GANGA RAM & ORS. v.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

February 2, 1970

(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.,

J. C, SHAH,

K. S. HEGDE,

A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND I. 0. DUA, JJ.)

Indian Railways Establishment Manuul-Para 20(b) of Chapter II whether violates Arts. 14 and 16 of Constitution of India-Discrimination whether exists between direct recruits and promotees in respect of posts of Grade I Accounts Clerks. .. '

The petitioners were oftkiating clerks Grade I in the office of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer (Traffic Accounts Branch) Northern Railway. They had been promoted to these posts after passing a qualifying examination which irl -the Indian Railways Establishment Manual was referre!l to as the Appendix 2 Examination.

When respondents 4 to 6 and 11 who had passed the said examination later than the petitioners were shown as senior to the petitioners in Grade I on the strength of para 20(b) of Chapter II and other relevant provisions of the aforesaid Manual, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Discrimination according to the petitioners arose because while senioritv amon~ direct recruits to Grade I was fixed on the basis of their. appointment, the seniority of promotees to Grade I like the petitionen was regulated by their seniority in Grade II without regard being paid to the fact of their having passed the Appendix 2 examination earlier or their having officiated in Grade I.

HELD : (i) The equality of opportunity in the matter of services undoubtedly takes within its fold all stages of services from initial appointment to its termination including promotion but it does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection and promotion, applicable to all members of a classified group.

Mere production of inequality is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition because every classifi cation is likely in some degree to produce some inequality. The classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete. The matter has to be considered in a practical way without whittling down the equality clause. The c\assification must however be founded on intelli gible differentia which on rational grounds distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out, and it must bear a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. [483 F-H; 484 A]

(ii) The State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down condition.;; of efficiency and other qualifications for securing the best se'rvice for being eligible for promotion in its different departments. In the present case the object which is sought to be achieved by the relevant provisions is the requisite efficiency in the Accounts Department of the Railway establishment. The departmental authority is the proper judge of its requirements. [488 CD]

The direct recruits and the promotees like the petitioners clearly constitute different classes and this classification is sustainable on intelligi'ble differentia which has. a reasonable .connection with. the. object of efficiency •ought to be achieved. Promotion to Grado I ts gmd, d by the

4S2

SCPREME COURT REPORTS

(1970] 3 S.C.R.

<onsideratiun 1f -enioritv-cum-merit. It is therefore difficult to find fault A with the pro'.i ... ion v ... hich places in one group all those Grade II clerks who have qu•lir.ed by pa,, ing the Appendix 2 examination.

The fact that the pron1rtees from Grade 11 who have officiated for some time are not given the credit of this period when a permanent vacancy arises also does not attract the prohibition contained in Arts. 14 and 16. It qoes not constitute any ho.stile discrimination and is neither arbitrary nor un reasonable. It applies uniformly to all members of the class of Grade B JI clerks who have qualified and become eligible. The petitioners had not discharged the onus which lay on them to prove discriminatiol!. [488 Fl

Meryyn Coutindo v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 600, referred to.

'"' ORIGINAL 1uRISD!CTION : Writ Petition No. 124 of 1967.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of.India for enforce- C ment of the fundamental rights. ·

S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners.

N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3.

Harbans Singh for respondents Nos. 4 to 10.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dua, .l.

Out of the five petitioners in this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution Kashmiri Lal, petitioner no. 5 having since retired, is no longer interested in the result of these proceedings.

The claim of only four petitioners thus survives for consideration.

They are officiating clerks/Grade l, in the o.flice of Deputy Chief Accounts Officer (Traffic Accounts Branch) Northern Railway.

They were promoted from Gade II after passing the <jepartmental qualifying examination descnbed as Appendix 2 examination.

They claim that their seniority should be determined as from the date of their appointment as officiating clerks Grade I and not on the basis of their position in the gradation list of Clerks, Grade IL Their grievance is that they were appointed as officiating clerks Grade I, after passing the Appendix 2 examination long before respondents 4 to 6 and 11 but these four respondents are shown as senior to the petitioners on the ground of their seniority in Grade II.

The petitioners seek to supJ)Ort their claim by relying on Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The seniority of the direct recruits to Grade I, the petitioners complain, is determined on the basis of their appointment, whereas the seniority of the petitioners, who are promotees from Grade II to officiate in Grade I, continues to be determined on the basis of their seniority in Grade TI.

It is emphasised that both the direct recruits and the promotees, like the petitioners, have to pass the Appendix 2 examination.

But their seniority is determined by differnnt methods. It is further complained that Grade

TI clerks who pass the qualifying Appendix 2 examination are not . .

promoted immediately.

They have to wait till a vacancy occurs and even at the time of filling the vacancy the seniormost qualified clerk is selected for promotion without giving any preference to those who have qualified earlier in point of time.

Again, when a permanent post falls vacant all the eligible clerks in Grade II are considered at par without giving any credit or preference to those who have already officiated as Clerks, Grade I. A juni!lr clerk, Grade II, qualifying earlier, according to the petitioners' grievance, continues to remain junior for !he purpose of promotion and confirmation in the permanent post in Grade I and a senior clerk, Grade II, . qualifying later retains his seniority for this purpose.

Similarly, in filling leave vacancies it is complained that if a clerk is appointed to officiate in short term leave vacancy, then on the return of the incumbent o.f the post, instead of reverting the clerk so appointed to officiate, the junior-most according to the gradation list in Grade II, officiating in Grade I, is reverted even though he may have qualified earlier than the former and may also have officiated for some time against a regular post in Grade I. The petitioners' right of equality before the Jaw and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment is stated thus to have been violated.

The right of equality is guaranteed by Arts. l 4 to 16 of our Constitution.

The petitioners rely on Arts. 14 and 16(1).

Article 14 is an injunction to both the legislative and the executive organs of the State and other subordinate authorities not to deny to any person qu.ality before the law or the equal protection of the laws.

Article' 16 is only an instance of the general rule of equality laid in Art. 14.

Sub-Article (1) of Art. 16 guarantees to every citizen equality of opportunity in matters of public employment thereby serving to give effect to the equality before the law guaranteed by Art. 14.

The equality of opportunity in the matter o( services undoubtedly takes within its fold all stages of service from initial

appointment to its termination including promotion but it does not prohibit the prescription.of reasonable rules for selection and promotion, applicable to all members of the classified group.

Mere production of inequality is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition because every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality.

The State is legitimately empowered to frame rules of classification fo!· securing the requisite standard of efficiei'lcy in services and the clssification need not be scientifica•Jy perfect or logically complete.

In applying the wide language of Arts. 14 and 16 to concrete cases a doctrinaire approach should be avoided and the matter considered in a practical way. of course, without whittling down the equality clauses.

The clasification, in order to be outside the vice of inequality, must, however, be founded on an intelligible differeiltia which on rational grounds distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out.

The differences which warrant a classification must be real and substantial and must bear a just .and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. If this test is satisfied then the classification cannot be hit by the vice of inequality.

It is in the background of this broad principle that the petitioners' grievance is to be considered.

The relevant provisions in the Indian Railways Establishrhent Manual directly applicable to the petitioners' case may now be seen. They are contained in paras 48 and 49, Chapter I, Section B and paras 16 and 20(b) of Chapter II.

As the petitioners also rely upon paras l 7 to 19 and 21 of Chapter II in support of the argument that para 20(b) is discriminatory it is desirable to reproduce all these paragraphs.

"48. The classes included in this group and the normal channel of their promotion are as under:-

Clerks, Grade Jl (110-180)

I Clerks Grade I (Rs. 130-300)

i----------1----· __ ,

i Sub-Head; (R<. 210-380) Stock Verifi'ers (Rs. 210-380)

Junior Account'ants (Rs. 270--435)

Sr. Accountants (Rs. 435--575)

i Jr. Inspectors Jr. Inspectors of

Store Accounts (Rs. 270-435) of Station Ac/s (Rs. 270-435)

I I 1 Sr. inspectors o

Station Ac/s (Rs. 435-575)

I I Sr. Inspectors of

Stores Ac/s Rs. 435-575)

Recntitnient ;-Initially in the grade of Clerks, Grade II Direct recruitment for 20 % vacancies in the grade of Clerks, Grade I.

Qualifications :-

(a) Age

GANGA RAM v. llNION (Dua, !. )

(i) For clerks, Grade ll 18-21.

(ii) For clerks, Grade I 18-25

4S5

(b) Education For clerks, Grade II, Matriculation, till replaced by Higher Secondary, For clerks, Grade I, University Degrer, preference being given to persons \\ith 1 and H Division honours and Master's Degree.

Directly recruited Clerks, Grade I, will be on probation for one year and will be eligible for confimation only after passing the prescribed departmental examination in Appendix 2. Necessary facilities will be given to them to enable them to acquire a working knowledge of the rules and procedure.

49. Such of the Clerks, Grade II, as qualify in the departmental examination as prescribed in Appendix 2 or those who may have been permanently exempted from passing the said examination will be eligible for promotion as Clerks, Grade I, and sub-heads.

They will be eligible for a minimum starting pay of Rs. 150 per month or will be granted four advance increments on promotion to Grade I after their pay has been fixed under the ordinary rules.

Promotion to the grade of Sub-Heads will be by seniority-cum-suitability.

CHAPTER II "17. Subject to what is stated in paragraphs 18 and 19 below, where the passing of a departmental examination or trade test has been prescribed as a condition precedent to the promotion to a particular non-selection post, the relative seniority of the railway servants passing the examination/test in their due turn and on the same date or different dates which are treated as one continuous examination, as the case may be, shall be determined with reference to their substantive or basic seniority.

18. A railway servant who, for reasons beyond his control is unable to appear in the examination/test in his turn along with others, shall be given the examination/test immediately he is available and if he passes the same, he shall be entitled for promotion to the post as if he had passed the examination/test in his turn.

19. Seniority for promotion as Junior Accountants, Junior Inspectors of Station or Stores Accounts :-

Seniority for promotion to the. rank of junior accountant or junior inspector of Station or Stores Accounts should count entirely according to the date of

486 SUPl:ME COURT REPORTS

passi111g the examination qualifying for promotion to those ranks.

Candidates who pass the examination in a year are ipso facto seniLlr to chose who qualify in subsequent years irrespective of their relative seniority before passing the examrnation.

In the ca>c of staff of Ex-Company Railways, who are exempted from passing the examination, the date on which they are declared lit for promotion to the rank of Accountant or Inspector should be considered as the date of their passing. On receipt of the result of the above examination each railway administration should immediately hold a selection test of the candidates declared successful along with any eligible ex- Company or ex-State Railway Staff, who may be asked to appear before the selection board in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Railway Board from time to time.

While the selection board will determine in the case of the ex-Company or ex-State Railway staff, their suitability for promotion as accountant/Inspctor before placing them on the panel, no candidate who has qualified in the said examination will be declared ineligible for promotion as a junior Accountant/Inspector, the selection board only assigning a suitable place to each such candidate in order of merit.

The staff placed on the panel in any year wiJI rank senior to those empanelled in subseq11ent years.

20. Date of passing the Departmental Examinmion/ Test to regu/.ate seniority :-

(a) Except as provided for in sub-paragraph (b) below, seniority of two or more railway servants, who pass the departmental examination/test on different dates, not treated as one continuous examination, will be regulated entirely qy the date of passing the examination or test.

(b) The seniority of Accounts Clerks, Grade I and Stock Verifiers is to be determined with reference to their substantivt! or basic seniority in Grade II irrespective of the dates they qualify for promotion as Clerks Grade I by passing the examination prescribed for the purpose.

21 . Seniority on promotion to non-selection posts :-

Promotion to non-selection posts shall be on the basis

~·~ se_niority-cwn-suitability being judged by the authority corhpetcnt to fill the post, by oral and/or written

test or a departn1ental examination as considered ne: cessary and the record Of service.

The only exception to this would be iu cases where for administrative convenience, which should be recorded in wr:ting, the competent author.ty considers ii u;:e>sary to app<'iut a railway servant otlir than the seniormoc.t suitable railway servant to o•c; qte in a short term vcancy not exceding two 1non~: ... as a rule , and 4 inonths in µny case.

This \Viii. hO\\.ever, not give the rail\i.ay servant

ayadvantage not otherwise due to him."

Appendix 2, in addition 'lo the syllabus for the examination provides:

. "3. The examination will.be-qonducted by the Head of-each office, who will also decide the intervals at which it should be held.

4. (l!) .Normally no railway ser\"dnt will be permitted to take the examination more than ihree, but the Financial Adviser and Chief Accoupts Officer may in deserving cases -premit a candidate to take the examination for a fourth time, and, in very exceptional cases, the General Manager may permit a candidate to take the examination or the fifth .and the last time.

~,, (b) No railway servant, who'lfas less'than six months" service in a Railway Accounts' Office or who has not a reasonable chance of passirg the examination will be allowed to ,'jppear in the cxarpination prescribed in this Appendix.

In excptional circumstances, the condition regarding six months' minimum service may be waived by the General Manager.

(c) Temporary railway servants may be permitted to sit for the examination but it should be clearly understood that the passing of this examination will not give them claim for absorption in te permanent cadre.

(d) A candidate who fails in the examination but shows marked excellence by obiaining not less than 50% in any subject may be exempted from further e.xamination in that subject in subsecj1/ent examination."

It is quite clear that para 49 does l)Ot confer any right to immediate promotion on those Grade II'.c!erks who pass the qualifying Appendix 2 examination.

The Only benefit which accrues to

them is that one hurdle is removed from their way and they become eligible for being considered for promotion to Grade I.

This promotion is governed by the test of seni'}rity-cum-suitability.

AIJ those who qualify for promotion are treated at par fov this purpose and they are grouped together as constituting one class.

The fact that one person has qualified earlier in point of time does not by itself clothe him with a preferential claim to promotion as againsi those who qualify later.

This examination is cQilsidered to be a continuous examination and as is clear from para 17 success at this examination does not constitute the basis of seniority which continues to be dependent on the substantive or basic seniority in Grade II.

The question which directly arises for determination is : does the procedure laid down in these instructions violate: the petitioners' right as guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 16 ? The State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency and other qualifications for securing the best service for being eligible for promotion in its different departments.

In the present case the object which is sought to be achieved by the provisions reproduced earlier is the requisite efficiency in the Accounts Department of the Railway establishment.

The departmental authority is the proper judge of its requirements.

The direct recruits and the promotees like the petitioners, in our opinion, clearly constitute different classes and this classification is sustainabie on intelligiQ!e differentia which has a reasonable connection with the object of efficiency sought to be achieved.

Promotion to Grade I is guided by the consideration of senioritycum-merit.

It is, therefore, difficult to find fault with the provision which places in one group all those Grade II clerks who have qualified by passing the Appendix 2 examil)ation. The fact that the promotees from Grade II who have officiated for some time are not given the credit of this period when a permanent vacancy arises also does not attract the prohibition contained in Arts. 14 and 16. It does not constitute any hostile discrimination and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

It applies uniformly to all members of Grade II clerks who have qu; tlified and become eligible. The onus in this case is on the petitioners to establish discrimination by showing that the classification does not rest upon any just and reasonable basis.

The difference emphasised on behalf of the petitioners is too tenuous to form the basis of a serious argument.

Their challenge, therefore, fails.

The decision in Mervyn Coutindo

v. Collector of Customs, Bombay(') on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the H petitioners dealt with a different problem though the principle

A of law laid down there seems to go against the petitioners' submission.

It was expressly observed that there is no inherent vice in the principle of fixing seniority by rotation in a case when a service is composed in fixed proportion of direct recruits and promotees.

The distinction between direct recruits and promotees as two sources of recruitment being a recoginised difference, nor obno- B xious to the equality clauses, the provisions which concern us cannot be struck down on the ratio of this decision.

The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but without costs.

G.C.

Petition dismissed

GANGA RAM & ORS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS

February 2, 1970

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.

SHAH

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER

I. 0. DUA, JJ.

Arts. 14 and 16

Constitution of India

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16

[1966] 3 S.C.R. 600

Art. 32

S. K. Mehta

K. L. Mehta

N. S. Bindra

S. P. Nayar

Harbans Singh

Dua

Art. 32

Kashmiri Lal

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16(1)

Article 14

Art. 14

Art. 16

Art. 14

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16


GOPI & ORS. v.

STATE OF U.P.

February 3, 1970

[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., A. N. RAY AND I. D. DuA, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 165 & 166(3)- Power of officer of a police station to conduct search of premises located in the jurisdiction of another police station-Recording of reasons of search-Presurnption in favour of official acts under s. 114 Evidence Act, 1872-Bona tides of search-Right of private defence against police party.

On the basis of a First Information Report regarding loss df a buffalo lodged at police station, Chhainsa, the Sub-Inspector of that police station sought to search the house of the appellants situated in the jurisdiction o'( police station, Dankaur.

The appellants and several others resisted the search and caused injuries to the police party, for which they were prosecuted under varioLJ5 sections of the Indian Penal Code.

The appellants along \Vith certain others were convicted by the trial court and their appeals were disallowed by the High Court.

By special leave they appealed to this Court. contending : (i) that the officer of a police station cannot carry out a search in the jurisdiction of another police. station without the permission o'f the Station House Officer of that station; in the present case the reason given by the Sub-Inspector for not taking such permission, nan1ely, that the local police was in league with the appeUants did not satisfy the terms of s. 166(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (ii) that the search '"'as. also illegal for the reason that the Sub-Inspector be fore attempting 1he search did not record his reason5 as required by ss. 165 & 166 of t'e Code; (iii) that being illegal the search was not bona fide: (iv) that thie appellants \Vere entitled to the right of private de'fence since the~ thought that the raiding party were decoits dre5sed as policemen.

HELD : (i} In the case of stolen cattle, time is of the essence, becau5e once the animal is removed and mixed up with others, it is very difficult to spot it in the big herds common in these places. 'fherefore if the police officer had reason to believe that the police officers at Dankaur "ould take their own time because they were mixed up with the accused party. he had full jurisdiction in taking recourse to sub-s. (3) of s. 166 and to carry out the seHrch himself. !493 G-I-IJ

(ii) No questions y; ere put to the Sub-Inspector to elicit from him \\hether the reasons 'for the search were recorded or not.

Regard being had to the regularity of official acts it must be presumed that the Sub- Jnspector must haye taken the precaution to record his reasons. [494 A]

(iii) Jn the circumstances of the case the search was legal and bona fide. [494 Bl

(iv) The accused \i.:ere in'tormed by the Sub-Inspector that it was the police party \vhich had come and they had no reason to attack the police party either as dacoits or in self-defence in any other form. [494 CJ ff

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No 159 of 1967.

A Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 28, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 1964.

Anil Kumar Gupta, R. A. Gupta and Uma Datta, for the appellant.

0. P. Rana, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hidayatullah, C.J. The appellants are five in number who were proscuted originally with 11 others under diverse sections of the Indian Penal Code which included sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and ss. 333 and 353 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code.

Of the original 16 accused in the case, 11 were acquitted in the Court ct Session. The High Court, on appeal, confirmed their convictions with some modifications and reduced the sentences passed on them.

As a result of the High Court's judgment, one of the appellants Gopi stands convicted . under s. 326 of the Indian Penal Code with a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment and under s. 148 of the Indian Penal Code with a like sentence, the two sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.

Others are convicted only under s. 147 of the Indian Penal Code and have been sentenced to imprisonment already undergone by them which we are told was in the neighbourhood of two weeks.

They now appeal by special leave against their conviction and sentences.

The facts of the case are as follows.

In November 1963 a she-buffalo belonging to one Rajbir cl village Chbainsa, police station Chhainsa in the district of Gurgaon (then a part of Punjab and now a part of Haryana) was stolen.

Rajbir's suspicion was that the appellants Gopi and Munshi had stolen the buffalo and that they were keeping it in village Gunpara, police station Dankaur in Bulandshahr district in Uttar Pradesh.

There are certain allegations that Gopi and Munshi demanded a sum of Rs. 200 for the return of the buffalo, that the amount was paid but the buffalo was not returned.

We are not concerned with the truth cf this statement.

A report of theft of buffalo was lodged at police station Chha1nsa on November 26, 1963. The report was sent to Sub- Inspector Kesar Singh (P.W. 1) wno was then at another village and he proceeded in the company of three constables and some other villagers to Gunpara.

From the village he took with him two other persons Rajey and Chander.

The police party was armed with rifles. a revolver and /athis.

They reached the house o.f Gopi and Munshi at about 11-30 p.m. and found them sleeping in front of their house.

Gopi and Munshi were woken up by the police and were informed that the police party had come to search

for the buffalo.

The prosecution case is that Gopi and Munshi thereupon raised a hue and cry that the police party had arrived and on that the appellants and some other persons violently attacked the police party causing simple injuries to Kesar Singh, Mohar Singh and Sri Ram of the police force and grievous injury to Jodhra Ram.

The injury to Jodhra Ram was caused with a farsa on the head a:nd had fractured his skull.

Later, the police party, when it was withdrawing, was again waylaid and the allegation is that Kesar Singh was wrongfully confined at Naurangpur.

He was then rescued by Mulaim Singh, a constable cf police station Dankaur and Kesar Singh th<in. went to Gunpara where he made a report to the police station officer Dankaur who had by that time returned.

It may be mentioned that on behalf of the appellants a report was also lodged at police station Dankaur at 4 a.m. on the night of the occurrence, complaining that a dacoity was attempted to be committed at the house of Gopi and Munshi by some pers0; ns who were dressed in police uniform.

Investigation then followed and the appellants with 11 others who have since been acquitted were prosecuted.

The High Court considered whether the action of Kesar Singh in conducting the search outside the limits of his police station house was bona fide or under colour of office.

It gave a finding that it was , not bona fide because Kesar Singh could have easily asked the police station house officer of Dankaur to conduct the search under s. 166(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

His explanation that the police at Dankaur were mixed up with the appellants' party was considered a lame excuse.

However, the High Court felt that the action of the appellants was criminal because they knew that it was a police party.

In this appeal, the appellants had earlier u, ndertaken to this Court that they would argue a pure point of law and that the record therefore' need not be printed.

As a result, there is i:io evidence before us.

All that we have is the copy of the judgment of the High Court and the special leave petition with the grounds on which this appeal is to be argued.

The only question of law argued on behalf of the appellants is that the search was illegal and there.fore the appellants had every right to resist it and further that they resisted the search party in the exercise of the right o.f private defence, thinking that the raiding party were decoits dressed in police uniforms.

As to the knowledge of the appellants about the identity of the raiding party, we have had the evidence of the witnesses read to us.

It is quite clear from that evidence that the sub-inspector Kesar Singh had communicated to Gopi and Munshi that this was a raid by a police party who were out to search life premises for

the missing buffalo.

Therefore, the statement of the appellants that they took the raiding party to be dacoits is not true and we do not, therefore, believe it.

The argument, however, was raised that under s. i65, the powers o, f search of station house officer are limited to the limits of his police station and he cannot make a search within the jurisdiction of another police station house officer.

Reliance.-was placed upon the provisions of s. 165 to establish this.

There-is no doubt that that is the normal and ordinary provision <>f the Code but then there is section 166 also to be read.

Under sub-s.1'-of that section a police officer may invoke the assistance of a police station house officer of another jurisdiction and ask him to <;!induct the search.

It is submitted that this is what the sub-inwector Kesar Singh ought to have done.

The powers of the police station house officer, however, are not confined to this only,-oecause sub-s. 3 of the same section gives the right and authg; ity to the police station house officer to conduct search in the i11tisdiction of another police station house officer if he has reasO!I" to believe that delay would be occasioned by requiring the officer in charge the other police station to cause the search to bei'nade and as a result evidence of the commission of the offen~-would be concealed or destroyed.

This is what the sub-inspector Kesar Singh seems to have done.

His explanation was that the police of Dankaur were mixed uo with the accused who had stolen the buffalo and therefore he took it upon himself to conduct the search and recover the buffalo. The explanation in our opinion is believable because no police officer would ordinarily go into another jurisdiction unless there are compelling reasons to do so.

A buffalo had been stolen a few weeks before and nothing had been done to recover it. In these circumstances the sub-inspector Kesar Singh might well have believed that unless he took some instant actjon, the buffalo would never be found.

Therefore his action was with due care and attention and cannot be said to be ma/a fide.

It was argued however that the sub-section is limited to avoidance of delay and there was no case made out here that there was likelihood of delay if the police station house officer of Dankaur had been inv:ted to conduct the search.

In our opinion in the case of stolen cattle, tim~ is of the essence, because once the animal is removed and mixed up with others, it is very difficult to spot it in the big herds common in these places. Therefore if the police officer had reason to believe that the police officers at Dankaur would take their own time because they were mixed up with the accused party, he had full jurisdiction in taking recourse to sub-s.

(3) of s. 166 and to carry out the search himself.

It was contended before us that he ought to have recorded his reasons in writing as required by s. 165 and also by s. 166. But

no question appears to have been put to the sub-inspector to elicit from him whether the reasons were recorded or not. Regard being had to the regularity of official acts, we are entitled to presume that the sub-inspector must have taken the precaution to record his reasons.

In any event, we cannot hold this against the prosecution, because there is no material on which we can proceed.' We are there.fore satisfied that the search in this case was bona fide and was conducted legally by Kesar Singh in another jurisdiction, because he hacl reason to believe that evidence, namely, the buffalo was likely to be lost if he did not take prompt action. The accused were informed by him that it was the police party which had come and they had no reason to attack the police party either as dacoits or in self-defence in any other form. . The offence of the appellants is therefore amply brought home to them.

We see no reason to interfere.

The appeal fails and will be dismissed.

G.C.

Appeal diSmissed.

GOPI & ORS

STATE OF U.P

February 3, 1970

A. N. RAY

I. D. DuA, JJ.

Code of Criminal Procedure

ss. 165 & 166(3)

s. 114

Evidence Act, 1872

Dankaur

Indian Penal Code

s. 166(3)

Code of Criminal Procedure

ss. 165 & 166

s. 166

Allahabad High Court

Anil Kumar Gupta

R. A. Gupta

Uma Datta

P. Rana

Hidayatullah

Indian Penal Code

sections 147 and 148

Indian Penal Code

ss. 333 and 353

s. 149

Indian Penal Code

Gopi

s. 326

Indian Penal Code

s. 148

Indian Penal Code

s. 147

Indian Penal Code

Chbainsa

Gurgaon

Haryana

Rajbir

Munshi

Gunpara

Bulandshahr district

Uttar Pradesh

November 26, 1963

Kesar Singh

Rajey

Chander

Gopi

Munshi

Kesar Singh

Mohar Singh

Sri Ram

Jodhra Ram

Naurangpur

Mulaim Singh

Dankaur

police station Dankaur

s. 166(1)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 165

section 166

s. 3

s. 166

s. 165

s. 166


K. A. NATARAJAN ETC. v.

M. NAINA MOHD. & ORS. ETC.

February 3, 1970

[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J.M. SHELAT, G. K. MITTER, A.'.\. RAY

AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136--Appeal C!gainst interlocutor) order-Practice of Supreme Court.

The Regional Transport Authority granted to the respondent a permit to operate a bus on a route.

The grant was set aside by the State Trans~ port Appellate Tribunal on appeal filed by another applicant. The order of the S.T.A. was quashed by a Single Judge <if the High Court in a writ petition filed by the grantee from the R.T.A. When the matter went before the Letters Patent Bench it was observed that since only the gr; intee trom the R.T.A. had a valid permit it was not possible to grant any permit to the appellant before the S.T.A. pending the disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal a• only one operator could be allowed on the route.

In the petition for special leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 136 against the interlocutory order, on the question of the jurisdiction of the High C.ourt to recognise the grantee from the R.T.A. when his permit w:.i~

c.ancelled by the S.T.A.,

HELD : This Court \\-'Ould not go into the matter at this stage Decause, the appeal itself was pending before the High Court and all that the Bench had done was to give effect to the order of the Single Judge pending disposal of the appeal. [497 A-BJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Petitions for special leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 2430, 2431, 2436 to 2438, 2442, 2443, 2445, 2446, 24 72 and 2480 of 1969 and 3 of 1970.

From the orders dated December 8, 1969 of the Madras High Court in Civil Misc. Petitions Nos. 15375 of 1969 etc. in Writ Appeals Nos. 519 of 1969 etc.

K. K. Venugopal and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioner (in S.L.P. Nos. 2430, 2431 and 2438 of 1969).

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, M. K. Ramamurthi, G. Ramaswamy, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioners (in S.L.P. No. 2436 of 1969).

M. K. Ramamurthi, G. Ramaswamy, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioner (in S.L.P. No. 2437 of 1969).

A. S. Nambiar, for the petitioner (in S.L.Ps. Nos. 2442, 2443 and 2472 of 1969).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1970) 3 S.C.R.

M. C. Setalv•1d, V. Subramanian and K. Jayaram, for the petitioner (in .S.L.P. Nos. 2445, 2446 and 2480 of 1969 and 3 of 1970).

Madan Mohan for resporulent No. 1 (in S.L.P. Nos. 2430, 2431, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2442, 2443 and 2472 of 1969).

0. C. Mathur, for respondent No. 1 (in S.L.P. No. 2445 of 1969).

R. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. 1 (in S.L.P. No. 2480 Of 1969).

K. Thirumalai, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agtawala, for respondent No. 1 (in S.L.P. No. 3 of 1970).

The Order of the Court was delivered by

Hidayatullah, C.J.

These are petitions for special leave against the orders of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras by which the High Court has ordered that the permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority will operate and not those which the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in appeal granted.

The facts may be stated, taking as a sample, Special Leave Petition No. 2430 of 1969. The original grantee of the permit by the Regional Transport Authority may be described as 'A'.

The date of the grant was November 20, 1966.

On appeal by the respondent /who may be described as 'B', the State Transport A.ppellate'Tribunal cancelled the grant made to A by the Regional Transport Authority.

This was on July 18, 1967. A writ petition was thereupon filed by A and it was a!Iowed by the _learned

single Judge on November 4, 1969 and the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was quashed.

When the matter went before the Letters Patent Bench, it was observed that in view of the fact that only the grantee of the Regional Transport Authority had a valid permit, it was not possible to grant any permit to B who was recognised by the State Transport Appe!Iate Tribunal.

They followed an earlier ruling ofthe court and restricted the grant pending disposal of the Letters Patent appeal to the grantee of the Regional Transport Authority who alone was permitted to operate on the route. It appears that only one operator could be allowed on this route, because of as. 47(3) determination.

In these petiti.ons for special leave which are ex facie against the orders made in interlocutory proceedings, the attempt is to get the pemlits restored to B. It-is claimed that this involves a question of jurisdiction and that question is whether the High Court could recognise A the grantee of the Regional Transport Authority when his permit had been cancelled by the State Transport Appellate

NATARAJAN v. NA!NA MOHD. (Hi<ta.varul/ah, C.J.) 497

Tribunal.

We think that these are matters into which this Court cannot be invited to go under Art. 136 of the Constitution, pecause the appeal itself is pending before the High Court and what the High Court has done is to give effect to the order of the learned single Judge. In other words, the Letters Patent Bench has not attempted to pass any special order of its own staying the operation of the decision of the learned single Judge.

We think it would be wrong .for us to interfere at this stage.

It may be that the question may come up in some other form before us when the appeals from the Letters Patent decision are brought before this Court. If and when this happens, we may find it convenient to express our opinion on the question of jurisdiction of the High Court to go into such matters in appeal or in original writ petitions.

Beyond this. we do not wish to express any opinion, one way or the other, at this stage.

We accordingly order the dismissal of these special leave petitions, reserving to the petitioners the right to raise such questions as may legitimately be raised when they choose to file appeals against the decision of the Letters Patent Bench.

Stay granted by this Court is vacated.

V.P.S.

Special Leai•e Perl/ions dismissed.

L8SupCl/7ll-2

K. A. NATARAJAN ETC

M. NAINA MOHD. & ORS. ETC

February 3, 1970

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.

M. SHELAT

G. K. MITTER

A.'.\. RAY

I. D. DUA, JJ.

Constitution of India

Art. 136

Art. 136

K. K. Venugopal

R. Gopalakrishnan

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam

M. K. Ramamurthi

G. Ramaswamy

Shyamala Pappu

Vineet Kumar

A. S. Nambiar

M. C. Setalv•1d

V. Subramanian

K. Jayaram

Madan Mohan

C. Mathur

R. Gopalakrishnan

K. Thirumalai

A. T. M. Sampath

E. C. Agtawala

Hidayatullah

Art. 136


49.8

DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF HYDERABAD & ORS.

MIS. IBRAHIM & CO. ETC.

February 5, 1970

{M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J.C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER,

A. N. RAY AND l. D. DUA, JJ.]

Constitution oj India, Arts. 301, 304, 305, 358 and 359--Freedom of Jr(.de under Art. 301 if guaranteed to indiPiduals-lf could be tnken away by executive action.

Protection und1r Arts. 358 and 359 to orders passed by Gorenanent- C Scope of.

The Central Government promulgated the Sugar Control Order, 1963, under r. U5(2) o'f the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The -respondents, who were holders of licences under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, (issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 195S) and who were dealers in sugar in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. were 'recognised dealers' under the Sugar Control Order.

D They were allocated quotas of sugar, but, in 1964, the State Government or:dered that the sugar allocated to the two cities be given in its entirety to a Cooperative Stores. The respondents were thus prevented by an executit-e order from carrying on their business. They chaJienged the order success~ fully in the High Court.

In appeal to this Court on the questions : ( 1) whether the order was protected under Arts. 358 and 359, because the President had declared a E state of emergency; and (2) whether the order was violative of Art. 301,

HELD: (l)(a) Under Art. 358 the respondents could not challenge any executive action which, but for provisions contained in Art. 19, the State was competent to take. But in the present case, the executive order was not one which the State was competent to make. Since the order of the State Government has the effect elf canceIIing the licences of the respondent, which cou:Id be done only after an enquiry according to the procedure prescribed in the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order. the executive order was contrary to the statutory provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order and the Sugar Control Order. Such executive action of the State, which is otherwise invalid, is not immune from attack under Art. 358, merely hecause a proclamation of emerg1211cy was in operation. [502 A-DJ

(a) In the present case, there was discrimination agaiilst the respondents in that the impugned order conferred -a monopoly on the Cooperative Stan s in disregard of the subsisting right of the respondents.

The order is not protected under Art. 359, because, only tf it was hov.n It'

have been made under the authority reserved by the Defence o'f India Ordinance or the Rules made thereunder, that the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a petition for infringement of the guarantee under Art. 14 is excluded. [502 E-G]

12\ The impugned order trenches U,,"<>n the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 301.

OOLLECTOB. V. IBRAHIM & 00, (Shah, J,) 499

A By this Article the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory df India i_s declared free.

Under it, a. retriction upon the legislative power of Parliament and State Legislature IS imposed

by the Constitution.

The guarantee of the freedom is not in the abstract but to individuals. Within the limits of Arts. 304 and 305 there could be legislative restrictions upon the individuals' right to freedom of trade, but not, by executive action. [503 D-F; 504 D-EJ

B Commonwealt/l of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales, LR. [1950] A.C. 235, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1285 to 1309 of 1966.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated C June 23, 1965 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 34 to 58 of 1965.

P. Ram Reddy and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals).

K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respon- D dent (in C.A. No. 1304 of 1966).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shah, J.

These appeals are filed with special leave against the order of the High Court o;( Andhra Pradesh declaring G.O.M.

No. 2976 dated December 30. 1964 "null, void and ultra vires ...

The respondents are dealers in sugar and other commodities and carry on their business in the cities o.f Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

The State of Andhra Pradesh issued the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, in exercise of the power conferred bys. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Under that order no person may carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued by the specified authority.

Grant and renewal of licence could be refused only on grounds reduced to writing and after giving opportunity to the party to state his case.

The respondents were granted licences under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963.

Shortly thereafter the Central Government, in exercise of the power conferreJ under snb-r. (2) of r. 125 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, promnlgated the Sugar Control Order, 1963.

By that order a recognized dealer was defined as a person carrying on the business of purchasing. selling or distributing sugar and licensed under the order relating to the licensing of sugar dealers for the time being in force in a State.

The order provided for placin~ restrictions on sale, or agreement to sell or delivery by the producers. for controlling the production. sale, grading, packing. making delivery, distribution etc. of sugar

by the producers or recognised dealers, for regulating the movement of sugar, for fixation of its prices, for allotment of quotas, for delivery of such quotas and for other incidental matters.

The respondents being holders of licqnces under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, were treated as recognized dealers under the Sugar Control Order, 1963.

The State Government allocated quotas of sugar received from the Central Government for distribution in different areas and nominated licensees or dealers to take delivery of the allotted quotas from the factories.

On December 30, 1964 the State Goverrunent ordered that the sugar quota allocated to "the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad" be given in its entirety to the Greater Hyderabacf Consumers Central Co-operative Stores, Ltd., Hyderabad.

On that account the respondents who held licences under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Licensing Order for distribution of sugar and were also recognized dealers under the Sugar Control Order, 1963, were by an executive fiat prevented from carrving on their business in sugar.

The respondents moved petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of the order.

The State resisted the petitions principally on the ground that the order made by the State Governme.nt was in conformity with the provisions of the Sugar Control Order and was issued in pursuance of the policy laid down by the Central Goverlllllent to entrust the work of distribution of sugar exclusively to cooperative societies and thereby to eliminate in the public interest the agency of private dealers in lifting and distributing sugar. It was urged that the respondents could not seek any relief complaining of infraction-of their rights under Arts. l4 and 19 because the emergency declared by the President in October 1962 had not been withdrawn.

The petitions were heard by Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.

The learned Judge held that the executive order was not supµorted either by the provisions of the Sugar Control Order, 1963, issued by the Central Government, or by the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 196i3, that the step taken by the Government was not permitted by law; that as a result of the order of the Government the licences held by the respondents were cancelled without following the procedure laid down in cl. 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order; and that the provisions of the order could not be circumvented by executive instructions and since the order discriminated between the respondents and the Central Consumers Cooperative Stores in that it conferred a mono- ]:>Oly in disregard of the subsisting rights of the respondents and amounted to "hostile and invidious" discrimination in the admi-

COLLECTOR v. !BRAHIM & CO. (Shah, J.)

50 I

A nistration of the Sugar Control Order.

He further held that since the Government had not taken action under the Defence of India Rules or under any Control Order made under those Rules, the respondents were not debarred tinder Arts. 358 & 359 of the Constitution from claiming protection against impairment of their rights by the order issued by the State. In appeal to a Division B Bench of the High Court the grou, nds on which the decision was recorded by Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., were confirmed.

In these appeals counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh has not contended that the impugned order could be issued either under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963, or the Sugar Control Order, 1963, issued by the Central Government.

Indisputably it is an executive order made by the State Government. The State Government it is claimed acted in pursuance of the policy of the Central Government to distribute sugar through cooperative societies.

But the order was still unauthorised. Under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the State Government had issued an order for distribution. of sugar through licensed dealers and the respondents had obtained licences in that behalf.

Their licences could only be cancelled after making the enquiry according to the procedure prescribed by cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order.

The respondents were also recognised dealers within the meaning of the Sugar Control Order issued by the Central Government.

The rights of the respondents could not be taken away by an executive order in a manner plainly contrary to the provisions .of the statutory orders.

It is true that under Art. 352 of the Constitution, the President declared a state of emergency on October 26, 1962. By Art 358 while a proclamation of emergency is in operation, nothing in Art, 19 shall restrict the power of the State (as defined in Part III) to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take.

By Art. 359 the President is authorised, where a proclamation of emergency was in operation, to declare that the right to move any court for the enforceme.nt of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation was in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order.

On the issue of the proclamation ot emergency the State is. for the duration of the emergency, competent to enact legislation, notwithstanding that it impairs the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19 of the Constitution.

The State is also competent to take executive action which the State would, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19 of the Constitution, be competent to take. The impugned order in this case was issued while the proclamation of emergency

was in operation.

The respondents could not challenge the validity of any law enacted by the State Legislature so long as the proclamation of emerge, ncy was in operation, on the ground that it impaired the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19.

They could not also challenge any executive action which, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19, the State was competent to take.

In the present case, the State did not enact any legislation impairing the ; fundamental right of the respondents to carry on business which is guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g), they proceeded to make a1n executive order.

But the executive order immune from attack is only that order which the State was compete, nt, but for the provisions contained in Art. 19, to make. Executive action of the State Government which is otherwise invalid is not immune . from attack, merely because a proclamation of emergency is in operation when it is take, n.

Since the order of the State Government was plainly contrary to the statutory provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order and the Sugar Control Order, it was not protected under Art. 358 of the Constitution:

Nor had it the protection under Art. 359.

On November 3, 1962 the President issued an order in exercise of the power under

Art. 359, that "the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 14, article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause :E ( 1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October, 1962. is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 ( 4 oi 1962) or ny rule or order made thereunder." Only if the impugned order was shown to be made under the authority reserved by the Defence of India Ordinance or rules made thereunder. the jurisdiction of the Court r to entertain a petition for impaitment of the guarantee under Art. 14 may be excluded.

But the action was not shown to be taken under the Defence of India Ordinance or under the rule or order made thereunder.

Again it may be pointed out that under Art. 301 the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India is declared free.

That freedom is declared in the widest terms and applies to all forms of trade, commerce and intercourse.

But it is subject to certain restrictions o; f which Arts. 304 and 305 are relevant.

It is provided by Art. 304 : "Notwithstanding anything in article 30 I or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law-

( a) ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

COLLECTOR V. IBRAHIM&; CO. (Shah, J.) 503

A ( b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade. commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest :

Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause ( b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President."

It is also provided by Art. 305 that the existing law or laws which may be made by the State providing for State monopolies, i.e. relating to any matter as is referred to in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. ( 6) of Art. 19, are outside the guarantee of Art. 301.

In the present case the State had not assumed a monopoly to deal in sugar.

It had granted monopoly to a Central Consumers Cooperative Stores which was not a corporation owned or controlled by the State within the meaning of Art. 19 ( 6) (ii) . The order was challenged on the ground that it trenches upon the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 301 of the Constitution.

By Art. 304 even by legislature restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within the State may only be imposed, if such restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest and the Bili or amendment is introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State with the previous sanction of the President.

Obviously the guarantee under Art. 301 cannot be taken away by executive action. The guarantee under Art. 301 which imposes a restriction upon legislative power of the Parliament or the State

Legislature and the declaration of freedom is not merely an abstract declaration.

There is no reason to think that while placing a restriction upon legislative power the Constitution guaranteed freedom in the abstract and not of the individuals.

Article 301 of the Constitution is borrowed almost verbatim from s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12 of 1900. In dealing with the contention that no individual right was guaranteed by s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act the Judicial Committee in Commonll'ea/th of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales(') observed at p. 305 :

"The necessary implicatiens of these decisions (James v. Cowan-(1932) A.C. 542-and James v.

The Commonwealth of Austra/ia-(1936) A.C. 578) are important.

First may be mentioned an argument strenuously maintained on this appeal that s. 92 of the Constitution does not guarantee the freedom of individuals.

Yet James was an individual and James vindicated his freedom in hard won fights.

0) L.R. t950 A. C. 235:

Clearly there is here a misconception.

It is true as has been said more than once in the High Court, that s. 9Z does not create any new juristic rights but it does give the citizen of State or Commonwealth, as the case may be, the right to ignore, and, if necessary, to call on the judicial power to help him to resist, legislative or executive action which offends against the section. And this is just what James successfully did."

Our Constituent Assembly borrowed the concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse from the Australian Constitution.

It is true that the limitations upon the amplitude of the guarantee are not expressed in s. 92 of the Australian Constitution, as are to be found in our Constitution.

Again, there is no guarantee in the Australian Constitution of a fundamental right to carry on trade.

But this departure from the scheme of the Australian Constitution <l_oes not alter the true character of the guarantee and it cannot be\inferred that the Coostitution imposed restrictions upon legislative power, but denied to the individuals affected by unauthorised

aumption of executive power the right to challenge the exercise of that power. A vital constitutional provision cannot be so construed as to make a mockery of the declared guarantee and the constitutional restrictions on the power of the Legislature. If the power of the State Legislature is restricted in the manner provided by Art. 301, but within limits provided by Arts. 303 to 305, it would be impossible to hold that the State by executive order can do something which it is incompetent to do by legislation.

Jn any view of the case, these appeals must fail and are dismissed.

Only one respondent has appeared in this case, but even he has not filed a statement of the case. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

V.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

8

DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF HYDERABAD & ORS

MIS. IBRAHIM & CO. ETC

February 5, 1970

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.

C. SHAH

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER

A. N. RAY

l. D. DUA, JJ.

Arts. 301, 304, 305, 358 and 359

Art. 301

Arts. 358 and 359

Central Government

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Essential Commodities Act

Hyderabad

Secunderabad

Arts. 358 and 359

Art. 301

Art. 358

Art. 19

Art. 358

Art. 359

Art. 14

Art. 301

OOLLECTOB. V. IBRAHIM

India

Parliament

Arts. 304 and 305

Andhra Pradesh High Court

P. Ram Reddy

A. V. Rangam

K. Rajendra Chaudhuri

K. R. Chaudhuri

Shah

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Defence of India Rules, 1962

December 30, 1964

High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Central Goverlllllent

Gopalakrishnan Nair

cl. 7

Arts. 358 & 359

State of Andhra Pradesh

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

cl. 7

Art. 352

October 26, 1962

Art 358

Art. 359

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19(1)(g)

Art. 19

Art. 358

Art. 359

November 3, 1962

Art. 359

article 14

article 21

article 22

article 352

26th October, 1962

Defence of India Ordinance, 1962

Art. 14

Art. 301

Arts. 304 and 305

Art. 304

article 30

article 303

COLLECTOR V. IBRAHIM

Art. 305

Art. 19

Art. 301

Art. 19

Art. 301

Art. 304

Art. 301

Art. 301

Article 301

s. 92

s. 92

s. 92

James

s. 9Z

s. 92

Art. 301

Arts. 303 to 305


sn 5

A. SANJEEVI NAIDU ETC. ETC. v.

STATE OF MADRAS AND ANR.

February 5, 1970

[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J, C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER,

A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.)

Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939, s. 68(c)-Validit~ of schen1e fra1ned upon for11u1tion of requisite opinion hy Secretary and not Minisfr'r. Rule 23-A authoriJi11g Secretary-Vulidity of- -Constitution af India, Art. 166(3 )-Scope of.

A draft scheme for the nationalisation of certain transport routes was prepared and published by the respondent State Government under Section 68(() of the Motor Vehicles Act 4 o[ 1939.

The validity of the

chcmc was challcn¥ed hy the appellants. who \Vere private stage carriage

operators, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but the petition \Vas dismissed hy the High Court.

In appeal to this Court the validity of the scheme was mainly challenged on the ground that the opinion requisite under Section 68(C) \\as not formed by the State Government but by the Secretary to the Go\ernment acting pursuant to powers conferred on him under Rule .23-A 0f the Madras Government Businc-ss Rule.

It was further contended that the

aid rule was ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution: Parlian1ent has conferred power!'! under Section 68-C to a designated authori:y and that power can be exercised only by the authority specified and no one else. 'fhe authority concerned in the present case was the State Government

and it coul<l not have delegated i's statutory 'functions to any one else.

By Government \Vas meant the Governor aided and advised by his iinis ters.

The requisite opinion should therefore have been formed hy the Minister to \\'horn the husincs-; had heen allocated under the Rules.

HELD : The function.; under the Motor Vehicles Act had been allocat- C'd by the Governor to the Transport Minister under the Rules and the Secretary of that Ministry had been v;:•lidly authorised under Rule .23-A lo take action under s. 68(C) of the Act.

In the very nature of things, neither the Council of Minh.ters nor an individual Minister can attend to the numerous matters that come up before the Government.

Those matters have to be attended to and decisions taken by various officials at various levels.

When those officials discharge the functions allotted to them. they are doing so as limbs o'f the Government and not as persons to whom the power of the Government had been delegated. [513 G]

Under our Cons!itution. the Governor is essentially a constitutional head; the administration of the State is run by the Council of Ministers.

In order to ohviate the difficulty that would arise if the Council of inisters had to deal with everv ma'.ter, the Constitution has authorised the Governor under sub-article ·(3) of the Article 166 to make rules for th'! more convenient transaction di the business of the Govenment .of the State and for the allocation amongst its Ministers of the business of Government.

All matter-; excepting those in which the Governor is required to act in his discretion have to he allocated to one or the other of the Ministers 'on

the advice cf the Chief Minister. Apart from allocating business among the Minister", the Governor can also make rules on the advice of his Council of Ministers for more convenient transaction of business. He can not only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may $0 further and on the advice of his Ministers, designate a particular official to discharge any particular function. [5 l l FJ

The cab.inet is responsible to the 'Legislature for every action taken in any O[ the Ministries.

This is the essence of joint responsibility, That does not nu:an that each and every decision must be taken by the cabinet.

Te political responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate th•:: personal responsibility of the Ministers to discharge all or any of the functions of the Government.

Similarly an individual Minister is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his rnini~; try.

This again is a political responsibility and not personal rcsponsihility. In every well-planned administration. most of the decisions are taken by the civil servants who are likely to be experts and not subject to polilical prcsurc. The Minister is not expected to hurden himself with the J.ay-to-Jay 1.1dministration.

His prin1ary function is to Jay down the policies and programmes of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle th~ rnajor prtlicics and programmes of the Government. [512 A]

E1npcror v. Sih1u11!1 Banerjee & Ors. L.R. 72 I.A. p. 241; Kalyan Sinnli v. Swte of U.P. [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 76; lshwarlal Girdhar /al Josfii ,., State of Gujarat and anr .. I 1968] 2 S.C.R. 266; Ca11ital Multipflrpose ('c1opc•rarire Snciety v. Stntt• of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Civil Appeal N,1. 220111966 decided on 30-3-1967; referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 397, 400 to 402, 404 to 417. 422 to 441, 451, 1158 to 1161, 1176,

1178 lo 1181, 1204, 1207 and 1407 of 1969.

App, als from the judgments and orders dated January 6, 1969 O'. the Mr.dras High Court in Writ petitions Nos. 846 of 1968 etc.

K. K. Veuugopa/, K. R. Nambiar and A. S. Nambiar, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 397. 400 to 402, 422, 423, 441and451 of 1969 i.

M. C. Chagla, V. Subraman:am, V. T. Gopalan, Radharani, C. S. Prakasa Rao and K. Jayaram, for the appellants (in C.As.

Nos. 404 to 417. 1179, 1180 of 1407 o~ 1969).

M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyilma/a Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1176 of 1969).

R. V. S. Mani. for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 424 to 428, 1158 to 1161and1207of1969).

A. K. Sen, C. A. Prakasa Rao and R. Gopalakrish11a11, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 429, 431 to 438, 440, 441, 1178 and 1181of1969).

C. S. Prakasa Rao, A. R. Ramanathan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, . for the appellant (in C.A. No. 430 of 1969).

• A

C. S. Prnkasa Rao, R. Gopalakrishna11 and Sudhir Khanna, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 439 of 1969).

C. S. PN1kasa Rao, K. K. Venugopa/ and R. Gopalakrishnan,. for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1204 of 1969).

Niren De, Attorney General for India and A. V. Rangam, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 397 of 1969).

S. V. Gupte and A. V. Rangam, for the respondents (in C.A.

No. 400 of 1969).

A. V. Rangam, for the respondents '(in C.A. Nos. 401,. c

402. 404 to 417, 422 to 441, 451, 1158 to 1161, 1176, 1178 to

1181, 1204, 1207 and 1407 of 1969).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hegde, J.

These 52 appellants are private stage carriage operators in the State of Tamil Nadu.

They have been operating in various routes in that , State.

Some of those routes are pro_posed to be nationalised.

A draft scheme of nationalisation has. been prepared and published under s. 68(C) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Central Act IV of 1939) (to be hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

The validity of the draft scheme was challenged by the appellants before the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

Incidentally the validity of some of the provisions of the amendin~ Act XVIII of 1968 (Madras Act) also came to be challen:; ed in thme petitions.

A division bench of the Madras High Court consistinJ! of Anantanarayanan C.J. and Natesan J. have dismi'ised those petitions.

As against the decision cf the High Court these appeals have been brought on the strength of the :ertificates issued by the High Court.

In these appeals we are primarily concerned with the validity of the draft scheme under challenge. The ground on which it is challenged is that the opinion requisite under s. 68(Cl of the Act was not formed by the State Government but by the Secretary to the government in the Industrie', Labour and Housing Department. acting in pursuance of the powers conferred on him under rule 23(A) of the Madras Government Business Rules (to be here inafter referred to as 'the Rules').

The contention of the appellants is that the said rule is ultra vires the provisions d the Constitution.

There is no dispute that if the rule in question is valid. the challenge directed against the draft scheme must fail.

The High Court has opined that that rule is a valid rule. It is the correctness of that conclusion that is primarily in issue in these appeals.

Section 68 ( C) prescribes :

"Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purp:ise of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme givng particulars of the nature o~ the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct."

This section requires that the State transport undertaking must form the opinion contemplated therein.

In the State of Tamil Nadu, the Stale transport undertaking is a .department of the State gove!nment.

Therefore the necessary opinion should have been formed by the State government.

It was urged on behalf of the appellants that under our constitutional set up, the requisite opininn could have been formed either by the Council of Ministers or the Minister to whom the business in question had been allocated under the 'Rules'.

The same could not have been formed by the Secretary ""ho is merely an official and that too by the Secretary who is not the head of the department to which the , functions under the Act had been assigned.

The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants proceed thus : The executive power of the State vests in the Governor (Art. 154). In the exercise of that power he has to be aided and advised by the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head (Art. 163 ( 1)) but the Governor can make rules for more convenient transaction of the.business of the government of the State arid for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion, (Art. 166(3) ).

A Minister can only deal with the business that has been allocated to him by the Governor under 'the Rules'.

He is not competent to deal with any other bustness.

Motor Vehicles Act has been allocated to the Home Department.

Mr. Karunanidhi, the Transport Minister was not in-charge of the Home Department.

Therefore his department could not have dealt with ful)ctions arising under the Act. Further the Governor could 1not have allocated any business to a Secretary.

Hence in making rule 23 (A). the Governor exceeded the powers conferred on him under Art. 166(3).

A ...

On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the State c.f Tamil Nadu that originally the functions under the Motor Vehicles Act had been allocated to the Home Department but when Mr. Annadurai formed the D.M.K. government in Tamil Nadu in 1967, the Home Department as such was not allocated to any Minister. The various subjects included in that department were split up and distributed amongst the various Ministers.

Transport was allocated to Mr. Karunanidhi.

Motor Vehicles Act as such was not allocated to any Minister.

The department of Transport included functions under the Motor Vehicles Act as well.

Ever since the D.M.K. ministry was formed, the functions under the Motor Vehicles Act were dealt with by the Transport ministry. At the instance of the Transport Minister, Mr. Karunanidhi, Governor framed rule 23(A) for the more convenient discharge cf the business.

On behalf of the government, it was further urged that Art. 166 ( 3 I has two parts namely ( 1) rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the government of the State and (2) rules relating to allocation of business of the State among the Ministers.

It was said that after allocating the business oi the government among various Ministers, it was open to the Governor on the advice of the ministry to make rules for the convenient discharge of the business allocated.

Rule 23(A) is one such rule made under Art. !66(3 ).

Hence its validity is not open to question.

The impugned rule 23 (A) was introduced for the first time l?y G.O.Ms. No. 2715 Public dated 22-12-67.

Under sub-cl. (I) of that rule, it is provided that powers and functions which State transport undertaking may exercise under s. 68(C) of the Act shall be exercised and discharged on behalf of the State government by the Secretary to the Government of Madras in the Industries, Labour and Housing Department.

The rule .further provides that cases relating to such powers and functions of the State transport undertaking under s. 68(C) need not be submitted to the Minister in-charge.

Under sub-cl. (2) of that rule, the power' and functions of the State government under s. 68 (D) of the Act and the rules relating thereto are directed to be exercised and discharged by the Secretary to the government in the Home Department.

Rule 4 of 'the Rules' deals with __ allocation and disposal of business.

It provides that the business of the Government shall be transacteci in the department' specified in the 1st Sch. and classified and distributed between those departments as laid down therein.

Rule 5 says that Governor shall, on the advice of the Chief Minister allot the business of the government among the Ministers, assigning one or more departments to the charge of a Minister but the proviso to that rule says that nothing in that rule shall prevent the assigning of one department to the charge of more than one Minister.

:Rule 6 pn:scribes that each department of the secretariat shall be .under a Secretary who shall be the official head of the department.

Under rul1~ 7, the Council of Ministers constituted under Art. 163 ( 1) is held collectively responsible for all the executive orders issued in the name of the Governor in accordance with rules, whether such orders are authorised, by an individual Minister on a matter pertaining to his portfolio or as a result of the discussion at the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Rule 9 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of rule 7, the Minister in-charge of a department shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to his department.

Section III of the "Rules" containing rules 21 to 30 deal with the departmental disposal of business.

Rule 21 says that except as otherwise provided by any other rule cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister in-charge who may by means of standing orders give such directions as he may think fit for the disposal of cases in the department; copies of such standing orders shall be sent to the Governor and the Chief Minister.

Rule 22 provides that each Minister shall by means of standing orders arrange with the secretary of the department what matters or class ef matters are to be brought to his personal notice; copies of such standing orders has to be sent to the Governor and the Chief Minister.

Rule 23 prescribes that except as otherwise provided in the rules, all cases shall be submitted to the Minister in-charge by the secretary of the department to which they belong.

Then comes rule 23(A) to which reference has already been made.

The first question that has to be decided is whether the functions nnder the Motor Vehicles Act had been assigned to Mr.

Karunanidhi, the Minister for Transport.

It is true that when the various d1ipartments were reorganized in 1961, Motor Vehicles

Act as we![ as Transport were included in the Home Department.

But when the D.M.K. ministry came to power after the 1967 general elections, the Home Department as such was not allocated to any Minister.

The various subjects included in that department were distributed amongst several Ministers.

Transport was allocated to the Transport Minister.

Motor Vehicles Act as such was not allocated to any Minister.

The allocation of business among, the various Minister; appears to have been made under broad heads.

In 1961 while allocating subjects to the various depa•tments there was a detailed and exhaustive enumeration of the subjects.

But that method was not adopted in 1967 while distributing the business of the government among the various Ministers . . The functions under the Act undoubtedly relate to Transport department.

It cannot be assumed that functions under the Act had not been assigned to any Minister.

It is proved that those functions were being discharged by the Minister for Transport.

Hence we agree with the High Court that those functions had been

allocated to the Transport Minister and that the State transport undertaking was being run by the Transport ministry.

Mr. Karunanidhi has' in his affidavit filed before the High Court sworn to the fact that rule 23(A) was framed at his instance.

Admittedly he could have assigned the functions under s. 68(C) of the Act to the Transport Secretary by making a standing order under rule 22. If he could have done that, we fail to see why he could not advise the Governor through the Chief Minister to make rule 23(A).

It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the parliament has conferred powers under s. 68 ( C) of the Act to a designated authority.

That power can be exercised only by that authority and by no one else. The authority concerned in the present case is the State government.

The governmentcould not have delegated its statutory functions to any one else.

The government means the Governor aided and advised by his Ministers. Therefcre the required opinion should have been formed by the Minister to whom the business had been allocated by 'the Rules'.

It was further urged that if the functions of the Government can be discharged by any one else, then the doctrine of ministerial responsibility which is the very essence of the cabinet form of government disappears; such a situation is impermissible under our Constitution.

We think that the above submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants are without force and are based on a misconception of the principles underlying our Constitution.

Under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a constitutional he<1d; the administration of State is run by the Council of Ministers.

But in the very nature of things, it is impossible for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matter that comes before the Government.

In order to obviate that difficulty the Constitution has authorised the Governor under sub-Art. ( 3) of. Art. 166 to make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the government of the State and for the allocation amongst its Ministers, the business of the gove•nment.

All matters excepting those in which Governor is required to act in his discretion have to be allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister.

A part from allocating business among the Ministers, the Governor can also make rules on the advice of his Council of Ministers for mo•e convenient transaction of business.

He can. not only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular

functn. But this again he can do only on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

The cabinet is responsible to the legislature for every action taken in any of the ministries.

That is the essence of joint responsibility.

That does not mean that each and every decision must be taken by the cabinet.

The political responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the Ministers to discharge all or any of the governmental functions.

Similarly an individual Minister is responsible to the legislature for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his ministry.

This again is a political responsibility and not personal responsibility.

Even the most hard working minister cannot attend to e\ery business in his department. If he attempts to do it, he is bound to make a mess of his department.

In every well planned administration, most of the decisions are taken by the civil servants who are likely to be experts and not subject to political pressure.

The Minister is not expected to burden himself with the day to day administration.

His primary function is to lay down the policies and programme:; of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the major policies and programmes of the government. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister.

He does it on behalf of the government.

It is always open to a Minister to call for any file in his ministry and p.tss orders.

He may also issue directions to the officers in his ministry regarding the disposal o.f government business generally or as regards any specific case.

Subject to that over all power. the officers designated by the 'Rules' or the standing orders, can take decisions on behalf of the government.

These officers are the limbs of the government and not its delegates.

In Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji and ors.(') construing s. 59(3) of the Government of I, ndia Act, 1935, a provision similar to Art. 166(3), the Judicial Committee held that it was within the competence of the Governor to empower a civil servant to transact any particular business of the government by making appropriate rules.

In that case their Lordships further observed that the Ministers like civil servants are subordinates to the Governor. In Ka/yan Singh v. State of U.P: (') .: this Court repelling the contention that the opinion formed by an official of the government does not fulfil the requirements of s. 68 ( C) observed :

"The opinion must necessarily be formed by somebody to whom, under the rules of business, the cqnduct of the business is entrusted and that opinion, in law. will be the opinion of the State Government. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that all the concerned officials in the Department of Transport considered the draft scheme and the said scheme was finally approved by the Secretary of the Transport Department before the

(I l L. R. 72 I. A. p. 241.

(2) [1962] Supp. (2) S. C.R. p. 76.

notification was issued. It is not denied that the ecre

tary of the said Department has power under the rules of business to act for the State Government in that behaM'.

We, therefore, hold that in the present case the opinion was formed by the State transport undertaking within the meaning of s. 68 ( C) of the Act, and that, there was nothing illegal in the manner of initiation of the said Scheme".

In lshwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. v.

State of Gujarat and anr. ( ') this Court rejected the contention that the opinion formed by the Deputy Secretary under 1s. 17 ( 1) of the !; and Acquisition Act cannot be considered as the opinion of the State government.

After referring to the rules of business regulating the government business, this Court observed at p. 282 :

"In our case the Secretaries concerned were given the jurisdiction to take action on behalf of Government and satisfy themselves about the •.need for acquisition under s. 6, the urgency of the matter and the existence of waste and arable lands for the application of sub-ss. ( L) and ( 4) of s. 17.

In view of the Rules of business and the Instructions their determination became the determination of Government and no exception could be taken." ·

In Capital Multi-purpose Co-operative Society v.

State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1 ), this Court dealing with the scope of s. 68 (D) of the Act observed that the Srate Government obviously is not a natural person and therefore some natural person has to give hearing on behalf of the State Government and hence the hearing given by the special secretary pursuant to the power conferred on him by the business rules framed under Art. 166 ( 3) is a valid hearing.

As mentioned earlier in the very nature of th\ngs, neither the Council of Ministers nor an individual Minister can attend to the numerous matters that come up before the Government.

Those matters have to be attended to a; nd decisions taken by various officials at various levels. When those officials discharge the functions allotted to them, they are doing so as limbs of the government and not as persons to whom the power of the government had been delegated.

In Halsbury Laws of England Vol. I 3rd Edn. at p. 170, it is observed :

"Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by an official employed in the Minister's department

(1) !1968] 2, S. C.R. p. 266.

(2) C. A. 2201 -0f1966 decided on :lll.3.1967.

L8Supcl/70-J

there. is in Jaw no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister."

Similar view has been expressed iin "Principles of Administrative Law" by Griffith and Street. That is also the view taken by Sir Ivor Jennings in his "Cabinet Government",

For the reasons mentioned above, we arc: of opinion that the iunctlons under the Motor Vehicles Act had been allocated by the Governor to the 'Transport Minister under "the Rules" and the Secretary of that ministry had been validly authorised under rule 23-A to take action under s. 68 (C) of the Act. ·

The validity of some of the provisions of Madras Act 18 of c 1968 which amended the Act was canvassed before us.

It is not necessary to go into those questions for deciding the validity of the impugned sdwme.

Those questions can be more appropriately gone into and decided if and when action is taken on the strength of those provisions.

Hence we leave open those questiQlls.

In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed with D costs-hearing fee one set.

R.K.P.S.

Appeals dismissed,

5

A. SANJEEVI NAIDU ETC. ETC

STATE OF MADRAS AND ANR

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.

C. SHAH

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER

A. N. RAY

I. D. DUA, JJ.

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 68(c)

Art. 166(3 )

Section 68(()

Motor Vehicles Act

Article 226

Section 68(C)

Section 68

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 68(C)

Article 166

1968] 2 S.C.R. 266

K. K. Veuugopa/

K. R. Nambiar

A. S. Nambiar

M. C. Chagla

V. Subraman

am

V. T. Gopalan

Radharani

C. S. Prakasa Rao

K. Jayaram

M. K. Ramamurthi

Shyilma

Vineet Kumar

R. V. S. Mani

A. K. Sen

C. A. Prakasa Rao

R. Gopalakrish11a11

C. S. Prakasa Rao

A. R. Ramanathan

R. Gopa

A

C. S. Prnkasa Rao

R. Gopalakrishna11

Sudhir Khanna

C. S. PN1kasa Rao

K. K. Venugopa/

R. Gopalakrishnan

Niren De

A. V. Rangam

S. V. Gupte

Hegde

s. 68(C)

Motor Vehicles Act

Central Act IV of 1939

High Court of Madras

Art. 226

Madras High Court

Anantanarayanan

Natesan

Section 68

Tamil Nadu

Art. 154

Art. 163

Art. 166(3)

Motor Vehicles Act

Karunanidhi

Art. 166(3)

Annadurai

D.M.K. government

Motor Vehicles Act

Motor Vehicles Act

D.M.K. ministry

Motor Vehicles Act

Art. 166

s. 68(C)

Government of Madras

s. 68(C)

s. 68

Art. 163

Motor Vehicles Act

Karunanidhi

Act

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 68(C)

s. 68

Art. 166

s. 59(3)

Art. 166(3)

s. 68

s. 68

s. 6

s. 17

s. 68

Srate Government

Art. 166

Griffith

Ivor Jennings

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 68