STATE OF KERALA

COCHIN CHEMICAL REFINERIES LTD.

March 26, 1968

[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 8

Contract-Mor{f:age deed providing for loan to company and for supply of goods by company to mortgagee-Sale price to be adiusted against loan and interest-Mortgagee not cdvancing loon-I/ relieved of obligation to purchase goods-Whether liable for da1nages for .'lot advancing loan and for bre(1ch of contract to buJ goods,

A mdrtgagc deed was executed by the respondent company and one of its directors in favour of the State of Keral::i. It was provided inter alia by the terms of the deed that in consideration of the State granting a loan of a sum of lls. 2.5 lakhs to the company, the laUer wou1U supply lo the State 3.000 tons of ground-nut cake Yyjthin a specified pe'riod and make deliveries in accordance 'Nith instructions to be given by the State, and the account for this supplv will be adjusted against the loan amount and the interest thereon.

It Was comn1on ground however that the loan amount, though acknowledged in the mortgage deed as received by the company, was never in fact advanced by the State. The respondent company arranged for the supply of goods as agreed and sought the necessary instructions for dlivery, but these we're never given.

The company instit\Ited a suit in 1Iarch 1953 against the appellant State for dumages for failure to advance the loan an1ount and for breach of contract to purchase the ground-nut cake. The trial court decTecd the suit for R.;;. 36,000 being damages for failure to advance the loan and for Rs. 1,23,000 as damages for breach of contract. An appeal to the High Court chaUenging the liability of the State to compensate the company for failure to take delivc'ry of the goods v.as dismissed.

It was contended on behalf of the State that the obligation to take delivery of the good_s agreed to be purchased was contingent upon the Government's advancing the loan amount, so long as the amount was not atlvanced by the State~ the mortgage \vas not in Jaw effective and the Company could not enforce the contract relating to ground-nut cake

~1i;:recd to be purchased by the State.

HELD : Dismissin.q the appeal.

A transaction of mortgage formally executed docs not become void or ineffective merely because the mortgagee fails to advance the amount of money undertaken to be advanced by him.

Under the terms of the mortgage deed liability of the State to purchase the roundnut cake from the Company was not n1adc conllitional upon the State advancing the 1oan.

By failing to advance the loan an1ount the State could. not avoid liability to carry out the obligation to purchase the goods contracted to be purchased. Even if it be assumed thJ.t the indenture incorporated reciprocal promises, in the absence of anv express provision to that effect the contract could not be trn1inatcd by the default of the State. Breach of contract by one party does not auton1atica1ly terminate the obligation under the contract: the injured party has the option either to treat the cnntract as still in existence. or to regard himself as discharged. If he

ccepts the discharge of the contract by the other party, the contract i"

KllRALA V. COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 557

A at an end. If he does not accept the discharge, he may insist on performance. (560 C-D; 561 DJ.

Tatia v. Babaji, I.L.R. 22 Bom. 176, Rashik Lal v. Ram Narain end Others, I.LR. 34 All. 273, Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshcr Prasad and Others. I.L.R. 52 All. 338, White and Cart., (Councils) Ltd, v.

Mc- Gregor, [1962] A.C. 413. referred to.

There was no substance in the contention that the State was by its default liable to compensate the Company only for loss arising out of its failure to advance the money, and not out of its failure lo purchase the goods. The State's undertakings to advance the loan and to take delivery of ground-nut cake were two independent, though inter-related transactions; and by committing a breach of its own obligation to advance the loan, the State did not absolve itself from liability for the breach arising from its refusal to take delivery of the goods offered. [561 F-H].

Civn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 741 of 1965.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 1, 1963 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 480 of 1958.

Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant.

S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.

On October 9, 1950, a deed styled an "indenture of mortgage" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin. The relevant terms of the indenture were :

"In consideration of the sum of Rupees 2.5 lakhs (2,50,000) borrowed by the mortgagor No. 1 from the mortgagee (the receipt of which sum mortgagor No. 1 doth hereby admit and acknowledge) mortgagor No. 1 hereby covenants with the mortgagee as follows :-

. (a) That the mortgagor No. 1 shall supply to the mortgagee 3,000 tons of groundnut cake at the rate of 600 tons per month within a period of five months commencing with the first day of November 1950 and ending with the last day of March 1951.

. (b) That the account for the groundnut cakes supphed by mortgagor No. 1 to the mortgagee will be settled and adjusted against the Joan amount of Rs. 2.5 lakhs and interest .thereon at 4!% per annum at the end of March 1951, the groundnut cakes supplied being valued at t?e average price fixed by the Government during the penod for purchases from other sources.

If on sucli adjustment any amount is found due to the mortgagor No. 1 the same will be paid by the mortgagee. If how-

558 SUP.REM!! COUllT .REPORTS

[1968) 3 S.C.R.

ever it is found that the price of the groundnut cakes supplied is not sufficient to make up the loan amount with the interest thereon, mortgagor No. 1 shall pay the deficit amount to the mortgagee immediately after the settlement of account

(c) That mortgagor No. I shall deliver the groundnut cakes at any depot in the Travancore-Cochin State as may from time to time be required by the Director of Agriculture from the mortgagee free of transport charges."

II .. "For the consideration aforesaid the mortgagor No. l hereby transfers by way of simple mortgage to the mortgagee" all the assets described in Sch. I, "and mortgagor No. 2 hereby transfers by way of simple mortgage to the mortgagee· the assets described in Sch. II, "to the intent that the said premises shall remain and be charged as security for the payment to the mortgagee of the said principal money, interest and costs in accorda11ce with the Covenants hereinbefore contained."

Ill. "The mortgagors hereby covenant with the mortgagee as follows :-

The indenture was executed by the Company and N. C. John and also by the Secretary to the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of His Highness the Rajpramulch. A supplementary deed was executed on November 7, 1950, whereby it was agreed that without prejudice to the right to recover the amount secured or any portion thereof as stipulated, it shall also be recoverable under the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force or in other marmer as the mortgagee may deem fit.

It is common ground that the amount acknowledged in the indenture was not advanced at the date of the indenture and was never advanced thereafter. The Company arranged for the supply of goods agreed to be sold under the terms of paragraph I(a) and wrote from time to time letters to the appropriate officers of the State asking them to give instructions about the depots where the supplies were to be made. In reply to the letter Ext H, the Assistant Director of Agriculture by Ext. M, dated January 3, 1951, replied that :

"I write .to invite your attention to my Jetter of even No. dated 12-12-1950 and to inform you that I shal~ be placing orders for the supply of groundnut cake as soon as I get orders from Government providing the necessary funds for paying you the advance of Rs. 2! lakhs."

KERALA V, COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 559

No instructions for supply were however given to the Company to supply the goods agreed to be purchased by the State. The Company instituted on March 9, 1953, an action against !he State of Travancore-Cochin for a decree for Rs. 3,600/- bemg damages for failure to advance the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/-, and Rs. 1,68,600/- as damages for breach of contract to purchase

3,000 tons of groundnut cake under the indenture.

The Trial Court decreed the suit for Rs. 3,600/- being damages for failure to advance the lcian, and for Rs. 1,23,000/- being damages for breach of contract to purchase groundnut cake. In appeal to the High Court, the liability of the State to compensate the Company for failure to take delivery of the goods offered to be delivered alone wa5 challenged. The High Court confirmed the decree -passed by tho Trial Court negativing the contention raised on behalf of the State that the obligation to take delivery of the goods agreed to be purchased was contingent on the Government's advancing Rs. 2,50,000/-. The State has appealed to this Court with special leave.

Two questions arise for determination in this appeal :

(I) Whether under the terms of the indenture the State by refusing to advance the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/- was absolved from the obligation to purchase the goods referred to in paragraph l(a) of the indenture; and

(2) Whether in the circumstances of the case, the Company was not entitled to claim damages for breach by the State to purchase the goods agreed to be purchased.

The indenture incorporated two transactions: ( 1 ) a mortgage in favour of the State by the Company and N. C. John charging properties belonging to the two mortgagors for repayment of Rs. 2,50,000/-; and (2) the Company agreeing to sell and the State agreeing to purchao; e 3,000 tons of groundnut cake at the rate of 600 tons per month for five months to be supplied at any of the depots in the Travanc<ire-Cochin State as may from time to time be designated by the Director of Agriculture. The indenture expressly recited that the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 /- was advanced to the Company but the supplementary deed dated November 7, 1950, and the correspondence make it clear that though the money wns recited to have been actually advanced, it was not in .fact advanced, but it was intended by the State Government to advance it.

For some reason, which it is difficult to ascertain from the record, the State Government did not carry out its obligation to advance the money, after obtaining the indenture and the supplementary deed from the Companv and its Director. But even as late as January 3, 1951, as is clear from Ext. M-the Assistant Director of Agriculture reiterated the promise that the money

560 SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS

(1968) 3 S.C.R.

will be advanced and delivery of goods offered by the Company will be accepted.

Counsel for the State contended that so long as the loan was not advanced by the State, the mortgage was not in law effective, and the Company could not enforce the contract relating to groundnut cake agreed to be purchased by the State, for the obligation undertaken was in consideration of the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/- and arose only when the loan was advanced. But the assumption, that if the State did not advance the loan which it had undertaken to advance, the indenture was ineffective, cannot be accepted. There is no such express term in the deed, and none can be implied from the covenants and the surrounding circumstances.

A transaction of mortgage formally executed does not become void or ineffective merely because the mortgagee fails to advance the amount of money undertaken to be advanced by him. If without advancing the amount agreed to be advanced, he sues on the title created under the deed of mortgage, the Court will not award him a decree for anything more than what he has advanced.

But that is not to say that the mortgage is invalid.

In Talia v. Babaji(1), Farran, C.J., observed :

"I am not, h9wever, . . . prepared to assent to the train of thought which puts conveyances of lands in the mofussil W{ected by possession or registration where the consideration expressed in the conveyance to have been paid has not in fact been paid in the same category as contracts void for want of consideration."

Similar observations were made in Rashik Lal v. Ram Narain arid others('), where Karamat Hussain, J., observed at p. 276 :

" . . . . . . mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act is a transfer of an interest in the land mortgaged, and not a mere contract. It therefore follows that no sooner a valid mortgage deed is registered, an interest in the property mortgaged, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, vests in the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage money has 110t been paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagor:' The mere nonpayment of the mortgage money cannot have the effect of rendering the mortgage invalid."

Sulaiman, J., in Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad and olhos(1) observed that once a document transferring immovable

property has been registered, the transaction passes out of the domain of a mere contract and into one of a conveyance. Such a completed transaction is governed by the provisions of the

(I) l.L.R. 22 Born. 176.

(2) I.L.R. 34 All. 273.

(l) I.LR. 52 All. 338.

KERALA >". COCHiX REFINERIES (Shalt, J.) 561

TJ'llnsfer of Property Act and so much of the Contract Act a; is applicable thereto.

The argument that because the amount was not advanced by the State to the Company, the mortgage was void or ineffective thenfore cannot be accepted. Nor do the terms of the indenture justifv the plea that the liability of the State to purchase 3,000 tous of groundnut cake from the Company was conditional upon the State advancing Rs. 2,50,000/-. The two transactions incor porated in the indenture were undoubtedly inter-related. . The price payable for the supplies of groundnut was to be adjusted towards the amount advanced or to be advanced by the State.

But by failing to advance the amount the State could not avoid liability to carry out the obligation to purchase the goods contracted to be purchased. Even if it be assumed that the indenture incorporated reciprocal promises--the State to advance Rs. 2,50,000/- and the Company to deliver 3,000 tons of groundnut cake-in the absence of any express provision to that effect the contract could not be tenninated by the default of the State. Breach of contract by one party does not automatically terminate the obligation under the contract: the injured party has the option either to treat the contract as still in existence, or to regard himself as discharged. If he accepts the discharge of the contract by the other party, the contract is at an end. If he does not accept the discharge, he may insist on performance : see the judgment of the House of Lords White and Caner (Co1mcils) Ltd. v. McGregor(').

The case before the House was a Scottish case, but the law of Scotland is not different on the matter under consideration from the F.nglish Jaw, and the Indian Contract Act closely follows the English Common Law in that matter. It cannot, therefore, be said that by refusing to advance the loan which the State i1ad

undertaken to t!dvance, the ooligation to purchase groundnut cake from the Company came to an elid.

Nor is there any substance in the secoud contention that the State was by its default liable to compensate the Company only for loss arising out of its failure to advance the money, and not out of its failure to purchase the goods. The State had undertaken to G advance Rs. 2,50,000/- to the Company. It had also undertaken .to take delivery of 3,000 tons of groundnut cake offered by the :Company under the terms of contract of sale.

These were two ]ndependent, though inter-related transactions, and by committing a breach of its own obligation to advance the sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-

the State did not absolve itself from liability for the breach arising from the refusal to take delivery of the goods offered. The cause of action arising out of the refusal to take delivery of the goods offered was independent of the cause of action arising out of the H

(I) (1962) A.C. 413=(196113 All. E.R. 1178.

562 SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.

breach committed by the State in not advancing the loan. The A two causes of action were cumulative and not alternative. There is therefore no warrant for the plea that by claiming damages for loss su1Iercd by it as a result of the failure to advance the loan. the Company elected to give up its claim for damages for breach of the contract to take delivery of 3,000 ions of groundnut cake by thf' S<ate.

B The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

R.K.P.S.

Appeal dismissed.

STATE OF KERALA

COCHIN CHEMICAL REFINERIES LTD

March 26, 1968

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

State of Keral::i

Shah

Kerala High Court

Sarjoo Prasad

M. R. K. Pillai

S. V. Gupte

A. G. Pudissery

October 9, 1950

Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.

N. C. John

State of Travancore- Cochin

Travancore-Cochin

Government of Travancore-Cochin

November 7, 1950

Revenue Recovery Act

January 3, 1951

KERALA V

March 9, 1953

State of Travancore-Cochin

Travanc<ire-Cochin

Farran

Karamat Hussain

Transfer of Property Act

Sulaiman

KERALA

Scotland

Indian Contract Act


• B

• D

• H

-,, , '/ --

S. N. BOSE

v. '\

STATE OF BIHAR ', March 26, 1968 '

.,;,

[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]

Pre"ention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), ss. 4(1), SA ond 6(1) (c)-Investigation by Inspector of Police after obtaining permission from First Class Afagistrate _to lay trap--Pernzission if sufficient for investiga- Iion-Rea.<>ons if to be ; ecOrded hy Alagistrate lvhile grcnting pernzission- Presumption under s. 4---Scope of and how rebutted-Sanction to prosecute-Granted by Chief Medical Officer of Rcilnay hospital a<; 'head of <lepartment-Accused a non-gazetted officer having prhileges of a-· ga:etted officer-uffeciencyr .:-

The appellant wits an assistant medical offiCCr in a_ railway hospital at Gaya.

Though he had certain privileges ordinarily available to gazetted officers he was only a non-gazetted Class III officer. He was convicted for effcnC'es under s. 161 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) read \\ith s. S(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The complaint that be had received Hiegal gratification, \vas investigated into by an Inspector of'. Police. The Inspector obtained permission from a First Class l\Iagistrate for layin6 a trap, investigated into the case, and later, after th~ entire investigation was over. he obtained pcrmis.sion from the ~Iagistrate to investigate into the cas-::.

The sanction to prosecute :required under_ s. 6(1) of the Act, Was granted by the Chief l\Icdical Officer, who was the hoad of tho Jcpartment.

The conviction \\'as _challenged on the fo1Iowing grounds: (1) The investigation \Vas \\'ithout authority of la\v, because, under s.

SA,· the Inspector could not have investigated \\ithout the prior permission of a

)Jagistrak~ of the First Class; (2) The permission granted by the l\fagist'.ratc d_id not meet the -requirements of la\V because, it was g!ven casually and '""ithout applying his -mind to the question as to \vhcther there was any need for departing from thenormal rule laid down in the section. namely, that such cases Should ordinarily be investigated by an officer of the rank of Dy. SuperintcnJcnt Of Police or above and there should be good reasons before a l\lagistrate accords permission to officers below that rank; (3)- The presumption under s. 4 that the appc11ant h3.d accepted. - the sum as a mOtivc or reward should not be drawn unless t~ prosecution proved that the amouilt v.as paid as a bribe; ( 4) The presumption \\'aS

rbuttcd by the appellant's explanation that \\'hat was paid to him was

th~ return of a loan; and (5) the sanctionto p'rD!>ecute graritcd by the -Chief l\fedieal Officer. \Vas invalid as he -was not the authority competent to remove him; ·

HELD : ( 1) There is no basis for the contention that. any portion of the investigation was done without authority of Jaw.

[567 DJ. .

Investigation under s. 4(1) Cr. P.C. is one and indivisibleand includes all the steps taken by the Inspector to ascertain the truth of , the complaint allz-ging that the appellant \vas attempting to obtain a bribe_.

Laying a trap~ is a part of the investigation and a permission given under s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act enables the officer concerned not only to lay a trap but also to _further inv'2stigatc., The.fact that the I nspcctor of Police obtain-:!d t\\'O permissions, one for laying a trap and

564 SUPRl!MB OOUllT llBPOl.1S

(1968) 3 S.C.R.

another for investigating the case, does not alfect the eorlier order as the A SC-."Ond p-;!rmission was wholly superlluous. [566 G-H, 567 B-DJ

(2) The ordet giving permission to the Inspector did not give ani reasons and there is thus a violation of s.. SA. But an illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not vitiate the mrult of a trial unless there was a miscarriage of justice. Jn the present ca!le the Icgalitv of the investigation was not challenged in the trial conn and prejudice tO the appellant was neither pleaded nor established. r568 ~D. F-0].

B ( 3) Tho presumption under s. 4 arises when it is shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was nm legal remuneration. [569 DJ.

( 4) The _words 'unless the contrary is proved' in s. 4( I) show that the presumption was to be rebutted by proof and not by a bale explanation which. i~ merely plausible. 1he burden resting on the accused "ill C however ho satisfied if he establishes his case by a mere prePondermce oi probability and it is not necessary for him to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Jn the present case, the appellant's pica was not accepted by th.: trial court and the High Coutt and hence, it must be held that be had not

disarged the burden placed on him. [571 ~E].

State of M.P. v. Mubarak A.Ii. [1959] 2 S.c.R.. 201, H. N. Risl1bm! and lnder Singh v. Sune of Delhi, (1955] 1 S.c.Il. 1150, Sfllte of U.P. ,. .

D Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.R. 221, MlllUtllltll v. Sune <>.' U.P. A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 28, C. I. Enuln. >'. Stale of U.P. [1960] :!

S.C.R. 592, Dhanvt111/1'11i Balwt111/1'11i Daai v. StaJe of Malumlshtra, A.l.R_.

1964 S.C. 575 and V. D. lhangan v. State of U.P. [1966] 3 S.C.R. 736. followed.

(5) Under s. 6(1) (c) of the Prevention of Cor'ruption Act, the appel lant couid n-ot be prosecuted without the previous sanction fJf the autho- E rity competent to remove him. Oral evidence of the officer gi\"ing sanction cannot be relied on for 4eciding the validity of the sanction. Tiie Court must be satisfied by reference to the rules on the snbject. Schedule II to the 1961 Rules relating to discipline and appeal of railway servants makes provision for the punishment of nilway servants employed in zonal railways.

Under the Schedule. a bead of a depattment was not mmpetent to impose on Class m officem the puoiabment of IelDO¥ll from

service. That punishment conld only be im-1 by an appointing autho- F rity or any other . higher authority. Under r. 134. the authorities competent to make first appointments to non-guetted pools arc the General Manager. the Chief Administrative Ofticer or a lower authority to whon1 he mcy dekgate power; but the power has notbeen delegat~ m head~ of departments.

T'ttciefr4=~ !he Chief Med.ai Ollicer was neither the appointing authority nor was he competent to remove the appellant from his office.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JUlllSDlcnON : al Appeal No. 109 of 1967.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 4, l 967 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal J\"o.

H 455 of 1965.

Debobrata Mookherjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant B. P. !ha, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Degele, 1. In this appeal by special leave, Mr. Debabrata Mookherjea learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following contentions : (1) the investigation conducted in this case was without the authority of Jaw, (2) the nature. of the onus under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruptfon Act has been wrongly construed by the High Court as well as the trial court, and (3) the sanction granted under s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is invalid in Jaw as the authority who granted the same had no competence to do so.

The facts leading upto this appeal are these. The appellant was an assistant medical officer in the railway hospital at Gaya in the year 1964.

PW 4 Doman Ram was a khalasi working under the inspector of works, Eastern Railway, Gaya. On March 2, 1964, as he was suffering from dysentery and stomach pain he was sent to the appellant along with a sick note for treatment.

The case of PW 4 was that when he went to the appellant for treatment the appellant demanded and received from him Rs. 2 as illegal gratification for treating him. Thereafter he was treated by the. appellant on the 5th, 7th; 9th and 12th of that month.

By the 12th he had completely recovered and therefore he wanted to rejoin duty and for that purpose he requested the appellant to give him a fitness certificate. For issuing him that certificate the appellant demanded Rs. 5 as bribe and he further told PW 4 that unless he paid him the said sum by March 14, 1964, he (appellant) would remove PW 4's name from the sick list. After this talk, when PW 4 was going out of the hospital he met a person by name Babu. He complained to Babu about the behaviour of the appellant. The said person told him that he would meet him again on March 14, 1964, but on March 14 Mr. A. C. Das PW 17, Inspector of Special Police Establishment, met PW 4 in his house and ascertained from him all that had happened. Thereafter PW 4 met PW 17 again at the railway station as desired by the latter. From there both of them went to the district Dak bunaa- Jow where PW 17 recorded the complaint" of PW 4.

The sa;;,_e day PW 17 obtained from the First Class Magistrate an order under s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Thereafter, PW 4 produced before PW l 7 a five-rupee-currency note in the presence of panch witnesses. PW 17 noted the number of the currency note in question, prepared a memorandum in respect of the same, got it attested by the panch witnesses and thereafter re !llflled the said currency note to PW 4 to be given to the appellant m case he made any further demand for bribe. After these pre-

Iiminarle_s were over PW 4 went to the appellant along with the panch witnesses. There when PW 4 asked for the certificate the appellant repeated his earlier demand.

Then PW 4 gave' him the currency' note in question.

This was seen by the pancll

566 SUPREME COURT lll!POllTS [1968) J s.c.R.

witnesses.. Immediately signal was given to PW 17 who came to the hospital and asked the appellant to produce the five rupee note received by him from PW 4.

At this stage the appellant became extremely nervous.

He admitted that PW 4 had paid him Rs. 5 but that according to him. was a return of the loan given to him by the appellant. He produced the currency note in question. After investigation the appellant was charged under s. 161 IPC and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The plea of the appellant was that PW 4 and his wife were doing odd jobs in his house; PW 4 was a drunkard and hence was always in need; he used. to often borrow from him (appellant); he had borrowed Rs. 5 / - from him some days prior to the date of the trap and he returned that amount on that day. The appellant examined some witnesses in support of that plea.

The trial court as well as the High Court accepted the prosecution evidence; rejected the defence version and convicted the appellant both under s. 161, IPC as well ass. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They have given good reasons in support of the findings of fact reached by them. As this Court does not go into questions of fact except under exceptional circumstances, Mr.

Mookherjea primarily confined himself to the legal issues arising in the case.

His first contention was that the investigation held-in this case was without the authority of law and hence the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.

He urged that in view of s .. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, PW 17 who was only an Inspector of police could noi h_ave investigated the case without the prior pennission of a magistrate of the first class; on March 12, 1964 he merely applied for and obtained from a first class magistrate permission to lay a trap; the permission to investigate the case was obtained by him only on the 21st. but by that time the entire investigation was over; hence there was no valid investigation.

The applic.ation made by PW 17. on the 12th was under s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therein, it is true, he had only asked. for permission to lay a trap. It must be remembered that ihe permission given was one under s. 5A.

A permission under ihat provision is a pennission to investigate the case. Laying the trap is a part of the investigation. It is so laid down by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali('). An investigation is one and indivisible.

All steps taken by PW 17 to ascertain the truth of the complaint made by PW 4 alleging that ihe appellant was attempting to obtain bribe from him, come within the expression 'investigation' under s. 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 'Investigation' includes all the proceedings

B -

under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or any person (other than a magistrate) who is authorised by a magistrate in this behalf. The scope of the expression 'investigate' found in s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was explained by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and lnder Singh v.

State of Delhi(') and State of .Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi(").

Section 5A does not contemplate two sanctions, one for laying the trap, and , another for further investigation. Once an order under that provision is made that order covers the entie investigation.

A permission given under that provision enables the officer concerned not only to lay a trap but also to hold further investigation.

There is no doubt that PW 17 was under a mistaken impression that he should obtain two permissions, one for laying the trap and another for investigating the case. Evidently because of that he applied for a second permission some days after the trap was laid.

But that permission v.ias wholly superfluous and the same does not affect the validity of the earlier order. Hence there is no basis for the contention that any portion of the investigation in this case was done without the authority of Jaw.

It was next urged that before granting the permission the learned magistrate did not apply hL~ mind to the question whether there was any need for granting the same.

Before permitting PW 17 he should have first ascertained whether any officer of the rank of Depnty Superintendent or above was not' immediately available to investigate the case, and whether there was any other reason for departing from the normal rule laid down by the legislature. namely, that cases of this nature should be investigated by officers of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or above. It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate made the order casually; he gave no reason in support of his order and hence the permission granted does not meet the requirements of the law. ·

The object of the legislature in enacting s. 5A was to see that the investigation of offences punishable under ss. 161, 165 or l 65A, IPC as well as those under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act should be done ordinarily by officers of the rank of deputy superintendent or allove.

No doubt s. 5 A also provides for an alternative procedure. An. officer below the rank of deputy superintendent can investigate those offences if he obtains the previous permission of a first-class magistrate. The legislature proceeded on the basis that except for good reasons the magistrate would not accord permission for officers below the rank of a deputy superintendent to investigate those offences.

But exigencies of dministrative convenience may . require that some of those

(I) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 11 SO.

(2) A.1.R.1964S.C. 221.

568 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS [i968] 3 s.c.R.

cases have to be investigated by officer.: below the rank of Deputy Superintendents. For that reason it was provided that in such cir.cumstances the permission of a magistrate of the first class shoulQ be .obtained. This Court has laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali(1) that the statutory safeguards under s. 5A must strictly be complied with for they are conceived in public interest and were provided as a guarantt; e against frivolous and vexatious proceedings. A magistrate. cannot surrender his discretion to a police officer but must exercise it having regard to the relevant material made available to him at the stage of granting permission. He must also be satisfied that there is reason owing to exigencies of the administrative convenience to entrust a subordinate officer with the investigation.

It is further observed therein that it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily on the face of it disclose the reasons for giving permission.

The order giving permission under s. SA in this case does not give any reason.

On the application submitted

by PW 17 the learned magistrate merely ordered "Permission granted". PW 17 did not mention in 'his application any special reason for permitting him to investigate the case unless we con- D >ider the statement in the apJ:?lication "Today is the date fixed for issuing the fit certificate after receiving a bribe money of Rs. 5 from him" as impliedly a ground in support of his application. It is surprising that even after this Court pointed out the significance of s. 5A in several decisions there are still some magistrates and .police officers who continue to act in a casual manner. It is obvious that they are ignorant of the decisions of this Court. But the legality of the investigation held in this case does not appear to have been challenged in the trial court.

The charge levelled against the appellant is established by satisfactory evidenee and therefore all that we have now to see is whether the accused was prejudiced by the fact that investigation of this case was made by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent, as laid down

by this Court in Munnalal v. Slate of Uttar Pradesh(') and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi("). No prejudice was pleaded much less established.

An illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless the miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby, See Rishbud and lnder Singh v. Slate of Delhi(').

We next take up the question as to the scope of ~. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As mentioned earlier, the appel- H

(I) (1959] 2 S.C.R. 201.

(3) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 221.

(2) A.T.R. 1964 S.C. 28.

(4) (1955] 1 S.C.R.1150.

lant admits the fact that he received a sum of Rs. 5 from PW 4 on March 14, 1964.

Once that fact is admitted by him, the court has to presume unless the contrary is proved by the appellant that he accepted the sum in question as a motive or reward for issuing the fit certificate. Mr. Mookherjea's contention was that the presumption in question does not arise unless the prosecution proves that the amount in question was paid as a bribe. He urged that the presumption under s. 4 arises only when the prosecution proves that the appellant had received "any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any

prson". He laid stress on the word 'gratification' and according

ro him the word 'gratification' can only mean something that is given as a corrupt reward. If this contention of Mr. Mookherjea is correct then the presumption in question would become absolutely useless. It is not necessary to go into this question in any great detail as the question is no more res integra. In C.1. En:rden

v. State of U .P. (1) this Court held that the "presumption under s. 4 arose when it was shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word 'gratification' in s. 4(1) was given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction of appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe." The Court further observed :

"If the word 'gratification' is construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe then it would be futile or superfluous to prescribe for the raising of the presumption. Technically it may no doubt be suggested that the object which the statutory presumption serves on this construction is that the court may then presume that the money was paid by way of a bribe as a motive or reward as required by s. 161 of the Code. In our opinion this could not have been the intention of the Legislature in prescribing the statutory presumption nuder s. 4(1). In the context we see no justification for not ving the word 'gratification' its literal dictionary meampg.

There is another consideration which supports this construction.

The presumption has also to be raised when it is shown that the accused person has received any valuable thing. This clause has reference to the offence punishable under s. 165 ot the Code; and there is no doubt that one of the essential ingredients of the said offence is that the valuable thing should have been received by the accused without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. It cannot be suggested that the relevant cfause in s. 4(1} OJ 11%0J 2 s.c.R: 592.

which deals with the acceptance of any valuable thing should be interpreted to impose upon the prosecutiou an obligation to prove not only that the valuable thing has been received by the accused but that it has been received by him without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. The plain meaning of this clause undoubtedly requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything more.

If that is the true position in respect of the construction of this part of s. 4( 1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word 'gratification' in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but the incriminating character of the said payment.

It is true that the Legislature might have used the word 'money' or 'consideration' as has been done by the relevant section of the English statute; but if the dictionary meaning of the word 'gratification' fits in with the scheme of the section and leads to the same result as the meaning of the word. 'valuable thiRg' mentioned in the same clause, we see no justification for adding any clause to qualify the word 'gratification'; the view for which the appellant contends in effect amounts to adding a qualifying clause to describe gratification."

The same view was taken by this Court in Dhanvantrai Ra/wamrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra(') and again in V. D. Jhangan v.

State of Uttar Pradesh(').

It was next contended that to discharge the burden placed on the appellant under s. 4 all that he has to do is to offer a reasonable explanation, the burden placed on him by s. 4(1) being somewhat analogous to that placed on an accused under s. 114 of the Evidence Act. This branch of thei law is also Well-settled bv the decisions of this Court. Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides that the court !\lay presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Under that provision the court is not bound to draw any presumption of fact. It is within its discretion to draw a presumption or not.

But under s. 4(1) the court is bound to draw the presumption mentioned therein.

The presumption in question will hold good unless the accused proves the contrary. In other words, the burden of proving the contrary is squarely placed on the accused. A fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it the court either believes it to exist or con-

(I) A.1.R. 1964 S.C. 515.

siders its existence was so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists. The proof given by the accused must satisfy the aforementioned conditions. If it does not satisfy those conditions then he cannot be said to have proved the contrary.

In Dhanvantrai Balwantrai v. State of Maharashtra(') this Court considered the nature of the proof required to be given by the accused under s. 4(1). Therein this Court held that the urden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as that placed on him under s. 114 of the Evidence Act and the same cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by him is reasonable and probable.

It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one.

The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in that provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible.

The same view was taken by this Court in V, D. Jhangan v. State of U ttar Pradesh (2) . But at the same time it was mentioned in that decisign that the burden resting on the accused will be satisfied if the accµsed person establishes his case by a preponderance of probability and it is not necessary for him to establish his case by the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the nature of the burden placed on him is not the same as that placed on prosecution which must not only prove its case but prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case the evidence adduced by the appellant in support of his plea was not accepted by the trial court as well as the High Court. Hence it must be held that he had not discharged the burden placed on him by law.

This takes us to the last point urged by Mr. Mookherjea namely that the sanction to prosecute granted fiy PW 1, the chief medical officer, under s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is invalid as he as not the authority competent to remove the ap pellant from his office and hence the prosecution is vitiated. Section 6 (1), to the extent it is material for our present purpose, reads : • "No court shall take cognizance of an offence punish• able under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Pertal Code, or under sub'section (2) or sub-section ~A of section 5 .of this Act, alleged to have been. comm1ttd bt a public servant, except with the previous sanct10n ..

(a)

(~ . . (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office."

(I) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 575.

(2) [1966] 3 SC R 736 L7 Sup. Cl/68-12 . . . . .

This Court has laid down in R. R. Chari v. State of UP. (1); Bil well as in several other decisions that no court can validly take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned in s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act without the previous sanction of the authority ompetent to remove from office the accused. Without a valid sanction the court had no jurisdiction to try the case.

Hence, if the sanction accorde4 in this case is invalid then the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.

P.W. 1 deposed that the appellant was a class ill officer and that he could have been appointed or dismissed by the Deputy Agent Personnel who is subordinate to him. Therefore he (P.W. 1) was competent to grant previous sanction under s. 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. P. W. 1 's assertion that the appellant could have been removed from his office either by the Deputy Agent Personnel or by himself was challenged in his cross-examination.

The trial court as well as the High Court have relied on the oral evidence of P.W. 1 in coming to the conclusion that the sanction granted is valid. In our opinion those courts erred in relying on oral evidence in deciding the validity of the sanction granted. Hence, we asked the .learned counsel for the respondent t.o satisfy us with reference to the rules on the subject that P.W. 1 was competent to remove the appellant from his office. For this purpose wo granted him several adjournments. Though our attention has now been invited to some rules, those rules do not estab- }ish that P. W. 1 as competent to grant the sanction in question.

It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was a gazetted officer and therefore he . could be removed only by the Railway Board.

This contention does not appear to be correct.

As seen from the Government of India, Ministry of Railways' publication under the title "authorised scales oi pay'', the appellant is a class III officer. From that publication it is further seen that only class I and Il officers are designated as gar.etted officers. In support of his contention that he was a gazetted officer, the appellant relied on the Railway Board's letter No. PC/60/PS-S/MH- 3 dated 2-3-1962. Paragraph 4 of that letter-the only relevant paragraph for our present purpose--i; ays that an assistant surgeon after five years service shall hold the honorary gazetted rank and shall be entitled to the usual privileges granted to gar.etted officers in matters such as passes,. allotment of quarters. This letter merely indicates that the officers mentioned therein are entitled to certain privileges which are ordinarily available to gazetted officers.

We are unable to read that letter as raising the rank of the appellant to that of a gazetted officer. Therefore we proceed on the basis that the appellan_t was a non-gazetted officer. But the question still remains whether P.W. 1 was competent to remove him

(I) ll963J l S.C.R. 121.

from service. In view of appendix 38 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code Vol. II (4th re-print, dated 26-7-1962), we may take it that P. W. 1 was the head of the department to which the appellant belongs. The next question is whether the head of his department was competent to remove the appellant from his service.

As per r. 134 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, published in 1959, authorities competent to make first appointment to non-gazetted posts in the Indian Railways are the General Manager, the Chief Administrative Officer or lower authority to whom he may delegate power. There is no evidence to show that this power has been delegated to the heads of the department. No provision in the Indian Railway Establishment Code 1959 prescribing the authorities competent to remove from office a class Ill officer was brought to our notice. But the prefatory note to Vol. I of the Code says, "The revised Chapter XVII and revised Appendices I and XII will be printed later for inclusion in this edition.

Till such times these are printed, the rules and provisions contained in Chapter XVII and Appendices IV and XVIIl in the 1951 Edition (Reprint) as amended from time to time shall continue to apply."

In 1961 new rules relating to discipline and appeal of railway servants other than employed in the railway protection force have been published. Rule 1701 says, "Without prejudice to the provisions of any Jaw, for the time being in force, relating to the conduct of Government servants, or to the rules made under section 47 (e) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890), the conduct of railway servants shall be governed by the rules contained in Appendix VIIl." Our attention has not been invited to any rules made under s. 47 (e). of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 or any other statutory rules. Hence we are proceeding on the basis that the aforementioned r. 1701 governs the present case. Rule 1705 says that the authorities who are competent to place a railway servant under suspension and to impose penalties on him are specified in the Schedules I, JI and Ill appended to the Rules.

Rule 1707 sets out the various punishments that may be imposed on a railway servant,. which includes removal from service as well as dismissal from service. Schedule I deals with railway servants employed in the Railway Board's office, the Research, Design and Standard. Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above. Schedule I does not apply to the case of railway

s:ryant~ employi;<I in the zonal railways. As regards them, prov1s1on 1s made m Sch. JI.

From that Schedule it is seen that though a head of the Department can impose on Class Ill officers

censure as well as some other punishments detailed therein, he is not competent to impose on them the punishment of removal from service, compulsory retirement or dismissal from service.

Those punishments, as seen from the Schedule, can be imposed on them only by the appointing authority or any other higher authority. P.W. 1 is not shown to be the appointing authority.

On the material before us it is not possible to come to the conclusion that P.W. 1 was competent to grant sanction under s. 6 ( 1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant. He is on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled.

V.P.S.

A ppea/ allowed.

S. N. BOSE

STATE OF BIHAR

G. K. MITTER

K. S. HEGDE, JJ.

ss. 4(1)

s. 4

Gaya

s. 161

I.P.C

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 6(1)

s. 4

s. 4(1)

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 4

s. 4( I)

[1966] 3 S.C.R. 736

s. 6(1)

Schedule II

Med.ai Ollicer

Debobrata Mookherjee

P. K. Ghosh

B. P. !

Degele

Debabrata Mookherjea

s. 4

s. 6

Prevention of Corruption Act

Doman Ram

March 2, 1964

5th, 7th; 9th and 12th of that month

March 14, 1964

Babu

March 14 Mr.

A. C. Das

Dak bunaa- Jow

SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

IPC

s. 5(2)

s. 5(1)(d)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

IPC

Prevention of Corruption Act

Mookherjea

Prevention of Corruption Act

March 12, 1964

s. 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5A

s. 4(1)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

Section 5A

s. 5A

ss. 161, 165

IPC

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

(1955] 1 S.C.R. 11

s. 5A

s. 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

(1959] 2 S.C.R. 201

lant

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4(1)

s. 161

s. 4(1)

s. 165

s. 4

s. 4(1)

s. 114

Section 114

s. 4(1)

s. 4(1)

s. 114

s. 6(1)

Prevention of Corruption Act

Section 6

section 161

section 164

section 165

section 5

[1966] 3 SC R 736

s. 6(1)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 6

Prevention of Corruption Act

Government of India

Ministry of Railways

Indian Railways

section 47

Indian Railways Act, 1890

s. 47

Indian Railways Act, 1890

JI and Ill appended to the Rules

Schedule I

Railway Staff College, Baroda

Railway S.:i:'ice Commission

Railwy Rates Tribunal

Railway L1a1son Office

Schedule I

s. 6

Prevention of Corruption Act


B. S. VADERA

''

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

March 27, 1968

[M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM,

K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J

Constilution of India, Art. 309-Railway Establishn1ent Code, r. 157- Rc.ilway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Reorganisation) Scheme

fr<11ned in 1957 hut nJade applicable from 1954-Board's power to frame rules with retrospective effect.

The petitioners who were wo'rking as Assistants were by the operation of the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Reorganisation) Scheme reverted as Upper Division CleTks in 1967. The said scheme was framed on Febtuary 5, 1957 but was brought into effect from December 1, 1954. Certain modifications to the scheme relating to the manner of filling. up of permanent and temporary vacancies in Grade I of the Service were made in 1963.

The. petitioners came to this Court under A'rt. 32 of the Constitution, challenging the orders of reversion passed against them as illegal. On behalf of respondents the o'rders were defended as being based on the order of seniority which had been re-fixe<l according to the said Scheme. The contentions advanced on behalf of .the petitioners were:· (i) That their promotion as Upper Division Clerks and later as Assistants had beeti. on a permanent basis and could not be disturbed;

(ii) That the Scheme as well as the various orders passed by the respondents weTe violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; (iii) That the second respondent (Railway Board) had no power in law, to frame either the Scheme, or the modified Scheme so as to have retrospective effect from December I. 1954.

HELD : (i) The ranking given to the petitioners as a result of which the impugned orders of reversion were passed was in accordance with the Scheme as . modified in 1963..

On the facts, the contention of the petitioners that their. appointment as Upper Division Clerks and later as F Assistants was on a permanent basis, could not be accepted. [582 B-C]

(ii) Once it was held that the petitioners did not satisfy the requirements of the scheme for being retained as Assistants there was no question of any discrimination under .Art. 14 or violation of Art. 16 arising for consideration at all. (582 G]

(iii) The Indian Railway Esiablishment Code has been issued by the President in exercise of the powers vested in him by th~ proviso to Art 309 of the Constitution'.

Rule 151 of the Code gives the Railway Board full powers to make rules of a general application to non-gazetted railway servants under their control. If full effect is given to: the wordS in Art. 309, namely 'and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act', then in the absence of any Act as afore.,.aid in the .pre.sent case, th~ power to make rules with retrospective effect ~.caiinot be .. demed to the Radway Board; Accordingly the Scheme fralll"..d by the satd Board 10 1957 could be made retrospectively effective from December I, 1954. [583 E, 584 H, A-El

State v. Padmanahhacharya, [19661 I S.C.R. 994 and Nagarajan v.

Mysore, [1966) 3 S.C.R1. 682. consideTed.

Ram Autar v. State of U.P. A.J.R., 1962 All. 328 F.B. approved.

Govindaraju v. State of Mysore,

A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 265 and Garindappa v. J.G. of Registration, A.J.R. 1965 Mys. 25, disapproyed.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 96 and 16S of 1967.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta for the petitioner (in W.P.

No. 96 of 1967).

A. K. Sen, A. P. Chatterjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the Petitioner (in W.P. No. 16S of 1967).

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in both the petitions).

i3. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos. 3, 6 to 9, 13, lS, 17, 18, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31, 36, 39, to 4S, 47, SO, S3 to SS, S8, 61, 64, 66, 69, 76, 77, 81, 82, 87, 91, 94, 96, 97, 103 to lOS, 108, 123, 136 and lSO (in W.P. No. 96 of 1967).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Vaidialingam, J. In both these writ petitions, under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners seek to have quashed, certain orders passed by the 2nd respondent and, in particular; the order dated June 16, 1967, reverting them, as Upper Division Clerks, with effect from June 9, 1967. The Union of India, through the Chairman, Railway Board, and the Secretary, Railway Board, are respondents 1 and 2, respectively, in these proceedings. The other respondents are officers, working under the 2nd respondent, who, according to the petitioners, have been given preferential treatment, by way of promotion, under the orders, impugned, in these proceedings.

At the outset, it may be stated, that the various orders, passed by the 2nd respondent, referred to, by both the petitioners, are one and the same, and therefore, we shall refer to those proceedings, in accordance with the annexure number, given to them, in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967. Wherever necessary, we shall advert to any separate order, that has been referred to, by the petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 16S of 1967.

According to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, he joined service, on July 16, 1955, as Lower Division Clerk, was promoted, with effect from February 2, 19S7, as Upper Division Clerk and further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3,

1958.

His grievance is that while he was holding the post of such Assistant, from 1958, he has been illegall~, and without any justification, reverted, as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from June 9, 1967, as per the impugned order, dated June 16, 1967 (Annexure 16). Similarly, according to the petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, he joined as a Lower Division Clerk, on September 14, 1954, was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from February 2, 1957 and was further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3, 1958. His grievance is that while he was so holding the post of Assistant, from 1958, he has been illegally, and without any justification, reverted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from June 9, 1967, as per Annexure 16.

According to the Railway Board, these promotions, made of the petitioners, either as Upper Division Clerk, in the first instance, or, later, as Assistant, were purely on a temporary and ad hoc basis, pending the framing of the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Re-organization) Scheme, which was in contemplation, at the material time. The Scheme (Annexure 4), was actually framed on February 5, 1957, and the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service was to be organized, in the manner, set out therein.

Under this Scheme, there were to be two grades of service-(i) Grade I-Upper Division Clerk; and

(ii) Grade Il-'-Lower Division Clerk.

The authorised pennanent strength of the Service, in Grade I, was fixed at 45, and of Grade II, at 82.

The initial constitution of the service, was to be with effect from December 1, 1954.

On March 30, 1963, some of the provisions, contained in Annexure 4, were modified, by Annexure 7.

One of the modifications, effected undtir Annexure 7, related to the manner of filling up of pennanent vacancies and temporary vacancies, in Grade I of the Service, and this modification was also to have effect, from the date of the initial constitution of the Service, viz., December 1, 1954.

In 1965, a final panel was drawn up, strictly on the basis of the Scheme, for promotion to the Grade of Upper Division Clerks, in which the names of all the Lower Division Clerks were arranged, strictly -in accordance with their seniority positions, in that Grade. Accordingly, the names of the petitioners, who had been promoted as Officiating Upper Division Clerks, in 1957 were entered, in that panel, in accordance with their inter s;

sniority as Lower Division .Clerks. As the posts of Upper Divismn Clerks were non-selectton posts, so far as promotion quota was cocei:n.ed, they had to be lied in, on the basis of senioritycu.m,-mtab1hty and hence a parttcular officer's seniority, as Lower

D1vmon Clerk, was duly reflected, in his seniority as Upper

Division Clerk. Similarly, Upper Division Clerks, who were promoted as officiating Assistants, were also promoted, on the basis of their seniority, in the Upper Division Clerks' Grade and, therefore, their seniority, ie-Lower Division Clerks' Grade, was thus reflected in the -Assistants' Grade.

The petitioners were required to be reverted, for such Upper Division Clerks, who were senior to them, being posted in the Grade of Assistants.

Effort, however, was made, to avoid hardship to persons, like the petitioners, who were functioning as Assistants, by deciding to make available, vacancies in the Assistants' Grade, by promotion and by curtailing the quota, reserved for direct recruits; but the petitioners could not be continued as Assistants, for an indefinite period, as difficulty arose, when there was contraction, in the Cadres, by some of the Section Officers, being reverted, as Assistants, in June 1967. This, in consequence, resulted in the reversion of certain Assistants, including the petitioners, to the posts of Upper Division Clerks. The reversions themselves were made, strictly in the reverse order of seniority. According to the Railway Board, the petitioner, in Writ Petition 96 of 1967 is still a temporary Lower Division Clerk, and he has not been even confinned in that Grade, because he has not passed the requisite typing test. It is further stated that the petitioner, in Writ Petition 165 of 1967 is even now not a permanent Upper Division Clerk, and that he was confirmed. as Lower Division Clerk, in 1966, with effect from September 14, 1957. Therefore, according to the Railway Board, the impugned orders were a!! valid and legal and did not contravene any provisions ofthe Constitution, nor did they infringe any of the rights of the petitioners.

In order to appreciate the arguments, addressed before us, on behalf of the petitioners, and respondents I and 2, it is necessary to give, in chronological order, the events, leading up to the filing of these writ petitions.

On August 22, 1956, the second respondent issued a Circular, Annexure 1, about having decided to hold a test, for drawing up a panel of staff considered suitable for promotion, to the Grade of Assistants.

The categories of staff, eligible to appear for the test, as well as the subject$ for the written tests, were mentioned, therein. There is no controversy legal and did not contravene any provisions of the Constitution, examination, and they also successfully got through the interview.

The second respondent simultaneously took a decision that posts of Upper Division Clerks, which were introduced at about that time, may also be filled up, on the basis of the results of the test, which was, no doubt, primarily held for the purpose of filling the posts of Assistants. The criterion for promoting Lower Division Clerks, to the posts of Upper Division Clerks and Assistants, was, that persons, who obtained 50% or more of the marks, were

to be promoted, as Officiating Assistants, and those w!::; obtained between 40 and 49%, were to be promoted, as Officiating Upper Division Clerks. Their inter se seniority was also to be, in accordance with their inter se seniority, as Lower Division Clerks. As both the petitioners had passed the test, they were promoted, as Officiating Upper Division Clerks, with effect from February 2,

1957. The order, appointing the petitioners, as Officiating Upper Divbion Clerks, is Annexure 3, dated February 1, 1957. It is the claim of the petitioners that they were promoted, on a regular basis, as Upper Division Clerks, and that a panel of Assistants and Upper Division Clerks, was formed, by the 2nd respondent.

Mennwhile, the framing of a scheme for the Rauway Board Secretariat Clerical Service, was in the offing, and such a scheme, was ultimately issued, under Annexure 4, on February 5, 1957.

The 2nd respondent has filed a statement, regarding the circumstances, under which the Scheme was framed, in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The scheme was for filling the posts of Lower Division Clerks, Upper Division Clerks and such of the Upper Division Clerks who can be promoted as Assistants.

Paragraph 14, subparas (1) and (3), dealt with the filling up of posts of Grade I, Upper Division Clerks, of the Clerical Service.

That provided for 'the different manner in which the permanent vacancies, and temporary vacancies, were to be filled up, in the authorized strength of Grade I of the Service. Under paragraph 14, sub-para 1 (b), promotion to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks, can only be made of permanent Lower Division Clerks, for permanent vacancies, and, under paragraph 14. sub-para (3), only permanent Lower Division Clerks. and temporary Lower Division Clerks, with more than three years' standing, and graduate Lower Division Clerks, could be promoted to Temporary vacancies in the Cadre.

But, in view of the non-availability of permanent Lower Division Clerks, the Scheme could not be implemented to fill permanent vacancies, immediately.

Similarly, under para 16 of the Scheme, permanent Upper Division Clerks, with three years' service in the grade, or in a higher grade, were eligible for promotion, as Assistants.

But, here again, no permanent Upper Division Clerks were available. at that time.

As certain vacancies existed, in the posts of Assistants, and required to be filled up, as a purely short-term measure, it was decided, by the 2nd respondent, that some of the posts of Assistants, may be temporarily filled up, by promotion from Upper Division Clerks. In view of this decision, the petitioners were promoted, as Assistants, on an ad hoc basis with effect from February 3, 1958, under Annexure 5, dated February l, 1958. That order clearly shows that the petitioners, including others, who were officiating as Upper Division Clerks,

were promoted to officiate, as Assistants, on a purely short-tenn

arrangt:;:!nt. It was further stated, in paragraph 5, of this Annexure, that the promotion is a purely short-term arrangement, till qualified Assistants become available, and that the promotion, under that order, will not confer, on the promotees, any claim for retention, as Assistants, as a long-term measure.

It may also be stated, at this stage, that it is the claim, of

bot~ the petiioners, that the)'. have been promoted, on a regular basis, as Assistants, under this Order, and that, in consequence, the order of reversion, passed on June 16, 1967, is illegal. That contention is clearly belied, by the express terms of the Order, Annexure 5, promoting these petitioners.

Later on, in or about 1959. as there were vacancies in the grade of Upper Division Clerks; a panel was drawn, by the 2nd respondent, called 'Interim Provision Panel', to fill in temporary vacancies, and certain Lower Division Clerks were considered suitable, for promotion. as Upper Division Clerks, again, on a purely short-term arrangement. That is Exhibit 6, dated June 24, 1959.

On March 3-0, 1963, the, original Service Scheme, Annexure 4, was amended in certain material particulars, by Apnexure 7.

Paragraph 14, of the original Scheme, was modified, by providing a different method of J'lromotion, to Grade I (Upper Division Clerks).

Under this modified scheme, the distinction between the manner of recruitment, in respect of pennanent vacancies, and temporary vacancies, which existed in the original scheme, was done away with.

The modified scheme provided a uniform method of promotion, to both permanent vacancies, in 'the autho rized strength of Grade I Service, as well as temporary vacancies.

Broadly, the method of appointment, to this Grade, was :

(a) 80%, by promotion of pennanent Lower Divi$ion Clerks and temporary Lower Division Clerks, with more than three years of service in the Grade, on the basis of seniority, subject to rejection of the unfit; (b) 20%, on the basis of competitive examination, limited to the Lower Division Clerks.

In 1965, a final panel was drawn up, according to the Railway Board, on the basis of the Scheme, Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7. That panel consisted of Lower Division Clerks, fit for promotion to the grade of Upper Division Clerks.

Te Lower Division Clerks were arranged, strictly in accordance with their seniority position, in that Grade.

The final panel is Annexure 14, dated March 30, 1965; and, according to the pell tioner in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, he has lost 148 places, and according to the petitioner, in the connected writ petition. he has lost 110 places, in seniority.

Both the petitioners are aggrieved about the ranking, given to them, in this list.

A On June 9, 1967, under .Annexure 18, the Railway Board had reverted, to the grade of Assistants, with immediate effect, the Ofliciating Section Officers, shown therein. In consequence, under Annexure 16, dated June 16, 1967, which is one of the orders, under attack, in boJh these petitions, the Railway Board reverted, as Upper Division Clerks, several officiating Assistants, including B the two petitioners, herein, with effect from June 9,

1967. As mentioned earlier, the main grievance of the petitioners is, that they having been promoted, as Assistants, as early as February 3, 1958, and which posts they had been holding till 1967, their reversion, as Upper Division Clerks, under Annexure 16, is illegal and void.

C We have referred to the relevant orders, promoting these two petitioners, in the first instance, as Upper Division Clerks and, later, as Assistants. The order promoting the petitioners, as Assistants, Annexure 5, dated February 1, 1958, has been referred to, already, and that order clearly shows that the promotion was only a short-term, temporary arrangement, on ari offi- D ciating basis, and that no claim could be based upon that promotion. No doubt, the order, Annexure 3, dated February 1, 1957, promoting the petitioners, as Upper_ Division Clerks, may, on a superficial reading of that order, give the impression that the promotion, is on a permanent basis, and from which further promotion is to be made, to the Grade of Assistants, but, in view of what is stated, on behalf of the Railway Board, the promotion, E under Annexure 3, is again, a temporary promotion, because the

Scheme, Annexure 4, was to c_ome into force, within a very short time, and that the promotions were made, only on a provisional basis. The regular promotions, or appointments, to Upper Division Grade, which is styled as Grade I, were to be made, as envisaged under the Scheme, Annexure 4, dated February 5, 1957.

F Both the petitioners have, categorically, averred in their petitions. that Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7, has retrospective effect, from December 1, 1954.

The secqnd respondent has also given various particulars, regarding as' to how the framing of the Scheme originated, as

vel\ as the different stages, it had to pass through.

In fact, it G 1s also seen, from the documents filed, on behalf of the respondent, that there was a suggestion, by either the Home Ministry, or the Union Public Service Commission, that the Scheme was to come into effect, on the date it was promulgated; but that was met, by the Board, by replying that an assurance had been given to the staff, to whom the Scheme had been circulated, iliat the H crucial date, for initial constitution of the Scheme, was to be fixed as December 1, 1954. In fact, a reading of Annexures 4 and 7, also clearly shows that the initial constitution of the Service, is to be from December 1, 1954, and it is, on that basis,

SUPREME COURT.REPORTS

[1968] 3 S.C.R.

that appointments, or promotions, are o be made. Once it is held that the initial constitution of the Service, is from the date, mentioned above, on the basis of Annexure ,4, read with Annexure 7, it follows that the promotion of the petitioners, as Upper Division Clerks, under Annexure 3, was not under the Scheme, but really -on a provisional, or temporary basis.

Notwithstanding the fact that the grievance of both the petitioners is that ranking has not been given to them properly, in Exhibit 16, we are satisfied that it is in accordance with the principles, under the Scheme Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7.

Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the petitioners that there has been a promotion, on a permanent basis, in the first instance, as Upper Division Clerks and, later, as Assistants, which cannot be disturbed, by any orders that may be passed, by the 2nd respondent. We have already indicated that the 'regular promotions and appointments have to be made, under the Scheme, with effect from December 1, 1954.

In particular, a contention has been raised, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, that he stands on a different footing, in that he is a permanent Lower Division Clerk and, therefore, his promotion, as an Assistant, must, again, have been, on a permanent basis. There is no substance, in this contention, in view of the statement, made by the 2nd respondent, that this petitioner was confirmed, as a Lower Division Clerk, in 1966 with effect from Sep.tember 14, 1957, in which case it follows that he will not be eligible, for promotion, as an Upper Division Clerk, under the Scheme. The petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, as pointed out, by the 2nd respondent, continues, even now, as a temporary Lower Division Clerk, and he has not been made permanent, and, therefore, he-cannot certainly be considered eligible, for promotion, under the Scheme.

A further contention has been taken, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, that the Scheltle, as well as the various orders, passed by the 2nd respondent, violate the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16, of the Constitution, Inasmuch as he has been deprived of the benefits of Chapters II and III, of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual. Once it is held that the said petitioner does not satisfy the requirement of the SClieme,

there is no question of any discrimination, under Art. 14, or violation of Art. 16, arising for consideration at all. Therefore, both the petitioners, will have to fail, on merits.

A more serious contention has, however, been taken, by the petitioners, that the second respondent has no power, in law, to frame, either the Scheme, Annexure 4, or the modified Scheme, Annexure 7 so as to have retrospective effect, from December 1,

1954. Tho'ugh both the petitioners have raised this contention

in the writ petitions, Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, was not prepared to take up that extreme position, because, his attempt, was to show that his client satisfies the requirement of the qualifications, laid down for promotion, in Annexure 4, read with Annexure 7. We have already negatived that contention; but this legal contention has been persisted, before us, by Mr. K. L. Mehta, counsel appearing for the petitioner, in Writ Petition No 96 of 1967.

Mr. Mehta, by reference to the provisions of the Indian Railway Board Act, 1905 (Act IV of 1905), and to the decision of this Court in State v. Padmanabhacharya('), urged that the 2nd respondent had no power to frame a rule, having retrospective .effect. In our opimon, this contention cannot be accepted.

Act IV of 1905 is an Act to provide for investing the Railway Board with certain pcwers of functions, unde~ the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The preamble to that Act shows that a Railway Board has been constituted, for controlling the administration of Railways in India. Section 2 provides that the Central Govern- ment, may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, invest the Railway Board, either absolutely, or subject to conditions, with powers, or functions, stated therein.

That statute, does not,. in any way, advance the petitioners' contention. As we shall presently. show, the decision of this Court, referred to above, does not also support the pftitioners.

There is no controversy that the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in exercise of the powers, vested in him, by the proviso to Art. 309, of the C1>nsti tution. Only two rules require to be. noted, and they are rr. 157 and 158, occurring in Chapter I, under the sub-heading 'Power to frame rules'.

They are as follows : ·

"157. The Railway Board have full powers to make rules of a general application to non-gazetted railway servants under their control.

158. The General Managers of Indian Railways have full .powers to make rules with regard to nongazetted railway serv, ants under their control, providd they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the President or the Railway Board."

We are not concerned, really in this matter, with r. 158, because the. Scheme, Annexurcs 4 and 7, in particular, and the various orders, have been passed by the 2nd respondent, the Railway Board. The Railway Board, as will be seen from r. 157, have full powers to make rules of general application, to non-gazetted railway servants under their control.

The question is whether the

(I) '[t 966] I S.C.R. 994.

.584 SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS

[1968] 3 S.C.R . i I 2nd respondent, has, while acting under r. 157, power to make A a rule (in this case, the Scheme), having effect from an anterior -Oate.

The matter must be considered, in the light of the provisions .of Art. 309, of the Constitution. That Article provides :

"309. Subject to the provisions o' this Constitution, B Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State : Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services c and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act."

We may emphasize the words 'and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act', which must receive their due weight.

To that aspect, we. shall come, pre- E sently.

We have already pointed out, that Annexure 4 was issued on February 5, 1957, and Annexure 7, on March 30, 1963, and that the initial constitution of the Service was to be from December 1, 1954, and it is, on that basis, that the promotions, or appointments, to the Service, are to be made. In this case, there F is no Act of the appropriate Legislature, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service, under the 2nd respondent and, therefore, the main part of Art. 309 is not attracted. But, under the Proviso therein, the President has got full power to make rules, regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service, of . . persons, under the 2nd respondent. Further, under the Proviso, G such person, as may be directed by the President, can also make rules, regulating th.e recruitment and conditions of service" of persons, under the 2nd respondent.

The rules so made, either by the President, or such person, as .he may direct, will have currency, until provision, in that behalf, is made by or under an Act, of 1he appropriate Legislature, under Art. 309.

H It is also significant to note that the proviso to Art. 309, clearly lays down that 'any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguous

expressions, used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning, unless hedged-in, by any limitations.

The rules, which have to be 'subject to the provi.sions of the Constitution', shall have effect, 'subject to the provisions of any such Act'. That is, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Art. 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act; but, in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President, or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect, both prospectively and, retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other, imposed by the proviso to Art. 309, regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules.

In other words, the rules, unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority.

In the case before us, the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in the exercise of his powers, under 1he proviso to Art. 309. Under Rule 157, the President has directed the Railway Board, to make rules, of general application to non-gazetted railway servants, under their control. The rules, which are embodied in the Schemes, framed by the Board, under Annexures 4 and 7, are within the powers, conferred under r. 157; and, in the absence of any Act, having been passed by the 'appropriate' Legislature, on the said matter, the rules, framed by the Railway Board, will have full effect and, if so indicated, retrospectively also.

Such indication, about retrospective effect, as has already been pointed out by us, is clearly there, in the impugned provisions.

The decision of this Court in State v. Padmanabhacharya('), does not assist the petitioners. The rule, that came up, for consideration, has been referred to, at p. 999, of the Reports, in the judgment of Wanchoo, J., (as he then was); and the Court specifically says that the rule, referred to by it, cannot be made, under the proviso to Art. 309, of the Constitution. It is further stated that the notification, referred to, cannot be said to be a rule, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the services and posts, in connection with the affairs of the State. This Court further! observes that the effect of the notification, or the rule, that it had to consider, was to select certain

Government servants, who had been illegally required to retire, and to say that even if the retirement had been illegal, that retirement should be deemed to have been properly and lawfully made.

Finally. the Court said, that such a declaration, made by the Governor. cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a rule, made under

(I) 11966] I S.C.R. 994.]

the proviso to Art. 309. Having held that the rule, which was before it, was not one made under the proviso to Art. 309, the Court further observed, in that case, that it was not necessary to decide, whether a rule, governing conditions of service, of persons appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, can be made retrospectively, under the proviso to Art. 309. This decision, in our opinion, can be distinguished, on two grounds : (i) that the rule, in question, construed by the Court, was held to be one, not coniing within the purview of the proviso to Art. 309; and (ii) the question, as to whether a rule, under the proviso to Art. 309, can be framed, to have retrospective effect, has been left open. •.

In this connection, we may refer to two decisions, of the Mysore High Court, and one of the Allahabad High Court. The Mysore High Court, in the decisions, Govindara; u v. State of Mysore(') and Govindappa v.

I. G. of Registration('), has taken the view. that it is not open to the Governor, under the proviso to Art. 309, to frame a rule, having retrospective effect. We may state that the decision in Govindara; u's Case(i) came up, before this Court, on appeal, in Nagara; an v. Mysore('). But this Court, in Nagara; an's Case('), had no occasion to express any opinion on the question as to whether the Governor, under the proviso to Art. 309, could frame a rule, having retrospective operation, as it took the view that the relevant rules had not been made under Art. 309. ·

A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, in Ram Autar v. State of U.P.(') has taken a view, contrary to the one, expressed by the Mysore High Court. We are of opinion that the latter, represents the correct view. But, even the Allahabad High Court has not given due importance to the mandatory words, used in the concluding part of the proviso to Art. 309, that the rules made, by the authority mentioned therein, 'shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'.

This aspect has been emphasized by us, in the earlier part of this judgment.

To conclude, on this aspect, we are satisfied that the Scheme, Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7, framed by the 2nd respondent, Railway Board, such as it is, must have effect, as it does not suffer from any defect in its making and does not offend against the Constitution.

In the result, both the writ petitions are dismissed; but, in the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs.

G.C.

(I) A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 265.

(2) A.LR. 1965 Mys, 25.

Petitions dismissed.

(ll (19661 3 S.C.R. 682.

(4) A.l.R. 1962 All. 328, F.B.

B. S. VADERA

UNION OF INDIA & ORS

March 27, 1968

R. S. BACHAWAT

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER, JJ

Art. 309

December 1, 1954

Arts. 14 and 16

Art. 14

Art. 16

Art 309

Art. 309

Art. 32

Constitution of India

S. K. Mehta

K. L. Mehta

A. K. Sen

A. P. Chatterjee

M. M. Kshatriya

C. K. Daphtary

V. A. Seyid Muhammad

R. N. Sachthey

R. G. K. Achar

Vaidialingam

Art. 32

Union of India

July 16, 1955

February 2, 19S7

February 3,

1958

September 14, 1954

February 2, 1957

February 3, 1958

June 9, 1967

February 5, 1957

March 30, 1963

September 14, 1957

August 22, 1956

February 2,

1957

February 1, 1957

Rauway Board Secretariat

Union Public Service Commission

Ministry of Home Affairs

June 16, 1967

June 24, 1959

March 3-0, 1963

March 30, 1965

9,

1967

February 1, 1958

Sep.tember 14, 1957

Arts. 14 and 16

Art. 14

Art. 16

December 1,

1954

Chatterjee

Mehta

Indian Railway Board Act, 1905

Indian Railways Act, 1890

India

Section 2

Art. 309

Indian Railways

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Wanchoo

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309

Mysore High Court

Allahabad High Court

Art. 309

Govindara

Nagara

Art. 309

Art. 309

Art. 309