subordinate officers along with the appellant the case may fail for lack of evidence.\"\n\nAgainst that order dated January 16, 1965 the Public Pro- :secutor preferred Cr. R.C. 294 of 1965 and the appellant preferred Cr.M.P. 934 of 1965 under s. 561-A of the Cod~ for quashing the proceedings and discharging him as the charge was groundless. The appellant filed two writ petitions before the High Court, namely, one for a writ of mandamus directing the forbearing from\n\nprosecution of C.C. No. 10 of 1964 and a second for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Special Judge mentioned above.\n\nThere was a petition under ss. 435/439 of the Criminal Procedure Code for revision of the order of the Special Judge and one under s. 561-A of the Code for quashing his said order.\n\nThe High Court dealt with all the Writ Petitions and the different allied matters together. Broadly speaking, it was urged before the High Court :\n\n1. There had been such a violent departure from the provisions ()f the Code in the matter of investigation and cognizance of offences as to amount to denial of justice and to call for interference by the issue of prerogative writs.\n\n2. The investigation and prosecution were wholly ma/a fide and had been set afoot by his immediate junior office.r, one Sivasankar Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras who was related to the Chief Minister of the State.\n\n3. The appellant's case was being discriminated from those of E others who though equally guilty according to the prosecution case were not only not being proceeded against but were promised absolution from all evil consequences of their misdeeds because of their aid to the prosecution.\n\nIn his petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus by the High Court the appellant stated that it was only by perusing copies of the statements furnished to him under s. 173(4) Cr. P.C. that he found that 18 public servants had stated having given him valuables without any or adequate consideration and that it was at his instance that they had committed offences of criminal conspiracy under s. 120-B lP.C. and criminal breach of trust of Government moneys under s. 409 lP.C. besides falsification of accounts etc.\n\nHis positive case was that the Director of Vigilance and Anti- Corruption had obtained signed statements which were confessional and self-incriminatory from persons who were going to be called as witnesses by _giving them assurances of immunity. These assurances were not only directed towards immunising them from prosecutions but also any departmental action likely to affect adversely the makers of the statements. The case of discrimination was based mainly on the above averments that the Directorate had :singled him out leaving others who were equally guilty. According\n\nF '\n\nSIRAJUDl)!N v. MADRAS (Mitter, J.) 937\n\n10 the appellant this also showed mala /ides and malice directed towards him.\n\nAnother main argument which was canvassed before the High Court related to h.e applicability of ss. 162. and. 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the effect of the v10lnt1on thereof, if any. For the appellant, it was argued that the taking of signed statements from persons who were eyentually going to be examined in the criminal proceedings by giving them assurances of immunity and thereafter relying on their subsequent unsigned statements those under s. 161(3) of the Code for the purpose of s. 173 amounted to a fraud on the procedure established by law. It was contended that as the statements recorded under s. 161 were the material on which the Special Judge had to consider whether the charge was groundless under s. 251-A _of the Code, the illegality \"corroding the foundation vitiated the enquiry and necessitated the discharge of the appellant.\" .\n\nThe High Court examined the case made out in the affidavits of the appellant and th_e counter affidavits on behalf of the State. It expressed great dissatisfaction at the variance in the attitude of the State in the different affidavits in that whereas in the first counter affidavit there was no contradiction of the appellant's averment that asurances of immu_nity had been given to all tire 18 persons examined before the lodging of the first information report, the plea put forward in a subsequent affidavit was that such assurance had been given only to two persons, namely, the two subordinates of the appellant and only after signed statements had been given by them. The Court was however not satisfied that a direction was called for for the prosecution of the subordinate officers , also.\n\nFurther the High Court was not impressed with the plea of hostile discrimination against the appellant observing that although the \"policy of not securing judicial pardon to accomplices by bringing them as approvers but retaining them at the sole discretion of the prosecution might be open to question\" \"that cannot by itself invalidate the arraignment of the persons actually put up for trial\"' specially where the person charged was in a position to wield influence and power over those asked by him to aid him in commission of misconduct.\n\nAlthough not of the view that the r.ecord before it established a case of ma/a fide or hostile discrimination against the appellant which called for the quashing of the proceedings, the High Court took the view that the investigation of the case under Chapter XIV of the Code should be held to have commenced when Ranganathan, / the Deputy Superintendent of Police, started the enquiry on 15th April 1%4 on the reasoning that though \"an enquiry may start with shadowy. beginnings and vague rumours. once a police officer forms a definite opinion that there are grounds for investigating a Ll0Sup.Cl(NP)70-15\n\ncrime, an investigation under the Code has started\". According to the High Court-\n\n(a) \"substantial information and evidence had been gathered before the so-called first information report was registered\".\n\n(h) the police officer who had conducted the enquiry prior to 27th June 1964 was a person competent to enter upon investigation;\n\n(c) admittedly there had been an earlier probe by the Vigilance Department prior to 10th March 1964 on the basis whereof he was not re-employed;\n\n(d) there was definite information to the Government contained in the report dated 13th March 1964 relatini: to corrupt activities of the appellant; and\n\n(e) the \"delay on the part of the investigating officer in registering the first information report may be an irregularity, but certainly the statements recorded subsequent to th~ receipt of definite information of the commission of an offence in gathering evidence of the offence would nonetheless be statements recorded during investigation and hit by s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\"\n\nWith regard to the disregard of the provisions of ss. 162 and 163 of the Code, the High Court observed that the result of taking his signature to a statement would be to tie a witness down to the statement or at least to give him the impression that he would not be free to make a different statement at the trial but the statement of a witness at the trial would not become inadmissible by reason of his having signed a statement before going into the witness box. Reference was .made to several decisions bearing on s. 162 of the Code and in particular to Zahiruddin v. King Emperor(') that the evidence of a witness who had previously signed a statement in writing did not become inadmissible or vitiate the whole proceeding although the value of the evidence would be seriously impaired thereby.\n\nThe court .seems to have been of the view that it was the duty of the Magistrate or the presiding Judge on discovering that a witness had while giving evidence, made material use of a statement given by him to the police to disregard the evidence of that witness\n\nas inadmissible. The High Court's definite conclusion was that H there had been a deliberate violation of the provisions of the Code\n\n(I) 74 I.A. 65, 74.\n\nA •\n\nand a departure from a recognised and lawful procedure for investigation. . . . . .\n\nWith regard to the propriety of takmg self-mcnrmnatory state ments even when there.had been no assurance of immunity from prosecution, the High Court observed that as the learned Advocate- General for the State had stated that the record of manipulations in the muster rolls by -the subordinate officers of the appellant had to be disregarded as not proper material for consideration as the \"Special Judge had not considered these vitiating features in regard to the documents placed before him while ordering the framing of charges against the appellant\" it was unnecessary to examine the question at length.\n\nThe High Court found partly in favour of the appellant and held that the order of the Special Judge directing the framing of a charge on consideration of the statements before him under s. 173(4) of the Code without reference to the illegalities in the investigation should be quashed. The High Court further directed the Special Judge to take up the matter once again and consider thr. case excluding from consideration all statements recorded under ss. 161(3) and 164 which were found vitiated in the light of the observations made by it. A direction was also given to exclude portions of the statements which were self-incriniinatory and con fessional in character of the maker even if the same did not otherwise violate the provisions of ss. 162 and 163 of the Code.\n\nIn our view the procedure adopted against the appellant before the laying of the first information report though not in terlllll forbidden by law, was so unprecedented and outrageous as to shod: one's sense of justice and fairplay.\n\nNo doubt when allegations about dishonesty _of a person of the appellant's rank were brought to the notice of the Chief Minister it was his duty to direct an en quiry into the matter. The Chief Minister in our view pursued the right course. The High Court was not impressed by the allegation of the appellant that the Chief , Minister was moved to take an initiative at the instance of a person who was going to benefit by the retirement of the appellant and who was said to be a relation of the Chief Minister. The High Court rightly held that the relationship between the said person and the Chief Minister, if any, was so distant that it could not possibly have influenced him and we are of the same view. Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleg ed in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer.\n\nThe lodging of such a report against a person, specially one who like the appellont occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculabJC\n\n940 SUPREME COURt REPORTS [!970j 3 S.C.R.\n\nharm not only to the officer in particular but to the department he belonged to, in general. If the Government had set up a Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department as was done in the State of Madras and the said department was entrusted with enquiries of this kind, no exception can be taken to an enquiry by officers of this department b!!t any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. 'fhe enquiring officer must not act under any preconceived idea of guilt of the person whose conduct was being enquired into or pursue the enquiry in such a manner as to lead to an inference that he was bent upon securing the conviction of the said person by adopting measures which are of doubtful validity or sanction.\n\nThe means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable.\n\nIn ordinary departmental proceedings against a G()vernrnent servant charged with delinquency, the normal practice before the issue of a charge sheet is for some one in authority to take down statements of persons involved in the matter and to examine documents which have a bearing on the issue invol_ved.\n\nIt is only thereafter that a charged sheet is submitted and a full-scale enquiry is launched.\n\nWhen the enquiry is to be held for the purpose of finding out whether criminal proceedings are to be resorted to the scope thereof must be limited to the examination uf persons who have knowledge of the affairs of the delinquent officer and documents bearing on the same t\" find out whether there is primu facie evidence of guilt of the officer.\n\nThereafter the ordinary law of the land must take its course and further inquiry be proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure by lodging a first information report.\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure is an enactment designed inter a/ia to ensure a fair investigation of the allegations against a person charged with criminal misconduct.\n\nChapter XIV of the Code gives special powers to the police to investigate into cases whether cognizable or non-cognizable in the manner provided therein.\n\nSection 160 empowers a police officer making an investigation to require the attendance before himself of any person who appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case.\n\nSection 161 (1) gives him the right to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.\n\nAlthough bound to answer question put to him sub-s. (2) of the section exempts a person from answering any question which would have a tendency to expose him to a penal charge or to a penalty for forfeiture.\n\nUnder sub-s.(3) the police officer is em, powered to reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of such examination.\n\nSection 162 (I) expressly Jays down that such a statement made in the course of an investigation if reduced into writing is not to be signed by the maker thereof and no part of such statement except as expressly provided is to be used\n\nA •\n\nSIRA.TUDDIN I', MADRAS (Mitter, J,) 941\n\nfor any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of. any such offence under investigation at the time when the statement was made.\n\nThe only exceptions to these are cases when the statement falls under s. 32 cl.(1) of the Evidence Act and to statements which are covered by s. 27 of that Act.\n\nThe obvious idea behind this provision is that an over-zealous police officer may not misuse his position by getting a statement in writing signed by the maker which would tend to pin him down to the statement but leave him free to speak out freely when called to give evidence in court.\n\nIn order that statements made in the course of such investigations be recorded without any pressure or inducement by an investigat ing officer s. 163(1) lays down an embargo on the investigating authorities usin_g any inducement, threat or promise to the maker which might influence his mind and lead him to suppose that thereby he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil in reference to his conduct as disclosed in the proceedings. It is to be noted that whereas the other sections hereinbefore referred to contain guidelines for the police officers in making investigation, this section expressly provides that any person in authority even if he is not a police officer must guide himself accordingly, in case where a crime is being investigated under this Chapter of the Code.\n\nAll this is however subject to the provisions of sub-s.(2) which1 allows a person to make any statement a_gainst his own interest by way of confession if he does so of his own free will.\n\nEven then the law enjoins by s. 164 that such a statement or confession can only be recorded by a Magistrate of the Class mentioned therein and even such a Magistrate must explain to the oerson making the confession before recording the same, that he is not bound to make it and if he does so it may be used as evidence against him.\n\nFurther the Magistrate must make sure that the person was making the confession voluntarily and not acting under any pressure from an outside source.·\n\nAll the above provisions of the Code are aimed at securing a fair investigation into the facts and circumstances of the criminal case : however serious the crime and howsoever incriminating the circumstances may be a11ainst a Person supposed to be guilty of a crime the Code of Criminal Procedure aims at securing a conviction if it can be had by the use of utmost fairness on the\n\nprt of the officers investigating into the crime before the lodging of \" charge sheet. Clearlv the idea is that no one should be put to the harassment of a criminal trial unless there are good aticl substantial reasons for holding it. Section 169 of the Code empowers a police officer making investigation to release an accused person from custody if there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground o.f suspicion to justify the forwarding of him to a Magit.rate by taking a bond from him with or without sureties. Section 1 n enjoins upon a p01ice officer\n\nto complete the investigation without unnecssary delay and forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cogruzance of the offence a report in the form prescribed by Governmemt setting forth inter alia the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acguainted with the circtim.stances of the cise and to communicate to the State Government the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom information relating to the commission of the ?ffenc~ was. fit given.\n\nWhen a report has been made under this section 1t 1s the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to furnish to the accused before the commencement of the enquiry or trial a copy of the report above mentioned and of the first inforni.ation report under s. 154 and of all other documents or relevant extracts on which the prosecution proposes to rely including the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under s. 164 and the statements recorded under sub-s.(3) of s. 161 of all persons whom the prosecution propOSCi to examine as its witnesses.\n\nIn our view the enquiring ofticer pursued ths mvcaligation with such zeal and vigour that he even enquired into arid took down statements of persons who were supposed to have provided the appellant with articles of food worth trilling sums or money long before the launching of the enquiry.\n\nThe whole course of investigation as disclosed in the affidavits is suggestive of 1some predetermination of the guilt of the appellant.\n\nThe enquiring officer was a high-ranking police officer and it is surprising that simply because he was technically not exercising powers under Chapter XIV or the Criminal Procedure Code in that a formal first information rep9rt had not been lodged he overlooked or deliberately overstepped the limits or investigation contained in the sa.id Chapter.\n\nHe recorded self-incriminating statements of a number or persons and not only secured their signatures thereto obviously with the idea or pinning them down to those but went to the length or providing certificates of immunity to at least two of them from the evil effects of their own misdeeds as recorded.\n\nIt was said that the certificates were given after the statements had been signed. It is difficult to believe that the statements could have been made before the grant of oral assurances regarding the issue of written certificates. There can be very little doubt that the persons who were given such immunity had made the statements incriminating themselves and the appellant under inducement, threat or promise as mentioned in s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nIt is no doubt the duty of the State to track down and punish 11 all delinquent officers but it is certainly not in accordance with justiCe and fairplay that their conviction should be sought for by such questionable means. ·\n\nA The office of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code under sub-cl. (s) of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the COde by a notification dated 25th May, 1964. Prior to that it was only functioning under a Memorandum No. 1356/ 64-2 dated 8th Apnl 1964 when it _was s7t up to ensu_re tJie mai?- 8 tenance ofthe highest standard of mtegnty and, prob1ty m public servants. If the investigation had been taken up after May 25;\n\n1964 it. would have been one under Chapter XIV of the Code without any doubt.\n\nAlthough we are not disposed to concur with the view that the investigation unper Chapter XIV of the Code started as early as 15th April 1964 we are of opinion that there was no warrant for the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department which was in the charge of one o{ the highest police officers of the State to disregard the provisions of ss. 162 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe investigation was of a type more thorough and\n\nelabote than is usually to be found : as noticed already it was o in charge of a senior police officer who had the assistance of two police inspectors in the matter. No blame attaches to them fo~ making enquiries of a large number of persons but the whole course of investigation is suggestive of guidance by someone who was intimately familiar with the affairs of the appellant and his department 'and throwing out scents which the investigafing officers were only too keen to pick p and follow.\n\nThe appellant may have been guilty of all the cliarges levelled against him out we cannot approve of the manner . in which the investigation against him was conducted and an attempt made to lay a guideline for the persons who were to be cited as prosecution witnesses in their evidence at the trial. To say the least it would be surprising to find so many persons giving confessional and self-incriminatory statements unless they had been assured of immunity fro.m the evil effects thereof whether oral or in writing.\n\n!here c~ be no excuse or he Directorate of Vigilance_ and Anh-Corruption for proceedmg m the manner adopted in the preliminary enquiry before the lodging of the first inforrnatio-, report: As sool! as it became clear to them-and according to the High Court 1t was before March 13, 1964 in which we concur-that the aooellant apocared to be guilty of serious misconduct,_ it was their duty to lodge such a -report and proceed further. in th~ !nvestigation accordin11; to Chapter XIV of the Code.\n\nTheir omission to do so cannot but prejudice the appellant and the State ought not to be allowed to take shelter behind the plea that although the steps taken in the preliminary enquiry were grossly irregular and , unfair, the accused cannot comolain because there was no infraction of the rules of the Evidence Act or th.e provisions of the Code,\n\nIn our view the granting of amnesty to two persons who are A sure to be examined as witnesses for the prosecution wa~ highly • irregular and unfortunate. It was rightly pointed out by tlfu_High Court:\n\n\"Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Prevention of Corruption Act recognises the immunity from 0 prosecution given under these assurances and that the grant of par.don was not in the discretion of police authorites.\"\n\nWe are not impressed by the argument that the appellant was singled out from a number of per.ions who had aided the appellant in the commission of various acts of misconduct and that they were really in the position of accomplices. It was pointed out by the High Court that the prosecutinn may have felt that \"if the subordinate officers were joined along with the appellant as accused the whole case may fall for lack of evidence\".\n\nIn our view, if it be a fact that it was the appellant who was the head of the department actively responsible for. directing the commission of offences by his subordin!ltes in ; i particular manner, he cannot be allowed to take the plea that unless the subordinates were also joined as co-accused with him the case should not be allowed to proceed.\n\nIt was contended before us by the learned Advocate-General for the State of Madras that both the High Court and the Special Judge had gone wrong in the interpretatiolf of s.5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nHaving heard counsel on both sides; we find ourselves unable to sustain the view of the High Court on this point.\n\nOmitting the portions of the section which are not relevant it reads :\n\n\"5 (I) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct-\n\n(a)\n\n(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains for\n\nhimself . . . . any valuable thing without consideration G or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person lwhom he knows to have been, or to be. or to he \"likdy tu be concerned in any proceeding or business lransaclcd or abcrut to he transacted by him, or) having any connection with the official functions of himself. or . . .\n\nH . . . . . . .The portion of the 'uh-section within hrnckets in OlJ.~ 'l!i.w qualifie~\n\nthe expression \"any person\" in the same way as the portion reading \"having any connection with the official function of himself'.\n\nSo read \"any person having any connection with the official functions of himself' would include any subordinate of the person who accepts the valuable thing.\n\nThe words \"of himself' do not refer to the person in the expression \"any person\" but refers to the pronoun \"he\" ai the beginning of the sub-section.\n\nA subordinate of the public servant would have connection with his official functions.\n\nIn our view the sub-section aims at folding within its ambit not only outsiders \"who are likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted\" by the public officer but also any subordinate or any other person who is connected with the official functions of the public servant.\n\nIn the result all the appeals are dismissed.\n\nAlthough we do not endorse the view of the High Court with regard to the elate of the commencement of the investigation so far as Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, we do hold that serious irregularities were committed in the so-called ''full-fledged enquiry\" to the prejudice of the appellant.\n\nWe do not however feel that there is any need to modify the directions given by the High Court to the Special 'Judge who will follow the directions of the High Court in addition to the modification indicated by us.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nA ppeais dismissed.", "total_entities": 133, "entities": [{"text": "P. SIRAJUDDIN ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. SIRAJUDDIN ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 9, 1970\n\n(J. M. SHELAT AND G. K, MITTER, JJ.J\n\nCade of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), Chapter XI-Investigation by Vigilance Department-Duty to follow procedure in Code-Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947), s. 5(1) (b)-Scope of."}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. 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'the\n\nChief Minister ordered further investigation."}}, {"text": "15th April, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 743, "end_char": 759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Director of Vigilance registered an inquiry on 15th April, 1964, and a Deputy Sugerintendent of Police of the Vigilance Department was asked to make the inquiry."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 27, 1964, he lodged a first information report, with respect to offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1590, "end_char": 1605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1645, "end_char": 1679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1846, "end_char": 1852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2080, "end_char": 2086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2142, "end_char": 2170, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "15th Aplril 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2354, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter moved the High Court,\n\nThe High Court held : (I) that the investigation started on 15th Aplril 1964 when the Director of Vigilance registered an inquiry (2) that the taking of signed and self-incriminating statements from various \\vitnesses was in violation of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 161 to 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2532, "end_char": 2546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Directorate of Vigilance and Anti.Corruption", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "945 DJ\n\nThe Directorate of Vigilance and Anti."}}, {"text": "25th May 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3376, "end_char": 3389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Corruption be'came a police station for the purposes ol the Criminal Procedure Code only by a notification dated 25th May 1964."}}, {"text": "ss. 162 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1966 d. the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6518, "end_char": 6530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. c\n\nM. C. Chagla, Amjad Nainar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Amjad Nainar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6532, "end_char": 6544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. c\n\nM. C. Chagla, Amjad Nainar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6549, "end_char": 6566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. c\n\nM. C. Chagla, Amjad Nainar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "S. Govind Swaminathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminathan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, A. V. Rangam, K. S. Ramaswami Thevar, N. S.\n\nSivan, for the respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6749, "end_char": 6761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminathan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, A. V. Rangam, K. S. Ramaswami Thevar, N. S.\n\nSivan, for the respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "K. S. Ramaswami Thevar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminathan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, A. V. Rangam, K. S. Ramaswami Thevar, N. S.\n\nSivan, for the respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "N. S.\n\nSivan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6787, "end_char": 6799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Govind Swaminathan, Advocate-General for the State of Tamil Nadu, A. V. Rangam, K. S. Ramaswami Thevar, N. S.\n\nSivan, for the respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J, These six appeals arise out of certificates granted by the High Court of Madras arising out of two Writ Petitions and a petition under ss.", "canonical_name": "MITTER, JJ"}}, {"text": "ss. 435 and 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7103, "end_char": 7118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7152, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. Sirajuddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed in that court by P. Sirajuddin, the appellant in the first set of appeals.", "canonical_name": "P. SIRAJUDDIN ETC"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the Chief Engineer, Highways and Rural Works, Madras having risen from the status of a District Board Engineer in which capacity he joined service in the year 1935."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He attained the age of 55 years on March 14, 1964 on which date he was asked to hand over charge of his office to one Shiv Shankar Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras."}}, {"text": "Shiv Shankar Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7759, "end_char": 7780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He attained the age of 55 years on March 14, 1964 on which date he was asked to hand over charge of his office to one Shiv Shankar Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on March 1, 1964 a copy of a petition concerning him and dated February 28, 1964 addressed to the Minister, Public Works by one Rangaswami Nadar was received by the Chief Minister of the State."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8055, "end_char": 8072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on March 1, 1964 a copy of a petition concerning him and dated February 28, 1964 addressed to the Minister, Public Works by one Rangaswami Nadar was received by the Chief Minister of the State."}}, {"text": "Rangaswami Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8120, "end_char": 8136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on March 1, 1964 a copy of a petition concerning him and dated February 28, 1964 addressed to the Minister, Public Works by one Rangaswami Nadar was received by the Chief Minister of the State."}}, {"text": "G. K. Ranganathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9009, "end_char": 9026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Chief Secretary orally ordered a full-fledged enquiry .in the matter and the Deputy Superintendent of P.olice, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption one G. K. Ranganathan, was asked to make a personal enquiry and report under the supervision of\n\nR. N. Krishnaswamy."}}, {"text": "R. N. Krishnaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9102, "end_char": 9120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Chief Secretary orally ordered a full-fledged enquiry .in the matter and the Deputy Superintendent of P.olice, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption one G. K. Ranganathan, was asked to make a personal enquiry and report under the supervision of\n\nR. N. Krishnaswamy."}}, {"text": "Ranganathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the enquiry was taken up with great keenness appears from a note of Ranganathan to the effect he would require the assistance of two Inspectors to assist him."}}, {"text": "S. Sivasubrahmanyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9840, "end_char": 9859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statements in writing signed by the makers were taken from no less than nine public servants regarding\n\nthe above and two of them, namely, S. Sivasubrahmanyam and S.\n\nChidambaram were given certificates assuring them immunity from prosecution for the part played by them in rendering aid to the .", "canonical_name": "S. Sivasubrahmanyam"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nChidambaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statements in writing signed by the makers were taken from no less than nine public servants regarding\n\nthe above and two of them, namely, S. Sivasubrahmanyam and S.\n\nChidambaram were given certificates assuring them immunity from prosecution for the part played by them in rendering aid to the .", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nChidambaram"}}, {"text": "June 27. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10181, "end_char": 10194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 27."}}, {"text": "Diretorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10241, "end_char": 10292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 a first information report was lodged in_ the Diretorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras and the case recorded as 3/ AC/64."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10402, "end_char": 10419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10930, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 25, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10955, "end_char": 10967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pertinent to note that the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption which had been set up under a Govemment order dated 8th April 1964 was declared to be a 'police station' under clause ( s) of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a notification dated May 25, 1964 and by another notification of the same date the Governor of Madras conferred upon the Director and the Superintendf\\nts of Police of the said Directorate all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the First Class under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act within the limits of the whole of the State of Madras except the Presidency Town."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11188, "end_char": 11197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11207, "end_char": 11235, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sivasubrahmanyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Inter alia said to have obtained various articles of furniture with the help of Sivasubrahmanyam and Chidambaram mentioned above by paying only a small fraction of the cost and asking them to adjust the balance by manipulations of the muster rolls claims.", "canonical_name": "S. Sivasubrahmanyam"}}, {"text": "Chidambaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11610, "end_char": 11621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Inter alia said to have obtained various articles of furniture with the help of Sivasubrahmanyam and Chidambaram mentioned above by paying only a small fraction of the cost and asking them to adjust the balance by manipulations of the muster rolls claims.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nChidambaram"}}, {"text": "Tiruchirapalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11999, "end_char": 12013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also alleged against him that h\"e had constructed a bungalow by diverting building materials allotted for the construction of the Cauveri bridge at Tiruchirapalli."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12481, "end_char": 12499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o prosecute the appellant was obtained on September 27, 1964 and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the court of the Special Judge, Madras on October 5, 1964 numbered as C.C. No."}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12571, "end_char": 12592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o prosecute the appellant was obtained on September 27, 1964 and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the court of the Special Judge, Madras on October 5, 1964 numbered as C.C. No."}}, {"text": "October 5, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o prosecute the appellant was obtained on September 27, 1964 and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the court of the Special Judge, Madras on October 5, 1964 numbered as C.C. No."}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13750, "end_char": 13776, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14180, "end_char": 14187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14195, "end_char": 14223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 1651", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14476, "end_char": 14483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14498, "end_char": 14505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14628, "end_char": 14635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14646, "end_char": 14656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 16, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14869, "end_char": 14885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that order dated January 16, 1965 the Public Pro- :secutor preferred Cr."}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14996, "end_char": 15002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15382, "end_char": 15389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15486, "end_char": 15492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sivasankar Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16038, "end_char": 16057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The investigation and prosecution were wholly ma/a fide and had been set afoot by his immediate junior office.r, one Sivasankar Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras who was related to the Chief Minister of the State."}}, {"text": "s. 173(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16601, "end_char": 16610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16828, "end_char": 16834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16899, "end_char": 16905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17750, "end_char": 17757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18273, "end_char": 18279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18381, "end_char": 18387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th March 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21039, "end_char": 21054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(h) the police officer who had conducted the enquiry prior to 27th June 1964 was a person competent to enter upon investigation;\n\n(c) admittedly there had been an earlier probe by the Vigilance Department prior to 10th March 1964 on the basis whereof he was not re-employed;\n\n(d) there was definite information to the Government contained in the report dated 13th March 1964 relatini: to corrupt activities of the appellant; and\n\n(e) the \"delay on the part of the investigating officer in registering the first information report may be an irregularity, but certainly the statements recorded subsequent to th~ receipt of definite information of the commission of an offence in gathering evidence of the offence would nonetheless be statements recorded during investigation and hit by s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\""}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21464, "end_char": 21470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 162 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22023, "end_char": 22029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 173(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23612, "end_char": 23621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 161(3) and 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23877, "end_char": 23895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 162 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27339, "end_char": 27365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27410, "end_char": 27436, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27575, "end_char": 27598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27730, "end_char": 27741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27913, "end_char": 27924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28395, "end_char": 28406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28881, "end_char": 28886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28953, "end_char": 28958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 163(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29405, "end_char": 29414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30263, "end_char": 30269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30990, "end_char": 31016, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31337, "end_char": 31348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31621, "end_char": 31630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32220, "end_char": 32229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32445, "end_char": 32451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32607, "end_char": 32613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32661, "end_char": 32667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34260, "end_char": 34265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34273, "end_char": 34292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34599, "end_char": 34676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34712, "end_char": 34716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "25th May, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34753, "end_char": 34767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s) of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the COde by a notification dated 25th May, 1964."}}, {"text": "8th Apnl 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34847, "end_char": 34860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1356/ 64-2 dated 8th Apnl 1964 when it was s7t up to ensure tJie mai?- 8 tenance ofthe highest standard of mtegnty and, prob1ty m public servants."}}, {"text": "s7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34874, "end_char": 34876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Madras became a police station for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "25;\n\n1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35028, "end_char": 35037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the investigation had been taken up after May 25;\n\n1964 it."}}, {"text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35068, "end_char": 35091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th April 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35238, "end_char": 35253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although we are not disposed to concur with the view that the investigation unper Chapter XIV of the Code started as early as 15th April 1964 we are of opinion that there was no warrant for the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department which was in the charge of one o{ the highest police officers of the State to disregard the provisions of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 162 and 163", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35453, "end_char": 35468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although we are not disposed to concur with the view that the investigation unper Chapter XIV of the Code", "statute": "Although we are not disposed to concur with the view that the investigation unper Chapter XIV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35476, "end_char": 35502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 13, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36844, "end_char": 36858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as it became clear to them-and according to the High Court 1t was before March 13, 1964 in which we concur-that the aooellant apocared to be guilty of serious misconduct, it was their duty to lodge such a -report and proceed further."}}, {"text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37042, "end_char": 37065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37620, "end_char": 37692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38697, "end_char": 38712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended before us by the learned Advocate-General for the State of Madras that both the High Court and the Special Judge had gone wrong in the interpretatiolf of s.5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act."}}, {"text": "s.5(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38801, "end_char": 38810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38818, "end_char": 38846, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40647, "end_char": 40673, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_946_952_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "S. N. SHARMA A\n\nBIPEN KUMAR TIWARI AND ORS.\n\nMarch 10, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA & C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] B\n\n Code 6f Criminal Procedure, (5 of 1898), s. 159-Maiutrote-if can hold tnquiry himself, and stop police investign1ion.\n\nA first information report was lodged in respect of a crime and the appellant, who was the AJditional District Ma&istrate (Judicial) was named therein as principal accused. The offences mentioned were coani zable and the Police after re¥istering the case, started investigation. The appellant applied to the Judicial Magistrate for invocation of the provisions of s. 159 Cr.P.C., and for conducting preliminary enquiry by the Court itself and for issuance of nei; essary directions to the Police to stop investiaation alleging that a false report had been lodged at the instance of the local police. The Magistrate directed the police to stop investip lion and decided to hold the enquiry himself. Thereupon an application was moved in the High Court under s. 561 A Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate as he had no jurisdiction to pass such an order under s. 159 Cr.P.C. The High Court accepted the application and set aside the Magistrate's order. Dismissing the appeal. this Court.\n\nHELD : Section 159 Cr.P.C. does not empower a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police.\n\nThis section first mentions the power of the Magistrate to direct an in E vestigation on receiving the report under s. 157, and then states the alternative that, if he thinks fit, he may at once proceed, rJr depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case. On the face of it, the first alternative of directing an investigation cannot arise in a case where the report it:self shows that investigation by the police is going on in accordance with s. 156. It is to be noticed that the second alteroative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold F the preliminary enquiry. That power is preceded by the condition that he may do so, \"if he thinks fit'. The use of this expression makes it clear that s. I 59. is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directinJ?: an investigation in cases where , the police decides not to investie:ate the case under the proviso to s. 157 ( 1). and it is in those cases that. it he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. Without the use of the exoression \"if he thinks fit\" the second aJtenati\\-e could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this cxpression G !rnakes h plain that the oo, ver confelrred bv the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can. therefor~. be e,,; ercised only in those cases in Whicfl the first clause is applicable. ·\n\nEven in sub..s.(3) of section 156, the only po,~:er given to the Magi5trate, who can take cognisance of an offence under section\n\n190. is to H order an 'investiJation~ there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the oolice. The scheme of these sections. thus, clearly is that the oower of the oolice to investiate any cognizable offence is un~ controlled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police\n\ns. N. SHARMA V. B. K. TIWARI (Bhargma, J.) 947\n\ndecide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation. or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. [949 G-950 F]\n\nThe Crown v. Mohammad Sadia Naiz. A.LR. 1949, Lah. 204, Pancham Singh v. The State. A.J.R. 1967 Pat. 416 and King Emperor V'. Khwaia Naziil Ahmad, 71 I.A. 203, refelrred to.\n\n(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect a cognizable offence has been committed. If the police engineer a false report of a cognizable offence aainst anv oerson he can in aoorooriate cases always invoke the '• power of the High Court under Art. 226. Therefore, the fact that the Code docs not provide for a poer to a Magistrate to stop investigation by C the nolice cannot be a round for holding that such a powe\" must be read into s. 159 of the Code. [951 Hl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATI! JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1969. '\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judment and order dated D Janua.rv 15, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc.\n\nCase No. 1770 of 1968. . •\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J.\n\nA first inforrriation reiiort was lodged by one Vijay Shanker Nfgam in Police Station Cantonment, Gorakhpur, in respect of an incident alleged to have taken place at about 7 p.m. on 10th April, 1968 in fro~_ of his house.\n\nThe report stated that one Bipen Kumar Tiwar1 had been attacked by certain goondas who also stabbed him with a knife and further caused injuries ot Vijay Shankar Nigam also.\n\nOne of the principal accused named in that report was S. N. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Gorakhpur, who is the appellant in this appeal.\n\nThe allegation agains~ him was that it was at his instigation that the goondas had attacked Bipen Kumar Tiwari and attempted to murder him.\n\nThe offences made out by the report lodged by Vijay Shankar Nigam were cognizable and the Police, after registering the case, started investigation.\n\nOn the 13th April, 1968, the appellant moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, alleging that a false report had been lodged against him at the connivance and instance of the local police. It was µrged that it would, therefore, _be desirable in the interest of justice that provisions of section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be\n\n. SUPREME COFRT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R .\n\ninvok~ and the preliminary enquiry J\"Ilay be conducted by the Court itself .and ecesary directions may be issued to the Police\n\nto sop the mvest1gat10n. The Magistrate, after hearing both parties, passed an order directig the police to stop investigation and decided to hold the enquiry himself.\n\nThereupon, on 2nd May, 1968, an application was moved in the High Court of Allahabad under section 561A, Cr. P.C., to quash the order passed by the Magistrate on 13th April, 1968, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to pass such an order under s. 159, Cr.\n\nP.C. This application was allowed by the High Court by its\n\njudgmen~ dated 15th January, 1969, so that the High Court quashed the order of the Judicial Magistrate and held that the police of Gorakhpur was at liberty to conclude the investigation and submit its report to the Magistrate after which the case could proceed in accordance with law.\n\nThe appeJ:ant has challenged this order of the High Court in. this appeal brought up by special leave.\n\nSection 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers an officer in charge of a police-station to investigate. any cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate. Sub-section (2) of s. 156 lays down that no proceeding of a police-officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was no~ empowred under this section to investigate, while sub-s. (3) gives power to any Magistrate empowered under section 190 of the Code to order such an investigation in any case as mentioned in sub-s. (!). Section 157 requires that, whenever such infonnation in received by an officer in charge of a police-stalion that he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under section 156, he must forthwith send a report of it to the Magistrate empowered to tak~ cognizance of such an offence upon a police report and, at the same t-ime, he must either proceed in person, or depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed, to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for discovery and arrest of the offender. This provision is qualified by a proviso which is in two parts. The first clause of the proviso enables an officer in charge of a police station not to proceed to make an investigation on the spot or to depute a subordinate officer for that purpose if the information received is given against a person by name and the case is not of a serious nature. The second clause of the proviso permits the officer in charge of a police station not to investigate the case if i~ appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for , entering on an investigation. The report to be sent to the Magistrate under sub-s. (1) of section 157 requires that in each of the cases where the officer in charge of the police station decides to act under the two clauses of the proviso, he must state in his report\n\ns. N. SHARMA I'. u. I.., TJWAR[ ( Bhargma, J.) 949\n\nhis reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of subsection ( l) and, in addition. in cases whre he decided not to in- . vestigate on the ground mentioned in the second clause of the proviso, he is required to notify to the informant the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to .be investigated. These provisions are followed by section 159 which is as follows :-\n\n\" 159. Such Magistrate. on receiving such report, may direct an investigation or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed. to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or othr\n\nwi>e to dispose of, the case in manner provided in this Code.\" The High Court has held that, under s. 159, the only power, which the Magistrate ciln exercise on receiving a report from the officer in charge of a police station, is to make an order in those cases which arc covered by the proviso to sub-s. (1) of sec[ion 157, vi~ .. cases in which the officer in charge of the police station does not proceed to investigate the case. The High Court has further held that this s. 159 does not empower a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police in exercise of the power conferred on it by section 156. It is the correctness of this decision which has been challenged by the appellant, and the ground taken is that s. 159 should be interpreted as being wide enough to permit the Magistrate to proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in the manner provided in this Code, even if the report from the police, submitted under section 157, states that the police is proceeding with the investigation of the offence.\n\nIt was urged by counsel for the appellant that the narrower interpretation of s. 15'1 accepted by the High Court will leave persons at the mercy of the police who can harass any one by having a false report lodged and starting investigation on the basis of such a report without any control by the judiciary. He has particularly emphasised the case of the appellant who was himself a Judicial Officer working as Additional District Magistrate and who moved the Magistrate on the ground that the police had engineered the case against him.\n\nWe. however, feel constrained to hold that the lang1rnge used in s. l 59 does not permit the wider interpretation put forward by counsel for the appellant. This section first mentions the power of the Magistrate to direct an investigation on receiving the report under s. l 57, and then states the alternative that, if he thinks fit, he may at once proceed, or depute any Magistrat~ subordinate\n\nH to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case. On the face of it, the first alternative of directing an inve>tigation cannot arise in a case where the report itself shows that investigation by the police is going on in\n\naccordance withs. 156. It is to be noticed that the second alternative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry. That power is prec.eded by the condition that he may do so, \"if he thinks fit''. The use of this expression makes it clear thats. 159 is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directing an investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the proviso to s. 157(1), and ii is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. If the expression \"if he thinks fit\" had not been used, it mighl have been argued that this section was intended to give in wide terms the power to the Magistrate to adopt any of the two courses of either directing an investigation, or of proceeding himself. or deputing any Magistrate subordinate to him to proc.eed to hold a preliminary enquiry as the circumstances of the case may require. Without the use of the expression \"if he thinks fit\", the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable.\n\nIt may also be further noticed that, even in sub-s. (3) of sec tion 156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of.an offence under section 190, is to order an investi gation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by. the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to in vestigate has been made independent of any control by the Magis trate. \"\n\nThe High Court of Lahore in The Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz('), and the High Court of Patina in Pancham Singh\n\nv. The State( 2 ) interpreted section 159 to the same effect as held by us above. The reasons given were different. Both the Courts based their decisions primarily on the view expressed by the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad('). That case, however, was. not quite to the poipt that has come up for decision before us. 'IJ!e Privy Council vjas concerned with the question whether the High Court had power under section 561A of the'\n\n. (1) A.l.R. 1949 Lah. 204.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1967 Patna418.\n\n(3) 71 I.A. 203.\n\nD -\n\nF (\n\nG ,\n\ns. N. SHARMA v. B. K. TIWARI (Bhargava, J.) 951\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure to quash proceedings being taken by the police in pursuance of first information reports made to the police.\n\nHowever, the Priv)' Council made some remarks which have been relied upon by the High Courts and are to the following effect :-\n\n\"In lndia, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part .of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus.\"\n\nThis interpreMion, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the\n\npolice to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary.\n\nTheir Lordships of the Privy Council were, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under sec!ion 561A, Cr. P.C., while we have to interpret section 159 of the Code which defines the powers of a Magistrate which he can exercise on receiving a report from the police of the cognizable offence under section 157 of the Code. In our opinion, section 159 was really intnded to give a limited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence.\n\nCounsel appearing on behalf_ of the appellant urged that such an interpretation is likely to be very prejudicial particularly to Officers of the judiciary who have to deal with cases brought up by the police and frequently give decisions which the police dislike. In such cases, the police may engineer a false report of a . cognizable offence against the Judicial Officer and may then harass hirri by cauying on a prolonged investigation of the offence made out by the report. It appears to us that, though the Code of Cri- minal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remdy by invokil!g the power of .the High Court under Art.\n\n226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the ffigh Court can always issue a writ of A mandamus restraining the police officer from misusi.Dg his legal powers. The fact tha~ the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in II section 159 of the Code.\n\nIn the resuJt,.the decision of the High Court in this case must be upheld, so that the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "S. N. SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. N. SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nBIPEN KUMAR TIWARI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIPEN KUMAR TIWARI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 10, 1970\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA & C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1003, "end_char": 1009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1113, "end_char": 1119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1854, "end_char": 1860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2875, "end_char": 2886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. SHARMA V. B. K. TIWARI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thus, clearly is that the oower of the oolice to investiate any cognizable offence is un~ controlled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police\n\ns. N. SHARMA V. B. K. TIWARI (Bhargma, J.) 947\n\ndecide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation."}}, {"text": "Bhargma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3316, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thus, clearly is that the oower of the oolice to investiate any cognizable offence is un~ controlled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police\n\ns. N. SHARMA V. B. K. TIWARI (Bhargma, J.) 947\n\ndecide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3782, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4064, "end_char": 4072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4256, "end_char": 4262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Aga1wal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chakavarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Aga1wal, D. P. Singh, V. J. Francis and S. Chakavarty, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bbargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J.\n\nA first inforrriation reiiort was lodged by one Vijay Shanker Nfgam in Police Station Cantonment, Gorakhpur, in respect of an incident alleged to have taken place at about 7 p.m. on 10th April, 1968 in fro~_ of his house."}}, {"text": "Vijay Shanker Nfgam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4742, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J.\n\nA first inforrriation reiiort was lodged by one Vijay Shanker Nfgam in Police Station Cantonment, Gorakhpur, in respect of an incident alleged to have taken place at about 7 p.m. on 10th April, 1968 in fro~_ of his house.", "canonical_name": "Vijay Shanker Nfgam"}}, {"text": "Bipen Kumar Tiwar1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that one Bipen Kumar Tiwar1 had been attacked by certain goondas who also stabbed him with a knife and further caused injuries ot Vijay Shankar Nigam also.", "canonical_name": "Bipen Kumar Tiwar1"}}, {"text": "Vijay Shankar Nigam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report stated that one Bipen Kumar Tiwar1 had been attacked by certain goondas who also stabbed him with a knife and further caused injuries ot Vijay Shankar Nigam also.", "canonical_name": "Vijay Shanker Nfgam"}}, {"text": "S. N. Sharma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the principal accused named in that report was S. N. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Gorakhpur, who is the appellant in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "S. N. SHARMA"}}, {"text": "Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Gorakhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5160, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the principal accused named in that report was S. N. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Gorakhpur, who is the appellant in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Bipen Kumar Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5344, "end_char": 5362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation agains~ him was that it was at his instigation that the goondas had attacked Bipen Kumar Tiwari and attempted to murder him.", "canonical_name": "Bipen Kumar Tiwar1"}}, {"text": "13th April, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th April, 1968, the appellant moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, alleging that a false report had been lodged against him at the connivance and instance of the local police."}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COFRT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COFRT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R ."}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6301, "end_char": 6314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, on 2nd May, 1968, an application was moved in the High Court of Allahabad under section 561A, Cr."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6348, "end_char": 6371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, on 2nd May, 1968, an application was moved in the High Court of Allahabad under section 561A, Cr."}}, {"text": "section 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th January, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6625, "end_char": 6643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. This application was allowed by the High Court by its\n\njudgmen~ dated 15th January, 1969, so that the High Court quashed the order of the Judicial Magistrate and held that the police of Gorakhpur was at liberty to conclude the investigation and submit its report to the Magistrate after which the case could proceed in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. This application was allowed by the High Court by its\n\njudgmen~ dated 15th January, 1969, so that the High Court quashed the order of the Judicial Magistrate and held that the police of Gorakhpur was at liberty to conclude the investigation and submit its report to the Magistrate after which the case could proceed in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "Section 156(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7022, "end_char": 7048, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7189, "end_char": 7195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7473, "end_char": 7484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7568, "end_char": 7579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7779, "end_char": 7790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8790, "end_char": 8801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8972, "end_char": 8981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report to be sent to the Magistrate under sub-s. (1) of section 157 requires that in each of the cases where the officer in charge of the police station decides to act under the two clauses of the proviso, he must state in his report\n\ns. N. SHARMA I'."}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9733, "end_char": 9739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10110, "end_char": 10116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10227, "end_char": 10238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10352, "end_char": 10358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10657, "end_char": 10668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10825, "end_char": 10830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 157(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13510, "end_char": 13521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Lahore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Lahore in The Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz('), and the High Court of Patina in Pancham Singh\n\nv. The State( 2 ) interpreted section 159 to the same effect as held by us above."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patina", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Lahore in The Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz('), and the High Court of Patina in Pancham Singh\n\nv. The State( 2 ) interpreted section 159 to the same effect as held by us above."}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14288, "end_char": 14299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14688, "end_char": 14700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14874, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15857, "end_char": 15863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16325, "end_char": 16336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16482, "end_char": 16493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16523, "end_char": 16534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17578, "end_char": 17587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 159", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18051, "end_char": 18062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_953_962_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "FATEH BIBI ETC.\n\nCHARAN DASS\n\nMarch IO, 1970\n\n(S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]\n\nHindu Law of Inheritance, (Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act 2 of 1929)- Act whethr applies in case of Hindu male dying in-estate before thei Act came into operation and succeeded by female heir dying after that dc .. te-Succession tp estate of last male owner when opens.\n\nK's son C died in 1925 and was succeeded in the ownership of his properties (inherited from K) by his mother B.\n\nB continued in possession till her death in 1946.\n\nHer daughter M took possession of the properties as heir.\n\nM died in 1950.\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff was the son of M.\n\nIn 1955 he filed a suit alleging that the defendant, after the death of B claiming to be entitled to the properties as a collateral and revisioner of K, had got mutation of the aforesaid properties effected in his name.\n\nAs daughter's son of K the respondent-plaintiff prayed for declaration of his title to the suit properties; he also prayed for recovery of pos:tession thei'e~ of from the defendant.\n\nThe defendant contended that he wa. a collateral .of K and was entitled to succeed to the properties after the termination of the life-estate of his widow B on her death in 1946. The trial court held that in view of the provisions of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929 (Act 2 of 1929) the plaintiff as sisters' son of C the last male holder, had a preferential claim to that of the defendant who was only a paternal uncle of C.\n\nThe first appellate Court upheld the decree of the trial Court.\n\nIn second appeal by the defendant before the High Court the learned Single Judge held that as C the last male owner had died in 1925 his heirs must be found on that date.\n\nOn that date according to the learned Judge the heir of C was the defendant. The fact that the life.estate of the mother and sister of C intervened after his death would not affect the rights of the defendant as the Act of 1929, had no retrospetive operation.\n\nIn Letters Patent Appe~I the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the Single Judge. The, legal representatives of the defendant appealed to this Court by certificate. The question of Jaw that fell for consideration was whether the Act applies only to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate on or. after February 21, 1929 when the Act came into force or whether it also applies to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and succeeded by a female heir who died after that date, It was not disputed that C held the pfoperty absolutely and he died intestate.\n\nHELD: Applying the rule laid down hy the Judicial Commi.tte~ of the Privy Council in Lala D1111i Chand'.\\· case the appeal must be d1sn11ssed.\n\nThe point of time for the applicability of the Act is when the succession opens ri:;,,. v, ihen the life estate terminates.\n\nIn consequence the qucs tion as to who is the nearest revcrsionarv heir. or \\Vhat is the class of reversionary heirs \\'.'ill fall to he settled at the date of the expirv of the ownerS:hip for life or lives.\n\nTh~ dcath of a flindu fen1alc life-estate owner oocns the inheritance to the rcvcrsioncrs and the one n1ost nearly\n\nrelated ) l.L.R. [1937] Mad 948. (F.R)\n\n(4) I.L.R. 58 All. 1041 (F. B.)\n\nI I\n\nMr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, pointed out that it was rather unfortunate that the later full Bench decisions of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who had followed the decisions of those Courts which had been subsequently over-ruled.\n\nThe learned Counsel also pointed out that according to the decisions of the various High Courts, the view taken by the Letters Patent Bench was correct.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the decision of the Letters Paten~ Bench i; correct.\n\nNo doubt, originally the view taken by some of the High Courts was that the Act applies only if the last male holder dies after the coming inte force of the Act and it will have no retwspective application to cases of Hindu males dying intest;;:e before the date of the Act.\n\nThat view has now been given the go-by as is seen from the later decisions to which we shall 1efer presently.\n\nBut before we refer to those decisions. we sh8:l quote the observations of this Court in 4 nnagouda Nathgoudu Patil v. Court of Wards(') regarding the object and scope of the Act.\n\nThis Court observed :\n\n\"The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to alter the order in which certain lteirs of a Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his estate; 1nd section 1 (2) expressly Jays down that 'the Act applies only to persons who but for the passing of this Act would have been subject to the Law of Mitakshara in respect of the provisions herein enacted, and it applies to such persons in respect only of the property of males not held in coparcenary and not disposed of by will'.\n\nThus the scope of the Act is limited.\n\nIt governs sucession only to the separate property of a Hindu male who dies intestate.\n\nIt iioes not alter the Jaw as regards the devolution of any 'otlr.:1 kind of property owned by a Hindu male ... : It is to be noted that the Act does not make these four relations statutory heirs under the Mitakshara Law un, der all circumstances and for all purposes: it makes them heirs only when the propositus is a male and the property in respect to which it is rnught to be applied is his separate property.\"\n\n\\ 'l1!e four relations, referred to in t.1.e above extract, are : the son's daughter. daughter's sister and sister's son.\n\nUnder the Mitakshara Law. in the line of heirs, the paternal uncle came .iust after the paternal grandfather and his son followed him immediately.\n\nBut, by the Act, the four relations mentioned above have been introduced between the grandfather and the\n\n(I) [l952J S.C.R. 208. 215.\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [ 1970 j 3 S.C •. ll\n\npaternal uncle and his son.\n\nThat is, the paternal uncle and his A ~ son are postponed to these four relations by the Act.\n\n' In the case before us we have already pointed out that Charanji Lal was the absolute owner of the property and therefore\n\n.there was no question of the property being held in coparcenary .and there is no controversy that the property was not disposed of by will by Charanji Lal.\n\nTherefore, prima facie the Act will apply to the esate of Charanji Lal if it can be hCld •that the succes- .sion to his estate opened only when his sister Maya Devi died on March 25, 1950.\n\nThe question is : When did succession gpen to the estate of <:haranji Lal. Was it on the date '?'hen-he died, i.e., AugUst 22, 1925; or was it when his sister Maya Devi died, viz., March 25, 1950? . .\n\nIn this connection we may refer to the decisions in Shrimati .Shakunta/a -Devi v. Kaushalya Devi('); Raipali Kunwar v. Scuju Rai('); Pokhan Dusadh v. Mst. Manoa('); Lakshmi v. Anantha\n\nrama(~) and Bindeshari Singh . v. Baij Naih Singh('). In alf\n\nthese cases the last male holder had died before the date of the Act and the estate was in the possession of a life-estate holder -either a widow or a mother who died after-the coming into force of the Act.\n\nIt has been held in all these decisions that the succession to the estate of the last male-holder must be considered to open only on the termination of the life-estate and the Act will apply _in considering the heirs of the last male holder a~ the termination of the life estate. ·\n\nIt is not necessary for us to refer to any of these decisions in great detail as the matter has been considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lala Duni Chand v. M'usammat A nar Kali ( •) . The Judicial Committee has held that the Act, which altered the order of succession of certain persons mentioned the.rein and. which came into operation on February 21, 1929 applies not oitly to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate -on or after February 21, 1929 but also to the case of such a\n\nmale·, dying intestate before th{lt date if he was succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. The Judicial Committee, has further held that succession in such cases to the estate of the 1ast Hindu male who died intestate did not open until the de_ath of the life-estate holder. It has also been held that during the life-time of the life-estate holr, the reversioners in Hindu Law have no vested interest in the estate and that they have a mere\n\n(I) I.L.R. 17 Lah. 356. ·\n\n(3) l.L.R. 16 Part. 215 F.B.\n\n(5) I.L.R. 13 Luck. 380.\n\n(2) l.L.R._ 58 All. 1041 F.B.\n\n(4) l.L.R. (1937) Mad. 948 F.B\n\n(6) L.R. 73 I.A. 187.\n\nG •\n\n1pes successionis.\n\nIt was contended before the Judicial Committee'that the words 'Hindu male dying intestate' was occurring in the preamble to the Act conaotes the future tense, of a Hindu male dying after the Act has come into force.\n\nThis contention was rejected by the Judicial Committee, which observed as follows:\n\n\"In the argument before their Lordships reliance was placed on the words 'dying intestate' in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in Shrimati Shakuntala Devi v. KaushalayQ Devi (ILR 17 Lah 356) that the words are a mere description of the status o.f the deceased and have no reference, and are no: intended to have any reference, to the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means \"in the case of intestacy of a H\\ndu male\". To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provisions, the material point of time being the date when tlie succession opens, namely, the death of the widow.\" D\n\nWe are in entire agreement with the above observations of the Judicial Committee and accordingly hold that the point of time . 'for the applicability of the Act is when.· the succession opens,.\n\nviz., when the life estate terminates. In consequence, it must\n\nbe further held that the questions as to who is the nearest reversionary heir, or what is the class of reversionary heirs will fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives.\n\nThe death of a Hindu female life-estate holder opens. the inheritance to the reversioners and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to the estate.\n\nWe hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and has been\n\nsucceed~ by a female heir who died after that date.\n\nIn this case, on the fiildings recorded by all the Courts, the last female heir died only on March 25, 1950 and, 'under the Act, the O plaintiff, as the sister's son of Charanji Lal, is entitled to succeed to his estate, in preference to the defendant who is only a paternal uncle.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the paternal .uncle is postponed to the four relations referred to in the Act, the last of whom iS the sister's son. -\n\nBefote .we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opned even on November 26, 1946 when Bishan DeVi's (the mother's) life estate terminated\n\nand it must be held that even Maya DeVi, the sister of Charanji\n\nLal, must be considered to have succeeded to the. property of her brother, in her own right as a preferential heir under the Act, though the est-ate, taken by.her under s. 3(b) will only bea life-estate.\n\nNo doubt these aspects have not been raised before any of the Courts, nor even before us.\n\nThe result is that the decision of the Letters Patenn Bench of the High Court is correct.\n\nIn consequence the appeal fails and is dismissed with _costs. ·\n\n-0.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nA '", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "FATEH BIBI ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FATEH BIBI ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHARAN DASS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHARAN DASS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March IO, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHARAN DASS\n\nMarch IO, 1970\n\n(S. M. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Act whethr applies in case of Hindu male dying in-estate before thei Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 21, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "after February 21, 1929 when the Act came into force or whether it also applies to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and succeeded by a female heir who died after that date, It was not disputed that C held the pfoperty absolutely and he died intestate."}}, {"text": "Lala D1111i Chand'.\\", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2681, "end_char": 2701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: Applying the rule laid down hy the Judicial Commi.tte~ of the Privy Council in Lala D1111i Chand'.\\· case the appeal must be d1sn11ssed."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LR. 73 I.A. 187", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4351, "end_char": 4366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Vohra and Harbans Singh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Vohra and Harbans Singh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain, J.\n\nB. Dadachanji,\n\n0.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Narain"}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain, J.\n\nB. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5153, "end_char": 5163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal, filed by the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, on certificate, is whether on a true construction of the Hiitdu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act II of 1929) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), h applies only to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate on or after February 21, 1929 (when the Act came into fqrce) or ''ether it applies in the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came ipto operation and succeeded by a female heir who died after that date."}}, {"text": "Dasodbi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Tota", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6089, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Thakur Dass", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6097, "end_char": 6108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Charallii Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6171, "end_char": 6184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Maya DeviNand Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Maya DeviNand Lal"}}, {"text": "Charan Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MJhri\n\nDasodbi\n\nDayala\n\nI Tota\n\nI Thakur Dass\n\nI Kirpa Ram-Bishan Devi Bishna@ Bishan Singh\n\n(Defendant)\n\nI Charallii Lal I Maya DeviNand Lal\n\nI Charan Dass (Plaintiff)\n\nThe respondent-plaintiff instituted Suit No.", "canonical_name": "CHARAN DASS"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge's Court, Jagraon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1955 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Jagraon, against the original defendant for recovery of possession of the suit properties."}}, {"text": "Kirpa Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6441, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiff Kirpa Ram was the last owner of the properties.", "canonical_name": "Kirpa Ram"}}, {"text": "Charanji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even during his life-time his only son Charanji Lal had died.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "Kirpa Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Kirpa Ram, his widow Bishan Devi became the owner of the properties and was in possession of the properties for her lifetime.", "canonical_name": "Kirpa Ram"}}, {"text": "Bishan Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6588, "end_char": 6599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Kirpa Ram, his widow Bishan Devi became the owner of the properties and was in possession of the properties for her lifetime.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Devi"}}, {"text": "Maya Devi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Bishan Devi, her daughter Maya Devi (daughter of Kirpa Ram and Bishan Devi) became her heir and remained in possession of the property till her death.", "canonical_name": "Maya DeviNand Lal"}}, {"text": "Dharma Shastras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Maya Devi's death, according to Dharma Shastras the plaintiff, as the daughter's son of Kirpa Ram, was entitled to succeed :0 the properties which were in the possession of Bishan Devi and later on of Maya Devi, his mother."}}, {"text": "January 6, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7304, "end_char": 7318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant, after the death of Bishan Devi, claiming to be entitled to the properties of Kirpa Ram, got mutation in the Revenue Registers effected in his name on or about January 6, 194 7, Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the defendant had no right, title or interest to the properties of Kirpa Ram and the mutation obtained by him could nGt affect the rights of the plaintiff as the daughter's son.of Kirpa Ram."}}, {"text": "JGtpa Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He alleged that Charanji Lal did not pre-decease Kirpa Ram but, on the other hand, after the death of JGtpa Ram,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1970) 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Charanji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charanji Lal, his son, became heir and was in possession of the A properties Jen by his father.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "February 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9094, "end_char": 9111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated February 22, 1956 decreed the plaintiff's claim."}}, {"text": "Charan ji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9406, "end_char": 9419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court further found that Charanji Lal did not pre-decease his father Kirpa Ram but, on the other hand, after the death of Kirpa Ram, Charan ji Lal was the last male holder of the entire property and was in possession, as such, till his death.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "August 22, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9693, "end_char": 9708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been found that Charanji Lal died issueless on August 22, 1925 and, after his death, his mother Bishan Devi was in possession of the property as a life-estate holder."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9833, "end_char": 9850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After her death on November 26, 1946 Maya Devi was in possession of the property, again as a Iifeestate holder, till her death on March 25, 1950."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After her death on November 26, 1946 Maya Devi was in possession of the property, again as a Iifeestate holder, till her death on March 25, 1950."}}, {"text": "Charl\\nii Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10016, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though no claim was made by the plaintiff to succeed to Charl\\nii Lal as his sister's son, and though his claim was to succeed to the property of Kirpa Ram as the latter's daughter's son, the Trial Court held that on the findings that Charanji Lal was the last male holder, the claim of the plaintiff had really to be decided on the basis of the Act under which the plaintiff, as the sister's son of Charanji Lal, has got a preferential claim."}}, {"text": "February 21. 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10548, "end_char": 10565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the defendant that the Act did not apply inasmuch as Charanji Lal had died long before the date when the Act came into force (February 21."}}, {"text": "Charanji Lall", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SO\" In this view the trial Court held that the plaintiff, bemg the sisters son of the last male holder (Charanji Lall was to :be preferred to the defendant who\n\nwas only a paternal uncle of Charanji Lal and as such, decreed the suit.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "District Judge, Ludhiana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10999, "end_char": 11023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant i;:arried the matter in appeal before the learned District Judge, Ludhiana, in C.A.53 of 1956."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11085, "end_char": 11099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue learned Judge, in the judgment dated March 14, 1957, has stated that the defendant only attacked the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff was the daughter's son of Kirpa Ram and the findings on the other issues were not challenged."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11609, "end_char": 11626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue defendant again challen.ged the decrees of both the Subordinate Courts before the Punjab High Court in Regwar Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "August 22. 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12061, "end_char": 12076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the learned S_ingle Judge the appelant raised two contentions : (1) That the plaintiff never set up any claim as a preferential heir under the Act being the sister's on of the last male holder and, as such, bis title should not have been recognised by the Subordinate Collrts; and (2) In any event, the Act does not apply inasmuch :13 the last male holder Charanji Lal died as early as August 22."}}, {"text": "Feb:uary 21, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12126, "end_char": 12143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1925, long before the coming into force of the Act on Feb:uary 21, 1929."}}, {"text": "Charan11 Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13297, "end_char": 13309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, regarding the applicability of the Act, the learned Judge held that as Charanji Lal died on August 22, 1925 the, succession .to his estated must be considered to have opened on the date of his death a!1d, as the A~~ came into force only on February 21, 1929 the hen:s of Charan11 Lal must be found on the date the succession opened, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13759, "end_char": 13776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this view, the learned Judge relied on two earlier decisions, one of the Madras High Court in Krishnan C, h, ettiar v.\n\nManikamma/(1) and the other of the Allahabad High Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Mst."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13841, "end_char": 13861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this view, the learned Judge relied on two earlier decisions, one of the Madras High Court in Krishnan C, h, ettiar v.\n\nManikamma/(1) and the other of the Allahabad High Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Mst."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13865, "end_char": 13877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this view, the learned Judge relied on two earlier decisions, one of the Madras High Court in Krishnan C, h, ettiar v.\n\nManikamma/(1) and the other of the Allahabad High Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Mst."}}, {"text": "November 18, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view the learned Judge, by his judgment dated November 18, 1958 held that the rightful heir to the estate of Charanji Lal was the defendant and reversed the decrees of the two Subordinate Courts and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout."}}, {"text": "Vohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15486, "end_char": 15491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Vohra, learned counsel for the appellant, no doubt urged that the interpretation placed upon the Act by the Division Bench is erroneous."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15809, "end_char": 15824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to him the Act will apply only to cases of Hfa1du male dying intestate after the Act came into force, i.e., after February 21, 1929; and, in this case as Charanji Lal died on August 25, 1925 long before tl!e Act came into force, succession to bis estate opened on the date of the death of Charanji Lal and on that date the defendant, in Hindu Law, was entitled to succeed to the estate."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16150, "end_char": 16163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1041 (F. B.)\n\nI I\n\nMr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, pointed out that it was rather unfortunate that the later full Bench decisions of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who had followed the decisions of those Courts which had been subsequently over-ruled.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Narain"}}, {"text": "Madras and Allahabad High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16297, "end_char": 16329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1041 (F. B.)\n\nI I\n\nMr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, pointed out that it was rather unfortunate that the later full Bench decisions of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who had followed the decisions of those Courts which had been subsequently over-ruled."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17473, "end_char": 17482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17619, "end_char": 17629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court observed :\n\n\"The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to alter the order in which certain lteirs of a Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his estate; 1nd section 1 (2) expressly Jays down that 'the Act applies only to persons who but for the passing of this Act would have been subject to the Law of Mitakshara in respect of the provisions herein enacted, and it applies to such persons in respect only of the property of males not held in coparcenary and not disposed of by will'."}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [ 1970 j 3 S.C •. ll\n\npaternal uncle and his son.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18751, "end_char": 18822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [ 1970 j 3 S.C •. ll\n\npaternal uncle and his son."}}, {"text": "haranji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19453, "end_char": 19464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is : When did succession gpen to the estate of <:haranji Lal.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "AugUst 22, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19507, "end_char": 19522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hen-he died, i.e., AugUst 22, 1925; or was it when his sister Maya Devi died, viz.,"}}, {"text": "L.R. 73 I.A. 187", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21445, "end_char": 21461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21970, "end_char": 21987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention was rejected by the Judicial Committee, which observed as follows:\n\n\"In the argument before their Lordships reliance was placed on the words 'dying intestate' in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in Shrimati Shakuntala Devi v. KaushalayQ Devi (ILR 17 Lah 356) that the words are a mere description of the status o.f the deceased and have no reference, and are no: intended to have any reference, to the time of the death of a Hindu male."}}, {"text": "hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23166, "end_char": 23255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Befote", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23779, "end_char": 23785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Befote .we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opned even on November 26, 1946 when Bishan DeVi's (the mother's) life estate terminated\n\nand it must be held that even Maya DeVi, the sister of Charanji\n\nLal, must be considered to have succeeded to the."}}, {"text": "Bishan DeVi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23909, "end_char": 23920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Befote .we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opned even on November 26, 1946 when Bishan DeVi's (the mother's) life estate terminated\n\nand it must be held that even Maya DeVi, the sister of Charanji\n\nLal, must be considered to have succeeded to the.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Devi"}}, {"text": "Maya DeVi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23992, "end_char": 24001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Befote .we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opned even on November 26, 1946 when Bishan DeVi's (the mother's) life estate terminated\n\nand it must be held that even Maya DeVi, the sister of Charanji\n\nLal, must be considered to have succeeded to the.", "canonical_name": "Maya DeviNand Lal"}}, {"text": "Charanji\n\nLal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24017, "end_char": 24030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Befote .we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opned even on November 26, 1946 when Bishan DeVi's (the mother's) life estate terminated\n\nand it must be held that even Maya DeVi, the sister of Charanji\n\nLal, must be considered to have succeeded to the.", "canonical_name": "Charan ji Lal"}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24196, "end_char": 24203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act", "statute": "We hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act"}}]} {"document_id": "1970_3_963_969_EN", "year": 1970, "text": "BDIAR SCHOOL EXAMINATION BOARD\n\nSUBHAS CHANDRA SINHA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 25, March 10, 1970.\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]\n\nNatural Justice-Evidence of unfair means at examination at a parN• cular centre appGrent--Cancellation of eXIQmination at the centr;:- Whether notice to exa1ninees necessary,\n\nBihar School Examination Board Act (Bihar Act 7 of 1952) s. 9(3)- Scope of.\n\nCandidates at the Secondary School Examination held in March 1969, appeared at various centres.\n\nThe results at all centres were published in July 1969, except those at a particular centre. The tabulators at that centre reported that the percentage of marks and of successful candidates was unusually high ( 80 % or more) . The matter was referred to the\n\nUnfair Means Committee of the Board. A comparison of the aO'\\i'er books at that centre showed such a remarkable agreement in the ansvters,\n\nthat it was obvious that unfair means were adopted and that the students had assistance from an outside source. The Chairman p3ssed an Order on August 30, 1969, cancelling the examination at the centre and allowing the examinees at the centre to re-appear at the Supplementary Examination in September The action of the Chairman was placed before the 803.t'd\n\nand was approved.\n\nThe respondents.· \\\\'ho \\\\'ere the examinees at that centre movei.! the High Court under Art. 226 and the High Court quashed the rder cf tl.te Board and ordered publication of the results of that centre.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (I) There was enough material for the Chairman and the Board for taking action without .any complaint from anybody of the use di unfair means. [966 E-FJ\n\n(2) There was no reason for __ \\vithholding the publication of r.!3trJts of other centres which \\vere notunder suspension. [966 F]\n\n(3) Under s. 9(3) of the Bihar School Examination Board Act. in an emergency, the powers of the Chairman are co-terminus with thOSI! of the Board and he can take action himself and later repdrt it to the Board.\n\nTherefore, the order of the Chairman in the present case \\Vas not in::i'11 petent. [966 C-F; 967 A]\n\n( 4) The essence of an examination is that the worth of every p-; rson is appraised without any assistance from an outside source. If at a C':!Dtre the whole body of students received assistance and managed to s.Jurce success at a high percentage, when at other centres, the average \\Vas only\n\n50%, the University or the Board ould cancel the exan1ir:.;:i, tion as tf whole; and if there was sufficient material on which it could be demonstrated that the Authority was right in its conclusion that the cxami .. nation as a whole \\vas vitiated then academic standards require th.lt the Authority's appreciation of the problem must be respected. To make ouch a decision depend upon a full-fledged judicial inquiry would hold up the functioning of such autonomous bodies as lJniversities and School Beards.\n\n!967 G-H; 968 E-HJ\n\nJn the present case, no principle of natural justice was violated and the1e was no need to give the examinees an opportunity to contest the conclusion, because, the evidence was plain and transparent, and the Beard had not charged anyone with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself.\n\nTherefore, the order of the High Court must be set aside and the respondents-candidates allowed to sit for the next examination. [969 B-Dl Board of High School Intermediate Examination, U.P. Allahabad v.\n\nGhanshyam Das Gupta and Ors. (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36, explained.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2620 of 1969.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 8, 1969 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1040 of l 969.\n\nSarjoo Prasad, Roy Paras Nath, S. K. Bisaria and S. S.\n\nJahar, for the appellant.\n\nS. N. Prasad, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by D\n\nHidayatullah, C.J., This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna, December 8, 1969 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1040 of 1969. It is brought to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe appellant is the Bihar School Examination Board through its Chairman.\n\nThe respondents are 36 students of S.S.H.E, School, Jagdishpur and H. E. School Mal- E aur, District Shahabad. They had moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Board cancelling annual Secondary School ExaminaHon of 1969 in relation to Hanswadih centre in Shahbad District.\n\nThey had also asked that a mandamus be issued to the Board to publish the results of the students who appeared at this centre.\n\nThe High Court has F quashed the order of cancellaHon and directed the Board to publish the results.\n\nCandidates at the Secondary School Examination held in March, 1969 appeared at various centres including Hanswadih Centre.\n\nThe results were published in July 1969 but the results of examinees at Hanswadih centre were not released.\n\nOn July 22, 1969 it was reported in a local Hindi daily newspaper thaa the results of this centre and others were under consideration.\n\nOn August 30, 1969 a communique from the Board appeared in the newspaper Searchlight that the examinations of all subjects held at the Secondary School Examination of 1969 at Hanswadih centre were cancelled and the reason was that unfair means were practised on a large scale at this Centre.\n\nExaminees were, however, allowed to appear at the supplementary Secondary School Examination to be held in September, 1969.\n\n- \"\n\nB!HAR EXAM. BOARD v. s. c. SINHA (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 965\n\nThe respondents challenged the order of the Board on many grounds.\n\nThe main grounds we_re that there was no complaint of use of unfair means; that no opportunity had been given to the examinees to show cause before passing the order of cancellation against them; that as the Supplementary Examination was to be held within 10 days of the communique there was no time for the students to prepare for the examination; that the cancellation ooght to have been announced before publishing the results of other centres . and lastly that the order passed by the Chairman and not by the Baord, was not a valid order under the Bihar School Examination Board Regulations.\n\nFrom the record of the case 'and the return which has been filed by the Board the following facts appear :\n\nThe Tabulators of the Hanswadih centres', reported that the percentage of successful examinees was as high as 80% whereas the average at the Arrah, Dalippur centres was only 50%. They were therefore asked to prepare percentage subjectwise.\n\nAll the Tabulators submitted these precentages.\n\nThe matter was referred to the Unfair Means Committee of the Board.\n\nThe Committee in its turn asked the Moderators to look into all the answer books where the percentage was 80% or more.\n\nThey reported unfair means on a mass scale.\n\nThe Chairman then passed an order on August 30, 1969 cancelling the examination in all subjects at the Hanswadih Centre allowing the examinees to re-appear at the Supplementary Examination in September, 1969 without payment of fresh fees.\n\nThe Head Masters of the three schools concerned were also informed by registered letters.\n\nThe action of the Chairman w11s placed before the Board at its meeting on September 9, 1969 and was approved.\n\nIt was stated\\in the return that a complaint was received from one Satnarain Singh of Jagdishpur, who, however, wrote a letter that he had made no such complaint.\n\nThe High Court gave a finding that the high percentages did give rise to a suspicion that unfair means were practised and that the Board was justified in investigating the case. It was, however, held that the examinees were not given a chance to show cause and the materials on which the Chairman of the Board passed his order were not disclosed-to the examinees.\n\nThe Board had therefore failed to act according to the principles of natural justice and the order of the Chairman and/ or .the Board could not, therefore, be sustained.\n\nThe High Court relied upon Board of High School & Intermediate Education. U.P., Allahabad v.\n\nGhanshyam Das Gupta and others(') and Ajit Singh and others v.\n\nRanchi Universlty('). It commented upon the short interval bet-\n\n(I) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C R. 36.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1964 Patna 291.\n\nween the communique and the Supplementary Examination and\n\nA - held that the communique should have been issued before the results had been published. The High Court also considered the competence of the Chairman to pass the order under the Regula- \" tions but did not decide it as it reached the conclusion that the principles of natural justice were violated and the orders of the Chairman and/ or the Board were, therefore unsustainable. The B order of the Board was quashed and the publication of the results of the Hanswadih Centre was ordered.\n\nThis Court granted special leave and directed stay of the operation of the order of the High Court.\n\nWe heard this appeal on February 25, 1970.\n\nSince the next c examination at which the respondents can appear is scheduled to be held in March, we did not wish to delay the decision of the appeal.\n\nWe accordingly passed an order allowing the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court but stated that we would give our detailed reasons later.\n\nWe now proceed to do so.\n\nAll the arguments which were presented in the High Court were repeated before us by the learned counsel for the responde12t.\n\nWe find it convenient to consider some of them before taking up the point on which the High Court has cancelled the order ot _ the Board and directed the publication of the results.\n\nThe argument that no one had complained about the examination need not detain us.\n\nThe Tabulators sent thier remarks on which investigation was made.\n\nThe Unfair Means Committee and the Moderators gave their opinion.\n\nThese were sufficient for taking action.\n\nThere was no need lo wait for a complaint, nor. was a complaint really necessary.\n\nThe results were withheld so that inquiries could be completed.\n\nIn the meantime the results of the other centres which were not under suspicion could be declared because in their case there was no reason to withhold publication.\n\nThe contention that the Board alone and not the Chairman could, cancel the examinations need not detain us.\n\nUnder s. 6(2) of the Bihar School Examinations Board Act, the Board co~ siders, moderates, determines and publishes the results of examinations.\n\nIt also admits ca, ndidates to examinations, disqualifies them for any reason which it considers to be adequate. l, Jnder s. 9(3) of the Act in an emergency the powers of the Chatrll:!an are co-terminus with those of the Board and he can take acl!on himself and later report it to the Board. n this case action as taken by the Chairman and he reported 1t. to the Board w¥ch folly endorsed it.\n\nTherefore the cancellatmn of the exammations at Hanswadih Centre .must be treated as an order of the Board and cannot, therefore, be challenged on the ground that it was incompetently made.\n\nThis brings us to the crux of the problem.\n\nThe High Court mterfered on the ground that natural justice and fair play were not observed in this case.\n\nThis was repeated to us by the respondents in the appeal.\n\nA mention of fair play does not come very '.\"ell from the respondents who were grossly guilty of breach of faJI play themselves at the examinations.\n\nApart from the reports of the experts, the results speak for themselves.\n\nAt the other centres the average of successful candidates was 50%. At this centre the examinations had the following percentage :\n\nI. Mother Indian Language 94\n\n2. English 70\n\n3. Social Studies .. 95\n\n4. Everyday Science 90\n\n5. Elementary Mathematics\n\nJOO\n\n6. Economics & Civics 92\n\n7. Elementary Physiology and Hygiene 96\n\n8. Geography 99 9.\n\nHistory 88\n\nIO. Physics 70\n\n11. Chemistry\n\nIOO\n\n12. Advance Mathematics 99\n\n13. Sanskrit .100\n\nThese figures speak for themselves.\n\nHowever, to satisfy ourselves we ordered that some answer books be brought for our inspection and many such were produced.\n\nA comparison of the answer books showed such a remarkable agreement in the answers that no doubt was left in our minds that\" the students had assistance from an outside source.\n\nTherefore the conclusion tha~ unfair means were adopted stands completely vindicated.\n\nThis is not a case of any particular individual who is being charged with adoption of unfair means but of the conduct of all the examinees or at least a vast majority of them at ::! particular centre. If it is not a question of charging any one individually with unfair .means but to condemn the examinate list the previous day he .. ought to have looked into the Cause List for the next day's work.\n\nThere was some negligence on the part of the counsel or his cletk but it was not so grave as to disentitle the party to be heard, and in any event, tJuo alleged contemnars could not be punished for a mistake on the part of their counsel or the counsel's clerk. .\n\nFurther this was a case in which the counsel must have an opportunity of explainig his conduct and the conduct of his clients in reference to the order of stay for whose disobedience the charge of contempt was made.\n\n[972 B-0]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 59 and 60 of 1968..\n\nAppeals by special \\eave from the judgments and orders \"lated May 2, 1967 and May 18, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc. Contempt Case No. 53 of 1966.\n\nM. V. Goswami, for the appellant (in both the appeals) S. S. Khanduja and Kailash Chander for the respondents (in both the appeals) . ·· O. P. Rana, for the interveners.\n\nF '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad.\n\nCriminaI Appeal No. 60 of 1968 arises out of an order by which the appellants held guilty of contempt and fined, asked the Court to vacate the order and to rehear the case.\n\nCriminaI AppeaI No. 59 of 1968 concerns the main order passed in the case holding the appellants guilty of contempt and imposing fines on them. We have not considered the merits of Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1968 be<:ause in our opinion, Civil Appeal No. 60 of 1968 should be allowed with the consequentiaI order that the conviction for contempt of Court should be set aside and the case remanded to the High Court for re-hearing.\n\nIt is not necessary to go into the facts of the case because we are only concerned with the absence of counsel and parties when the motion for contempt was heard in the High Court. The case was shown in the daily Cause I..ist of Monday, the 1st May, 1967 before Mr. Justice Gyanendra Kumar in Court Room No. 2. On that day, there were two cases fixed at the top for dictation of judgment and for orders.\n\nThereafter, this case was shown at the 12th place.\n\nThe entry read correctly in so far as the names of the parties were concerned and the number of the case but by some mischance, the name of the counsel was shown as Mr. C.B. Gupta in place of Mr. C.B. Misra.\n\nIt appeai:s hat the case was not reached that day.\n\nIt was shown the next day in the same Court its position was then No. 3. One case which had tire 15th place on 1st May. 1967 was shown ahead of this case.\n\nThis time, the name of the counsel was correctly mentioned.\n\nWhen the case was called in the Court of Mr. Justice Gyanendra Kumar, the appellants were absent as also t!Jcir counsel.\n\nThe order was passed ex-parte imposing fines upon the contemnors who are the appellants here.\n\nAccording to the affidavit filed by the clerk of Mr. C. B. Misra, he missed the case on the first day because the name of his counsel was not correctly recorded.\n\nHe also stated that as contempt matters were usuaily shown on Monday, he overlooked the case on the following day also and hence Mr. C. B. Misra could not be present in Court.\n\nIt is also stated in the affidavit that another counsel informed Mr. C. B. Misra that his case had been called in Court No. 2.\n\nMr. Misra went to enquire because he did not know that he had a case Jhere.\n\nHe found that this case was in fact shown in the Cause List but that it was already heard and decided and the judgment was also delivered.\n\nThe application was thereafter made for re, hearin~ the ease after vacating the order, pointing out the facts which we have narrated above.\n\nThe learned Judge did not accept the affidavit of Mr. Misra's cl.erk.\n\nHe observed that it was not a\n\nSUPREME._ COURT REPORTS\n\n(1970) 3 S.C.R.\n\ncase of optical illusion or that two pages had been turned by mis- A take.\n\nThe case was shown on the 1st May and also on the second May he was not, therefore, prepared to accept the explanation.\n\nAlthough, we are reluctant to interfere in matters of disdpline, when the High Court punishes for contempt for disobedience of its orders, we think in this case, the learµed judge migh: well have heard Mr. Misra.\n\nThere is no doubt that on the ls~ of May there was an error in the Cause List and it is a maxim that an act of Court should not harm any person.\n\nThe omission to mention the case correctly in the Cause List was a mistake of the Court itself and some indulgence was, therefore, to be shown to the party who had been mis-led by this erroneous entry.\n\nIt is no doubt true that on the next day, the entry was correctly m; ide.\n\nWhen the counsel knew that his case was not in the Cause List the previous day he ought to have looked into the Cause List for the next day to find whether it was included in the next diy's work.\n\nThere is some negligence Oil the part of the counsel er his clerk but it is not so grave as to dis-entitle the party to be heard, and in any event, the _alleged contemnors cannot be punisheJ for a mistake on the part of their counsel or the counsel's clerk.\n\nIn a contempt matter, the Court acts as accuser as well as the Ji:dge.\n\nAlthough, strictly speaking, the contemnor is not allowed. to defend himself where the contempt is patent, however, here. there was some question as to whether the stay granted remained ir!tact after the order of August 30, 1965, or had been varied by that order.\n\nThere was also some doubt as to whether the constructions had been made in such a way as to amount to disobedience of the injunction which had been made by the Court on fanuary 11, 1965. All these matters might have been properly explained if the party had appeared. In our judgment, the High Court contributed to the failure of the party. to appear before it on the first day and in these circumstances, the High Court should have seen its way to hear the counsel when he put an application for re-hearing.\n\nWe say nothing about the merits of the case.\n\nIf contempt has been committed, no doubt, it will be dealt with properly by the High Court.\n\nBut in this case, we are sati>fied that the counsel must have an opportunity of explaining his c.Jnduct and the conduct of his clients in reference to the order of stay.\n\nWe accordingly set aside both the orders and remit the c:ise to the High Court for considering whether contempt has boon committed or not and to deal with the matter in accordance with law.\n\nSince the appellants were guility of some neglience. we think, we should make an order that they should bear the costs o.f these appeals qualified at Rs. 300.\n\nY.P.\n\nCase remanded.\n\nLICSupCl/7()-15-5-71--0IPF.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "JAGANNATH SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGANNATH SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM NARESH SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM NARESH SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAM NARESH SINGH\n\nMarch 10, 1970."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N .. RAY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. RAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. D. DUA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I.D. DUA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2685, "end_char": 2705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "59 and 60 of 1968..\n\nAppeals by special \\eave from the judgments and orders \"lated May 2, 1967 and May 18, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami, for the appellant (in both the appeals) S. S. Khanduja and Kailash Chander for the respondents (in both the appeals) . ··"}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2810, "end_char": 2824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami, for the appellant (in both the appeals) S. S. Khanduja and Kailash Chander for the respondents (in both the appeals) . ··"}}, {"text": "Kailash Chander", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2829, "end_char": 2844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami, for the appellant (in both the appeals) S. S. Khanduja and Kailash Chander for the respondents (in both the appeals) . ··"}}, {"text": "O. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2892, "end_char": 2902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. P. Rana, for the interveners."}}, {"text": "JAGANNATH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "RAM NARESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "RAM NARESH SINGH"}}, {"text": "lfjdayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "High, Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F '\n\nJAGANNATH v. RAM NARESH (lfjdayatullah, C.J.) 971\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. These two appeals arise out of two separate proceedings in the High, Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was shown in the daily Cause I..ist of Monday, the 1st May, 1967 before Mr. Justice Gyanendra Kumar in Court Room No."}}, {"text": "Gyanendra Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was shown in the daily Cause I..ist of Monday, the 1st May, 1967 before Mr. Justice Gyanendra Kumar in Court Room No."}}, {"text": "C.B. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4362, "end_char": 4372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entry read correctly in so far as the names of the parties were concerned and the number of the case but by some mischance, the name of the counsel was shown as Mr. C.B. Gupta in place of Mr. C.B. Misra."}}, {"text": "C.B. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entry read correctly in so far as the names of the parties were concerned and the number of the case but by some mischance, the name of the counsel was shown as Mr. C.B. Gupta in place of Mr. C.B. Misra.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Misra"}}, {"text": "1st May. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One case which had tire 15th place on 1st May. 1967 was shown ahead of this case."}}, {"text": "C. B. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4941, "end_char": 4952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the affidavit filed by the clerk of Mr. C. B. Misra, he missed the case on the first day because the name of his counsel was not correctly recorded.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Misra"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Misra went to enquire because he did not know that he had a case Jhere."}}, {"text": "August 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7434, "end_char": 7449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was some question as to whether the stay granted remained ir!tact after the order of August 30, 1965, or had been varied by that order."}}, {"text": "fanuary 11, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7655, "end_char": 7671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also some doubt as to whether the constructions had been made in such a way as to amount to disobedience of the injunction which had been made by the Court on fanuary 11, 1965."}}]}