{"document_id": "1968_2_709_719_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "O. N. MOHINDROO\n\nTHE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI & ORS.\n\nJanuary 8, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT,\n\nG. K. MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] Con:titution of India, 1950, Art. 138(1) and (2) Scope of.\n\nAdvocates Act (25 of 1961), s. 38-Right of appool to Supreme Court Riven to advocate in disciplinary proceedings-Whether right Jails undu c Entry 77 of List I or Entry 26 of List Ill.\n\nSupreme Court Rules 1966, 0, 5, r. 1-Appeal under s. 38 Advoccies Act, rejected summarily-If rule curtails right of appeal-Rule, if valid.\n\nTho appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing, (al Ille order of suspension passed against him by the State Bar Council under •· 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, (b) the order of the Bar Council of India in appeal under s. 37 of the Act, confirming the order of suspension. aJld (c) the order of this Court summarily rejecting his appeal to this Court under s. 38, under O.V., r. 7 of the Supreme CoU!rt Rules, 1966.\n\nHe contended that : ( 1) the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by •· 31 related to a matter under Entry 26 of List III of the ConstitutiOB, that it therefore fell under Art. 138(2), and as there was no special agree- IM!lt between the Government of India and the Government of a State\n\n.., required by Art. 138(2), s. 38 was not validly enacted; and (2) 0. 5, r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules under which the appeal was plaoed for preliminary hearing was ultra vires s. 38, as the rule cut down and impaired the right of appeal under the section.\n\nThe writ petition W3i dismitoed.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) While Entry 26 of List III deals with the legal, medical and other professions, Entry 77 of List I deals with the constitution, orpniu.tion, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court, and also with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court.\n\nSinee there is a oeeming conflict between the two entries they have to be hannoniaed by reading the general power in Entry 26 in a restrict\"'1 sense. That i•, the power to legislate in regard ta persons entitled to practise befor~ the Supreme Court 11nder Entry 77 of List I should be held to be carveit out from the general power relating to the professions in Entry 26 of Liiit Ill, and made the exclusive field of Parliament. [715 E-, F, H; 716 A.CJ\n\nThe object of the Advocates AC'! is to constitute one common bar foe the whole country and to provide machinery for its regulated functioning.\n\nThough the Act relates to Jegal practitioners, in its pith and substance it is an enactnient dealingwith the qualifications, enrolment. right to practise and discipline of Advocates.\n\nSince the Act provides that once a person is enrolled by any State Bar Council he becomes entitled to pracb,, e in all courts including the Supreme Court, the Act is a piece of legisiatiOn dealing with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court. 11lcrefore, the Act, including the right of appeal to this Court under s. 38, deals with a matter relating to Entry 77 of List I and falls under Art. 138(1) and within the exclusive field of Parliament. The Act is not\n\na composite lcgislatian parrly falling under Entry 77 of List l and partly under Entry 26 of Lisr Ill. It does not fall under Art. !38(2) and a special agreement with a State Government. is therforc not necessary.\n\n1717 E, F-H; 718 A-C]\n\nState of Bomha..v v. Ba/sara, (19511 S.C.R. 682. State of Bombay v.\n\nNarothamdas, [!9511 S.C.R. 51 and In re: Lily Isabel Thomas. (19.641 6 S.C.R. 229. followed.\n\nC. P. & Brar Sales of .\"Jotor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, l 938\n\n(I 9381\n\nF.C.R.\n\nJ 8. Citizens lns11ra11ce Co. of Canada v. Parsons. [18811 7 A.C. 96, Bhola Prasad v. Emperor, (19421 F.C.R. 17, G. G. i\" Council v. Province of Madras, (1945) 72 I.A. 91 and Durgtshwar v.\n\nSecretary. Bar Council. Allahabad, A.LR. 1954 All. 728. referred to.\n\n(2) On the e>press terms of Art. 145(l)(h) of the Constitution, r. 7 of 0. 5 of the Supreme Coon Rules is within the rule-making power ol lhis Court, as it merely Jays down hov..· and in v.hal manner an appeal filed under s. 38 is to be dealt \\\\ith and does not deal with or affect the right of appeal.\n\nThe fact that under tho rule the appeal is placed for preliminary hearing and is liable to be diposcd of at that stage docs not mean that the content of the right of appeal under the section is in anv way curtailed, because, the party filing the appeal is heard on all poinb;\n\nrai>cd by him even at that stage. (718 F-HJ\n\nPrem Chand Garg v. I-:xcisc Commi.nioner. (1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 885. llistinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 240 of 1967\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 22, 1966 of lhe Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. I of\n\nI 966.\n\n:' ; ipellant in person.\n\nAvadh Behari, for respondents Nos. I and 2.\n\nP. Ra/II Reddy, and A. V. Ra11gam, for respondent No. 3.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and /. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 4.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and S .. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J. This appeal by certificate raises the question as to G\n\nth~ scope of entries 77 and 78 in List I and entry 26 in List IIl L'f the Sevenlh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThe question arises in the following manner :\n\nOn a complaint by the Subordinate Judge that the appellant, while taking inspection of the Court record in an arbitration mat- H ter periding before his Couri, had mutilated the copy of a notice in th; tt record by wilfully tearing a portion thereof. the District Judge, Delhi filed a report against the appellant before the Delhi\n\nMOHJNDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (She/at, /.) 711\n\nState Bar Council for taking action under the Advocats c.t, 25 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Disciplinary Committee of the said Council after hearing the appellant found him guilty of professional misconduct and ordered his suspension for one year under s. 35 ( 3 )( c) of the Act. An appeal filed by the appellant under s. 3 7 before the Bar Council of India failed.\n\nThereupon he filed an appeal against the said orer under s .. 38 in this Court.\n\nThe 1appcal was placed for prehmmary heanng and summarily rejected at that stage. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) for quashing the said order of suspension, the order of the appellate authority continuing the said order and the order of this Court dismissing the appeal. He thereafter filed a review petition against. the dismissal of his appeal contending, inter alia, that rule 7 of\n\n0. 5 of the Supreme Court Rule~ was ultra vires s. 38 of the Act.\n\nThe review petition also was dismissed.\n\nAt the hearing of his writ petition, the appellant, inter alia, contended that s. 38 of the Act was ultra vires Art. 138(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the appellate jurisdiction conferred on this Court by s. 38 fell under entry 26 in List III and that there being no special agreement between the Government of India and the Government of any State as required by clause 2 of Art. 138 sec. 38 was invalidly enacted. He also contended that 0. 5 r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules under which the appeal was placed for preliminary hearing was ultra vires s. 38 as the said rule cut down and impaired his right of appeal under s. 38. Lastly, he contended\n\n1that the decision of the Bar Council of India was bad for the several grounds alleged by him in his writ petition. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition rejected these contentions and dismissed it.\n\nAs regards the first conten•ion he held that, clause 2 of Art. 13 8 did not apply and that it \"'as clause\n\nI of'thaliil\\rticle which was applicable as the subject matter of the Advocate&· Act fell under entry 77 of the Union List. As to the other two contentions he held that rule 7 of the 0. 5 was valid and did not contravene s. 3 8; that the Bench before which the appeal came up for preliminary hearing had heard the appellant's counsel and in addition had called for production of a document desired by him.\n\nThere was no affidavit by Counsel appearing for him that he was not heard on any point which he desired to contend. He also held that the appellant had specifically raised the contention as to the vires of the said rule in his review petition and that that contention having been rejected, the appellant could not reagitate it in the writ petition. He also held that the. appellant was similarly not entitled to reagitate the question as to the merits of the said order of suspension. the same having been considered and rejected at the time of the preliminary hearing of his appeal.\n\nAggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.CR.\n\nthe appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal.\n\nAt the hearing of that appeal the appellant's csel conceded that he could not raise any contention on the merits of the case in view of this Court having disposed of th.ose very contentions and that therefore he would confine his argument' only •to the question of the \\lires of s. 38.\n\nThe learned Judges who heard that appeal were of the view ( 1) that the Act was a composite piece of legislation. that it did not, as held by the learned Single Judge, fall exclusively under entries 77 and 78 of List I but that it fell partly under tho.se entries and partly under entry 26 of List Ill; (2) that Art. 138 had no application as the jurisdiction to entertain and try appeals under s. 38 was not 'further jurisdiction' within the meaning of that Article; that the jurisdiction to hear such appeals was already vested in this Court under Art. 136 even without s. 38 as the Bar Councils of Delhi and of India were quasi-judicial tribunals and that therefore this Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try appeals against their orders; and (3) that the only effect of s. 38 was that by providing for an appeal Parliament removed the hurdle of an appellant having to obtai• special leave under Art. 136.\n\nOn this reasoning the learned Judges dismissed the rontention as to the vires of s. 38.\n\nDismissin~ the appeal the learned Judges observed :\n\n\"There is no bar to the Parliament legislating with respect to jurisdictiofl afld powers of the Supreme Court subject to the express provisions of the Constitution like Arts. 132 and 134.\n\nWhen a provision for appeal to the Supreme Court is made in a statute, within the sphere covered by Arts. 132 to 136 it is not confermot\n\nof further power and jurisdiction as envisageu by Art. 138, such power would be exercisable by reason of entry 77 of List I\".\n\nIn this appeal the appellant challenges the correctness of thi~ view.\n\nThe question which falls for consideration is one of interpretation of entries 77 and 78 of List I and entry 26 of List III.\n\nIf it is held that it is entry 26 of List 111 under which the Act was enacted, clause 2 of Art. 138 would apply and in that case a special agreement with the State Governmeflt becomes a condition precedent to the enactment of s. 38 of the Act.\n\nIn that case the difficulty would be to reconcile entries 77 and 78 of List I with entry 26 of the List III.\n\nIt is a well recognised rule of construction that the Court while construing entries must asume that the distribution of legislative powers in the three Lists could not have been intended to be in conflict with one another.\n\nA general power ought not to\n\nMOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (She/at, J.) i 13\n\noe so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same instrument and operating in the same field when by reading the former in a more restricted sense, effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning. It is, therefore, right. to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of an entry in one List the meaning which, if less wide than it might in another coniext bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it and equally giving to the language of another entry in another List a meaning which it can properly bear. Where there is a seeming conflict between one entry in one List and another entry in another List, an attempt should always be made to avoid to see whether the two entries can be harmonised to avoid such a conflict of jurisdiction. (C.P.\n\n& Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938( 1 ); Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons('); Rho/a Prasad v. Emperor('); Governor General in Council v.\n\nProvince of Madras('). and State of Bombay v. Balsara(•).\n\nIt is in the background of these principles of construction that we must proceed to examine the content of the various relevant entries dealing with the constitution and organisation of courts and their jurisdiction and powers and the scheme envisaged thereunder.\n\nEntries 77 and 78 of Li>t I read as under :-\n\n\"77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court) ... persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court.''\n\n\"78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts ... , persons entitled to practice before the High Courts.\" Entry 95 of List I reads as follows :-\n\n\"95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court. with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction.\"\n\nEntry 65 of List II reads :\n\n\"65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, exce:pt the Supreme Court. with respect to any of the matters in this List.\"\n\nEntry 46 in List III reads :\n\n\"46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.\"\n\n(1) [1938] F.C.R. I 8.\n\n(3) [1942] F.C.R. 17.\n\n(5) [195t] S.C.R. 682.\n\n(21 [1881] 7 A.C. 96.\n\n(4) [1945] 72 I.A. 91.\n\nThe scheme for conferring jurisdiction and powers on courts is\n\n(a) to avoid duplication of Courts, Federal and State Courts as in the Constitution of the United States, ( b) to enable Parliament and the State Legislatures to confer jurisdiction on courts in respect of matters in their respective lists except in the case of the Supreme Court where the legislative authority to confer jurisdiction and powers is exclusively vested in Parliament.\n\nIn the case of the Concurrent List both the legislatures can confer jurisdiction and powers on courts except of course the Supreme Court depending upon whethr the Act is enacted by one or the other. Entry 3 in List II confers legislative powers on the States in the matter of \"Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court.\" It is clear that except for the constitution and the organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts the legislative power in the matter of administration of justice has been vested in the State Legislatures.\n\nThe Stale Legislatures can, therefore enact laws, providing fo[ the constitution and organisation of courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts and confer jurisdiction and powers on them in all m; i!lers. civil and criminal. except the admiralty jurisdiction.\n\nIt would, of course, be open to Parliament to bar the jurisdiction of any such court by special enactment in matters provided in Lists I and III where it has made a law but so Ion~ as th; H is not done the courts established by the State Legislatures would have jurisdiction to try all suits and proceedings relating even to matters in\n\nLis'.s I and Ill. Thus, so far as the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court <lnd the High Courts arc concerned. the power is with Parliamnt. As regards the other courts. Entry 3 of List II confers such a power on the State Legislatures.\n\nAs regards jurisdiction and powers. it is Parliament which can deal with the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and the admiralty jurisdiction.\n\nParliament can confer jurisdiction and powers on all courts in matters set out in List I and List III where it has passed any laws.\n\nBut under the power given to it under entry 3 in List II, a State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers on any of the courts except the Supreme Court in respect of any statute whether enacted by it or by Parforr.ent except where a Central Act dealing with matters in Lists T and Ill otherwise provides. That these entries contemplate such a scheme was brought out in State of Bombay v. Narorhamda'( 1 ). where it was contended that the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 40 of 1948, consti:uting the said Civil Court as an additional court :was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature as it conferred jurisdic-\n\n(1) (195t] S.C.R. 51.\n\n~OIDNDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 715\n\ntion on the new court not only in respect of matters in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 but also in regard io matters in List I such as promissory notes in item 8 of List I. Rejecting the contention it was held that the impugned Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra vires as the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws with respect to \"administration of justice\" and \"constitution and organisation of all courts\" under item 1 of List Il was wide enough to include the power to make laws with regard to the jurisdiction of courts established by the Provincial Legislature; that the object of item 53 of List I. item 2 of List II and item 15 of List III was to confer such powers on the Central and the Provincial Legislatures to make laws relating to the jurisdiction of courts with respect to the particular matters that are referred to in List I and II respectively and the Concurrent List, and that these provisions did not in any way curtail the power of the Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II to\n\nmake laws with regard to jurisdiction of courts and to confer jurisdiction on courts established by it to try all causes of a civil nature subject to the power of the Central and Provincial Legislatures to make special provisions relating to particular subject~ referred to in the Lists.\n\nIt may be mentioned that item 53 in List I, items 1 and 2 in List II and item 15 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act more or less correspond to entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, entries 3 and 65 in List II and entry 46 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nThis being the scheme with regard to the constitution and organisation of courts and their jurisdiction and powers let us next proceed to examine entry 26 in List III. Entry 26, which is analogous to Item- 16 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act, deals with legal, medical and other professions but is not concerned with the constitution and organ_isation of courts or their jurisdiction and powers. These, as already stated. are dealt with by entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, entries 3 and 65 in List II and entry 46 in List TIT.\n\nEnactments such as the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, the Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947, the Dentists Act, 1948, the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 and the Pharmacy Act, 1948, all Central Acts, would fall under the power to deal with professions under entry 26 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and item 16 of List III of 1935 Act.\n\nIt will, however, be noticed that entries 77 and 78 in List I are composite entries and deal not only with the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts but also with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts.\n\nThe only difference between these two entries is that whereas the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court are dealt with in\n\nentry 77, the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts are dealt with not by entry 78 of List I but by other entries. Entrioi; 77 and 78 in List I apart from dealing with the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts also deal with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This part of the two entries shows that to the extent that the persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Court are concerned, the power to legislate in regard to them is carved out from the general power relating to the professions in entry 26 in List Ill and is made the exclusive field for Parliament. The power to legislate in regard to persons\n\nentitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts\n\ni~ thus excluded from entry 26 in List III and is made the exclusive field for legislation by Parliament only [Re : Lily Isabel Tlroma.r( 1) and also Durgeshwar v. Secretary, Bar Council, Allahabad(')). Barring those entitled to practise in the Supreme Court and the High Com .s. the power to legislate with respect to the rest of the practitioners would still seem to he retained under entry 26 of List III.\n\nTo what extent the power to legislate in regard to the legal profession still remains within the field o{ entry 26 is not the question at present before us and therefore it is not necessary to go into it in this appeal.\n\nThe Aavocates Act was passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an All-India Bar.\n\nSection 2(a) and\n\n(i) define an 'advocate' and a 'legal practitioner'.\n\nChapter II deals with the establishment of Bar Councils and their functions,\n\nviz .. to admit persons on its roll, to prepare and maintain such roll, to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll etc.\n\nSection 7 lays down the functions of the Bar Council of India, that is, to prepare and maintain a common roll of advocates, to lay down the standards of professional conduct and etiquette, to lay down procedure to he followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of each State Bar Council, to exercise gene1 al supervision and control over State Bar Councils etc.\n\nChapter III deals with admission and enrolment of advocates. Section 16(1) provides that there shall be two classes of advocates. senior advocates and other advocates.\n\nChapter IV deals with the right to practise.\n\nSection 29 provide.' that subject to the provisions of this- Act and the rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed day. be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law. namely. the advocates. Section 30 provides that subject to the provisions of this Act. every advocate wh05e name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise thro\\lghout the terri-\n\n(I) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 229, 236.\n\nMOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 717\n\ntories to whkh this Act extends in all courts including the Supreme Court and before any tribunal or any other authority before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise. Chapter V deals with the conduct of advocates.\n\nSection 35 lays down that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refeu the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.\n\nThe' disciplinary committee has to fix a date for the hearing of the case and give a notice thereof to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State. Subs. ( 3) provides that such committee after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard, may make, inter alia, an order suspending the advocate\n\nfrom practice as it may deem fit.\n\nSimilar powers are also conferred on the Bar Council of India under s. 36 in relation to an advocate on the common roll. Section 3 7 gives a right of appeal to the Bar Council of lndia by any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council. Section 38 confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court on any person aggrieved by an orde• by the disciplinary commi•tee of the Bar Council of lndia under s. 36 or s. 37 and empowers the Supreme Court to pass such orders thereon as it deems fit.\n\nThe object of the Act is thus to constitute one common Bar for the whole country and to provide machinery for its regulated functioning.\n\nSince the Act sets up one Bar, autonomous in il~ character, the Bar Councils set up thereunder have been entrusted with the power to regulate the working of the profession and to prescribe rules of professional conduct and etiquette, and the power to punish those who commit breach of such rules.\n\nThe power of punishment is entrusted to the disciplinary committees ensuring a trial of an advocate by his peers.\n\nSections 35, 36 and 37 lay down the procedure for trying complaints, punishment and an appeal to the Bar Council of India from the orders passed by the State Bar Councils.\n\nAs an additional remedy s. 38 provides a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Though the :'-ct relates to the legal practitioners, in its 'pith and substance it 1s an enact?lent which c.oncerns itself with the qualifications, enrolmnt, nght to practise and discipline of the advocates.\n\nAs provided by the Act once. a person is enrolled by any one of the Stte Ba; Councils. he becomes entitled to practise in all courts mcludmg the Supreme Court. As aforesaid, the Act creates one common Bar, all its members being of one class. namely, advocates.\n\nSmee all those who have been enrolled have a ricrht to pactise. in the Supreme Court and the High Courts, he Act 1.s a piece of legislation which deals with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. There- L3 Sup.Cl/68-2\n\nfore the Act must be held to fall within entries 77 and 78 of List I.\n\nAs the power of legislation relating to those entitled to practise in the Supreme Court and the High Courts is carved out from the general power to legislate in relation to legal and other professions in entry 26 of List Ill, it is an error to say, as the High Court did, that the Act is a composite legislation partly\n\nfalling under entries 77 and 78 of List I and partly under entry 26 of List Ill.\n\nIn this view, the right of appeal to this Court under s. 38 of the Act creates a jurisdiction and power in relation to a ma, tter falling under entries 77 and 78 of the Union List and the Act would, therefore, fall under clause 1 and not clause 2 of Art. 138. The argument that s. 38 falls under Art. 138(2) and is invalid on account of its having been enacted without a special agreement with the State Government is, therefore, without merit.\n\nAs regards the valiuity of rule 7 of 0. 5 the contention, as already pointed out, was raised and rejected in the said review petition filed by the appellant. The contention having thus been concluded could not obviously be raised in the writ petition filed by the appellant. nor would he be entitled to any writ or order from the High Court as against the said decision.\n\nThe rule, in any event, merely provides for the placing of an appeal filed under s. 38 for a preliminary hearing and enables this Court to dismiss at that stage an appeal if it finds it has no substance. The appellant in such an appeal is heard; if the court finds that there is nothing in the appeal, the court declines to issue notice on the opposite side and disposes of the appeal there and then. Section 38 confers no doubt a right of an appeal on a person aggrieved by an order passed under ss. 36 and 37 and the appellant\n\ndoes not have to obtain any special leave under Art. 136. But the fact that under rule 7 the appeal is placed for preliminary hearing and is liable to be disposed of at that stage does not mean that the content of the right of appeal under s. 38 is in any way curtailed as the party filing the appeal has to be heard on all points raised by him therein. There is, therefore, no substance id the argument that rule 7 contravenes s. 38, and is therefore ultra vires the section. On the express terms of Art. 145(1) (b), the rule is within the rule-making power of this Court as it merely lays down how and in what manner an appeal filed under s. 38 is to be dealt with and does not deal with or affect the right of appeal. The validity of the rule cannot, therefore,. be impeached.\n\nThe decision in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Cnmmissioner( 1 ) cannot assist the appellant. In that decision rule 12 -\n\n(t) (1963) Supp. I S.C.R. 885.\n\nMOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 719\n\nA of 0. XXXV of ihe Supreme Court Rules was declared void in so far as it related to the furnishing of security on the ground that the right to move the Supreme Court under Art. 32 was absolute and the rule by providing security for costs impaired such an absolute right.\n\nFurnishing of security in the case <if persons without means to do so would obviously obstruct 'such B persons from vindicating their rights under Art. 32 and would-, therefore, curtail the right under that Article.\n\nThat obviously is not so in the case of the rule with which we are concerned inthis appeal. The contention, therefore, that rule 7 curtails the right of appeal under s. 38 or contravenes that section must be rejected.\n\nC The appellant cited a number of authorities but it is not necessary to deal with them as they have no bearing on the questions before us. He also tried to question the correctness of the order passed against him by the Bar Council of India but we did not allow him to reagitate it as it stood concluded on the dismissal of the appeal and the review petition filed by him in this D Court.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dilflllissed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "O. N. MOHINDROO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. N. MOHINDROO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 8, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT,\n\nG. K. MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. 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["}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 138(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3047, "end_char": 3058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lily Isabel Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3469, "end_char": 3487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9511 S.C.R. 51 and In re: Lily Isabel Thomas. 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This appeal by certificate raises the question as to G\n\nth~ scope of entries 77 and 78 in List I and entry 26 in List IIl L'f the Sevenlh Schedule to the Constitution."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the District Judge, Delhi filed a report against the appellant before the Delhi\n\nMOHJNDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (She/at, /.) 711\n\nState Bar Council for taking action under the Advocats c.t, 25 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "State Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the District Judge, Delhi filed a report against the appellant before the Delhi\n\nMOHJNDROO v. 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{"document_id": "1968_2_720_730_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS.\n\nU.A. BASRURKAR AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 8. 1968\n\n(J. C. S!ll\\11, V. RAMASWAMl AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nTransfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), ss. 106, 107, 53A- Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877), s. 27A-Porrions of business premises given on sub-lease-Documents purportng to constitute sub-ltase not re11istered-Applicabi/ity of ss. 106, 107-Enforceability of agreement under s. 53A-Specific performanct of contract-Effect of s. 21A.\n\nCertain documents were executed between the appellant firm and the respond.eat company in respect of premises df which the latter \\\\ra<; a tcnanl According to the appellant these documents were intended to effect a sub-\n\nJcase of hree portions of the premises in question though in order 10 avoid =equences ur.der lhe Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act 10 of I 94 7 they apparently purported to cre>te a partnership.\n\nThe finn wu actually given pos-:; cssion of two of the three portions thus given to it.\n\nAfter some time the firm was dispossessed by the company of the pn>-\n\nmisrs occupied by it and it therefore filed a suit claiming delivery of possession.\n\nJn defence the company contended that the c.iocumcnts relied upon hy the firm did not evidence either a sub-lease or a partnership.\n\nAccording to it there were negotiat:ons for a partnership \\\\'hich never fructified.\n\nThe tri•I court held that the documents executed by the par:ie) evidenced an agreement for a sub-lease and since the agreement did not require rcg:s1rafion the firm was entitled to the reliefs claimed by it on the basis of the agreemont.\n\nIn appeal by the company the High Court held 1hat the documents constitued a completed lease of at least an agreement to lease falling within s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act. and\n\nsine~ the lease or the agreement to lease 1J.•as evidenced by documents in\n\nWritin~ an<l they \\\\'ere unregistered. the lease or the areement to lease could net he enforced.\n\nOn this so'e ground. the High Court \"llowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the firm, which thereupon, >ppealed to this Court.\n\nHELD : (i) The three documents in qu.,.tion were relied on hv the appellant firm itself as eviden~ of the lease and the tenns thereof: the firm could not therefore be hea\"rd to say that these documents did not represent the comoleted lease and did not, for tha .. reason, require regi'Jtrntion. [724 C-HJ\n\n(ii) According to the firm's case based on the said document~ ren~ in the first inc; tance wac; paYablc to the comoanv in the shane of J Of7o of the profit, of the firm for th'c period 1st April 1950 to 30th June 1951. Therefore the leac; e that came into ·~~<i\"-lcnce through thc.;;; c documentc; \\\\'as cer tainlv for more than a year.\n\nSection 107 of the Tran'ifer of Proerty Act 'v.as thus clt>arlv applicahlc and q1ch a leac; c could not have hccn \\'al'dJ\\· m1dc cxccnt under a reei.;;;!ercd in..; trumcnt.\n\nAdmittedly there was no r-:(!i'itration ofthe documents \\vhich constituled the lc; ise. and. conscquenlv. the finn cnu!d nor claim anv rir.:hto;; on the basis or this lease\n\nevidnc~~ hy unrcgi<; tcred documents. f725 R-FJ\n\n(iii) fercly hecauc; e the 1~:.isc was for an indefinite period and related to immovable property which vo:is not used for agricullural or manufac~ turing pllrposes it could not be held to be a lease from month to month\n\nDELHI MOTOR co. v. BASRURKA!t (Bhargava, I.) 721\n\nA to which s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable. There , was nothing in the terms of the lease which showed that it was from\n\nmonth to month. {725 F-Hl\n\nRm Kumar Das v. Jagadish Chandra Deb Dhabal Deb & Anr. (1952] , S.C.R. 269, distinjlllisbed.\n\n(iv) Section . 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of .property of which the lessee had already taken possession, hut does not\n\ngive any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other -.right on the basis of an unregistered lease.\n\nSection 53A is 'only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which 1be lessee can claim rights against the lessor. [726 C-E] ·\n\nIn the present case the claim which was put forward by the firm. in .the plaint. could by no means be construed as a mere defence of the firm's rights. What the firm. was actually' seeking to do was to enforce the :ri&ht• under the lease and, in such a case, s. 53A of the Transfer. of Property Act was clearly inapplicable. [727 H-728 A]\n\nProbqdh Kumar Das & Ors. v. Dantmara Tea Company Ltd. <l Ors. 66 LA. 293, relied on.\n\nRam Chandtr v. Maharaj Kunwar & Ors., I.L.R. 1939 All. 809, listinguished.\n\n(v) Specific performances of the lease could not be enforced because:\n\n(a) In the 11Jaint no specific performance was claimed by the appellant,\n\n(b) The appellant's own c\"\"\" was that the entire ccntract was not included in the three written documents, and s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act under which only the ccntract could be enforced requires the whole contract to be in writing; ( c) The difference between the words of s. 53A of the Transfer of Propelrty Act and s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act brings out clearly that the latter is applicable when the entire property under contract has been taken possession of by the lessee in part performance of the contract. In the present case only two out of the three portions of the premises leased out to it were taken possession of by the\n\nappellant. [728 G-H, 729 H, 730 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 495 Of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 22, 1959 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at\n\nDelhi in Regular First Appeal No. 78-D of 1953.\n\nRamesliwar Dayal and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants.\n\nVeda Vyasa, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for . respondent No. 6.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The first appellant, Messrs. Delhi Motor Company, is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as \"the firm\"),\n\nof which the other four appellants Nos .. 2 to 5 are partners. Respondent No. 6, New Garage Ltd., is a private limited company (hereinafter referred to as \"the Company\"), of which respondent\n\n722 SUPREMB COURT REPOllTS [1968 J 2 s.c.R.\n\nNo. I was the Managing Director, and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were members of the Board of Directors.\n\nThe firm brought a suit against the Company for possession of part of the building known as \"Scindia House\" situated in Connaught Circus, New Delhi, on the basis of an agreement of sub-lease. Possession wa.s claimed of a portion of the Show-Room on the ground floor, of 1/2 portion of the Balcony, and another portion of the premises which were, in the year 19 50, in the possession of Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd.\n\nThe case put forward by the firm was that the Company was the tenant of Scindia House and was in occupation of the Show-Room and other parts of the building, while a part of it was occupied by Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. u sub-lessee of the Company. According to the firm, the agreement to sub-lease, or the sub-lease on the basis of which possesion was claimed l>y the firm from the Company, is evidenced by three documents, the first one of which is letter, Ext. P. l, dated 20th February, 1950, written by K. S. Bhatnagar, appellant No. 2, on behalf of the firm, to U. A. Basrurkar, respondent Ne.\n\nI, who was the Managing Director of the Company. The second document is letter, Ext. P. 2, dated 22nd February, 1950. writ ten by respondent No. I Basrurkar to appellant No. 2 Bhatnagar; and the third document is Ext. P. 3, which purport~ to be nolell on agreement arrived at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950.\n\nThe case of the firm was that, though these document~ did not purport in so many words to be an agreement of sub-lease to be granted by the Company to the firm, in substance and in fact, the agreement arrived at was of a sub-lease in respect of the premises mentioned above. Since, under the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act 19 of 1947, if a sub-lease had been granted by the Company to the firm with out the consent of the landlord, the Company would have been liable to ejectment from the premises, the agreement was not made as directly evidencing 'a sub-lease, so that the landlord should not have an opportunity of suing the Company for ejectment.\n\nIn February, 1950, when the agreement evidenced by these three documents was arrived at, respondent No. 1, U. A.\n\nBasrurkar as Managing Director did not have the authority to enter into this transaction on behalf of the Company with the firm and, consequently on 22nd March, 1950. the Board of Directors of the Company, by a resolution Ext. P. 9. authorised the Managing Director to enter into this transaction.\n\nThereafter, the firm came into possession of two portions of the leased property and started its business in them with effect from !st April, 1950.\n\nThe two portions of the leased property. which came into the posse, sion of the firm. were a portion of the Show- Room on the ground floor and a half portion of the Blcony on the first floor.\n\nThe agreement contained in these letters and\n\n• F\n\ndocuments also required parties to carry out some other obligations and, according to the firm, it complied with them.\n\nIn order to avoid the liability of th, e Company for ejectment under the Delhi and A jmer Mcrwara Rent Control Act, 194 7, the agreement was sought to be given the form of a partnership; and in order to enable the Company to enter into such a transaction, a special reso!Ution .Ext. P. 4 was passed on 24th November, 1950 at an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Share-holders of the Company amending the Memorandum of Association of the Company.\n\nThis amendment was subsequently approved by the District Judge and was registered with the Registrar of Companies.\n\nSo far as the landlord is concerned, he was not a party to these transactions, though, on 5th April, 1951, the landlord gave a letter Ext. P. 22 recognising .the possession of the firm, but he specifically stated In that letter that the firm would be a licensee\n\nand not a sub-lessee.\n\nOne other term in tlie agreement arrived at was that appellant No. 2, K. S. Bhatnagar, was to be taken as a Director of the Company and he was in fact.included in the Directors of the Company thereafter.\n\nThe further case of the firm was that when Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. vacated the portion of the premises which was included in the sub-lease, the Company did not give possession of that portion of the leased property to the firm a11d also started obstructing the use of those portions of the property by the firm of which the firm had secured possession by I st April, 1950.\n\nA stage came when the firm was completely dispossessed from the property leased and, ultimately, after giving notices, the firm instituted a suit on 18th June, 1952. The principal prayer in the suit was for delivery of possession in respect of all the three portions of the leased property.\n\nThen, there was a claim for damages to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- in respect of loss incurred on account of dispossession and obstruction in use of the leased property at the instance of the Company.\n\nInjunctions were also sought restraining the Company from interfering with the rights of the firm and with their uninterrupted use of the leased property. There were further prayers for other consequential injunctions which need not be described in detail.\n\nOn behalf of the Company and its Directors, the plea put forward was that there was no agreement of sub-lease or a completed sub-lease between. the Company and the firm and that. in fact, all that took place were negotiations for entering into a partnership. Even the agreement for partnership was .never completed, so that the firm was not entitled to any relief at all.\n\nThe trial Court held that the contract evidenced by these documents was an agreement for a sub-lease and, since this agreement did not require registration, the firm was entitled to the\n\n724 SUPREM!l COURT REPORTS [I 968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nreliefs claimed on the basis of this agreement.\n\nThe Company and its Directors appealed to the High Court of Punjab and that Court held that these documents constituted a completed lease or at least an agreement to lease falling within s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and, since the lease or the agreement to lease was evidenced by documents in writing and they were unregistered, the lease or the agreement to lease could not be enforced.\n\nOn this sole ground, the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the firm.\n\nThe firm has now come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe iirst point urged on behalf of the firm was that, in this case, there was a completed sub-lease, but it did not rl!tjuire registration for .two reasons.\n\nThe first reason advanced was !hat the lease was not evidenced by the documents Exts. P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3 only, but was, in fact, completed subsequently when, .after the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company,\n\nthe Company gave possession of the leased property to the firm on or about the 1st April, 1950. The second reason was that, in any case, this lease was not a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, so that s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable and registration was not compulsory. These submissions fail, because the lease, as relied upon by L.e firm, has to be held to be a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year, and\n\nsuch a lease is fully governed by s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The firm itself came forward with the case that the rights thac were being claimed were under a lease and the lease was in respect of immovable property consisting of the three portions of the Scindia }louse which have been mentioned above.\n\nIt was, however, urged that this lease was not for any fixed term at all and was for an indefinite period, so that it could not be held to be a lease from year to year either.\n\nIt was further submitted that yearly rent had not been reserved in respect of this lease.\n\nEven these submissions were made on the basis that the terms of the le:; se have to be ascertained from the three documents Exl<. P. !, P. 2 and P. 3 which were relied upon by the firm to claim the relief in the suit. It appears to us that, if these documents are properly interpreted, an inference necessarily follows that the lease. if any, brought into existence by these documents was certainly for a period exceeding one year.\n\nSince reliance was placed on these documents on behalf of the tirm to urge that there was a completed lease, learned counsel for the firm was asked to point out the provision which fixed the rent payable in re, pcct of the leased property.\n\nThe only provision, on which he relied to show that rent had, in fact,\n\nbeen agreed upon the fixed, was para I of Ext.\n\nP. 3 which\n\ncontains notes on agreement dated 22nd February, 1950. Thar paragraph is as follows ;-\n\n\"Profit share of party No. 1 would be 10% of net profit of New Delhi business only and will be settled at the end of the 1st closing of the financial year which would be 30th June, 1951.\"\n\nAccepting this submission that this paragraph lays down the rent payable, it is clear that, under it, the rent payable for the first time would be 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in its New Delhi business up to 30th June, 1951. The period would naturaiiy begin on the date on which the lease commenced. That date, according to the firm itself, was 1st April, 1950.\n\nFrom these facts. it follows that when the rent is to be paid for the first time, it would be an amount of 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in its New Delhi business between 1st April,\n\n1950 and 30th June, 1951, and, naturally enough, the rent will be in respect of the same period.\n\nThis term, therefore, clearly laid down that the very first payment of rent was to be for a period of one year and three months, so that, even though no further period for he continuance of the . lease after 30th June, 1951 was laid down, the lease at least made. rent payable for the first period of fifteen months. The lease was, therefore, at least for a period of fifteen months and, consequently, for a period exceeding one year.\n\nSection 107 of the Transfer of Property Act was, thus, clearly applicable and such a lease could not have been validly made, except under a registered instrument.\n\nAdmittedly, there was no registration of the documents which constituted the lease and, copsequently, the firm could not claim any rights on the basis of this lease evidenced by unregistered documents.\n\nLearned counsel tried to urge that, since in these documents no definite period for the lease was mentioned, we should hold that s. I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable and the lease being in respect of immovable property for purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing must be deemed to be a lease from month to month.\n\nWe are unable to accept this submission, because none of the documents, on which reliance bas been placed on behalf of the firm to prove the lease, contains any clause indicating that the tenancy was to be from month to month or the rent was payable monthly. In fact, the indication from para I of Ext.\n\nP. 3 quoted above is that the rent was to be payable annually, so that the contract itself seems to give an indication that it was to be a lease from year to year and annual rent was payable.\n\nThese circumstances, however, are immaterial, because we have already. indicated earlier our\n\n726 St:PREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nfinding that this lease was at least for a minimum period of 15 months and, consequently, s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes applicable, irrespective of the question whether it was a lease from month to month or from year to year.\n\nThe High Court was, therefore, quite correct in holding that on the basis of this lease the reliefs claimed hy the firm could not be granted to it.\n\nIn these circumstances. an arugment was put forward on behalf of the firm that, though this contract to lease had not been registered, the firm could claim possession under it in view of the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, because, in this case, the Company would be debarred from enforcing against the firm any right in respect of that property of which the firm had already taken possession, viz., part of the Show-Room and a portion of the Balcony.\n\nIn our opinion, this argument proceeds on an incorrect interpretation of s. 53A, because that section is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of property of which the lessee had already taken possession, but does not give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other rights on the bsis of an unregistered lease.\n\nSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor.\n\nThis interpretation of\n\n1>. 53A was clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das and Othas v. Da11rmar11 Tm Company Umited & Others(').\n\nLearned counsel for the firm. ho\"cver, relied on a decision\n\nof the Allahabad High Court in Ram Cham/er v. Maharaj Kunwar and Others(').\n\nIn that case. the Jessee, under a registered lease which was defective and did not comply with the require- F ments of s. 107 of the Trnnsfcr of Property Act, brought a suit against a subsequent purchaser of te house. of th~ lessor on !h~ allegation that the purchaser had, m collus1on with the Mumctpal Board, procued the demolitio!1 .of a. portion of. the house, and claimed a relief of perpetual m1unct1on restrammg the purchaser from demolishing the house or othe.rwise interfering .with G the lessee's rights as such, and for restor:iuon of the .demohsed portion at the purchaser's cost.\n\nThe High Court, in allowing the claim of the lessee, held : -\n\n\"Now, in the present case, what is it that the plaintiff is attempting to do'?\n\nHe is not attempting to set up a transfer which .is invalid: he. h.as not instituted suit for the declaration of the vahd1ty of the transfer,\n\n(I) 66 I.A. 29.1. (21 J.l..R. (19J9J All. 809.\n\nhe has not instituted a suit in which he claims an order against the defendant directing him to perform any on\n\nvenant of the transfer.\n\nWhat he is seeking to do 1s to debar the defendants from interfering with his possession into which he has entered with the consent of his transferor after the execution of a transfer in his favour.\n\nHe is, in other words, seeking to defend the rights to which he is entitled under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in demolishing part of the property of which the plaintiff had obtained possession were acting suo motu with the aid of the Municipal Board of Moradabad. It is the defendants who are seeking to assert rights covered by the contract.\n\nThe plaintiff seeks merely to debar them from doing so; the plaintiff is seeking to protect his rights.\n\nIn a sense, in the proceedings he is really a defendant and we see nothing in the terms of section 5 3A of the Transfer of Property Act to disentitle him from maintaining tiJe present suit.\" Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of the view taken by th.e Allahabad High Court, we have to point out that the interpretation put on s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act even by that Court is of no assistance to the firm in the present case.\n\nIn this case, the firm is seeking to enforce rights under the unregistered lease and to seek a decree for possession against the lessor.\n\nThe Allahabad High Court in that case proceeded on the basi.s that the plaintiff of that suit was in the position of a defendant and was only seeking to protect his rights by resort to the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, so that no principle was laid down by the High Court that s. 53A is available to a lessee otherwise than as a defence. We are unable to accept the submission that the judgment in that case should be read as recognising a right of a lessee to enforce rights on the basis of an unregistered lease by resort to that provision: of law. In fact, if that case be interpreted as laying down such a principle, it must be held that it has been directly over-ruled by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Probodh Kumar Das and Others(') and is not correct.\n\nThat decision may be justified, if at all, on the basis that, :hough the \\essee in that case was a plaintiff, he was actually seeking protection under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act by being in the real position of a defendant.\n\nOn the question whether a person. who sues as a plaintiff, may still be regarded as defending the rights sought to be conferred upon him by an unreg'stered deed, we need express no opinion. In the present case before us, the claim, which was put forward by the firm in the plaint, can by\n\n(I) 66 I.A. 293.\n\nSUPREME COURT 'REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nno means be construed as a mere defence of the firm's rights. What the firm is actually seeking to do is 10 enforce the rights under the lease and, in such a case, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is clearly inapplicable.\n\nReliance was also placed on behalf of the firm on the decision of this Court in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagadish Chandra Deb\n\nDhaba/ Deb and Another('), in which case also, a registered Kabuliyat executed by the lessee did not comply with the requiremenls of s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act, and on the facts of the case it was held that, though under the Kab1iyat the land was leased out for a period of ten years, the lease in fact must be presumed to be from menth to month under s. I 06 of that Ac!.\n\nThe facts of that case were, however. quite different. In that case, the terms of the lease were not ::scertaincd from the Kabuliyat in which the period of lease was fixed at I 0 years.\n\nThe terms of the lease were ascertained from <>ther documents, including receipts for rent paid by the lessee lo the lessor, and on the basis of that evidence it was found that a lease had come into existence under which rent was being paid monthly.\n\nNo such circumstances appear in the case before us.\n\nIn fact, it was at no stage pleaded and no evidence was led to show that, independently on the three documents Exts. P. I, P. 2 and P. 3, there was material from which it could be inferred that a !Clise from month to month had come into existence between the firm and the Company.\n\nNo such point was urged either in the trial Court or before the High Court and no such finding of fact exists.\n\nIn these circumstances, s. 106 of the Transfer <Jf Property Act would clearly be inapplicable, and the lease has to be held to be for a period exceeding one year for the reasons given by us above.\n\nIn the alternative, learned counsel for the firm urged that the firm was entitled to contend that these documents Exts. P. l to P. 3 constituted an agreement in writing to lease the property in suit and could claim specific performance of this contract.\n\nThere arc three reasons why we are unable to accept this submission.\n\nThe first is that, in the plaint itself, no specific performance of contract was claimed on behalf of the firm.\n\nThough the pleadings included averments about this contract, the relief claimed was for a decree for possession, damages and injunctions.\n\nThese reliefs could only be claimed on the basis of a completed lease and could not be the reliefs in a suit for specific\n\nperformance of a contrac.t to lease. e second reason is th.at, as mentioned by us earlier, the firm itself came forward with the case that the entire contract was not included within these three documents Exts. P. I to P. 3, because, at the stage when ·--·---'-·\n\n(I} (1952! S.C.R. 269.\n\nD -\n\nthese documents came into existence, the Managing Director of the Company had no authority to enter into such. a contract on behalf of the Company and that the contract was only completed subsequently when the Board of Directors passed a resolution authorising the Managing Director to enter into such a contract and actual possession of part of the property was given on or about the 1st April, 1950.\n\nThe contract being a contract to lease immovable property and unregistered, specific performance of it could not be sought, except under s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act.\n\nThat section, however, applies only if th.e entire contract is made in writing, while, according to the case put forward on behalf of the firm itself, the entire contract was not in writing.\n\nThe third reason why specific performance of the contract cannot be claimed by the firm under s. 27 A of the Spe.- cific Relief Act is that such a claim under that provision of law is only available to a lessee, when the lessee, in part performance of the contract, has taken possession of the property, or, being already in possession, continues in possession in part petformance of the contract.\n\nIn the present case, the pleas put forward on behalf of the firm itself show that the firm never got possession of the ec1tire property to which the contract related.\n\nPossession was taken by the firm of only two items of property, while the 1irm never obtained possession of the third item of property which was in possession of Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. Clause (b) of s. 27A can apply only if possession of the entire property, which is the subject-matter of the contract of lease, has been taken by the lessee. The pleadings in the plaint show that, even though the third item of property was vacated by M/s. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. in December, 1950, possession of that property was never obtained by the firm.\n\nTo meet this objection, it was urged by learned counsel on behalf of the firm that we should 'interpret s. 27 A of the specific Relief Act as being applicable even if possession of part of the property, which is the subject-matter of the contract, is obtained by the lessee; but we are unable to accept this submission.\n\nThe language used makes it clear that possession must be obtained of the entire property to which the contract relates.\n\nIn this connection, it is significant to note that under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, a transferor is barred from interfering with the rights of the transferee, even if the transferee gets possession of any part of the property sought to be transferred by the unregistered document of transfef.\n\nThat' section specifically uses the expression \"taken possession of the property or any part thereof\", whereas the words used in s. 27A of the Specific Relief Act are : \"taken possession of the property\". The omission of the words \"any part thereof\" in s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act when compared with the provision in s. 53A of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nTransfer of Property Act clearly brings out the position that the former section is only applicable when possession of the entire property, which is the subject-matter of the contract, has been taken, while the latter section is made applicable even if the lessee takes possession of any part of the property. Consequently, on the facts of the present case, the firm could not claim specific performance of the contract under s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act, even if such a claim had been put forward in the plaint.\n\nThis alternative contention also, therefore, fails.\n\nThe appeal is, consequently. dismissed, but, in view of the cirucumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties relating to the contract, we direct parties to bear their own costi of the appeal.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. BASRURKAR AND ORS.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "U.A. BASRURKAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 8. 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 8."}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 106, 107, 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "ss. 106, 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 359, "end_char": 371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 406, "end_char": 412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 21A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 783, "end_char": 823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1498, "end_char": 1500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1732, "end_char": 1739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1754, "end_char": 1770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3421, "end_char": 3445, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4423, "end_char": 4429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4937, "end_char": 4956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5151, "end_char": 5170, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramesliwar Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramesliwar Dayal and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. D. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5751, "end_char": 5763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramesliwar Dayal and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5786, "end_char": 5796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for ."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for ."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for ."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The first appellant, Messrs. Delhi Motor Company, is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as \"the firm\"),\n\nof which the other four appellants Nos .. 2 to 5 are partners."}}, {"text": "Delhi Motor Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The first appellant, Messrs. Delhi Motor Company, is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as \"the firm\"),\n\nof which the other four appellants Nos .. 2 to 5 are partners.", "canonical_name": "DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS"}}, {"text": "New Garage Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6, New Garage Ltd., is a private limited company (hereinafter referred to as \"the Company\"), of which respondent\n\n722 SUPREMB COURT REPOllTS [1968 J 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The firm brought a suit against the Company for possession of part of the building known as \"Scindia House\" situated in Connaught Circus, New Delhi, on the basis of an agreement of sub-lease."}}, {"text": "Kanwar Brothers Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6754, "end_char": 6774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession wa.s claimed of a portion of the Show-Room on the ground floor, of 1/2 portion of the Balcony, and another portion of the premises which were, in the year 19 50, in the possession of Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd.\n\nThe case put forward by the firm was that the Company was the tenant of Scindia House and was in occupation of the Show-Room and other parts of the building, while a part of it was occupied by Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. u sub-lessee of the Company."}}, {"text": "K. S. Bhatnagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. l, dated 20th February, 1950, written by K. S. Bhatnagar, appellant No.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Bhatnagar"}}, {"text": "U. A. Basrurkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, on behalf of the firm, to U. A. Basrurkar, respondent Ne."}}, {"text": "Bhatnagar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Bhatnagar; and the third document is Ext."}}, {"text": "Basrurkar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 3, which purport~ to be nolell on agreement arrived at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950."}}, {"text": "Bhatnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 3, which purport~ to be nolell on agreement arrived at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 3, which purport~ to be nolell on agreement arrived at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950."}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, U. A.\n\nBasrurkar as Managing Director did not have the authority to enter into this transaction on behalf of the Company with the firm and, consequently on 22nd March, 1950."}}, {"text": "st April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8919, "end_char": 8933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Company for ejectment under the Delhi and A jmer Mcrwara Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9341, "end_char": 9414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9602, "end_char": 9621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 4 was passed on 24th November, 1950 at an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Share-holders of the Company amending the Memorandum of Association of the Company."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9957, "end_char": 9972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the landlord is concerned, he was not a party to these transactions, though, on 5th April, 1951, the landlord gave a letter Ext."}}, {"text": "K. S. Bhatnagar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10223, "end_char": 10238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, K. S. Bhatnagar, was to be taken as a Director of the Company and he was in fact.included in the Directors of the Company thereafter.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Bhatnagar"}}, {"text": "18th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10886, "end_char": 10901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A stage came when the firm was completely dispossessed from the property leased and, ultimately, after giving notices, the firm instituted a suit on 18th June, 1952."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12188, "end_char": 12208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company and its Directors appealed to the High Court of Punjab and that Court held that these documents constituted a completed lease or at least an agreement to lease falling within s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and, since the lease or the agreement to lease was evidenced by documents in writing and they were unregistered, the lease or the agreement to lease could not be enforced."}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12329, "end_char": 12336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12351, "end_char": 12367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1st April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13162, "end_char": 13177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3 only, but was, in fact, completed subsequently when, .after the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company,\n\nthe Company gave possession of the leased property to the firm on or about the 1st April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13351, "end_char": 13375, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13624, "end_char": 13630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13638, "end_char": 13662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "30th June, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15238, "end_char": 15253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 would be 10% of net profit of New Delhi business only and will be settled at the end of the 1st closing of the financial year which would be 30th June, 1951.\""}}, {"text": "1st April,\n\n1950 and 30th June, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15816, "end_char": 15852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it follows that when the rent is to be paid for the first time, it would be an amount of 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in its New Delhi business between 1st April,\n\n1950 and 30th June, 1951, and, naturally enough, the rent will be in respect of the same period."}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16362, "end_char": 16373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16381, "end_char": 16405, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16873, "end_char": 16897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17812, "end_char": 17836, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18306, "end_char": 18312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18320, "end_char": 18344, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18649, "end_char": 18655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18958, "end_char": 18969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18977, "end_char": 19001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19385, "end_char": 19405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ho\"cver, relied on a decision\n\nof the Allahabad High Court in Ram Cham/er v. Maharaj Kunwar and Others(')."}}, {"text": "Jessee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Jessee, under a registered lease which was defective and did not comply with the require- F ments of s. 107 of the Trnnsfcr of Property Act, brought a suit against a subsequent purchaser of te house."}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19574, "end_char": 19580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20802, "end_char": 20808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20816, "end_char": 20840, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Moradabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20994, "end_char": 21022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 in demolishing part of the property of which the plaintiff had obtained possession were acting suo motu with the aid of the Municipal Board of Moradabad."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21300, "end_char": 21309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21320, "end_char": 21344, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21553, "end_char": 21559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21567, "end_char": 21591, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22006, "end_char": 22012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22020, "end_char": 22044, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22104, "end_char": 22110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probodh Kumar Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22553, "end_char": 22570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, if that case be interpreted as laying down such a principle, it must be held that it has been directly over-ruled by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Probodh Kumar Das and Others(') and is not correct."}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22757, "end_char": 22763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22771, "end_char": 22795, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23150, "end_char": 23163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23354, "end_char": 23360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23368, "end_char": 23392, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23686, "end_char": 23710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24834, "end_char": 24840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jf Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24858, "end_char": 24873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26541, "end_char": 26546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26556, "end_char": 26575, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26864, "end_char": 26869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27542, "end_char": 27548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27989, "end_char": 27994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28004, "end_char": 28023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28384, "end_char": 28390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28398, "end_char": 28422, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28763, "end_char": 28769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28777, "end_char": 28796, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28887, "end_char": 28892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28902, "end_char": 28921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28958, "end_char": 28964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29013, "end_char": 29037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29439, "end_char": 29444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29454, "end_char": 29473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_731_739_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY v.\n\nM/S. SHREE GOVERDHAN LTD. BOMBAY\n\nJanuary 9, 1968.\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act, ,1922, ss. 2(11) ood 23A-Accounting , vear of company ending on September 30, every year-Colnpany a partner in a firm-Accounting periods of firm for 1951-52 A.Y. ending on November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951-Company's annual general meeting held on May 17, 1951-Company's shore of income from partnership whether to be Included in its income for 1951-52 A.Y. for purpose of s. 23A.\n\nThe assessee-a public limited company, entered into a partnership on April 20, 1950 with another firm, and thus had 1wo sources of income,\n\n(i) from its own business and (2) from the shares of the partnership business.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer included the shares of profit of the assessee from the partnership business up to November 30, 1950 and up to March 31, 1951 in the assessment of the assessment year 1951-52. The assessee objected, contending that this income accrued after the ccounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950, and at i~ general\n\nm<:eting held on May 17, 1951, the assessee could not be expectetl to declare a dividend for the assessment year 1951-52 which related to the accounting year ending on September 30, 1950 out of its profits that accrued during subsequ-ent accounting period.\n\nTbe Revenue maintained' the assessment. which, on reference, the High Court answered in favour of the assessee. In appeal, this Court.\n\nHELD : The assessable income of the assessee included the share of the assessee's profits in the partnership for the purpose of app1ication of\n\ns. 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 so far as the a.Sessment year 1951-52 was concerned.\n\nUnder s. 2(11) of the Act an assessee may have different previous years in respect of different sources of income and under the scheme of the Act the income of the varying previous years from the different 'oOurces should be lumped together to arrive at the total income of the assessee. The provisions of s. 2(11) of the Act make it clear that, except in cases where a previous year is determined by the Department under\n\ncl. (b), the varying previous years must all necessarily end with or within the financial years next preceding the assessment year.\n\nIn the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was cqncerned, was the previous year ended on Septen; i.ber 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the partnership the previous year was the period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed.\n\nThe provisions of s. 23 (I) must be construed in the context of s. 2(11) of the Act arid the expression 'previous year' of the company in s. 23A(I) must be interpreted as meaning two previous years where the company carries on two different businesses with different sources of income for which there are separate accounting periods. [736 F-737 BJ ·\n\nThe annual general meeting of the assessee was held on May 17, 1951 after the close of the accounting year of the firm. It is true that the actual profits of the -assessee from its partnership busins were\\ ascertained after the close of the accounting period i.e., March 31, 19~. -. But the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nincome may accrue to an a-sscsscc wi1hout actual receipt of the same and if the asscssee acquires a rtght to rcc; eivc the income. the income can be\n\n6aid to have accrued to him though it may be rccciveJ later on on it~ being ascertained.\n\nThe le_gal positior:i is !hat a liab_ility dcpcning upon a contingency is not a debt 1n praesenll or 1n futuro till the contingency ap pens.\n\nBut if it is a debt the fact that_ the aou~~ hs to ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the ltabtllly 1s certain and what\n\nrem:tins is only a quantification of the amount : Dehirum in praesenJi, Solve11dum in futuro. 1737 E-H)\n\nCommissioner of Inland Re\\enue v. Gardner hlountain &. D' Ambrumnil Ltd. 29 T.C. 69, applied.\n\nC!\\'IL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated Seplembcr I 8, I 962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Refctcnce No. 34 of I 96 I.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Grneral, T. A. Ramachandrar. and R. N. Sachthey, for 1he appellant.\n\nRadhey Lal Aggarwal, Bishambar Lal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 in Income>\n\nTax Reference No. 34 of 1961 whereby the High Court held thdt the order passed against the respondent, hereinafter referred lo as the 'as-; essee' under s. 23A of !he Indian Income Tax Ac1, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the \"Act\") was not justified and v:ilid for the :issessment year 1951-52.\n\nThe asscssee is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act.\n\nIts share capital con:; ists of 50,000 sh:ires subscribd and paid up. Out of these shares, 47,493 are hc!c.l by Shree R:ighunath Investment Trust Ltd., u compan~· incorr\"irated as a privale company under the laws of Ja•.nmu and Kashmir (hereinafter rderred to as \"The Jammu Co.\") an'.l having ils registered office there.\n\nOut of the remaining 2,507 shares, 2,500 shares were held by another private limitd company incorporated in India and having its registered office in New Delhi and ihe remaining 7 shares were -held by seven individuals.\n\nThe shares of the assesse<: are not quoted on the Stock Exchange any where in India.\n\nThere is nolhing, however. in ils Memorandum and Articles of Association placing any restric1ion on the free transfer of its shares. The assessce entered\n\nG •\n\ninto a partnership on April 20, 1950 with a firm call~ 'The India Steel Syndicate'.\n\nThere was a reconstitution of this firm on December l, 1950. The shares of profit of the assessee from this firm (which was registered under s. 26-A of the Act) as up to November 30, 1950 and upto March 31, 1951 totalling Rs. !70,895/- were included in the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1951.52.\n\nDuring the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52, for which the previous years ended on September 30, 1949 and September 30, 1950, the Income Tax Officer determined-the assessable income of the assessee at Rs. 60,350 and Rs. 93,884 respectively.\n\nAfter deduction of the taxes payable, the balance was Rs. 35;834 in the first year and Rs. 53,103 in the second year.\n\nAs the assessee had not declared any dividend at its Annual General Meetings during either of the aforesaid two years or within six months thereafter, the Income Tax Officer issued notices to the assessee. to show cause why an order under s. 23-A(l) of the Act should not be passed for the two years, The assessee, however, contended that s. 23-A was not applicable inasmuch as the public were substantially internsted within the meaning of the Explanation appended to the third proviso to s. 23-A(l). Overruling this contention the Income Tax Officer made an order under s. 23-A against the assessee in respect of the undistributed profits for the said two years.\n\nAgaint these orders the asse ssee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. A further ground was taken in the appeal that the order under s. 23-A was unwarranted so far as assessinent year 1950-51 was concerned inasmuch as the assessable profits included a sum of Rs. 70,895/- being tbe share of the assessee's income which arose in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate as up to November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951, and that the income accrued after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeals and his order was affirmed by the Appe !late Trbunal on June 28, 1959 for both the assessment years.\n\nAt the instance of the assessee the Appellate Tribunal stated a, case to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act on the followin\" ~cl~: a \"Whether the order passed against the assessee for assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52 under section 23-A are justified ancl valid ?\" By its judgment dated September 18, 1962, the High Court answered the question in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1950-51 in the affirmative; and in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1951-52 in the negative anCJ against the appellant.\n\nL3 Sup. CT/68--'3\n\n734 SUPllEMl!· COURT REPORTS [1968) 2 S.c.R.\n\nSection 23-A of the Act, as it stood before its amendment A by the Finance Act, 1955 was to the following effect :\n\n\"23-A. Power to assess individual members of cenain companies.-( I) Where the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for that previous year are laid before the company in general meeting are less than sixty per cent of the assessable incwne of the company of that previous year, as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof he shall, unless he is satisfied that having regard to losses incurred by the company in earlier years or to the smallness of the profit made, the payment of a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared would be unreasonable, make with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner an order in writing that the undistributed portion of the assessable income of the company of that previous year as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as at the date of the general meeting aforesaid, and thereupon the proportionate share thereof of each shareholder shall be included in the total income of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income:\n\nProvided that when the reserves representing r accumulations of pasi profits which have not been the subject of an order under this sub-section exceed the paid up capital of the company together with any Joan capital which is the .property of the shareholders, or the actual cost of the fixed assets of the company\n\nwhichever of these is greater. this section shall apply G\n\na~ if instead of the words 'sixty per cent' the words 'one hundred per cent' were substituted :\n\nProvided further that no order under this sul>-section shall be made where the comoany has distributed not less than fifty-five per cent of the assessable income of the company as reduced by the amount of incometax and super-tax payable by the company in respect\n\nthereof, unless the company, on receipt of a notice from the Income-tax Officer that he proposes to make\n\nsuch an order, fails to make within three months of th.: receipt of such notice a further distribution of its profits and gains so that the total distribution made is not less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the company of the previous year concerned as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof : Provided further that this sub-section shall not apply to any company in whicl! the public .are substantially interested or to a subsidiary company of such a company if the whole of the share capital of such subsidiary company is held by the parent company or by the nominees thereof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \"\n\nSection 2 ( 11 ) of the Act states :\n\n\"2.\n\nIn this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- ( 11) 'previous year' means- ( i) in respect of any separate source of income, profits and gains--\n\n(a) the twelve months ending on the 31st day of March next preceding the year for which the assessment is to be made, or, if the accounts of the assessee have been made up to a date within the said twelve months in respect of a year ending on any date other than the said 31st day of March, then, at the option of the assessee, the year ending on the date to which his accounts have been so made up : ,\n\nProvided that where in respect of a particular source of income, profits and gains an assessee has once been assessed, or where in respect of a business, profession or vocation newly set up an assessee has exercised the option under sub-clause ( c), he shall not, in respect of that source or, as the case may be, business, profession or vocation, exercise the option given by this sub-clause so as to vary the meaning of the expression 'previous year' as then applicable to him except with the consent of the Income-tax Officer and upon such . conditions. as the Income-tax Officer may think fit to impose; or . .... .... .... ....... ...... .... .... ... .\n\nH (ii) in respect of the share of the income, profits and gains of a firm where the assessee is a partner in the firm and the firm has been asses5ed as such, the\n\n736 SUPR.EME COURT REPOl.TS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nperiod as detennined for the assessment of the income, A profits and gains of the firm;\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellant the Attorney-General put forward the argument that the High\" Coun was in error in holding that the sum of Rs .. 70,895 which was the assessee's share of income in its pannership with the Indian Steel Syndicate should be left out of consideration so far as the assessment year 1951-52 was concerned.\n\nIt was pointed out that the assessee had two different sources of income: ( 1) from its own business, and (2) from the share of the pannership business with the Indian Steel Syndicate and that under s. 2 ( 11) of the Act the\n\nassessee must be deemed to have two previous years with regard to two different sources of income. It was therefore argued that the High Coun was in error in holding that the income from the pannership could not be included in the assessment income of the assessee for tlie assessment year 1951-52.\n\nOn behlllf of the assessu the conll'llly view-point was put forward by Mr.\n\nRadhey Lal Aggarwal. It was submitted that the sum of Rs. 70,895 related to the share of the profits of the assessee from ou1 of the pannership for the period between November '30,\n\n1950 to March 31, 1951 and this period was after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950.\n\nIt was contended that at its general meeting held on May 17, I 951 the assessee could not be expected to declare a dividend for the assessment year 1951-52 which related to the accounting year ending on September 30, 1950 out of its profits that accrued durir.;; the subsequent accounting period. In our opinion, the argument put forward by the Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant i' well-founded and must be accepted as correct. It is true that the assessee had prepared a balance sheet on the basis that its accounting year ended on September 30, 1950. It is, however. admitted that the assessee had two sources of income: ( J) from its own business, and (2) from the share of the partnership business with Indian Steel Syndicate.\n\nUnder s. 2(11) of the Act an assessee may have different previous years in respect of different sources of income and under the scheme of the Act the income of the varying previous years from the different sources should be lumped together to arrive at the total income of the assessee.\n\nThe provisions of s. 2 (I I) of the Act make it clear thai, except in cases where a previous year is determined by the Department under cl. (b), the varying previous years must all necarily end with or within the financial year next preceding the as.essment year. In the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was concerned, was the previous year ended on September 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the pannership the previous year was\n\nthe period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed.\n\nIn our opinion, the provisions of s. 23A ( 1) must be construed in the context of s. 2 ( 11) of the Act and the expression 'pr.:viqus year' of the company in s. 23A ( 1) must be interpreted as meaning two previous y.ears where the company carries on two different businesses with two different sources of income for which there are separate accounting periods.\n\nIt follows therefore in the. present case that the Income Tax Officr wa, s right in holding that the assessable income of the company includd the share. of the assessee's profits in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate for the purpose of application of s. 23A of the Act so far as the asessment year 1951-52 was concerend.\n\nThe argument was, however, stressed on behalf of the res pondent that in any event the share of the profit of the a.sesee froru the partnership business for the period from October 1,\n\n1950 to March 31, 1951 was not known to the assessee before its annual gene1al meeting on May 17, 1951.\n\nIt was pointtcl out that for the first time the Income Tax Officer was intimated on August 11, 1953 that the share of the profit cf the assessce in the partnership was to the extent of Rs. 70,895 and should be included in its assesment. After receipt of the intimatioo the Income Tax Officer rectified the original assessment made on February 29, 1952 and included the said amount of Rs. 70,895.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no warrant for the argument put forward on behalf of the respondent. It is conceded in this case that the aTtnual general meeting of the assessee was held on May 17, 1951 after the close of the accounti11g year of the Indian Steel Syndicate.\n\nIt is true that the actual profits of the assessee from its partnership busines; were ascertained after the close of the accounting period, i.e., March :'11, 1951. lt is, however, well-established that the income may accrue to an asses, ee without actual receipt of the same and if the asses.<ee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on on its being ascertained. The legal position is that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti or i'I\n\nfuturo till the contingency happens.\n\nBut if it is a debt the fact that the amount has to be ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the liability is certain and what remains is only a quantiCTcation of the amount : debitum in praese11t1, solvendum in futuro.\n\nReference may be made in this connection to the decision in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gardner Mountain & D' Ambrumenil, Ltd.(') The assessee in that case carried on the business of under-writing agents, and entered into agree-\n\n(!) 29 T.<;. 69.\n\nSUP.REMS COURT REPORTS [1%8) 2 S.C.lt.\n\nments with certain underwriters at Lloyds under which it was entitled to receive as remuneration for its services in conducting the agency, commissions on the net profits of each year's underwriting.\n\nThe agreements provided that \"accounts should be kept for the period ending 31st December in each year and that each such account shall be made up and balanced at the end of the second clear year from the expiration of the period or year to which it relates and the amount then remaining to the credit of the account shall be taken to represent the amount of the net profit of the period or year to which it relates and the commiS!;:on payable to the company shall be calculated and paid therwu.\" The accounts for the underwriting done in the calendar ) <!a!\n\n1936 were made up at the end of 193 8 and the questi.on t bat arose was whether the asscssee was liable to additional ass~-ss ment in respect of the commission on underwriters' profits from the policies underwritten in calendar year 1936 in the year in which the policies were underwritten or in the year when the accounts were thus made up.\n\nThe assessee contended that the contracts into which it entered were executory contracts. under which its services were not completed or paid for, as regards commission, until the conclusion of the relevant account; the profit in the form of commission was not ascertainable or earned, and did not arise, until that time and the additional assessment which was made in the year in which the policies were underwritten should accordingly be discharged.\n\nThe Special Com- 111issioners allowed the assessec's contention and discharged the additional assessment.\n\nThe decision of the Special Commissioners was confirmed on appeal by Macnaghten, J. in the King's Bench Division of the High Court. The Court of Appeal however reversed this decision and a further appeal was taken by lhe assessee to the House of Lords.\n\nThe House of Lords held ibat on the true construction of the agreements, the commissions in question were earned by the assessee in the year in which the policies were underwrirten, and must be brought into account accordingly and confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.\n\nAt page 96 of the Report Lord Wright observed :\n\n\"I agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking that the necessary conclusion from that must be that the right to the commission is treated as a vest~.d right which has accrued at the time when the risk was underwritten.\n\nIt has then been earned, though the profits resulting from the insurance cannot be then ascertained, but in practice are not ascertained until the end of two years beyond the date of underwriting. The right is vested, though ii!; valuation is postponed, and is not merely postponed but depends on all the contingencies\n\nwhich are inevitable in any insurance risk losses\n\nwhic~ may or may not happen, returns of pemium, prenuums to be arranged for additional risks, reinsurance, and the whole catalogue of uncertain future factors.\n\nAll these have to be brought into account according to ordinary commercial practice and understanding. But the delays and difficulties which there may be in any particular case, however they may affect the profit do not affect the right for what it eventually proves to be worth.\"\n\nLord. Simonds also stated at page 110 of the Report as follows_:\n\n\"It i.s clear to me that the commission is wholly earned in year, 1 in respect of the profits of that year's underwriting. If so, I should have thought that it was not arguable that that commission did not accrue for Income Tax purposes in that same year, though it was not ascertainable until later.\"\n\nIt is admitted in the present case that the Indian Steel Syndicate closed the accounts of the partnership for the first time for the first set of partners on November 30, 1950 and for the other set of partners on March 31, 1951 and the assessee as a partner was therefore entitled to the share of the profits as on the last day of the accounting period of the partnership i.e., March 31, 1951.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that the income Tax Officer was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 70,895/- which was the share of the assessee's income from its partnership 'with Indian Steel Syndicate for the period ending March 31, 1951 should be included in the assessable profits of the company for the assessment year 1951-52 and should be treated as part of the distributable profits of the company for the purpose of s. 23-A ( 1 ) of the Act. In other words, the order made by the Income Tax Officer against the assessee under s. 23-A of the Act for the assessment year 1951-52 must be held to be justified and valid and the question of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income Tax Department for the year 1951-52 also. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 so far as the assessment year 1951-52 is. concerned and allow this appeal with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M/S. SHREE GOVERDHAN LTD. BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. SHREE GOVERDHAN LTD. BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 9, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 88, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY\n\nJanuary 9, 1968."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538, "end_char": 544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "April 20, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(11) ood 23A-Accounting , vear of company ending on September 30, every year-Colnpany a partner in a firm-Accounting periods of firm for 1951-52 A.Y. ending on November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951-Company's annual general meeting held on May 17, 1951-Company's shore of income from partnership whether to be Included in its income for 1951-52 A.Y. for purpose of s. 23A.\n\nThe assessee-a public limited company, entered into a partnership on April 20, 1950 with another firm, and thus had 1wo sources of income,\n\n(i) from its own business and (2) from the shares of the partnership business."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer included the shares of profit of the assessee from the partnership business up to November 30, 1950 and up to March 31, 1951 in the assessment of the assessment year 1951-52."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer included the shares of profit of the assessee from the partnership business up to November 30, 1950 and up to March 31, 1951 in the assessment of the assessment year 1951-52."}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1671, "end_char": 1691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Septen; i.ber 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was cqncerned, was the previous year ended on Septen; i.ber 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the partnership the previous year was the period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2667, "end_char": 2672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 17, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "736 F-737 BJ ·\n\nThe annual general meeting of the assessee was held on May 17, 1951 after the close of the accounting year of the firm."}}, {"text": "March 31, 19~.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the actual profits of the -assessee from its partnership busins were\\ ascertained after the close of the accounting period i.e., March 31, 19~. -."}}, {"text": "Dehirum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if it is a debt the fact that_ the aou~~ hs to ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the ltabtllly 1s certain and what\n\nrem:tins is only a quantification of the amount : Dehirum in praesenJi, Solve11dum in futuro."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of I 96 I.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Grneral, T. A. Ramachandrar."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandrar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4294, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of I 96 I.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Grneral, T. A. Ramachandrar."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and R. N. Sachthey, for 1he appellant."}}, {"text": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal, Bishambar Lal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "Bishambar Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal, Bishambar Lal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal, Bishambar Lal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 in Income>\n\nTax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "asscssee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The asscssee is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5020, "end_char": 5033, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shree R:ighunath Investment Trust Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of these shares, 47,493 are hc!c.l by Shree R:ighunath Investment Trust Ltd., u compan~· incorr\"irated as a privale company under the laws of Ja•.nmu and Kashmir (hereinafter rderred to as \"The Jammu Co.\") an'.l having ils registered office there."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5467, "end_char": 5472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the remaining 2,507 shares, 2,500 shares were held by another private limitd company incorporated in India and having its registered office in New Delhi and ihe remaining 7 shares were -held by seven individuals."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the remaining 2,507 shares, 2,500 shares were held by another private limitd company incorporated in India and having its registered office in New Delhi and ihe remaining 7 shares were -held by seven individuals."}}, {"text": "India Steel Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5886, "end_char": 5907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessce entered\n\nG •\n\ninto a partnership on April 20, 1950 with a firm call~ 'The India Steel Syndicate'."}}, {"text": "December l, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5954, "end_char": 5970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a reconstitution of this firm on December l, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7084, "end_char": 7089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Steel Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7626, "end_char": 7648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "70,895/- being tbe share of the assessee's income which arose in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate as up to November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951, and that the income accrued after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7781, "end_char": 7799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "70,895/- being tbe share of the assessee's income which arose in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate as up to November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951, and that the income accrued after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "late Trbunal on June 28, 1959 for both the assessment years."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8056, "end_char": 8064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8195, "end_char": 8205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 18, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated September 18, 1962, the High Court answered the question in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1950-51 in the affirmative; and in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1951-52 in the negative anCJ against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8555, "end_char": 8565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8622, "end_char": 8639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13687, "end_char": 13691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14090, "end_char": 14109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behlllf of the assessu the conll'llly view-point was put forward by Mr.\n\nRadhey Lal Aggarwal.", "canonical_name": "Radhey Lal Aggarwal"}}, {"text": "May 17, I 951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14446, "end_char": 14459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that at its general meeting held on May 17, I 951 the assessee could not be expected to declare a dividend for the assessment year 1951-52 which related to the accounting year ending on September 30, 1950 out of its profits that accrued durir.;;"}}, {"text": "s. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15141, "end_char": 15149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15441, "end_char": 15445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was concerned, was the previous year ended on September 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the pannership the previous year was\n\nthe period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed."}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16064, "end_char": 16070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16112, "end_char": 16116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16188, "end_char": 16194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16656, "end_char": 16662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 1,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16900, "end_char": 16916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument was, however, stressed on behalf of the res pondent that in any event the share of the profit of the a.sesee froru the partnership business for the period from October 1,\n\n1950 to March 31, 1951 was not known to the assessee before its annual gene1al meeting on May 17, 1951."}}, {"text": "August 11, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17101, "end_char": 17116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointtcl out that for the first time the Income Tax Officer was intimated on August 11, 1953 that the share of the profit cf the assessce in the partnership was to the extent of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After receipt of the intimatioo the Income Tax Officer rectified the original assessment made on February 29, 1952 and included the said amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "March :'11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17828, "end_char": 17844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the actual profits of the assessee from its partnership busines; were ascertained after the close of the accounting period, i.e., March :'11, 1951."}}, {"text": "Lloyds", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18831, "end_char": 18837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ments with certain underwriters at Lloyds under which it was entitled to receive as remuneration for its services in conducting the agency, commissions on the net profits of each year's underwriting."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20529, "end_char": 20539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Special Commissioners was confirmed on appeal by Macnaghten, J. in the King's Bench Division of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21023, "end_char": 21029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 96 of the Report Lord Wright observed :\n\n\"I agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking that the necessary conclusion from that must be that the right to the commission is treated as a vest~.d right which has accrued at the time when the risk was underwritten."}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22082, "end_char": 22089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simonds also stated at page 110 of the Report as follows_:\n\n\"It i.s clear to me that the commission is wholly earned in year, 1 in respect of the profits of that year's underwriting."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23264, "end_char": 23269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23374, "end_char": 23379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23582, "end_char": 23603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the order made by the Income Tax Officer against the assessee under s. 23-A of the Act for the assessment year 1951-52 must be held to be justified and valid and the question of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income Tax Department for the year 1951-52 also."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23676, "end_char": 23693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 so far as the assessment year 1951-52 is."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_740_744_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "VIRUDHUNAGAR STEEL ROLLING MILIS LIMITED A\n\nTHE GOVERNMEl'iT OF MADRAS\n\nJanuary I 0, I 968\n\n[K .. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SnELAT\n\nG. K. MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 32-Peziiion under Art. 226 no notice to respondent-disn1issed by single Judge-Appeal to division bench also dis1nissed by speaking order-Petilioner nor filin~ appeal but a petition\n\nunder Art. 32-Whetlter petition barred hy re.; ju<licata.\n\nMadras E/cc1rfcity (Taxation on Consumption) Act, 1962, s. 12-// vio/Gtive of Art. 14.\n\nThe petitioner, a public limited con1pany manufacturing various steel and iron products, requested the respondenr ;\\ladras Government for an exemption from tax under s. 12 of the Madras Eectricitv Act No. JV of 1962 which provided that wh\"e energy of a specified type was consumed in the process of manufacture or production in an industrial undertaking licensed under the Industries (Development and Regulation) 'Act 65 of 1951, no electricity tax shall he payable on the energy so consumed for a period of three years from the date of the commencement of production.\n\nThe petitioner's cac; c wa'\\ that though it did not require a licence under s. 11 of the later Act in view of the notification issued by the Central Govt. under s. 29-B by which industrial undertakings having fixed assets not exceeding Rs. I 0 lakhs were not required to obtain µ licence, it was still governed by Act 65 of 1951 for the purposes of s. 12 of Madras Act No.\n\nIV of 1962. The respondent Government rejected the claim on the ground that no exemption could he granted under s. 12 of the Madras Act tD undertakings which were not licensed under the Central Act.\n\nThereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court attacking :s. 12 of the Madras Act under Art. 14 of the Omstitution and contending that it should also hae hcen granted the cxemtion claimed. The petition was dismissed by _a Single Judge \\\\'ithout i<><>ue of notice by a short order to the effect that the pctitior.or was not entitled :o the benefit of s. 12 of the Madras Act and the validi!v of the Sl!'Ction could not be attacked as the exemption provided was based on sohnd principlc<;.An appeal to a Division Bench \\\\.\"as also dismissed. The petitioner did not file an appeal from the order of the Division Bench but chose to file the present petition under Art. 32 claiming the same reliefs as in his carl!cr petition to the High Court. The respondnt raic; ed a preliminary objction tha1 the petition wa'\\ not maint:linahle -in view of th~ petitioner~ 'failure to file an\n\nppeal from the order of the Divio; ion Rench.\n\nJt wa~ also contended on the merits that s. 12 of the Madra> Act wa< not hit by Art. 14.\n\nHELD : dio; miss; ng the petition :\n\n(i) The preliminary objection must he upheld.\n\nThe pctitiO'ller did not appeal from the order of the Division Bench.\n\nThe High Court made a speaking order dealing with the merits of the case and the fact that no notice was issued to the other side before such an orch..~ was passed v.-as immaterial in the circumstances.\n\nThe present\n\n().\n\nff.\n\n. \\·\n\npetition under Art. 32 on the same facts for the same relief based on the same article of the Constitution ws therefore barred. [744 DJ\n\nWhere a writ petition is dismissed without notice to the other side but the order of dismissal is speaking orde'r and the petition is disposed o~ .o°: merits, that would still amount to res judicata and would bar a petition under Art. 32. The petitioner's only proper remedy in such a case wol; lld\n\nhe to come in appeal from such a speaking order passed on the ments. [743 E-Fl\n\nDaryao v. The State of U.P., [1962] 1 S.C.R. 574; explained and applied.\n\n(ii) Section 12 of the Madras as Act was not hit by Art. 14 of the C.onstitution.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 38 of 1967.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nR. Gppalakrishnan, for the petitioner.\n\nA. V. Rangam, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, C.J. The petitioner is a Public Limited Company manufacturing bars, rods and agricultural implements out of scrap iron and steel and consumes energy of High Tension Supply for the purpose.\n\nIts case is that it is governed by the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, No. 65 of 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), even though it did not require a licence under s. 11 thereof in view of the notification issued by the Central Government under s. 29-B by which industrial undertakings having fixed assets not exceeding rupees ten lakhs were not required to obtain a licence thereunder irrespective of the number of persons employed in ; uch undertakings.\n\nThe petitioner commenced functioning from February, 1963. The Madras Legislature passed the Madras Electricity (Taxation on consumption) Act, No. IV of 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Madras Act) by which tax was imposed on the consumption of energy both of high 'tension and low tension electricity for various purposes at varying rates. Section 12 of the }'iadras Act however provided that where energy under High Tension Supply is consumed in the process of manufacturing or producing the principal product in any industrial. undertaking licensed under the Central Act, no electricity tax shall be payable on the energy so consumed for a period of three year' from the date of the commencement of the manufacture or production of the principal product in such undertaking.\n\nThe petitioner requested the Government of Madras for exemption from tax on the ground that even though it was not\n\nIinsed under s. 11 of the Central Act, it was governed by that Act. The Madras Government rejected its riayer on the ground that no exemption could be granted to undatakings which were not licensed under the Central Act a' provided in s. 12 of the Madras Act. Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madras attacking s. 12 of the Mad1as Act under Art. 14 of the Constitution and claiming that it :; hould also have been granted exemption.\n\nThe petilion wa' dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court without issue of notice by a short order to the effect that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of s. 12 of the Madras Act and the validity oi the section could not be attacked as the exemption provided wa' based on sound principles.\n\nThe petitioner then went in Letters Patent Appeal and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that the exemption was a concession and could not be claimed as a matter of right and that a' s. 12 did not provide for exemption in favour of undertakings like the petitioner's it could not claim exemption.\n\nThe Division Benett also rejected the argument that Art. 14 was applicable in this case.\n\nIn consequence, the appeal was dismissed.\n\nThe present petition was filed by the petitioner soon after the appeal had been dismissed by the High Court and its contention before us is that it should have been given the exemption under s. 12 of the Madras Act in view of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioner however did not file any appeal from the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nThe petition has been opposed on behalf of the State of Madras and a preliminary objection has been taken that as the petitioner did not file an appeal from the order of the Division Bench, it is not open to it to file this\n\npetition in view of the decision of this Court in Daryao v. The State of V.P.( 1 ) It is further contended thats. 12 of the Madra, Act is not hit by Art. I 4.\n\nWe arc of opinion that the preliminary objection must prevail.\n\nIt is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the decision in the ca!IC of Daryao( 1) shows that it was only when notice had been issued on a writ petition and it is decided on contest that the principle of res judicata would apply and a petitioner losing on such coolest in the High Court would not be entitled to come to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nJn this connection reference has been made to the observation at p. 592 where thm Court observed ihat \"if a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed .ne decision thus pronounced would continue to bind\n\n(I) fl96l] I S.C.R. 374.\n\nH -\n\nthe parties unless it is otherwise JllSJdified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution\".\n\nBut it was later observed on that very page that \"if the petition filed in the High .Court under Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the lac hes of the party apr lying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Art. 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an orde: is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constituie a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata.\"\n\nIt is true that this Court said in that case that if a writ petition under Art. 226 is dismissed on merits after contest it would bar a petition under Art. 32 on the same facts.\n\nBut the later observations at the same page show that that was not the only case in which there would be a bar of.res judicata.\n\nEven where notice might not have been issued by the High Court and the writ petition dismissed in Umine, the question whether such dismissal would bar a petition under Art. 32 would depend upon the nature of the order dismissing it in Umine.\n\nThis is perfectly clear from the later observations made at p. 592 in the same case.\n\nWhere therefore a writ petition is dismissed without notice to the oth1.; r side but the order of dismissal is a speaking order and the petition is .disposed of on merits, that would still amount to res judicata and would bar a petition under Art. 32. The petitioner's only proper remedy in such a case would be to come in appeal from such a speaking order passed on the merits, even though the High Court may not have issued notice to the other side.\n\nWhat has been decided in Daryaols case(') is that the High Court should have decided the petition on the merits by a speaking order. If that is done, it is immaterial whether notice was issued to the other side or not before such a decision was given.\n\nThe bar arises not because there was a notice issued but because the High Court has dealt with the merits of the petition before it and has passed a speaking order even though no notice might have been issued.\n\nIn the present case the petition is clearly barred in view of the decision in Daryan's case('). The learned Single Judge who first dealt with the petition passe\\1 a short order dealing with the merits and stating that'l:he validity 'bf s. 12 of the Madras Act could not\n\n\nbe attacked as the exemption was based on sound principles.\n\nHe therefore repelled the attack on s. 12 of the Madras Act based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioner then went in appeal to the Division Bench.\n\nThe order of the Division Bench is more comprehensive than the order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench has dealt with the attack under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt has rejected the contention that there was any clement of hostile discrimination. It has also held that there was no arbitrary or unreasonable classification by s. 12 of the Madras Act.\n\nIt has finally held that it could not be said that there was no nexus between the conditions specified in the Madras Act and the Central Act which seeks, for reasons of national development and prosperity, to license and supervise undertakings.\n\nThe order of the Division Rench in appeal is clearly a speaking order dealing with the merits of the petition where only ono point under Art. 14 was raised.\n\nIn our opinion it bars the making of the present petition under Art. 32 op the same facts for the same relief based on the same article of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioner did not appeal from the order of the Division Bench.\n\nThe High Court made a speaking order dealing with the merits of the case and the fact that no notice was issued to the other side before such an order was passed is immaterial in the circumstances.\n\nWe therefore uphold the preliminary objection.\n\nWe may add that if we were to go into the merits of the case ourselves we would see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Division Bench as to the application of Article 14.\n\nThe petition is dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "VIRUDHUNAGAR STEEL ROLLING MILIS LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIRUDHUNAGAR STEEL ROLLING MILLS LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nTHE GOVERNMEl'iT OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K .. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235, "end_char": 243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Govt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's cac; c wa'\\ that though it did not require a licence under s. 11 of the later Act in view of the notification issued by the Central Govt."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1277, "end_char": 1282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1602, "end_char": 1607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1766, "end_char": 1771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1796, "end_char": 1803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3476, "end_char": 3483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S.C.R. 574", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3655, "end_char": 3674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3867, "end_char": 3888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. Gppalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gppalakrishnan, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4052, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, C.J. The petitioner is a Public Limited Company manufacturing bars, rods and agricultural implements out of scrap iron and steel and consumes energy of High Tension Supply for the purpose."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4333, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 of 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), even though it did not require a licence under s. 11 thereof in view of the notification issued by the Central Government under s. 29-B by which industrial undertakings having fixed assets not exceeding rupees ten lakhs were not required to obtain a licence thereunder irrespective of the number of persons employed in ; uch undertakings."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4525, "end_char": 4530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Legislature passed the Madras Electricity (Taxation on consumption) Act, No."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner requested the Government of Madras for exemption from tax on the ground that even though it was not\n\nIinsed under s. 11 of the Central Act, it was governed by that Act."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Government rejected its riayer on the ground that no exemption could be granted to undatakings which were not licensed under the Central Act a' provided in s. 12 of the Madras Act."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5871, "end_char": 5876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5950, "end_char": 5970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madras attacking s. 12 of the Mad1as Act under Art."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6820, "end_char": 6827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7308, "end_char": 7323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition has been opposed on behalf of the State of Madras and a preliminary objection has been taken that as the petitioner did not file an appeal from the order of the Division Bench, it is not open to it to file this\n\npetition in view of the decision of this Court in Daryao v. The State of V.P.( 1 ) It is further contended thats. 12 of the Madra, Act is not hit by Art."}}, {"text": "Daryao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7784, "end_char": 7790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the decision in the ca!IC of Daryao( 1) shows that it was only when notice had been issued on a writ petition and it is decided on contest that the principle of res judicata would apply and a petitioner losing on such coolest in the High Court would not be entitled to come to this Court under Art.", "canonical_name": "Daryaols"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8049, "end_char": 8056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8224, "end_char": 8232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8902, "end_char": 8909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9016, "end_char": 9023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9476, "end_char": 9484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9552, "end_char": 9559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Umine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9807, "end_char": 9812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even where notice might not have been issued by the High Court and the writ petition dismissed in Umine, the question whether such dismissal would bar a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9877, "end_char": 9884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Umine", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 would depend upon the nature of the order dismissing it in Umine."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10281, "end_char": 10288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Daryaols", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10516, "end_char": 10524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What has been decided in Daryaols case(') is that the High Court should have decided the petition on the merits by a speaking order.", "canonical_name": "Daryaols"}}, {"text": "Daryan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11033, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the petition is clearly barred in view of the decision in Daryan's case(').", "canonical_name": "Daryaols"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11191, "end_char": 11196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11324, "end_char": 11329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11357, "end_char": 11364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11598, "end_char": 11605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11792, "end_char": 11797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12867, "end_char": 12877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_745_753_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "ANGLO AMERICAN DIRECT TEA TRADING CO.\n\nLTD.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nAGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX,\n\nKERALA STATE, TRIVANDRUM lanuary IO, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.,\n\nR. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ. M. SHELAT, G. K. MI.TTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.j\n\nKera!a ARricultr1rr.l l11co111e-tax Act (20 Of 1950), ss. 2 and 5-Jnco1ne-tat Act (11 of 1922), s. 10 and lnco111e-tax Rules, 1922, r. 24-- lnco1ne derived by cultivation, n1an11facture and sale of teG~Non tlf?ricultural inco111e detennined under s. 10 of the lncon1e-tax Act and r. 24 of the lncon1e-tax Ru/es-Whether con1putation binding on At?ricultural Income-tax Officer.\n\nKera/a Surcltar,; e on Taxes Act (11 of 1957), Surcharge on agricultural inco1ne for assess1nent year 1951-58-lf can be leiied.\n\nThe appellants \"W'crc carrying on the business of cultivation, manufacture and sale of tea. Some of them owned tea plantations h<:°'th within and outside the State of Kerala. Income derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the sellr is derived partly from business and partly from agriculture, and. has to be computed under r. 2.4 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922 (corresp011ding to r. 8 of the 1962 Rules) as if it were income derived from business in accordance with the provisions of s. 10 of the lncome,-tax Act, 1922. On the basis of r. 24, the. central income-tax authorities Computed the total tea income of the appellants and 40% thereof, representing the non-agricultural income, was asesscd to non-agricultural income-tax and the balance 60% was le'ft unasesscd as agricultural income. In proceedings under the Kerala Agricultural Incomctax Act, 1950, the agricultural income of the appcilants was determined on an independent computation of their 1ca income.\n\nThe agricultural income so determined was higher than that arrived at by th: central income-tax authorities.\n\nIn some of the apals, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer levied a surcharge of 5% for the assessment year 1957-58 under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957.\n\nOn the questions : ( 1) whether the Agricultural Income-tax Officer was bound to follow the computation of income from tea made by the Central\n\nIncome-tax Officer; and (2) whether the surcharge could be levied, the High Court held against the a.ppellants.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : There is no provision in the Kcrala Act authorising the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to disregard the computation of the tea income made by the Central income-tax authorities acting under the Central Act, and, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, in making an assessment of agricultural income is bound to accept the computation of tea income already made by the central income.tax authorities and to assess only 60% of the income so computed, less allowable deductions, c:. agricultural income taxable under the Kerala Act.\n\n[751 B-C]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\n(a) In view or Arts. 274(1) and 366(1) or the Constitution. the power of the State Legislature to make a law in respect of taxes on agricultural income arising from tea plantations is limited to legislating with respect to the agricultural income determined under s. 10 of the Incometax Act and r. 24 of the Income-tax Rules.\n\nIn fact, the E•planation to s. 2(a) (2) of the Kerala Act adopts this rule of computation and therefore, the agricultural income tuable under tho Kerala Act is 60% of the income so computed after deducting therefrom the allowances authorised by s. 5 of the Kerala Act, in so far as the same has not already been allowed in the assessment under the Central Income-tu Act.\n\nWhere the agricultural income :s derived from lands panly within and partly without the State the portion of the income attributable to lands within the State is determined under s. 6 of the Kerala Act read with r. 15 of the Kerala\n\nA8ficultural Incom...tax Rules. (750 B-D; 751 A, CD}\n\nKarimthill'uvi Tea Estatts Ltd. Ko11a; am v. State o/ K.trala, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 823, followed.\n\n(b) It may be difficult to make an use.ument under •. 22 of the Kerala Act or on the ba.sil of the , previous year under 1. 2A of the Kerala N:t in the absenee of any rule fixin1 the income for a broken part of the year with reference to an assessmmt made under the Indian Income-tu Act.\n\nIn spite of these and other difllculties in the working of the Ac~ the Agricultural Income-tu Ofllcer cannot ignore the assessment of the tea income\n\nalready made by the cmtral income-ta. authorities. [752 B-D]\n\nCommissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Kerala v. Peruncd Pltmtations, (1965) 56 l.T.R. 193, overruled.\n\n(2) No surcharge on agricultural income can be levied under the Kerala Surchasge on Taxes Act, in respect of the assessment year 1957-58.\n\n[753 DJ\n\nKarimlilaruvi Tea Estates Ltd. v. Stair of Kera/a. [!966} 3 S.C.R. 93 :\n\n(1965) 60 l.T.R. 262 (S.C.), followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC1'ION : Civil Appeals Nos. 9J6- 939 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated\n\nJuly 16, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred F Cases Nos. 53 to 56 of 1964.\n\nAND Civil Appeals Nos. 585 to 588 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 18, 1964 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Refer- G red Cases Nos. 52 to 55 of 1953 (Agrl.).\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 589 to 591 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated August 14. 1964 and July 17, 1964 of the Kerala High Court\n\nH in Income-tax Referred Cases Nos. 50, 51 and 49 of 1963 ( Agrl.) respectively.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, S. K. Dholakia, Joy Joseph and 0. C Mathur, for the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 936-939, of 1966).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Joy Joseph, 0. P. Malhotra and 0. C. Mathur, for the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 585 to 588 of 1966).\n\nS. T. Desai, Joy Joseph, P. C. Bhartarl and O. C. Mathur for the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 589 to 591 of 1966).\n\nH. R. Gokhale and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondent (in C.As. Nos. 936 to 939 of 1966).\n\nM. J? K. Pillai, for the respondent (in C.As. Nos. 585 to 591 of 1966).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacbawat, J. The appellants carry on the business of culti vation, manufacture and sale of tea. They own tea plantations in the State of Kerala. Some of them own tea plantations both within and outside the State. They are assessed to non-agricultural a8 well as agricultural income-tax.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 936 to 939 of 1966 arise out of the agricultural income-tax assessments of the Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd .. under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. Civil Appeals Nos. 585 to 588 of 1966 arise out of the agricultural income-tax assessments of the Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. for the years 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61. Civil Appeals Nos. 589 to 591 of 1966 arise out of the agricultural income-tax assessments of the Southern India Tea Estates Co., Ltd. for the years 1957-S-8, 1958-59 and 1959-60. For all the assessment years, the central income-tax authorities computed the total tea income of the appellants and 40 per cent thereof representing the non-agricultural income was assessed to nonagricultural income-tax and the balance 60 per cent was left unassessed as agricultural income.\n\nThe appellants produced before the Agricultural Income-tax Assistant Commissioner, Kerala, the central income-tax assessment orders, and requested him to take 60 per cent of the tea income computed by the central income-tax authorities as the gross income derived from agriculture.\n\nThe Agricultural Income-tax Assistant Commissioner disregarded the central income-tax assessments, and on independent computation of the tea income determined. the agricultural income of the appellants.\n\nThe agricultural income so determined by the Agricultural Income-tax Assistant Commissioner was m, uch higher than 60 per cent of the total tea income assessed by the central incometa,~ authorities.\n\nOn appeal, the Deputy Commissioner of Agri-\n\nSUPRDIE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S C.R.\n\ncultural Income-tax and Sales Tax, South Zone, Quilon held that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer could make an independent computation of the tea income and was not bound to adopt the assessment made by the central income-tax officer.\n\nOn further appeal, the Kcrala Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum held that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer was bound to accept the computation of tea income by the central income-tax authoritie,.\n\nOn the application of the respondents, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law to the High Court under s. 60(1) of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax, 1950 : \"Whether the Agricultural Income-tax Officer is to follow the computation of income from tea made by the Central Income-tax Ofliccr or whether he can find out the income from tea plantations applying the provisions of the Income-tax Act and make the assessment exercising his powers under the Agricultural Income-tax Act?\". Following its earlier decision in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Kera/a v. Perunad P/antatiom Ltd. ('), the High Court held that the agricultural Income-tax Officer wo, not obliged to accept the computation of the tea income made by the Income-tax Officer acting under the Income-tax Act, and it was open to him to compute the income independently applying the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Agricultural Income-tax Act.\n\nFrom these orders, the present appeals have been filed by special leave.\n\nBefore answering the aforesaid question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Under Entry 46, List IL Seventh Schedule to 1hc Constitu1ion, 1he State Legislature is competent to make laws with regard to \"taxes on agricultural income\".\n\nUnder Enlry 82, List I, Parliament is competent to make laws with respect to \"taxes on income other than agricultural income\". In view of Art. 366(1 ), agricultural income means \"agricultural income as defined for the purposes of the enact men ls relating to Indian income-tax.\" Article 274 (I) pr?vides that a bill which seeks to vary this meaning requires 1he pnor rccommenda1ion of the President.\n\nThese provision of lhe Conslitution correspond to ss. 141 (I), 311 (2), Sch. Vil. List I Entry 54, List II, Entry 41 of the Government of India Acl,\n\n1935. Section 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 defined agricultural income.\n\nSection I 0 provided for computalion of income derived from business.\n\nScc1ion 59 empowered the Cenlral Board of Revenue to make rules which took effect as if enacted in the Act.\n\nRules 23 and 24 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, framed under s. 59 provided for computalion of\n\n(I) (1965) ~6 1.T.R. 193.\n\nH 1\n\nANGLO AMERICAN co. v. c.A.I.T. (Bachawat, 1.) 749\n\nthe business profits where the income was derived partly from agriculture and partly from business.\n\nUnder r. 23, th_e narket value of the agricultural produce used as raw matenal m the business was deducted in c.omputing the business profits.\n\nRule 24 provided that \"income derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller in the taxable territ<?ries shall be computed as if it were income derived from bu.smess, and 40 er cent of such income shall be deemed to be mcome, profits and gains liable to tax, provided that in computing such !ncome an allowance shall be made in respect of the cost of plantmg bushes in replacement of bushes that have died or become permanently useless i::. an area already planted, unless such area has previously been abandoned.\" These provisions correspond Lo ss. 2(1), 28 to 44 and 295.of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and rules 7 and 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Section 2 (a) of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 defines agricultural income.\n\nThe Explanation to s. 2(a)(2) provides tl!at \"agricultural income derived from such land by the, cultivation of tea means that portion of the income derived from the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tea as is defined w be agricultural income for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income-tax.\" Section 3 is the charging section.\n\nSection 2(s) read with ss. 4, 5, 9 and 10 defines total agricultural income.\n\nSection 5 provides for compu.tation of agricultural income after making certain deductions.\n\nThe proviso to s. 5. lays down that \"no deduction shall . be made under this section if it has already been made in the assessment under the Ihdian Income-tax Act, 1922.\" Section 6 provides for assessment of income derived from lands partly within the State and partly without.\n\nSection 7 relates to the method of accounting.\n\nSection 17 deals with return of income.\n\nSection l 8 provides for assessment of income.\n\nSections 21 to 29, provide for assessments in special cases.\n\nSection 3 5 provides for assessment of income escaping assessment.\n\nSection 36 provides for rectification of mistakes.\n\nSection 67 empowers the Government to make rules.\n\nRle 9 of the Keala Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1951, prescribes the deductions allowable under s. 5 ( 1 ) for depreciation of buildings, machinery, plant and furniture in respect of tea factories.\n\nRule 15 prescribes the method of apportionment of income derived from lands pa, rtly within the State and part! v without. -\n\nIn Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd., Kottayam v.\n\nState of Kera/a(\n\n1 ), this Court held that Explanation 2 to s. 5 of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act added in 1961 disallowing certain ded.uctions in the computation of agricultural income did not apply\n\n(I) [J96JJ Supp. 1 s.c.~. gzJ.\n\nLJ Sup Cl/61\"'\"'4\n\nSUPRD1E COURT REPORTS\n\n1968] 2 SCR.\n\n10 compulation of agricultural income derived from 1ea plan1a- 1ions. The reasons for this conclusion may be summarised thus : The defini1ion of agricultural income in !he Constitution and the J ndian I ncome-1ax Ac1, 1922 is bound up with r. 24 of the Income 1ax Rules, 1922.\n\nInrome derived from the sale of 1ca gr<>Wn and manufactured by the seller is to be computed under r. 24 as if it were income derived from business in accordance with the provisions of s. IO of the Indian Income-lax Act.\n\nThe Explanation to s. 2(a)(2) of the Kerala Ac1 adoplS !his rule of computation.\n\nOf the income so compured, 40 per cent is to be 1reat:ed as income liable to income-tax and the other 60 per cenl only is deemed to be agricultural inco111e within the meaning of !hat expression in !he Income-tax Act.\n\nThe power of the State Legislature to make a law in respect of taxes on agricultural income arising from tea plant~.ion is limited to legislating wi1h respect to the agricultural income so detennined.\n\nThe legisla ture cannot add. to the amount of the agricultural income so determined by disallowing any item of deductions allowable under r. 24 read with s. 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income-tax Ac1.\n\nExplanation 2 to s. 5 of the Kerala Act if applied to income from 1ea planta1ions would creale an agricultural income which is no! conlernplated by the Income-tax Act and the Constitution and would be void, and it should therefore be construed not to apply IO 1he computation cf incvmc from lea plan1a1ions.\n\nThe question arising in these appeals is whether the agricul- 1ural Income-tax Officer making an assessment of agricultural income under 1he Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act is bound lo accept the assessment of the income which has already been made by !he central income-tax authorities under r. 24 of the Income-tax Rules. 1922 read with s. 10 of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922 or under r. 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 read with ss. 28 to 44 of the Income-lax Act, 1961.\n\nWe think that this quesiion should be answered in the affirmative.\n\nIncome from sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller is derived partly from business and partly from agriculture.\n\nThis income has to be computed as if it were income from business under the Central Income-tax Act and Rules. 40 per cent ·)f the income so computed is deemed to be income derived from business and assessable to non-agricultural income-tax.\n\nHaving regard to the decision in Karimtharuvi Tra Estates Ltd .. Kottayam v. State of Kera/a('), we are bound to hold that (a) the Explanation to s. 2 (a )(2) of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act adopts this rule of computation and (b) the balance 60 per cent of the income so computed is aj!Ticultural income within the meaning of the Central Income-tax Act and the Constitution\n\n(l) [196.1) Surp. I S.C.R. Sl'.\n\n) A -\n\nThe agricultural income taxable under the Kerala Act is 60 per eent of the .income so computed lifter deducting therefrom the allowances authorised by s. 5 of the Kerala Act in so far as the\n\nsame has . not already been allowed in the assessment under the Central Income-tax Act.\n\nThere is no provision in the Keraia Act authorising the Agricultural lncom(}-ta .. Officer to disregard the computation of the tea income made by the incom(}-tax authorities acting under the Central Incom(}-tax Acts.. The Agricultural Income-tax Officer in making an assessment of agricultural income is bound to accept the computation of the tea income already made by the central income-tax authorities and to assess only 60 per cent of the income so computed Jei; s allowable deductions as agricultural income taxable under the Kerala Act: Where the agricultural income is derived from lands partly within the State of Kerala and partly outside the State, the portion of the income attributable to lands within the State is detennined under s. 6 of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act read with r. 15 of the Kerala Agricultural Incom(}-tax Rules.\n\nOur attention was drawn to the provisions of (a) ss. 8(2), 24 ( 1) proviso, 24 (2) proviso, 25 ( 4) and 25 ( 5) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax. Act, 1944 and rules 7 and 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944, (b) s. 8 of the Mysore Agricultural Incom(}-tax Act, 1957 and rule 6 of the Mysore Agrfoultural Income-tax Rules, 1957, (c) s. 8 of the Coorg Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1951, ( d) the second proviso to s. 8 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939 and rule 5 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1939, (e) Explanation 1 to s. 2(a) (2) of the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 and\n\nr. 7 (I ) of the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax. Rules, 1955 and (f) r. 5 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Rules,\n\n1949. Under some Acts and Rules, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer is bound to adopt the assessment of the tea income made by the central income-tax authorities. But under some other Acts and Rules, he is authorised in special cases to disregard this assessment and to make a fresh computation of the tea income. We express no opinion on the construction of these Acts and Rules.\n\nFor the purpose of these appeals, it is sufficient to say that the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act and Rules do not confer upon the Agricultural Income-tax Officer the power to disregard the assessment of the tea income already made by the central income-. lax authorities. We are unable to introduce by way of implication in a taxing statute a provision which requires explicit statement.\n\nDifficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act on the basis\n\n• 752\n\nSUPREME COURT RF.PORTS\n\n[1968) 2 SC.R.\n\nof the assessment of the tea income made by the Central incometax authorities.\n\nThe previous year under s. 2(o)(i1 of the Kerala Act may be different from the previous year under the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThis difficulty may be resolved by fixing the previous year for this class of income under s. 2(o)(ii) m conformity with the previous year under the Indian Jncometax Act.\n\nBut the anificial previous year under s. 2-A is not subject to the provisions of s. 2(o) (ii). Moreover, s. 22 authorises the assessment of income for the period from the expiry of a previous year to the probable date of the depanure qf the asessee from the State.\n\nIt may be difficult to make an assessment under s. 22 or on the basis of the previous year under s. 2-A in the absence of any rule fixing the income for a broken part of the year with reference to an assessment made under the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nIn spite of the>e and other difficulties in the working of the Act, -we are unable to agree with the decision in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax Keralo v. Pertmad Plantations Ltd. (') or to ho!'' that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer can ignore the assessment of the tea income already made by the central income-tax authorities.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants, it was argued that the power to compute business income under r. 24 read with s. I 0 of the Indian Income-tax Act having regard particularly to proviso (a) to sub-s. (2)(vi), the proviso to sub-s. 2(\\i-b), sub-clause (g) of the second proviso to sub-s. 2(xiv), sub-s. (4-A) and the first proviso to sub-s. 5 (a) of s. I 0 must be exercised by lhe Central Income-tax Officer alone, that there is no provision in the Kerala Act conferring this power on the Agricultural Incometax Officer and that therefore the assessment of agricultural income must wait until the assessment by the Central Income-tax Officer under r. 24 read with s. I 0.\n\nThls wider question does not arise for decision and is left open.\n\nIn all the cases before us, the assessments by the Central Income-tax Officer were completed before the Agricultural Income-tax Officer proceeded to assess the agricultural income. For the purpose of these appeals, it is sufficient to say that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer acting under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act. 1950 is bound to follow the assessment of i.D.come b.J the Central Incometax Officer under r. 24 of the Income; taxllules, 1922 and r. 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 where such assessment has been made before the Agricultural Income-tax Officer proceeds to make the assc.sment under the Kerala Act.\n\nThe question referred to the High Court is answered accordingly. We must not be understood to say that the assessment made by the Central Income-tax Officer under r. 23 of the Income-tax Rules, 1922\n\n(I) (19~) 56 l.T.a. 191.\n\nANGLO AMERICAN co. V. C.A.J.T. (Bachawat, J.) 753\n\nor r. 7 of the Ir.come-tax Rules, 1962 is in any way binding on the Agricultural Income-tax Officer.\n\nIn Civil Appeals Nos. 585 to .588 of 1966 and 589 to 591 of 1966, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer made a surcharge of 5 per cent for the assesi; ment year 1957-58 under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957.\n\nOn appeal, the Deputy Commissioner held that the surcharge was rightly made.\n\nOn further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that the levy of the surcharge was illegal.\n\nOn the application of the respondent, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following additional question of law to the High Court : \"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal is justified in holding that surcharge on agricultural income-tax cannot be levied for the assessment year 1957-58 ?\".\n\nThe High Court answered this question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.\n\nThis decision must be set aside.\n\nIn Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd. v. State of Ker ala ( 1 ), this Court held that no surcharge on agricultural income can be levied under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957 in respect of the assessment year 1957-58. The second question is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee and against the\n\nRevenue.\n\nIn the result, the appeals are allowed with costs and the judgments of the High Court are set aside. The questions refer- E red to the High Court are answered in favour of the appellants and against the Revenue as indicated in the body of this judgment. There will be one hearing fee.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(1) [1966] l S.C.R. 93 : [1965] 60 I.T.R. 262.", "total_entities": 129, "entities": [{"text": "ANGLO AMERICAN DIRECT TEA TRADING CO.\n\nLTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANGLO AMERICAN DIRECT TEA TRADING CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF\n\nAGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX,\n\nKERALA STATE, TRIVANDRUM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, KERALA STATE, TRIVANDRUM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 477, "end_char": 482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 904, "end_char": 910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of them owned tea plantations h<:°'th within and outside the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "proceedings under the Kerala Agricultural Incomctax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1961, "end_char": 1996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 274(1) and 366(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957", "statute": "the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "No surcharge on agricultural income can be levied under the Kerala Surchasge on Taxes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC1'ION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4823, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC1'ION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5503, "end_char": 5517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. K. Dholakia, Joy Joseph and 0.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. K. Dholakia, Joy Joseph and 0."}}, {"text": "Joy Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. K. Dholakia, Joy Joseph and 0.", "canonical_name": "Joy Joseph"}}, {"text": ". C Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. K. Dholakia, Joy Joseph and 0.", "canonical_name": "O. C. Mathur"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Joy Joseph, 0.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "Joy Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5632, "end_char": 5642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Joy Joseph, 0.", "canonical_name": "Joy Joseph"}}, {"text": ". P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Joy Joseph, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5664, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and 0.", "canonical_name": "O. C. Mathur"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Joy Joseph, P. C. Bhartarl and O. C. Mathur for the appellant (in C.As."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartarl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Joy Joseph, P. C. Bhartarl and O. C. Mathur for the appellant (in C.As."}}, {"text": "O. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5776, "end_char": 5788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Joy Joseph, P. C. Bhartarl and O. C. Mathur for the appellant (in C.As.", "canonical_name": "O. C. Mathur"}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5844, "end_char": 5857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondent (in C.As."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondent (in C.As.", "canonical_name": "M. R. K. Pillai"}}, {"text": "M. J? K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5935, "end_char": 5950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. J?", "canonical_name": "M. R. K. Pillai"}}, {"text": "Bacbawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6051, "end_char": 6059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacbawat, J. The appellants carry on the business of culti vation, manufacture and sale of tea."}}, {"text": "Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6437, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "936 to 939 of 1966 arise out of the agricultural income-tax assessments of the Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd .. under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62."}}, {"text": "Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Southern India Tea Estates Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6868, "end_char": 6904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "589 to 591 of 1966 arise out of the agricultural income-tax assessments of the Southern India Tea Estates Co., Ltd. for the years 1957-S-8, 1958-59 and 1959-60."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income-tax Assistant Commissioner", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7531, "end_char": 7577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agricultural Income-tax Assistant Commissioner disregarded the central income-tax assessments, and on independent computation of the tea income determined."}}, {"text": "Kcrala Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8278, "end_char": 8339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On further appeal, the Kcrala Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum held that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer was bound to accept the computation of tea income by the central income-tax authoritie,."}}, {"text": "s. 60(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8878, "end_char": 8892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 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Parliament is competent to make laws with respect to \"taxes on income other than agricultural income\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 366(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9924, "end_char": 9936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 274", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10065, "end_char": 10076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10237, "end_char": 10244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10363, "end_char": 10390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10624, "end_char": 10653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", 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{"text": "Income-tax Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15547, "end_char": 15569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 28 to 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15580, "end_char": 15592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Rules, 1962", "statute": "the Income-tax Rules, 1962"}}, {"text": "Income-lax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15600, "end_char": 15620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15898, "end_char": 15912, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16202, "end_char": 16206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-lax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income-lax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16242, "end_char": 16256, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ticultural income within the meaning of the Central Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16633, "end_char": 16637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ticultural income within the meaning of the Central Income-tax Act", "statute": "Ticultural income within the meaning of the Central Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16746, "end_char": 16760, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is no provision in the Keraia Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16769, "end_char": 16802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provision in the Keraia Act", "statute": "There is no provision in the Keraia Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17539, "end_char": 17553, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2), 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17666, "end_char": 17678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no provision in the Keraia Act", "statute": "There is no provision in the Keraia Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17803, "end_char": 17845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17851, "end_char": 17855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944", "statute": "the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944"}}, {"text": "Mysore Agrfoultural Income-tax Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17923, "end_char": 17965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17971, "end_char": 17975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Agrfoultural Income-tax Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Mysore Agrfoultural Income-tax Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "Coorg Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17983, "end_char": 18022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18051, "end_char": 18055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Coorg Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1951", "statute": "the Coorg Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18063, "end_char": 18102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Assam Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18121, "end_char": 18162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18185, "end_char": 18192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1939", "statute": "the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1939"}}, {"text": "Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18204, "end_char": 18256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18355, "end_char": 18390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18863, "end_char": 18877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19270, "end_char": 19284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19536, "end_char": 19550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19763, "end_char": 19767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19806, "end_char": 19813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19830, "end_char": 19835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20039, "end_char": 20044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20088, "end_char": 20092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Difficulties may arise in making an assessment of agricultural income under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Difficulties may arise 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false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21795, "end_char": 21817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22128, "end_char": 22150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22508, "end_char": 22543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_754_766_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "T. S. PL. P. CHIDAMBARAM CHETI1AR A\n\nT. K. B. SANTHANARAMASWAMI ODAYAR & ORS.\n\nJanuary 10, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. R.AMASWAMJ AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] B\n\nMadras Estates Land Act I of 1908, .vs. 3(2)(d), 3(10)(b) and 3(16)-Lalfd.< in Orathur Padugai In Tanjore Palace Estate wheth~ /1111 undtr dtfinition of 'estatt' ;,. s. 3(2) (d)-Tanjort PaJact Estate whether crtatM by grant--Orathur Padugai whether a wholt villDgt or part of a\n\nl'iU~Distinction bttwun 'priwut land' as dtfined in s. 3(10)(h) and 'ryOli lend' as dtfined in' 3( 16).\n\nWhen the Raja of Tanjore died in 1855 without leaving male iSiue tbe East India Company tool< possession of all his properties including his private property.\n\nHowever on a memorial being presented by the seruor widow of the late Raja, the Go•ernment of India in 1862 \"sanctioned the relinquishment of the whole of the landed property of the Tanjore Raja in favour of the heirs of the late Raja.\" The Tanjore Palace Estate thus eame into existence. In 1948 the appellant purchased certain lands situate\n\nin Orathur Padugai which was part of the aforesaid Tanjore Palace Estate, and thereafter institute-O suits for possession of these lands from variOUI defendants.\n\nThe trial court dismissed the suir. on the ground th•t the lands were situated in an 'estate' unde.- s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras E.italel Lands Act I of 1908 and they were 'ryoti lands' as defined in s. 3(16) in which the defendants had acquired occupancy rights. The Madras High Coult affirmed the decree, whereupon the appellant came to thia Court.\n\nIt .,. .. contended on behalf of the appeHant that (i) the lands did Bot form an 'estate' under 1. 3(2)(d) of the afore .. id Act be<:ausc the r....toration of the land to the widows of the Raja of Tanjore did not amount to a fresh grant but only a restoration of the .ftaJus quo aJt1t;\n\n(ii) that Grathur Padugai was not a whole vinage \"'' required by the definition ol 'estate'; (iii) the widows of the Raja enjoyed both the •wa..,.ms' and tho\n\nla.ado pW'chascd by the appellant were 'private lands' in•· 3(10)(b) so that the defendants did not have any occupancy rights therein.\n\nHF.LO : (i) The relinquishment by the Government of India in favour of the widows of the Raja in 1862 ..... a fresh grant a.< already held in s~ cases.\n\nIn view of the authorities it could no longer be questioned thal the Tanjore Palace E.<tate was an •eswe• within the meaning of s. 3(2)(d) of the Madra.' Estates Landll Act. [759 F-760 Bl\n\nJijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saibo,\n\n3 M.H. C.R. 424, Suridaram Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar, l.L.R. 40 Mad. 389, Maharaia nf KollUJpur v. Sondaram lytr, I.L.R. 48 Mad.\n\nI, Sulllfaram v. Dewi Sankara, A.l.R. 1918 Mad. 428 and T. R. Bhawmi Slrankar Joshi v. Soma-\n\n.•11ndiira Moopanar, [1963) 2 S.C.R. 421, relied on.\n\nChota Raia Saheb Mohitai v. Surodaram l1or, 63 I.A. 224, referred to.\n\n(ii) There was sufficient material on the record to shO\\\\· that at least\n\n~Ince 1830 -onwards Orathur Padugai was a whole village and therefore an 'estate' -.ithin the meaning of the Act. [762 CJ\n\n(iii) The lands in suit were 'ryoti lands' and not 'private lands'.\n\nThe definition in s. 3(10) read as a whole indicates clearly that the ordinary test for 'priv11te land' is the test of retention by the landholder\n\nA for his OW1l personal use and cultivation by him or unde\"r his personal supervision.\n\nNo doubt, such lands may be let on short leases for the convenience of the liindholder without losing their .distinctive character; but it is not the intention dr the scheme of the Act to treat aS private f.hose lands with reference to which the only peculiarity is the fact that the landlord owns ooth the wararns in the lands and has been letting them out on shon leases. [.765 H-766 BJ\n\nB In the present case there was no proof that the lands were ever directly cultivated by the landholder. The High Court had found that the same tenants continued to cultivate the lands without break or change, and the fact that there were periodical auctions of the lease rights did \"not necessarily deprive the tenants of the occupancy rights which they were enjoying._ The. appellant had not been able to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under s. 185 of the Act that the lands in the inam village are C not ;>rivate lands. [766 C-G]\n\nYtrlagadda Malikariuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya, l.L.R. 42 Mad. 400 (P.C.), referred to with approval. ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 54 to 65, 67 and 69 to 71 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated January 10. 1956 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit Nos. 223 and 224 of 1951, and 264 to 273,275 and 277 to 279 of 1952.\n\n-'R. Kesava Iyengar, R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nBishan Narain and 0. P. Malhotra, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. Nos. 54 and 55 of 1963).\n\nM. R. K. Pi//ai, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 55 of 1 %3) and for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 56 to 65, 67 to 7l of 1963). ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Cour~ was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. These appeals are brought against the judgment and decree in A.S. nos. 223 and .224 of 1951, 264 to 273 of 1952, 275 of 1952 and 277 to 279 of 1952 of the M:idras High Court dated January _10, 1956 af)irming. the judgment and decree in O.S. nos. 75\"; 77 to 81 of 1949 and 19 to 22, 24 to 26, 28 & 30 to 31 of 1950 of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore.\n\nThe appellant instituted the above-mentioned suits for recovery of possession frorri the respective defendants of the disputed lands and for payment of damages at the rate of Rs. 50/- per annum per acre. The case of the appellant was that the disputed lands which were purchased by him by a sale deed dated November IL 1948 (Ex. A-145) are situated in Orathur Padugai which is attached to Pannimangalam, one of the villages comprised in what is known as the \"Tanjore Palace Estate'', that\n\nSUPRF.MI! COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S CR.\n\nthe said lands are not si1ua1ed in an es late as defined by the Madras Estates Land Act I of 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and in any event the said lands are 'private lands' of the appcllanl and no1 'ryoti lands' as defined in the Act and the various defendants are tfespassers in unlawful occupation of the lands and had no right to continue in possession and were therefore liable to ejectment.\n\nThe appellant also claimed that the defendants were liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. SO/- per annum per acre in respect of the lands in their unlawful occupation.\n\nThe defence in all the suits was substantially the same.\n\nIt was contended by the defendants that the disputed lands are situated in an cstalc within the meaning of s. 3(2) (d) of the Act, that the lands arc 'ryoti lands' in which they have\n\npcrmannt right of occupancy and that they arc not \"private lands\" as alleged by the appellant and the civil court had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the suits and the Revenuo Courts alone had jurisdiction.\n\nBy his two judgments dated Octobor 31, 1950 and February 2, 1951, the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore dismissed the suits, holding that the lands were situnted in an estate and w. ce 'ryoti lands' in which the defendants w1rc entitled to occupancy rights.\n\nThe appellant took the matter in appeal to the Madras High Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed all the appeals.\n\nThe two principal questions which are presen1ed for determination in these appeals are : (I) whether the suit-lands are located in an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2) ( d) of the Act, and (2) if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative. whether the suil-lands are 'private lands' or 'ryo1i lands' as defined in the Act.\n\nSection 3 ( 2 )( d) of the Act. as originally enacted slates :\n\n\"3. In this Act, unless 1here is something repugnanl in the subject or context :-\n\n(2) 'Es1a1e' means-\n\n( d) any village of which the land revenue alcn~ has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, or\n\nany separated part of such village;'' H\n\nThe section was amended by the Madras Estates Land (Third Amcndmenc) Act 18 of 1936 to the following effect :\n\n\" ( d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Gowrnment, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among .the grantees, or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees.\n\nExplanation ( 1 ) :\n\nWhere an inam village is resumed by the Government, it shall cease to be an estate; bui, if any villag~ so rc>- sum¢ is subsequently regranted by the Government as an inam, it shall, from the date of such re-grant be regarded as an .estate.\n\nExplanation (2): • Where a portion of an inam village is resumed by the Government, such portion shall cease to be part of the estate, but the rest of the village shall be deemed to be an inam village for the purposes of this sub-clause.\n\nIf the portion so resumed or any part, thereof is subsequently regranted by the Government as an inam, such portion or part shall, from the date of such re-grant be regarded as.forming parl of the inam village for the purposes of this sub-clause.\"\n\nBy s. 2 of the Madras Act II of 1945 s. 3 of the Act was further amended as follows :\n\n\"Section .2 : ( 1)\n\nIn sub-clause ( d) of clause ( 2) of s. 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) Explanations (.I) and (2) shall be renumbered as Explanations (2) and (3) respectively and the following shall be inserted as Explanation ( l), namely:\n\nExplanation ( 1 ) :\n\nWhere a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subjectmatter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on seryice or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes :\n\n(2) The amendment made by sub-section (1} be deemed to have had effect as from the date on which the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act,\n\nSUPREME OoUl\\T REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.CR.\n\n1936 came into force and the said Amendment shall be read and construed accordingly for all purposes;\"\n\nSection 3 ( 19) of the Act has defined a \"Village\" as follows :\n\n\" 'Village' means any local area situated in or .:onstituting an estate which is designated as a village in the revenue accounts and for which the revenue accounts arc separately maintained by one or more kamams or which is now recognised by the State Government or may hereafter be declared by the State Government for the purposes of this Act to be a village, and includes any hamlet or hamlets which may be attached thereto.\"\n\nThe .history of what is known as the \"Tanjore Palace Estarc'.' is wcll•known and will be found in various reported decisions of the Judicial Committee and of the Madras'High Court : (Sec\n\nJijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v.\n\nKm1u.lshi Bayi Saiba('), Su11daram Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar('), Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer (3) and Chota Raja Saheb Mohitai v. Sund ram Iyer('). In 1799, Serfoji, the then Raja of Tanjore, surrendered\n\nhis terri1ory into the hands of the East India Company, but he was allowed to retain possession of certain villges and lands which constitu1ed his private property.\n\nWhen his son the lasl }{aja died in 1855 without leaving male issue. the East India Company took possession of all his properties including his private property.\n\nThereupon the senior widow.\n\nKamachee Boye Sahaba filed a Bill on the Enquiry Side of the Supreme Court of Madras, and obtained a decree lhat the seizure of the private properties was wrong.\n\nOn appeal by lhc Secretary of State in Council of India, the Privy Council reversed lhe decree, and ordered the dismissal of the Bill.\n\nThereafter, a memorial was submitted to the Queen and in 1862 the Government of India which had succeeded the East India Company \"sanctioned the relinquishment cf the whole of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj in favour of the heirs of the late Raja\".\n\nUnder instructions from the Government of India, the Government of Madras, on August 2 f, 1862, passed an order the material part of which is as follows :\n\n\"In Col. Durand's letter above recorded the Govrn ment of India have furnished their instructions with\n\nreference to the disposal of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj regarding whicfi this Government addressed them under date the 17th May last.\n\nTheir decision\n\n(I) 3 M.H.CR. 424.\n\n(l) 1.t.R. 48 Mad. I.\n\n(2) U.R. 40 M•d. 389\n\n(4) 61 I.A. 224.\n\nis to the effect, that 'since it is doubtful whether the Jandl; in question can be legally dealt with . as State property, and since the plea in equity and policy, for treating them as the private property of the Raja is so stront1 that it commands the unanimous support of the members of the Madras Government,' the whole of the lands are to bq relinquished in favour of the heirs of the late Raja (page 228).\"\n\nThe Tanjore Palace Estate came into being as a result of this grant.\n\nThe question in these appeals is whether the property involved in the suits being a part of the Tanjore Palace Estate can be considered to be. an \"estate\" within the meaning of the term in the Act.\n\nIt was conceded by the Counsel for the appellant that if it was part of all' inam it would be an 'estate' within the meaning of that Act.\n\nIt was, however, contended that the manner in which the property reverted to the widows of the Raja in l 862 after an act of State did not show that the estate was freshly granted but wls restored to the widows who enjoyed both the wararns, in the same way as the warams were enjoyed before.\n\nTo put it differently, the argiiment was that the effect of restoration or relinquishment was only the undoing of the wrong and therefore if the villages were the private properties of the Raja at the time of the seizure then the same character is maintained when tliey were handed back to his widow.\n\nThe contention was that what actually happened in 1862 was the restoration of the status quo anttt rather than a fresh grant by the British Government. The\n\narment is not a new one but has been raised before arid reiected in a number of authorities. In Jijayiamba Bayi Saiba v.\n\nKamakshi Biryi Saiba(') it was held by the Madras High Court that the Government Order, 1862 was a grant of grace and favour to persons .who had forfeite.:1 aJJ claims to the personal properties of the Rajah by the act. of State and was not a revival of any antecedent rights which they might have had. A similar orinion of the grant was expressed in a Full' Bench case of the Madras High Court in Sumlaram Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar(').\n\nBut in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer(•), Spencer, 0.C.J.,\n\nappeare<l to doubt the decision -0f Scotland, C.J., in Jijqyi.::mba Bayi Saiba v; Kamakshi Bayi Saiba(') that there was a grant of grace and favour in 1862. A similar view was taken in Sundaram\n\nv. Deva Sankara('), but these cases have been subsequently ex-\n\n(I) 3 M.H.C.R. 424.\n\n(3) I.LR• 48 Mad. I:\n\n(2) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 389.\n\n(4) A.1.R. l918 Mad. 428.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nI 1968] 2 S.C.R\n\nPlained or not accepted on this point. In T.R. Bhavani Shankar Joshi v. Somasundra Moopanar('), it was held by this Court that the act of State having made no distinction between the private nnd public properties of the Rajah the privalc properties were lost by the Act of State leaving no right outstanding in the existing claimants.\n\nThe Government Order, 1862 was therefore a fresh grant due to the bounty of the Government and not because of any antecedent rights in the grantees.\n\nIt was pointed out that the words \"relinquished\" or \"restored\" in the Government Order did not have the legal effect of reviving any such right because no rights survived the act of State. The root of title of the grantees was the Government Order of i 862 and it was therefore held that the restoration amounted to a grant in inam by the British. Government within the meaning of the Act.\n\nBut the question whether wich regard to any particular area bat was granted in inam is a whole village or less than a whole village is a question that has to be decided with reference to the facts of each particular case.\n\nThe question therefore arises .whether the area in question, viz., Orathur Padugai, constitutes a whole village and therefore nn estate within the meaning of s. 3(2) (d) of the Act.\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that the suit-lands were not comprised in a whole inam village.\n\nThe contention was rejected by both the lower courts which concurrently held that the lands were located in Orathur Padugai, a whole village by itself or a named village and therefore an estate within the meaning of the Acl.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the :ippcllant that the finding of the lower courts is vitiated in law because it is based on no evidence.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no justification for this argument.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents reference was made to Ex. A-64.\n\nPannimancalam Vattam Jamabandhi Accoun: individual-war. Fasli 1296, which shows in column no. 3 Orathur Padugai as a village.\n\nSimilarly, in Ex. A-78(a), Cess account for Pannimangalam Vattam and Ex.\n\nA-79, the Village war Jamabandhi Account Fasli 1309 Orathur Padugai village is shown as a whole village.\n\nEhibit A-82, Village war Jamatandhi Individual War, Fasli 13 JO. Ex. A-84. Jamabandhi Ghoshpara for the village, Fasli 1311 and Exs. A-153 to A-157 all mention Orathllr Paduj!ai as a village. All the leases, lease-auctions and receipts given for payment of rent speak of Orathur Padugai as a separate village.\n\nEven the sale deeds, Exs. B-6, B-31, B-32 and B-33 contain a recital of Orathur Padugai as a separate village.\n\nIt is manifest therefore that there is sufficient mattrial to how that at least since 1830 onwards Ordthur Padugai is a whole village.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reference was ; nade\n\n(I} (1963) 2 S'c.R. ~21.\n\n . . ,\n\nto Ex. A-128 and Ex. A-129 dated April 6, 1800 and July 5,\n\n1800. Exhibit A-128 is a letter from the President, Tanjore to the Secretary to the Government of Madras in which there is a reference to Pannimungalam. Jt is stated therein that \"the fields of Pannymungalam to the westward of Tanjore which from time immemorial have been reserved for the pasture of the drear cow do remain in the Raja's possession. There is neither village nor cultivation on these lands\".\n\nIn answer to this letter there is a communication from the Chief Secretary to the Government to the Resident, Tanjore, Ex. A-129. In para 5 of this letter it is stated: \"The fields of Pucanymangalam containing neither village nor cuitivation shall remain in the hands of Rajah for the pasturage of His Excellency's cows.\" Much reiiance was placed 6y Counsel for the appellant on these two documents, but the High Court has rightly pointed out that the identity of the lands referred to in Exs. A-128 and A-129 is doubtful. The lands in suit arc situated at least 30 miles south-east of Tanjorc town In Mannargudi taluk but in Exs. A-128 and A-129 the lands are described as westward of Tanjore. That there was Orathur village in existence even as early as 18 30 is clear from Ex. A-l 5J because in describing certain boundaries of another village it is mentioned as to the north of assessed Orathur village nadappu karai (bund pathway). Exhibit A-4 of 1868 is a Debit and Credit Balance account relating to Orathur Padugai attached to Mukasa Pannimangalam Thattimal. It is clear from this Exhibit that the entire village except the waste land was assessed. From Exhibit A-5 dated September 4, 1870, it appears that the punja lands. in Orathur village were taken on lease from the Collector of Tanjore who was the receiver and manager of the estate of the Rajah of Tanjore for a period of 5 years on payment of a total sum of Rs. 122/9/3. Exhibits A-7, A-8, A-12 to A-16 and A-18 are either Adaiyo/ai muchi/lkas or lease deeds for leasing the lands in. Orathur padugai village for a term granted by the Collector of Tanjore.\n\nIn all these documents the description is that the lands are situated in Orathur Padugai in Mokhasa Pannymangalam Thattimal.\n\nThe documents range between the years 1870 to 1875. In Ex.A-63 which is. the individual war settlement register for Pannymangalam vattam for Fasli 1296 against column 6 it is stated that the income in the matter of the anumi cultivation of sugarcane, etc., on 95 kullis is 'Rs. 4 and it is in Orathur padugai village, Pannymangalan1 vattam. Exhibit A-61 is the debit and credit balance account of Orathur padugai for Fasli 1294.\n\nSimilarly, in Ex. A-64, the individual war settlement register for Pannimangalam vattam, column 3 relating to the villaie of Orathur states ihat tlie Orathur padugai is a village and the vattam is Panniniangalam. There arc similar dos-\n\n762 SUPl.ElllE COUllT l.EPORTS\n\n(1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\ncriptions of Orathur as a village in Ex. A-65 which is the settlement register for Pannirnangalam vattam for Fasli 1297. Exhibit A-80 contains a similai description <>f Orathur village in Pannimangalam vattam.\n\nExhibits A-153 to A-155 and A-157 ire all lease deeds between the years from 1901 to 1906 relating to lea'le of lands in Orathur padugai. It is manifest that there is sufficient evidence to show that from 1868 right up to 1907 Orathur padugai was considered as a separate village. It was contended for the respondents that even after the passing of the Act Orathur padugai was treated as a separate village. Reference was made in this connection to a number of documents, E:ts. A-158, A-105,\n\nA-159, A-106, A-116, A-161, B-17, A-117 to\n\nA-120,\n\nB-18, A-121, A- I 62 and A-163. In our opinion, the finding of the lower courts that Orathur padugai is a whole village and therefore on stitutes an 'estate' within the meaning of the Acl is supported by p1 o; ier evidence and Counsel for the appellant is unable to make good his argument that the finding of the lower courts is in any way defective in law.\n\nWe proceed to consid.er the next question arising in •his case, viz .. whether the suit-lands are 'private lands' within the meaning of s. 3 ( I 0) ( b) of the Act which reads as follows :\n\n\"3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context-\n\n(I 0) 'Private land'-\n\n(b) in the case of an estate within the meaning <>f subclause ( d) of clause (2), means-\n\n( i) the domain or home-farm land of the landholder, by whatever designation known, such as, kambattam, khas, sir or pannai; nr\n\n(ii) land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years, immediately before the first day of J\\llY 1908, provided that the landholder has retained the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land; or\n\n(iii) land which is 1_Jroved to have been cultivated by landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock. for a continuous period of twelve yeallS immediately before the first day of NDvember 1933, provided that the landholder has\n\nj '\n\nretained the lmdivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land; or\n\n(iv) land the entire kudivaram in which was acquired by the landholder before the first day of No_vember 1933 for valuable consideration from a person owning the kudivaram but not the melvaram, provided that the landholder has retained the kudivararii ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land, and provided further that, where the kudivaram wa~ acquired at a sale for arrears of rent the land shall not be deemed. to be private land unless it is proved to have been cultivated oy the land holder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years since the acquisition of the land and before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.''\n\nSection 3(16) of the Act defines 'Ryoti land' as follows:\n\n\" 'Ryoti land' means cultivable land in an estate other than private land out does not include-·- ( a) beds and bunds of t; mks and of supply, drainage, surplus or irrigation channels;\n\n(b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands, village-sites, and other lands situated in any estate which are set apart for the common use of the villagers; ( c) lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted before the passing of this Act or free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the service tenure subsists.\"\n\nSection 185 of the Act enacts a presumption that land in inam village is not private land and reads as follows :\n\n\"185. When. in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether any land is the landholder's private land, regard shall be had--\n\n( 1) to local custom,\n\n(2) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subclause (a), (b), (c), or (e) of clause (2) of section 3, to the question whether the land was before the first day of Jtily 1898, specifically Jet as. private land, and\n\n(3) to any other evidence that may be produced :.\n\nProvided that the land shall be presumed not to be private land until the contrary is proved:\n\n\n[ J 968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nProvided f11rther that in the cao; e of an estate within A the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3-\n\n( i) any expression in a lease, patta or the like, executed or issued on or after the first day of July, 1918 to the effect or implying that a tenant hs no right of occupancy or that his right of occupancy is limited or restricted in any manner, shall not be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving that tile land concerned was\n\npivate land at the commencement of the tenancy; and\n\n(ii) any such expression in a leae, patta or the like, executed 0r issued before the first day of July 1918, shall not by itselfbc. sufficient for the purpose of proving that the land concerned was private land at the commencement of the tenancy.\"\n\nSecticn 6 is to the following effect :\n\n\"6. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryoi now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.\n\nExplanation ( 1 ) .-For the purposes of this sub-seciion, the expression 'every ryot now in possession' shall in elude every per; on who, having held land as a ryot continues in possesion of such la.'!d at the commencement of this Act. \"\n\nThe Subordinate Judge and the High Court have concurrently come to the conclusion, upon consideration of the e\\•idence, that the lands in suit are not private lands but ryoti lands. On hehalf of the appellant Mr. Kesava Iyengar conceded that onus is on the appellant to show that the lands are 'private lands' within the meaning of the Act, but the argument was stressed that t}ie lower courts have failed to take into account certain important documents filed on behalf of the appellant, viz .. A-128, A-129 and the Paimash account dated August 25, 1830, Ex. A-147 and the Land Registor, Ex.A-134. In our opinion. there is no warrant for the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant.\n\nAs regards Exs. A-128 and A-129 it is apparent that apart from the question as to the identity of the land, they relate to a period p=-ious to the grant of 1862 which alone constitules the root of title of the grantees and there is no question of restoration or revival of any anterior right.\n\nThe same rcallOtjing applies to the Paimash account dated August 25, 1830, Ex.\n\nA-147 which\n\n, ...\n\n,,.~··\n\nCH!DAMBARAM v. T. K. B. ODAYAR (Ramaswami, I.) 765\n\ncannot, therefore, be held to be of much relevance in this connection.\n\nReliance was placed on behalf of the. appellant on Ex.\n\nA-134, the Land Register for Pannimangalam which shows that in Orathur Thauimal Padugai\" which consists of Punjais (dry lands) and arc rain-fed, the land-holder (the Tanjore Palace Estate) owns both the warams (lruwaram in vernacular). It was argued for the appellant that the expression 'lruwaram' means that the land was owned as Pannai or private Janda.\n\nReference wa' made to the record of rights and Irrigation Memoir dated January ) 3, 1935, Ex. B-8 which shows that. the Janda are lr111mram and there are no wet lands.\n\nBut the use of the expression \"Jruwaram\" in these dccuments is not decisivt; of the question whether the land is private land of the appellant or not.\n\nUnder s. 3 ( 10) of the Act. private land comprises of two cam. gories. private hmds technically so-called. and lands deemed to be private lands.\n\nJn regard to private lands technically so-called, it must be the domain or home-farm land of the landholder aa understood in law.\n\nThe mere fact that particular lands are described in popular parlance as pannai kambattam. sir, khas, is not decisive of the question unless the lands so-called partake of the characteristics of domain or homefarm lands. In our opinion the correct test to ascertain whether a land is domain or. home-farm is that accepted by the Judicial Commi1tee in Yerlagadda. Malikarjtma Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya('), that is, whether it is land which a zamindar has cultivated himself and intends to retain as resumable for cultivation by himself even if from time to time he demises for a season. The Legislature did not use the words 'domain or home-farm land' without attaching to them a meaning; and it is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature would attach to these words the meaning which would be given to them in ordinary English.\n\nIt seems to us that the sub-clause {b )(i) of the' definition is intended to cover those lands which come obviously within Y:hat would ordinarily be recognised as the domain or home-farm, that is to say, lands appurtenant to the landholder's residence and kept for his enjoyment and use: The home-farm is land which the landlord cultivates himsef, as distinct from land which he lets out to tenants to be farmed. The first clause is, therefore meant to include and signify those lands which are in the ordinary sense of . the word home-farm lands.\n\nThe other clauses of the definition appear to deal with those lands which would not r.ecessarily be regarded as home-farm lands in the ordinary usage of the term; and with reference to those lands there is a proviso that lands purchased at a sale for arrears of revenue shall not he regarded as private lands unless cultivated directly by the landlord for the required nerimL It seems to us that the definition reads as a whole\n\n(ll .1.1..R. 42 Mad. 4\n\n(P.C.).\n\nL3 Sup. Cl/68-5\n\n166 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nindica~ clearly that the ordinary test for 'private land' is the test of retention by the landholder for his personal use and cultivation by him or under his personal super>'ision.\n\nNo doubt, auch lands may be let on short leases for the convenience of the landholder without losing their distinctive character; but it is not the intention or the scheme of the Act to treat as private those lands with ref.erence to which the only peculiarity is the fact that the landJgrd owns both the warams in the lands and has been letting them out on short term leases. There must, iu our opinion be something in the evidence either by way of pro0f of direct cultivation o• by some clear indication of an intent to regard these lands as retained for the personal use of the landholder and his establishment in order to place those lands in the apecial c; itegory of private lands in which a tenant under the Act cannot acquire occupancy rights.\n\nIn the present case there\n\ni~ no proof that the lands were ever directly cultivated by the landholder.\n\nAdmittedly, soon after the grant of 1862 the estate came under the administration of Receivers, who always let out the lands to the tenants t0 be cultivated. In Ex. B-8, the Record of Rights the lands are entered in column 5 as Punja ot dry land. In column 4 which requires the entry to be made as private land they arc not entered as private lands. Ii was argued for the appellant that the lands are sometimes called 'Padugai' and that the expression meant that the lands were within the ftood bank\n\nand forming part of the river bed.\n\nBut the description of the land as 'Padugai' is not of much consequence because they are also called as Orathur 'Thottam', thottam meaning a garden where garden crops are raised to distinguish it from paddy fields.\n\nIt appears that the lands actually lie between two rivers and comprise more than l 00 acres, and by their physical feature cannot be 'padugai' in the sense in which the term is normally used. The argument was stressed on bel}alf of the appellant that leasing rights of the land were auctioned periodically. But the Righ Court has observed that one and the same tenant continued to bid at the auction and there was evidence that tenants continued\n\nto cultivate the lands without break or change, and the fact that there were periodical auctions of the lease right~ ldid not necesc sarily deprive the tenants of the occupancy tjghts which they. were enjoying. We accordingly hold that the appellant has. not G adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under s. 185 of the Act that the lands in the inam village are not private lands . and the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case must be rejected.\n\nFor the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the Madras High Court dated January 10, 1956 is correct and these appeals must be dismissed with costs--0ne set of hearing fee.\n\nG. C.\n\nAppeals dismis.fed.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "T. S. PL. P. CHIDAMBARAM CHETI1AR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. S. PL. P. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nT. K. B. SANTHANARAMASWAMI ODAYAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. K. B. SANTHANARAMASWAMI ODAYAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "statute": "Madras Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(10)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Estates Land Act", "statute": "Madras Estates Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lands Act I of 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1335, "end_char": 1354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(16)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1397, "end_char": 1405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lands Act I of 1908", "statute": "Lands Act I of 1908"}}, {"text": "Madras High Coult", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Coult affirmed the decree, whereupon the appellant came to thia Court."}}, {"text": "Tanjore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1747, "end_char": 1754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3(2)(d) of the afore .. id Act be<:ausc the r....toration of the land to the widows of the Raja of Tanjore did not amount to a fresh grant but only a restoration of the .ftaJus quo aJt1t;\n\n(ii) that Grathur Padugai was not a whole vinage \"'' required by the definition ol 'estate'; (iii) the widows of the Raja enjoyed both the •wa..,.ms' and tho\n\nla.ado pW'chascd by the appellant were 'private lands' in•· 3(10)(b) so that the defendants did not have any occupancy rights therein."}}, {"text": "Grathur Padugai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3(2)(d) of the afore .. id Act be<:ausc the r....toration of the land to the widows of the Raja of Tanjore did not amount to a fresh grant but only a restoration of the .ftaJus quo aJt1t;\n\n(ii) that Grathur Padugai was not a whole vinage \"'' required by the definition ol 'estate'; (iii) the widows of the Raja enjoyed both the •wa..,.ms' and tho\n\nla.ado pW'chascd by the appellant were 'private lands' in•· 3(10)(b) so that the defendants did not have any occupancy rights therein.", "canonical_name": "Grathur Padugai"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2170, "end_char": 2189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HF.LO : (i) The relinquishment by the Government of India in favour of the widows of the Raja in 1862 ..... a fresh grant a.< already held in s~ cases."}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Estates Landll Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1963) 2 S.C.R. 421", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3155, "end_char": 3163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estates Landll Act", "statute": "Estates Landll Act"}}, {"text": "s. 185", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 10. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated January 10."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Kesava Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'R. Kesava Iyengar, R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'R. Kesava Iyengar, R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'R. Kesava Iyengar, R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4781, "end_char": 4794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pi//ai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4871, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. K. Pi//ai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Cour~ was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. These appeals are brought against the judgment and decree in A.S. nos.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Tanjore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5384, "end_char": 5410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75\"; 77 to 81 of 1949 and 19 to 22, 24 to 26, 28 & 30 to 31 of 1950 of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore."}}, {"text": "Pannimangalam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5802, "end_char": 5815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-145) are situated in Orathur Padugai which is attached to Pannimangalam, one of the villages comprised in what is known as the \"Tanjore Palace Estate'', that\n\nSUPRF.MI!"}}, {"text": "Land Act I of 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Act I of 1908", "statute": "Land Act I of 1908"}}, {"text": "Octobor 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7013, "end_char": 7029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his two judgments dated Octobor 31, 1950 and February 2, 1951, the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore dismissed the suits, holding that the lands were situnted in an estate and w. ce 'ryoti lands' in which the defendants w1rc entitled to occupancy rights."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7034, "end_char": 7050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his two judgments dated Octobor 31, 1950 and February 2, 1951, the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore dismissed the suits, holding that the lands were situnted in an estate and w. ce 'ryoti lands' in which the defendants w1rc entitled to occupancy rights."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7545, "end_char": 7549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9274, "end_char": 9278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9286, "end_char": 9307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1945", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1945"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9415, "end_char": 9419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1945", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1945"}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1968] 2 S.CR.\n\n1936", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10173, "end_char": 10193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10293, "end_char": 10302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "statute": "the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Madras'High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is wcll•known and will be found in various reported decisions of the Judicial Committee and of the Madras'High Court : (Sec\n\nJijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v.\n\nKm1u.lshi Bayi Saiba('), Su11daram Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar('), Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer (3) and Chota Raja Saheb Mohitai v. Sund ram Iyer(')."}}, {"text": "Serfoji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1799, Serfoji, the then Raja of Tanjore, surrendered\n\nhis terri1ory into the hands of the East India Company, but he was allowed to retain possession of certain villges and lands which constitu1ed his private property."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11253, "end_char": 11271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1799, Serfoji, the then Raja of Tanjore, surrendered\n\nhis terri1ory into the hands of the East India Company, but he was allowed to retain possession of certain villges and lands which constitu1ed his private property."}}, {"text": "aja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11407, "end_char": 11410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When his son the lasl }{aja died in 1855 without leaving male issue.", "canonical_name": "Rajah"}}, {"text": "Kamachee Boye Sahaba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11575, "end_char": 11595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamachee Boye Sahaba filed a Bill on the Enquiry Side of the Supreme Court of Madras, and obtained a decree lhat the seizure of the private properties was wrong."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamachee Boye Sahaba filed a Bill on the Enquiry Side of the Supreme Court of Madras, and obtained a decree lhat the seizure of the private properties was wrong."}}, {"text": "Tanjore Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12077, "end_char": 12088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, a memorial was submitted to the Queen and in 1862 the Government of India which had succeeded the East India Company \"sanctioned the relinquishment cf the whole of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj in favour of the heirs of the late Raja\"."}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12124, "end_char": 12128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, a memorial was submitted to the Queen and in 1862 the Government of India which had succeeded the East India Company \"sanctioned the relinquishment cf the whole of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj in favour of the heirs of the late Raja\".", "canonical_name": "Rajah"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12199, "end_char": 12205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under instructions from the Government of India, the Government of Madras, on August 2 f, 1862, passed an order the material part of which is as follows :\n\n\"In Col."}}, {"text": "August 2 f, 1862", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12210, "end_char": 12226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under instructions from the Government of India, the Government of Madras, on August 2 f, 1862, passed an order the material part of which is as follows :\n\n\"In Col."}}, {"text": "Durand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12297, "end_char": 12303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Durand's letter above recorded the Govrn ment of India have furnished their instructions with\n\nreference to the disposal of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj regarding whicfi this Government addressed them under date the 17th May last."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12346, "end_char": 12351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Durand's letter above recorded the Govrn ment of India have furnished their instructions with\n\nreference to the disposal of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj regarding whicfi this Government addressed them under date the 17th May last."}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12931, "end_char": 12948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as State property, and since the plea in equity and policy, for treating them as the private property of the Raja is so stront1 that it commands the unanimous support of the members of the Madras Government,' the whole of the lands are to bq relinquished in favour of the heirs of the late Raja (page 228).\""}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14186, "end_char": 14204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention was that what actually happened in 1862 was the restoration of the status quo anttt rather than a fresh grant by the British Government."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14875, "end_char": 14883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer(•), Spencer, 0.C.J.,\n\nappeare<l to doubt the decision -0f Scotland, C.J., in Jijqyi.::mba Bayi Saiba v; Kamakshi Bayi Saiba(') that there was a grant of grace and favour in 1862."}}, {"text": "British. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16058, "end_char": 16077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The root of title of the grantees was the Government Order of i 862 and it was therefore held that the restoration amounted to a grant in inam by the British."}}, {"text": "Orathur Padugai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16400, "end_char": 16415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orathur Padugai, constitutes a whole village and therefore nn estate within the meaning of s. 3(2) (d) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Grathur Padugai"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16491, "end_char": 16498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orathur Padugai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention was rejected by both the lower courts which concurrently held that the lands were located in Orathur Padugai, a whole village by itself or a named village and therefore an estate within the meaning of the Acl."}}, {"text": "Ordthur Padugai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17930, "end_char": 17945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is manifest therefore that there is sufficient mattrial to how that at least since 1830 onwards Ordthur Padugai is a whole village."}}, {"text": "Pucanymangalam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18703, "end_char": 18717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 5 of this letter it is stated: \"The fields of Pucanymangalam containing neither village nor cuitivation shall remain in the hands of Rajah for the pasturage of His Excellency's cows.\""}}, {"text": "Rajah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18790, "end_char": 18795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 5 of this letter it is stated: \"The fields of Pucanymangalam containing neither village nor cuitivation shall remain in the hands of Rajah for the pasturage of His Excellency's cows.\"", "canonical_name": "Rajah"}}, {"text": "Mannargudi taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19121, "end_char": 19137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in suit arc situated at least 30 miles south-east of Tanjorc town In Mannargudi taluk but in Exs."}}, {"text": "nadappu karai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19426, "end_char": 19439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-l 5J because in describing certain boundaries of another village it is mentioned as to the north of assessed Orathur village nadappu karai (bund pathway)."}}, {"text": "Orathur Padugai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19526, "end_char": 19541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit A-4 of 1868 is a Debit and Credit Balance account relating to Orathur Padugai attached to Mukasa Pannimangalam Thattimal.", "canonical_name": "Grathur Padugai"}}, {"text": "Mukasa Pannimangalam Thattimal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19554, "end_char": 19584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit A-4 of 1868 is a Debit and Credit Balance account relating to Orathur Padugai attached to Mukasa Pannimangalam Thattimal."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1870", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Exhibit A-5 dated September 4, 1870, it appears that the punja lands."}}, {"text": "Orathur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19754, "end_char": 19769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Orathur village were taken on lease from the Collector of Tanjore who was the receiver and manager of the estate of the Rajah of Tanjore for a period of 5 years on payment of a total sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Orathur padugai village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20071, "end_char": 20094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orathur padugai village for a term granted by the Collector of Tanjore."}}, {"text": "Orathur padugai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21424, "end_char": 21439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is manifest that there is sufficient evidence to show that from 1868 right up to 1907 Orathur padugai was considered as a separate village."}}, {"text": "Orathur padugai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21827, "end_char": 21842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the finding of the lower courts that Orathur padugai is a whole village and therefore on stitutes an 'estate' within the meaning of the Acl is supported by p1 o; ier evidence and Counsel for the appellant is unable to make good his argument that the finding of the lower courts is in any way defective in law.", "canonical_name": "Grathur Padugai"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22237, "end_char": 22241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(16)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24098, "end_char": 24111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 185", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24706, "end_char": 24717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25089, "end_char": 25098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25485, "end_char": 25494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kesava Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26886, "end_char": 26900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hehalf of the appellant Mr. Kesava Iyengar conceded that onus is on the appellant to show that the lands are 'private lands' within the meaning of the Act, but the argument was stressed that t}ie lower courts have failed to take into account certain important documents filed on behalf of the appellant, viz .. A-128, A-129 and the Paimash account dated August 25, 1830, Ex."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1830", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27212, "end_char": 27227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hehalf of the appellant Mr. Kesava Iyengar conceded that onus is on the appellant to show that the lands are 'private lands' within the meaning of the Act, but the argument was stressed that t}ie lower courts have failed to take into account certain important documents filed on behalf of the appellant, viz .. A-128, A-129 and the Paimash account dated August 25, 1830, Ex."}}, {"text": "January ) 3, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28374, "end_char": 28391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference wa' made to the record of rights and Irrigation Memoir dated January ) 3, 1935, Ex."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28630, "end_char": 28634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 185", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33366, "end_char": 33372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 10, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33606, "end_char": 33622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the Madras High Court dated January 10, 1956 is correct and these appeals must be dismissed with costs--0ne set of hearing fee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_767_777_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "M~I\n\n.DIXIT & ANOTHER\n\nBHRIGUNATH & OTHERS\n\nJanuary 12, 1968\n\nB (J. C. SHAH, V. IUMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.j\n\nU.P. Zamlndari Abolition and Land Reforms A.ct (lf.P. I of 1951 ), u. 152, 171, 112r-Jnheritance by Hindu widow-Become> bhumidhdr- Whether life estate.\n\nOn the death of her husband, certain cultivatory lands devolved on a indu widow. . She became a bhumidhar on the enactment of the U.P.\n\nZamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1951. Thereafter ahe gifted the lands to respondents I _and 2. On her death, the appellants, whp were reversioners to her husband's estate filed a suit claiming that the widow had only a life-estate in the bhumidhari lands, and therefore. the gift which was to enure beyond her life time was incompetent. The end\n\nwas dismissed. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, _\n\nHELD : There is nothing in the Act which indicates that when ,. female who inherits the rights of a bhumidhar, under s. 171 or s. 172 0< a. 172A, any residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Under the Act she is the owner of the property : the entire estate is vested in hes:.\n\nAbsence of testamentary power in a female bhumidhar qua her holding is reconcilble with devolution upon the heirs of the female bhumidhar •. and an absolute title during her life time. That is clearly illnstrated by 1he nature of the interest which the heirs of the classes referred to in s. 172(~\n\n(a) (ii) hold. [774 H, 776 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 458 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 10, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 1315 of 1958.\n\nF J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kum4T, fpr respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J, One Raj Kishore was possessed of sir and khudka..Wrl lands, which on his death in 1923 devolved upon his widow Sanwari. With the coming into force on July 1, 1952, of the U.P, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951, Sanwari acquired the status of a bhumidhar in respect of those sir. and khudkasht lands. On December 18, 1952, Sanwari made a gift of the bhumidhari lands in favour of respondents 1 & 2. Sanwari died in 1954. Claiming to be the nearest reversioners to the estare of Raj Kishore, the appellants commenced an action in the Court of Munsif, Deoria, for a declaration of their title to the lands gifted by Sanwari, and for a decree for possession of those lands on the\n\n768 SUPREME COURT RLl'ORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\npica, inter alia, that holding only a Hindu widow's estate in the bhumidhari lands Sanwari was incompetent to create an interest by gift which was to enure beyond hr lifetime.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, and the decree was confinr.ed in appeal by the Additional Civil Judge, Deoria.\n\nIn second appeal before the High Court of Allahabad Desai, C.J., and S. N. Dwivedi, J., agreed with lhe judgments of the courlS below. Jagadish Sahai, J., was of the opinion that Sanwari held in the bhumidhari lands ill dispute only a life estate.\n\nAgainst the decree of the High Court sonfirming the decree of the District Court, the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.\n\nThe U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act l of 1951 was primarily intended to abolish the rights of intermediaries and to define the inletest of various classes of holders in possession •f agricultural lands who since the extinction of the rights <>f interlllediaries had direct relation with the State.\n\nBy s. 4 on the com- 111encement of !he Act all estates situate ill Uttar Pradesh stood transferred to and vested in the Slate free from all encumbrances.\n\nEtinction of the interest of rhe intermediaries did not however affect the interest of the tenants in the land who derivi:d their rlght of occupation from the intermediaries. By s. 129, for the purpose of the Act, there were to be three classes of tenure-holders-(!) bhumidhars; (2) sirdars and (3) asamis. Bys. !30 every person belonging to one cf the classes specified in els. (a) & (b) was tc be a hh11midhar and was to have all the rights and to be subject to all the liabilities, conferred or imposed upon bh11midhflrs by or under the Act. The persons so entitled to bhumidhari rights were-(}) all persons who as a consequence of the acquisition n~ .:stales became bhumidhars under s.18; and ( 2) all persons who acquired the rights of bhumidhars under or in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section I 8 provided, subject to exceptions not material for the purpose of this appeal, !.hat all lands of the descriptions in els. (a) to (e) shall on the dote immediately preceding the date of\n\nvsting be deemed to be settled by lhe State with tlie intermediary. lessee, tenant, grantee or grove-holder, as the case may be, who shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be entitled to rnkc or retain possession as a bhumidhar thereof.\n\nPersons belonging to\n\nth~ classes mentioned ins. 3 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act. 1949, who had obtained the declaration referred to in s. 6 of that A':t in respect of any holding or share thereof were also to be deemed bh11midhars of the holding or the share therein in respect of which the declaration had been made and continued in force.\n\nSection 134 provided for acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a sirdar, by paying to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable or deemed to be payable on the date of application for the land of which he is the sirdar. The Act provided by\n\nRAMJI DIX!T V. BHRIGUNATH (Shah, /.) 769\n\n' 189 that the interest of a bhumidhar in his holding or any part thereof shall be extinguishtd-(a) when he dies intestate leaving no heir entitled to inherit in accordance with the , provisions of the Act; (aa) when the holding or part thereof has beeJ!, transferred or let out in contravention of the provisions of the Act; (b) when the land comprised in the holding has. been ac~ .quired under any law for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of land, or (c) when he has been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barred by limitation.\n\nBy s. 152 it was provided that :\n\n\"The interest of a bhumidhar shall be transferable subject to the conditions hereinafter contained in. this chapter.\"\n\nRestrktions on the rights of a bhumidhar to transfer a holding by sale, gift, mortgage, lease and exchange were prescribed hr ss. 154, 155, 156 and 165 and transfers in contravention of the\n\nprovisions rendered the bhumidhars liable to eviction from the holding.\n\nSection 169 provided :\n\n\" ( l) A bhumi'dhar may by will bequeath his holding or any part thereof except as provided in sub-section (2).\n\n(2) No bhumidhar entitled to any holding or part in the right of a widow, widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, mother, daughter, father's mother, son's daughter, sister or half-sister being the daughter of the same father as the deceased, may bequeath by will such holding or part.\n\n(3)\n\nSection 171 provided, inter alia, that subject to the prov1s1ons of s. 169, when a bhumidhar being a male dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve. upon classes of heirs male and female-in\n\nthe order of succession given in els. (a) to (r). The section wa .amended from time to time.\n\nFemales who were entitled te inherit to the holding under the section as finally amended hr Act 37 of 1958 were-(a) widow of a predeceased male lineal descendant who has not remarried when there were male descendants; (b) widow and widowed mother and widow of a predeceased male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, who had not re-married; (ee) unmarried daughter; (ff) unmarried sister; (g) married daughter; (m) married sister; (n) half-sister being the daul!hter of the same father as the deceased. Section 172(1} provided, inter alia, that on the death or marriage of a woman who had inherited. the interest in the holding after the, date of vesting under the Act, as an heir to a mafe bhumidhar, as a\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1968] 2 S.C.ll..\n\nwidow, widow of a male lineal descendant, mother, father's mother, daughter, son's daughter or sister or half-sister of the last holder, the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir determined in accordance with the provisions of s. 171 of the last male bhumidhar, and the same rule of devolution shall he followed when the female abandons or surrenders the holding.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 172 dealt with devolution of int., rest on the death of a female bhumidhar belonging to any of the classes listed in sub-s. (I) who had inherited an interest in any holding before the date of vesting, as an intermediary of the land comprised in the holding, or held the holding as a tenant belonging to the classes specified.\n\nIf the female holder was entitled to a limited estate in the holding in accordance with the personal law, the interest\n\nwa~ to devolve upon the nearest surviving heirs in accordance with the provisions of s. 1 71 of the last male intermediary or tenant of the land, and if she was under the personal law entitled to the holding absfllutely, it was to devolve in accordance with the table in s. 174. It was further provided that where a female bhumidhar of any of the classes mentioned in sub-s. (2) dies, abandons or surrenders and wher~ the female being a widow, widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, mother, father's mother, manies and such bhumidhar on the date inuoediately before the date held the holding otherwise than as an intermediary or tenant referred to in cl. (a) of s. 172(2), the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviYing heir of the last male tenant, ascertained in accordane with the provisions of s. 171.\n\nSection 172A, which was incorporated by Act 30 of 1954, provided that where an inferior female tenureholdPr like a sirdar or an adhivasi has inherited any interest in any holding in any of the relationships mentioned in s. 171 (2) and has acquired the rights of a bhumidhar in such land, the right so acquired shall for purposes of devolution under s. 172 be deemed to be accession to the holding of the last male holder thereof.\n\nSection 17 4 provided, inter alia, that when a female bhumidhar, [other than a bhumidhar mentioned in ss. 171 (sic.) or 172] dies, her interest in the holdinj! shall devolve in accordance with\n\ntJie order of succession given in that section.\n\nBy that list, the predeceased son's widow and predeceased son's predeceased sm:i's widow, daughter, mother and sister were the female heirs competent to inherit the holding. Section 175 provided that in the case or a co-widow, or a co-tenure-bolder, who dies leaving no heir entitled to succeed under the provisions of the Act, the interest shall pass by survivorship.\n\nSection 152 expressly provides that the interest of a bhumidhar shall be transferable, subject to the conditions contained in Ch. VIH.\n\nThe conditions to which the transfet is subject are to be found in ss. 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 164 and 165\n\nff ·•\n\nP.AMJI DIXIT v. BHRIGUNATH (Shah., /.) 771\n\nThese conditions do not purport to qualify the interest or the title in the holding of a bhumidhar.: they merely impose restrictions upon the right of a bhumidhar to transfer his interest. By s. 152 no distinction is made between the power to transfer the\n\ninterest by act inter vivas by a male bhumidhar and a female. bhumidhar. Prima faciq, therefore. the power of a female bhum1dhar to transfer her interest in a holding by act inter vivas is as extensive as the power which a male bhumidhar may exercise in respect of his interest in a holding.\n\nBy s. 169 (1) a bhumidhar is declared competent by will to 'bequeath his holding or any part thereof except as provided in sub-s. (2). But a female\n\nbhumidhar belonging to any of the classes specified in sulH.\n\n(2) is declared incompetent to bequeath by will her holding.\n\nThis restriction operates against every female bhumidhar entitled to a holding in the right of a female relation mentioned in sub. s. (2). It is plain on the words of the statute that a female who is entitled to the holding in the right of a widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line, or mother, daughter, father's mother,\n\noon's daughter, sister or half-sister, whether under s. 171 or under s. 17 4, is declared incompetent to bequeath the holding by\n\nwill.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contends that s. 152 makes the interest in a holding of a bhumidhar whether male or female tramferab!e, but it is not intended thereby to declare thai the inter~! of a female bhumidhar is in all cases absolute. Undoubtedly, if the interest of a bhumidhar in a holding is limited, he cannot tramlllit a larger interest than his own. But there is no express provision in the Act which defines the interest of a female bhumidh11r under the Act.\n\nIt is common ground that the personal Jaw of inheritance of the holder does not determine the nature of the estate vested in i a female bhumidhar. Counsel for the appellant says, however, that the Act contains, indications that the interest of a female bhumidhar extends only to a life-interest in the holding held by her.\n\nThose indications are, according to counsel for the appellant-(a) to females of the. classes mentioned in s. 169\n\n(2) the right to make a testamentary disposition of bhumidhari holding was expressly denied; (b) on the death of a female bhumidhar who had inherited the holding under s. 171 from a male bhumidhar or on abandonment or surrender by her the holding devolves not upon her heirs but upon the nearest surviving heirs of the last male bhumidhar; ( c) on the death of a female belonging tc any of the classes mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 172 who had inherited the land comprised in the holding before the date of vesting and was in accordance with the personal law applicable to her entitled to a life-estate only in the holding, the holding devolves up011 the nearest surviving heirs of the last male intermediary or the tenant and in the case of .a female tenure-holder\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nnot belonging to the classes mentioned in s. 172(2) (a) the holding devolves on death, ab:indonment or surrender upon the heirs mentioned in s. 171 of the last male tenant; (d) the right of the female heir belonging to the classes specified in s. 172( 1) who inherited the holding under s. 171 and of a widow, widow of a male linGal descendant in the nialc line, mother, and father's mother who has inherited beFore the datP. of vesting and docs not fa!l within s. I 72(2)(a) is forfeited upon marriage or remarriage; and (cl by s. I 72A interest acquired by a female heir inheriting an interest in any holding as a sirdar or an adhivmi when converted into a bhumidhari interest under s. 134 or s. 235 is for the purpose of devolution under s: 172 to be deemed an accession to the holding of the last male holder.\n\nThese provisions, counsel con1cnds, clearly indicate that the interest of the female bhumidhars mentioned ins. 169(2) is not intended to cnure beyond her lifc.; imc and is liable to be extinguished in certain conditions even during her life-time, and is on that account merely a life-interest.\n\nWe are un:1blc to accept this submission as. correct. Counsel for the 11ppcllants asks us to infer that th_c estate of a female bhumidhar !ailing within sub-s. (2) of s. 169 is a life-interest as a matter of necessary implication from the express denial of the right to llcqueath the holding and devolution according to special rules on llcath, abandonment or surrender, and forfeiture on marriage or 1emarriage in certain cases.\n\nBut there is, in our judgment, nca discernible relation between the nature of the-estate of a female bolder, and the restriction placed upon the power of testamentary disposition or the special rules of devolution of the holding of -a female bhumidhar on death, abandonment or surrender, or forfeiture resulting from marriage or remarriage.\n\nFrom the vari- '1tls provisions made in the Act it is impossible to evolve any eonsistent or logical pattern, indicating that the LegL, Jaturc '.nlendcd by imrosing the special rules of devolution of the interest of a female bhumidhar on death, marriage, abandonment or surnder, to make her tenure in the holdmg a mere life-estate.\n\nRestriction on the power of testamentary disposition is not imposed upon only those females who inherit the holding under\n\n1. 171 on the death of a male bhumidhar. It applies alike to thD\n\ntenure of a female bhumidhar who inherits the holding from a female hhumidhar under s. 174, and from a male bhumidhar under s. 171.\n\nA female bhumidhar under s. 174 apparently has an absolute interest in her holding: the persons who inhcri' 'he holding from her accnrdin~ to the order of succession mentioned in s. 174 also take the holding in absolute right.\n\nIn the table of heirs in s. 174 arc included a predeceased son's widow, a nrrdeceased son's predeceJsed son's widow, daughter, mother nd sister. and there 0cin2 no indication to the contrary the holding of a female bhumidhar will devolve upon those female heirs in\n\n' B\n\nabsolute right.\n\nThose heirs arc included in the list of female heirs in s. 169(2). The result is that while under s. 174 the\n\nfemale heir would take the holding on inheritance .from a female with full power to transfer by act inter vivos, she would still be subject to a restriction on her power of testamentary disposition.\n\nAgain the female heir of any of the classes mentione<i ins. 172(2)\n\n(a) (ii) who is entitled to a holding absoluiely though not liable to be divested on marriage also is incompetent to bequeath her holding, if she has inherited it in the right of any of the fetnalt: relations mentioned in s. 169(2). The rule that on death or marriage of a female bhumidhar who has inherited a holding under s. 1.71 the holding will devolve upon the heirs of the last male bhumidhar also does not imply that her tenure is merely of a holder for life.\n\nUnder the general law, a restriction upon the power of testamentary disposition docs not necessarily carry with it a limitation upon the tenure of the holder so as to restrict the power of disposition inter vfros.\n\nIt is well-recognized that a II)Uslim by his personal Jaw is incompetent to dispose of property exceeding a third without the consent of the heirs. But it caqnot be sugge<\"..;; d\n\nthat his power of disposition inter vivos is on that account restricted.\n\nCounsel for the appellants asked us to assume that sub-s. (2) of s. 169 only applies to holdings inherited by female heirs from male bhumidhars under s. 171.\n\nBut the Legislature has made no such express provision, and we are unable to hold that such a reservation is implied. The fact that in sub-s. _(2) of s. 169 as it stands enacted after amendment by Act XXi of 1954 all females who inherit the holding from a male bhumidhar under s. 171 are listed as incompetent to bequeath a holding is a very slender foundation for inferring the legislative intent that the restriction upon the power of disposition is sought to be limited to females who inherit the holding under s. 171.\n\nIt may be noticed that under s. 171 as originally enacted, the widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent was an heir to male bhumidlrar, but she was not disqualified from bequeathing the holding tmder s. 169(2) as originally enacted.\n\nOther indications to the contrary may also be gathered from the amendments made by the Legislature in ss. 169(2) and 171 from time to time. Under s. 169(2) as originally enacted, amongst the classes of persons who were prohihitcd from making a testamentary disposition was the' father's father.\n\nBy s. 173 of the Act when a bhumidhar inheriting an interest in a holding as a father's frther, whether before or after the date of vesting, died, abandoned, or surrendered such hokli11g. the holding was to devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (ascertained in accordance with s. 171 ) of the last male bliumidhar from whom the father's father had inherited the holding.\n\nBy Act XX of 1954, s. 173\n\n77-i\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nwas repealed, and reference to the father's father was delctzd\n\nfrom the list of heirs incompetent to bequeath by will a bhum~ hari holding. If denial of testamentary power to a holder of bhumidhari land implied that the b0lder had merely a liftate to the Legislature must be imputed an intention to convert what was a life-interest till Act XX of 1954 was passed into an absolute estate. The position of a father's father in the scheme of the Act before and after the amendment of the Act in I 954 would, if the argument of the appellant be accepted, furnish a striking illustration of obscurity in the provisions of the Act.\n\nA review of other provisions enacted in the Act from time to time also doc.; not indicate anv definite scheme, or disclose an intention to confer merely a life-estate only upon female heirs of bhumidhars. By s. 169 as origir; ally enacted by sub-s. (2) the widow, mother, step-mother, father's father, father's mother, unmarried daughter and unmarried sister were not competent to\n\nxercise the power of testamentary disposition of the holding.\n\nWe have already referred to the omission of the widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent who was one of the heirs under s. 171 from the list of female heirs who were not prohibited by s. 169(2), as it stood before it was amended by Act XX of 1954, from making testamentary disposition.\n\nBy the amendment made by Act XX of 1954 restrictions upon the poW'CI£ of testamentary disposition applied only to female bhumidhars who inherited the holding in the right of the specified relatiom.\n\nFor the first time a married daughter or married sister and a half- <ister were given separate places in the list of heirs in s. 171(1) by Act 37 of 158-an unmarried daughter being preferred to a married daughter, and an unmarried sister to a married sister, bnt half-sisters married and unmarried took the holding simultaneously.\n\nAfter the amendment of the Act by Act 37 of 1958, an unmarried daughter was entitled to inherit the holding of hec father, but ber interest was forfeited on marriage, wherea., a married daughter was entitled to inherit the holding. By the Act therefore the interest in the holding of an unmarried daughter or unmarried sister was forfeited, but a married dau)!hter or married 'ister was an heir to the holding of a male bhumidhar.\n\nThe principle contended for by counsel for the appellant is also not discernible in the scheme of s. 172.\n\nWhen a female bhumidhar mentioned ins. 172(2) (a) (ii) dies or a female bhumidhar mentioned ins. 172(2)(b) who has inherited the holding before the date of vesting as a daughter, son's daughter, sister or half-sister marries, the holding will not devolve upon the heirs H of the last male holder, but upon her heirs under s. 174, but the holding may still not be bequeathed by her by will.\n\nAbsence of testamentary power in a female bhumidhar qua her holding is •\n\nreconcilable with devolution upon the heirs of the female bhumidhar, and an absolute title during her life-time.\n\nThat is clearly illustrated by the nature of the interest which the heirs of the classes referred to in s. 172(2)(a)(ii) hold.\n\nIt is in the circumstances difficult to draw any inference from the various provisions which do not disclose any logical or systematic pattern that it was intended to impose upon a female heir mentioned in the list in s. 169(2) a limitation that she was, notwithstanding the amplitude of the expressions used in s. 152, not competent to dispose of her interest beyond her life-time.\n\nIt was urged that the Legislature has by using two different expressions \"interest\" and \"holding\" in s. 172 indicated that the expression \"interest\" may in the case of a female heir indicate a life-interest in the holding.\n\nBy s. 152 it is expressly enacted that the interest of a bhumidhar shall be transferable.\n\nIt is true that no person .can convey a larger interest than what he posse5ses. But there is nothing in s. 152 from which it may be inferred that the interest of a female bhumidhar is anything less than the interest held by a male bhumidhar. Section 169(1) provides that a bhumidhar may by will bequeath his holding .or any part thereof, except as provided in sub-s. (2), and sub-s. (2) prohibits female bhumidhars of the classes mentione'I therein from making a bequest by will of the holding or any part thereof.\n\nSection 169 seeks to make no distinction between the holding and interest in a holding. Even in s. 171 the right or a male bhumidhar for the purpose of devolution upon his heirs-male as well as female-~ referred to as \"interest\". In s. 172, however, the Legislature has enacted that a bhumidhar who has after the date of vesting inherited an interest in any holding as a widow, (to use a compendious expression), or as a daughter or a sister, when she marries, dies, abandons or surrenders such holding or part thereof, the holdinR or any part thereof shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir.\n\nIt was argued that the Legislature has designated the estate inherited by a female as a bhumidhar as \"interest\" and the devolution in the contingencies mentioned as of the \"holding\".\n\nSimilar phraseology is used in sub-s. (2) of s. 172, which speaks of inheritance of an \"interest\" and devolution of the \"holding\" upon the heirs.\n\nThe same schemes is also adopted in s. 172A.\n\nWhere a sirdar or an adhivasi acquires an interest in any holding and then acquire the rights of a bhumidhar it is orovided by s. l 72A that the rights so acquired shall be deemed to be accession to the holding of the last male holder. But in s. 174 it is provided that the \"interest\" of a female bhumidhar, sirdar or asami, other than a bhumidhar. sirdar or asami mentioned in s. 17l or ' I 72 on her death devolves in accordance with the order of succession mentioned in that section.\n\nThe difference in phraseo-\n\nSUPRF.ME. COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nlogy, in our judgment, docs not indicate that the expression \"inte rest\" of a female heir in a holding has a restricted connotation.\n\nThe two exprcs, ions have been indi, criminatcly used.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act which indicates that when a female who inherits the rights of a bhumidhar, under s. 171 or s. 172 or s. 172A, any residuary interest remains vested in any other person.\n\nUnder the Act she is the owner of the property : the entire estate is vested in her.\n\nIt is a fundamental rule of our jurisprudence that an estate docs not remain in abeyance. If ii\n\nwas intended by the Legislature that the interest inherited hy a female mentioned in s. 171 was to be a life-interest, there wnuld be some indication that the rcversionary or residuary intcres• remains vested in another person designated for that purpose.\n\nBut a search in that behalf in the Act is fruitfe, s.\n\nOn a careful review of the provisions of the Act, we arc 11n- <1bk to hold that ii was intended by the Legislature to en2c! by\n\nimrlication that the holding inherited by a female heir helongiPg to one of the classes of female heirs in s. 171 is not held as a lifceslate.\n\nOne important : .. ·· l.111ve development which throws some light on the qucslio11 •) also he noticed.\n\nThe U.P. Zamindari Abolition .and Land Reforms Bill was published in 1949. llefore &he scheme incorporated in the Bill could he implemented considerable spade-work had 10 be done. and the Bill could he brc.ughl before the Legislature after great delay.\n\nIn the n'eanwhile it was apprehcded. the intermediaries may de;-nve the tenants of the lands in their occupation.\n\nThe Legislature therefore, as an interim measure, enacted the U.P. Agricultural Ten- :1Dls (Acquisition of Privileges). Act 10 of 1949.\n\nBy\" s. 3 of that Act certain classes of tenants could apply to be declared entitled to acquire the privileges on payment to the State an amount equal to ten times the annual rent payable or deemed to be r, ay- .able in respect of the holding. and on making an application in that behalf to the Assistant Collector.\n\nThose rights were conferred by later amendments upon sub-tenants and unrecorded cntenants.\n\nBy s. 7 it was provided that upon the grant of the dcclardlion the applicant shall, with effect from the date of pa~ menl or deposit of the amount payable. be entitled to th~ privileges against cjcctmenl in execution of any decree or order of ejectmenl.\n\nClause (c) was added in s. 7 by item 5 of Sch. IV of U.P. Acl I of 1951, and that clause provided :\n\n\"The applicant shall. except as hereinafter excepted, he entitled, notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Temi:1cy Act. l 939, or any contract to bequeath\n\nA by will or transfer by way of sale, simple mortgae or gift his interest in the holding or his share therem .\n\nSedion 340 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act l of 1951 provided that '\"where any orders .have been made, proceedings taken, declarations granted, or jurisdiction exercised under the prov.isions of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions of the said Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained therein, be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act.\" Clearly by the enactment of cl. ( c) in s. 7 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the tenant who deposited the amount payable by him became competent, notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or any contract, to bequeath by will or transfer by way of sale, simple mortgage or gift his interest in the holding or his share therein, and this holding by virtue of s. 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in respect of an occupancy tenant, a hereditary tenant or a grove. holder and in respect of a tenant belonging to certain other specified classes became the bhumidhari holding of the tenant.\n\nIn the absence of any express provision in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act l of 1951, taking away the right to make a disposition, inter vivos, which was expressly conferred bys. 7(c) of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisitidn of Privileges) Act, 1949, upon 'the tenant who had acquired the privileges under that Act, when the tenant became entitled to bhumidhari rights, it would be difficult to hold that by implication those rights were not exercisable and must be deemed to have been taken away on the coming into force of the U.P. Act 1of1951.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order a' to costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal di.vmissed.", "total_entities": 123, "entities": [{"text": "M~I\n\n.DIXIT & ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMJI DIXIT & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHRIGUNATH & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHRIGUNATH & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M~I\n\n.DIXIT & ANOTHER\n\nBHRIGUNATH & OTHERS\n\nJanuary 12, 1968\n\nB (J. C. SHAH, V. IUMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.j\n\nU.P. Zamlndari Abolition and Land Reforms A.ct (lf."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 940, "end_char": 946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 172(~\n\n(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "F J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kum4T, fpr respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1654, "end_char": 1669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kum4T, fpr respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1692, "end_char": 1708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kum4T, fpr respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1710, "end_char": 1724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kum4T, fpr respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kum4", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1729, "end_char": 1740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants,\n\nM. K. 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N. Dwivedi, J., agreed with lhe judgments of the courlS below."}}, {"text": "S. N. Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In second appeal before the High Court of Allahabad Desai, C.J., and S. N. Dwivedi, J., agreed with lhe judgments of the courlS below."}}, {"text": "Jagadish Sahai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadish Sahai, J., was of the opinion that Sanwari held in the bhumidhari lands ill dispute only a life estate."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3558, "end_char": 3562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s.18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 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{"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1968] 2 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8118, "end_char": 8155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the interest in the holding after the, date of vesting under the Act, as an heir to a mafe bhumidhar, as a\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1968] 2 S.C.ll..\n\nwidow, widow of a male lineal descendant, mother, father's mother, daughter, son's daughter or sister or half-sister of the last holder, the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir determined in accordance with the provisions of s. 171 of the last male bhumidhar, and the same rule of devolution shall he followed when the female abandons or surrenders the holding."}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9094, "end_char": 9098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10694, "end_char": 10705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10890, "end_char": 10901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 164 and 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11093, "end_char": 11138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11383, "end_char": 11389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11744, "end_char": 11750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12400, "end_char": 12406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12416, "end_char": 12421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12524, "end_char": 12530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13383, "end_char": 13389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13820, "end_char": 13826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14158, "end_char": 14193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "classes mentioned in s. 169\n\n(2) the right to make a testamentary disposition of bhumidhari holding was expressly denied; (b) on the death of a female bhumidhar who had inherited the holding under s. 171 from a male bhumidhar or on abandonment or surrender by her the holding devolves not upon her heirs but upon the nearest surviving heirs of the last male bhumidhar; ( c) on the death of a female belonging tc any of the classes mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 172 who had inherited the land comprised in the holding before the date of vesting and was in accordance with the personal law applicable to her entitled to a life-estate only in the holding, the holding devolves up011 the nearest surviving heirs of the last male intermediary or the tenant and in the case of .a female tenure-holder\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 172(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14239, "end_char": 14248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14338, "end_char": 14344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14441, "end_char": 14451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14484, "end_char": 14490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14882, "end_char": 14888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14892, "end_char": 14898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15474, "end_char": 15480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16686, "end_char": 16692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16726, "end_char": 16732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16760, "end_char": 16766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16914, "end_char": 16920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 16994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17307, "end_char": 17316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17349, "end_char": 17355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17851, "end_char": 17860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17953, "end_char": 17957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18631, "end_char": 18637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18875, "end_char": 18881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19239, "end_char": 19245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19277, "end_char": 19283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19469, "end_char": 19478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 169(2) and 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19605, "end_char": 19623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19802, "end_char": 19808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20078, "end_char": 20084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "By Act XX of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20173, "end_char": 20190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20192, "end_char": 20198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By Act XX of 1954", "statute": "By Act XX of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21082, "end_char": 21088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By Act XX of 1954", "statute": "By Act XX of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21460, "end_char": 21466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21524, "end_char": 21533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21952, "end_char": 21961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "After the amendment of the Act by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22158, "end_char": 22195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22688, "end_char": 22694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the amendment of the Act by Act", "statute": "After the amendment of the Act by Act"}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23019, "end_char": 23025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the amendment of the Act by Act", "statute": "After the amendment of the Act by Act"}}, {"text": "s. 172(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23380, "end_char": 23396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 169(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23622, "end_char": 23631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23716, "end_char": 23722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23889, "end_char": 23895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24015, "end_char": 24021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24207, "end_char": 24213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 169(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24345, "end_char": 24359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24619, "end_char": 24630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24715, "end_char": 24721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24852, "end_char": 24858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25448, "end_char": 25454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25586, "end_char": 25593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 174", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25839, "end_char": 25845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25974, "end_char": 25979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26453, "end_char": 26459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26463, "end_char": 26469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26473, "end_char": 26480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26810, "end_char": 26816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27272, "end_char": 27278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27923, "end_char": 27927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28330, "end_char": 28334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28606, "end_char": 28610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28982, "end_char": 29022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29385, "end_char": 29474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29517, "end_char": 29521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act", "statute": "Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force from the commencement of the said Act"}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29710, "end_char": 29727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29898, "end_char": 29903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29916, "end_char": 29956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30201, "end_char": 30241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_778_785_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "IDRA SINGH PAL\n\nMADAN LAL\n\nJanuary 15, \"1968\n\n[M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND K. S. HEDGE, JJ.]\n\nRepreurrtatwrr of the People Act. 1951, s.•. 36 and JOO-Clerical muuzJ.e in nomination pcpers-Duty of Returning Officer-NomituJtion , aper• must not be lightly re; ected even in the case of dummy candidate\n\n~Election to be set a.Ide if papers of such a candidate wrongly rejected.\n\nThe rC5pondent filed two nomination papers for election to the I.egis lative Assembly from a constituency in Himachal Pradesh in the 1967 general election. Both bis nomination papers were rejected at the scrutiny. 1l>e first nomination paper was rejected on the ground that the proposer's name wa< wrongly mentioned as being at serial No. 380 of Pan 13 of the l!lectoral Roll of the constituency whereas it was actually at serial No. 380 of Pan 23 of the Roll. The oce-0nd nomination paper was rejected on the lfound that the respondent was shown ~~ the elector at Serial No. 504 ot Pan 2 of 9-Arki Assembly constituency but really his name was found at serial No. 504 of Pan 12 of that constituency. At the election subsequently held the appellant was the winning candidate. The respondent filed an election petition challenging the appellant's election on the ground that his (the respondent's) nomination papers had been wrongly rejected.\n\nThe High Coun allowed the petition whereupon, by special leave, the appellant came to this Coun. It was urd on behalf of the appellant, i11trr alia, that the respondent was only a dummy candidate who was not e'Ven pr\"'5cnt at the time of tl\\e scrutiny and had filed the petition only hecausc the candidate representing his pany had been defeated.\n\nHELD : The respondent's nomination papers were wroogly rejected in a manner impermissible under s. 36 of the Representation er the People\n\nAct and the election must be set aside under s. 100 of the Act. [785 A] It may be that while scrutinising the first nomination paper the Returning Officer had no material before him II> find out whether the proposer of the candidate was really an elector in the constituency or not but in the second nomination paper the proposer's name as well as place in the electoral roll was correctly mentioned.\n\nIt was improper on the part of the Returning Officer to have rcjecled the second nomination paper merely on the ground that the pan of the electoral roll in which the respondent'• name was recorded was wrongly mentioned because the correct number of the electoral rolt was mentioned in the firt nomination paper.\n\nAll the required information was hcforc the Returning Officer and the mistake was onlv clerical.\n\nObviously he rejected the nomination paper for the reason that the respondent was a dummy candidate but that was not a matter for him to decide. [784 D-Hl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1112 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act H 1951 from the judgment and order dated July 14, 1967 of the Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench at Simla in .C.O.P. (Election) Petition No. 3 of 1967.\n\nH. R. Gokha/e, S. K. Khanna; S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.\n\nR. K. Garg, Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J,.\n\nThis appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of oelhi and Himachal Pradesh in Election Petition\n\nNo. 3 of 1967. That petition related to the election to the Hirn0chal Pradesh Legislative Assembly during the last General Election, from 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nThe only ground taken in the petition was whether the nomiaation of the respondent was improperly rejected.\n\nThe respondent had filed his nomination for the election in question on January 20, 1967. He had filed two nomination papers. The scrutiny took place on January 21, 1967. At the time of the scrutiny, the respondent was not present; his Pomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer. The election took place in February, 1967. The two contesting candidates were the appellant and Hari Das the Congress nominee. The appellant succeeded by a margin of about 8000 votes.\n\nAfter the results of the election were announced, the respondent filed an election petition with which we are now concerned.\n\nThe only ground taken in the election petition as mentioned earlier was that his nomination papers were improperly rejected.\n\nIn rejecting the nomination papers of the respondent, the Returning Officer observed as follows :\n\n'Shri Madan Lal, resident of Village Parchech, P.O.\n\nGhanahatti District Mahasu filed two nomination papers before me on 20th January, 1967 which bear serial Nos. 5 and 6. According to the entry in the nomination paper serial No. 5 Shri Anant Ram proposer has been shown to be entered at serial No. 383 of 13 of the electoral rolls for 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nFrom the comparison with the nnal copy of electoral rolls for this constituency, at serial No. 383 of part 13 the name of Shrimati Phullu wife of Shri Nirjal Singh has been entered.\n\nAs such this entry in this nomination paper is wrong.\n\nAs regards nvmination paper bearing serial No. 6 the candidate has shown his name to be entered at serial No. 504 of part 2 of the Electoral rolls for 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nFrom the comparison with the aforesaid entry in the final copy of the electoral rolls at the aforesaid serial No. of the aforesaid part one Shrimati Darshnoo wife of Shri Ghanaya Ram has been\n\nentered. Hence this entry in the nomination paper bearing serial No. 6 is incorrect.\n\nAt the time of scrutiny neither Shri Madan Lal nor his proposer or election agent nor any one authorised on his behalf was present so that he could be given an opportunity for correcting these entries.\n\nThis candidate while presenting his nomination papers claimed to be\n\nth~ substitute candidate of the lndian National Congress who have put up Shri Hari Dass as their only candidate.\n\nIn view of the aforesaid circumstances it cannot be ascertained whether Shri Madan Lal is an elector in any Assembly Constituency of Himachal Pradesh or that his proposer Shri Anant Ram is an elector in the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nShri M. R. Gupta. Advooate the person authorised on behalf of Shri Hari Dass was informed to convey to Shri Madan Lal that he can approach me any time upto 3.00 p.m. today for correcting these entries. Shri Madan Lal has not turned up as yet.\n\nIt is now I 5 minutes past 3.00 p.m.\n\nJn these circumstances there is no alternative hut' to reject both these nomination papers as the candidate does not seem to be interested in correcting these entries and filing proper and valid nomination papers.\n\nThese orders arc passed ex-parte since Shri Madan Lal has not cared co turn up.\n\nAnnounced.\n\nSd/- R. C. Gupta. 21-1-1967.\n\nReturning Officer.\n\n9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\" F\n\nThe two nominations filed by the respondent arc marked as annexures A and B. They read as follows :\n\nForm 2-B\n\n(See rule 4)\n\nANNEXURE 'A'\n\nNomination paper.\n\nElection to the Lrgi, lativc Assembly of Union territory of Himachal Pradesh (State).\n\nI. Nomination as candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly from the 9-Arki assembly constituency.\n\nlilRA SINGH V. MADAN LAL (Hegde, /.)\n\nCandidate's name His postal address.\n\nMadan Lal Village Parhech P.O. Ghanahatti. District, Mahasu.\n\nHis name is entered at serial No. 504 of the Electoral Roll for the 9-Arki in part No. 12.\n\nAssembly Constituency My name is_Anant Ram and it is in Part No. 13 entered at serial No. 380 Electoral Roll of the Assembly Constituency for the 9-Arki Date: 20-1-1967.\n\nC Sd./- Anant Ram Signature of Proposer.\n\n''Decision of Returning Officer accepting or rejecting the Nomination paper.\n\nI have examined this nomination paper in accord- D ance with section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and decide as foll()WS : Rejected.\n\nShri Anant Ram proposer is not entered at SI. No. 380 of Part No. 13 of the Electoral Roll of 9-Arki Assembly constituency. Despite opportunity this entry has not been corrected.\n\nDate: 21-1-1967.\n\nSd./ R. C. Gupta 21-1-1967 Returning Officer 3-15 P.M., 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\n\" •• 1. the above mentioned candidate assent to this nom'ination and hcreb..- declare:- (a} that I have completed 49 years of age;\n\n(b) that I am sponsored at this election by the Indian National Co111ress Party;\n\n(c) that the symbols I have chosen are, in order of preference\n\n(i) Two Bullocks with yoke on (ii) .... and\n\n(iii) . . . • x x\n\n• Score out this paragraph, if not applicable. •• Score out the word not applicable. (to be filled by the returning ollicfr)\n\nSerial No. of nomination paper This nomination was delh:cred to\n\n20/1/67 (date by the •candidate/\n\nDated 20/1,'67.\n\nL3Sup.Cl/68-6\n\nmo at my office at 1.20 P.M. (hour) on\n\nSd. R.C. Gupta 20/1/67\n\nReturning Officer, 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nANNEXURE'B'\n\nForm 2-B !See rule 4) Nomination paper.\n\n[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nElection to the Legislative Assembly of Himachal B Pradesh (State)\n\nI nominate as a candidate for election to the legislative Assembly from the 9-Arki assembly constituency Candidate's name Madan Lal\n\nHis postal address Village Parhech P.O. Ghanahati District :'-•ahasu\n\nHis name is entered at Serial No. 504, in pan No. 2 of the Electoral Roll for the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.\n\nMy name is Hari Nand and it is entered at serial No. 799 in Part No. 13 of the Electoral roll for the 9-Arkj Assembly Constitutency.\n\nDate: 20-1-1967.\n\nSd./ Hari Nand Signature of proposer.\n\nDecision of Returning Officer accepting or rejecting the Nomination paper.\n\nI have examined this nomination paper in accordance with section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and decided as follows :-Rejected.\n\nI .. The above-mentioned candidate.\", assent to this nomination •ind hereby\n\ndeclare:-\n\n(a) that I have completed 49 years of age :\n\n(b) that I am sponso:-ed at this eJcction by the Indian J'\\ational Congress party;\n\n(c) that the symbols I have chosen arc, in order of preference.\n\n(i) Two bullocks with yoke on (ii) ....... ar.d (iii) •score out this paragraph, if not applicable. ••score out the word not applicable.\n\nScriai No. of non1ination paper 6\n\n(to bt fill('d by the Returning\n\nOfficer)\n\nThi~ nomination was delivered 10 me at my ,, nice at J. :u p_ ~1.\n\n(hour) on 2u-I-67 (dated) by th,.• cnrdidate,'\n\nSd. R.(:_ Gupta, Rctu1nin~ OOi.:c:r,\n\n9-:\\rki Ass..:1nbly C<1nstit!;, nc)\n\nH ~\n\nA The name of the candidate is not entered at SI. No. 504\n\nof Part No. 2 of Arki Assembly Constituency Electoral roll; despite opportunity he has not cared to correct the entry.\n\nDate: 21-1-1967.\n\nSd./ R. C. Gupta Returning Officer, 21-1-67 3-15 P.M.\n\n9-Arki Assembly Constituency. ,,\n\nIn the first nomination paper, the proposer was one Anant Ram. It was mentioned in the nomination paper that he is the elector shown at serial No. 380 of Part 13 of the Electoral Roll '1f Arki Assembly Constituency. This was clearly a mistake. His name is really found at serial No. 380 of Part 23. In the second nonunation paper the candidate is shown as the elector at serial No.\n\n504 of Part 2 of 9-Arki Assembly Constituency; but really his name is found at serial No. 504 of Part 12 of that Constituency.\n\nHence the question is whether the grounds on which the Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers of the respondent were substantial grounds as contemplated by s. 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nBefore we deal with that question, it is necessary to set out few more facts.\n\nAccording to the appellant the respondent was not a genuine candidate; he was a dummy Congress candidate; he never intended to contest the election.\n\nThere is basis for this contention.\n\nThe respondent was the General Secretary of the Mahasu District Congress Committee. He never applied for any Congress ticket: nor his name was considered either by the District Congress Committee or by the Pradesh Congress Committee. He did not give the contribution required to be given by the candidate! to the party; nor did he give the security prescribed by the party.\n\nThe Congress had selected Mr . .Hari Dass, one of the then Ministers in the Himachal Pradesh Government for contesting the constituency in question.\n\nHis nam~ had been recommended by the District Congress Committee as well as by the Pradesh Congress Committee. It had been accepted by the Parliamentary Board.\n\nHe had paid the necessary subscription. He had also deposited the prescribed security. It is found from the evidence of the appellant that both Mr. Hari Dass as well as thg respondent went together to the Returning Officer foc filing their nominations. In fact it is clear from the order of the Returning Officer that the appellant had told him that he was only a covering candidate for Mr. Hari Dass.\n\nIt may also be noted that the respondent had declared that he was a Congress nominee. He had also asked for the Congress 'ymbols namely a pair of bullocks. It may further be noted that on the date of the scrutiny, the respondent was absent and there was nobody to represent him.\n\nTue Advocate\n\n784 SUPREME COUllT llBPO!lTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R\n\nwho represented the Congress organisation did not object to the rejection of the nomination of the respondent presumably becalllie no one was interested in his nomination as the nomination of Mr.\n\nHari Dass had been accepted. Possibly he is now challenging the election because his party's candidate has been defeated.\n\nAt this juncture, we may notice that the respondent did not even apply for a copy of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination till the election results were announced. He admitted during his cross-examination that he had acted as the counting agent of Mr. Hari Dass. It is proved from the evidence of. the appellant that he actively canva.ssed for Mr. Hari Dass. From the facts and circumstances established in this case we have no doubt in our mind that the respondent was at no time a genuine candidate. He is merely availing himself of the opportunity of the rejection of his nomination paper for undoing the result of the election.\n\nThat. however, is not the end of the matter. All that we have to consider in this appeal is whether the Returning Officer was right in rejecting the nomination of the respondent. As mentioned earlier, the errors found in the nomination papers are purely clerical errors.\n\nThe Returning Officer had the duty to scrutinise the nomination papers when they were presented for finding out whether there were any clerical mistakes in the same.\n\nUnder that provision he was required to find out whether the names of the candidates as well as their proposers and seconders were correctly mentioned in the nomination papers.\n\nHe was also required to see whether their place in the electoral roll was correctly mentioned in the nomination papers.\n\nEvidently the Returning Officer failed in his duty.\n\nFurther, when he scrutinised the nomination papers on January 21, I 967, he had before him all the required information.\n\nIt may be that while scrutinising the first nomination paper (marked as No. 5) he had no material before him to find out whether the proposer of the candidate was really an elector in the constituency or not; but when he came to the second nomination paper where the proposer's name as well as his place in the electoral roll is correctly mentioned, it was improper on his part to have rejected that nomination paper. It is true that in that nomination paper, it had been mentioned that the candidate's name is found at serial No. 504 of part 2 of 9-Arki Assembly Constituency, though in fact it is found at serial No. 504 in part 12 of that constituency; but from the first nomination paper, the Returning Officer could have easily found out the correct part of the electoral roll.\n\nAll the required information was before him. Obviously he rejected the nomination papers for the reason that the respondent was only a dummy candidate but that was not a matter for him , decide. If he was a dummy candidate there was occasion for Um to withdraw his candidature after the scrutiny of the nominecion papers.\n\nTherefore it is quite clear that the respondent's\n\nA •\n\n-~--\n\nA nomination papers were improperly rejected. Such a. rejection was impermissible under s. 36 and the same .is a ground for setting aside the election under s. 100 of the Representation of the People Act.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, we dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "IDRA SINGH PAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIRA SINGH PAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 15, \"1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IDRA SINGH PAL\n\nMADAN LAL\n\nJanuary 15, \"1968\n\n[M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND K. S. HEDGE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Repreurrtatwrr of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1756, "end_char": 1761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2844, "end_char": 2850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court, Himachal Bench at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2957, "end_char": 2992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act H 1951 from the judgment and order dated July 14, 1967 of the Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench at Simla in .C.O.P. (Election) Petition No."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e, S. K. Khanna; S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e, S. K. Khanna; S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e, S. K. Khanna; S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e, S. K. Khanna; S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3118, "end_char": 3128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3145, "end_char": 3156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J,."}}, {"text": "Hari Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4014, "end_char": 4022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two contesting candidates were the appellant and Hari Das the Congress nominee.", "canonical_name": ".Hari Dass"}}, {"text": "Madan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In rejecting the nomination papers of the respondent, the Returning Officer observed as follows :\n\n'Shri Madan Lal, resident of Village Parchech, P.O.\n\nGhanahatti District Mahasu filed two nomination papers before me on 20th January, 1967 which bear serial Nos.", "canonical_name": "Madan Lal"}}, {"text": "Anant Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 Shri Anant Ram proposer has been shown to be entered at serial No.", "canonical_name": "Anant Ram"}}, {"text": "Shrimati Phullu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "383 of part 13 the name of Shrimati Phullu wife of Shri Nirjal Singh has been entered."}}, {"text": "Nirjal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "383 of part 13 the name of Shrimati Phullu wife of Shri Nirjal Singh has been entered."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Darshnoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the aforesaid part one Shrimati Darshnoo wife of Shri Ghanaya Ram has been\n\nentered."}}, {"text": "Ghanaya Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the aforesaid part one Shrimati Darshnoo wife of Shri Ghanaya Ram has been\n\nentered."}}, {"text": "Madan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of scrutiny neither Shri Madan Lal nor his proposer or election agent nor any one authorised on his behalf was present so that he could be given an opportunity for correcting these entries.", "canonical_name": "Madan Lal"}}, {"text": "Hari Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This candidate while presenting his nomination papers claimed to be\n\nth~ substitute candidate of the lndian National Congress who have put up Shri Hari Dass as their only candidate.", "canonical_name": ".Hari Dass"}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the aforesaid circumstances it cannot be ascertained whether Shri Madan Lal is an elector in any Assembly Constituency of Himachal Pradesh or that his proposer Shri Anant Ram is an elector in the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency."}}, {"text": "Anant Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the aforesaid circumstances it cannot be ascertained whether Shri Madan Lal is an elector in any Assembly Constituency of Himachal Pradesh or that his proposer Shri Anant Ram is an elector in the 9-Arki Assembly Constituency.", "canonical_name": "Anant Ram"}}, {"text": "M. R. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri M. R. Gupta."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7771, "end_char": 7809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "R. C. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8050, "end_char": 8061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd./ R. C. Gupta 21-1-1967 Returning Officer 3-15 P.M., 9-Arki Assembly Constituency."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9625, "end_char": 9635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11375, "end_char": 11380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11388, "end_char": 11426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahasu District Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11743, "end_char": 11777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was the General Secretary of the Mahasu District Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "Pradesh Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11901, "end_char": 11927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He never applied for any Congress ticket: nor his name was considered either by the District Congress Committee or by the Pradesh Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12074, "end_char": 12082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress had selected Mr ."}}, {"text": ".Hari Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Hari Dass, one of the then Ministers in the Himachal Pradesh Government for contesting the constituency in question.", "canonical_name": ".Hari Dass"}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Hari Dass, one of the then Ministers in the Himachal Pradesh Government for contesting the constituency in question."}}, {"text": "District Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12257, "end_char": 12284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His nam~ had been recommended by the District Congress Committee as well as by the Pradesh Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "January 21, I 967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14945, "end_char": 14962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, when he scrutinised the nomination papers on January 21, I 967, he had before him all the required information."}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16270, "end_char": 16275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16385, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_786_796_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MINOR P. RAJENDRAN\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS & ORS.\n\nJanuary 11, 1968\n\n[K. N. WASCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ. M. SHELAT,\n\nG. K. MITTER A!'ID C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]\n\nConstitutio11 of lruii.1, Aris. 14, 15-State Government promulga, ting rules fer selection of carulidares to medical course-One rule providing for distric/·\\1isc allocation of sears on basis of population-I/ discriminarory when objecr is Io a/lracr be.<t tal•nt-Socially and , ducational/y back- \\vrtrd classes specified by reference to easies-Whether Art. 15(1) infringed-lnterl'it:w hy selection con1111irree-extent to which criterion for allolt~ inR mGrks can be indica1('d.\n\nThe petitioners challcngi.:d an order of the State Government by which rules were promulga1ed for selection of candidates for admission to a medical course. These rules provided for re-; ervations of scats for various rategories of candida1cs. i.e. for he Scheduled Trube< and Scheduled Castes, for 'socially and educationally backward classes', aod for women; the remaining seats were placed in the general pool available to all. One rule provided for the appointment of a selection rommittec of not more than three persons 10 interview the candidates and another. Rule 8, provided that the seats reserved in the scneral pool and for the 'socially and educationally backward classes' would be allocated among the various districts of the State on the basis of the ratio of th' population of each Diotrict to the tolal population of the State. It was contended,, inter alia, on behalf of the petitioners that r. 8, in providing for district-wi\"SC distribution of the seats, violated Art. 14 of !he Constitution becaUSe such alloca- 1ion of seats might result in candidates of inferior calibre being selected in one District and those of superior calibre not being se1cc'ed in anothtr District.\n\nFurthermore. the provision in the application fonn for the candidates as to \"nativity claimed\"' waC! a camouflage for discrimination on •he ground of place of birth and therefore violative of Art. 15(1). It was also claimed that the reservation for 'socially and educationally backward classes' infringed Art. 15 (I) because it was made by reference to a list of such classes specified in ahother context and that this list wa~ nothing but a list of certain cas:es; and that there was no objective test laid down in the Rules for interview and the question that were put were unrelated to s. IO(d) which lays down certain criteria for the purpose.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent State it was con1endcd that there were. better educational\n\n\"facilities in fadras city as compilre<l to other district-; and thcre(ore if district-wise selection \\\\'as not made candidates from Madras city would secure mahy more scats thai. was juslified on the basis of the proportion of the population of Madras city; furthermore. candidates coming from various Distric's would settle down in tho:sc Districts and thus medical help \"'ould he available in sufficient measure in aJl the Dis1ricts.\n\nHELD : Rule 8 providing for district-wise allocation was discriminatory and violative of Art. 14. The State had made out no case for such district-wise allocation and there was no nexus shown between such distribu\n\ntion and the object to be achieved. namely, admission of the best talent H among the candidates. [794 E, FJ\n\nThe district-wise distribution on the basis of population was not juUilied even assuming that candidates from Madras city would !!et a larger number\n\nof seats in proportion to the population of the State. That would happen because a candidate from Madras city was better. Even if the respondent's contentions were to be accep'.ed that }VOuld only justify allocation of seats between the city of Madras on one side and the rest of the State on the other and not a district-wise allocation throughout. [793 G, H] There were no facts and figures given to suggest that candidates from a particular district would by and large settle down in that district. Furthermore, the provisions as to \"nativity claimed\" by candidates showed that candidates would have a number of districts to choose from depending upon where they thought that their chances were best and therefore the argument. that district-wise allocation was justifiable on this ground had no merit. [794 DJ If the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken ;:ito account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15(1). But a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educaticmally backward, reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15(4). [790 F-G] M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439 at pp. 459- 60, referred to.\n\nThere was no substance in the argument that there was no test provided for marking. Rule lO(d) indicates what matters have to be taken into consideration for allotting marks provided under that rule. It would be difficult to provide any further guidance in the matter and the rest must be left to the selection committee. It cannot be held that the committee did not follow the criterion indicated in r. lO(d) in allotting the marks\n\nprovided in that rule. [794 H-795 BJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 194, 196 and 202 of 1967.\n\nPetitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nAND Civil Appeal No. 1456 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 16. 1967 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 308 of 1967.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioner (in W.P. No. 194 of 1967).\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 196 and 202 of 1967).\n\nAbdul Karim and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant lin C.A. No. 1456 of 1967).\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, G. Ramanujam and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 194 aild 196 of\n\n1967) respondents Nos. 2 to 6 (in C.A. No. 202 of 1967) and respondent \"lo. 1 (in C.A. No. 1456 of 1967).\n\n7 88 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nC. K. Daphtary. Attorney-General, K. N. Mudaliar, Advocate- General for the State of Madras, A. V. Rangam and G. Ramanu- 1am. for respondent No. I (in W.P. No. 202 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, C.J.\n\nThe three petitions and the civil appeal challenge the same order of the State of Madras by which rules were promulgated for selection of candidates for admission to the First Year integrated M.B.B.S. Co•.irse.\n\nWe shall briefly refer to the provisions of the Rules to understand the . attack made thereon. It appears that there was a large rush of candidates for admission to the medical colleges in the State of Madras while the seats therein were limited.\n\nIn consequence, the State o{ Madras which runs these colleges framed rules for admission to them.\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to all the Rules and we shall\n\nconfin~ ourselves to those Rules which have a bearing on the challenge made in these cases.\n\nRule 2 provides for reservation of 10 seats for certain categories.\n\nWe arc however not concerned with it as it is not challenged. Rule 3 provides for appointment of a Selection Committee of not more than \"hrce persons.\n\nThe Committee has to interview all candidates who arc qualified and eligible for admission to the course and the interview is for verifying the data and allotting marks for extra curricular activities.\n\nRule 4 provides for reservation of seats for Scheduled Tri~ and Scheduled Castes, with which also .we are not concerned in the present cases.\n\nRule 5. which is one of the rules under challenge, provides for reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, and lays down that for the purpose of this rule \"socially and educationally backward classes\" will mean those classes which have been specified in Group III of the revised Appendix 17-A to the Madras Educational Rules, issued with G.O. (Ms) 83<; Education, dated 6th April, 1951, as subsequently amended.\n\nRule 6 provides for reservation for women, which is also not under challenge, and the remaining se; its, under r. 7, go to the general pool available to all.\n\nRule 8, which is another rule under challenge, provides that the seats reserved in the general pool and the seats reserved for the wcially and educationally backward classes will be allocated among the various districts on the basis of the ratio of the population of each districts to the total population of the State. This districtwise allocation will not apply to seats reserved for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes provided under r. 5.\n\nThen follows r. 9 as to the procedure for selection and qualifications of candidates.\n\nRule I 0( d) provides for a maximum of 75 marks for cxtr~ curricular activities which have been specified under live heads.\n\nFunhcr the Rules also prescribe the form of\n\nMJENDRAN v. MADRAS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 789\n\npplication and as the selectiqn is on a districtwise basis, the form has ; column to the effect: \"NATIVITY CLAIMED\". It further appears from the form that nativity. depends on. the S.S.L.C. Register, i.e., the district from which the candidate passed the S.S.L.C. Examination, or on the nativity certificate of parents.\n\nFurther for the purpose of nativity, the place where the candidate's parents were born or the place where they possessed immovable property has to be considered.\n\nThe candidate may choose. the district from which he passed the S.S.L.C.\n\nExamination, but he may, in the alternative, choose some other district on the ground of nativity, and this choice leaves it open to h.i;:i to choose the district of permanent residence of the father or the mother. Further the form of certificate shows that where the parents are dead even the guardian's nativity can be the basis of the district which a candidate may claim.\n\nOn the basis of these rules, a number of Selection Committees were appointed, each consisting of three members. It is not in dispute that the three members of the Selection Committee D did not sit together to interview candidates; each member was allotted 25 marks out of the total of 7 5 prescribed for the interview and interviewed each candidate separately.\n\nThis method of selection has also been attacked as against the Rules.\n\nFour main contentions have been raised before us in these cases. It has been urged that r. 5, which provides for reservation for socially and educationally backward classes is bad, as it violates Art. 15 of the Constitution on the grotmd that it is based entirely on consideration of caste. The second attack is on tlre districtwise allocation under r. 8 on ihe ground that it violates Articles 14 and 15.\n\nIt is urged that in effect the selection is made to a large extent en the basis of thr; place of birth and this violates Art. 15.\n\nIt is also urged that districtwise allocation of seats for medical colleges is discriminatory, for such allocation has no nexus with the object of selection, namely, to secure the best talent for admission to medical colleges. Thirdly, it is urged that the procedure evolved by the Selection Committee for inter- G. view, which we have already referred to, was in violation of the Rules. It is also urged that there was no objective test laid down in the Rules for interview and the questions that were pnt were unrelated tor. lO(d) •. which lays down certain criteria for the purpose. Lastly, it is urged that tile selection was ma/a fide inasmuch as the two official members contrived to secure caste\n\nH representation in the matter of admission.\n\nThe petitions have been opposed on behalf of State of Madras as also the civil appeal. It has been urged that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised in these cases. It is\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968 J 2 S.C.R.\n\nunnecessary to refer to the stand taken by the State of Madras in A detail at this stage for it will appear at appropriate places when we consider the various points raised in these cases.\n\nBefore we consider the points raised in these cases, we may refer to a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents.\n\nIt is urged that the selected candidates whose number is in the neighbourhood of I, I 00 have not been made parties in these cases and therefore the cases should be rejected on that ground alone.\n\nLerned counsel for the petitioners/appellant however, accepted tht so far as the present selections are concerned, they would not press for quashing them, for in any case it would be too IJte for ihe; e petitioners/ appellant to get admission in medical collegs this year. They therefore pray that the points raised may be decided for the future and the selection made this year may not be disturbed. On that basis it is urged on behalf of the petitioners n1 the appellant that it would not be necessary to make the camliciates selected for this year parties.\n\nIn view :if this statement ::t the bar we propose to decide the points rai5ea in these cases hut shall not disturb the selections made this year.\n\nThe first challenge is to r. 5 on the ground that it violates Art. I 5 of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 15 forbids discrimination against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. At the same time Art. lS ( 4) inter a/ia permits the State to make any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.\n\nThe contention is that the list of sociaily and educationally backward classes for whom reservation is made under r. 5 nothing but a list of certain castes.\n\nTherefore, reservation in favour of certain castes based only on caste considerations violates Art. 15 ( J ) , which prohibits discrimination on the ground of caste only.\n\nNow if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15 (I). But it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the casle as a whole is socially and educationally backward resrv~1ion can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4). Re!erence in this connection may be made to the observations of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore(') to the effect that it was not irrelevant to consider the caste of a class of citizens in determining their social and educational backwardness.\n\nIt was further observed that though the caste of a class of citizens may\n\n(I) (19631 Supp. I S.C.R. 439 at p. 459·460.\n\nbe relevant its importance should not be exaggerated; and if classification of backward classes of citizens was based solely on the caste of the citizen, it might be open to objection. It is true that in the present cases the list of socially and educationally backward classes has been specified by caste. But that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that persons belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally backward citizens.\n\nIn its reply, the State of Madras has given the history as to how this list of backward classes was made, starting from the year 1906 and how the list has been kept upto date and necessary amendments made therein.\n\nIt has also been stated that the main criterion for inclusion in the list was the social and educational backwardness of the caste based on occupations pursued by these castes. Because the members of the caste as a whole were found to be socially and educationally backward, they were put in the list.\n\nThe matter was finally examined after the Constitution came into force in the light of the provisions contained in Art. 15 ( 4). As it was found that members of these castes as a whole were educationally and socially backward, the list which had been coming on from as far back as 1906 was finally adopted for purposes of Art. 15 ( 4).\n\nIn short the case of the State of Madras is that the castes included in the list are only a compendious indication of the class of people in those castes and these classes of people had been put in th!' list for the purpose of Art. 15 ( 4) because they had been found to be socially and educationally backward.\n\nThis is the position as explained in the Affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Madras. On the other hand the only thing stated in the petitions is that as the list is based on caste alone it is violative of Art. 15 (1). In view however oi the explanation given by the State of Madras, which has not been controverted by any rejoinder, it must be accepted that though the Jfst shows certain castes, the members of those castes are really classes of fducationally and socially backward citizens.\n\nNo attempt was made on behalf of the petitioners/ appellant to show that any caste mentioned in this list was not educationally and socially l::ackward.\n\nNo such averment was made in the affidavit in support of their caes, nor was any attempt made to traverse the\n\ncae. piit forwar~ on behalf of the State of Madras by filing a reiomder affidavit to show that even one of the castes included in the list was not educationally and socially backward. In this\n\nsta~ of the pleadings, we must come to the conclusion that though the list is prepared caste-wise, the castes included therein are as a whole educationally and socially backward and therefore the list is not violative of Art. 15. The challenge to r. 5 must therefore fail.\n\nSUPREME COURT :RJ!PORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.CR.\n\nThe next attack is on r. 8, which provides for districtwis~ dis- 1ribution of scats according to population of the district.\n\nThis is attacked fiist on the ground that it violates Art. 15 (I) which lays down that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of place of binh and it is urged that the provision for \"nativity claimed\" in the form is really a camouflage for discriminating on the ground ot place of birth.\n\nWe have already referred to the provisions rdating to nativity certificate.\n\nWe must say that these provisions me as complicated and confusing as possible and there m:iy be\n\nsome force in the contention raised that this has been done to .get over th~ prnhibirion in Art. I 5 (I) with respc-:t to discnrnination on tile basis of place of birth. What exactly \"nativity\" means is not clear iroP'l the rules; it may be the place from where the candidate flssed his S.S.L.C. Examination; it may be the p!acc where his 'ather was born or his mother was born; it may b1 the\n\nplzce where his father has propcrt; or his mother has property; Or it may be the place of permanent residence of the parents or ;?Uardian. for the words \"permanent residence\" appear in the fonn of nativity certificate.\n\nBut the dictionary meaning ot the word \"nativity\" is bi•th and when the Rules provide for nativity certi ficate they really mean the place of birth.\n\nHowever, it appears that the place of birth of the candidate is nowhere mentioned in the Rules.\n\nEven though there may be some substance in the charge that all this complicated and confusing methud has been provided in crder to get over the prohibition in Art. 15 (I) by a camouHage, we cannot say that there is a clear violation of An. 15 (I) for the district which the candidate may claim does not depend upon the place of his birth.\n\nWe cannot therefore strike down r. 8 on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of place of binh of the candidate wncerned.\n\nIn 1hc allernative, it is urged that district-wise dis1ribution violates An. 14 of the Constitution because it denies equality before the law or equal protection of the laws, inasmuch a.< such allocation of seats may result in candidates of inferior calibre being selec1ed in one district while candidates of superior calibre cannot be selcc1ed in another district.\n\nIt has not been denied on behalf of the State that such a thing cannot happen, though there are no statistics available in this behalf because the mark-sheet< were all destroyed after the interviews.\n\nTile quest.ion whctha di, trictwi, c allocation is viob:ivc of Art. 14 will dencnd on what i' the object to be achieved in th~ matter of admission to medical colleges.\n\nConsiderin~ the fact that thc1 e i' :i larger number of cand.ldates than seats -avaiiabk selection has got io be made.\n\nThe object of selection can only\n\nbe to secure the best possible material for admission to colleges subject to the provision for socially and educationally backward. classes. Further whether selection is frem the socially and educationally backward classes or from the general pool, the object of selection must be to secure the best possible talent from the two sources. 1f that is the object, it must necessarily follow that that object would be defeated if seats are allocated district by district.\n\nIt cannot be and has not been denied that the object of selection. is to secure the best possible talent from the two sources so that the country may have the best possible doctors. If that is the object, the argument on behalf _of the petitioners/ appellant is that that object cannot possibly be served by allocating seats districtwise.\n\nIt is true that Art. 14 does not forbid classification, but the classification has to be justified on the basis of the nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved, even assuming that territorial classification may be a reasonable classification.\n\nThe fact however that the classification by itself is reasonable is not enough to support it unless there is nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved.\n\nTherefore, as tile object to be achieved in a case of the kind with which we are concerned is to get the best talent for admission to professional colleges, the allocation of seats districtwise has no reasonable relation *ith the object to be achieved. If anything, such allocation will result in many cases in the object being destroyed, and if that is so, the classification, even If reasonablc, would result in discrimination, inasmuch as better qualified candidates from one district may be rejected while less qualified candidates from other districts may be admitted from either of the two sources.\n\nLet us now look to the justification which has been put forward on behalf of the State of Madras ill support of lhis districtwise allocation. It is said that there are better educational facilities in Madras city as compared to other districts of L'le State arid rherefore if districtwise selection is not made, candidates from Madras city would have an advantage and would secure many more seats than justified on the basis of proportion of the population of Madras city compared to the population of the State as a whole.\n\nThis in our opinion is no justification for districtwise allocation which results in discrimination, even assuming that\n\ncandidate~ from Madras city will get a larger number of seats in proportion to the population of the _Stat.e, That would happen because a candidate from Madras city 1s better. If the obiect is to attract the best talent, from the two sources, districtwise allocation in the circumstances would destroy that object. Further even if we were to accept this contention that would orJy justify allocation of seats between the city of Madras on one side and\n\n\n(1968] 2 S.CR\n\nthe rest of the State on the other and not a districlwise allocation A throughout.\n\nBut aparl from this, we are of opinion that the object being what we have indicated, there is no reason why there should be discrimination which would go against the candidates from Madras city.\n\nWe may add that candidates who pass from Madras city need not all be residents of the city for it is common knowledge that schools and colleges in the capital ity ; ittract B students from all over the State because of better cducatio:ial facilities.\n\nAnother justification that has been attempted is tbat candid; ites coming from various districts would settle down in those districts and thus medical help would be available in sufficient measure in all the districts.\n\nNow this was not stated in the afli- C davit on behalf of the State of Madras.\n\nBesides there are no facts and figures to suggest that candidates from a particular district would by and large settle down in that district.\n\nFurther !he various options in the matter of nativity certificate to which we have referred, show that candidates will have a number of districts to choose from depending upon where they think that D their chances arc best and therefore the argument th; it districtwise allocation is justifiable on this ground is in our opinion of n.J merit. We arc satisfied therefore that the State of Madras has\n\nmade out no case for districtwise allocation of scats in medical colleges.\n\nWe are also satisfied that such allocation results in discrimination and there is no nexus between this territorial dis- E tribution and the object to be achieved, namely, admission of the hest talent from the two sources already indicated. We are therefore of opinion that allocation of seats on districtwise basis is violative of Art. 14.\n\nWe may add that we do not mean to say that territorial classification is always bad under all circumstances.\n\nBut there is no doubt that districtwise classification which is being F justified on a territorial basis in these cases is violative of A;1. 14. for no justification worth the name in support of the classification has been made out.\n\nWe therefore hold that r. 8 providing for districtwise allocation is bad .. as it violates Art. 14 and we hereby strike it down.\n\nIn view of our decision as to r. 8 and in view of the fact that there is no question of disturbing the selection made this year, we do not think it necessary to decide finally whether the procedure for selection followed in the present cases to which we have al read\\ referred is in accordance with the Rules or not. All that we need say is that it cenainly looks odd that the members of the selection committee should sit separately.\n\nRut we do not propose ; o decide the point finally in the present cases.\n\nWe do not find any substance in the argument th\"• there is no test provided for marking. Ruic 10( d) indicates what matters\n\nRAJENDRAN v. MAl>MS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 795\n\nhave to be taken into consideration for allotting marks provided under that rule~ We do not think that it is possible to provide any further guidance in the matter and the rest must be left to the Selection Committee. It may be added that we are not prepared to accept that th~ Committee did not follow the criterion Indicated in r. lO(d) in allotting the marks provided in that rule.\n\nThis leaves the question of mala fide.\n\nOnly two points are urged in this connection. The first is that the official members of the Selection Coinmittees 1:9ntrived to get caste representation in the matter of selection at the behest of the Government. There is in our opinion no proof of this and we are not prepared to accept that this was done. The second point in support of mala fides is that mark-sheets were destroyed after the setion was over. It does look odd that mark-sheets were so destroyed and we should have thought that mark-sheets would be kept for some period at any rate after the selection was. over. But from this it is not possible to infer that the selection itself was mala-fide.\n\nMoreover the attack on the selection on e ground of ma/a fides will affect the current selectio.n only and therefore in view of .the stand taker; at the bar by the petitioners this ground does not now avail them.\n\nThe ground that the selection was mala fide must therefore fail.\n\nWe now come to the civil appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant wished to raise an argument based on Art. 21, which deals with protection of life and personal liberty. Apart from the question whether admission to professional colleges results in deprivation of life and liberty, we did not allow learned counsel to develop this point because no such case was made out before the Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal.\n\nWe told learned counsel that he could argue only those points which had been urged befote the Division Bench. The only point urged before the Division Bench was on the basis of a provision in the University Act as to eligibility and qualification of candidates for admission to medical colleges.\n\nThere is however no substance in the contention raised in this behalf, for the Rules as to eligibility and qualification as framed by the University have been followed.\n\nSo far as admission is concerned, it has to be made by those who are in control of the Colleges,-in this case the Government, because the medical colleges are Government colleges affiliated to the University. In these circumstances, the Government was entitled to frame rules for admission to medical colleges controlled by it subject to the rules of the university as to eligibility and qurJifications. . This was what-was done in these cases and therefore the selection cannot be challenged on the ground that it was not in accordance with the University Act and the Rules framed thereunder.\n\n796 SUPllEME C:OUllT llPOl.TS [1968] 2 S.C.Jl.\n\nWe therefore partly allow the petitions and strike down rule 8 A of the Rules for admission to medical colleges, which deals with districtwise allocation.\n\nThe appeal is also allowed to the same extent.\n\nWe have already indicated that so far as the cction for the current year is concerned, it will stand; however, r. 8 will not be enforced when selection is made hereafter. The petitioners/ appellant will get their costs, one set of hearing fee.\n\nR.K.P S.\n\nPetitions an.ti Appeal allowed in part.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "MINOR P. RAJENDRAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MINOR P. RAJENDRAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 11, 1968\n\n[K. N. WASCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ. M. SHELAT,\n\nG. K. MITTER A!'ID C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1623, "end_char": 1630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2027, "end_char": 2037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2140, "end_char": 2147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2705, "end_char": 2716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "better educational\n\n\"facilities in fadras city as compilre<l to other district-; and thcre(ore if district-wise selection \\\\'as not made candidates from Madras city would secure mahy more scats thai."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3729, "end_char": 3735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the respondent's contentions were to be accep'.ed that }VOuld only justify allocation of seats between the city of Madras on one side and the rest of the State on the other and not a district-wise allocation throughout. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5439, "end_char": 5460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioner (in W.P. 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Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the petitioners (in W.Ps.", "canonical_name": "Shyama/a Pappu"}}, {"text": "Abdul Karim", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5895, "end_char": 5906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Karim and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5911, "end_char": 5932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Karim and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, G. Ramanujam and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the respondents (in W.Ps."}}, {"text": "G. Ramanujam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6015, "end_char": 6027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, G. Ramanujam and A. 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Ramanu-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6362, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attorney-General, K. N. Mudaliar, Advocate- General for the State of Madras, A. V. Rangam and G. Ramanu- 1am.", "canonical_name": "G. Ramanujam"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, C.J.\n\nThe three petitions and the civil appeal challenge the same order of the State of Madras by which rules were promulgated for selection of candidates for admission to the First Year integrated M.B.B.S. Co•.irse."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6558, "end_char": 6573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, C.J.\n\nThe three petitions and the civil appeal challenge the same order of the State of Madras by which rules were promulgated for selection of candidates for admission to the First Year integrated M.B.B.S. Co•.irse."}}, {"text": "State o{ Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6965, "end_char": 6980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, the State o{ Madras which runs these colleges framed rules for admission to them."}}, {"text": "6th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8152, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which is one of the rules under challenge, provides for reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, and lays down that for the purpose of this rule \"socially and educationally backward classes\" will mean those classes which have been specified in Group III of the revised Appendix 17-A to the Madras Educational Rules, issued with G.O. (Ms) 83<; Education, dated 6th April, 1951, as subsequently amended."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10661, "end_char": 10668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10851, "end_char": 10869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10993, "end_char": 11000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13301, "end_char": 13311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13864, "end_char": 13871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14127, "end_char": 14134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14429, "end_char": 14436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15948, "end_char": 15955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16195, "end_char": 16210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short the case of the State of Madras is that the castes included in the list are only a compendious indication of the class of people in those castes and these classes of people had been put in th!'"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16693, "end_char": 16700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17660, "end_char": 17667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17934, "end_char": 17941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19370, "end_char": 19377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20313, "end_char": 20320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21398, "end_char": 21405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25326, "end_char": 25333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25771, "end_char": 25778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27962, "end_char": 27969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_797_804_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "NINGAWWA v.\n\nBYRAPPA & 3 ORS.\n\nJanuary 17, 1968.\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nIndian Limitation Act (9 of 1908), Arts. 91 and 95-Suit to set aside. gift deed on grounds of undue inffuence and fraud-Period of limitation and starting point for lbnitation.\n\n. .In 1938, the appellant executed a gift deed df four plots of land-two in village T and two in village L in favour of her husband. At that time the appellant was young and illiterate and her husband was in a position to dominate her will, and she believed that the document related only to the plots in villagt T which were originally the property of the husband.\n\nThe properties in village L were inherited by the appellant froni her father ..\n\nThey were very valuable and fertile and there was no reason whatever for her to gift them away to her husband. In 1941. the husband married a second wife but the appellant continued to live with him amicably till he died in 1949. Thereafter the conduct of the relatives of the second wife made her suspicious, and on enquiry, she found that the plots in village L were also included in the gift deed. She therefore filed a suit for setting aside the gift deed and for possession of all the four items of property, against the second wife and her children.\n\nThe High Court, in appeal, dismissed the suit.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) The appellant's husband included the two plots of land in village L in the gift deed by fraud and without the appellant's knowledge.\n\nSince the fraudulent misrepresentation ws with respect to the contents and not the character of the document the transaction was not void-but only voidable.\n\nTherefore, the suit for setting aside the gift deed would be governed by Art. 95 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Since the Article prescribes a period of limitation of 3 years from the time whenthe fraud became known to the party wronged, and the suit in the present case was filed within a few days after the at>Pellant came to know of the fraud, the suit with respect to the items in village L was within time and should be decreed. [800 G; 802 A.C, BJ '\n\nClough v. L. & N. W. Railway, (1871) LR. 7 Ex. 26; Foster v.\n\nMackinon ( 1869) 4 C.P. 704, Sanni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain, A.LR. 1919 Cal. 728 and Brindaban v. Dhurba Chc; ran, AJ.R. 1929 Cal. 606, referred to.\n\n(2) As regards the plots in village T, in view of s. 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act, and s, 111 of the Evidence Act the gift deed must be. presumed to have been obtained by the appellant's husband by undue inlluence.\n\nThe suit with respect to these properties would tberefore be governed by Art. 91. The period of limitation prescribed by the Article is three years and, time begins to run from the date when the plaintiff discovered the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside and not from the date when the plaintiff escaped from the undue inlluence.\n\nSince the appellant in the present case knew at the veiry time of the execution of the gift deed that her husband prevailed upon her to convey the plots in village T to him by undue inftueoce, her suit was barred by limitation so far as he plots in village T ate concerned- [803 A-B, D, Jl,-0] L3 Sup. CJ/68-7\n\n798 SUPREME COURT lll!PORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nSomtshwar D11tt v. Tirbhawan Dutt, 61 I.A. 224, applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATF. JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 586 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated July 29, 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. (B) 71 of 1956.\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nNaunit Lal, for the respondent.\n\nThe .ludgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated July 29, 1960 in R.A. (B )· 71 of 19~6, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and dismissed the suit of the appellant.\n\nIn the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal the appellant asked for a decree for possession of the properties mentioned in the schedule to the plaint on the ground that she was the owner of the properties in spite of the gift deed, E; r;. 45 executed by her on January 16, 1938.\n\nAccording to the case of the appellant, plot nos. 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village were inherited by her from her father and plot nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village were originally the properties of her husband Sh.iddappa.\n\nThese plots had been usufructually mortgaged but they were redeemed from the funds supplied by the appellant and a reconveyance of the two plots was taken in the name of the appellant.\n\nAt about the time Ex. 45 was executed it is alleged by the appellant that her husband Shiddappa was dominating her will and persuaded her to execute the gift deed in respect of plots 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village. The appellant was taken to Bijapur by her husband on _January 16, 1938 and there Ex. 45 was written and she was made to sign it.\n\nThe document was registered on January 18, 1938 at Indi. The appellant believed that the document, Ex. 45 related to only plots nos. 407 /1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village.\n\nShe was never told by her husband that the document related either to plot no. 91 or plot no. 92 of Lingadahalli village.\n\nSh.iddappa died in about the end of December, 1949 and till then she was amicably living with him and consequently she had no occasion to know about the true character of Ex. 45 or about it~ contents. Shiddappa had taken a second wife in the year 1941 and after the death of Shiddappa\n\nin 1949 the relations of the second wife, respondent no. 4, began to assert their rights in respect of the properties of the appellant.\n\nGrowing $USpicious of the conduct of the respondents, the appellant made enquiries from the Kamam of the village and found that in Ex. 45 she was purported to have made a gift of properties\n\n.. c\n\nNINGAWWA v. BYRAPPA (Ramaswami, I.) 799\n\nincluded in plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village to her husband Shiddappa.\n\nConsequently the appellant brought the present suit for possession of properties. Respondent no. 4 is the second wife of Shiddappa and respondents 1 to 3 are the children of Shiddappa through respondent no. 4. They resisted the appellant's suit and contended that the gift deed in favour of Shiddappa, Ex. 45 was valid and that the same was executed voluntarily by the appellant and consequently it was not liable to be set aside. The trial court came to the conclusion that Shiddappa obtained Ex. 45 by the exercise of undue influence over the appellant, that he bad represented to her that it related only to plots nos. 407I1 and 409 /I of. Tadavalga village and he had fraudulently included in the document plots nos. 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli vi11age.\n\nThe trial court, however, dismissed the appellant's suit in respect of plots nos. 407/1 and 409/1 on the ground that the suit was barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act.\n\nWith regard to plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village the trial court gave a decree in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe respondents took the matter in appeal to the Mysore High Court.\n\nThe appellant filed crossobjections against the decree of the trial court. By its judgment dated July 29, 1960, the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objections, thereby dismissing the suit of the appellant in its entirety.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the finding of the trial court so far as plots nos. 407 /1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village were concerned and held that the suit was barred by limitation as it was not filed within three years of the execution of the deed. As regards plots nos._ 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village the High Court held that the alleged fraud had not been established by the appellant.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant learned Counsel contended, in the first place, that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of the trial court that plots nos. 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village were included in \\he gift deed by the fraud of the husband without knowledge of the appellant. It was pointed otit\n\nthat the finding of the High Court is vitiated because it has not taken into account certain important circumstances upon whkh the trial court relied for reaching its finding.\n\nIn our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. At the time of the gift deed, :he appellant was a young woman of about 24 years of age. She was illiterate and ignorant <jnd all her affairs were being managrd by her husband who stood in a position of active confidence towards her.\n\nThe trial court found that the appellant's husband was in a position to dominate her will. The document of gift alsoappears to be grossly undervalued at Rs. 1,500 while actually the alue of the property was about Rs. 40,000 at the relevant'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\ndate.\n\nThe trial court has foun\\I that plots nos. 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village were the most valuable and fertile lands owned by the appellant before the execution of the gift deed. It is the admitted position that not only the appellant and her husband but her husband's two brothers and their families lived on ihe income of the two plots. There appears to be no reson whatever for the appellant to agree to transfer the valuable lands of plots nos. 91 \\illd 92 of Lingadahalli village inherited by her from her fathcc to her husband, It was suggested on behalf ot the respondents that it was the desire of the appellant that her husband should marry a second wife and he could not fir.d a bride to marry unless he possessed sufficient properties and therefore the appellant executed the .gift deed in favour of her hu, band with a view to enable him to find a bride. But it is an uPdisputed fact that the appellant's husband married the 4th respondent .a\"<lut three ycais after the execution of the gift deed and it i' not po;- sible to accept the case of the respondents that there was any connection between the gift deed and the second marriage nf Shiddappa. The High Court has referred to the evidence uf the attesting witness, Bhimarao who said that the cocumc11'. was read over to the appellant before she put.her thumb imprcs_, io:i threon.\n\nOn the basis of this evidence the High Court came to the condusion that the plea of fraud could not be accepted ~:; 5hiddappa would not have allowed th.: document to be read over to the appellant if he intended to perpetrate a fraud on i1er.\n\nBut Bhimarao was not a disinterested witness because it is admitted that he had been approached by the respondents before they filed the Written Statement in the suit. For this reasor the trial court disbelieved the evidence of Bhimarao and no reason har, been given by the High Court for taking a different view of the evidence Of this witness.\n\nThe other attesting witness, Venkappa does not say that the gift deed was read over to the appelldnt\n\nbefore her thumb impression was taken on it or that she knew of its contents. In our opinion the Civil Judge was right in taking the view that the appellant never agreed to convey the lands in plots nos. 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village and that they were included in the gift deed by the fraud of Shiddappa without the knowledge of the appellant.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents Mr. Naunit Lal, however, stressed the argument that the trial court was wrong in holding that the gifc deed was void on account of the perpetration of fraud.\n\nIt was submitted that it was only a voidable transaction and the\n\nsuit for setting aside the gift deed would be governed by Article 95 H of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the proposition contented for by Mr. Naunit Lal must be accepted as correct. It is well-established that a contract or other transaction induced or\n\nH -\n\nNINGAWWA v. BYRAPPA (Ramaswafni, J.) 801\n\ntainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the parly defrauded.\n\nUntil it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded. \"The fact that the contract has been induced by fraud does not. make the contract void or prevent the property from passing, but merely gives the party defrauded a righi on discovering the fraud to elect whether he shall continue tc treat the contract as binding or disaffirm the contract and resume the property. If it can be shown that the party defrauded has at any time after knowledge of the fraud either by express words or by unequivocal acts affirmed the contract, his election is determined for ever.\n\nThe party defrauded may keep the question open so long as he does nothing to affirm the contact.\"\n\n(Clough v. L. & N.W. Ry.)( 1 ).\n\nThe legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but a-s to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof.\n\nWith reference to the former, it hasbeen held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon( 2 ) the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a frauc'ulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. Ii; i holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed :\n\n\"It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on thy ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never iritended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended. . . . The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or'thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual contents' of the instrument.\"\n\nThis decision has be<on followed by the Indian courts-Sanni Bilii v. Siddik Hossain('), and Brindaban v. Dhurba Charan(').\n\nIt is not the contention of the appellant in the present case that there was any fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the gift deed but Shiddappa fraudulently included in the gift deed\n\n(I) (1871) L.R. 7 E<. 26, 34.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1919 Cal. 728.\n\n(2) [t869] 4 C.P. 704.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1929 Cal. 606.\n\n802 SUPllEME COURT llEPOl.TS [1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nplots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village without her knowledge.\n\nWe are accordingly of the opinion that the transaction of gift waa voidable and not void and the suit must be brought within the time prescribed under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the respondents that the terminus a quo for the limitation was the date oi the execution of the gift deed and claim of the appellant was therefore barred as the suit was filed more than three years after that date. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Article 95 prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the time when the fraud becomes known to the party wronged.\n\nIn the present case, tile appellant stated that she did not rome to know of the fraud committed by her husband in respect of plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli vill<1gc till his death.\n\nThe trial court has discussed the evidence on this point and reached the conclusion that the case of tl!e appellant is true. The appellant lived with her husband 011 affectionate terms till the time of his death. Till then she had ae\n\nrc11.•on to suspect that any fraud had been commi!lcd on her in respect of the two plots in L'ngadahalli village. Jt is only after his death when his brothers and respondent no. 4's brothers removed Rrain from the house against her wishes that the appcllut came to know that the lands at Lingadahalli village were included in the gift deed by fraud. The suit was instituted hy the appell1nt within a few days after she came to know of the iraud. We arc thrrcfore of the opinion that the suit was brought within time prescribed under Art. 95 of the Indian Limita!ion Act so far a~\n\nplot~ 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village are concerned\n\nAs regards plots nos. 407/l and 409/l of Tadavalga villa&e the trial court has found that the husband of the appellant was in a position of active confidence towards her at the time of the gift deed and that he was in a position to dominate her will and the transaction of gift was on the face of it nr.onscionable.\n\nSetkn 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act says that where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of auothcr enters into a transaction with him which appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such transaction was not induced by undue inHuence, shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of another.\n\nSection 111 of the Indian Evidence Act also states :\n\n\"Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of prnving the good faith of the transaction b or. the party who is in a position of active confidence.\"\n\n; A\n\nN!NGAWWA v. BYRAPPA (Ramaswami, J.) 803\n\nThe trial court found that the respondents had not adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under these statutory provisions and reached the finding that the gift deed was obtained by the appellant's husband by undue influence as alleged by her.\n\nThe finding of the trial court has been affirmed by the High Court.\n\nBut both the trial court and the High Court reiused to grant relief to the appellant on the ground that the suit was barred under Art. 91 of the Limitation Act so far as plots nos. 407/1 and 409/1 were concerned. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the lower courts were wrong in taking this view. We are, however,. unable to accept this -argument as correct.\n\nArticle 91 of the Indian Limitation Act provides that a suh to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three year's limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known to him. In the present case, the trial court has found, uron examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ex. 45 the appellant knew that her hu<b3nd prevailed upon her to convey survey plots nos. 407 /1 and 40\\1/l of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of tlris finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Ari. 91 of the Limitation Act o far as plots nos. 407 Ii and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned. On behalf of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri presented the argument that the appellant continued to be under the undue influence of her husband till the date of his death and the three year's period under Art. 91 should therefore be takento run not when the appellant had knowledge of the true nature of the gift ded but from the date when she escaped the influence of her husband by whose wi!l she was dominated. It is riot possible to accept this argument in vie'.v of the express language of Art. 91 of the Limitation Act which provides that the three years' period run' from the date when '.he plaintiff came to know the facts entitling her to have the in,:rument cancelled or set aside.\n\nThis view is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Someshwar Dutt v.\n\nTirbhawan Dutt(') in which it was held that the limitation of a suit to set aside a deed of gift on the ground that it was obtained by undue influence was governed b¥ Art. 91 of the Indian Limitation Act, _and the three years penod runs from the date whe'l the plaintiff discovered the true nature of the deed, and not from the d'ite when he escaped from the influence by which he alleged that he was dominated.\n\n(ll 61 I.A. 224.\n\n804 SUPll.EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968 I 2 S.C.R.\n\nFor the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal must be allowed and the appellant must be granted a decree that the gift deed, Ex. 45 is not binding on her so far as plob 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village are concerned and she is further entitled to recover possession of the said two plots frnm the defendantrespontlents with mesne profits.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bijapur dated January 29, 1953 and allow this appeal with costs. v.r.s.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "NINGAWWA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NINGAWWA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BYRAPPA & 3 ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BYRAPPA & 3 ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 17, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 17, 1968."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arts. 91 and 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2396, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2604, "end_char": 2611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATF. JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3318, "end_char": 3347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATF."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .ludgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated July 29, 1960 in R.A. (B )· 71 of 19~6, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and dismissed the suit of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3695, "end_char": 3712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .ludgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated July 29, 1960 in R.A. (B )· 71 of 19~6, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and dismissed the suit of the appellant."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3719, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .ludgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated July 29, 1960 in R.A. (B )· 71 of 19~6, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents and dismissed the suit of the appellant."}}, {"text": "January 16, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4134, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 executed by her on January 16, 1938."}}, {"text": "Lingadahalli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village were inherited by her from her father and plot nos."}}, {"text": "Tadavalga village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4308, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village were originally the properties of her husband Sh.iddappa."}}, {"text": "Shiddappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 was executed it is alleged by the appellant that her husband Shiddappa was dominating her will and persuaded her to execute the gift deed in respect of plots 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village."}}, {"text": "Bijapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4819, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was taken to Bijapur by her husband on _January 16, 1938 and there Ex."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document was registered on January 18, 1938 at Indi."}}, {"text": "Indi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4973, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document was registered on January 18, 1938 at Indi."}}, {"text": "Article 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6876, "end_char": 6890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhimarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has referred to the evidence uf the attesting witness, Bhimarao who said that the cocumc11'."}}, {"text": "5hiddappa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of this evidence the High Court came to the condusion that the plea of fraud could not be accepted ~:; 5hiddappa would not have allowed th.:"}}, {"text": "Venkappa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10827, "end_char": 10835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other attesting witness, Venkappa does not say that the gift deed was read over to the appelldnt\n\nbefore her thumb impression was taken on it or that she knew of its contents."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11283, "end_char": 11293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondents Mr. Naunit Lal, however, stressed the argument that the trial court was wrong in holding that the gifc deed was void on account of the perpetration of fraud.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11562, "end_char": 11572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11603, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14789, "end_char": 14799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14807, "end_char": 14821, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15119, "end_char": 15129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L'ngadahalli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15755, "end_char": 15775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Till then she had ae\n\nrc11.•on to suspect that any fraud had been commi!lcd on her in respect of the two plots in L'ngadahalli village."}}, {"text": "Rrain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15862, "end_char": 15867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4's brothers removed Rrain from the house against her wishes that the appcllut came to know that the lands at Lingadahalli village were included in the gift deed by fraud."}}, {"text": "Art. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16196, "end_char": 16203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16635, "end_char": 16654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17004, "end_char": 17015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17023, "end_char": 17042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17829, "end_char": 17836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17844, "end_char": 17858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18073, "end_char": 18083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18098, "end_char": 18112, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 18978, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19083, "end_char": 19098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri presented the argument that the appellant continued to be under the undue influence of her husband till the date of his death and the three year's period under Art.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "Art. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19259, "end_char": 19266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19549, "end_char": 19556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19564, "end_char": 19578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20023, "end_char": 20037, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 29, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20783, "end_char": 20799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bijapur dated January 29, 1953 and allow this appeal with costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_805_811_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "LAXMAN SIDDAPPA NAIK v.\n\nKATTIMANI CHANIAPPA JAMAPPANNA & ORS.\n\nJanuary 19, 1968\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, S. M. S!KR! AND K. S. HEGDB, JJ.]\n\nConstitution <Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950-Caste of candidature- Burden of proof.\n\nAn unsuccessful candidate for •olection to the Mysore Legislative Assembly for a seat reserved for a member of the Schedul-:d l'ribes, filed an election petition on tho ground that the other three candidates belonged to the Bedar caste, which is not a tribe specified in Part YIU para 2 of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.\n\nThe appellant-the succl.!ssful candidate, asserted that he was a Nayaka (which is mentioned at item No. 13 in Part VIII (2) of the Order) and Nayakas are also.called Bedars.\n\nThe High Court held that there was no Nayaka in this area and that the appellant was a Bedar.\n\nAllowing the appeal, this Court,\n\nHELD : The Presidential o,.Jci showed that Naikdas or Nayakas are to be found not only in ihe districts of Mysore but. also in Maharashtra and Raja!:ithan.\n\nThis tribal community was therefore, quite widespread and it was not pOssible to say that there was no Nayaka in the district to which the appellant belong, d.\n\nEven if he was the solidary Nayaka he would be covered by the Presidential order and would be .. entitled to stand for the reserved sat for the tribal communities mentioned in the Pre\"Siden~ tial Order. He claimed to be a. Nayaka and this claim was upheld by the Returning Officer. [810 G]\n\nOnce the nomination paper was accepted the burden .must be 3:ssuffied again by the party challenging the fact that a candidate belonged to a particular community.\n\nIf prima facie evidence h:id been led by the election petitioner the burden might have shifted to the candidate but as he led no evidence whatever he must obviously fail. [809 H; 810 A]\n\nThe election peitioner could have provr.d by positive evidence that the appellant was a Bedar. That would have proved that he was not a Nayaka. l\"o establish the fact evidence was required to show the characteristics, such as customs of marriages. births; deaths, wdrship, dress, cupation and the like which distinguish a Bedar from a Nayaka. Evidence was also possible to show that the appellant was received in the Bedar community.\n\nThis was capable of being proved by showing inter-marriage, interdinin~, community of worship, residence in a particular place and the like. Such facts would have led lo the drawing of aQ inference one way or the other.\n\nA bare assertion by the election petitioner that the appellant is a Bedar does not suffice to displace the acceptance of the nomination paper or the claim of the appellant that he is a Nayaka. [808 D-F)\n\nAbhoy l'ada Saha v, Sudhir Kumar Monda/, [1966] supp. S.C.R. 387, B. Basavalingc.ppa v. D. Munichinnappa & Ors. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1269 and llhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh & Ors. A.I.R. 1965 S.C, 1957, referred to.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1303 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act 19 51 from the judgment and order dated July 24, 1967 of the\n\nMysore High Court, Bangalore in Ele<., tion pctitio,1 No. I 0 of 1967.\n\nS. S. Ja .. a/i and M. Veerappa, for the appellant.\n\nR. Gopa/akrishnan, for respondent no. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J.\n\nThis is an appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the judgment and order, July 24, 1967, of the High Court of Mysore in Election Petition No. 10 of 1967. The High Court has ,; et aside the election of L&xman Siddappa Naik, who is the appellan: before us.\n\nThe appellant had stood from Gokak constituency of the Mysore Legislative Assembly for a seat reserved for a member of the Scheduled Tribes specified in Part VIII para 2 of !he Constitution\n\n(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.\n\nFive others had tiled nomination papers.\n\nThe nomination paper of one Kaushalya Devi was rejected by the Returning Officer and one Bhimgouda Mallagouda Patil withdrew from the contest within the time permi'.ted by the Act.\n\nThcte were thus four contesting candidates. The result of the poll was as follows :-\n\n1. Shri Laxman Siddappa Naik 17522\n\n2. Shri Parasappa Hanmantha Karaing 7044\n\n3. Shri Patel Shivangowd Malgowd 5996\n\n4. Shri Kattimani Chandappa Jampanna 620\n\nThe election petition was filed by the last candidate who had rectived only 620 votes.\n\nThe main contention and on which his cleciiun petition in the High Court succeeded was that the appellant and the other two were not members of the Scheduled Tribes and were not thus entitled to stand tor the reserved seat.\n\nThis objection was also taken before the Returniilg Officer but was rejected by him.\n\nThe case of the election petitioner was that the appellant did not bdong to the tribe shown as Nayaka including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapadia Nayaka, Mota Nayaka and )'fana Nayaka, mentioned at No. 13 in Part VIII (2) of the Order. He was, on the other hand, a \"Bedar\" which tribe is not mentioned in the\n\nOrder.\n\nThe election petitioner also urged that the other two candidates also did not belong to any Scheduled Tribes but to the\n\n'Bedar\" caste.\n\nHe, therefore, asked that he himself should be declared elected treating the votes cast in favour of his opponents as \"thrown away\" since the voters knew this fact and voted with this knowledge. h answer to the petition the appellant asserted that he was a Nayaka although he stated that Nayakas are also\n\ncalled \"Bedars\". The High Court on an appraisal of the evidence and after looking into census reports and certain v:riters on the subject of Castes and Tribes has come to the conclusmn that there is no Nayaka in this area and that the appellant is a Bedar. The appellant now appeals against the order of the High Court.\n\nUnder Art. 332 of the Constitution seats are reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of the States and under Art. 342 of the Constitution the President has, with respect to the States, after consultation with the Governors, by public notification specified the tribal communities which are deemed to be the Scheduled Tribes in relation to a particular State. Parliament has power by law to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the President's order any trib~ or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community.\n\nThe Presidential Order was modified in 1956 :md\n\n1960. The District in which Gokak is situated was formerly part of the Bombay State. 24 tribes were named in the original Presidential Order.\n\nIn 1956 this part was incorporated in the State of Mysore. In 1960 the Bombay State was bifurcated into two.\n\nAs a result the Presidential order was suitably amended. Para 2 of Part VIII now refers to the area formerly in Bombay State which now is a part of the Mysore State. This part now shows 19 tribes instead of 24.\n\nAn identical list of tribes is also shown in certain districts of Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Formerly the entry read only \"Naikda or Nayaka\" but now it reads \"Naikda or Nayaka, including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapdia Nayaka, Mot1' Nayaka arid Nana Nayaka\". The \"Nayaka\" also means a chieftain and the word \"Naikda\" means a petty Nayaka, but that obviously is not intended to be its meaning.\n\nThese words definitely refer to tribal communities which the President's Order shows are autochthonous in the respective areas. The appellant claimed to be a Nayaka. In his evidence he .denied that he was a Naikda.\n\nHe did not know the other tribal communities included in the P.xpression \"Naikda or Nayaka\" by the entry. In Abhoy Pada Saha\n\nv. Sudhir Kumar Monda/(') the question had arisen what was meant by the entry \"Sunri excluding Saha\". The plea of the election petitioner in that case was that the candidate was a Saha.\n\nHe failed to prove it and it was held that he belonged to the Sunri caste. It was pointed out that where the entry excluded a certain sub-caste the candidate must be taken to belong. to the original caste if his exclusion as a member of that sub-caste was not proved. In other words, the matter was treated as a question of fact.\n\nSimilarly, in B. Basava/in<(appa v. D. Munichinnappa and others(\") the Voddar caste of Mysore State, before the State Reorganization in 1956 was held, on evidence, to be the same as\n\n(1) (1966] Supp. S.C.R. 387.•\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1269.\n\nthe Bhovi caste mentioned in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)\n\nOrder, 1950.\n\nAgain the matter was treated as a question of fact.\n\nThis Coun has finally decided in Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh and others( 1 ) that what caste a candidate belongs to is a question of fact.\n\nStarting from this conclusion that the matter in controversy between the election petitioner and the appellant is a question of fact we have to address ourselves to the right questions in this case.\n\nThese questions are : to what tribal community, if any, docs the appellant belong_ and who is to prove the necessary facts?\n\nThese questions obviously have to be resolved on certain principles.\n\nThe ordinary rule is that a person, who as a plaintiff, asserts a fact, has to prove it.\n\nThe election petitioner here asserts two facts (a) that the appellant is not a Nayaka as mentioned in the Order, and (b) that he is a \"Bedar\".\n\nThe first is a negative fact and the second a positive one.\n\nIt is said that the proof of the negative was not only difficult but impossible.\n\nWe do no: agree.\n\nThe election petitioner could have proved by positive evidence that the petitioner was a \"Bedar\".\n\nThat would have proved that he was not a Nayaka.\n\nTo establish the fact evidence was required to show the charactl'ristics, such as customs of marriages. hirths. deaths, worship, dress, occupation and the like which distinguish a Bedar from a Nayaka.\n\nEvidence was also possible to show that the petitioner was received in the Bedar community.\n\nThis was capable of being proved by showing inter' marriage. inter-dining, community of worship, residence in a particular place and the like.\n\nSuch facts would have 'led to the drawing oJ an inference one way or the other.\n\nA bare assertion that the appellant is a Bedar does not suffice to displace the acceptance of the nomination paper or the claim of the appellant (hat he is a Nayaka.\n\nWe shall now see what the election petitioner did to establish that the appellant was a Bedar which would have proved conclusively that he was not a Nayaka.\n\nThe election petitioner examined five wi1nesses inoluding himself and filed two documents.\n\nThe first document (Ex.P.-1) was a certified extract of Births and Deaths Register of Arbhani village issued by the Tehsildar Gokak regarding the birth of a child Anasuya by name.\n\nIt was alleged that Anasuya was the daughter of the appellant and the caste was dcscrihcd as Bedar.\n\nThe appellant denied that it related io his daughter.\n\nHe said that he had only one daughter by name t5hankuntala and that the certificate produced was not of his\n\n'dauhter.\n\nNo evidence was led to establish that the cerlificate related to the daughter of the appellant.\n\nThe other document <Ex. P-2) was a certified extract of a school leaving certificate\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1961S.C.1557.\n\nrelating to one Lakshinappa Siddappa Naik.\n\nThe appellant denied that it was his school leaving certificate.\n\nAgain no attempt was made to connect the certificate with him.\n\nThe original of Ex. P-2 was not summoned from the school office.\n\nThese facts were capable of being proved.\n\nThere was not even cross-examination of the appellant with reference to these documents.\n\nThe High Court rejected both the documents.\n\nAs regards the Qral evidence it is sufficient to say that it did not exist.\n\nThe four witnesses summoned by the election .petitioner only proved that Cholivadi, Lamani and Kurubar were also called Nayaka and that the Bedars had sub-castes known as Talawars, Valmiki and Nayaka Makkalu.\n\nNone of these witnesses, however, diiifllayed any knowledge of the Gokak area or the position of the Bedars and Nayakas in that area.\n\nIn fact, they clearly stated that they knew nothing about it.\n\nThe election petitioner as witness stated that he had heard tha! the appellant was a Bedar and he did not examine any persoa in suppoi:t of his statement.\n\nHis evidence was obviously hearsay and when he was questioned he could not even name the person from whom he had learnt these facts.\n\nThe evidence on the part of the appellant was also nothing on both the points.\n\nHe filed a document Ex. R-1 said to be a certified copy of the extract relating to his birth from the Births and Deaths Register issued by the Tehsildar, Gokak.\n\nThe High Court summoned the original which we have also seen.\n\nThere is a correction in the appropriate column.\n\nSome writing appears to have been erased wher~ Nayaka is mentioned and it is possible to read the first letter, which is \"w\" (equal to B) and this shows that the original writing was perhaps Bedar.\n\nThere is nothing to show when the correction was made.\n\nIn the Register there are 58 entries and many of them relate to Bedars but there is no other entry of a Nayaka.\n\nNo doubt this is a suspicious circumstance but the question still is : does the appellant suffer ? In a case of this type when both sides lead-no evidence the matter must be decided on the basis of the original onus which clearly lay on the election petitioner.\n\nMr. Gopal Krishnan argres that as an objection was raised before the Returning Officer and was repelled on the acceptance of R-1, now found unacceptable, the appellant is relegated to the original burden.\n\nHere again this is a wrong. approach to the qvestion.\n\nThe Returning Officer was entitled to act on the evidence before. him.\n\nThe original was not seen by him and the doubt, now created, was not present in h; s mind.\n\nOnce the nomination paper was accepted the. burden must be assumed again by the party challenging the fact that a candidate belonged\n\nto a particular community.\n\nIf prima facie evidence had been led by the election petitioner the burden might have shifted to the candidate but as he led no evidence whatever he must obviously fail.\n\nThis is not one of those cases in which both sides having led evidence the question where onus lies, becomes immaterial, since the court can reach a conclusion on the totality of the evidence before it.\n\nThere was no evidence in this case one way or the other.\n\nIn these circumstances, the election petitioner could not succeed because of the weakness of the appellant's case.\n\nThe High Court did not approach this problem from his angle.\n\nAs it could not reach any conclusion on the evidence before it, the High Court turned to Census Reports of the Bombay Presidency of 1911. 1921 and 1931, the Bombay Karnatak Gazetteer of 1893, Hu:tons book on Castes in Indian ( 1931 ), Mysore Tribes and Castes Vol. II by Nanjundayya and Iyer, Hindu Tribes and Castes. Vol. II by Sherring. Castes and Tribes of Southern India by Thurston. certain Government Orders issued in 1959 and 1960 and the Administration Report of the Welfare Department of 1956-57.\n\nThese documents could be consulted to find out the distinguishing customs and manners of different tribes but not to reach a conclusion about the appellant.\n\nThe conclusion drawn from this material was that Naikda is a dis<inct tribe, that Nayaka! arc not mentioned and that the Bedars could not be called 'Naikda\".\n\nReverting to the pica of the appellant that he was not a Naikda . but a Nayka and that Nayakas were also known as Redars, the learned Judge reached the conclusion that the appellant was a Bedar.\n\nHe found no evidence in these Reports of the existence of 1'ayakas in this district and as the appellant claimed to be a Nayaka he felt that he must be a Bedar because there was no Nayaka in this area.\n\nIt has been pointed out in this Court, in the cases to which we have referred, that one must accept the Presidential Order.\n\nThe Presidential Order shows that Naikdas or Navakas are to be found not only in the districts of Mysore but also in Maharashtra and Rajasthan.\n\nThis tribal community is. therefore, quite wide-spread and it is not possible to say that there was no Nayaka in the district to which the appellant belonged.\n\nEven if he was the solitary Nayaka he would be covered by the Presidential Order and would\n\nbe entitled to stand for the reserved seat for the tribal communities mentioned in the Presidential Order.\n\nHe claimed to be a Nayaka and this claim was upheld by the Returning Officer.\n\nIt is significant that he was not an independent candidate but one chosen by a party.\n\nThis party would not have been easily imposed upon and would have taken care to select the right person for the seat.\n\nThere were two others who also came forward as Nayakas.\n\nE .. •\n\nL. S. NAIK v, K. C. JAMAPPANNA (Hidayotu//ah, J.) 81 l\n\nA these circumstances, <he learned Judge was in error in attempting. to establish that the tribal community mentioned as Nayakas was not to be found in this area and that only Naikdas were found and as the appellant did not claim to be a Naikda he must be held to be disentitled to be chosen to fill this seat for the tribal communities. A heavy burden obviously lay upon the election petitioner to.\n\nB displace his .claim by evidence.\n\nHe did not even lead prima facie evidence and therefore the claim cannot be said to have been negatived.\n\nAn election is something which cannot be readily set aside.\n\nThere must be proof and convincing proo.f that a person is not properly chosen to fill a particular seat.\n\nMere suspicion or C surmise is not sufficient after the Returning Officer accepts a candidature and the candidate is chosen in the election. Once a community has gone to the polls and the voters have exercised their franchise it is necessary for an election petitioner to show that the candidate is not entitled to the seat.\n\nIn other words, the burden originally lies on the election petitioner and he cannot succeed D ,. unless he discharges that burden.\n\nThe High Court recognized that there was no evidence in the case but went into the matter from a different angle and attempted to contradict the Presidential Order which it was not entitled to do.\n\nWe are accordingly satisfied that the election petitioner had failed to establish his case and that the election of the appellant could not be set aside.\n\nThe appeal will accondingly be allowed.\n\nThe order of the High Court will be set aside. The election petitioner must pay the costs of the appellant here and in the High Court.\n\nY. P.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "LAXMAN SIDDAPPA NAIK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMAN SIDDAPPA NAIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KATTIMANI CHANIAPPA JAMAPPANNA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KATTIMANI CHANIAPPA JAMAPPANNA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jci showed that Naikdas or Nayakas are to be found not only in ihe districts of Mysore but."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "also in Maharashtra and Raja!:ithan."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. Ja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Ja .. a/i and M. Veerappa, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Veerappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Ja .. a/i and M. Veerappa, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3205, "end_char": 3212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopa/akrishnan, for respondent no."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J.\n\nThis is an appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the judgment and order, July 24, 1967, of the High Court of Mysore in Election Petition No.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3442, "end_char": 3462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J.\n\nThis is an appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the judgment and order, July 24, 1967, of the High Court of Mysore in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "L&xman Siddappa Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has ,; et aside the election of L&xman Siddappa Naik, who is the appellan: before us."}}, {"text": "Kaushalya Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nomination paper of one Kaushalya Devi was rejected by the Returning Officer and one Bhimgouda Mallagouda Patil withdrew from the contest within the time permi'.ted by the Act."}}, {"text": "Bhimgouda Mallagouda Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nomination paper of one Kaushalya Devi was rejected by the Returning Officer and one Bhimgouda Mallagouda Patil withdrew from the contest within the time permi'.ted by the Act."}}, {"text": "Laxman Siddappa Naik", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Laxman Siddappa Naik 17522\n\n2.", "canonical_name": "LAXMAN SIDDAPPA NAIK"}}, {"text": "Parasappa Hanmantha Karaing", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4180, "end_char": 4207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Parasappa Hanmantha Karaing 7044\n\n3."}}, {"text": "Patel Shivangowd Malgowd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Patel Shivangowd Malgowd 5996\n\n4."}}, {"text": "Kattimani Chandappa Jampanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kattimani Chandappa Jampanna 620\n\nThe election petition was filed by the last candidate who had rectived only 620 votes.", "canonical_name": "KATTIMANI CHANIAPPA JAMAPPANNA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Cholivala Nayaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the election petitioner was that the appellant did not bdong to the tribe shown as Nayaka including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapadia Nayaka, Mota Nayaka and )'fana Nayaka, mentioned at No."}}, {"text": "Kapadia Nayaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4824, "end_char": 4838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the election petitioner was that the appellant did not bdong to the tribe shown as Nayaka including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapadia Nayaka, Mota Nayaka and )'fana Nayaka, mentioned at No."}}, {"text": "Mota Nayaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4840, "end_char": 4851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the election petitioner was that the appellant did not bdong to the tribe shown as Nayaka including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapadia Nayaka, Mota Nayaka and )'fana Nayaka, mentioned at No."}}, {"text": ")'fana Nayaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the election petitioner was that the appellant did not bdong to the tribe shown as Nayaka including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapadia Nayaka, Mota Nayaka and )'fana Nayaka, mentioned at No."}}, {"text": "Art. 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6147, "end_char": 6157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament has power by law to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the President's order any trib~ or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community."}}, {"text": "Gokak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6435, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District in which Gokak is situated was formerly part of the Bombay State."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Para 2 of Part VIII now refers to the area formerly in Bombay State which now is a part of the Mysore State."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An identical list of tribes is also shown in certain districts of Maharashtra and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Kapdia Nayaka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7077, "end_char": 7090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Formerly the entry read only \"Naikda or Nayaka\" but now it reads \"Naikda or Nayaka, including Cholivala Nayaka, Kapdia Nayaka, Mot1' Nayaka arid Nana Nayaka\"."}}, {"text": "Mysore State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in B. Basava/in<(appa v. D. Munichinnappa and others(\") the Voddar caste of Mysore State, before the State Reorganization in 1956 was held, on evidence, to be the same as\n\n(1) (1966] Supp."}}, {"text": "Anasuya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10676, "end_char": 10683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.-1) was a certified extract of Births and Deaths Register of Arbhani village issued by the Tehsildar Gokak regarding the birth of a child Anasuya by name."}}, {"text": "Lakshinappa Siddappa Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11195, "end_char": 11220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to one Lakshinappa Siddappa Naik."}}, {"text": "Cholivadi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11747, "end_char": 11756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The four witnesses summoned by the election .petitioner only proved that Cholivadi, Lamani and Kurubar were also called Nayaka and that the Bedars had sub-castes known as Talawars, Valmiki and Nayaka Makkalu."}}, {"text": "Lamani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11758, "end_char": 11764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The four witnesses summoned by the election .petitioner only proved that Cholivadi, Lamani and Kurubar were also called Nayaka and that the Bedars had sub-castes known as Talawars, Valmiki and Nayaka Makkalu."}}, {"text": "Kurubar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11769, "end_char": 11776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The four witnesses summoned by the election .petitioner only proved that Cholivadi, Lamani and Kurubar were also called Nayaka and that the Bedars had sub-castes known as Talawars, Valmiki and Nayaka Makkalu."}}, {"text": "Gopal Krishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13362, "end_char": 13376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gopal Krishnan argres that as an objection was raised before the Returning Officer and was repelled on the acceptance of R-1, now found unacceptable, the appellant is relegated to the original burden."}}, {"text": "Nanjundayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14827, "end_char": 14838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II by Nanjundayya and Iyer, Hindu Tribes and Castes."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14843, "end_char": 14847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II by Nanjundayya and Iyer, Hindu Tribes and Castes."}}, {"text": "Thurston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14934, "end_char": 14942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Castes and Tribes of Southern India by Thurston."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_812_818_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "PASHUPATI NATH SINGH\n\nHARIHAR PRASAD SINGH\n\nJanuary 2z, 1968\n\n(M. H1DAYATULLAH 0 S. M. S!KRI AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]\n\nRtpr<Stntation of the People Act, 1951, ·\"· 30 to 35, and 3cndi .date not having made or subscribed ooth nr t;/firmation under Art. 173(a)\n\n-Whether entitled to do so on date fixed fOI' scrutiny of nomination\n\npaptr.~.-\"On lhe date fixed for scrutiny\"-nrtaning of.\n\nCon.rrit11tion of India Art. 173fal an<I third Schedule-When oath tx C1{firn1<.:tion 10 he 1nade or subscribed by candidaJt.\n\nThe ap1dlar,; challenged the election of the respondent to the Bihar Legislative /., ssembly by an election pctilion on the ground that his own nomination paper had been improperly rejectd by the Retumin& Officer.\n\nOn January 21, 1967 the dale fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers under s. 36 of the Reprc'S\"•nlation of the People Act, 1951. the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of the appellant on tbe ground that he was Jl01 qualified to be chosen to fill a scat in the State Legislature since he had not made and subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined bv clause (a) of Art. 173 of tbe Constitution. The High Court rej-zcted the appellant's election petition.\n\nll was contended for the appellant that on objection being taken undtr s. 36(2) that the petitioner had not made and suh<cribed an oath or affirmation acoording to the form se: out in the Third Schedule of the LI:>nstitution, he was entitld to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation immediately before the objection was considered by the lleturning Officer.\n\nAs soon as a candidate makes or subscrib6 the oath or affirmation, he would become qualified under Art. 173 of the Constitution, and this qualification would exist \"on the da!e fixed for the scrutiny\" within the meaning of s. 36(2) because the date of scrutiny of nomination papers-in this case January 21, 1967-would not ha\"'. passed away by the time the oath or affirmation is taken or sub5cribcd.\n\nHELD : dismissing the appeal.\n\nThe expression \"on the date fixed for scrutiny\" in s. 36(2) (a) means \"on the whole of the day on which the scrutiny of nomination has to take place\".\n\nIn other words, tbe qualification must exist from the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny. On this date the Returning Officer has to decide the objections and the objections have to be made by the other\n\ncandidates after examining the nomination papers and in the Hght of s.\n\nG 36(2) of the Act and other provisions.\n\nOn the dale of the scrutiny the other candidalcs shouJd be in a position to raise all possible objections\n\nheforc the scrutiny of a particu1ar nomination paper starts. (817 F-Hl\n\nParnte.- v.·/Gme.<, (1866-67) LR. 2 C.P. 348 and Reg v. H111nphtry, 10 Ad'. & E. 335: referred !o.\n\nThe fact that there was no place in form 2B prescribed under the Conduct of Election Ru:cs. 1961 wh-:re it can be staied by the candidates H 1hat he had taken th~ requisite oath or affirmation docs nol mean that th-.:\n\noath or affirmation cnn he taken and subscribed on the date fixed for c; crutiny.\n\nThe nomination paper does not provide for the statement about ..\n\nA the oath because the oath or affirn1ation has to be taken after a candidate has been nominated.\n\nIt cannot be said that a person can be regarded as nominated only when, after scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning OffiC'er finds him to be validly nominated.\n\nThe form of oath does not say \"having been vali<lly nominated\" but only \"having been nominated\".\n\n[818 EJ\n\nShira Sluu1k(; r Kanodia v. Kapildeo Narain Singh, Election Appeal No. 4 of 1965; judgment dated September 22, 1965 of the Patna High Court; disapproved.\n\nThe words \"having been nominated\" in the fo'rm of the oath or affirmation in the third Schedule to the Constitution clearly show that the oath or alftrmation c.innot be taken or made by a candidate before he has been nolT'!!'l.atcd as a candidate.\n\nFurther. it is clear that none of the sections from s. 30 to s. 36 require that this Oath should accompany the nomination paper.\n\nNo refeience has bee\"n made to the form of oath in s. 33 or s. 35, although in s. 33 it is provided that in certain cases the nomination paper should be accompanied by a declaration or by a certificate issued by the Election Commission. [817 B, C]\n\nCtv1L APPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN: Civil Appeal No. 1692 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 195 l from the judgment and order dated September 26, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 8 of 1967.\n\nH. R. Goklwle, J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. N. Prasad and B. P. Singh, for the respondent.\n\nR. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the intervener.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J.\n\nThis is an appeal under s. 116A of the Represer.- tation d the People Act, 1951-hereinafter referred to as the Act-from the. judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing Election Ptition No. 8 of 1967 filed by the appellant Pashupati Nath Singh hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. ln order to appreciate the point arising before us it is necessary to state the relevant facts.\n\nThe petitioner stood as a candidate for election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly.\n\nThe election to that Assembly from the Dumraan Assembly Constituncy was held during the last gene- H ral elections as per the following schedule ;\n\n\"(a) Date of filing nomination papers-13-1-1967 to 20-1-1967.\n\nL3 Sup Cl/68-~\n\n(b) Date of scrutiny of nomination papers-21-1-1967.\n\n(c) Last date of withdrawal of candidatures-23-1-1967.\n\n(d) Date of poll-17-2-1967.\n\n{e) Date of counting of votes-. 23-2-1967.\n\n(f) Date of declaration of result of the election-\n\n23-2-1967\".\n\nThe petitioner filed his nomination paper before the Returning Officer at Buxar on January 16, 196.7.\n\nEight other candidates, including the respondent Harihar Prasad Singh, filed their nomination papers before the Returning Officer on different dates between January 13, 1967, and January 20, 1967. On January 21, 1967, the nomination papers were taken up for scrutiny, when the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner and accepted the nomination papers of the remaining eight candidates. On February 17, 1967, the poll was held and the respondent, Shri Hnrihar Pra, ad Singh, secured the largest number of votes, namely, 14,539, and was accordingly declared elected. Thereupon the petitioner presented election petition in the Patna High Court for a declaration that the election of the respondent is void on the ground that the nomination paper of the petitioner was in1propcrly rejected by the Returning Officer.\n\nThe High Court held that the nomination of the petitioner ·.vas rightly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that he was not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the State Legislature since he had not made and subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined by cl. (a) of Art. 173 of the Constitution, either before the scrutiny of nominations or even subsequently on the date of scrutiny.\n\nThe short question which arises in this appeal is whether it is necessary for a candidate to make and subscribe the requisite oath pr affirmation as enjoined by cl. (a) of Art. 173 of the Constitution before the date fixed for scrutiny of nomination paper.\n\nIno other words, is a candidate entitled to make and subscribe the requisite oath when objection is taken . before the Returning Officer or must he have made and subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation before the scrutiny of nomination commenced ? The answer to this question mainly depends on the interpretation of s. 36(2) ofthe Act. It will, however, be necessary to refer to some other sections of the Act in order tr\n\nfully appreciate the effect of the words used in that section Section 32 of the Act provides for nomination of candidates for election thus :\n\nH .\n\n\"Any' person may be nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat if he is qualified-to be chosen to fill that seat under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, as the case may be.\" It was suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Gupte, that this section means that a canidate lll:ust. also be qualified to be chosen 011; the last date for filmg nonupattons.\n\nWe need not consider this question because we have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not qualified for being chosen to fiil the. seat on the date fixed. for scrutiny of nominations within the meaning of s. 36(2)(a).\n\nSection 33 provides for presentation of nomination paper and certain requirements for a valid nomination.\n\nSub-s. (2), for instance, provides that in the case of a constituency where any seat is reserved, the nomination paper must contain a declaration by the candidate specifying the particular caste or tribe of which he is a member and the area in relation to which that caste or tribe is a Scheduled Caste or, as the case may be, a Scheduled Tribe of the State. Sub-s. (3) provides that where a candidate is a person who, having held any office referred to in cl. (f) of s. 7, has been dismissed and a period of five years has not elapsed since the dismissal, he must with the nomination paper give a certificate issued in the prescribed manner by the Election Commission to the effect ihat he has rot been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State.\n\nSection 35 deals with the notice of nominations and the time and place for their scrutiny.\n\nThe Returning Officer has to inform the person or persons delivering the nomination paper of the date, time and place fixed for the scrutiny of nominations.\n\nHe is also required to sign a certificate stating the date on which and the hour at which the nomination paper has been delivered to him, and also to cause to be fixed in some conspicuous place in his office a notice of the nomination containing descriptions similar to those contained in the nomination paper, both of the candidate and of the proposer.\n\nThen comes s. 36, relevant portion of which reads as follows:\n\n\"36. Scrutiny of nominations.-(1) On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly authorized in writing by each candidate, but no other person, may attend at such time and place as the returning officer\n\nmay appoint; and the returning otlicer shall give them all reasonable facilities for examining the 'nomination papers of all candidates which have been delivered within the time and in the manner laid down in section 33.\n\n( 2) The returning officer shall then exam inc the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject\n\nany nomination on any of the following grounds :-\n\n(a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of 'lcminations the candidate either is not qualified or is disql!alificd for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following provisions that may be applicable, namely:-\n\nArticles 84, 102, 17 3 and 191.\n\nPart II of this Act. and sections 4 and 14 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 or\n\n( b) that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of section 33 or section 34; or\n\n( c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine ... \"\n\nIt will be noticed that\" under ' 36 (2) of the Act, one of the grounds on which a nomination can be rejected is that Qn the date fixed for the scrutinv of nominations the candidate is not qualified for being chosen' to fill the scat under Art. 173 of the Constitution.\n\nThe relcvanj part of Art. 173 provides :\n\n\"173. A person shall not be quaii1ied to be chosen to fill a set in the Legislature of a State unless he- ( a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorized in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for. the purpose in the Third Schedirle.\" The form referred to reads as under :\n\n\"Form of oath or affirmation to be made by a candidate for election to the Legislature of a State :-\n\n\" \"l, A.R., having been no; ainatcd as a candidate to fill a scat in the Legislative Assembly (or Legislative\n\nH ..\n\nH ..\n\nPASHUPATI NATH V. HARIHAR PRASAp (Sikri, J.) 817\n\nCouncil), do swear in the name of God/ solemnly affinn that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India\" \" \".\n\nThe words \"having been nominated\" in this fonn clearly show that the oath or affirmation cannot be taken or made by a candidate before he has been nominated as a candidate.\n\nFurther, it is clear that none of the sections from s. 30 to s. 36 require that this oath should accompany the' nomination paper.\n\nNo reference has been made to the fonn of oath in s. 33 or s. 3S, although in s. 33 it is provided that in certain cases the nomination paper should be accompanied by a declaration or by a certificate issued by the Election Commission. In this case it is common ground that no oath or affinnation was attached to the nomination paper or was filed before the date fixed for the scrutiny.\n\nMr. Gokhale, who appears for the petitioner, contends that on objection being taken under s. 36(2) that the petitioner hacl not made and subscribed an oath or affirmation according to the fonn set out above, he was entitled to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation immediately before the objection was considered by the Returning Officer. He says that as soon as a candidate takes the oath or makes and subscribes the oath or affim, ation he would become qualified within the terms of Art. 173 of the Constitution, and this qualification would exist \"on the date fixed for the scrutiny\" because the date of scrutiny of nomination paper-in this case January 21, 1967-would not have passed away by the time the oath or affirmation is taken or subscribed.\n\nIt seems to us that the expression \"on the date fixed for scrutiny\" in s. 36(2)(a) means \"on the whole of the day on which the scrutiny of nomination has to take plaee\". In other words, the qualification must exist from the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny. It wilt be noticed that on this date the Returning Officer has to decide the objections and the objections have to be made by the other candidates after examining the nomination papers and in the light of s. 36(2) of the Act and other provisions. On the date of the scrutir.y the other candidates should be in a position to raise all possible objections before the scrutiny of a particular nomination paper starts. In a particular case, an objection may be taken to the form of the oath; the fonn of the oath may have been modified or the oath may not have been sworn before. the person authorised in this behalf by the Election Commission.\n\nTt is not necessary under Art. 173 that the permn authorised by the Election Commission should be the returning officer.\n\nIn Paynter v. James('), Bovill, C.J., quoted, with approval, A the passage from lhe judgment of Tindal, C.J., in Reg v. Humphery('), in which the following occurs:\n\n\" .... we hold it therefore to be unnecessary to refer to instances of the legal meaning of the word 'upon' which, in different cases, may undoubtedly either mean before the act done to which it relates, or sim11lta11eo11s- B ly with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require the interpretation, with reference to the context and the subject-matter of the enactment.\"\n\nBovill, C.J., observed that \"that is a very clear statement of the various meanings of the word \"on\" or \"upon''.\"\n\nIn this connection it must also be borne in mind that law disregards, as far as possible, fractions of the day.\n\nIt would lead to great confusion if it were held th!lt a candidate would be entitled to qualify for being chosen to fill a seat till the very end\n\nof the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations.\n\nIf the learned.\n\nD counsel for the petitioner is right, the candidate could ask the Returning Officer 10 wait till 11.55 p.m. on the date fixed for the scrutiny to enable him to take the oath.\n\nReference was also made to Form 2B in the Conduct of Elections Rules. 1961. 'It was pointed out that in ihis form there 1s no place where it can be stated by the candidate that he had taken the requisite oath or aftirmation.\n\nBut, )his in our view does not mean that the oath or affirmation can be taken\n\nand subscribed on the date fixed for scrutiny.\n\nIt seems to us that the. nomination paper docs not provide for the statement about the oath because the oath or affirmation has to be taken after a candidate has been nominated.\n\nOur attention was invited to an unreported decision of the Patna High Court in Shiva Shankar Kanodia v, Kapildeo Narain Singh('). That decision proceeded on the basis that \"one , can be\n\nsaid to be so nominated only when, after scrutiny of the. nomination papers. the Returning Officer finds him to be validly nominated, as provided under section 36 ( 8) of the Reprent.a- G tion of the People Act, 1951.\" With respect, the High Court proceeded on a wrong basis.\n\nThe form of oath does not say \"having been validly nominated\" but only \"having been nominated.\"\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed, H\n\n(ll (1866-67) L. R. 2 C. P. 348.\n\n(2) to A. D. &. E. JJS.\n\n(3) Eltctin Appeal No. 4 of t%5; judgn1en1 dated September 22. 1965.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "PASHUPATI NATH SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PASHUPATI NATH SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARIHAR PRASAD SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARIHAR PRASAD SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. 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R. Goklwle", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Goklwle, J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Goklwle, J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Goklwle, J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4595, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. N. Prasad and B. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. N. Prasad and B. P. Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P. 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Agarwal, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J.\n\nThis is an appeal under s. 116A of the Represer.- tation d the People Act, 1951-hereinafter referred to as the Act-from the."}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4828, "end_char": 4844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4906, "end_char": 4939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing Election Ptition No."}}, {"text": "Pashupati Nath Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 of 1967 filed by the 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8615, "end_char": 8625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9190, "end_char": 9194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9371, "end_char": 9390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f) of s. 7, has been dismissed and a 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Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Part II of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11260, "end_char": 11279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 4 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11285, "end_char": 11302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of this Act", "statute": "Part II of this Act"}}, {"text": "Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11310, "end_char": 11351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Art. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11803, "end_char": 11811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Art. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11855, "end_char": 11863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963", "statute": "the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A person shall not be quaii1ied to be chosen to fill a set in the Legislature of a State unless he- ( a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorized in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for."}}, {"text": "PASHUPATI NATH V. HARIHAR PRASAp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The form referred to reads as under :\n\n\"Form of oath or affirmation to be made by a candidate for election to the Legislature of a State :-\n\n\" \"l, A.R., having been no; ainatcd as a candidate to fill a scat in the Legislative Assembly (or Legislative\n\nH ..\n\nH ..\n\nPASHUPATI NATH V. HARIHAR PRASAp (Sikri, J.) 817\n\nCouncil), do swear in the name of God/ solemnly affinn that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India\" \" \"."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12621, "end_char": 12642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13089, "end_char": 13094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13098, "end_char": 13103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13117, "end_char": 13122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13431, "end_char": 13438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gokhale, who appears for the petitioner, contends that on objection being taken under s. 36(2) that the petitioner hacl not made and subscribed an oath or affirmation according to the fonn set out above, he was entitled to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation immediately before the objection was considered by the Returning Officer."}}, {"text": "s. 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13517, "end_char": 13525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13917, "end_char": 13925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 36(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14257, "end_char": 14268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14655, "end_char": 14663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15118, "end_char": 15126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bovill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15238, "end_char": 15244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Paynter v. James('), Bovill, C.J., quoted, with approval, A the passage from lhe judgment of Tindal, C.J., in Reg v. Humphery('), in which the following occurs:\n\n\" .... we hold it therefore to be unnecessary to refer to instances of the legal meaning of the word 'upon' which, in different cases, may undoubtedly either mean before the act done to which it relates, or sim11lta11eo11s- B ly with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require the interpretation, with reference to the context and the subject-matter of the enactment.\""}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15310, "end_char": 15316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Paynter v. James('), Bovill, C.J., quoted, with approval, A the passage from lhe judgment of Tindal, C.J., in Reg v. Humphery('), in which the following occurs:\n\n\" .... we hold it therefore to be unnecessary to refer to instances of the legal meaning of the word 'upon' which, in different cases, may undoubtedly either mean before the act done to which it relates, or sim11lta11eo11s- B ly with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require the interpretation, with reference to the context and the subject-matter of the enactment.\""}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17274, "end_char": 17284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17322, "end_char": 17338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 22. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17696, "end_char": 17714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of t%5; judgn1en1 dated September 22."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_819_822_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "R. RAMAKRISHNA RAO\n\n~\"' \"'\"· OF KERAl., l\\\n\n;~;. :: :!3, 1968\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J\n\nEmployees Provident Funds Act (19 of 1952), s. 1(3)(b) ands. 16 (l)(b)-Proprietor of hotel starting new hotel-Number of emplo.vees reaching twenty-Whether employer can claim exemption from appUca tlon of Act for 5 y•ars.'\n\nThe appellant started running a hotel in 1948. In 1949 he started a seocnd hotel and in 1959 a third in the same place.\n\nOn the addition of the 3rd hotel the number of employees reached t1:0 figure 20.\n\nOn the question whether, even if the three hotels were taken together as one establishment, the proprietor could not .' \";' ''r, der s. 16(1) (b) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, exe1~1pti0\": (r!1IT the appJica~ tion of the provisions of the Act for a period of five y<ars from 1959.\n\nHELD : The period should be counted only from 1948, when the establishment was first set up.\n\nUnder s. 1(3)(b) the Act applies to establishments employing 20 or more persons. The word 'employing' only describes the establishments to which the Act applies and does not show that there should be continuity of employment of 20 persons for 5 years.\n\nUnder s. 16(1) (b), in the case of a new establishment, the period Of 5 years is counted forward from the date the establishment is set up but in the case of an existing establishment from the date tho establishment has been set up. The intention in either case is to give a breathing time to new establishments. [822 C, D,\n\nE-F]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 94 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated F January 11, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Revi sion Petition No. 90, 107 and 108 of 1964.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant (in all the appeals)\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. The appellant is the proprietor of two establishments called Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging and Hotel Brinda. Palghat. He was convicted by the Special 1st Class Magistrate, Kozhikode on three counts under paragraphs 76(c) and ( e) of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 read with s. 14 of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 for having failed to submit the returns, statements and other documents required by the Scheme in respect of three quarters July to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S C.R.\n\nSeptember, 1961, October to December, 1961 and January to A Ma.rch, 1 962: . He. was fin.ed Rs. 25 on each count.\n\nHis application for rev1s1on m the High Court of Kerala was dismissed. He has now filed these appeals by special leave of this Court.\n\nAnanda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging was started by him on December 6, 1949 and Hotel Brinda on January 15, 1959. He had a third establishment which went under the name of Anand Bhavan started on September 15, 1948 but it was sold by him in April, 1962. Complaints were filed against him by the Provident Fund Inspector, Trichur on December 16, 1962, alleging that he had contravened paragraphs 36(2)(a) and (b) and 38 of the Scheme.\n\nUnder these provisions he was required to submit within 15 days of the close of the month a return of the employees qualified to become members of the Fund for the first time during the preceeding month together with a declaration of such qualifying employees and to pay to each member his wages in respect of any period or part of tht period for \\Vhich contributions were payable after deducting the employees' contribution from his wages which together with his own contribution as well as an administrative charge were to be paid to a Fund established under the Scheme.\n\nHe was also required to forward to the Commissioner within 15 days of the close of the month a consolidated statement.\n\nThe appellant contended that two employees were working in the Ananda Bhavan Lodging and 11 members in the Hotel Brinda. He claimed exemption for five years under the Act.\n\nHis further defence was that the three estalilishments formed different units and that 20 persons were not employed in any one of these places and that even if the three establishments could be deemed to a single establishment the number of employees reached the figure (which the Act puts down as the minimum) after Hotel Brinda was opened in January 1959 and he was entitled to an exemption under the Act for a further period of five years from January 15, 1959. Lastly, he pleaded that if there was a doubt on all these points the matter could only be decided after the doubt was cleared by an order of the Central Government under s. 19A of the Act.\n\nHis pleas were not accepted hy the High Court and the Magistrate and he has raised some of the contentions before us.\n\nBefore we comider the arguments which have been urged before 1ls we may refer to some of the provisions of the Act. The Employees Provident Fund Act !>.:came law on March 4, 1952 and the scheme was published on September 2, 1952.\n\nA part of the Scheme became operative from October 31, 1953; other portions came into operation on subsequent dates .. It was not contended before us that the relevant part~ of the Scheme were not in force.\n\nThe Act applies to the whole of India and subject\n\n. ,.\n\nRAMAKRISHNA V; KERALA (Hidayatul/ah, J.) 821\n\nto the provisions contained in s. 16 of the Act it applies (a) to a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I in which 20 or more persons are employed and (b) to \"any other establishment employing 20 or more persons or class of such establishments which the Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf\". These estal:>lishments come within cl. (b) and are governed by the appropriate notification issued by the Central Governme)\\t. No contention has been raised before us that the Act and the Scheme were not applicable to the kind of establishments here. Since the objection is that s. 16 excludes the establishments for a period we may read that section here :\n\n\"16. Act not to apply to certain establishments.- ( I) This Act shall not apply- ( a) to any establishment registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, or under any other law for the time being in force in any State relating to cooperative societies, employing less than fifty persons and working without the aid of power; or\n\n(b) to .any othr establishment employing fifty, or more persons or twenty or more, but less than fifty, persons until the expiry of three years ht the case of the former and five years in the case of the latter, from the date on which the establishment is, or has been set up.\n\nExplanation.-For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that an establishment shall ndt be deemed to be newly set up merely by reason of a change in its location. (2)\n\nF Paragraph 26 (I) (a) of the Scheme shows the classes of employees entitled and required to join the Fund. It reads as follows :-\n\n\"26 (I )(a) Every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, other than an excluded employee shall be entitled and required' to become a member of the Fund from the beginning of the month following that in which this paragraph comes into force in such factory or other. establishment, if on the date of such coming into force he has completed one year's continuous service or has actually worked for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months or less in that factory or other establishment or in any other factory or other establishment to which the Act applies under the same employ, er, or partly in one and partly in the other.\"\n\nq .• ') st:l'Rl!ME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nNow the question in this case is that Hotel Brinda commenced only on January 15, 1959 and the number of employees then exceeded 20 for the first time. Under the provisions of s. 16 an exemption from the Act and the- Scheme is claimed for five years and it is submitted no offence was committed because the establishments even if taken together could not be subjected to the provisions till a period of five years had expired from January 15, 1959.\n\nIn support of this argument Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar emphasises that the use of the participle 'employing' in s. I ( 3) (b) shows some continuity of employment of 20 persons and not the first point of time when that number is rearhed. He contends that it is always intended that a period of 3 or 5 years, as the case may be, must elapse before the provisions o' the Act and the Schemes are made applicable.\n\nThis is an ingenious way of putting the matter but is not admissible. The language of s. 16 (I )(b) is very precise.\n\nThe last thirteen words of the clause 'from the date on which the establishment is or has been set up', show both cases where the establishment is new and where the establishment is old.\n\nThe word 'is' shows that a new establishment is meant and the words 'has been' show that the establishment existed before the number is reached.\n\nIf it was intended to apply the clause to new establishments the words 'is set up' would have been sufficient.\n\nThe construction sought to be placed would render the words 'has been' otiose. Further the scheme of Paragraph 26 quoted earlier relates to a period of service and this qualifying period may be in the past as well a. in the future.\n\nThe intention behind s. 16 read with paragraph 26 quite clearly shows that the period is intenJed to give a breathing time to new establishments. That reason does not hold when the establishment is already old and well founded.\n\nThe use of the participle is therefore immaterial.\n\nWhether a present perfect tense or a participle be used the meaning is the same. Clause (b) of s. I ( 3) which uses the participle and clause (a) of the same section which employs the present perfect tense both merely describe the establishments and convey no different meanings.\n\nThe conclusion of the High Court was thus right. The appeals fail and will be dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "R. RAMAKRISHNA RAO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. RAMAKRISHNA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Employees Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Employees Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Employees Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 662, "end_char": 670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Employees Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Employees Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 925, "end_char": 935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1178, "end_char": 1186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated F January 11, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Revi sion Petition No."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant (in all the appeals)\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for the respondent (in all the appeals).", "canonical_name": "B. R. L. Iyengar"}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1757, "end_char": 1774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant (in all the appeals)\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. The appellant is the proprietor of two establishments called Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging and Hotel Brinda.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Special 1st Class Magistrate, Kozhikode", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2078, "end_char": 2117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was convicted by the Special 1st Class Magistrate, Kozhikode on three counts under paragraphs 76(c) and ( e) of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 read with s. 14 of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 for having failed to submit the returns, statements and other documents required by the Scheme in respect of three quarters July to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 S C.R.\n\nSeptember, 1961, October to December, 1961 and January to A Ma.rch, 1 962: ."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220, "end_char": 2225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2592, "end_char": 2612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His application for rev1s1on m the High Court of Kerala was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2692, "end_char": 2724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging was started by him on December 6, 1949 and Hotel Brinda on January 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging was started by him on December 6, 1949 and Hotel Brinda on January 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "Brinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging was started by him on December 6, 1949 and Hotel Brinda on January 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "January 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Bhavan Boarding & Lodging was started by him on December 6, 1949 and Hotel Brinda on January 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2884, "end_char": 2902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had a third establishment which went under the name of Anand Bhavan started on September 15, 1948 but it was sold by him in April, 1962."}}, {"text": "Trichur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complaints were filed against him by the Provident Fund Inspector, Trichur on December 16, 1962, alleging that he had contravened paragraphs 36(2)(a) and (b) and 38 of the Scheme."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Complaints were filed against him by the Provident Fund Inspector, Trichur on December 16, 1962, alleging that he had contravened paragraphs 36(2)(a) and (b) and 38 of the Scheme."}}, {"text": "Ananda Bhavan Lodging", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3880, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contended that two employees were working in the Ananda Bhavan Lodging and 11 members in the Hotel Brinda."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, he pleaded that if there was a doubt on all these points the matter could only be decided after the doubt was cleared by an order of the Central Government under s. 19A of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 19A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4929, "end_char": 4942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">.:came law on March 4, 1952 and the scheme was published on September 2, 1952."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4975, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">.:came law on March 4, 1952 and the scheme was published on September 2, 1952."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5038, "end_char": 5054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A part of the Scheme became operative from October 31, 1953; other portions came into operation on subsequent dates .. It was not contended before us that the relevant part~ of the Scheme were not in force."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act applies to the whole of India and subject\n\n. ,."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6145, "end_char": 6176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar emphasises that the use of the participle 'employing' in s. I ( 3) (b) shows some continuity of employment of 20 persons and not the first point of time when that number is rearhed.", "canonical_name": "B. R. L. Iyengar"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_823_832_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "i F\n\nH ,.. -\\\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.\n\nSARDAR D. K. JADA V\n\nJanuary 25, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act Sr.1m-at 2008 (Act 28 of 1951), ss. 2(i)(ix). 3. 4, 5(c) and 17-Tanks and lvells clabned to be situated on 'occupied lan<l'-Question ll'hether exen<ption under s. 5(c) applies- Jssue whether can be decided hy Jagir Conrnzissioner under s. l 1-High Court's duty in l\"rit proceedings to decide jurisdictional fGct on which the co1npe1ency of adn1ini:arative authority depends.\n\nOn the issuz of a notification under s. 3 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act Samvat 2008 (Act 28 of 1951 l aU the property in jagirs including Jagjr lands, trees tanks etc. stood vf.'stcd in the State under s. 4 of the Act.\n\nUnder s. 5(c) of tho Act all tanks. private weUs etc. in or on 'occupied land' as defined in s. 2(i) (ix) of the Act were excluded from vestin~. The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959 (Act 20 of 1959) in s. 251 provided that all tanks as d<scribed therein whi0 h were situated on unoccupied land and had not already vested in the State oner\n\nthe Abolition Act would. vest ahsolutely in the State Government with effect from 6th April. 1959: the sction also provided for compensation being paid in respect of such tanks.\n\nCertain tanks belonging to the respondent were treated as vested in the Stare Government.\n\nAt first he claimed compensation for them. but later he also claimed before the Revenue authorities that the tanks \\\\-'ere situated on 'occupied land' a11d therefore under s. 5 ( c) of the Aholition Act they were exempt from the vesting provisions.\n\nThe Revenue authorities having decided against him, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court.\n\nThe High Court held that the question raised by the respondent under s. 5(c) should he decided by !he Jagir Con1missioner undc'r s. 17 of the Abolition Act and on this view quashed the orders of Revenue authorities.\n\nThe State appealed. along with olher appellants.\n\nHELD : (i) The High Court was in error in holding that s. f7 of the Abolition Act was applicable to the case.\n\nSection 17 is jncluded in Chapter III which deals with compensation which Government is liable to pay to every jagirdar whose jagir land has been resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition Act. It follows therefore that the inquiry made by the Jagir Commissioner under s. 17 on the question of title is only for the purpose of enabling him to pay compensation to the persons who in his opinion are entitled to receive it.\n\nIn other words the inquiry by the Jagir Commissioner or the decision of the State Government under s. 17 does not embrace within its scope any djspute as to whethei any particular property falls within s. 4(1) (a) read with s. 5 of the AboHtion Act and whether it has or has not in consequence .vested in the. State Government by notification issued under s. 3 of. the Abolition Act. [829 D-G]\n\n{ii) However. if the respondent was right in .his contention that the tanks and wells were constructed on 'occupied Iand' belonging to the, jagirdar within the meaning of s. 5 ( c) of the Abolition Act, it was manifest that the appellants had no authority to take possession of those tanks and wells because. the title therein did not vest in the State Government in view of s. 5(c) which has an overriding effect on s. 4 of the Abolition Act.\n\nII was 1herefore the duty of the High Court in the present case to decide the: jurisdictional 'fact as to whether the tanks and wells claimed by the respondent belonged 10 the Jagirdar wi1hin tl>o meaning of s. 5(c) of the Abolilion Act. and if the High Coun reached the conclusion that the ciaim of the respondent was substantialed iL would be open to the High Court ro 2rant a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution directing the appellants to hnnd over possession of the aforesaid tanks and wells to the respondenl. [830 B-CJ\n\n[Case remanded to the High Court accordingly.] Ra v. Slwreditch Assessment Commiue (1910) 2 K.B. 859 and White & Collin.• v. Minister of Hea/tli [ 1939) 2 K.B. 838. applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISOICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1244 and 1245 of 1967.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated C November 30., 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.\n\nPelition Nos. 184 and 183 of 1965 respectively.\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in borh the appeals).\n\nS. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and A. G. Ratnaparkhi. for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nD The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Civil Appeal No. 1245 of 1967\n\nRamaswami, J.\n\nThis appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of rhe Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30, 1966 in Miscellaneous Petirion No. 183 of 1965 whereby the High Court allowed !he writ petition of the respondent and quashed two orders dated November 4, 1963 and June 11, 1964 of the Collector of Gwalior (Annexures VIII and XII respectively) and two orders of the Additional Commissioner, Gwalior Division dated February 19, 1964 and November 16, . 1964 ( Annexures X and XIV respectively) in so far as they pur- : ported to decide any question raised by the respondent under s. 5 ( c) of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008\n\n(Act No. 28 of 1951), hereinafter referred to as \"the Abolition Act\".\n\nIn Sarnvat 1885, the Ruler of the erstwhile Gwalior State conferred on Shri Bhavdeo Mishra-the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-the jagir of Mauza Siroli, situated in Pargana Gwalior. After the issue of the notification under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, all the property in the jagir including jagir lands, forests, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds etc. stood vested in the State under s. 4of ihe Abolition Act. Under s. 5(c) of the Abolition Act, all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar o' any other person were excluded from vesting.\n\nSection 2(l)(ix) of the Abolition Act defines \"occupied land\" as follows :\n\nM. P. STAIE v. JADAV (Ramaswami, J.) 825\n\n\"(ix) 'Occupied land'. means land held immediately before the commencement of this Act on any of the following tenures, namely :\n\n(a) Ex-proprietary;\n\n(b) Pukhta Maurusi; B ( c) Mamuli Maurusi;\n\n(d) Gair Maurusi;\n\nand includes land held as Khud Kasht and land comprised in a homestead; ..\n\nSection 3, 4 (I)( a). and 5 ( c) of the Abolition Act are reproduced c below:\n\n3. Resumption of Jagir-lands by the Government.-\n\n( l) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Government shall by notification in the Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of all Jagirlands in the State.\n\n(2) The Government may, by notification published in the Gazette, vary the date specified under sub-section (I) at any time before such date.\n\n( 3) The date finally appointed under this section. as the date for the resumption of Jagir-lands is hereinafter referred to as 'the date of resumption'.\n\n4. Consequences of the resumption of Jagir-lands.-.- ( l) As from the date of resumption notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or pocument or in any other law, rule, regulation or order for the time being in force but save as otherwise provided in this Act-\n\n( a) the right, title and interest of every Jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him ( including a Zamindar) in his Jagir-lands, including forests, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds,. water-channels, ferries, pathways, village-sites, hats, bazars and melagrounds and mines and minerals whether being worked or not, shall stand resumed to the State free from all encumbrances;\n\n\" ............................\n\n5. Private wells, trees, buildings, house-sites and enclosures.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the last preceding section, ..............................\n\n( c) all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar or any other person shall continue to belong to or, be held by such Jagirdar or other person.\"\n\nAfter lhe abolilion of jagirs under the Abolition Act, proceedings were iniliated for delermining the compensation payable to lhe respondent and the same was determined at a sum of Rs. 22,293/- and odd out of which certain loans were deducted and the amount of Rs. 3,586/- and odd was paid. The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 19.39 (M.P. Act No. 20 of 1959) came into force 0n October 2, 1959 and s. 251 thereof reads as follows :\n\n\"Vesting of tanks in State Government.-( I) All tanks situ<'.led on unoccupied land on or before the date of coming into force of the Act. providing for the aboli1ion of the rights of intermediaries in 1he areas concerned and over which members of the village community were, immedialely before such date, exercising right~ of irrigation or nis1ar, shall, if not already vested in the State Government, vest absolutely in the State Governmen1 wilh effect from the 6th April, 1959 :\n\nProvided lhat nothing in 1his section shall be dee•ned to affect any right of a lessee in the tank under a lease subsisting on lhe date of vesting of the tank which shall be exercisable to 1he extent and subject to the lerms and conditions specified in the lease :\n\nProvided further that no tank shall vest in the State Government. unless-\n\n( a) after making such enquiry as he deems fit, the Collector is satisfied 1hat the tank fulfils the conditions laid down in this sub-section; and\n\n( b) notice has been served on the parties inlerested and opportunity given to them for bein_g heard.\n\n(2) Any person claiming in any such. tank any interest other than the right of irrigation or nistar, may, within a period of four years from the date of vesting under sub-section (I). make an application in the prescribed form to the Collector for compensation in respect of his interest.\n\n(3) Such compensation shall be 15 times the land revenue assessable on the land covered by the tank and\n\nfor purposes of assessment such land shall be treated as irrigated land on the same quality as the adjoining land.\n\n( 4) The compensation as determined under subsection ( 3) shall be paid by the Collector to the person or persons proved to his satisfactbn to be owning interest in the tank concerned. ·\n\n\" On April 5, 1961, the respondent made an.application to the Collector, Gwalior under s. 251 of the M.P. Lmd Revenue Code, 1959, claiming compensation for the tanks which, according to the respondent, were built by the respondent and his predecessor-in-title over an area of 1,679 bighas and 18 biswas of land.\n\nBy his order dated April 24, 1963, the Sub-Divisional Officer\n\ndetermined the amount of compensation at Rs. 11,512/- and odd but by his subsequent order dated May 28, 1963, the Sub-Divisional Officer suo motu cancelled his previous order dated April 24, 1963. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Collector of Gwalior wh<;>, by his order dated November 4, 1963 dismissed the appeal of the respondent holding that the property claimed as tanks was really not of that description as all that was done was to cause temporary obstruction to the flow of waters by creating bunds and the case did not fall within the purview of s. 251(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and no compensation was payable. The respondent preferred a second appeal before the Commissioner, Gwalior Division who dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 251 compensation could not be claimed with regard to the so-called tanks which were situated on 'occupied land'.\n\nOn July 4, 1963, the respondent made an application to the Co1lector of Gwalior stating that he was entitled to paymen! of compensation if the tanks had vested in the. State Government.\n\nThe application was dismissed by the Collector on June 11, 1964. Thereupon the respondent moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the two orders dated November .4, 1963 and June 11, 1964 of the Collector of Gwalior ( Annex4res VIII and XII) and the two orders dated February 19, 1964 and November 16, 1964 of the Additional Commissioner, Gwalior Division (Annexures X and XIV). The writ petition was opposed by the appellants on the ground that the tanks claimed by ihe respondent were really no tanks at all and, in any case, were not on ;'occupied land' within the meaning of s. 5 ( c) of the Abolition Act and the tanks and wells had vested in the State under s. 4 (I)( a) of the Abolition Act. By its judgment dated November 30, 1966, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the four orders aforesaid on the ground that the question raised by the respondent under s. 5 ( c)\n\nof the Abolition Act should be decided by the Jagir Commissioner A in the manner .required by s. 17 of the Abolition Act.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to reproduce ss. 8, 15, 17 and 18 of the Abolition Act which arc to the following effect :\n\n\"8. Dµty to pay compensation.-( 1) Subject to other. provisions of this Act the Government shall be B liable to pay to every Jagirdar whose Jagir-land has been resumed under Sec. 3, such compensation as shall be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Schedule I.\n\n( 2) Compensation payable under this section shall be due as from the date of resumption and shall carry simple interest at the rate of 2 i per cent per annum from that date up to the date of payment :\n\nProvided that no interest shall be payable on any amount o[ compensation which remains unpaid for any default of the Jagirdar, his Agent or hi~ representativein-interest.\"\n\n\"15. Payment of compensation money.-( 1) After the amount of compensation payable to a Jagirdar under Sec. 8 is detennined under clause ( 3) of Sec. 13 and the amount deducted from it under Sec. 14, the balance shall be payable in maximum ten annual instalments.\n\n(2) The amounts determined under clauses (c),\n\n(d) and (e) of Sec. 13 shall be deducted and paid annually to the persons entitled thereto, out of the annual instalments referred to in sub-section ( 1) and the remaining amount of the iIJ>talment shall be payable by the Government to the Jagirdar.\n\n\" ........................................\n\n\"17. Questions of title.-lf, during the course of an inquiry by the Jagir Commissioner, any question is raised, in respect o[ a Jagirdari title to, or right in, Jagir-lands resumed under Sec. 3, and such question has not already been determined by the Government, the Jagir Commissioner shall proceed to enquire into the merits of such question and refer the matter for decision to the Government whose orders shall be final.\"\n\n\"18. To whom compensation shall be payable after the death of a Jagirdar. If any Jagirdar to whom compensation money is payable under this Act dies before the full payment of such compensation money to\n\nH -\n\nH ...\n\nhim, such compensation money as may remain pafable to. him under this Act, shall be payable--ro such of his heirs or successors as may be declared py a competent Court entitled to receive the same, according to the personal law by which the Jagirdar is governed.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellants learned Counsel put forward the argument that the High Court was in error in holding that s. 17 of the Abolition Act was applicable to the present case and that it was the function of the Jagir Commissioner alone tO inquire whether the claim of the respondent under s. 5 ( c) was well-founded on merits and refer the matter for the lif\\.al decision of the Government under s. 17 of the Abolition Act. In our opinion the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. It is manifest that under s. 17 of the Abolition Act only those disputes which pertain to the Jagirdari title or 'right in jagir lands already resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, can be raised.\n\nThe section also contemplates that the disputes must be raised during the course of an inquiry for assessment of compensation by the J agir Commissioner. It should be noticed that s. 17 is included in Ch. III which deals with compensation which the Government is liable to pay to every jagirdar whose jagir land has been resumed under s. 3.\n\nIt follows therefore that the inquiry made by the Jagir Commissioner under s. 17 on. the question of title is only for the purpose of enabling him to pay compensation to the person who in his opinion is entitled to receive it.\n\nIn our opinion, the scope of the inquiry under s. 17 only relates to disputes with regard to rival claimants to jagirdari title or right in jagirdari lands already resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition Act.\n\nIn oth1<r words, the i11quiry by the Jagir Commissioner or the decision of the State Government under s. 17 does not embrace within its scope any dispute as to whether any particular property falls within s. 4 ( 1)\n\n(a) read with .s. 5 of the Abolition Act and whether it has or has not in consequence vested in the State Government by the notification issued under s. 3 of the Abolition Act It is also necessary to add that the inquiry contemplated under s. 17 by the Jagir Commissioner relates to compensation to be paid to the jagirdar whose jagir is vested in the State Government and once the compensation is determined and paid, no further inquiry. under s. 17 is c.ontemplated. We are accordingly of .the opinion that the High Court was in error in holding. that s, 1.7 of the Abolition Act is applicable to the case and that the dispute raised by the respondent should have been determined in accordance with the procedure envisaged in s. 17 of the Abolition Act.\n\nBut this does not necessarily mean that the respondent is left without any remedy for the redress of his grievance. If the U Sup. Cl/68-9\n\n830 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS (1966] 2 s.C.R.\n\nrespondent is right in his contention that the tanks and wells were A constructed on 'occupied land' belonging to the jagirdar within the meawng of s. 5 ( c) of the Act it is manifest that the appellants have no authority to take possession of those tanks and wells because the title therein does not vest in the State Government in view ot s. 5 ( c) which has an over-riding effect on s. 4 of the Abolition Act. lt was therefore the duty of the High B Coun in the present case to decide the jurisdictional fact as to whether the tanks and wells claimed by the respondent belonged to the Jagirdar within the meaning ot s. 5{c) of the Abolition Art and ii the High Court reached the conclusion that the claim of the respondent was substantiated it would be open to the High Court to grant a writ under Art. 226 of the Conslitution directing C the appellants to hand over possession of the aforesaid tan ks and wells to the resportdents.\n\nIt is well-established that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact the Htgh Court is entitled, in a proceeding for a writ, to determine upon its own independent judgment whether or not that D finding is correct. The matter has been very put by Farwell, L. J. in Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee( 1 ) as follows:\n\n\"The existence of the provisional list is a condition precedent to their jurisdiction to hear and determine, and as the claimant is entitled to require them to hear and determine, they cannot refuse to take the steps neces>ary to give rise to such jurisdiction; if they do, their refusal may be called in question in the High Court.\n\nNo tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decisio:1 finally decide on the question of the existence or extent of such jurisdiction : such question is always subject to review by the High Court, which does not permit the inferior tribunal either to usurp a jurisdiciion which it does not possess, whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has and ought to exercise.\n\nSubjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for the existenc~ of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it : it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to <letermine such limit at its own will and pleasure-- such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited-and it i! immaterial whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact; a Court ----·------\n\n(!) (1910] 2 K. B. 859, 879.\n\n' .\n\n- '\n\nF ..\n\nH .. .\n\nwith jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe.\"\n\nThe same principle was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in White & Collins v. Minister of Health('). The question debated in that case was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to revie'h'. the finding of the administrative authority on a question of fact.\n\nIt appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936, enabled the local. authority to acquire land compulsorily for the provision of houses for the working classes, but s. 7 5 of the Act provided that nothing in the Act was to authorise the compul\n\nsory acquisition of land \"which at the date of the compulsory purchase forms part of any part, garden or pleasure ground or is otherwise required for the amenity or convenience of any house\".\n\nIn accordance with the provision of this part of the Act, the Ripon Borough Council made an order for the compulsory P.urchase of 23 acres of land, it being part of an estate in Yorkshire called Highfield, consisting of a large house and 35 acres of land surrounding it.\n\nThe owners served notice of objection to the order as being contrary to s. 75 and the ground of objection was that the land was part of a park and. was required for the amenity or convenience of the house. The Minister of Health directed a public inquiry, and after holding the inquiry and taking evidence, the Chairman duly made his report to the Minister, who thereupon confirmed the oder. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the High Court had jurisdiction to review the Minister's finding and since the land in question was part of the park of Highfield, the order of compulsory purchase was quashed. At page 855 Luxmoore L.J. stated :\n\n\"The first and the most important matter to bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to make the order is dependent on a finding of fact; for, unless the land can be held not to be part of a park or not to be required for amenity or convenience, there is no jurisdiction in the borough council to make, or in the Ministe.r to confirm, the order. In such a case it seems almost selfevident that the Court which has to consider whether there is jurisdiction to make or cc!lfirm the order must be entitled to review the vital finding on which the existence of the jurisdiction relied upon depends. If this were not so, the rigQ.t to apply to the Court would be illusory.\" For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside tile judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30,\n\n1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 183 of 1965 and the case is\n\n(!) [1939] 2 K.B. 838.\n\n832 SUPREME COURT Rl!POllTS (1968] 2s.C.R.\n\nremanded to the High Coun for deciding it afresh in accordance with the directions given.\n\nIt will be open to the High Court to take such further evidence--oral and documentary-as the parties may decide to give on the points at issue. The parties will bear their own costs upto this stage.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1244 of 1967\n\nThe material facts of this case are almost similar to those in Civil Appeal No. 1245 of 1967 and for the reasons given in that judgment, we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the case should be remanded to the High Court for being decided afresh in accordance with the directions given in that judgment.\n\nThe parties will bear their own costs upto this stage.\n\nG.C.\n\nAr1peals allowed and cases r1manded.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARDAR D. K. JADA V\n\nJanuary 25, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2(i)(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 318, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 862, "end_char": 869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jair Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "6th April.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1196, "end_char": 1206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vest ahsolutely in the State Government with effect from 6th April."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1876, "end_char": 1881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2125, "end_char": 2135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2285, "end_char": 2289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2387, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2640, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2765, "end_char": 2769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3311, "end_char": 3318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3353, "end_char": 3357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3589, "end_char": 3596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3771, "end_char": 3779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISOICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4087, "end_char": 4115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISOICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in borh the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4400, "end_char": 4411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and A. G. Ratnaparkhi."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and A. G. Ratnaparkhi."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and A. G. Ratnaparkhi."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1245 of 1967\n\nRamaswami, J.\n\nThis appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of rhe Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30, 1966 in Miscellaneous Petirion No."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1245 of 1967\n\nRamaswami, J.\n\nThis appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of rhe Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30, 1966 in Miscellaneous Petirion No."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sarnvat 1885, the Ruler of the erstwhile Gwalior State conferred on Shri Bhavdeo Mishra-the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-the jagir of Mauza Siroli, situated in Pargana Gwalior."}}, {"text": "Bhavdeo Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5389, "end_char": 5403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sarnvat 1885, the Ruler of the erstwhile Gwalior State conferred on Shri Bhavdeo Mishra-the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-the jagir of Mauza Siroli, situated in Pargana Gwalior."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5545, "end_char": 5549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5741, "end_char": 5748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(l)(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pukhta Maurusi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6199, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "means land held immediately before the commencement of this Act on any of the following tenures, namely :\n\n(a) Ex-proprietary;\n\n(b) Pukhta Maurusi; B ( c) Mamuli Maurusi;\n\n(d) Gair Maurusi;\n\nand includes land held as Khud Kasht and land comprised in a homestead; ..\n\nSection 3, 4 (I)( a)."}}, {"text": "Mamuli Maurusi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6222, "end_char": 6236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "means land held immediately before the commencement of this Act on any of the following tenures, namely :\n\n(a) Ex-proprietary;\n\n(b) Pukhta Maurusi; B ( c) Mamuli Maurusi;\n\n(d) Gair Maurusi;\n\nand includes land held as Khud Kasht and land comprised in a homestead; ..\n\nSection 3, 4 (I)( a)."}}, {"text": "Gair Maurusi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "means land held immediately before the commencement of this Act on any of the following tenures, namely :\n\n(a) Ex-proprietary;\n\n(b) Pukhta Maurusi; B ( c) Mamuli Maurusi;\n\n(d) Gair Maurusi;\n\nand includes land held as Khud Kasht and land comprised in a homestead; ..\n\nSection 3, 4 (I)( a)."}}, {"text": "Section 3, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6334, "end_char": 6346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagirdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7988, "end_char": 7996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Private wells, trees, buildings, house-sites and enclosures.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the last preceding section, ..............................\n\n( c) all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or on occupied land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar or any other person shall continue to belong to or, be held by such Jagirdar or other person.\""}}, {"text": "After lhe abolilion of jagirs under the Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8016, "end_char": 8069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 2, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8396, "end_char": 8411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of 1959) came into force 0n October 2, 1959 and s. 251 thereof reads as follows :\n\n\"Vesting of tanks in State Government.-( I) All tanks situ<'.led on unoccupied land on or before the date of coming into force of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After lhe abolilion of jagirs under the Abolition Act", "statute": "After lhe abolilion of jagirs under the Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "April 5, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10230, "end_char": 10243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" On April 5, 1961, the respondent made an.application to the Collector, Gwalior under s. 251 of the M.P. Lmd Revenue Code, 1959, claiming compensation for the tanks which, according to the respondent, were built by the respondent and his predecessor-in-title over an area of 1,679 bighas and 18 biswas of land."}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10312, "end_char": 10318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lmd Revenue Code, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10331, "end_char": 10353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 28, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10697, "end_char": 10709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11,512/- and odd but by his subsequent order dated May 28, 1963, the Sub-Divisional Officer suo motu cancelled his previous order dated April 24, 1963."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11,512/- and odd but by his subsequent order dated May 28, 1963, the Sub-Divisional Officer suo motu cancelled his previous order dated April 24, 1963."}}, {"text": "November 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10891, "end_char": 10907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent preferred an appeal before the Collector of Gwalior wh<;>, by his order dated November 4, 1963 dismissed the appeal of the respondent holding that the property claimed as tanks was really not of that description as all that was done was to cause temporary obstruction to the flow of waters by creating bunds and the case did not fall within the purview of s. 251(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and no compensation was payable."}}, {"text": "s. 251(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lmd Revenue Code, 1959", "statute": "Lmd Revenue Code, 1959"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Code, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11191, "end_char": 11214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gwalior Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11314, "end_char": 11330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent preferred a second appeal before the Commissioner, Gwalior Division who dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 251 compensation could not be claimed with regard to the so-called tanks which were situated on 'occupied land'."}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11376, "end_char": 11382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Code, 1959", "statute": "Land Revenue Code, 1959"}}, {"text": "July 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11496, "end_char": 11508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 4, 1963, the respondent made an application to the Co1lector of Gwalior stating that he was entitled to paymen!"}}, {"text": "June 11, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11730, "end_char": 11743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed by the Collector on June 11, 1964."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11780, "end_char": 11808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the respondent moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for grant of a writ under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11835, "end_char": 11843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Code, 1959", "statute": "Land Revenue Code, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12321, "end_char": 12325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12406, "end_char": 12410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12624, "end_char": 12628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12729, "end_char": 12734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 15, 17 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12801, "end_char": 12821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13054, "end_char": 13060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13150, "end_char": 13160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13683, "end_char": 13690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13729, "end_char": 13736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13865, "end_char": 13872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15347, "end_char": 15351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15454, "end_char": 15459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15625, "end_char": 15630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15756, "end_char": 15760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15979, "end_char": 15984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16134, "end_char": 16138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16216, "end_char": 16221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16677, "end_char": 16682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16780, "end_char": 16784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16806, "end_char": 16810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16941, "end_char": 16945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17031, "end_char": 17036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17236, "end_char": 17241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17519, "end_char": 17524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17879, "end_char": 17883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18072, "end_char": 18076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18350, "end_char": 18354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18532, "end_char": 18540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Farwell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18970, "end_char": 18977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter has been very put by Farwell, L. J. in Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee( 1 ) as follows:\n\n\"The existence of the provisional list is a condition precedent to their jurisdiction to hear and determine, and as the claimant is entitled to require them to hear and determine, they cannot refuse to take the steps neces>ary to give rise to such jurisdiction; if they do, their refusal may be called in question in the High Court."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20505, "end_char": 20511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe.\""}}, {"text": "appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20879, "end_char": 20923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21040, "end_char": 21044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936", "statute": "It appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "Ripon Borough Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21375, "end_char": 21396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the provision of this part of the Act, the Ripon Borough Council made an order for the compulsory P.urchase of 23 acres of land, it being part of an estate in Yorkshire called Highfield, consisting of a large house and 35 acres of land surrounding it."}}, {"text": "Yorkshire", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21491, "end_char": 21500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the provision of this part of the Act, the Ripon Borough Council made an order for the compulsory P.urchase of 23 acres of land, it being part of an estate in Yorkshire called Highfield, consisting of a large house and 35 acres of land surrounding it."}}, {"text": "s. 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21657, "end_char": 21662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936", "statute": "It appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "Luxmoore", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22206, "end_char": 22214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 855 Luxmoore L.J. stated :\n\n\"The first and the most important matter to bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to make the order is dependent on a finding of fact; for, unless the land can be held not to be part of a park or not to be required for amenity or convenience, there is no jurisdiction in the borough council to make, or in the Ministe.r to confirm, the order."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22967, "end_char": 22992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside tile judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30,\n\n1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "November 30,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22999, "end_char": 23017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside tile judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30,\n\n1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_833_841_EN", "year": 1968, "text": ">- A\n\nH ..\n\nHAZARI & ORS.\n\nNEKI & ORS.\n\nJanuary 25, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nPunjab Pre-emption Act (Punj. 1 of 1913), ss. 14 tl1ld 15(1)(a)- Statutory right of Pre-emption-Whether heritable.\n\nPuni<'b Pre-emption Act as amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960, s. 31-Whether bar to decree-Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1905),\n\n0. 22, rr. 1 and 11-Legal representatives of statutory preemptor-If right to sue survives.\n\nBy s. 4 of the Amending Act (Punj. Act 10 of 1960) s. 15 of the Punjffb Pre-emption Act, 1913 was repealed and in its place was substituted a new provision which omitted to confer a right of pre-emption in the case of persons 'owning land in the estate' as the originals. IS(c) 'thirdly' had done.\n\nRetrospective effect was given to the provisions by the insertion of new s. 31 in the parent Act. Jn respect of sales effected after the promulgation of the Amending Act, one N filed suits and obtained decrees for pre-emption in all suits against the appellants under s. 15(1){a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act.\n\nThese decrees were confirmed by the first appellate court. While the second appeals were pending in the High Court, N died, and his legal representatives were brouilbt on record. The High Court dismissed the appeals. In appeals to t.his Court, it was contended that (i) tho statutory right df pre-emption under the Punjab Preemption Act, was not a 'heritable right' and no decree for pre-emption should have been passed by the lower court in favour of the legal representatives; and (ii) s. 31 of the Act as amended retrospectively by Punjab Act 10 of 1960, stood as a bar to the granting of a decree in favour of substituted legal representatives.\n\nHELD : The appeals must be dismissed.\n\n(i) The statutory right of pre-emption though not amounting to an interest in the land is a right which attaches to the land and which can be enforced against a purchaser by the persons entitled to•pre-empt. The right of pre-emption under s. 15(1) (a) of the Punjab Act of 1913 is a personal right in the sense that the claim of the pre-emptor depends upon the nature of his relationship with the vendor.\n\nBut under s. !4 of the Act, the pre-emptor must be a member o.f an agricultural tribe in the same group of agricultural tribes, as the vendor and the land of which preemption is sought must be in respect of agricultural land sold to member of the agricultural tribe.\n\nIf an involuntary transfer takes plaoe by inheritance the successor to the land takes the whole bundle JJf the rights which go with the land including the right of pre-emption.\n\nThis view is supported by the language of s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act and therefore, the clalm of N for pre-emption did not ab!ll!e upon his death and his legal representatives were properly brought on -record of the second appeals under the provisions of 0. 22, r. 1 read with 0. 22, r. JO di the Code of Civil Procedure. [836 G; 837 B-D]\n\nFaqir Ali Shah v. Ram Kishan d: Ors. 133 P.R. 1907 and Wa; id All d: Ors. v. Shaban d: Ors. I.LR. 31 All 623. approved .\n\nMuhammud Husain v. Niamat-un•nissa d: Ors. l.L.R. 20 All. 88, referred to.\n\n834 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) The Amending Act came inlo foree long before N in•tituted the A present suib. Even the sales of land were -cffcc1ed after the promulgation\n\nof the Amcndlag A.ct.\n\nIn RanJ Sarup's case, the right of the plaintiff to pre.empt 1,1, as extinguished retrospec1ivcly; in the present case N's right to sue has not been extinguished.\n\nN had lhc righl of pre-emption under the Amended Act at the time he ins1i1u1ed the suit and N's right was not extinguished on his dealh but paS>ed to his legal representatives. 1839 G]\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURiso1cnoN: Civil Appeals Nos. 1148, 1656 and 2341 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July' 27, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Ap peals Nos. 13 to 15 of 1965.\n\nPrem Chand Jain and Janardan Sharma, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nD. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 1 (iv to xiii) in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals arc brooght by special leave on behalf of the defendants against the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated 27th July, 1965 in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 13 and 14 of 1965.\n\nDbara Sinh. respondent No. 2, executed three sale deeds with regard to lands at village Bhadani, Tchsil Jhaijar, Rohtak in favour of the appeilants in all the three appeals.\n\nThe first sale was of land measu; ing 27 kanals and 4 marlas dated Septber 20, 1960, the second was of land measuring 36 kanals and 19 mar!as dated November 23, 1960 and the third was of land measuring 33 kanals and 18 marlas dated March 6, 1961. Neki deceased, who was the father's brother of Dhara Singh, vendor, instituted three suits in the court of Subordinate Judge at Jhajjar for possession of the aforesaid lands covered by the three sales on the ground that he had a superior right of preeruption on the basis of his relationship with the vendor as against the appellants under section 15(1 )(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913). These suits were contested by the appellants.\n\nAfter hearing the contentions of the rival parties, the Subordinate Judge granted decrees in ail the three suits in favour of the plaintiffs. In suit No. 311 of 1961 the decree stipulated that the plaintiff should deposit the amount of Rs.\n\n3.500/- in court on or before 15-1-1963.\n\nIn suit Nos. 368 and 369 of 196 I 1he condition was that the plaintiffs should make the deposit of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 7,000/- respectively in court on or before 15-1-1963. The appellants took the malter in appeal before the Senior Subordinate Judge who by his .iudgment dated 30th January, 1963 dismissed the appeals against the decrees in\n\n- A\n\nsuits Nos. 313 and 369 of 1961 and modified tbe decree in suit No. 368 of 1961 to the extent that the plaintiff was called upon to deposit a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- on or before 1-3-1963.\n\nThe appellants preferred regular Second Appeals Nos. 280, 281 and 282 of 1963 in the High Court against the decres and judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak. The plaintiffs also preferred in the High Court appeal No. 830 of 1963 against the increase mde in the price of the land by the Senior Subordinate Jud.;:· '.'.0;, c;:k in the appeal arising out of decree in suit No. 368 of 1961. While tbe appeals were pending in the High Court, Neid plaintiff died on April 7, 1963. After his death, the appellants vendors in the three regular appeals moved applications under 0.22, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to bring on record of the appeals the legal representatives of Neki, deceased plaintiff, namely, Dhara Singh, Ramkishan and Balbir Singh.\n\nAll the four appeals were heard and dismissed by Mr. Justice Khanna by his judgment dated 17th September,\n\n1964. The appellants preferred appeals under the Letters Patent which were dismissed by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court by a common judgment dated 27th July, 1965i\n\nThe claim of Neki for pre-emption .was based on &s. 14 and lS(l)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913). Section 14 states :-\n\n\"No person other than a person who was at the date of sale a member of an agricultural tribe in the the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor shall have a right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land sold by a member of an agricultural tribe\".\n\nSection lS(l)(a) reads as follows:-\n\n\"The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest- ( a) where the sale is by a sole owner: FIRST, in the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son of the vendor;\n\nSECONDLY, in the brother or brother's son of the vendor; THIRDLY, in the father's brother or father's brother's sen of the vendor; FOURTHLY, in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendor the land or property sold or a part thereof.'' The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was amended by Punjab Act\n\n10 of 1960 and s. 6 of the amending Act inserted a new s. 31 in the Principal which states as follows : -\n\n\"No court hall pass a decree in a suit for pre-emption whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act,\n\n1960, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act\".\n\nIt is necessary also to refer at this stage to the provisions of 0.22. r. I and 0.22, r. 11 which are to the following effect :-\n\n\"0.22, r. I : The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue sur- ·ives\". \"0.22, r. 11 : In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word 'plaintiff' shall be held to include an appellant the word 'defendant' a respondent, and the word 'suit an appeal\".\n\nIn support of these appeals, learned counsel put forward the argument that the right of pre-emption claimed by Neki deceased plaintiff was a personal right which died with him upon his death and the legal representatives of Neki were not entitled to be granted a decree for pre-emption.\n\nThe argument was that the statutory right of pre-emption under the Punjab Act was not a heritable right and no decree for pre-emption should have been passed by the lower court in favour of :he legal representatives as representing the estate of Neki.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument put forward hy the appellants. It iS' not correct to say that the right of pre-emption is a personal right on the part of the pre-emptor to get the re-transfer of the property from the vendee who has already become the owner of the same. It is true that the right of pre-emption becomes enforceable only when there is a sale but the right exists antecedently to the sale, the foundation of the right being the avoidance of the inconveniences and disturbances which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land. The correct legal position is that the statutory law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon the ownership of a property to the extent that rt restricts the owner's right of sale and compels him to sell the property to the person entitled to pre-emption under the statute.\n\nJn other words, the statutory right of pre-emption though not amounting to an interest in the land is a right which attaches to the land and which can be enforced against a purchaser by the person entitled to pre-empt.\n\nJn the present case, Neki obtained decrees for pre-emption in all the three suits against the appellants and these decrees were confirmed by the first appellate Court. While the second appeals were pending in the High Court.\n\nNeki died and the question is whether under the provisions of 0.22. r. 1 and 0.22. r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the right to sue survived after the death of Neki. Jn this context, it is necessary to consider the provisions of s. 306 of the Indian\n\nA ·•\n\nH ..\n\nHAZARJ v. NEKI (Ramaswami, J.) 837\n\nSuccession Act XXIX of 1925. This section expresses a qualification of the maxim actio persona/is mortiur cum persona to the extent that the section indicates that, amongst causes of action which survive, are included some actions of a personal nature. that is to say personal actions other than those expressly excluded by the section itself. It is true that the right of pre-emption under s. 15 (1 )(a) of the Punjab Act of 1913 is a personal right in the sense that the claim of the pre-emptor depends upon the nature of his relationship with tl)e vendor. But under s. 14 of the Act, the pre-emptor must be a member of an agricultural tribe in the same group of agricultural tribes as the vendor and the land of which pre-emption is sought must be in respect of agricultural land sold to a member of the agricultural tribe.\n\nWe are of opinion that if an involuntary transfer takes place by inheritance the successor to the land takes the whole bundle of the rights which go with the land including the right of pre-emption.\n\nThe view which we have taken is supp9rted by the language of s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act and it follows therefore that the claim of Neki for pre-emption did not abate upon hi, s death and that the legal representatives of Neki were properly brought on record of the second appeals under the provisions of 0.22, r. 1 read with 0.22, r. 1 O of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe view that we have expressed is borne out by a decision of the Punjab High Court in Faqir Ali Shah v. Ram Kishan & Ors.('). The question that arose for determination in that case was whether the right to sue for pre-emption under s.12 of the Punjab Laws Act upon a cause of action which accrued to a person in his life-time passed at his death to his successor who inherited the 1 property through which the right had accrued.\n\nThe view of the Full Bench as regards the transfer by inheritance was that the general principle applied and that the right of pre-emption passed with the land and the learned Judges distinguished the transfer by inheritance from the transfer of property by some voluntary act of the parties.\n\nAt p. 641 of the Report, Clark, C.J. observed :\n\n\"While, therefore, there is good reason why voluntary transfers should not pass a right of pre-emption as regards properties previously sold, those reasons do not apply to transfers by inheritance.\n\nAs regards transfers by inheritance, the general principle should apply that the right of pre-emption passes with the land.\n\nMr. Grey laid great stress on sections 13 and 16 of the Punjab Laws Act urging that the father was the person on whom the notice had to be served, and that it was he who had the right to sue and that the right was thus a personal one that could not\n\n(I) 133 P. R. 1907.\n\nbe inherited by the son. The right was no doubt a personal one in the father based on his land, but I can see no reason why such right cannot be inherited by the son. If the father had waived or otherwise disposed of his right this would no doulit be binding on the son, as the father was representing the whole estate.\n\nWhere, however, the father has done nothing of the kind, but has simply taken no steps in the matters, there seems to me no reason why the son should not step into th' shoes of his father and take the same action as the father could have done. The son inherits the other causes of action belonging to his father and why not this one ? Nor do I sec why the son cannot come in under Section 16, simply alleging that no notice as required by section 13 was served on his father\".\n\nA similar view was expressed by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Wajid Ali & Ors. v. Shaban & Ors.('). It was held that where a right of pre-emption exists by custom as recor<led in the village wajib-ul-arl, the right fiaving once accrued did not of necessity lapse by the death of the pre-emptor before making a claim, but descended alon3 \\\\ ith the property in virtue of which it subsisted to the heir of the pre-emptor.\n\nIt is necessary to emphasize that we arc dealing in this case with the statutory right of pre-emption under Punjab Act I of 1913 and its subsequent amendment and not with the right of preemption under the Mohammedan Law.\n\nIn reard to the latter right it has been held that accordin~ to the Mohammadan law applicable to the Sunni sect if a plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption has not obtained his decree for pre-emption in his life-time the right to sue does not survive to his heirs.-(See Muhammad Husain v. Niamet-un-nissa and Ors.)('). It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this point in the present case.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was also pointed out that after the passing of the decree by the trial court, Ncki complied with the terms of the decree and made payments within the time given.\n\nIt was said that under the terms of s. 14 and s. 15 (I )(a) the title to the land in the pre-emption suits must be deemed to have accrued to Neki from the dale of such payment.\n\nIt was argued that before his. death, Ncki became the owner of the lands which were the subject matter of pre-emption and the legal representatives of Neki were substituted in his place as representing the estate of Ncki.\n\nIn support of this proposition counsel relied upon the language of 0.20 r. 14( I) which states :\n\n\"Where the court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the pur-\n\n(t)\n\nL. R. 31 AIL 6~3.\n\n(2) I. L. R. WAIL ~8.\n\nA chase-money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall-\n\n( a) specify a day on or before which the purchasemoney shall be so paid, and\n\n( b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a) the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs.\"\n\nIn this connection counsel referred to the decision of the Punjab High Court in Ganga Ram & Ors. v. Shiv Lal ( 1 ) where it was held that the title to the pre-empted property passes to the pre-emptor under a pre-emption decree on deposit of the purchase-money in terms of the decree and was deemed to pass to him from the date of the deposit. So far suit No. 368 is concerned, there is a dispute as to whether or not Neki deposited the amount under the decree within the time prescnbed but as regards suits Nos. 311 and 369 of 1961, it is admitted that the dectased Neki made the payment of the amount un\"ler the two decrees within the time prescribed.\n\nSo far as these two decrees are concerned, the deposit of the purchase money is an additional reason for holdinJ! that the legal representatives of Neki were properly substituteG in his place in the proceedings of the second appeals.\n\nIt was finally urged on behalf of the appellants that, in any event, s. 31 of the Punjab Act 1 of 1913 as amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960 stood as a bar to the granting of a decree in favour of the substituted respondents. The argument was stressed that s. 31 of the Punjab Act 1 of 1913 was in plain words retrospective in character and Dhara Singr and his two sons as legal representatives of Neki could not be granted a decree for pre-emption. In our opinion, this argument is wholly irrelevant. The reason is that the Amending Act came into force on February 4, 1960 anu Neki instituted the present suits for pre-emption long after th .• s date.\n\nEven the three sales or land were effected after the promulgation of the Amending Act. Reliance was placed on behalf of !he appellants on the decision of this Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi & Ors. (1 )· but the material facts of that case are quite different. It appears that the claim of pre-emption in that case was based upon s. 15(c) 'thirdly' of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 which states:\n\n(1) 66 P. L. R. (1964), 251.\n\n(2) [1963\n\nS.C. R. 858.\n\n840 SUPREJll! c:ouKT REPORTS [1968) 2 s.c.R.\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of s. 14 the right of preemption in respect of llficultural land and village immoveable property shall val-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a sole owner or occupancy tenant or, in the case of land or property jointly owned or held, is by all the co-sharers joint! y, in the persons in order of succession, who but for such sale would be entitled, on the death of the vendor or vendors, to inherit the land or property sold;\n\n(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property, and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly,-firstly, in the lineal descendants of the vendor in order of succession; secondly, in the co-sharers, if any, who are agnates, in order of succession;\n\n( c) If no person having a right of pre-emption under\n\nclause (a) of clause (b) seeks to exercise it:- D\n\nthirdly, in the owners of he estate; ........ \"\n\nBy s. 4 of the amending Act (Act I 0 of I 960) s. I 5 of the parent Act was repealed and in its place was subs:itutcd a new provision which omitted to confer a right of pre-emption in the case of pusons 'C'wning land in the estate' as the original s. 15 ( ~) 'thirdly' had done.\n\nRetrospective effect was given to the provision by the inserticn of a new s. 3 I in the parent Act.\n\nThe question for consideration was that whether by reason of this amendment in the Jaw the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the decree which he obtained under the previously existing enactment. It was the case of the plaintiff that he owned land in the 'estate' whereas the vendee did not own land there. The defendant while not disputing that the plaintiff owned land in the village or the correctness of the allegation that the land was in an 'estate', sought to prove that he too owned land in the same village and 'estate' but in this he failed.\n\nAs the case of the plaintiff was directly covered by the terms of the statute his suit was decreed by the trial court en Novber 8, 1951, and an appeal and second appeal therefrom were also dismissed.\n\nThe question was whether the respondent was entitled to a decree in view of s. 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act I 913 as amended by Punjab Act I 0 of 1960 which came into force on February 4, 1960. It wa, l; cld '\"' :his Coun that in view of the plain language of s. 31, the substantive law enacted by the legislature in the amended s. 15 of the Pre-emption\n\nHAZARI v. NEKl (Ramaswami, J.) 841\n\nAct should be applied and the d:cree for pre-emption in favour of the first respondent should bi; set aside. ft is manifest that the material facts of the present c, ase are different and the ratio of the decision of this Court in Ram Sarup ~·. Munshi & Ors. ( 1) has no application to the present case.\n\nIn RGm Sari:p's case(') the right of the plaintiff to pre-empt was extinguished retiospectively; in the present case !lleki'3 right tci sue has not been extinguishec.\n\nNki had the right of pre-emption under the Amended Act at the tin1e he instituted the suit and Neki's right was not\n\next'.nguished on his death but passed to his legal represer.tatives.\n\nFor the reasons expressed above, we hold that these appeals have no merit and must be dismissed with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "HAZARI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAZARI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NEKI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEKI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 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These appeals arc brooght by special leave on behalf of the defendants against the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated 27th July, 1965 in Letters Patent Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Dbara Sinh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dbara Sinh.", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhadani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, executed three sale deeds with regard to lands at village Bhadani, Tchsil Jhaijar, Rohtak in favour of the appeilants in all the three appeals."}}, {"text": "Rohtak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, executed three sale deeds with regard to lands at village Bhadani, Tchsil Jhaijar, Rohtak in favour of the appeilants in all the three appeals."}}, {"text": "Neki", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4758, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neki deceased, who was the father's brother of Dhara Singh, vendor, instituted three suits in the court of Subordinate Judge at Jhajjar for possession of the aforesaid lands covered by the three sales on the ground that he had a superior right of preeruption on the basis of his relationship with the vendor as against the appellants under section 15(1 )(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913).", "canonical_name": "Neki"}}, {"text": "Dhara Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4805, "end_char": 4816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neki deceased, who was the father's brother of Dhara Singh, vendor, instituted three suits in the court of Subordinate Judge at Jhajjar for possession of the aforesaid lands covered by the three sales on the ground that he had a superior right of preeruption on the basis of his relationship with the vendor as against the appellants under section 15(1 )(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913).", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "section 15(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th January, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5783, "end_char": 5801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants took the malter in appeal before the Senior Subordinate Judge who by his .iudgment dated 30th January, 1963 dismissed the appeals against the decrees in\nA\n\nsuits Nos."}}, {"text": "1-3-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000/- on or before 1-3-1963."}}, {"text": "Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6180, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "280, 281 and 282 of 1963 in the High Court against the decres and judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak."}}, {"text": "Neid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While tbe appeals were pending in the High Court, Neid plaintiff died on April 7, 1963."}}, {"text": "Ramkishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his death, the appellants vendors in the three regular appeals moved applications under 0.22, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to bring on record of the appeals the legal representatives of Neki, deceased plaintiff, namely, Dhara Singh, Ramkishan and Balbir Singh."}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6788, "end_char": 6800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his death, the appellants vendors in the three regular appeals moved applications under 0.22, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to bring on record of the appeals the legal representatives of Neki, deceased plaintiff, namely, Dhara Singh, Ramkishan and Balbir Singh."}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6864, "end_char": 6870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the four appeals were heard and dismissed by Mr. Justice Khanna by his judgment dated 17th September,\n\n1964."}}, {"text": "Neki", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7098, "end_char": 7102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants preferred appeals under the Letters Patent which were dismissed by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court by a common judgment dated 27th July, 1965i\n\nThe claim of Neki for pre-emption .was based on &s. 14 and lS(l)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913).", "canonical_name": "Neki"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913"}}, {"text": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7996, "end_char": 8024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8067, "end_char": 8071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "statute": "The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "statute": "The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10906, "end_char": 10912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Succession Act XXIX of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10976, "end_char": 11003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Succession Act XXIX of 1925", "statute": "Succession Act XXIX of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11545, "end_char": 11550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Succession Act XXIX of 1925", "statute": "Succession Act XXIX of 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12079, "end_char": 12100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12354, "end_char": 12381, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clark", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13134, "end_char": 13139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At p. 641 of the Report, Clark, C.J. observed :\n\n\"While, therefore, there is good reason why voluntary transfers should not pass a right of pre-emption as regards properties previously sold, those reasons do not apply to transfers by inheritance."}}, {"text": "Grey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13486, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Grey laid great stress on sections 13 and 16 of the Punjab Laws Act urging that the father was the person on whom the notice had to be served, and that it was he who had the right to sue and that the right was thus a personal one that could not\n\n(I) 133 P. R. 1907."}}, {"text": "sections 13 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13512, "end_char": 13530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14455, "end_char": 14465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14513, "end_char": 14523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14606, "end_char": 14626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar view was expressed by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Wajid Ali & Ors."}}, {"text": "Punjab Act I of 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15097, "end_char": 15117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ncki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent it was also pointed out that after the passing of the decree by the trial court, Ncki complied with the terms of the decree and made payments within the time given."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15843, "end_char": 15848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act I of 1913", "statute": "Punjab Act I of 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15853, "end_char": 15858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act I of 1913", "statute": "Punjab Act I of 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18003, "end_char": 18008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18189, "end_char": 18194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhara Singr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18273, "end_char": 18284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument was stressed that s. 31 of the Punjab Act 1 of 1913 was in plain words retrospective in character and Dhara Singr and his two sons as legal representatives of Neki could not be granted a decree for pre-emption.", "canonical_name": "Dhara Singh"}}, {"text": "February 4, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18489, "end_char": 18505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason is that the Amending Act came into force on February 4, 1960 anu Neki instituted the present suits for pre-emption long after th .• s date."}}, {"text": "anu Neki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18506, "end_char": 18514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason is that the Amending Act came into force on February 4, 1960 anu Neki instituted the present suits for pre-emption long after th .• s date."}}, {"text": "Even the three sales or land were effected after the promulgation of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18586, "end_char": 18671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18913, "end_char": 18921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even the three sales or land were effected after the promulgation of the Amending Act", "statute": "Even the three sales or land were effected after the promulgation of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18939, "end_char": 18966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19113, "end_char": 19118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19950, "end_char": 19954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20195, "end_char": 20200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20301, "end_char": 20305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Novber 8, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21009, "end_char": 21023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the case of the plaintiff was directly covered by the terms of the statute his suit was decreed by the trial court en Novber 8, 1951, and an appeal and second appeal therefrom were also dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21165, "end_char": 21170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21353, "end_char": 21358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21422, "end_char": 21427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21715, "end_char": 21724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ft is manifest that the material facts of the present c, ase are different and the ratio of the decision of this Court in Ram Sarup ~·.", "canonical_name": "RanJ Sarup"}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21729, "end_char": 21735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munshi & Ors. ("}}, {"text": "RGm Sari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21792, "end_char": 21800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In RGm Sari:p's case(') the right of the plaintiff to pre-empt was extinguished retiospectively; in the present case !"}}, {"text": "Nki had the right of pre-emption under the Amended Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21957, "end_char": 22011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_842_847_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OJ< UTT AR PRADESH\n\nMAHARAJ NARAIN AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 30, .1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH Al'D K. S. HEGDE, JJ.j\n\nLimitation ACI, 1908, .1. 12(2)-\"time rtquirite\" for obtaining copy of order appealed fro1n-n1eaning of.\n\nThe appellanl Slate filed an appeal in the High Court on March 29, 1963 against the order made by the trial court on November 10, 1962 acquitting the rcpondents. According to the information contained in the copy of the order produced along w1lh the Memorandum of Appeal.\n\n1he appeal was filed wilhin time.\n\nIt showed Iha! the copy was applied for on Novombcr 15. 1962 and it was ready on January 3. 1963. It was contended on behalf of the respondents 1ha1 the appeal was out of time in view of the fact that 1he appellant had applied for and obtained two\n\nother copies of the orJcr appealed from and i'f time was calculated on the basis o[ thoc; c copies the appeal\n\nv. a\" beyond time.\n\nIn addition 10 the copy referred 10 earlier. the app<:llant had applied for another copy of the order appealed fron1 on December 3, 196:!. and that copy was ready for delivery on December 20, 1962.\n\nThe appellant also applied for yel another copy of rhc same order on Dcrcmbcr 21, 1962 and that copy was made ready on the same day.\n\nII was not disputed lba1 if the period of limitation was con1puted on the basis of the t\\l.'O later copies, the appeal\n\nwas barred hy limitation.\n\nThe High Court accepted the respondent's contention and dismissed the appeal.\n\nOn appeal to this Courl.\n\nHELD : That lbc decision of 1he High Court under apoeal did not Jay down the law correctly.\n\nThe expression 'time requisite' in s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act can nol be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy\n\nof the order.\n\nWhal is deduc1ible under s. 12(2) is not the minimum F time within which a copy of lbc order appealed against could have been obtained.\n\nIt must be remembered that s. 12(2) e!llarges tho period of limitation proscribed under entry 157 of Schedule I. That stion permits the appellant 10 deducl from the time ta.ken for filing lbe appeal. the time required for obtaining lhe copy of the order appealed from and not any lesser period \"'hich might hav~ been occupied if th~ application for copy had been filed al some 01hcr date.\n\nThat section lays no obligation on the appellant 10 be prompt in his application for a copy of the order.\n\nG A plain reading of s. 12(2) shows 1ha1 in computing the peiiod of Iimi1a-\n\n1ion prescribed for an appeal. the day on which the judgment or order complained of \\Vas pronounced and the time taken by the court to make available the copy applied for. have lo be excluded. There is no justification for restricting the scope of 1ha1 provision. [844 E-HJ\n\nMatltek and others v. Siter Moltai11111ad, A.l.R. 1935, Lah. 682; disapproved.\n\nPra111atlta Nat/1 Rov v. Lee, 49 I.A. 307 and /, N. Surry v.\n\nT. S.\n\nClietlyar, 55 I.A. 161; distinguished.\n\n...\n\nA Panjam Y. Trimala Reddy, I.LR. 57 Mad. 560; Kunju Kesavan v.\n\nM. M. Philip, A.LR. 1953 T.C. 552; B. Govind Raj Sewak Singh and Anr.\n\nv. Behuti Narain Singh. A.LR. 1950, All. 486 and K. U. Singh v. M. R.\n\nKachhi, A.LR. 1960 M.P. 140; referred to.\n\nCB'IMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C: !minal Appeal No. 122 of 1965.\n\nB Appeal from the judgment and order dated December l,\n\n1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No. 785 of 1963.\n\n0. P. Rana, for the appellant.\n\n!. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. In this appeal by certificate, the only question that arises for decision is as to the true scope of the expression \"time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from\" found in sub-s. 2 cf s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act. The said question arose for decision under the following circumstances: The respondents were tried for various offences before the learned assistant sessions judge, Farrukhabad. The said learned judge acquitted them.\n\nAgainst the order of acquittal the State went up in appeal to the High Court of Allahabad. The said appeal was dismissed as being barred by limitation. The correctness of that decision is in issue in this appeal.\n\nItem 157 of the first schedule to the Act prescribes that the period of limitation for an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, from an order of acuittal is three months from the date of the order appealed from.\n\nBut sub-s. 2 of s. 12 provides that iu computing the period of limitation prescribed for ari appeal th\" day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from shall be excluded.\n\nThe memorandum of appeal was filed into court on March 29,\n\n1963. The order appealed from had been delivered on November 10, 1962. According to the information contained in the copy of the order produced along with the said memorandum the appeal was within time. It showt:d that that copy was applied for on November 15, 1962 and the same was ready on January 3, 1963.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the respondents that the appeal was out of time in view of the fact that the appellant had applied for and obtained two other copies of the order appealed from and if time is calculated on the basis of those copies the appeal was beyond time. In addition to the copy referred to earlier, the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 2 SC.R.\n\nappellant had applied for another copy of the order appt'aled A from on Drcember 3, 1962 and that copy was ready for delivery on Dc-:c::.· <:r 20, 1962. The appellant also applied for yet another copy of the same order on December 21, 1962 and that copy was made ready on the same day. There is no dispute that if the period of limitation is computed on the basis of those copies 1:1c appeal was barred by limitation. But the point for considera- B lion is whether the obtaining of those copies has any relevance in the matter of computing the period of limitation for the <:ppeal.\n\nThe High Court of Allahab1d accepted the contentio..i of the respondents that in determining the time requisite for obtai,1ing a copy of the order appealed fro1.1, it had to take into consideration the copies made available to the appellant on the 20th c and 2 lst December, 1962. 1t opined that the expression 'requisite' found in s. 12(2) means \"properly required\", and hence the limitation has 10 be computed on the basis of the copy made available to the appellant in Decembtr, 1962.\n\nIt was not disputed on behalf o( the respondents that it was not necessary for the appellant to apply for a copy of the order appealed from immediately after the order was pronounced. The a1 :>ellant could have, if !I chose to take the risk, waited till the ninety days period allowed to it by the 'tatutc was almost exhausted.\n\nEven then the time required for obaining a copy of the order would have been deducted in calculating the period of liinitation for filing the appeal.\n\nHence Ire expression 'timt requisite' cannot be understood as the time absolutely neccsary for obtaining the copy of the order. What is , teductible under s. 12(2) is not the minimum time within which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained.\n\nIt must be remembered that sub-s. 2 of s. 12 enlarges the period of limitation prescribed under entry 157 of Schedule I. That section permits the appellant to deduct from the time taken for filing the appeal, the time required for obtaining the copy of the order appealed from and not any lesser period which might have been occupied if the application for copy had been filed at some other date.\n\nThat section lays no obligation on the appellant to be prompt in his application for a copy of the order.\n\nA plain reading of s. 12 (2) shows that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal. the day on which the judgment or order complained of was pronounced and the time taken by the court to make available the copy applied for, have to be excluded. There is no justification for restricting the scope of that provision.\n\nIf the appellate courts are required to find out in every appeal filed before them the minimum ti.ne requ; red for obtaining a copy of the order appealer! from, it would be unworkable. In that event every time an appeal is filed, the court not only will hav~ to see\n\nH ...\n\nH ..\n\nV.P. STATE v. MAHARA. NARAIN (Hegde, J.) 845\n\nwhether thP, appeal is in time on the basis of the information availble from the copy of the order filed along with the memorandum of appeal but it must go further and jiold an enquiry whether any other copy had been made available to the appellant and if so what was the time taken by the court to make available that copy.\n\nThis wo•.1ld lead to a great deal of confusion and enquiries into the alleged !aches or diktoriness in respect not of copies produced with the memoranC:11m of appeal but about other copies which he might have got and u5ed for other purposes with which the court has nothing to do.\n\nThe High Court in arriving at the decision that the appeal is barred by time relied on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Mathe/a and Others v. Sher Mohammad('). It also sought support from the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee(') and J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar('). The Lahore decision undoubtedly supports the view taken by the High Court. It lays down that the words \"time requisite\" mean simply time required by the appellant to obtain a copy of the decree assuming that he acted with the reasonable promptitude and dili gence. It further lays dpwn that the time requisite for obtaining it copy is the shortest time during which the copy would have been obtained by the appe!lant, and it has nothing to do with the amount of time spent by him in obtaining the copy which he chooses to file with the memorandum of appeal.\n\nWith respect to the learned judges who decided that case we are unable to spell out from the language of s. 12(2) the requirement that the appellant should act with reasonable promptitude and diligence and the further condition that the time requisite for obtaining a copy should be the shortest time during which a copy could have been obtained by the appe!lant. We are of the opinion that the said decision does not lay down the law correctly.\n\nNow we shall proceed to consider the decisions of the Judicial Committee relied on by the High Court. IP ?ramatha Nath Roy\n\nv. Lee(') the appellant was found to be guilty of !aches.\n\nThe Judicial Commitee held that he was not entitled to deduct the time lost due to his !aches. It is in that context the Board observed that the time which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order could not be regarded as 'requisite' within sub-s. 2 of s. 12. That decision does not bear on the question under consideration.\n\nIn J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar('), the question that fell for decision by the Judicial Committee was whether in reckoning the time for presenting an appeal, the time required for obtaining\n\n(!)A.LR. !935 Lah. 682.\n\n(3) 55 I.A. 161.\n\n(2) 49 I.A. 3 7.\n\nLJSup.Cl/68-10\n\n8~6\n\nSUPREMI! COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\na copy of the decree or judgment must be excluded even though by the rules of the court it was not necessary to produce with the memorar.dum of appeal the copy of the decree or judgment.\n\nTheir Lordships answered that question in the affirmative. While deciding that question, their Lordships considered some of the observations made by the High Court relating to the dilatoriness of some Indian practitioners.\n\nIn that context they observed :\n\n\"There is force no doubt in the observation made in the High Court that the elimination of the requirement to obtain copies of the documents was part of an effort to combat the dilatoriness of some Indian practitioner; and their Lordships would he unwilling to discourage any such effort.\n\nAll, however, that can be done, as the law stands, is for the High Courts to be strict m applying the provision of exclusion.\n\nThe word 'requisite' is a strong word; it may be\n\n:\"garded as meaning something nfore than the word 'required'.\n\nIt means 'properly required' and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the ,.. ::ssity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his fault.\"\n\nIn other words, what their Lordships said was that any delay due to the default of the pleader of the appellant cannot be deducted.\n\nThere can be no question of any default if the steps taken by the appellant are in accordance with law.\n\nHence, the above quoted observations of the Judicial Committee can have no application to the po:nt under consideraion.\n\nPreponderance of judicial opinion is in favour of the conclusion reached by us earlier. The leading case on the subject is the decision of the fu]] bench of the Madras High Court in Panjamv. Tri ma/a Reddy('), wherein the court laid down that in s. 12 the words 'tim.~ requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree' mean the time beyond the party's control occupied in obtaining <he copy which is filed with the memorandum of appeal and not an ideal lesser period which might have been occupied if the application for the copy had been filed on some other date. Th's decision wa! followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kunju Kesavan\n\nv. M. M. Philip('), by the Allahabad High Court in B. Gorind Raj Sewak Singh and Another v. Behuti Narain Singh(') and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in K. V. Singh v. M.\n\nKachhi(').\n\nFrom the above discussion it follows that the decis-'on under appeal does not lay down the la\"' correctly.\n\nBut yet we arc of\n\nCtl 1.L.R. l7 Ma<l. 561. (Jl A .IR J9; J All. 486.\n\n(2) A.J.R. 195) T.C. 552.\n\n(4) A.l.R. t960 M.P. 14J.\n\nll ..\n\n' ..\n\nA the opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal. The respondents were acquitted by the assistant sessions judge, Farrukhabad on November 10, 1962. We were informed by learned counsel for the State that this appeal was brouht to this court mainly with a view to settle an important question of law, and under instructions B from the State government he told us that he does not press the appeal on merits. Accordingly this appeal is dismissed.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OJ< UTT AR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHARAJ NARAIN AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARAJ NARAIN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, .1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OJ< UTT AR PRADESH\n\nMAHARAJ NARAIN AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 30, .1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH Al'D K. S. HEGDE, JJ.j\n\nLimitation ACI, 1908, .1."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH Al'D K. S. HEGDE, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 3. 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1962 and it was ready on January 3."}}, {"text": "December 3, 196", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the app<:llant had applied for another copy of the order appealed fron1 on December 3, 196:!."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1086, "end_char": 1103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that copy was ready for delivery on December 20, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1620, "end_char": 1628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1650, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1770, "end_char": 1778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 1993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2400, "end_char": 2408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panjam Y. Trimala Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nA Panjam Y. Trimala Reddy, I.LR."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. In this appeal by certificate, the only question that arises for decision is as to the true scope of the expression \"time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from\" found in sub-s. 2 cf s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3726, "end_char": 3730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Farrukhabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 4000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said question arose for decision under the following circumstances: The respondents were tried for various offences before the learned assistant sessions judge, Farrukhabad."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of acquittal the State went up in appeal to the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898"}}, {"text": "March 29,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4780, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum of appeal was filed into court on March 29,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "November 10, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order appealed from had been delivered on November 10, 1962."}}, {"text": "November 15, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It showt:d that that copy was applied for on November 15, 1962 and the same was ready on January 3, 1963."}}, {"text": "January 3, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5083, "end_char": 5098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It showt:d that that copy was applied for on November 15, 1962 and the same was ready on January 3, 1963."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also applied for yet another copy of the same order on December 21, 1962 and that copy was made ready on the same day."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahab1d", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6050, "end_char": 6073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahab1d accepted the contentio..i of the respondents that in determining the time requisite for obtai,1ing a copy of the order appealed fro1.1, it had to take into consideration the copies made available to the appellant on the 20th c and 2 lst December, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7804, "end_char": 7809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9163, "end_char": 9180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in arriving at the decision that the appeal is barred by time relied on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Mathe/a and Others v. Sher Mohammad(')."}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9365, "end_char": 9371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lahore decision undoubtedly supports the view taken by the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10025, "end_char": 10033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10871, "end_char": 10875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10879, "end_char": 10884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12956, "end_char": 12973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leading case on the subject is the decision of the fu]] bench of the Madras High Court in Panjamv."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13041, "end_char": 13046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13390, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kunju Kesavan\n\nv. M. M. Philip('), by the Allahabad High Court in B. Gorind Raj Sewak Singh and Another v. Behuti Narain Singh(') and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in K. V. Singh v. M.\n\nKachhi(')."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13464, "end_char": 13484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kunju Kesavan\n\nv. M. M. Philip('), by the Allahabad High Court in B. Gorind Raj Sewak Singh and Another v. Behuti Narain Singh(') and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in K. V. Singh v. M.\n\nKachhi(')."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13563, "end_char": 13588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kunju Kesavan\n\nv. M. M. Philip('), by the Allahabad High Court in B. Gorind Raj Sewak Singh and Another v. Behuti Narain Singh(') and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in K. V. Singh v. M.\n\nKachhi(')."}}, {"text": "R.K.P.S.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_848_855_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "THAKORE SOBHAG SINGH\n\nTHAKUR JAi SINGH & ORS.\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM! AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]\n\nJaipur Matmi Rules, 1945-W/Je//Jer lune force of /c; n-Adoption prior to pron1ulga1ion of Rule~ l\\itliour sanction of Ru/er-Validity.\n\nBoard of Revenue, Rajas1han-Jurisdic1io11 10 decide q11es1io11.r of adop. tion and succession to jagirs in Jaipur State.\n\nThe Board of Revenue, Rajasthan. 1,1, i1hout recording a finding on the C factum of respondent's adoption to the last holder of the jagir, rejected his claim to be rcogniscd as the adopted son, on rhc ground that, under the MaJ111i Rules, the adoprion, without lhc pr-evious sanct; on of the Ruler. could not be recognised for the purpose of determining succession to the jagir.\n\nJn the writ petition filed by him, the High Court dealt with lhe dispute on merits and, holding (a) that the Jaipur Mar111i Rules had no statutory force bccau'!le rhc Ruler had not given his assent to them; (b) thar on lhe death of the last holder without any issue lhe jagir would v-.'5t 1) in the respondent if it \"'as proved that he v1as adopted in accordance wilh the personal law of the las! 1agirdar; and (c) that rule 14(2) requiring the previous sanclion of the Government of the State to adopt is prospective and could have no applicatiori to n adoption made before th: Rules \"'-ere promulgated, dircc:ed the Qoard to drcide the case in accord ance with the law declared hv the High Courl.\n\nThe Board hold that the respondent was proved to have been adopted by the las1 jagirdar and directed that he should be recognised as the jagii'dar.\n\nIn appeal 10 this Court. against the order of the Board er Revenue it was contended by the appellant. \\\\'J10 claimed to have a preferential riaht to !he jagir, that : ( 1) rhe Board ol Revenue had no jurisdiction 10 decide the dtsput-~ relaring to ado; Jtion as it Yi:as triable by a civil court, and (2) since the Jaipur MO/mi Rules (Validalion) Act, of 19&1, was passed after the judgment of the High Court, the Board was bound lo dispose of the matter in the light of the Rules. }'\n\nHELD : ( l) Under the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedins (Validation) Act, 1955. the power to doal y, i1h and decide Jispules relaling to succession lo jagircstatcs '\"a~ vested. in respect of procccdins pending at the date of the Act and instituted thercaf:-:!r, in the Revenue Courts.\n\nTherefore. the Board of Revenue as competent to decide the question rrlating to the respondent's ad0ption. and its decision· on--~ .the factum of adoption recorded on appreciation of evidenc! ml.Jst be accepted.\n\n1852 D-E, H!\n\n(2) It was not open 10 !he appellant lo con'end !hat the righl of the respondenl. a> lhe adopted son, to th~ iagir had to he decided by 1he Roard on the basis of tl:c Mar111i Rules and not in accordance with the personal law of the last jagirdar.\n\n(a) Though the State legislature ., naclcd the Validation Acl, declaring that the Ma1mi Rules 'shall have and shall be deemed always 10 have had, ll .. the for~ of law and '>halt be treated as heing and as having been an existing jagir law within the meaning of s. 2(d) of the Rajasthan Laod Reforms and Resumplion of Jagirs Act. 1Q5T, norwilhslanding anyrhing\n\n• A\n\n• c\n\ncontained in any Judgment of any court, the Act did not supersede the judgment of tho High Court and therefore, the Board was incompetent to consider and decide the question .whether the Government mav. in the absence of its previous sanC'tion, refuse to recognise the adoption of the respondent on the basis of the Matmi Rules. [854 A-CJ\n\n(b) Acco<ding to the personal Jaw applicable to the last jagirdar, the respondent could have bee\" adopted by him and the finding of the High Court that the jagir would vet in the respondent as the adopted son in accordance with such persl)!}al Jaw operated as res judicata and could not be reopened before the Board of Revenue; and, it was not open to the appeJlant to contend in the appeal to this Court that the deCision of the High Court on questions decided in the writ petition was erroneous. The order of the High Court on the writ petition was not an interlocutory order. [854 E-G]\n\n(c) Rule 14(2) is on its terms prospective and the Validation Act Joes not give retropective operation to the Matmi Rules. [853 FJ\n\n(d) It could not be contended that the judgment of the H; igli Court should not be treated as res judicata, on the ground that .if it was regarded as binding between the parties, the equal protection clause of the Consti 4 tution would be violated if another person similarly situated were to be differently treated by the Board of Revenue. [855 E-FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 23, 1962 of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan at Ajmer in Matmi Case No. 40 (Jhunjhunu) of 1961.\n\nM. M. Tiwari, D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai, for the app.ellants.\n\nA. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No. 1.\n\nK. B. Mehta and Miss Indu Soni, for respondent Nos. 2 to 4.\n\nT.he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. This is an appeal brought with special leave against the judgment dated October 23 1962 in Matmi Case No. 40 of 1961, of the file of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan.\n\nThakur Sabha! Singh-. hereinafter called 'Sabhal Singh'-a jagirdar of Thikana Jhakora in Shekhawati area in the former Indian State of Jaipur applied on November 3, 1933 to recognize Jai Singh-the first respondent in this appeal-as his adopted son for succession to the Thikana.\n\nOn May 23, 1936, the Ruler of Jaipur in Council ordered that he \"saw no reason at the present moment to recognize the adoption advocated by\" Sabha! Singh,\n\nand that the \"alleged adoption of Jai Singh shall in no way be deemed to be an adoption that will in any. sense bind the Darbar as regards the question of succession\". On June 16, 1947, Sabha!\n\nSingh preferred another application to the Prime Minister of Jaipur for recognizing the adoption of Jai Singh.\n\nThe application was\n\n850 SUPRF.MP. COl!RT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.CR.\n\nsent to the Board of Revenue for enquiry and report under the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945. The Board of Revenue rep8rted that in view of the Council Resolution dated May 23, 1936, the application was not maintainable since Sabha! Singh was living at the date of the application.\n\nBut before this application could be finally disposed of by the Government of the State of Jaipur Sabha! Singh died and the Prime Minister of Jaipur directed that nccessai:\"\"el)quiries be held under the Matmi Rules. and for that purpose the record be sent to the Deputy Commissioner for taking action according to the Rules.\n\nThe Nazim, Jhunihunu reld an enquiry and reported that adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh\n\ncould not be recognized, for, under the Council Resolution dated May 23, 1936, the Government had refused to rant any recognition to the adoption. In the view of the Nazim, the adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh without the previous sanction of the Governinent was ihvalid, and evidence of the \"factum of adoption\" was inadmissible, but that did not debar Jai Singh from setting up a claim to succeed to the Thikana as a descendant in the senior line of the original grantee. An appeal against that order to the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed.\n\nA second appeal was then carried to the Board of Revenue. Jn the view of the Board. on the terms of the Council Resolution dated May 23, 1936. an enquiry into the factum of adoption could not be shut out. The Board accordingly called for a finding on the question, amongst others. whether Jai Singh was formally adopted by Sabha! Singh of Jhakora, and if so wherv?\n\nThe Nazim reported that the adoption of Jai Singh stood proved atisfactorily, but the adoption could not be recognized because no previous sanction of the Ruler had been obtained.\n\nSince. however, Jai Singh was the senior-most member of the senior line of descent from the original grantee. he was entitled to succeed to the J!rant under r. 14(1) of the Jaipur Matmi Rules. 1945. in preference to any other claimant.\n\nThe papers were then submitted to the Collector, Jhunjhunu.\n\nThe Collector confirmed the finding of the Nazim that Jai Singh wa~ adopted by Sabha! Singh. but in the absence of previous sanction of the Ruler the adoption co\"Jd not be recognized.\n\nThe Collector did not, however. agree with the Nazim that Jai Singh was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee : he held that Sobhag Singh-appellant in this appeal-was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee and recommended that \"the Matmi be granted in favour of Sobhag Singh.\" Th~ Roard of Revenue agreed with the Collector that Jai SinJ?h wa' not the senior member of the senior line of the oriinal grantee of the j!rant in question. and that the appellant Sobhag Sin.gh had a preferential claim to the grant of Matmi. The Board without recording a finding on the issue of adoption accepted the recommendation of the Collector.\n\nA •\n\n' c\n\n• A\n\nSOllHAG SINGH v. JAi SINGH (Shah, J.) 851\n\nJai Singh then moved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court quashed the decision of the Boatd of Revenue and directed the Board \"to decide the case ih accordance with law in the light of observations made\" in the judgment. In the opinion of the High Court, the Jagir devolved according to the personal law applicable to the last holder, and the personal law included the custom or usage relating to the particular Jagir; that the custom or usage applicable to the Jagir in question was that the adopted son must be a direct male lineal descendant of the original granite, and that Nahar Singh was the original grantee of the Jagir in question and Jai Singh as a descendant of Nahar Singh was entitled to take the Jagir if it was proved that the adoption had been made in accordance with the personal Jaw, that the Matmi Rules had no statutory force because it was not proved that assent of the Ruler of Jaipur had been given thereto, and that even assuming that rhe Rules were \"existing Jagir Jaw\" they did not govern adoptions made before they were brought into force.\n\nAn application for certificate to appeal to this Court against the judgment of the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution was rejected on the ground that the dispute had not been finally decided, and a number of issues remained to be decided.\n\nThe Board of Revenue held, on a re-hearing of the appeal, that Jai Singh was proved to have been adopted by Sabha) Singh.\n\nThe Board accordingly directed that by virtue of the adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha! Singh, Jai Singh be shown in the revenue records as the Jagirdar of Jhakora on the demise of Sabha! Singh.\n\nAgainst that order, Sobhag Singh who claimed to have a preferential right to the Jagir of Jhakora has appealed to this Court.\n\nA large number of grounds were canvassed at the Bar in support of this appeal : they fall into three broad divisions :\n\n( 1) That the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to decide a dispute relating to adoption which dispute was triable by the Civil Court alone;\n\n(2) Since the Jaipur Matmi Rules had been validated\n\nbv the Jaipur Matmi Rules (Validation) Act. 1961 (Act 21of1961), the Board was bound to decide the appeal in the light of the Rules; and ( 3) That on the evidence it is not proved that Jai Singh was in fact adopted by Sabha! Singh as his son on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987.\n\n \" The first and the third grounds Present no difficulty. The Raiasthan Legislature enacted the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Pro- Cl'edings (Validation) Act 18 of 1955 to validate certain decisions\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 968] 2 S.C.R.\n\ngiven, and proceedings taken, in respect of matters relating to the resumption of Jagirs in the covenanting States of Rajasthan, and the recognition according to the law of succession to the rights and titles of Jagirda\"' therein, and to provide the forum for the disposal of such cases and proceedings.\n\nThe State of Jaipur was one 'of the covenanting States. Bys. 3 of it.at Act it was provided that all decisions of the various grades of Revenue Courts or officer,, in cases or proceedings arising out of, or under, the laws of the covenanting States providing for the resumption of jagirs in 'those States and the recognition of succession to the rights and titles of jagirdars therein shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be liable to b~ called in question in any Civil Court.\n\nSection 4 provided or continuance of pending cases and proeedings before the Revenue Courts as .f they were properly instituted. Section 5 provided that all casesor proceedings of the nature referred to in s. 3 may after the Act be instituted in the Court of the Collector exercising jurisdiction in the area within which the subject-matter of the case or proceeding is situate. Provision was made for appeals from the orders of the Revenue Courts by s. 8, and by s. 12 the order of the Board of Revenue was declared final.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits or proceedings referred to In s. 5 was expressly excluded by s. 13.\n\nThe power to deal with and decide disputes relating to succession to jagir estates was therefore vested in respect of proceedings pending at the date of the Act and instituted thereafter, in the Revenue Courts. The Board of Revenue was, therefore, competent to decide the question relating to the adoption of J ai Singh by Sabha! Singh.\n\nThere is overwhelming evidence on the record in support of the case that Jai Singh was adopted on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987 by Sabha! Singh with the requisite ceremonies according to the personal law.\n\nEvery authority or Tribunal which had occasion to deal with this quc;5tion was of the opinion that Sabha!\n\nSingh and adopted Jai Singh on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987 according to the custom of the Jagir.\n\nApart from the oral evidence, there is the deed of adoption, a copy of an invitation sent to an invitee to attend the adoption ceremony and the recitals in the application submitted by Sabha! Singh requesting recognition of the adoption of Jai Singh. The Board of Revenue in the judgment under appeal has carefully analysed the evidence, and we see no reason to enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence in this appeal with special leave.\n\nThe view recorded by the oard of Revenue on appreciation of evidence that Jai Singh was adopted as a son by Sabhal Singh must be accepted.\n\nThe second contention may now be considered.\n\nIn 1945 the Jaipur Matmi Rules were published in the State Government Gazette.\n\nBy r. 3 all existing orders, rules and hidayats which\n\n• A\n\nH ... -\n\nA .were inconsistent with the Matmi Rules were repealed.\n\nRule 4\n\nsub-r. (3) defined \"Matmi\" as meaning mutation of the name of the successor to a State grant on the death of the last holder. By r. 5 it was provided that all State grants shall be subject to matmi with certain exceptions not relevant in this case.\n\nRule 14 provided:\n\n\" ( 1) Subject to the provisions of rule 13, succession in the absence of a direct male lineal descendant of the last holder shall be restricted to the lineal male-descendants of the original grantee, preference being given to the senior member of the senior line :\n\nProvided, firstly, that in tht; case of a grant for the maintenance of a temple, mosque or other religious place, other than a Jain temple, it shall be within the discretion of Government to select as successor any one of the male lineal descendants of the original grantee, with due regard to his suitability for the perfomiance of worship; and\n\nProvided, secondly,\n\n(2) No adoption shall be recognised for the purpose of succession to a State grant unless a holder has obtained the previous sanction of the Government to adopt, such sanction being given only in favour of a direct male !in.ea! descendant of the original grantee : Provided, firstly,\n\nProvided, secondly, \"\n\nThat rule is plainly prospective, and can have no application to an adoption !nade. before the Rules were promulgated. Previous sanction to adopt is not a condition of the grant of recognition for the purpose of succession to a State grant in respect of a person who is adopted by the holder of a I agir before the date of the promulgation of the Rules.\n\nThat was the view taken by the High Court in the writ petition filed by Jai Singh against the order of the Board of Revenue. The High Court also held that the Matmi Rules were not sanctioned by the Government, and had not the force of >aw.\n\nIt is true that the State Legislature has enacted Act 21 of 1961-called 'The Jaipur Matmi Rules (Validation) Act 1961 '.\n\nBy s. 2 of that Act it is provided that \"notwithstanding anything contained in the Jaipur General Clauses Act, 1944, or any other Jaw or in any rule of interpretation or in any judgment decision, decree or order of any court, notwithstanding any omission or defect of form or procedure or .want of any competent sanction or approval, it. is hereby declared that the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, published in the Jaipur Gazette, Extraordinary, dated\n\nSUPREME COURT RF.PORTS\n\n[I 968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthe 8th December. 1945. under Revenue Branch Notification No. 15941 /Rev., dated 24th November, 1945, shall have, and shall be deemed always to have had, the force of law and shall be treated as being and as having been an 'existing Jagir law' within the meaning of clause ( d) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Land Refonns and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (Rajasthan Act 6 of\n\n1952) for the purpose of that Act as we)) as of the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 (Raiasthan Act 18 of I 955). and any other law relatnip; to \"Jagirs or Jagirdars.\" But the Act did not supersede the judgement of the High Court. The Board of Revenue was therefore incompetent to consider and decide the question whether the GovernmCilt may in the absence of the previous sanction of the Government refuse to recognize the adoption of Jai Singh.\n\nThe Act again merely declares that the Matmi Rules shall be deemed always to have the force of law and shall be treated as being \"cxistin)l Jagir law\" within the meaning of cl. (d) of s. 2 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jaj!irs Act 6 of 1952 and Rajas1han Act 18 of 1955. But the Act docs not purport to give retrospective operation to the Jaipur Matmi Rules. It is futile then t.1 contend that the Board of Revenue before determining the quc ;. tion as to the factum of adoplion of Jai Sinh was required t l consider wnether the adoption was invalid. because sanction of th~ Ruler of Jaipur was not previously obtained by Sahhal Singh bcrorc taking Jai Singh in adoption.\n\nThe High Court had also held in the writ petition that on the death of the holder of the Jair without having any issue the Jagir will vest in his adopted son in accordance wi1h the personal law.\n\nThat findinj! is now res j11dicafa and is bindin~ upon the parties.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the Hi!!h Court was an interlocutory order remanding the proceeding to the Board of Revenue, and on that account the decision of the High Court will not operate as res j11dicata either before the Board of Revenue or in this Court.\n\nWe are unable to accept that contention.\n\nAgainst the order or\"the Board of Revenue rejectin~ the claim of Jai Singh to be recOgQized as the adootcd son of Sabha!\n\nSingh a writ petition was moved in the Hioh Court and a prayer for ouashing that order was made.\n\nThe Hi2h Court dealt with the dispute on merits and held that the order of the Board of Revenue holdine that because of the Matmi Rules the adoption of Jai Sineh by Sabhal Singh without the previous sanction of the Ruler could not be recognized for the purome of detenninine the succession to the Jagir was erroneous.\n\nThe Hi2h Court did in making the final order direct the Tribunal to decide the case 'in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made in the judement. but the direction was. in our judgment. a surplusa, ee.\n\nThe Hi.eh Court is<:i?ed a writ in the nature of certiorari\n\n' c\n\n' •J\n\nquashing the order of the Tribunal.\n\nIt was unnecessary thereafter to direct or advise the Board of Revenue lo perform its statutory duty to decide the dispute according to law. The Board of Revenue had to decide the dispute in accordance with the law declared by the High Court.\n\nAll questions which had been expressly decided by the High Court on contest between the parties and other questions which must be deemed by necessary implication to have been decided were res judicata and could not be re-opened before the Board of Revenue.\n\nIn this appeal it is therefore, not open to the appellant to contend that the decision of the High Court on the questions decided in the writ pctttion was erroneous.\n\nIt is unfortunate that the application for certificate to appeal to this Court filed by Sobhag Singh was erroneously rejected by the High Court.\n\nBut that does not affect the binding character of the judgment of the High Court between the parties. Unless the decision of the High Court on those questions was set aside by appropriate proceeding in this Court, the judgment must be held binding between the parties.\n\nIt is, therefore. not open to the appellant to contend. that the right of Jai Singh as the adopted son to the I agir had to be .decided otherwise than in accordance with the personal law of Sabha! Singh. It is undisputed that accordin.g to the personal law applicable to Sabha! Singh, Jai Singh could have been adopted by him.\n\nIt was somewhat faintly contended by counsel for the appellant that if the judgment of the High Court is regarded as bindin~ between the parties, the equal protection claus~ of the Constitution would be violated, and on that account also the judgment must be held invalid.\n\nThe argument needs no serious consideration. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that two persons similarly situate were or cod be differently treated by the judgment of the Board of Revenue. because the decision of the High Court operate> as res judicata between the parties in one case. By the application of the rule of res judicata the appellant was not singled out for special or prejudicial treatment.\n\nIt may suffice to observe that all adoptions according to the personal law in the State of Jaipur made by Jagirdars before the p•omulgation of the Matmi Rule~ are valid, even if no sanction of the Ruler was. obtained to the adoptions.\n\nThat rule applies to all adoptions by /agi•dars in the State of Jaipur.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs in favour of the first respondent.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nA ppea/ dismissed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "THAKORE SOBHAG SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKORE SOBHAG SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THAKUR JAi SINGH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR JAI SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM!"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3116, "end_char": 3123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. M. Tiwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Tiwari, D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai, for the app.ellants."}}, {"text": "D. D. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Tiwari, D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai, for the app.ellants."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4894, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Tiwari, D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai, for the app.ellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4928, "end_char": 4937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, D. P. Gupta, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. B. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Mehta and Miss Indu Soni, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Indu Soni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5034, "end_char": 5043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Mehta and Miss Indu Soni, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5119, "end_char": 5123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. This is an appeal brought with special leave against the judgment dated October 23 1962 in Matmi Case No."}}, {"text": "Jai Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'Sabhal Singh'-a jagirdar of Thikana Jhakora in Shekhawati area in the former Indian State of Jaipur applied on November 3, 1933 to recognize Jai Singh-the first respondent in this appeal-as his adopted son for succession to the Thikana.", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "May 23, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5578, "end_char": 5590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1936, the Ruler of Jaipur in Council ordered that he \"saw no reason at the present moment to recognize the adoption advocated by\" Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Jaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5605, "end_char": 5611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1936, the Ruler of Jaipur in Council ordered that he \"saw no reason at the present moment to recognize the adoption advocated by\" Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Sabha! Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1936, the Ruler of Jaipur in Council ordered that he \"saw no reason at the present moment to recognize the adoption advocated by\" Sabha!", "canonical_name": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora"}}, {"text": "Jai Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5765, "end_char": 5774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh,\n\nand that the \"alleged adoption of Jai Singh shall in no way be deemed to be an adoption that will in any.", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "June 16, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1947, Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue for enquiry and report under the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before this application could be finally disposed of by the Government of the State of Jaipur Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Jhunihunu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6718, "end_char": 6727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Nazim, Jhunihunu reld an enquiry and reported that adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Nazim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the Nazim, the adoption of Jai Singh by Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whether Jai Singh was formally adopted by Sabha!", "canonical_name": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora"}}, {"text": "Jhunjhunu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8185, "end_char": 8194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The papers were then submitted to the Collector, Jhunjhunu."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agree with the Nazim that Jai Singh was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee : he held that Sobhag Singh-appellant in this appeal-was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee and recommended that \"the Matmi be granted in favour of Sobhag Singh.\"", "canonical_name": "Sobhag Sin.gh"}}, {"text": "Sobhag Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8689, "end_char": 8701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agree with the Nazim that Jai Singh was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee : he held that Sobhag Singh-appellant in this appeal-was the senior member of the senior line of the original grantee and recommended that \"the Matmi be granted in favour of Sobhag Singh.\"", "canonical_name": "Sobhag Sin.gh"}}, {"text": "Jai SinJ?h", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Roard of Revenue agreed with the Collector that Jai SinJ?h wa' not the senior member of the senior line of the oriinal grantee of the j!rant in question.", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "Sobhag Sin.gh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8885, "end_char": 8898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that the appellant Sobhag Sin.gh had a preferential claim to the grant of Matmi.", "canonical_name": "Sobhag Sin.gh"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9153, "end_char": 9161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Nahar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion of the High Court, the Jagir devolved according to the personal law applicable to the last holder, and the personal law included the custom or usage relating to the particular Jagir; that the custom or usage applicable to the Jagir in question was that the adopted son must be a direct male lineal descendant of the original granite, and that Nahar Singh was the original grantee of the Jagir in question and Jai Singh as a descendant of Nahar Singh was entitled to take the Jagir if it was proved that the adoption had been made in accordance with the personal Jaw, that the Matmi Rules had no statutory force because it was not proved that assent of the Ruler of Jaipur had been given thereto, and that even assuming that rhe Rules were \"existing Jagir Jaw\" they did not govern adoptions made before they were brought into force."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10344, "end_char": 10352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sabha) Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue held, on a re-hearing of the appeal, that Jai Singh was proved to have been adopted by Sabha) Singh.", "canonical_name": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora"}}, {"text": "Jhakora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10771, "end_char": 10778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh, Jai Singh be shown in the revenue records as the Jagirdar of Jhakora on the demise of Sabha!"}}, {"text": "Since the Jaipur Matmi Rules had been validated", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11207, "end_char": 11254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karlik Sudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11501, "end_char": 11512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh as his son on Karlik Sudi 13 Samvat Year 1987."}}, {"text": "State of Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12084, "end_char": 12099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Jaipur was one 'of the covenanting States."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12725, "end_char": 12734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12802, "end_char": 12806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13060, "end_char": 13065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13206, "end_char": 13210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13237, "end_char": 13242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J ai Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13554, "end_char": 13564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue was, therefore, competent to decide the question relating to the adoption of J ai Singh by Sabha!", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "Sabhal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14547, "end_char": 14559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view recorded by the oard of Revenue on appreciation of evidence that Jai Singh was adopted as a son by Sabhal Singh must be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaipur General Clauses Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16853, "end_char": 16885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17540, "end_char": 17549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945", "statute": "the Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Land Refonns and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17557, "end_char": 17614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18300, "end_char": 18304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Land Refonns and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952", "statute": "the Rajasthan Land Refonns and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Jai Sinh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18616, "end_char": 18624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion as to the factum of adoplion of Jai Sinh was required t l consider wnether the adoption was invalid.", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "Sahhal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18756, "end_char": 18768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "because sanction of th~ Ruler of Jaipur was not previously obtained by Sahhal Singh bcrorc taking Jai Singh in adoption.", "canonical_name": "Sabha! Singh of Jhakora"}}, {"text": "Jai Sineh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19779, "end_char": 19788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hi2h Court dealt with the dispute on merits and held that the order of the Board of Revenue holdine that because of the Matmi Rules the adoption of Jai Sineh by Sabhal Singh without the previous sanction of the Ruler could not be recognized for the purome of detenninine the succession to the Jagir was erroneous.", "canonical_name": "Jai SinJ?h"}}, {"text": "Jagirdars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22494, "end_char": 22503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may suffice to observe that all adoptions according to the personal law in the State of Jaipur made by Jagirdars before the p•omulgation of the Matmi Rule~ are valid, even if no sanction of the Ruler was."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_856_861_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "GRAM SABHA, BESAHANI\n\nRAM RAJ SINGH & ORS\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nU.P. Zamindari Aholi1ion and Lc; ncl Reform< Act. 1950 (1 of 1951). s. 212A (6) and (7)--Suh-Di\\i{ionnl Officer ordering tjtctment under s. 212A (6) without a1vardi111: co111pensation-Such order ; S invt:.lid and does not a/tract provi<ions of s. 212A (7) arrd Entry at SI. No. 328 of Appendix Ill read with Rule 338 of U.P. Zc.1nindari Aholition and Land Refornis Rules. 1952-Suit challen11in11 .111ch order can be filed under s. 209 of\n\nthe Act within si:c years of the date of dispO.\\StS!iiOfl,\n\nThe respondents filed a suit under s. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, in respect of five plots of land claiming to have Sirdari rights in one of them and Bhumidari rights in the other four.\n\nBy this suit they challenged the order of th-' Sub-Divisional Oll!cer\n\npurting to be under s. 2 I 2A ( 6) of the Act dispossessing the plaintiffs from he aforesaid plots and ran1ing pession thereof to the appellant Gram Sabha.\n\nThe Revenue c:ourt framed several issues, the second of \\•.:hich was whether the respondent!\\ had ever acquid Bhurnidha'ri rights in Jhe four plots in which they claimed tbern. 'fhis issue was referred to lhe Civil Court which held thal. as no suit was filed under s. 212A (7) of the Act, within six month) ol the dispossession as required by the Entry at SI. No. 328 of Appendix III read with Rule 338 of the U.P.\n\nZamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952. !he respondents' rights as Rhumidars, if any, stood extinguished.\n\nOn receipt of this decision oe issue No. 2 the Revenue Court proceeded to determine the claim of the respondents in respect of Sirdari right\"i in one plot and it found lhat these\n\nrits were never acquired.\n\nIt therefore dismissed the respondents' suit w1tho\\lt recording any finding on the remaining issues. The first \"ppeal having failed, the respondents liled a second appe•I: Therein the High Court held that the order of the Suh-Divisional Mastrate purporting to be made under s. 212A (6) of the Act was not valid because it did not direct payment of compen'Sation as laid down in that section, so that the rights a6 Sirdars and Bhuntidars were not lost hy lhe respondents.\n\nThe appellant came to this Court by special leave.\n\nHELD: fi) The language of s. 212A (6) makes it clear that the order under that provision must he an order for ejectment of the person in possession of the land on payment of such compensation as mc1.y be prescribed.\n\nIn the present case no compensation having been Ordered to be paid there was no valid order under s. 212A (6). AC'Cordingly the provisions of s. 212A (7) which come into play only when a valid order has been passed under s. 212A (6). were not auracte<l to the ca; e at all. In such a case a suit clearly lay against the appellants under s. 209 of the Act and such a suit could be instituted within six years from the date that unla1,1w- ful possession wa5 taken hy the appellant. The present suit was admittedly brought within that period and was therefore not time-barred.\n\n[859 F,\n\n860 E]\n\n(ii) The suit in respect Of the plot in which Sirdari rights were claimed by the respondents was dismiiscd hy the trial court on the ground that such rights had neVcr been acquired.\n\nThis was a finding of fact and the invalidity of the order under s. 212A did not affect it. [d60 FJ\n\nII ....\n\n(iii) In respect of the four plots in which Bhumidhari rights were claimed by the respondents, the case must be remanded to the tnal court for determination of the undecided issues relating to them. [859 B.C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 719 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 4482 of 1961.\n\nS. P. Sinha, E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawala, for the appellant.\n\nB .. C. Misra and H. K. Puri, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbari:ava, J.\n\nThe plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit No. 25 of 1957 under section 209 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (No. I of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as 'the act\"), claiming possession of five plots Nos. 729/2, 725/2, 723/2 881/2 and 330/3 on the ground that t)iey were Sirdars of plot No. 330/3 and Bhmnidars of the remaining plots.\n\nThe main ailegation was that the Chairman of the Gram Samaj of the village, in which the plots were situated, had, for certain reasons, filed an application before the Sµb-Divisional Officer under section 2 l 2A of the Act for dispossession of the plaintiffs/respondents on the ground that these lands were of pu'Q, lie utility and they vested in the Gram Samaj. , The Sub-Divisional Officer, purporting to act under s. 212A of the Act, passed ; m order for dispossession of the plaintiffs/respondents and granted possession of t.he ll)nds to the appellant, Gram Sabha, Besahani.\n\nThat order purporting to be under s. 212A of the Act was challenged as invalid. a:nd, on that basis, possession was claimed from the ; ippellant under s. 209 of the Act, alleging that the possession of the appellant was without any legal right.\n\nThe suit was defended on behalf of the appeilant on various groun<ls as a result of which the foJlowing ten issues were framed by the trial Court :-\n\n\"Issue No. I : Whether the plaintiffs have right to file the presen, suit ? 2 : Whether plaintiffs are Bhumidars of the plots in suit except plot No. 330/3 ? If so, its effect?\n\n3 : Whether plaintiffs are Sirdars of plot No. 330/3 in suit ? '\n\n4 : Whether plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of H possession over the plots in suit ?\n\n5 : Whether the, disputed plots are land of public utiljty and they vest in Gaon Samaj ? If so, its effect'?\n\n6 :Whether the suit is barred by s. 23, C.P.C.? 7 : Whether the suit is barred by .cction 11, C.P.C. '? 8 : Whether the disputed plots are culturable land ?\n\nIf so, its effect'? 9 : Whether the Court has jurisdiction to the case ?\n\nI 0 : Whether the suit is within time ?\"\n\nOf these issues, issue No. 2 was triable exclusively by the Civil Court and, consequently, the Revenue Court, which was seized of the suit, referred this issue to the Civil Court for a finding.\n\nThis issue No. 2 arose because of two plca<lmgs put forward on behalf of the appellant.\n\nOne was that the plaintiffs/respondents had neve1 acquired Bhumidari rights, and the other was that even if it be held that they did possess any Bhumidari rights, those rights were extinguished when the respondents were dispossessed in pursuance of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer under s. 2 l 2A of the Ac: and no suit within six months was instituted by the respondents in accordance withs. 212A(7) of the Act. The Civil Court, without going into the question whether the respondents had ever acquired Bhumidari rights, decided this issue onlv on the limited ground that the Bhumidari rights of the respondents had been extinguished as a result of the order under s. 212A of the Act. On receipt of this finding from the Civil Court, the Revenue Court proceeded to record its own finding on issue No. 3 in respect of plot No. 330/3 which was the only plot i!l which the respondents had claimed rights as Sirdars. On this lssue, th~ Revenue Court went into the first question only raised on behalf of the appellant and held that it was not proved that the respondents had ever been admitted to tenancy of this plot of land, so that they never became Sirdars of this land.\n\nOn this view, the Revenue Court considered it unnecessary to entr into the question whether the Sirdari rights acquired, if any, had been extinguished as a result of the order under s. 2 l 2A of the Act.\n\nIn view of these findings no decision was recorded on issues Nos. 5-10, and the suit was dismissed.\n\nThat order was upheld by the first appellate Court.\n\nThe respondents then filed a second appeal in the Allahabad Hih Court.\n\nThe High Court held that the order purporting to be under s. 2 l 2A of the Act was not valid, because it did not direct payment of compensation as required bys. 212A(6) of the Act, so that the rights as Sirdars and Bhumidars were not lost by the respondents.\n\nOn this view. the High Court set aside the dismissal of the suit by the lower Courts and decreed the suit of the respondents. The appellant has now come up to this Court against this judgment by special leave.\n\nTwo points have been raised in this appeal on behalf of the appellant before. us.\n\nThe first point is that the High Court was\n\nwrong in holding that the order passed under s. 2.12A of the Act by the Sub-Divisional Officer was not valid, and on that basis decreeing the suit which was clearly\" time-barred, as it was not instituted within six months of the order of ejectment passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer under s. 212A(6) of the Act.\n\nThis ground raised in the appeal has (o be rejected, as we are of the opinion that the High Court was perfectly correct in holding that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer under s. 212A of the Act was not valid and, consequently, the provisions of s. 212A(7) of the Act were never attracted to the present dispute.\n\nSectio.1 212A(6) & (7) are as follows:-\n\n\"212A. ( 6) Where upon the said hearing the Collctor is satisfied that the person was admitted as a tenure-holder or grove-holder of land referred to in Section 212 or being an intermediary brought such land under his own cultivation or planted a grove thereon on or after the eighth day of Augut, 1946, he shall pass an order for ejectment of the person from the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed.\n\n( 7) Where an order for ejectment has been passed under this section, the party against whom the order has been passed may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by it but sub.iect to the results of such suit the order passed under sub-section ( 4) or ( 6) shall be conclusive.\"\n\nThe language of s. 2 l 2A ( 6) makes it clear that the order under that provision must be an order for ejectment of the person in possession of the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed. This means that an order under that provision must tirst direct payment of compensation to the person in possession and the direction for ejectment of the person in possession must be. made effective only thereafter, i.e., after the compensation has been paid.\n\nThe order to be made under this provision of Jaw must, therefore, contain as a GOndition precedent to eiectment the payment of compensation. If no payment of compensation is ordered, the order made would not be an order under this provision of law.\n\nIn the present case, admittedly no compensation was ordered to be paid in the order purporting to have been passed under s. 212A(6) of the Act, so that that order cannot be treated as an order under this provision of Jaw.\n\nThe order n'ot being under this provision, the dispossession of the plaintiffs/ respondents in pursuance of that order was clearly illegal and the plaintiffs/ respondents had the right to institute the suit for obtaining possession under s. 209 of the Act.\n\nIt is true ; hat, in accordance with Entry at SJ. No. 32B of Appendix 11! read with Rule 338 of the U.I'. Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Rules\"), a suit to establish a right claimed in accordance wit'1 s. 2!2A(7) of the Act has to be instituted within six months.\n\nJn pursuance of that right claimed, possession can also be claimed; and, if the suit for establishing the right fails, the right to obtain possession would also become time-barred.\n\nConsequently, under s. 189(c) of the Act. the person concerned, who fails to institute the suit within this period of limitation in accordance with s. 2 I 2A ( 7) of the Act, would have hi>\n\nintrest in the land extinguished. This provision, however, will only apply to cases where a valid order has been made under s. 2 J 2A of the Act and the person concerned has been dispossessed in pursuance of su'ch an order.\n\nIn the present case, we have held that the order. in ptmuance of 1vhich the respondents were dispossessed, was not a val id order under s. 2 I 2A ( 6) of the Act and cannot be held to be an order under that provision of law, so that the respondents in this case must be deemed to have been deprived of possession otherwise than in accordance with law. In such a case, a suit clearly lay against the app'Cllant under s. 209 of the Act and such a suit could be instituted within six years from the date that unlawful possession was taken by the appellant in accordance with Entry at SI. '.'lo. 30 of Appendix Ill read with R. 33~ of the Rules. The present suit was admittedly brought within this period of limitation and was, therefore, not time-barred. The High Court was, therefore. right in holding that the. claim of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be defeated on this ground.\n\nThe second point urged on behalf of the appellant, however, appears to us to have great force and must be accepted.\n\nIt was urged that, so far as plot No. 330/3 is concerned, there was a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. which was upheld by the first appellate Court, that the plaintiffs/respondents never acquired any tenancy or Sirdari rights in this land, so that, irrespective of the validity of the order under s. 212A(6) Qf...lhe Act. the plaintiffs/respondents' suit for possession of t11is plot had to be dismissed.\n\nThe High Court, in decreeing the suit, clearly ignored this aspect. The dismissal of the suit by the trial Court which was upheld by the first appellate Court in respect of this plot No. 33013 was. therefore, not liable to he set aside even on the view taken by the High Court and to that extent it has to be upheld.\n\nWith regard to the remainin~ four plots in which the respondents wereclaiming Bhumidari rights, the error committed by the High Court is that on the finding recorded by that Court there should have been an order of remand to determine other questions\n\nraised in the suit in respect of those plots.\n\nOne of the questions raised, which formed part of issue No. 2 and was never decided by the Civil Court to \"hich tliat issue was referred, was that the\n\n' c\n\nA respondents had never acquired Bhumidari rights at all in these plots. That question should have been remitted for a fresh decision when the High Court held that the Civil Court was wrong in holding that the Bhumidari rights, if possessed by the respondents in these plots, had been extinguished under s. 189 of the Act in view of the failure of the respondents to institute the suit B within the period of limitation applicable to a suit under s. 212A(7) of.the Act. Further, in respect of these plots, other issues which were not decided by the Revenue Court also required decisio'1 before the suit in respect of them could be completely disposed of. Consequently, it is now necessary to remand the suit to the trial Court for a fresh trial for the purposes indicated above.\n\nC As a result, the appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside. The suit of the plaintiffs/respondents will stand dismissed in respect of plot No. 330/3, while it will go back to the trial Court for a fresh decision in respect of the remaining four plots in the light of our decision that, in case the respondents had acquired Bhumidari rights, they were not D extinguished by any order under section 2J 2A of the Act.\n\nParties will be given an opportunity to give evidence on the question of acquisition of Bhumidari rights by the plaintiffs/ respondents ancl on other issues which have not been decided so far. Costs of this appeal shall abide the result of the suit.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\nL3 Sup Cl168--Jt", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "GRAM SABHA, BESAHANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GRAM SABHA, BESAHANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM RAJ SINGH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM RAJ SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GRAM SABHA, BESAHANI\n\nRAM RAJ SINGH & ORS\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 354, "end_char": 361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Appendix Ill read with Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Aholition and Land Refornis Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538, "end_char": 544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aholition and Land Refornis Rules", "statute": "Aholition and Land Refornis Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aholition and Land Refornis Rules", "statute": "Aholition and Land Refornis Rules"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 922, "end_char": 926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Appendix III read with Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2062, "end_char": 2069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952", "statute": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2338, "end_char": 2345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952", "statute": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Rules 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2627, "end_char": 2634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2671, "end_char": 2678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2750, "end_char": 2757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2866, "end_char": 2872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3369, "end_char": 3376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3825, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agrawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3838, "end_char": 3852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawala, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "E. C. Agrawala"}}, {"text": "P. C. Agrawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3857, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawala, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "E. C. Agrawala"}}, {"text": "B .. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3893, "end_char": 3906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B .. C. Misra and H. K. Puri, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3911, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B .. C. Misra and H. K. 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( 6) Where upon the said hearing the Collctor is satisfied that the person was admitted as a tenure-holder or grove-holder of land referred to in Section 212 or being an intermediary brought such land under his own cultivation or planted a grove thereon on or after the eighth day of Augut, 1946, he shall pass an order for ejectment of the person from the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9974, "end_char": 9978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10798, "end_char": 10808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11138, "end_char": 11144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "and Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11285, "end_char": 11313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 189(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11677, "end_char": 11686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11805, "end_char": 11809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11972, "end_char": 11976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12209, "end_char": 12213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition\n\nand Land Reforms Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12489, "end_char": 12495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13385, "end_char": 13395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 212A(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14715, "end_char": 14725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15468, "end_char": 15478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15777, "end_char": 15782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_862_869_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "FIRM MUKAND LAL \\'EER KUMAR & ANR.\n\nSRI PlJRUSHOTl'A\\'I SINGH & ORS.\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)\n\nPtorincial /11sohency Act (5 of 1920), s. 9(l)(c)-Trv.11sfer of pro. perry by Dl'ed-All<'1-:ed act \"-' insolvcucy-Threr 1non1hs pt'Tiod start.t\n\nw11etlzer frnnz• execution or rl'gistrlltion-Whethcr finn can be adjudicated irnolvent-P<1rtners when can he adjudicated i1no/l•ent.\n\nM a p;.1nncr of. a firn1 cxccurcJ a dccJ of gif1 in Octob.; r, 1957 of a property. \\\\hich v•as not partnl'r.., hip property. rhe deed of gifts v.as rcgi>tcrcd in March 1958.\n\nIn April, lay, 1958 and January 1959, pelirions \\\\'ere tiled alleging thar the firn1 and its l\\l/O p<irlncrs had comn1i1te<l acts of in1, olvcncy <11HI therefore, thl!y shoulU he declared inolvnts. The lo\\\\cr court<; .a<ljudic;11ed lhe firm and rh-~ partner-; insolven!. 'fhl! High C.\"ourr, in revision. confinncd th1.? adjudica1ion of insolvency \\\\'ith rcgan.J\n\nto lhc firn1 and \\I. hut set a.;, idc \\\\'ilh regard 10 the other partner. In 11ppeal to thi_.; Couri it \\\\'3\\ conrendeJ lhJt (i) the siarling point of the three n1onth\"' period prscrihcd under s. 9(i) (c) of the Provincial Jn- .!, Q)vcnc)' Ac1 .... hould he lhc d; ite of execu i0n of the Jeed of gifr and not the date of rcgisrration; (ii) no order of ; tdjudication could be made agains1\n\n;1 firm hut it could only be n1aUc agJin~I the parlners individually; and\n\n(iii) the Jirn1 should no~ have hecn d2clarcU inolvcnt n1ercly because of 1hc deed of g1fl cx, culed hy \\1.\n\nllELD: (il Scciion 49 of the Indian Rcgi!:>lra1ion Act implies thal a do..:umcnt by rc<i<.On of ih c:xecutionalone cannot h; ivc lhc effect of lr'1n.;;- fcrring the properly.\n\nThe deed of gift cxccut-:!d by f\\f, could not be considered 10 he an acr of in:-.olvcncy unless a v<1lid tr<1nsf.!r of properly \\\\'as\n\nn1adc hv I hat Uocun1cn1 and such ;1 valid t r;.insfer could he said to hu\\-e been m; de only when the docun1cnt \\Vas registered. J866 D-FJ\n\n.J.akh111i Cliond v. Kt\\110 R.t1111. 1.L.R. 16 L<1h, 735. Saratl1adu /)h'lJr\"yya' v. K uruba Suhh11n11a, I. L. R. 5 8 \\.fad. J 66 and /)istrilI Bua rd Bij11or\n\nv. A1 uht1111n1t1d A hdul S:do111, I. l. R, J 94 7 AIL 624, approve<l.\n\nU ()11 M~11u1g v. ,\\fa1111,1,• Shwc //paung, A.l.R. 1937 Rangoon 446, <lisapprove<l.\n\n(ii) An ord1r of adjuJicarion could be made againr the firm in rhc prccnt case if the proper condition . .;; \\\\'ere sa1isfied. Seclion 79(2) (c) of the Act provides for rules to he ma<lc bv the High Court as to the procedure to he follo\\1.-'Cd \\\\'h-.!11 :he debtor is a firn1. 'rhis section, therefore. ;1ssumc) rhat ; ut adjudication order can he n1ade under !he Act againsr 1hc firm in the firms name. [~67 G-l~]\n\nJ:'x ptirlt' /llc1i11 (1879)12 Ch. D. 5~2. rcrcrred to.\n\n(iii) Jn order to support an adjudication again5t a firm ihcrl' n1ust be proof thal c;1ch of the partners h;1~ committed some act Of insol\\'cncy. If, ho\"ever, a joint acr ol insohency iS relied upon it must be shoy.n to be the aL\"t of <111 rhe parlnrs. 1\\n or<lcr for adjudication can also be made <1J!ains1 a firn1 if 1hcrc v.--; is an ac 1 of insolvency by an agent of 1he firm \"hich W<tS !luch :is n1us1 ncccs\\arily he in1ru1ed to lhC firm. rh~ cxpla.- n:i!il1n ro s. 6 of the Acr docs nor by do\\\\n !hat an act of insolvency of\n\n• A\n\nII ..\n\nthe agent shall. be attributed to the principal but that it ma~ .. e treated asthc Act of the principal. [868 E, F] ·\n\nrfhe on.Jer of the lower court, so far it adjudicated the registered firm as insolvent. rnut be set aside.\n\nThe property of which M made gift was not a partnership property an<l ther~ was no collective act of insol vcncy allcgc<l on behalf of all the partners <; Jf the firm.\n\nRe : lvlvhanuul Hasan1 & Co. 24 Born. l.R. 861 and Gopal Naidu v.\n\nMohan/al Kan'yafol, LL.R. Mad. 189. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1167 to 1169 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the fµdgment and order dated November 1, 1961 of the Allahabad High Cnurt in Civil Revision Nos. 310 to 312 of 1960.\n\nA. K. Sen and J. P. Goyal, for the appelhmts (in all the appeals).\n\nB. C. Misra, M. V. Goswami and R. H. Dhebar, for rej:lon dcnts Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.As. Nos. 1167 and 116~ of 1965).\n\nS. S. Shukla, for respondent No. 3 (in C.As. Nos. 1167 and 1168of1965) and respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 1169of1965).\n\nB. C. Misra and R. Mahalingier, for respondent No. 1 (ii) to\n\n(v) (in C.A. No. 1169 of 1965).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was q.e}iyered by\n\n' Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Allahabad B:igh Court dated November 1, 1961 in three Civil Revision Applications nos. 310 , o 312 of 1960.\n\nAppeJlant no. 1 is a registered firm of which appellant no. 2.\n\nMukund Lal and respondent no. C/, Ram Surat Misra. are the only two partners. The firm carried on 'Arhat' (Commission Agency) business.\n\nThree petitions µnder the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act V of 1920), hereinafter called the 'Act', were made against the firm and its two partners under s. 7 of the Act. Purushottah1 Singh, respondent no. 1 and Sat Narain Singh, respondent no. 2 filed the first petition (Petition no. 9 of 1958) on April 28, 1958.\n\nThe second petition was filed by Smt. Tara Devi, respondent no. 3 and Shyam Das, respondent no. 4 on May 30, 1958 which was registered as Petition no. 19 of 1958.\n\nThe third petition was filed by Jivenda Mal on January 20. 1959 which was registered as Petition no. 2 of 1959.\n\nIn petition no. 9 of 1958, a sum of Rs. 15,760/- was claimed; in petition no. 19 of 1958, a sum of Rs. 14,545/-was claimed and in petition no. 2 of 1959 a sum oi Rs. 3,884/- was claimed but other creditors also filed their claims to the extent of Rs. 96,000/-.\n\nIn all these petitions it was alleged\n\n864 SUPREME COt:RT REPORTS\n\n[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nthat the firm and its two partners Jiad committed acts of insolvency and therefore they should be declared insolvents. The firm and its partners contested the pctitiiins and asserted that they had already paid a sum of Rs. 3,50.000/- to other crcllitors and they .were in a position to pay all the creditors and had not conunittcJ any acts of insolvency. All the three insolvency petitions wer~ consolidated together and were heard by the Insolvency Judge, Varanasi whQ by his judgment dated August 8, 1959 adjudieatrd the firm .and its two partners as insolvents.\n\nThereafter the firm and its two partners filed three appeals i; nder s. 75 or the Act but all these appeals were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi by his judgment dated February 28, 1960. Thereafter the firm and its two partner> took the matter in revision to th,• Allahabad High Court which partly allowed the revision applications and set aside the order of the lower courts adjudging Ram Surat Misra. respohdent no. 7. one of the partners of the firm a; insolvent.\n\nThe rest of the order declaring the firm and its other partner, Mukand Lal as insolvent was cofinned.\n\nThe main question iO be considered in these appeals is whether the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of his soi;, Veer Kumar on October 3 I, I 951 and registered on March 11.\n\nI 958 could be treated as an Act of insolvency committed withi,, three months of the presentation of the petition.\n\nSecion 6 ( b) or the Act state' : \"6. A debtor commits an act of inso:vency in each of the following cases, namely :-\n\n( b) if, in India or ebewhere, he makes any transfer of his property or of any part thereof with intent to defeat or delay his creditors;\"\n\nSection 9( I) (c) states:\n\n\"9. (I) A creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvecy petition against a debtor unless-\n\n( c) the act of insolvency on which the petition is G grounded has occurre.d within three months before the presentation of the petition :\n\nProvided that where the said period of three months referred to in clause ( c) expires on a day when the Court is closed. the insolvency petition may be presented on the day on which the Court re-opens.\" Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act 4 of 1882) \" to the following effect :\n\nFJRM MUKAND LAL \"· PURUSHOTAM (Ranwswami, !.) 865\n\nA \"Gift is the transfer of certain existing moveable or\n\nimmoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, .called the donor, to another, called the donee, arid accepted by or on behalf of the donee.\n\nSuch acceptance must be made during the life-time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.\n\nIf the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.\"\n\nSection 123 of the Transfer of Property Act states :\n\n\"For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable C property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.\n\nFor the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.\n\nSuch delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered.\" Section 47 of the. Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Act 16 of\n\n1908) is to the following effect :\n\n\"A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operte if no registration thereof bad been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.\" Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act states as follows :\n\n\"No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer o.f Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall- ( a) affect any immoveable prope1iy comprised therein, or\n\n(b) confer any power to adopt, or ( c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such. power. unless it has been registered : Provided .that an unregistered document affecting immoveable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contrct in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 1 882. or as evidence of any collateral\n\n866 ' j•\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S C.R\n\ntransaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.\"\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that under s. 4 7 of the Indian Registration Act a registered document operates from the date of its executirn even though it may require registration and consequently the registration of the document should be taken to. date back to the date of execution by a fiction of law.\n\nIt was therefore submitted that the starting point of the three months' period prescribed under s. 9(1 )(c) of the Act should be the dat~ of execution of the deed of gift and not the date of registration.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nSection 123 of the Transfer of Property Act states that for the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument in the prescribed manner. Under th!s section therefore a gift of immoveable property is not valid unle>' it is effected by a registered instrument. It is true that under s. 47 of the Indian Registration Act once a document is registered the effect begins to commence from the date of execution, but if the document is not registered it can never have any legal effes; t as \" deed of gift.\n\nUnder s. 49 of the Indian Registration Act it is provided that no document required by s. 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to he registered shall affect any immoveable property comprised therein unless it has ben registered. The section necessarily implies that such a document by reason of its execution alone cannot have the effect of transferring the property.\n\nIn the present case, therefore. the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of Veer Kumar dated October 31, 1957 cannot be considered to be an act of in<c.; vency unless a valid transfer of properly was made by that document and such a valid transfer could be said to have been made onlv when the document was registered on March 11, 1958. The question in the present case is nof what was the effect of the registration of the deed of gift, but when did the event take place which effectively transferred the property.\n\nWe are not concerned wit!• the point of time from which the document became operative but with the point of time at which the deed of gift became legnlly effective.\n\nThe contrary viewpoint for which the appellant con tends would ignore the cirrnmstance that if the reistration of the deed of gift was not effected within the period of three months the creditor would be deprived of his remedy of relying upon the act of transfer as constitutin~ an act of insolvency. Such an interpretation should be avotded as it would nullify the intention of the statute.\n\nOn this question there has been divergence of opinion amon~ the various High Courts.\n\nTn Lakhmi Chand v. Kesha Ram ( 1 i\n\n(I) I.LR. 16 Lah, 7)5.\n\n' c\n\nit was held by the Full Bench of Lahore High .Court th11t .when a petition was presented alleging that a debtor had committed an act of insolvency by a regi, stered deed, the period of limitation prescribed by s. 9 (1 )( c) of the Act ran from the date of the registration of the deed and not .from the .date of the execution thereof.\n\nThe same view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Sarvathada Iswarayya v. Kuruba Subbanna('). In that case, the execution of the sale deed waR relied upon as an act of insolvency by a petitioning creditor and it was held by Madhavan Nair and Bardswell, JJ. that the three months' period prescribed by s. 9 (1) ( c) of the Act must be calculated from the date of the registration of the deed and not from the date of its execution.\n\nThe same view was also enunciated by the Allahabad High Court in Dis'lrict Board, Bijnor v. Mohammad Abdul Salam(').\n\nA contrary view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in U On Maung v. Maung Shwe Hpaung( 8 ). It was held that the period of three months referred to in s. 54, Provincial Insolvency Act, began to run from the date of execution of the transfer provided it had been properly registered within the spei fied time..\n\nBut for the rasons already expressed we hold that the decisions in Lakhmi Chand v. Kesho Ram('), in Sarvathada Iswaryya v. Kuruba Subbanna.('). and in' District Board, Bijnor v. Mohammad Abdul Salam('), correctly state the law on the point .\n\nIt was next argued that no order of adjudication could be made against a firm but it can only be made against the partners individually. We are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nIt is true that according to the English law the act o[bankruptcy must be a personal act and no act of bankruptcy could . , be committed by a firm as such, and no adjudication could be made against a firm . in the firm's name.-(See Ex parte Blain)('). But under s. 99 of the PresidenC)'-towns Insolvency\n\nAct (Act III of 1909) an adjudication order may be made. against a firm in the firm's name and such an order operates as if it were an order made against each of the persons who at the date of the order was a partner in the firm.\n\nThere is, however, no provision in the Act corresponding to s. 99 of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act., But s.79(2)'(c) of the Act .provides for rules to be made by 'the High. Court as to the procedure to be followed when the . debtor is' a firm.\n\nThis section therefore assumes that an adjudication order can be made under ihe Act against the firm in the firm's name. Rules have been made under this section by th<:l Allahabad. High Court'. Reference was made H on behalf of the respondents to Rle 26 which states :. ·\n\n{!) I.L.R. SB Mad.166. . (>) A.J.R. 1937 Rangoon 446.\n\n(5) (1879) 12 Ch. D. 522-.\n\n__ ._..\n\n(2) I.)'.,.il, )947 Alt. 624.\n\n(4) LL.Rd6 Lah.'735 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\n\"26. An adjudication order made against a firm shall operate as if it were an adjudication order made against each of the persons who at the date of the order is a partner in that firm.\"\n\nIt is manifest that an order of a\"djudication could be made against the firm 1n the present case if the proper conditions were satisfied.\n\nWe therefore reject the argument of the appellants on this aspect of the case.\n\nJ, was further contended on behalf of the appellants that there is no finding of any of the couns to the effect that the firm commilted any act of insolvency.\n\nThe allegation of the respondents was that appellant no. 2 transferred to his son.\n\nVeer Kumar his personal house property by way of a gift deed dated October 31. 1957 and this was done by him with the intent to defeat or delay his creditors.\n\nIt was pointed out that Ram Surat Misra was adjudged nor to be insolvent by the High Court on the ground that there WJs no allegation against him of any act of insolvency.\n\nIt was therefore contended that the firm should not have been declared insolvent merely because of the deed of gift executed by appellant no. 2, Mukand Lal.\n\nIn our opinion, this argument is well-founded and must be accepted as correct.\n\nWe think that in order to support an adjudication against a firm there must be proof that each of the partn.rs has committed some act of insolvency.\n\nIf, however, a joint act of insolvency is relied upon it must be shown to be the act of all the partners.\n\nAn order for adjudication can also be made against a firm if there was an act of insolvency by an agent of the firm which was such as must necessarily be imputed to the firm.\n\nThe Explanation to s. 6 of the Act says \"for the purpose of this section the act of the agent may be the act of the principal\".\n\nThe Explanation does not lay down that an act of insolvency of the agent shall be attributed to the principal but that it may be treated as the act of the principal.\n\nSection 2 (a) of the Indian Partnership Act (Act IX of 1932) defines 'an act of a firm' to mean \"any act or omission by all the partners, or by any partner or agent of the firm which gives rise to a right enforceable by or against the firm\".\n\nThe effect of this section read with the Explanation to s. 6 of the Act appears to be that the question whether an act of insolvency of one or more partners can be regarded as an act of all the partners is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.\n\nFor instance, In Re Mohomed Hasham & Co.(') one of the partners in a firm consisting of two parnters departed from the usual place of business with intent to delay and defeat the creditors of the firm.\n\nIt was held by the Bombay\n\n(ll 24 Hom. LR. 86).\n\n' c\n\nHigh Court that an adjudication order could not be made against the firm in such a case unless the other partner had also departed with like intent.\n\nSimilarly, in Gopal Naidu v.\n\nMohan/al Kanya/al ( 1 ) it was held by the Madras High Court that it is a question of fact whether the aq of one partner in closing the business of the firm and thus committing an act of insolvency so far as he is conce1 ned was imputable to another partner so as to entitle the creditors of the firm to get the other also adjudicated an insolvent.\n\nIn the circumstances of that particular case it was held that the mere fact of closing the firm by one partner without more evidence to show that the other either expressly or impliedly authorized the same was insufficient to lead to such imputation.\n\nIn the present case, the property of which Mukand Lal made a gift to Veer Kumar was not partnership property and the.re was no collective act of insolvency alleged on behalf of. all the partn.ers of the firm.\n\nIn the circumstances of the present case it cannot also be held that the act of insolvency committed by Mukand Lal should be attributed to Ram Surat Misra.\n\nThe High Court has, in fact, allowed the appeal of Ram Surat Misra and set aside the order of the lower courts declaring him as insolvent.\n\nWe are consequently of opinion that the order of the lower courts, so far as it adjudicates the registered firm as insolvent, should be set aside, but the rest of the order of the lower courts declaring Mukand Lal as insolvent will stand.\n\nSubject to this modification these appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of this Court.\n\nY.P .\n\n(I) J. L. R. 49 Mad. 189.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n' \\", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "FIRM MUKAND LAL \\'EER KUMAR & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FIRM MUKAND LAL VEER KUMAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 9(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1134, "end_char": 1141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and J. P. Goyal, for the appelhmts (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and J. P. Goyal, for the appelhmts (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, M. V. Goswami and R. H. Dhebar, for rej:lon dcnts Nos."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, M. V. Goswami and R. H. Dhebar, for rej:lon dcnts Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, M. V. Goswami and R. H. Dhebar, for rej:lon dcnts Nos."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Shukla, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Mahalingier", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra and R. Mahalingier, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was q.e}iyered by\n\n' Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Allahabad B:igh Court dated November 1, 1961 in three Civil Revision Applications nos."}}, {"text": "Allahabad B:igh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was q.e}iyered by\n\n' Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Allahabad B:igh Court dated November 1, 1961 in three Civil Revision Applications nos."}}, {"text": "Mukund Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukund Lal and respondent no.", "canonical_name": "Mukund Lal"}}, {"text": "Ram Surat Misra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4772, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C/, Ram Surat Misra.", "canonical_name": "Ram Surat Misra"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purushottah1 Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottah1 Singh, respondent no."}}, {"text": "Sat Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5086, "end_char": 5102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and Sat Narain Singh, respondent no."}}, {"text": "April 28, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5174, "end_char": 5188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 of 1958) on April 28, 1958."}}, {"text": "Tara Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tara Devi, respondent no."}}, {"text": "Shyam Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5261, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and Shyam Das, respondent no."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 on May 30, 1958 which was registered as Petition no."}}, {"text": "Jivenda Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5387, "end_char": 5398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third petition was filed by Jivenda Mal on January 20."}}, {"text": "January 20. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third petition was filed by Jivenda Mal on January 20."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the three insolvency petitions wer~ consolidated together and were heard by the Insolvency Judge, Varanasi whQ by his judgment dated August 8, 1959 adjudieatrd the firm .and its two partners as insolvents."}}, {"text": "s. 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Varanasi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6511, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the firm and its two partners filed three appeals i; nder s. 75 or the Act but all these appeals were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi by his judgment dated February 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6569, "end_char": 6586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the firm and its two partners filed three appeals i; nder s. 75 or the Act but all these appeals were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi by his judgment dated February 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6665, "end_char": 6685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the firm and its two partner> took the matter in revision to th,• Allahabad High Court which partly allowed the revision applications and set aside the order of the lower courts adjudging Ram Surat Misra."}}, {"text": "Ram Surat Misra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6787, "end_char": 6802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the firm and its two partner> took the matter in revision to th,• Allahabad High Court which partly allowed the revision applications and set aside the order of the lower courts adjudging Ram Surat Misra.", "canonical_name": "Ram Surat Misra"}}, {"text": "Mukand Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest of the order declaring the firm and its other partner, Mukand Lal as insolvent was cofinned.", "canonical_name": "Mukund Lal"}}, {"text": "Veer Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7098, "end_char": 7108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main question iO be considered in these appeals is whether the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of his soi;, Veer Kumar on October 3 I, I 951 and registered on March 11."}}, {"text": "October 3 I, I 951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7112, "end_char": 7130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main question iO be considered in these appeals is whether the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of his soi;, Veer Kumar on October 3 I, I 951 and registered on March 11."}}, {"text": "March 11.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main question iO be considered in these appeals is whether the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of his soi;, Veer Kumar on October 3 I, I 951 and registered on March 11."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7407, "end_char": 7412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A debtor commits an act of inso:vency in each of the following cases, namely :-\n\n( b) if, in India or ebewhere, he makes any transfer of his property or of any part thereof with intent to defeat or delay his creditors;\"\n\nSection 9( I) (c) states:\n\n\"9. ("}}, {"text": "Section 9( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 122", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8049, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "FJRM MUKAND LAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8095, "end_char": 8110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act 4 of 1882) \" to the following effect :\n\nFJRM MUKAND LAL \"· PURUSHOTAM (Ranwswami, !.)"}}, {"text": "Ranwswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act 4 of 1882) \" to the following effect :\n\nFJRM MUKAND LAL \"· PURUSHOTAM (Ranwswami, !.)"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8557, "end_char": 8581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9017, "end_char": 9027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9036, "end_char": 9065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1908", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9349, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9396, "end_char": 9406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act, 1908", "statute": "Indian Registration Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9447, "end_char": 9465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9806, "end_char": 9847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9948, "end_char": 9991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10062, "end_char": 10073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or as evidence of any collateral\n\n866 ' j•\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S C.R\n\ntransaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.\""}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10321, "end_char": 10325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10342, "end_char": 10358, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9(1 )(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10864, "end_char": 10888, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11184, "end_char": 11189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11204, "end_char": 11220, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11410, "end_char": 11415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11430, "end_char": 11446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11491, "end_char": 11496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11524, "end_char": 11554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11900, "end_char": 11916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of Veer Kumar dated October 31, 1957 cannot be considered to be an act of in<c.; vency unless a valid transfer of properly was made by that document and such a valid transfer could be said to have been made onlv when the document was registered on March 11, 1958."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12128, "end_char": 12142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lal in favour of Veer Kumar dated October 31, 1957 cannot be considered to be an act of in<c.; vency unless a valid transfer of properly was made by that document and such a valid transfer could be said to have been made onlv when the document was registered on March 11, 1958."}}, {"text": "Lahore High .Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' c\n\nit was held by the Full Bench of Lahore High .Court th11t .when a petition was presented alleging that a debtor had committed an act of insolvency by a regi, stered deed, the period of limitation prescribed by s. 9 (1 )( c) of the Act ran from the date of the registration of the deed and not .from the .date of the execution thereof."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13244, "end_char": 13248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Sarvathada Iswarayya v. Kuruba Subbanna(')."}}, {"text": "Madhavan Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13600, "end_char": 13613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the execution of the sale deed waR relied upon as an act of insolvency by a petitioning creditor and it was held by Madhavan Nair and Bardswell, JJ."}}, {"text": "Bardswell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the execution of the sale deed waR relied upon as an act of insolvency by a petitioning creditor and it was held by Madhavan Nair and Bardswell, JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rangoon High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13982, "end_char": 14000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A contrary view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in U On Maung v. Maung Shwe Hpaung( 8 )."}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14101, "end_char": 14106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14108, "end_char": 14133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14954, "end_char": 14959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "statute": "Provincial Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15288, "end_char": 15293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.79(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15338, "end_char": 15345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 31. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16656, "end_char": 16672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veer Kumar his personal house property by way of a gift deed dated October 31."}}, {"text": "Ram Surat Misra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that Ram Surat Misra was adjudged nor to be insolvent by the High Court on the ground that there WJs no allegation against him of any act of insolvency.", "canonical_name": "Ram Surat Misra"}}, {"text": "Mukand Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17067, "end_char": 17077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Mukand Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mukund Lal"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17612, "end_char": 17616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17889, "end_char": 17898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17910, "end_char": 17932, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18188, "end_char": 18192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_870_880_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "BIRENDR, A PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nGULWANT SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nJan11ary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] B\n\nU.P. Znmi11dari Abolition & Reforms Act, 1950, s. 19(vii)-person in possession of lane/ heco11Jing a Sirdt1r by vir1ue of being subtenc'1t undt: s. 47( 4) of U.P. Tenancy Ac1, 1939-req11iremen1s for-Suh./ense signed prinr In coming inin force of s. 295A of I 939 Act but to take efJect .o; ubsequently-if .s. 295A applicahlt'--Duration of lease mentioning no fixed period-pri11rioles for de1erfni11ing.\n\nP held the ex-proprietary tenancy of certain lands and, on the 5th\n\nJur.~. 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants which laid down that !he tenancy \\.•/as to con1mencc from lst Ju:y, 1947 an~ which was regislered on the 22nd June.\n\nOn 15th January, 1951. P surrendered his tenancy rights to th.! landlord who in turn. executed a Jeruje in respect of !he land in favour of the rrspondcn's.\n\nThe appellants ho\\\\evcr con1inucd in possession. l\"hc lJ.P. Zan1indari Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act. I 950 came into force on I st July, 1952 and both the appellants as well\n\ns the rc!<ipond.::nts claimed to have become Sirdars of the land under the Act.\n\nThe appellant.s instiluled 'a suit for a doclaration that they had be come Sirdars of the land under s. 19(vii) by virtue of being suh-tenants within the meaning nf s. 47(4) of the U.P. Tenancy Act.\n\n1939. The rrial Court decreed the st.:it in the appcllan~· 'favour but a Division Bench of the High Court et asid~ the decree.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it \\\\'as contended, inter alia, on behalf of the appellants that although P had suuendered his rights as ex-proprietary tenant on I 5th January. 1951, their own sub-tenancy continued by virtue of the provisions of s. 295A of the Tenancy Ac! which was introduced into that Act by the amendment Act X of 1947 that came into force on the 14th June. I 947; it was cla'med that s. 295A became applicable to the appellants becaus! a suh-Jease in their favour was executed on 5th June. 1947. prior to the enforcement of Act X of !947 so that on the da'e of commencen1ent of this Act the appell1nts continued to be the subtenants under s. 295A; ii was further contended that though the sub-lease in favour of the appellants \\\\-as not for any fixed tcrn1 mentioned in the .sublease itself. it should be held from the surrouhding facts and circumslanccs that the sub-lease was for a period of five y-ars as. under the Tenancy Act. an ex-proprietary tenant could sublet hie:; holding for a period not\n\ncxc-:!edin~ 5 vears ..\n\nHELD: The appellants' possession subsequent to 30th June. 1951 could not be held lo be in pursuance of a right confrred. on a sub-tenant\n\nhy ' 47(4) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and consequently. the land was not held by the appellants in the capacity mentioned in s. I9(vii) of the\n\nU.P. Zan1indari 'Abolition and Land Ref0rn1'i Acl. 1950.\n\n(i) \"rhe appellants \\Vere not suh-tenants on 14t!i June. 1947 which was\n\nthe date of commencement of the U.P. AC'! X of !947 and. therefore, H s. 295A of the Tenancy Act never becnme applicable to their case.\n\nThe sub-leac; e clearly laid down that the suh-lenancy was to commence from 1st July. 1947 which was a date subseQuent to 14th June, 1947.\n\nThe\n\nI '\n\nc •\n\nBIRENDRA v. GULWANT 871\n\nmere fact that the sub-lease was executed on 5th June, 1947 by P could not mean that the appellants' sub-lease was with effect from that date.\n\n~{ere delivery of the leas-e and its counter-part by one party to the other as envisaged under s. 55(1) of the Tenancy Act does not make the lessee under th:: lease a lessee fron1 the date of delivery of the written documents nor is any such principle laid down in s 55(1 ). Fu'rthermore it was in any case not shown. on the facts, such delivery had taken place prior to 14th June, 1947. [874 G-HJ\n\n(ii) Nothing in the conduct of the parties had been brought on record to show that the sub-lease was intended to remain effective for a period of 5 years and on the facts of •he case the sub-lease must be. held to be from year to year and the appellants' rights determined accordingly.\n\nMohd. Sher Khan & Anr. v. Sp<cia/ Manager, Court of Wards, Mahewa Estate and Or.t. 1950 A.W.R. 447; distinguished.\n\nSurendra Ktonar Sen Chaudhury & Ors. v. Chandratara Na:h & Ors., A.LR. 1931, Cal. 135 and Janaki Nath Roy and Ors. v. Dina Nat/1 K11nd11 & Ors., A.LR. 1931 P.C. 207; referred to.\n\nThe appellants had obtained the. sub-lease with effect from !st July, 1947, and were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the 30th June, 1948: but, if they were. allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expiring on 30th June, 1949, and so on from year to year.\n\nSince the appellants were allowed by P to continue in possession after !st July 1950, they were sub-tenants of P under the sub-lease. and were entitled to continue in possession upto 30th June, 1951.\n\nBut on 15th January. 1951, P lost his right as chief-tenant and the effect of s. 47(1) of the Tenancy Act was that, with effect from that date, the rights of the appellants as sub-tenants of P became extinguished. Their pbssession after that date could no longer be he.Id to be in the capacity of sub-tenants of P bu' was under a legal right which accrued to them under s. 47(4).\n\nThis is a limited right to continue in possession for \\the remainder of the term of the sub-lease or for five years whichever period may be shorter.\n\nIn the present case, the right granted by s. 47(4) to the appellants could be exercised by them only upto 30th June, 1951. [879 C-FJ\n\nUtility Articles Man11fact11ring Co. v. Raja Balwdur Motilal Bomha..v Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1943 Born. 306 and Queen'.< Club Gorden.< Estate Ltd.\n\nv. Bignell, [1924] 1 K.B.D. 117; referred to.\n\nThere was no force in the cont<ntion that when the appellants continued in possession of the disputed land after 30th June, 1951, they did so in exercise of the same right whica they possessed on 30th June, 1951, as that right was not extinguished by eviction from the land. The right under s. 47(4) is granted by the statute itself for a limited period, and, once that period expires, it cannot 1>e held. that the, right continues tbereafter. There is no require.ment in law that. after the expiry of that period. there must be eviction from the land in order to extinguish the right granted by s. 47(4), [880 D-E] Ram Dular Singh and Another v. Babu Sukhu Ram & Ors; 1963 Alld.\n\nL.J. 667; dist; nguished. ' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 619 of 1965.\n\n H Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 17, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Special Appeal, No. 76 of 1961.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nGopalji Mehro1ra, S. S. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellants.\n\nJagdish Swamp and J. P. Goyal: for respondents Nos. I to 4.\n\nTh~ Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The disputed land was the ex-proprietary tenancy of one Parmeshwar Singh who, on the 5th June, 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants on an annual rent of Rs. 74.\n\nThe sub-lease was registered. on 22nd June, 1947.\n\nIt laid down that the tenancy was to commence from the beginning of the year 1355 Fasli, i.e., with effect .from I st July, 194 7.\n\nIn pursuance of this sub-lease, the appellants entered into possession.\n\nOn 15th January, 1951, Parmeshwar Singh, the ex-proprietary tenant, surrendered his tenancy rJ'ghts to the landlord and on the same date the landlord executed a Jesse in respect of this land in favou:· of the 1espondents.\n\nThe appellants, however, continued to remain in possession.\n\nThcreafte~. on !st July, 1952, the U.P.\n\nZamindari Abolition and Land Refonns Act, 1950 (No. I o!\n\n1951) (hereinafter referred to as \"ihe Act\") came into force.\n\nDisputes arose between the appellants and the respondents who both claimed to hawe become Sirdars of this land and, consequently, on I st August, 1952, the appellants instituted a suit for a declaration that thy were the Sirdars of the disputed land.\n\nThey also prayed for an injunction restraining the respo11.dents\n\nfrom interfering with the possession of the appellants.\n\nIn the alternative, a prayer was also made for a decree for possession, in case it was found that the appellants had been disposses.sed.\n\nThe Munsif. who tried the suit, held that the appellant< had become Sirdars under section I 9(vii) of the Act and, consequently, decreecl the suit.\n\nThe decree was aflinned by the first appellate Court as well as by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in second appeal.\n\nA special appeal to a Division Bench was taken up by the respondents with the leave of the single Judge.\n\nIn this special appeal, the High Court held that the appellants did not become Sirdars of this land when the Act came into force and, consequently, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the appellants.\n\nThe appellants have now come up to this Court against thLs decree of the High Court under special leave gran!ed. by this Court.\n\nThe appellants claimed to have become Sirdars of this land under s. 191vii) of the Act which is as follows :-·\n\n\"19. All land held or deemed to have been held on the date immediately preceding tl\\e date of vesting by any person as-\n\nBIRENDRA v. GVLWANT (Bhargava, !.) 873\n\n(vii) a sub-tenant referred to in .sub>-section ( 4) of\n\nsection 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939,\n\n.· shall, save in cases provided for in clause ( d) of sub section ( 1) of sec: ion 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person, who shall subject to the provisions of this Act be entitled, except as provided in sub-section (2) of section 18, to take or retain possession as a sirdar thereof.\"\n\nIn order to substantiate this claim, the appellants thus had to prove that this land was held or must be deemed to have been held by them on ihe 30th June, 1952 as sub-tenants referred to in sub-section (4) of s. 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Tenancy Act\"). The question arose, because the appellants were holding as sub, tenanui from Parmeshwar Singh who surrendered his rights as chief tenant on the 15th January, 1951, before the relevant date mentioned ins. 19(vii) of the Act.\n\nSection 47(1) of the Tenancy Act lays down that, except as otherwise provided in sub-section ( 3) and sub-section ( 4), the extinction of the interest of a tenant, other than a permanent tenure-liolder or a iixed 'ate tenant, shall operate to extinguish the interest of ''\"Y knant holding under him.\n\nThis sub-section when applied to the cas~ of the appellants, ignoring the exceptions laid down in it, necessarily leads to the conclusion that. wh.n Parmeshwar Singh 0n 15th January, 1951 surrendered his rights as ex-proprietary tenant, the interest of the appellants, who were holding as sub -tenants under him, came to be extinguished.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants, however, it was urged that there are two grounds for holding that their interest was not extinguished and we proceed to examine these contentions.\n\nThe first ground, on which the continuance of subtenancy. even after the surrender by Panneshwar Singh, is claimed by the appellants, is based on the provisions of section 295A of the Tenancy Act which was introduced in that Act by section 26 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 and which reads as follows :-\n\n\"295-A. Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary or anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force every person who on the date of the commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, is a sub-tenant shall, subject to th~ provisions of the proviso to sub-section (3) of\n\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nsection 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, I 94 7. be e:1?itled lo retain possession of his holding for a period of live years from that date, and for this period nothing in sub-section (2) of section 44 or section 171 shall render the landholder of such subtenant liable to ejectment under the provisions of section 171 :\n\nProvided ........................ \"\n\nThe United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 came into force on the 14th June. 1947, and it is urged that s. 295A of the Tenancy Act becomes applicable to the ap!Jellants.\n\nbecause the sub-lease in their favour was executed on 5th June. 194 7, prior to the enforcement of that Amendment Act.\n\nIt is urged that, on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act, the appellants were sub-tenants of this laud. This plea fails, because we are unable to accept the submission that the appellants were sub-tenants of this land on 14th June, 1947. The sub-leas~\n\nin plain terms lays down that the sub-tenancy is to commerce from the beginning of 1355 Fasli, i.e., with effect from !st July.\n\nI 947. which is a date subsequent to 14th June, I 947. The mere fact that the sub-lease wa' e:-ecuted on 5th June, 1947 by Parmeshwar Singh cannot make the appellants sub-lessees with elfet from\n\nthat date when the sub-lease itself laid down that it was to commence from the beginning of 1355 Fasli.\n\nLearned counsel appearing on heh:ilf '1f the appellants. however, relied on sub-section ( 1) of s. 55 of the Tenancy Act which is as follows :-\n\n\"On admissio~ to a holding the tenant is enti!l•'.! to recciw from his landholder a written lease consistent with the provisions of this Act and the landholder upon delivering or tendering to a tenant such a lease is entitled to receive from him a counterpart thereof.\" Jn this case, there is no doubt that a written lease consistent with the provisicns of the Tenancy Act was executed together with a counterpart thereof on the 5th June, 1947; and learned counsel's argument was that this lease and the counterpart having been delivered in accordance with this provision on 5th June, 1947, it should be deemed that the appellants became tenants with effect from that very date.\n\nThe argument fails for two reasons.\n\nOne is that the mere delivery of the lease and the counterpart by one party to the other does not make the lessee under the lease a lessee from the date of delivery of the written documents, nor is any such principle laid down is sec. 55 (I). The rights under the lease can only arise in accordance with the terms of the lease.\n\nJn the present case. the terms of th~ sub-lease themselves laid down tha the appellants were to he sub-lessees irom !st July, 1947, and. consequenlly, the mere delivery of the documents could not brin_g\n\nBIRENDRA v. GULWANT (Bhargava, J.) 875\n\ninto existence the relationship of lessor and lessee from an earlier date.\n\nThe second reason is that, even on facts, there is nothing to show that the written lease and its counterpart were actually delivered by one party to the other on the 5th June, 194 7.\n\nOn the other hand there is material on the record which makes it clear that there could not possibly have been such delivery of the written documents prior to 14th June, 1947.\n\nThe sub-lease itself shows. that it was registered on 22nd June, 1947.\n\nThe sub-lease was not valid and effective until it was registered.\n\nThis registration was required under s. 56 of the Tenancy Act which lays down that a lease for a period exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made by a registered instrument only.\n\nThe appellants themselves came forward with the case that this was not a lease for a period not exceeding one year, so that the lease to be valid had to be registered in accordance with s. 56 of the Tenancl! Act.\n\nThe registration took place on 22nd June, 1947 and it is, therefore, clear that the written lease properly executed and ell'ective could not have been delivered by Panueshwar Singh to the appellants before 22nd June, 1947.\n\nConsequently, even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted, though we consider that it is entirely wrong, that on delivey of the written lease under s. 55 the rights as a lessee commence, such rights as sub-lessees in favour of the appellants could not arise before 22nd June, 1947, as there could not possibly be delivery of the written lease to the appellants by Panneshwar Singh prior to that date.\n\nIn these circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the appellants were not subtenants on 14th June, 1947, which was the date of commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 194 7 and, therefore, section 295-A of the Tenancy Act never became applicable to the case of the appellants.\n\nThe applicability of s. 19(vii) of the Act was claimed, in the alternative, on .the ground that the appellants were holding this land as sub-tenants referred to in s. 4 7 ( 4) of the Tenancv Act.\n\nThe case put forward on behalf of the appellants was that the sub-ledse in. their favour by Parmeshwar Singh was not for any fixed term mentioned in the sub-lease itself, but from the surrounding facts and Circumstances it should be held that it was a-sublease for a period of five years. The appellate Bench of the High Court, in deciding the case against the appellants, has held that the sub-lease was a lease from year to year and not for a period of live years as contended on behalf of the appellants. The term of five years as the period of sub-lease was claimed on the basis that, under the Tenancy Act, an ex-proprietary tenant could sublet his holding for a period not exceeding five years and any sub-lease for a period exceeding five years would be invalid. The argument was that when Parmeshwar Singh sublet his ex-proprietary holding to the appellants without mentioning any period, it must be inferred that he intended it to be a sub-lease for the full period of\n\n876 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[19681 2 S.C.R.\n\nfive years for which he was entitled to sublet his holding.\n\nWe do not think that this argument can he accepted.\n\nIf Parmeshwar Singh had intended to sublet the land for a priod of five years only, or for a period less than five years, there was no difficulty in his making a mention of that period in the suh-lease itself.\n\nParmeshwar Sinh chose not to mention any period at all and. consequently, this sub-lease cannot be held to be a lease for any fixed period.\n\nThe sub-lease reserves an annual rent, and the period of the lease has to be determined on the basis of this rr.sr vation of rent.\n\nWe are unable to find any reasons in support of the plea put forward on behalf of the dppellants that the term of the sub-lease should Le held to be five years simply because no period at all was mentioued in the sub-lease itself.\n\nNo principle of law could be cited on behalf of the appellants in support of this plea.\n\nReliance was placed on a decision of a learned single Judge of the A!lahabad High Court in Mohd. Ser Khan and Another v.\n\nSpecial Manager Courr of Wards, Mahewa Estate and Others( 1 ).\n\nIn !hat case, d:aling with an agricultur'11 lease in which no period was specified and there was only a mention of the date fwm which the lease was :o begin, it was held that the lease required registration as it could not 1'e treated as a lease for a period of one year only.\n\nThis proposition may be correct; but it docs not assist tilt appellants in urgin~ that the period must be held .to be five years.\n\nIt is true that, where the terms of a !case are not free from ambiguity, it is permissible to take into consideration the conduct of the parties for the purpose of determining its true nature, as held by the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Kumar Sen Choudhury and , Others v. Chandratara Nath and Others('). But, in the present case, nothing in the conduct of the parties has been brought on record to show that the sub-lease was intended to remain effective for a period of five years only.\n\nThe sub-lease. as we have mentioned earlier, did not specify any term, but reserved an annual rent.\n\nSuch a lease can only be held to be either a permanent lease or a lease from year to year.\n\nThis proposition was clearly laid down by the Privy Council in Janaki Nath Roy and Others v. Dina Nath K1111du and Others('). fn that case, their Lordships were concerned with a lease which was described as \"beymeyadi\".\n\nUpon a careful consideration of the document of lease, their Lordships held :-\n\n\"Either the lease is a permanent lease, determinable only in the special cases therein provided, or it is a lease from year to year, which the landlord could at his will determine by a six months' notice.\n\nNo intermediate position is open.\"\n\n(l) tQ50 ,\\W.R. 447. (')A.LR. t9)1 Cal. l.'5.\n\n(3) At.R. !Y.11 P.C 2G7.\n\n.· A\n\nBIRllND!lA v. GULWANT (Bhargava, J.) 871\n\nThe principle laid down, thus, categorically excludes an interpretation being put on such a lease by which the lease may be held to be for a fixed period.\n\nThe only interpretation possible is that either it is a permanent lease, or a lease from year to year.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the appellants that this Court should hold the present sub-lease in favour of the appellants to be for a fixed term of five years must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nSince the appellants themselves do not contend that this sub-lease should be held to be a permanent one because, in that case, it would become invalid, the conclusion necessarily follows that the sub-lease must be held to be from year to year, and it is on this basis that the rights of the appellants shou\\d be determined.\n\nCounsel appearing on behalf of the appellants argued that, even if it be held \\hat the sub-lease is Aot for a fixed term of five years but is one from year to year, the appellants can still justifiably claim that they were holding the land on 30th June, 19S2 as sub-tenants referred to in s. 4 7 ( 4) of the Tenancy Act. In order to test this argument, we have first to consider the status of the appel!ants on 15th January, 1951, the date when their chief tenant Parmeshwar Singh surrendered his rights, and the effect of that surrender on the rights of the appellants. It is true, as urged by learned counsel, that there is a distinction between a lease from year to year and a lease for a fixed period of one year .only. The sub-lease in favour of the appellants was not for a fixed period of one year.\n\nBeing a sub-lease from year to year, the right of the appellants acquired under it was to hold the land as 5ub-lessees year after year as those years commenced. The true nature of such a lease was explained by the Bombay High Court in Utility Articles Manufacturing Co. v. Raja Bahadur Motilal Bombay Mills\n\nLtd.('), though with reference to a monthly lease. In order to explain the incidence of such a lease, that Court relied on the judgment of Salter, J. in Queen's Club Gardens Estate, Ltd. v.\n\nBignell('), whq was dealing with a case where the parties, by agreement between them, had expressed the intention that the tenancy shall be a periodic tenancy, viz., a tenancy from week to week and beyond this, no further or other intention could be gathered either from the words or the conduct of the parties.\n\nSalter, J. held that \"in the case of all periodic tenancies, whether from year to year, or from quarter to quarter, or from month lo month, or for any otherperiod, the law, as I find it stated in the authorities, appears to be that the tenancy is from perio~ period, from one fixed date to another.\n\nIt is a tenancy for so many years, or quarters, or months, or weeks, as the parties may think fit. If a new period be allowed to begin, the tenancy must, in the absence of course of any other arrangement between the parties, continue until the period ends, and neither party can, against the will of\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1943 Born. 306.\n\n(2) [1924] I K.B.D. 117.\n\nLJSup.Cl/68-12\n\n878 SUPIU!MB OOU1T IU!POllTS\n\n[!968] 2 $.C.R.\n\nthe other, put an end to the tenancy during the currency of the period.\" In that case, the principle was further explained by approving the following dictum :-\n\n\"It seems clear that the true nature of such a tenancy is that it is a lease for two years certain, and that every year after it is a springing interest arising upon the first contract and parcel of it, so that if the lessee occupies for a number of years, these years by computation from the time past, make an entire lease for so many years, and that after the commencement of each new year it becomes an entire lease certain for the years past and also for the year so entered on, and that it is not a reletting at the commencement of the third and subsequent years.\"\n\nIn our opinion, this is the correct principle to be applied in giving effect to a lease from year to year. In the present C:ISe, the appellants had obtained this sub-lease with effect from lst July, 1947 and, as we have held earlier, it was a sub-lease from year .o year.\n\nOn 1st July, 1947, therefore, the appellants were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the\n\n30th June, 1948; but, if they were allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expirinJ? on 30th June, 1949. During that year, therefore, the sub-lease would be held to be a sub-lease for two years.\n\nSimilarly, since the appellants were allowed to continue by Parmeshwar Singh in possession until 15th Jan11ary, 1951. it must be held. that under that same sub-lease, the appellants were sub-lessees for the subsequent years 1949-50 and 1950-51 also.\n\nOn 15th January, 1951, consequently, the appellants were subtenants of Parrneshwar Singh under this sub-lease and their term was to continue up to 30th June, 1951. On 15th January, 1951, Parrneshwar Singh lost his right as chief-tenant and the effect of s. 4 7 ( 1) of the Tenancy Act was that, with effect from that date, the rights of the appellants as sub-tenants of Parrneshwar Singh became extinguished.\n\nThe sub-lease in favour of the appellants terminated on that date.\n\nThe appellants continued to remain in possession even after 15th January, 1951, but that possession could no longer be held to be in the capacity of sub-tenants of Parmeshwar Singh. The subsequent possession was, however, under a legal right and that right accrued to the appellants under su~. ( 4) of section 47 which is as follows :-\n\n\"Where, at the time of the extinction by surrender or abandonment, or by death without any heir entitled to inherit such interest, of the interest in a holding of a tenant other than a permanent tenure-holder or fixedrate tenant, there is in existence a valid sub-lease of the\n\nH •\n\nBIRBNDRA v. GULWANT (Bhargava, 1.) 879\n\nwhole or of a portion of the holding, executed on or after the first day of January, 1902, all covenants, binding and enforceable as between the tenant and the subtenant shall, subject to 'the provisions of sub-s. ( 5), be binding and enforceable as between the tenant's landholder and the sub-tenant for the remainder of the term of the llUb-lease or for five years, whichever period may be shorter.\"\n\nThis sub-section does not lay down that the original sub-lease executed by the chief tenant, who surrenders his riglits, is to continue in force. What this provision does is to create a new right in the sub-tenant and that is the limited right to continue in possession for the remainder of the term of the sub-lease or for five years whichever period may be shorter.\n\nDuring this period when the sub-tenant of the chief tenant, who has surrendered his rights, is entitled to remain in possession, he .is allowed the benefit of all covenants between him and the chief tenant and to treat them as . binding and enforceable between him and his chief tenant's landholder, subject to the slight modification in special cases governed by sub-section ( 5) of s. 4 7 when he is required , to pay to the land-holder the rent which was payable by the chief tenant in case it happens to be more than the rent which was payable by him a5 sub-tenant to his chief tenant. This special right granted by s. 47 ( 4) is exercisable for the limited term mentioped therein.\n\nWhere the remaining term of a sub-lease is more than five years, this right would be exercisable for five years; but, where the remaining period of a sub-lease is less than five years, the right would be exercisable only for the remainder of the term of the sub-lease.\n\nIn the present case, we have already held above that, on 15th ianuary, 19 51, the appellants were holding the land under a sub; lease under which they were entitled to continue as sub-tenants up to 30th June, 1951. Consequently, the right gra!lted bys. 47(4) to the appellants could be exercised by them ,. tly up to 30th June,\n\n1951. No such right could remain vested in them subsequent to that date.\n\nWe are unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that it should be held that this right granted by s. 47 ( 4) would again accrue to the appellants on 1st July, 1951 in accordance with the terms of the sub-lease, because the sub-lease in their favour was from year to year. We have already mentioned earlier that the effect of s. 4 7 ( 1) of the Tenancy Act was that that sub-lease was extinguished and no accrual of a fresh right with reference to that sub-lease could be claimed thereafter.\n\nThe right that accrued under s. 47 ( 4) was no longer in the same terms as the right under the sub-lease and was only limited to the period during which that sub-lease was to remain effective on the date when s. 4 7 ( 1) and s. 4 7 ( 4) became applicable. On that L3Sup.CI/68-l3\n\n880 SUPREME COURT IU!POllTS [1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\ndate, the remaining term of the sub-lease was up to 30th June, 1951, so that the right that accrued unJer s. 47 ( 4) was limited up to 30th June, 1951 only and it could not arise afresh on !st July, 1951 as it was not a recurring right like that of a sub-tenant holding under a sub-lease from year to year.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants, relying on a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Dular Singh and A1101her v. Babu Sukhu Ram & Others( 1 ) urged that in any case, we should hold that, when the appellants continued in posse; sion of the disputed land after 30th June, 1951, they did so in exercise of the same right which they possessed on 30th June, 1951, as that right was not extinguished by their eviction from the land.\n\nThe principle laid down by the Allahabad High Court in that case does not apply, because the decision in tat case depended on the circumstance that, under the Tenancy Act, the rights of a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of the period of lease did not extinguished under sections 45 or 47 of the T nancy Act which \"'ere the only sections which deal with the extinction of the rights of tenants. So far as the right granted by s. 47 ( 4) is concerned, it is granted by the statu1e itself for a limited period and, once that period expires, it cannot be held that the right continues thereafter.\n\nThere is no requirement in law that, after the expiry of that period, there must be eviction from the land in o:der to extinguish the right granted bys. 47(4).\n\nThe possession subsequent to 30th June, 1951 cannot, therefore, be held to be in pursuance of a right conferred on a sub-tenant referred to ins. 47(4) of the Tenancy Act and, consequently, th~ land was not held by the appellants thereafter in the capacity mentioned in s. l 9(vii) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court, in these circumstances, was right in rejecting the claim of the appellants.\n\nThe appeal fails.\n\nAs agreed by counsel for parties, parties F will bear their own costs of .this appeal.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) 1961 Alld. L.J. 667.", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "BIRENDR, A PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIRENDRA PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GULWANT SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GULWANT SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jan11ary 31, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIRENDR, A PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nGULWANT SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nJan11ary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 47( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1013, "end_char": 1043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 47(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1766, "end_char": 1773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Aboliiion and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "5th June. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a suh-Jease in their favour was executed on 5th June."}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3053, "end_char": 3060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 55(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s 55(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "14th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the facts, such delivery had taken place prior to 14th June, 1947. ["}}, {"text": "30th June, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4968, "end_char": 4983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and were entitled to continue in possession upto 30th June, 1951."}}, {"text": "15th January. 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4993, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on 15th January."}}, {"text": "s. 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5559, "end_char": 5567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6133, "end_char": 6141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopalji Mehro1ra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6812, "end_char": 6828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nGopalji Mehro1ra, S. S. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. S. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nGopalji Mehro1ra, S. S. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nGopalji Mehro1ra, S. S. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Swamp", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swamp and J. P. Goyal: for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6896, "end_char": 6907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Swamp and J. P. Goyal: for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6983, "end_char": 6991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The disputed land was the ex-proprietary tenancy of one Parmeshwar Singh who, on the 5th June, 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants on an annual rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Parmeshwar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. The disputed land was the ex-proprietary tenancy of one Parmeshwar Singh who, on the 5th June, 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants on an annual rent of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Parrneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 22nd June, 1947."}}, {"text": "15th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th January, 1951, Parmeshwar Singh, the ex-proprietary tenant, surrendered his tenancy rJ'ghts to the landlord and on the same date the landlord executed a Jesse in respect of this land in favou:· of the 1espondents."}}, {"text": "Parmeshwar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7455, "end_char": 7471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th January, 1951, Parmeshwar Singh, the ex-proprietary tenant, surrendered his tenancy rJ'ghts to the landlord and on the same date the landlord executed a Jesse in respect of this land in favou:· of the 1espondents.", "canonical_name": "Parrneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Refonns Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7757, "end_char": 7803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8629, "end_char": 8649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree was aflinned by the first appellate Court as well as by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in second appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9179, "end_char": 9185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9444, "end_char": 9454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9462, "end_char": 9496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9755, "end_char": 9765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9964, "end_char": 9979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to substantiate this claim, the appellants thus had to prove that this land was held or must be deemed to have been held by them on ihe 30th June, 1952 as sub-tenants referred to in sub-section (4) of s. 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Tenancy Act\")."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10029, "end_char": 10034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10042, "end_char": 10076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10350, "end_char": 10363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939", "statute": "the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Panneshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11253, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "even after the surrender by Panneshwar Singh, is claimed by the appellants, is based on the provisions of section 295A of the Tenancy Act which was introduced in that Act by section 26 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 and which reads as follows :-\n\n\"295-A. Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary or anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force every person who on the date of the commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, is a sub-tenant shall, subject to th~ provisions of the proviso to sub-section (3) of\n\n(1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nsection 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, I 94 7.", "canonical_name": "Panneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "section 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11331, "end_char": 11343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11399, "end_char": 11409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11840, "end_char": 11850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12050, "end_char": 12060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12064, "end_char": 12075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12166, "end_char": 12177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th June. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12296, "end_char": 12311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be e:1?itled lo retain possession of his holding for a period of live years from that date, and for this period nothing in sub-section (2) of section 44 or section 171 shall render the landholder of such subtenant liable to ejectment under the provisions of section 171 :\n\nProvided ........................ \"\n\nThe United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act X of 1947 came into force on the 14th June."}}, {"text": "s. 295A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12334, "end_char": 12341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th June. 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12455, "end_char": 12470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "because the sub-lease in their favour was executed on 5th June."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13314, "end_char": 13319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this case, there is no doubt that a written lease consistent with the provisicns of the Tenancy Act was executed together with a counterpart thereof on the 5th June, 1947; and learned counsel's argument was that this lease and the counterpart having been delivered in accordance with this provision on 5th June, 1947, it should be deemed that the appellants became tenants with effect from that very date."}}, {"text": "sec. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14310, "end_char": 14317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th June, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14896, "end_char": 14911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second reason is that, even on facts, there is nothing to show that the written lease and its counterpart were actually delivered by one party to the other on the 5th June, 194 7."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15268, "end_char": 15273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15609, "end_char": 15614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panueshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15801, "end_char": 15817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The registration took place on 22nd June, 1947 and it is, therefore, clear that the written lease properly executed and ell'ective could not have been delivered by Panueshwar Singh to the appellants before 22nd June, 1947.", "canonical_name": "Panneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16017, "end_char": 16022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16492, "end_char": 16503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16602, "end_char": 16612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16745, "end_char": 16749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parmeshwar Sinh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18127, "end_char": 18142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parmeshwar Sinh chose not to mention any period at all and.", "canonical_name": "Parrneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "A!lahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18788, "end_char": 18808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on a decision of a learned single Judge of the A!lahabad High Court in Mohd."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19524, "end_char": 19543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case are not free from ambiguity, it is permissible to take into consideration the conduct of the parties for the purpose of determining its true nature, as held by the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Kumar Sen Choudhury and , Others v. Chandratara Nath and Others(')."}}, {"text": "30th June, 19S2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21683, "end_char": 21698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants argued that, even if it be held \\hat the sub-lease is Aot for a fixed term of five years but is one from year to year, the appellants can still justifiably claim that they were holding the land on 30th June, 19S2 as sub-tenants referred to in s. 4 7 ( 4) of the Tenancy Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21729, "end_char": 21733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22461, "end_char": 22478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The true nature of such a lease was explained by the Bombay High Court in Utility Articles Manufacturing Co. v. Raja Bahadur Motilal Bombay Mills\n\nLtd.('), though with reference to a monthly lease."}}, {"text": "Salter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22694, "end_char": 22700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to explain the incidence of such a lease, that Court relied on the judgment of Salter, J. in Queen's Club Gardens Estate, Ltd. v.\n\nBignell('), whq was dealing with a case where the parties, by agreement between them, had expressed the intention that the tenancy shall be a periodic tenancy, viz.,"}}, {"text": "1st July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24786, "end_char": 24800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st July, 1947, therefore, the appellants were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the\n\n30th June, 1948; but, if they were allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expirinJ?"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24899, "end_char": 24914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st July, 1947, therefore, the appellants were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the\n\n30th June, 1948; but, if they were allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expirinJ?"}}, {"text": "1st July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st July, 1947, therefore, the appellants were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the\n\n30th June, 1948; but, if they were allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expirinJ?"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25061, "end_char": 25076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 30th June, 1949."}}, {"text": "15th Jan11ary, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25266, "end_char": 25285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, since the appellants were allowed to continue by Parmeshwar Singh in possession until 15th Jan11ary, 1951."}}, {"text": "Parrneshwar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25491, "end_char": 25508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th January, 1951, consequently, the appellants were subtenants of Parrneshwar Singh under this sub-lease and their term was to continue up to 30th June, 1951.", "canonical_name": "Parrneshwar Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25674, "end_char": 25678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26200, "end_char": 26210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27714, "end_char": 27718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27950, "end_char": 27955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th ianuary, 19 51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28344, "end_char": 28363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, we have already held above that, on 15th ianuary, 19 51, the appellants were holding the land under a sub; lease under which they were entitled to continue as sub-tenants up to 30th June, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28812, "end_char": 28817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28867, "end_char": 28877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that it should be held that this right granted by s. 47 ( 4) would again accrue to the appellants on 1st July, 1951 in accordance with the terms of the sub-lease, because the sub-lease in their favour was from year to year."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29039, "end_char": 29043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29235, "end_char": 29240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29415, "end_char": 29419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29431, "end_char": 29435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29637, "end_char": 29642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30580, "end_char": 30591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30735, "end_char": 30740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_881_886_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "CHHATU RAM HORIL RAM LTD. v.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)\n\nBihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950), ss. 3, 4 and 10-Lease of mica bearing /ands-Covenant for renewc/ of /ease-Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act-Whether lessee entitled to renewal.\n\nThe appellant-company obtained a lease of certain mica bearing land from the owners for a period of fifteen years.\n\nThe lease deed provided for a renewal of the lease on the expiry of the period at the option of the lessee. The land .was within an estate and by virtue of a notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Ac', 1950, the estate vested in the State Government under s. 4, free 1from all encumbrances and free from all rights of the lessees. But the appellant continued in occupation for the remaining period of the contractual lease, under a s'atutory lease deemed to have been granted by the State under s. Hl of the Act.\n\nOn the question whether the &ppellant was entitled to specific performance of the covenant of renewal,\n\nHELD : The agreement of renewal of the lease in future was not binding upon the State Government after the vesting of the estate.\n\n(I) The original contractual lease came to an end by the operation of s. 4 and under s. 10 a fresh statutory lease for the remainder of the term of •hat lease, in favour of the lessee, came into being with terms and conditions mutatis mutandis the same as the conditions of the original\n\nleas~. But the covenant granting an option of renewal of 1he lease on the expiry of the period of the lease is merely a covenant running with the land, and does not create any interest in land. It being in the nature of an encumbrance and by virtue Of s. 4 it was extinguished and the land vested in the State free from the obligation crea'ed by the renewal clause.\n\n[885 C-E] The St1:1te of Bihar v. Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. I.L.R .. 38 Pat. 1160, approved.\n\n(2) Rule 40 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, under which a lessee of a mining lease is enti•led to at least one renewal for a period not exceeding the duration of the original lease, applies to grants made by Government and not to statutory leases. Therefore, the , rule has no applica'ion.\n\nEven assuming the rule was applicable, the duration of the original lease in the case of such a statutory lease must be deemed to be no longer than the period between the date of vesting and the da'e of expiry of the original lease and that period. for which renewal may have been claimed, expired many years ago. [885 G; 886 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated December 12, 1962 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 433 of 1959. .\n\nH. R. Gokhalt!, S. N. Prasad and iJ. P. Singh, for the appellant. ·\n\n882 SUPlll!MB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nD. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and Shivapufan, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On September 30, 1940 the appellant-a private limited Company-obtained a lease froin the owners of 3,300\n\nacres of mica bearing land in viIJage Sapi:hi in the District of Gaya, for a period cf fifteen years. Clause 29 of the indenture of lease read as folJows :- ·· \"If on the expiry of the term of the thika we executant Nos. 1 and 2, first party, the lessors, desire to let out in thika the thika property or any portion thereof and if any other person wants to take it in thika, then in such circumstances it will be incumbent upon us, executant Nos. I and 2 first party, the lessors. to inform about it to executant No. 3, second party, the lessee, first. If on the same terms and stipulations and ; ama executant No. 3, second party, the lessee, wants to take it in thika then in that case, we executant Nos. I and 2, first party, the lessors, shall let it out in thika to him ( executant No. 3), and we shall execute a fresh thika deed in respect thereof in favour of executant No. 3, second party, the lessee. and executant No. 3, second parfy. the lessee, shall be competent to get the deed executed.\"\n\nBy virtue of a notification issued under s. 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the right of •he owners in the lands. vested on June 27, 1953 in the State of Bihar.\n\nThe appellant Company remained thereafter in occupation under a statutory lease deemed to be granted by the State for the remaining period of the contractual lease. On February 22, 1955, the Company served a notic~ upon the State exercisinit the option of renewal granted by cl. 29 of the indenture. On January 6, 1956, the State granted a lease to the appellant of 410 acres out of the lands for 20 yeat\\ and the remaininit area was granted in lease to one Sant Saran Bhadani a director of the appellant Company.\n\nIn a writ petition moved by one Sudha Devi the lease granted to the appellant Comnany and Rhadani were set aside by order dated July 5, 1956. of the High Court of Patna. on the ground that in eranting fresh leaes to the appellant Company and Bhadani the State of Bihar had violated rr. 67 and 68 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949.\n\nThe appellant Com,, anv then instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judee. Second Grade. Gava. an action for !t>Ccific H performance of the covenant of renewal in the indenture Of lease • dated September 30, 1940.\n\nThe Subordinate Ju_dJ?e dimiissed the action holding that by the Stipulation in cl. 29 a right of pre-\n\nClillATU RAM I.TD. V, BIHAR (Shah, J.) 883\n\nA emption and not of renewal was granted to the appellant Company. The High Court of Patna confirmed the decree passed by the Trial Court but on different grounds. .The High Court held that the right granted by cl. 29 gave rise to an \"encumbrance\" which was extinguished when the interest of the owners in the land vested in the State.\n\nWith certificate granted by the High B Court, this appeal has been preferred by !he Company.\n\nA notification under s. 3 ( 1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, on June 27, 1953 was issued in respect of the land of the owners.\n\nSection 4 of the Act prescribes the consequences of the publication of the notification under s. 3 ( 1) : it provides, insofar as it is reievant :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in . any contract, on the publication of the notification under sub-section ( 1) of section 3, or sub-section\n\n(1) or (2) of section 3A the following consequences shall ensue, namely :\n\n(a) Such estate or tenure including the interests of the proprietor or tenure-holder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estat~ or tenure and used primarily as office or cutch ery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, ja/kars, hats, bazar, me/a and ferries and all other sairati interests as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals, whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not, inclusive of such rights of a Jessee of mines and minerals comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the iaterests of raiyats and under-raiyats) shaJI, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interests in such estate or tenure, other than the interests expressly saved b; y or under the provisions of this Act.\" The opening words of this clause \"Subject to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter\" were omitted by Bihar Act 16 of 1959, but that omission has no practical significance in this case. Section 10 of the Act provides :\n\n\"( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where immediately before the date of vesting of the estate or tenure there is a subsisting lease of mines or minerals comprised in the estate or tenure or :my part\n\nthereof, the whole> or that part of the estate or tenure\n\n884 SUPREME COURT ll!POllTS\n\n\ncomprised in such lease shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be deemed to have been leased hy the State Government to the holder of the said subsisting lease for the remainder of the tem1 of that lease, and such holder shall be entitled to retain possession of the leasehold property.\n\n(2) The terms and conditions of the said lease by the State Government shall mutatis mutandis be the same as the terms and conditions of the subsisting lease referred to in sub-section ( I ) , but with the additional condition that, if in the opinion of the State Government the holder of the lease had not, before the date of the commencement of this Act, done any prospecting or developing work, the State Government shall be entitled at any time before the expiry of one year from the said date to determine the lease by giving three month's notice in writing :\n\nProvided\n\n(3) ..\n\nCounsel for the appellant Company contended that cl. 29 created an interest in the demised land in favour of the Company and the State of Bihar as successor-in-title of the original owners took the land subject to that interest.\n\nIn the altemativ~. counsel contended, the Company acquired immediately on execution of the indentures of lease an indefeasible right to obtain renewal and that right was enforceable against the owners and thir uccessors in-interest alike.\n\nWe are unable to agree with those contr.nti<'ns.\n\nThe covenant granting an option of renewal of the lease on the expiry of the period of the lease outstanding is a covenant running with the land : it creates no interest in land.\n\nIn The State of Rihar\n\nv. Indian Copper Corporation Ltd.(') the High Court of Patna held that a clause for renewal of a lease on the expiry of its period has not the effect of a present demiSe nor does it opera'e to crete an interest in land on the date on which the original lease was executed : a covenant fpr renewal is not tantamount to an actual demise and therefore \"no leasehold interest is created for the renewed term when the original lease is granted.\" Under the terms of the lease dated September 30, 1940, the appetlant Company became entitled to a lease for a period of fifteen years.\n\nOn the expiry of that period the Company could have enforcd their right to get a renewal of the lease for a period of fifteen years against the owners if their interest had not been extinguished. If the owners declined to carry out their obligation, the Company could sue for specific performance and claim a light to remain\n\n(I) t.L.R. 38 Pat. 1!60,\n\ncHltATU RAM LTD. v. BilIAR (Shah, ].) 885\n\nin possession for a period of fifteen years stipulated in cl. 29.\n\nBut the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act intervened. By rhe express terms of s. 4(a) of the Act all the interests of the owners in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals, whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worktd or not inclusive of such rights of the lessee of mines and minerals ·\n\ncoprised in such estate or tenure became vested in the State with effect from the date of vesting absolutely and free from all encumbranches. Even the interest of the lessees of the mines and m; nera\\s comprised in the estate therefore ceased, and all encumbrances on the interest of the owners' estate were extinguished and the State took the estate free from all the rights of the lessees. The original contractual lease came to an end by the operation C'f s. 4 (1 )(a) of the Act, and a fresh statutory lease for the remainder of the\n\nteem of that lease in favour of the lessee came into being under s. 10(1) of the Act.\n\nThe appellant Company therefore acquired the rights of a s:atutory lessee for the period between June 27, 1953 and September 30, 1955, with terms and conditions mutatis mutandis the same as the conditions of the original lease granted by the owne, rs on September 30, 1940. But by virtue of s. 4 that covenant by which the owners had agreed to renew the lease at the option of the lessee being merely of the nature of an e11crnnbrance and not an interest in the land was extinguished, the land vested in the State free from the obligation created by the renewal clause.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that \"a clause for renewal of the lease at a future date was a limitation imposed upon the lessor.\n\nHis freedom as an absolute owner was sought to be curtailed by such agreement. It was thus an encumbrance and all encumbrances were wiped out by section 4. . .................. .\n\nTaking all these provisions into consideration, an agreement for renewal of a lease in future cannot be binding upon the State Government after the vesting of the estate\".\n\nCounsel for the appellant relied upon r. 40 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, and contended that under 'the scheme of the Rules a lessee of a mining lease is entitled to at least one rrnewal.\n\nRule 40, insofar as it is material, provides : \" ( 1) The period for which a mining lease may be granted shall be 30 years in the case of coal, iron-ore and bauxite for manufacture of aluminium, and 20 years in the case of any other minerals, unless the applicant himself asks for a shorter period. The lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee, for one or two periods, each not exceeding the duration of the original lease, in the case of iron-ore and bauxite for manufacture of aluminium, and one period not exceeding the\n\n886 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS\n\n[1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nduration of the original lease in the case of other minerals.\" But r: 40 has no application.\n\nManifestly, the rule applies to grants made by the Government : it has no application to statutory leases arising by virtue of s. I 0 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.\n\nEven assuming that r. 40 applies to such a statutory lease, , the duration of the \"original lease\" may be deemed to be no longer B than the period between the date of vesting and September 30,\n\n1955. That period for which renewal may have been .claimed has expired many years ago, and recognition of the rights of the appellant Company will be of no practical significance in this appeal.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with cdsts.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "CHHATU RAM HORIL RAM LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHHATU RAM HORIL RAM LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Bihar Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 684, "end_char": 688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act", "statute": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1247, "end_char": 1251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act", "statute": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1262, "end_char": 1267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act", "statute": "Vesting of estate in State Government under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1717, "end_char": 1721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 12, 1962 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhalt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2756, "end_char": 2769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhalt!,"}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2772, "end_char": 2784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad and iJ. P. Singh, for the appellant. ·"}}, {"text": "iJ. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2789, "end_char": 2801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Prasad and iJ. P. Singh, for the appellant. ·", "canonical_name": "iJ. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2874, "end_char": 2885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "882 SUPlll!MB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nD. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and Shivapufan, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "iJ. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2887, "end_char": 2900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "882 SUPlll!MB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nD. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and Shivapufan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shivapufan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "882 SUPlll!MB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nD. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and Shivapufan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On September 30, 1940 the appellant-a private limited Company-obtained a lease froin the owners of 3,300\n\nacres of mica bearing land in viIJage Sapi:hi in the District of Gaya, for a period cf fifteen years."}}, {"text": "Clause 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3198, "end_char": 3207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4154, "end_char": 4182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vested on June 27, 1953 in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4438, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 22, 1955, the Company served a notic~ upon the State exercisinit the option of renewal granted by cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "January 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1956, the State granted a lease to the appellant of 410 acres out of the lands for 20 yeat\\ and the remaininit area was granted in lease to one Sant Saran Bhadani a director of the appellant Company."}}, {"text": "Sant Saran Bhadani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1956, the State granted a lease to the appellant of 410 acres out of the lands for 20 yeat\\ and the remaininit area was granted in lease to one Sant Saran Bhadani a director of the appellant Company."}}, {"text": "Sudha Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a writ petition moved by one Sudha Devi the lease granted to the appellant Comnany and Rhadani were set aside by order dated July 5, 1956."}}, {"text": "Comnany", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4863, "end_char": 4870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a writ petition moved by one Sudha Devi the lease granted to the appellant Comnany and Rhadani were set aside by order dated July 5, 1956."}}, {"text": "Rhadani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a writ petition moved by one Sudha Devi the lease granted to the appellant Comnany and Rhadani were set aside by order dated July 5, 1956.", "canonical_name": "Rhadani"}}, {"text": "July 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a writ petition moved by one Sudha Devi the lease granted to the appellant Comnany and Rhadani were set aside by order dated July 5, 1956."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Bhadani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the ground that in eranting fresh leaes to the appellant Company and Bhadani the State of Bihar had violated rr.", "canonical_name": "Rhadani"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the ground that in eranting fresh leaes to the appellant Company and Bhadani the State of Bihar had violated rr."}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 27, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 6003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification under s. 3 ( 1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, on June 27, 1953 was issued in respect of the land of the owners."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 30, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10031, "end_char": 10049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms of the lease dated September 30, 1940, the appetlant Company became entitled to a lease for a period of fifteen years."}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10585, "end_char": 10591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10602, "end_char": 10642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10679, "end_char": 10686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act", "statute": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11380, "end_char": 11384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act", "statute": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11524, "end_char": 11532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act", "statute": "But the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11661, "end_char": 11679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Company therefore acquired the rights of a s:atutory lessee for the period between June 27, 1953 and September 30, 1955, with terms and conditions mutatis mutandis the same as the conditions of the original lease granted by the owne, rs on September 30, 1940."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_887_891_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nNANAK SINGH\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n(1. C. SHAH AND V. RAMAswAMI, JJ.]\n\nRes Judicata-Petltion under A.rt. 226 allowed by single Judge o/ High CouN on twn groumh-Division Bench dismissing petition by advene/y deciding first ground Olld not considering second ground-Second growul\n\nwhether can be basis of civil suit-Whether barred by re&<judicata,\n\nThe respondCJ1t was a temporary Field Inspector of the Office of the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi.\n\nBy an order passed in Januaey 1958 the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Mr. Kane, who wu also holding the office of Additional Custodian terminated the employment of the respondent after giving him one month's salaey in lieu of notice. The\n\norder was confirmed by the departmental authorities in appeal. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court on two grounds, namely :\n\n(i) that the order terminating the employment amounted to punishment and could not be made without affording opportunity to be heard; (ii) that Mr. Kane was not competent under s. 5 of the Central Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 to pass the order. The single Judge who heard the petition upheld both the grounds and granted the petitilJn.\n\nIn appeal, the Division Bench reversed the order and dismissed the peti• lion observing that the order in question did not amount to punishment.\n\nThe Division Bench observed that the second point was not before them,\n\nbecause arguments were advanced mainly on the first rint and on a decimon of tho first point the appeal. could he disposed o . The respondents petition under Act. 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal to this Court was dismissed. The respondent thereafter instituted a suit in the Civil Court. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the first appellate court held that the order terminating the respondent's serviee was void.\n\nA second appeal by the Union of India was dismissed by the High Court on the view that the order of termination of services was passed by an incompetent authority and this issue was not barred by res judicata. The Union of India appealed. d'' HELD : The single Judge who decided the respondent's W[lf\"petition decided both the grounds in his favour. When in appeal the.High Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the petition it must be deemed to have rejected both the grounds on which the petition was founded.\n\nIn rejecting the fil'!t plea the High Court gave detailed reasons. The second plea must also be deemed to have been negatived by the High Court. for the High Court could not, without reversing the judgment of the single Judge, on that plea have dismissed the petition. The suit was therefore barred by res judlcata.\n\nIt could not be said that the High Court reserved to the respondent the right to agitate the question about the authority of Mr. Kane to pass the order. in a separate suit. There was no snch express reservation and it could not be implied, for such an implication was plainly inconsistent with the final order passed by the High Court.\n\nGukibchand Chhota/al Parikh v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1965. S.C II 53, referred to.\n\nAbdul/ah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Gnnesh Dass, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 201. held not applicable. 1.3 Sup Cl/63-14\n\nSSS vl'REML COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No; 280 of A 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 29, 1966 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Regular Second Appeal No. 74-D of 1966.\n\nB. Sen, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nPritam Singh Safeer, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of tile Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nNanak Singh-respondent in this appeal-held in August 1957 the post of Field Inspector in the Office of the Custodian, Evacuee Property, Delhi, as a temporary employee.\n\nBy order dated January 10, 1958, K. S. Kane, Additional Settlement Commissioner who was also holding the office of Additional Custodian terminated the employment of the respondent. after giving him one month's salary in lieu of notice.\n\nThe order of Mr. Kane was confirmed in appeal.\n\nNanak Singh then moved the High Court of Punjab by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an order dcclarin)! that the determination of his employment was \"void, illegal and unconstitutional\" on two grounds-( I) that the order terminating the employment amounted to imposing punishment and could not be made without affording opponunity to the employee to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him: and (2) that Mr. Kane was not competent under r. 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Ru!es. 1949 to terminate his employment.\n\nGurdev Singh, J., upheld both the grounds and granted the petition.\n\nThe Hih Court of Punjab in appeal reversed that order and directed that the petition be dism1 .. , d. The High Couri observed that by the order determining the employment of Nanak Singh no punishment was imposed. Jn dea!ing with the authority of Mr. Kane to terminate the employment of 1'.anak Singh the High Court observed :\n\n\"Jn the second place it was urged that the Officer who had passed the order of dismissal was not competent to do so.\n\nThe second point is not before us because arguments have been advanced mainly on the first point and on a decision of this point the appeal can be disposed of.\" A petition preferred to this Court against the order of the High (; ourt for leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution was rejected.\n\nNanak Singh thereafter instituted suit No. 218 of 1963 in the Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, for a declaration that the order terminating his employment was made by an authority lower\n\n• !'\n\nthan the authority competent to pass that order, and that the order was \"wanting in bona fides\" and was on that account \"illegal, null and void\", and for an order declaring him entitled to be treated as continuing in employment and on duty and entitled to all the benefits of service as if he had not been removed from employment.\n\nThis suit was dismissed by the Court of First Instance.\n\nIn appeal; the Additional District Judge, Delhi, reversed the decree passed by the Court of First Instance, and declared that the order of Mr. Kane dated January 10, 1958, terminating the employment of Nanak Singh was void and inoperative, and that Nanak Singh was entitled to be treated as in service and on duty since the date of the order.\n\nA second appeal against that judgment by the Union of India was dismissed by Bedi, J.\n\nThe learned\n\nJudg~ was of the view that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ petition did not operate to prevent Nanak Singh from reagitating the question about the authority of Mr. Kane to terminate his employment, and that on the materials placed before the Court there was no evidence that authority had been delegated to Mr. Kane to exercise that power. Against that order, with special leave, the Union of India has appealed to this Court.\n\nThe first question which falls to be determined in tl1is appeal is whether the judgment of the High Court in the writ petition operated as res judicata in the Civil Suit filed by Nanak Singh.\n\nNanak Singh, it may be recalled, claimed relief on two alternative grounds-( 1) infringement of the protection under Art. 311 of the Constitution; and (2) absence of authority' in the Officer who terminated his employment under r. 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. Each ground, if successful. was sufficient to support an order in his favour. Gurdev Singh, J .. decided both the grounds in favour of Nanak Singh. The High Court reversed the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., and dismissed the petition filed by Nanak Singh : thereby the High Court must be deemed to have rejected both the grounds on which the petition was founded.\n\nOn the plea that the order of termination of his employment amounted to dismissal, the High Court gave detailed reasons and observed that by the termination of his employment Nanak Singh was not visited with any punishment. The second plea about the authority of Mr. Kane also must be deemed t0 have been negatived by the High Court, for the High Court could not, .without reversing the judgment of Gurdev Singh, J., have dis-- missed the petition.\n\nIt is true that in the judgment of the Court of Appeal some obscure statement has been made, and it is difficult to appreciate the true purport thereof.\n\nBut what operates as res judicata is the decision and not the reasons given by the Court in support of the decision.\n\nWe are unable to agree with counsel for Nanak Singh, that the High Court reserved to Nanak\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nSingh the right to agitate the question about the authority of Mr.\n\nKane in a separate suit.\n\nThere is n~ such express reservation. and it cannot be implied, for such an implication is plainly incoasistent with the final order passed by the High Court. Even assuming that the High Court was in error in holding that the appeal could be decided oitly on the first point, the order dismissing the petition must still operate as res judicata in respect of both the points on which the petition was founded.\n\nThis Court in Gulabchand Chhota/a/ Parikh v.\n\nState of Gujarat(') observed that the provisions of s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same panics on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after a.ftording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court oompetent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit.\n\nIt is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. There. is no good reason to preclude such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decision after full contest. The Court in Gu/abchand's case(') left open the question whether the principle of c0nstructive res judicata may be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, must still be deemed to have been decided.\n\nIf the order of the High Court in appeal from the order in the writ petition operated constructively as res judicata, it might have been necessary to consider the question which was left open by Court in Gulabchand's case('). But in our view the judgment in the previou~ case operates by express decision as res\n\n; udicara.\n\nIt is true that in order that the previous adjudication between the parties may operate as res judicata, the question must have been heard and decided or that the parties m11St have an opportuntiy of raising their contentions therein.\n\nJn the present case, Gurdev Singh, J .. dealt with the question in some detail and held that Mr Kane had no authority to terminate the employment of Nanak Singh.\n\nThe High Court in appeal thought that the\n\nppeal could be disposed of only on the first ground, and they recorded no express finding on the second ground. But once the\n\nti) A. I. R. 1%~ S. C. 1153.\n\n' •\n\nappeal was allowed and the petition was dismissed, the dismissal of the petition operated as a rejection of both the grounds on which it was .founded.\n\nThe judgment of the Privy Council on which reliance was placed by counsel for Nanak Singh-. Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass('), has, in our judgment, r.o application.\n\nIn that case a suit was dismissed by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner on the view that its constitution was defective, and no opinion on the merits of the dispute between the parties was expressed.\n\nThe judgment of the Judicial Commissioner was held not to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the parties to the previous suit, because the dispute was not decided on its merits in the previous suit expressly or even by implication.\n\nIt is unnecessary on that view to adjudicate upon the question whether Mr. Kane had authority to determine the employment of N auak Singh.\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside.\n\nThe decree passed by the Court of First Instance is restored.\n\nWhen special leave to appeal was granted to the Union, this Court passed an order that the Union of India will pay the costs of the appeal in any event. The Union of India must, therefore, pay the costs of the tespondent iri this appeal. There will be no order as to costs in the Court of the First Instance, the District Court and the High Court.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 201.", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NANAK SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Nanak Singh-", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nNANAK SINGH\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n(1."}}, {"text": "1. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMAswAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 546, "end_char": 550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order passed in Januaey 1958 the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Mr. Kane, who wu also holding the office of Additional Custodian terminated the employment of the respondent after giving him one month's salaey in lieu of notice."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1886, "end_char": 1900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second appeal by the Union of India was dismissed by the High Court on the view that the order of termination of services was passed by an incompetent authority and this issue was not barred by res judicata."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh Safeer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3561, "end_char": 3580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pritam Singh Safeer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tile Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nNanak Singh-respondent in this appeal-held in August 1957 the post of Field Inspector in the Office of the Custodian, Evacuee Property, Delhi, as a temporary employee."}}, {"text": "Nanak Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of tile Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nNanak Singh-respondent in this appeal-held in August 1957 the post of Field Inspector in the Office of the Custodian, Evacuee Property, Delhi, as a temporary employee.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Singh-"}}, {"text": "K. S. Kane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated January 10, 1958, K. S. Kane, Additional Settlement Commissioner who was also holding the office of Additional Custodian terminated the employment of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Nanak Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4111, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Singh then moved the High Court of Punjab by a petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Singh-"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Singh then moved the High Court of Punjab by a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4179, "end_char": 4187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdev Singh, J., upheld both the grounds and granted the petition."}}, {"text": "Hih Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hih Court of Punjab in appeal reversed that order and directed that the petition be dism1 .. , d. The High Couri observed that by the order determining the employment of Nanak Singh no punishment was imposed."}}, {"text": "Nanak Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Hih Court of Punjab in appeal reversed that order and directed that the petition be dism1 .. , d. The High Couri observed that by the order determining the employment of Nanak Singh no punishment was imposed.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Singh-"}}, {"text": "1'.anak Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5046, "end_char": 5059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn dea!ing with the authority of Mr. Kane to terminate the employment of 1'.anak Singh the High Court observed :\n\n\"Jn the second place it was urged that the Officer who had passed the order of dismissal was not competent to do so."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5465, "end_char": 5473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5584, "end_char": 5607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "218 of 1963 in the Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, for a declaration that the order terminating his employment was made by an authority lower\n\n• !'"}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal; the Additional District Judge, Delhi, reversed the decree passed by the Court of First Instance, and declared that the order of Mr. Kane dated January 10, 1958, terminating the employment of Nanak Singh was void and inoperative, and that Nanak Singh was entitled to be treated as in service and on duty since the date of the order."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal; the Additional District Judge, Delhi, reversed the decree passed by the Court of First Instance, and declared that the order of Mr. Kane dated January 10, 1958, terminating the employment of Nanak Singh was void and inoperative, and that Nanak Singh was entitled to be treated as in service and on duty since the date of the order."}}, {"text": "Bedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second appeal against that judgment by the Union of India was dismissed by Bedi, J.\n\nThe learned\n\nJudg~ was of the view that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ petition did not operate to prevent Nanak Singh from reagitating the question about the authority of Mr. Kane to terminate his employment, and that on the materials placed before the Court there was no evidence that authority had been delegated to Mr. Kane to exercise that power."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nanak\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8661, "end_char": 8689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to agree with counsel for Nanak Singh, that the High Court reserved to Nanak\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nSingh the right to agitate the question about the authority of Mr.\n\nKane in a separate suit."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9347, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10102, "end_char": 10110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10114, "end_char": 10121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10371, "end_char": 10373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court in Gu/abchand's case(') left open the question whether the principle of c0nstructive res judicata may be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, must still be deemed to have been decided."}}, {"text": "abchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10374, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court in Gu/abchand's case(') left open the question whether the principle of c0nstructive res judicata may be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, must still be deemed to have been decided.", "canonical_name": "Gulabchand"}}, {"text": "Gulabchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10889, "end_char": 10899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the order of the High Court in appeal from the order in the writ petition operated constructively as res judicata, it might have been necessary to consider the question which was left open by Court in Gulabchand's case(').", "canonical_name": "Gulabchand"}}, {"text": "Nanak Singh-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11843, "end_char": 11855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Privy Council on which reliance was placed by counsel for Nanak Singh-.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Singh-"}}, {"text": "N auak Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12522, "end_char": 12534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary on that view to adjudicate upon the question whether Mr. Kane had authority to determine the employment of N auak Singh."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_892_896_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "SPECIAL\n\nLAND\n\nACQUISITION &\n\nREHARIUTATION A\n\nOFFICER, SAGAR\n\nM. S. SESHAGIRI RAO & ANR.\n\nJanuary 31, 1968\n\n(1. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAM!, JJ.]\n\nL.Jnd Acquisition Act (I of 1894).-<irant of lend on surrer.der >n:ithoul compensation-Proceedings under Latid Ac1--Con1pensation, how payable.\n\ncondition to\n\nAcqUisition\n\nThe Government of ~1ys0rc. granted a plot of land to the respondent~\n\n\"'ith the added condition that \"in the event of the Government requirini C the land for anv reason \\vhatsoevcr. the grantee shall suncoder the land to the Government withbut claiming any compensation\".\n\nThe Government acquired the land by adopting tho procedure prescribed by the Laed Acquisition Act but no compensation wa~ awarded to the grantees for the land.\n\nThe Hih Court, in appeal, held that sinee the Government had failed to exercise the right which it had under the terms of tbe grant and had acted under the Land Acquisition Act, lhe grantees v.erc entitled to compensation :is provided under the Act.\n\nIn appeal, this Court.\n\nD HELD : After ob!aining poession of the land in pursuance of statu tory authority under s. 17 of the Land Acqu; sition Act, the Govemme!lt could not seek ro exercise the option conferred by the terms of the grant.\n\nThe grantees wrc entitled to iom!JC'0.S3tion for the land of \\\\ohich the OMlcrship v.as vcs:red in them.\n\nBu. in :i''C'i'iing compensation payable to the antces, existence of the condition which severely restricte.d their right\n\ncould not be ignored. [894 ll-C] E The Act is silc11: s to the acquisiti,)n of partial interestc; in Jana but it cannot be inferred therefrom that interest in Jand restricted becau!ie of the existence of rights of the State in the land cannot be acquired. When land is notified for acquisition for a public purpose and the State has no interest therein. market value of the land mus! be detennined and aPPortioned among the persons entitkd to the land.\n\nWhere the interest of the owner is clogged by the right of the Stale, the compensation payable is F only th-o market value of that intere, t. subject to the clog. [895 B, CJ\n\nThe Coliector of Bon1bay v. .1\\/u\\ser,., anji Rattt; nji Mirtri &: Ors. { 1955} S.C.R. 131 I, followed.\n\nAttomry-Grnera/ v. De Kayser\"s Ro.val Hot<! Ltd., (1920) A.C. 508, referred to.\n\nGovernment of Bombay v. Es11fa/i Salebliai.\n\nI.LR. 34 Bom. 618, G approved.\n\nStat,· of Mtulras v. A.Y.S. /'arisuthn NnJnr. [1961] M.L.J. 285. disapproved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 6. 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Misc. Appeal No. 293 of 1961.\n\nH •\n\nA Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. Gopa/akrishnan and S. P.\n\nNayar, for the appellant.\n\nNau;; it Lal and T. S. Ramachandran, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On April 15, 1952, the Government of Mysore granted an area of 11 acres and 3 8 gunthas of land situate in village Hebbyle to the respondents to this appeal. The grant was made in Form Appendix 'E' to the Mysore Land Revenue Rules with the added condition that \"in the event of the Government requiring the land for any reason whatsoever, the grantee shall surrender the land to the Government without claiming any compensation\". On January 11, 1958, the Government of Mysore published a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act that the land granted was likely to be needed for a public purpose.\n\nBy a subsequent notification made under s. 17 ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, Government dispensed with the enquiry under s. 5-A of the Act and obtained possession of the land. In assessing compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer did not award any compensation for the land, and awarded Rs. 1,495 /- for improvement claimed to have been made to the land by the grantees.\n\nIn a reference under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Court agreed with the Land Acquisition Officer.\n\nIn appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the award anJ remanded the case to the District Court with a direction to dete!1lline the compensation payable to the grantees 11nd to dispose of the case acording to law.\n\nT!e High Court observed that since the Government had failed to exercise the right which it had under the terms of the grant and had adopted the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act, compensation for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the process by which ihe grantees were to be deprived of the land must be followed.\n\nAgainst the order passed by the High Court, this appeal is preferred with special leave.\n\nUnder s. 3 (a) \"land\" is defined as including benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. By s. 4 the appropriate Government is authorised to issue a notification that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, and thereafter to exercise certain powers in respect of the land for determining its suitability for the purpose notified.\n\nThe Government may under s. 17 in cases of urgency take possession of any waste or arable 1and needed for the public purpose and the land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all\n\nencumbrance~.\n\nThe Government of Mysore did not purport to exercise the power reserved by the terms of the grant, and adopted the proce-\n\n894 SUPREME COURT JlEPORTS JI968J 2 s.c.R.\n\ndure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court observed, relying upon the decision of the House of Lords in A11orney-General v. De Kayser's RoyaJ°Hote/ Ltd.(') that the Government could not, after adopting the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act, seek to resort to the conditions of the grant and claim that no compensation for acquisition of the land was payable.\n\nIt is true that after obtaining possessio!l of the land in pursuance of statutory authority under s. 17, the Government of Mysore could not seek to exercise the option conferred by the terms of the grant.\n\nBut on that account in assessing compeDation payable to the grantees, existence of the condition which severely restricted their right could not be ignored. The grantees were entitled to compensation for the land of which the ownership was vested in them.\n\nThe measure of that compensation is the market value of the land at the date of the notification, and the measure of that market value is what a willing purchaser may at the date of the notification under s. 4 pay for the right to the land subject to the option Yested in the Government.\n\nThe High Coun also placed reli'!nce upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in The State of Madras v. A. Y. S. Pdrisutha Nadar('). In that case the main question decided was whether it was open to a claimant to compensation for land under acquisition to assert title to the land notified for acquisition as against the State Government when the land had become vested in the Government by the operation of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948. On behalf of the State it was contended that once an estate is taken over by the State in exercise of its powers under the Estates Abolition Act, the entire land in the estate so taken over vested in the State in absolute ownership, and that no other claim of ownership in respect of any parcel of the land in the estate could be put forward by any other person as against the State Government without obtaining a ryotwari pa/ta under the machinery of the Act. The High Court rejected that contention observing that the Government availing itself of the machinery under the Land Acquisition Act for compulsory acquisition and treating the subject-matter of ' the acquisition as not belonging to itself but to others, is under an obligation to pay compensation as provided in the Act, and that the Government was incompetent in the proceeding under the Land Acquisition. Act to put forward its own title to the property sought to be acquired so as to defeat the rights of persons entitled to the compensation. The propositions so broadly stated are, in our judgment, not accurate. The Act contemplates acquisition of land for a public purpose.\n\nBy acquisition of land is intended the purchase of such interest outstanding in others as clog the right of the Government to use the land for the public purpose. Where\n\n(I) [ 1920) A.C. 508.\n\n(2) [1961) 2 M.L.J. 285.\n\nthe land is owned by a single p.!rson, the entire market value payable for deprivation of the ownership is payable to that person : if the interest is divided, for instance, where it be.longs to several persons, or where there is a mortgage or a lease outstanding on the land, or the land belongs to one and a house thereon to another, or limited interests in the land are vested in different persons, apportionment of the compensation is contemplated. The Act is, it is true, silent as to the acquisition of partial interests in the land, but it cannot be inferred therefrom that interest in land restricted because of the existence . of rights of t)J.e State in the land cannot be acquired.\n\nWhen land is notified for acquisition for a public purpose and the State has no interest therein, market value of the !arid must be determined and apportioned among the persons entitled to the land.\n\nWhere the interest of th(: owner b clogged by the right of the State, the compensation payable is only the market value of that interest, subject to the clog.\n\nWe re unable to agree with the High Court of Madras that when land 'is notified for acquisition, and in the land the State ha~ \" an J.riierest, or the ownership of the land is subject to a restrictive .covenant in favour of the State, the State is estopped from setting up its interest or right in the proceedings for acquisition.\n\nThe State in a proceeding for acquisition does not acquire, its own interest in the land, and the Collector offers and the Civil Court assesses compensation for acquisition of the interest of the private E persons which gets extinguished by compulsory acquisition and\n\n pays compensation equivalent to the market value of that interest.\n\nThere is nothing In the Act which prevents the State from claiming in the proceeding for acquisitron of la, nd notified for acquisition that the interest proposed to be acquired is a restrictive interest.\n\nWe agree with the observations made by Batchelor, 1., Government of Bombay v. Esufali Salebhai(') at p. 636:\n\n\"The procedure laid down in the Act is so laid down as being appropriate to the special case which is considered in the Act, i.e., the case where the complete interests are owned privately. But that special case is, as I understand it, singled out by the legislature as the norm or type with the intent that in other cases which only partially conform to the type the procedure should be followed in so far as it is appropriate, nor that such cases should be excluded from the Act because they do noi wholly conform to the type. In other words, Government . . are not debarred from acquiring and paying for the only outstanding interests merely because the Act, which primarily contemplates 1111 interests as\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 2 S.C.R.\n\nheld outside Government, directs that the entire cor.; pensation based upon the market value of the whole land must be distributed among the. claimants.\n\nIn such circumstances, as it appears to me, there is no insuperable objection to adapting the procedure to the ease on the foot.ing that the outstanding interests, which are the only things to be acquired, are the only things to be paid for.\"\n\nThe principle of Esufa/i Salebhai'J case(') was it may be observed, approved by this Coun in The Collector of Bombay v.\n\nNusserwanji Ratranji Mistri & Others( 2 ).\n\nBut the view expressed by the District Coun that the grantees c are not entitled to any compensation for the land cannot be sustained.\n\nThe District Court was bound to determine the market value. at the date of the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, of the interest of the grantees in the land.\n\nThe order passed by he High Court is maintained subject to the modification that the market value of the interest of the gran D tees 11 the land (of the nature hereinbefore mentioned) at the date of th~ notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act shall be determined and paid to the grantees in addition to the compensat'T1 paid for the improvement in the land.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in this appeal.\n\nY.P.\n\n(1) (19~5) s. c. , i_ ::11.\n\nOrder of the High Court modified.\n\n• '", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "SPECIAL\n\nLAND\n\nACQUISITION &\n\nREHARIUTATION A\n\nOFFICER, SAGAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION & REHABILITATION OFFICER, SAGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. S. SESHAGIRI RAO & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. S. SESHAGIRI RAO & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jnd Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1115, "end_char": 1120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jnd Acquisition Act", "statute": "Jnd Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2442, "end_char": 2470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1963 of the Mysore High Court in Misc."}}, {"text": "A Niren De", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2643, "end_char": 2653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H •\n\nA Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. Gopa/akrishnan and S. P.\n\nNayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2674, "end_char": 2681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H •\n\nA Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. Gopa/akrishnan and S. P.\n\nNayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P.\n\nNayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H •\n\nA Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. Gopa/akrishnan and S. P.\n\nNayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nau;; it Lal and T. S. Ramachandran, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2832, "end_char": 2836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On April 15, 1952, the Government of Mysore granted an area of 11 acres and 3 8 gunthas of land situate in village Hebbyle to the respondents to this appeal."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2844, "end_char": 2858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On April 15, 1952, the Government of Mysore granted an area of 11 acres and 3 8 gunthas of land situate in village Hebbyle to the respondents to this appeal."}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On April 15, 1952, the Government of Mysore granted an area of 11 acres and 3 8 gunthas of land situate in village Hebbyle to the respondents to this appeal."}}, {"text": "Hebbyle", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On April 15, 1952, the Government of Mysore granted an area of 11 acres and 3 8 gunthas of land situate in village Hebbyle to the respondents to this appeal."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 11, 1958, the Government of Mysore published a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act that the land granted was likely to be needed for a public purpose."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3348, "end_char": 3352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the award anJ remanded the case to the District Court with a direction to dete!1lline the compensation payable to the grantees 11nd to dispose of the case acording to law."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5075, "end_char": 5080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5920, "end_char": 5925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6635, "end_char": 6652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Coun also placed reli'!nce upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in The State of Madras v. A. Y. S. Pdrisutha Nadar(')."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9507, "end_char": 9527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We re unable to agree with the High Court of Madras that when land 'is notified for acquisition, and in the land the State ha~ \" an J.riierest, or the ownership of the land is subject to a restrictive .covenant in favour of the State, the State is estopped from setting up its interest or right in the proceedings for acquisition."}}, {"text": "is nothing In the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Batchelor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10391, "end_char": 10400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the observations made by Batchelor, 1.,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12009, "end_char": 12013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12311, "end_char": 12315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_2_897_905_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KT. N. RM. THENAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS.\n\nN. S. KR. KARUPPAN CHETTIAR & ORS •\n\n. January 31, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] Trust-founded for certain religious purposes with contributions from a nun1her of persons-whether all of them 'follnders' of th~ 1r11It-Ril!ht\n\nof any one interested in proper 111a11age1ne11r of trust 10 file a suit for re- 1noval of managing trustee or for frcmlng a sche1ne of 1nanagment.\n\nThe appellants filed a suit praying for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a trust and f\\Jr an account of the n1anagement of the trust by C and for certain incidental reliefs.\n\nTheir case \\Vas that the trust was a joint foundation made on November 12. 1919 by the ancestors of various parties to the suit and the first ·espondent's late father C; that it was founded for conducting certain special and ordinary Pujas 10 the Mutt and for the feeding of the pupils. It was alleged that at the time of the foundation C contributed Rs. 25,000 and four others contributed Rs. 6,250 each and the joint founders had t the time of foundation appointed C, \\vho was the 1argest conlributor. as the Manager and executive trustee.\n\nOn November 27, 1943 C had nominated the. second respondent. his grandson, as the executive trustee.\n\nVarious lleiations of mismanagement of the trust were made against the second respondent claiming tat he had stopped the Pujas and various other activities for which the 1rust wa~ created. The Trial Cotirt disrn-issed the suit on the findin~ that C was the sole founder of the. trust who had conducted it with the monev contributed by himself and other persons and that at the time of the foundation the other four contributors did not reserve for themselves. any right in the trusteeship of the Mutt. lt also held that the charges of mismanagement were ...:nfounded and no case was made out for fr:iming: a scme. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed.\n\nOn appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD : (i) The High Court was right in finding the appellants had failed to establish that they were joint founders of the trus• and that thev\n\n\\Vere entitled in turns to management in proportion to their contribution.\n\nIt is not a correct proposition of law to state tha' every donor contri-\n\n...: buting at the time of foundation of a trust becom-:s a founder of the trust. lt may be that in a particular case all the contributors of a trust fund be~ come the founders of the trust itself, but the question when a contributor would become in law a joint founder of the trust would depend not inere1y upon the fact of his contribution but also upon the s.urrounding circum-\n\nG tances proved in the parliC'Ular case and the subsequent conduct of the\n\nparties. [901 HJ\n\nfo the Matter of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869-and Tn the Malter of the St. Leonard, Shoreditch, Parochial Schools. 10\n\nA.C. 304 and Settikara Venkataran1a ChetJiar v. 0. P. Damodarc1n Chettiar, 51 M.L.J. 457: refc.rred to.\n\nEven in the case of a private trust a suit can be filed for the removal of the trustee or for settlement of a scheme. for the purpose .of cffc.ctively ca\"rrying out the objects of the trust. If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee. a suit can be brought in a civil court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the\n\n898 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1968] 2 S.C.R.\n\nproper administration of lhe endowment.\n\nIn the present case the appellants being contributors to 1he trust were interested in the proper administration of •he trust and had a sufficient right to bring a suit in ca<; e there w~ mismanagement or breach of trust on. the.part of the managing trus:U and for framing of a scheme. However, m view of the concurrent lindma of both the lower Courls 1hat the llllegaliollll of breach of tru.'1 or management had not been established, no grou.id had been made out on behalf of lhe appellants for framing of a scheme or for the removal of\n\nthe second respondent. [904 A.CJ\n\nPramotha Nath Mu//ick's case. 52 I.A. 245; Manahar Maalerj\" \"· Peary Mohan, 24 C.W.N. 478; and Bimal Krizhna'r case, 41 C.W.N. 728; ttferred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 355 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 4, 1961 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 99 of 1957.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, R. Thiagarajan for R. Ganapathy Iyer, for lhe appellants.\n\nK. Gopa/achari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamru; wami, J. This appeal is brought on behalf of the plaintilfs, by special leave, against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated April 4, 1961 in Appeal No. 99 of 1957.\n\nIn the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal, the plaintiffs prayed for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a Trust known as Sina Ravanna Mana Pana Sona Guru Puja Mutt at Pillamangalam Alagapuri, Tiruchnapalli District and for dn account of the management of the Trust by the late N. S. Chockalingam Chcttiar and for certain incidental reliefs.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs was that the Trust was a joint foundation made on November I 2, 19 I 9 by Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, father of plaintiffs I and 2 a.nd grand-father of plaintiffs 3, Raman Chettiar, father of plaintiff no. 4, Subramaniam Chettiar Plaintiff no. S, Perianan Chettiar. father of defendant no. 3 and Chockalingam Chettiar, father of defendant no. 1 and grand-father of defendant no. 2. It was said that the Trust was founded for conducting puja to God Vinayagar installed in the Mutt, by an Oduvar; to do !pecial pujas for the Samayarcharyars, vii:;., Appar, Sundarnr, Sambhandar and Manickavachakar and ordinary pujas to the other 63 Nayanmars on their birth days; to conduct a Thevaram PatasaJa, and feeding the pupils.\n\nIt was alleged that at the time of the foundation Chockalingam Chettiar contributed Rs. 2S,000/- Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, Raman Chettiar, Subramaniam Chettiar, and Perianan Chettiar contributing Rs. 6,250/- each.\n\nHundie! were passed by the four contributors for Rs. 6,250 each in favour\n\nTHESAPPA v. KARUPPAN (Ramaswami, I.) 899\n\nof the first defendant's father on November 12, 1919 and they were cashed in due course. It was alleged that the joint founders had at the time of foundation appointed Chokalingam Chettiar who was the largest contributor as the manager and executive Trustee and the latter had constructed buildings for the Mutt and bought lands in Manakkarai village, Mannargudi taluk. . On November 27, 1943, Chockalingam Chettiar nominated defendant no., 2, his grand-son as the executive Trustee. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that defendant no. 2 had stopped the pujas to the Nayanmars and Samayacharyas and had discontinued the Thevararn school and the feeding of the boys. Several other acts of mis-management were alleged in the plaint.\n\nThe suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who alleged that the sole founder of the Mutt was the late N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar, his grandfather, who at first installed the Vinayakar image and also the 63 Nayanmars and established the pujas for the four Samayacharyars and the Nayanmars, He was also the sole trustee and was in exclusive management from the foundation of the trust till November 29, 1943 when by a registered instrument he appointed the second ?ef.endant and hi~ escendant~ s heredit111'. trustees.\n\nIt was denied that the plamuffs were 1omt-founders. though they had made contributions .{Qr the management of the Mutt.\n\nIt was said that from the very\"date of contribution the plaintiffs never bargained for any rights as trustees but they accepted N. S. Chockalingam Chettiar as the sole trustee.\n\nThe charge of mis-management was totally denied by the defendants and it was said that the trust was being maintained and conducted on a much grander scale than during the trusteeship of the senior Chockalingam.\n\nIt was asserted that the daily puja to the Vinayakar and the ordinary and special pujas to the Nayanmars and the Samayacharyars were all performed with scrupulous re~.ula- F rity.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Pudu-, klmtai by his judgment dated January 31, 1957. The finding of the Subordinate Judge was that the sole founder of the trust was the senior Chockalingam Chettiar who conducted it with the aid gf moneys contributed by himself and other persons and th:; ii at the time of the foundation the other four contributos did not\n\nre!Crve for themselves any right in the trusteeship of the Mutt.\n\nIt was also found by the Subordinate Judge that the charges of mis-management were unfounded and no case was made 'out on behalf of the plaintiffs for framing a scheme. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was affirmed by the High Court in Appeal No. 99 of 1957 by its judgment dated April 4, 1961. The High Court substantially agreed with the finding of the Subordinate Judge. It was held by the High Court that the eVidence made it quite clear that the contributors agreed to leave the management of the trust solely in-charge of the senior Chocka!ingarn.\n\nThe High Court also agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 968] 2 s.c.R.\n\nplaintiffs had failed to establish that all the contributories were joint founders and that they were entitled to turns of management in proportion of their contributions.\n\nThe only matter on which the High Court expressed its disagreement with the Subordinate. Judge was with regard to the date of the foundation of the trust. The High Court expressed the .view that the trust was founded in 1919 but the Subordinate Judge found that the trust had been founded much earlier, though it took a definite shape in the year 1919.\n\nAs regards the charge of mis-management, the High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge and held that non.: of the charges had been established and accordingly there were no grounds made out for the framing of a scheme or the\n\nremoval of the second defendant from the management of the trust.\n\nThe first q11esuon to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellants are right in their contention that they were joint founders of the trust along with the senior Chockalingam. It was contended on their behalf that Exs. A-1 and A-3 described the contributions of the sum of Rs. 6,250/- as having been made towards I/8th 'Pangu' or share.\n\nReference was also made to Ex. A-5, ledger account of the Mutt in which the contribution is\n\ndescrid as the share capital.\n\nIt was pointed out by Mr. N. C.\n\nChatterjee thafthe vilasam of the trust S.R.M.P.A.S. supports the claim of the appellants that they were joint founders. The High Court has, however, rightly pointed out that these two circumstances are not decisive. There is on the contrary an admission on behalf of the first plaintiff that the contributories were not treated as founders.\n\nIn the course of his evidence the 5th plaintiff as P.W. I stated as follows :\n\n\"As Chockalingam Chettiar he!d the largest number of shares the other four requested him to administer the suit trust maintain accounts and render accounts to the four other shares on demand ............ AU the five pangudars were present when the decisions to found the charity was arrived at.\n\nWe decided that senior Chockalingam should manage the charity to be founded.\n\nNone of us demanded that the pangudars should administer the trust by rotation. None of us suggested that the te•ms of the endowment should be reduced to writing.\n\nWe wanted senior Chockalingam to consult us with reference to important matters pertaining to the administratfon.\n\nWe did not define the nature of the matters with reference to which we should be consulted.\n\nTHENAPPA V. KARUPPAN (Ramaswami, l.) ./ ./ Since the inception of the trust no meeting of the five pangudars was ever held.\n\nNor were minutes of such proceedings kept. Chockalingam used to have informal consultations with us. At no time, between 1919 and 1945, the year. of senior Chockalingam's death did we ever call upon him to show us his accounts. Nor did he show us his accounts. We never asked him to what the total income from the lands and buildings was.\n\nI do not remember the particulars of information which senior Chockalingam voluntarily gave us.\"\n\n90!\n\nThe conduct of the parties subsequent to the foundation of the trust is also not consistent with the claim now' putJorward on behalf of the appe!lants. Senior Chockalingam:,, acquired considerable properties between 1919 and 1945 on behalf of the trust. Exhibit B-2, dated June 23, 1920, Ex, B-3; dated January 27, l927, Ex. B-5, dated June 18, 1931,_.Ex<. B;6:datecl June 22, 1931.\n\nEx. B-7 dated January 4, 1934, Ex, B-8 dated March 2, 1934.\n\nEx. B-9 dated September 30 1934, Ex.\n\nB-10 dated September 30, 1934, Ex. B-11 dated June 6, 1936 and Ex. B-12 dated April 5, 1937 are all sale deeds solely in the name of the senior Chockalingam. The mutt bui)ding had always stood in the name of the senior ChockaJingam in the register of Alagapuri Panchayat Union.\n\nThe oral evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents which has been accepted both by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court also shows that there was a total non-interference on the part of the plaintiffs in the management of Chockalingam till he app:iinted the second defendant as his succeeding trustee under Ex. B-1 and there was a total non-interference also with the management of the second defendant after that date.\n\nP.W. 1 alS<> admitted in his evidence that the second defendant was appointed as the successor of senior Chockalingam and at the time of the appointment all the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 agreed that defendant no. 2 should be so appointed as the sole managing trustee. If the plaintiffs had any right to manage the trust by turns, as they now claim. it is not likely that they would have agreed to the second defendant being appointed as the sole trustee in place of senior Chockalingam.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court was right in reaching the finding that the p'aintiffs have failed to establish that they were the joint founders of the trust or that they were entitled in turns to management in proportion to their contributions.\n\nIt is not a correct proposition of law to state that every dono~ contributing at the time of foundation of a trust becomes a founder of the trust. It may be that in a particular case all the contributors of a trust fund become the founders of the trust itself, but the question when a contributor would become in law a joint founder of the trust would depend not merely upon the fact of his\n\n902 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS (1968] 2 s.c.R.\n\ncontribution \"ut also upon the surrounding circumstances proved in the particular case and the subsequent conduct of the parties.\n\nJn In the Matter of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869-and In the\n\nMatter of the St. Leonard, Shoreditch, Parochial Schools(') it was held by the House of Lords that where a charity is established b~ subscriptions the original subscribers alone are the founders, and the later benefactions are on the footing of the original foundation.\n\nAt page 308 of the Report Earl of Selbome, L.C. stated :\n\n\"Now let us consider what is the reasonable manner of applying to such a charity the word 'founder'.\n\nIt is reasonably clear that not every subscriber or contributor could be a founder having control over the school, or capable within the meaning of the Act of Parliament of impressing on it, by his own act or by his own authority a denominational character.\n\nIt i> also reasonably plain, when you have once started with a foundation in 1705, though by smail beginnings, yet that everything afterwards added, every accretion to the original subscriptions, which was not an endowment for any new and special purpose, must be taken to be upon the footinl! of the original foundation; not a new foundation, but something contributed for the purpose of the original foi:odation .............. Now it is quite cot\\ceivable that a number of per; ons mi?ht have met at that time, and miht have come tQ a comm'JO agreement as to the purposes for which they should subscribe and solicit subscriptions; a'ld if th1~ had been embodied in writin!!, and if th\"y had solicited subsc, iptions on the footing that either they themselves were to make a law for the char:ty and giv~ it sa•uts. or that this was to be done by ohrs in a particular manner, or if in any original documents soliciti.n, f sub- Jcriptions there had been a written law laid ., t}6wn for the charity expressing the purposes for which it was to be founded, those persons so initiating .tlfe subscriptions, and so declaring the purpose for which they were made and solicited, might be regarded as founders within the meaning of this clause.., But it appars to their Lordships to be q11ite impossible to attribute that d1aracter to those who come after them-whthcr they contributed to the building fund Or any other fund in aid ..:if the existin!! charity or notJ They did not found the\n\nharity; they found it existing; they merely aided and .assisted it.\"\n\n(I)\" l\" :t..C. 3114.\n\nIn Sattikara Venkatarama Chettiar v. 0. P. Damodaram Chettiar(') there was a deed of trust executed by V in favour of 19 persons known as Chettithanakaras which stated that he a.lone was unable to make and set up idols of Ramalingam and Choudeswari Amman in the Choudeswari Amman Temple Devasthanam built by him and that the nineteen persons agreed to raise a fund and to put up the idol in the temple anj according to the aeei; n.ent that they set up the idols of Rama, ingam and Choudeswljff Animan and they agreed to purchase property for endowing the temple. and the document then went on to state \"that the nineteen prsons should manage the temple from generation to gi; neration.\"1 /Funds were coliected by V and by the ninete€'n persons mentioned in. the document; they built the. temple installed the idols in it, and collected funds for the upkeep of. the temple and managed the temple under the deed of trust.\n\nIt was held by the Madras High Court that the deed of trust conferred the hereditary right to the trµsteeship upon V and tile nineteen Chettithankars. -At page 461 of the Report the High Court stated as follows :\n\n\"If persons invite subscriptions on a representation that they would devote the subscriptions so , collected to a particular purpose and they divert the subscriptions to some other purpose the subscribers have tsf object to the funds being diverted to other purposes/than those for which they were collected.\n\nBut so loefg as the subscribers do not object to the person or P, ersons collecting subscriptions for building or endowing any particular institution, the person or persons so building or and endowing it have the right to provide for its management for all time to come.\n\nThere is nothing in the evidence to show that the persons wo/gae subscriptions gave them on the understanding that the founders should not have the hereditary right . of management.\n\nAll that appears from Ex. A is, that subscriptions were collected, funds were raised, a temple was built and idols were installed and the management was in the hands of Venkatarama Chetti and others and all of them.\"\n\nAs we. have already stated, the appellants have failed to prove that all the contribuwrjes were the joint founders of the trust and that they\" were all in turns entitled to management in proportion to the amounts that they had contributed. On the other hand, the evidence makes in11,1i te cleat that the contributories agreed to leave the management of the trust solely in the hands of the senior Chockalingam/ and subsequently of defendant no. 2.\n\nWe are acocrdingly of the opinion that Mr. N. C. Chatterjee has been lll)able tomake good his argument on this aspect of the case.\n\n(1) 51 M.~.J. 547.\n\n904 SUPREME o6URT REPORTS\n\n\nWe proceed to coos~ the next question aris; ng in this appcaJ, viz., whether the p!ori'ntifij are entitled to ask for the settlement of a scheme even on tlie aumption that they were not co-founders of the trust. .The parties in this case have proceeded on the footing that the' trust is a private trust, but the authorities establish that even in the case of a private trust a suit can be filed for the removal of the trustee or for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the objects of the trust. If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee, a suit can be brought in a civil court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.-( See, for example, Pramatha Nath. Mullick's case(') and Manohar Mookerjee v. Peary Mohan('), There are also authorities to the effect that a Civil Court may frame a scheme in !he case of a private endowment at the ins•ance of the parties interested.\n\nThe question has been discussed by the Ca!cu; ta High Court in Bi ma/ Krishna's case(8 ) and it was held in that case that a scheme for the administration of a private endowment can be framed by a Civil Court.\n\nMookerjce. J. observed in that case that in India the Crown is the constitutional protector of all infants and as the deity occupies in law the position of an infant, the shebaits who represent the deity are entitled to seek the assistance of the Court in case of mismanagement, fraud or maladministration on the part of the shebait and to have a proper scheme for managemept framed for the administration of the private trust.\n\nIn Pramatha Nath Mu/lick's(') case to which we have already made reference, the Judicial Committee itself directed the framing of a scheme in the case of a private endowment and the case was expressly remanded to the trial court for that purpost..\n\nIo the present case the appellants being contributors to the trust are interested in the proper administration of the trust and, in out opinion, they h'ave a sufficient right to bring a suit in a Civil Court in case there is mismanagement or breach of trust on the part of the managing trustee and fer framing of a scheme.\n\nBut the question in the present appeal is whether the appellants have made out any grounc!S, for framing of a scheme or for the removal of the second defe.ndant from the management of the trust.\n\nIt was alleged by the apJ>, C!}lants in .the plaints that the trust had G been mismanaged by the, enior Chockalingam and by his grandson, 2nd defendant and; botb have been guilty of breach of trust.\n\nThe main char¥e Jeveljed against defendant no. 2 was the nonperformance of the pujas and the closing down of the Thevara Patasala and the feeding of the pupils. The Subordinate Judge ha~ examined the evidence dealing with the charge and found that it H\n\n(I) 52 IA 245.\n\n(2) 24 C.W.N. 478.\n\n(3) 41 C.W.N. 72 .\n\nwas not established. The High Court, upon a11alysis of the evidence, has reached the same conclusion. It was also alleged by the appellants that Account Books/ Exs. A-9 and A-10 have been fabricated by defendant. no. 2 but the Subordinate Judge and. the High Court both held that the allegation was not true.\n\nCertain other charges were also levelled by the plaintiffs against defendant no. 2 and senior Chockalingam but the High Court as well as the Subordinate Judge found that these charges were not substantiated The question whether defendant no. 2 or the senior Chockalingam was guilty of breach of trust or of acts of mismanagement is' a question of fact and in view of the concurrent finding of both the lower courts on this question we are of opinion that no ground has been made out on behalf of the appellants for framing of a scheme or for removal of defendant no. 2 from the office of the managing trustee.\n\nIt follows that the suit brought by the appellants has been rightly dismissed.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that the judgment of the High Court dated April 4, 1961 in Appeal No. 99 of 1957 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P:s.\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\nL3Sup.C. l./68-l 6-l-69-2,500-GIPF.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "KT. N. RM. THENAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KT. N. RM. THENAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. S. KR. KARUPPAN CHETTIAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. S. KR. KARUPPAN CHETTIAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "November 12. 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 666, "end_char": 683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their case \\Vas that the trust was a joint foundation made on November 12."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 27, 1943 C had nominated the."}}, {"text": "fo the Matter of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2702, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pramotha Nath Mu//ick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "904 A.CJ\n\nPramotha Nath Mu//ick's case.", "canonical_name": "Pramatha Nath. Mullick"}}, {"text": "Manahar Maalerj", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 I.A. 245; Manahar Maalerj\" \"· Peary Mohan, 24 C.W.N. 478; and Bimal Krizhna'r case, 41 C.W.N. 728; ttferred to."}}, {"text": "Peary Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 I.A. 245; Manahar Maalerj\" \"· Peary Mohan, 24 C.W.N. 478; and Bimal Krizhna'r case, 41 C.W.N. 728; ttferred to."}}, {"text": "Bimal Krizhna'r", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4056, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 I.A. 245; Manahar Maalerj\" \"· Peary Mohan, 24 C.W.N. 478; and Bimal Krizhna'r case, 41 C.W.N. 728; ttferred to."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4107, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, R. Thiagarajan for R. Ganapathy Iyer, for lhe appellants.", "canonical_name": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4311, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, R. Thiagarajan for R. Ganapathy Iyer, for lhe appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4330, "end_char": 4347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, R. Thiagarajan for R. Ganapathy Iyer, for lhe appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Gopa/achari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "K. Gopa"}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Gopa/achari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "K. Gopa"}}, {"text": "Ramru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamru; wami, J. This appeal is brought on behalf of the plaintilfs, by special leave, against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated April 4, 1961 in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "wami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamru; wami, J. This appeal is brought on behalf of the plaintilfs, by special leave, against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated April 4, 1961 in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Pillamangalam Alagapuri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4839, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal, the plaintiffs prayed for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a Trust known as Sina Ravanna Mana Pana Sona Guru Puja Mutt at Pillamangalam Alagapuri, Tiruchnapalli District and for dn account of the management of the Trust by the late N. S. Chockalingam Chcttiar and for certain incidental reliefs."}}, {"text": "Tiruchnapalli District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal, the plaintiffs prayed for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a Trust known as Sina Ravanna Mana Pana Sona Guru Puja Mutt at Pillamangalam Alagapuri, Tiruchnapalli District and for dn account of the management of the Trust by the late N. S. Chockalingam Chcttiar and for certain incidental reliefs."}}, {"text": "N. S. Chockalingam Chcttiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the suit which is the subject-matter of this appeal, the plaintiffs prayed for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a Trust known as Sina Ravanna Mana Pana Sona Guru Puja Mutt at Pillamangalam Alagapuri, Tiruchnapalli District and for dn account of the management of the Trust by the late N. S. Chockalingam Chcttiar and for certain incidental reliefs.", "canonical_name": "N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar"}}, {"text": "November I 2, 19 I 9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5091, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs was that the Trust was a joint foundation made on November I 2, 19 I 9 by Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, father of plaintiffs I and 2 a.nd grand-father of plaintiffs 3, Raman Chettiar, father of plaintiff no."}}, {"text": "Sinnakaruppan Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs was that the Trust was a joint foundation made on November I 2, 19 I 9 by Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, father of plaintiffs I and 2 a.nd grand-father of plaintiffs 3, Raman Chettiar, father of plaintiff no."}}, {"text": "Raman Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5203, "end_char": 5217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs was that the Trust was a joint foundation made on November I 2, 19 I 9 by Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, father of plaintiffs I and 2 a.nd grand-father of plaintiffs 3, Raman Chettiar, father of plaintiff no.", "canonical_name": "Raman Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Subramaniam Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5246, "end_char": 5266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, Subramaniam Chettiar Plaintiff no.", "canonical_name": "Subramaniam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Perianan Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, Perianan Chettiar.", "canonical_name": "Perianan Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Chockalingam Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and Chockalingam Chettiar, father of defendant no.", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Appar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5585, "end_char": 5590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appar, Sundarnr, Sambhandar and Manickavachakar and ordinary pujas to the other 63 Nayanmars on their birth days; to conduct a Thevaram PatasaJa, and feeding the pupils."}}, {"text": "Sundarnr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appar, Sundarnr, Sambhandar and Manickavachakar and ordinary pujas to the other 63 Nayanmars on their birth days; to conduct a Thevaram PatasaJa, and feeding the pupils."}}, {"text": "Sambhandar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appar, Sundarnr, Sambhandar and Manickavachakar and ordinary pujas to the other 63 Nayanmars on their birth days; to conduct a Thevaram PatasaJa, and feeding the pupils."}}, {"text": "Manickavachakar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appar, Sundarnr, Sambhandar and Manickavachakar and ordinary pujas to the other 63 Nayanmars on their birth days; to conduct a Thevaram PatasaJa, and feeding the pupils."}}, {"text": "Chockalingam Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5806, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that at the time of the foundation Chockalingam Chettiar contributed Rs.", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Raman Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2S,000/- Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, Raman Chettiar, Subramaniam Chettiar, and Perianan Chettiar contributing Rs.", "canonical_name": "Raman Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Subramaniam Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5893, "end_char": 5913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2S,000/- Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, Raman Chettiar, Subramaniam Chettiar, and Perianan Chettiar contributing Rs.", "canonical_name": "Subramaniam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Perianan Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2S,000/- Sinnakaruppan Chettiar, Raman Chettiar, Subramaniam Chettiar, and Perianan Chettiar contributing Rs.", "canonical_name": "Perianan Chettiar"}}, {"text": "November 12, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,250 each in favour\n\nTHESAPPA v. KARUPPAN (Ramaswami, I.) 899\n\nof the first defendant's father on November 12, 1919 and they were cashed in due course."}}, {"text": "Chokalingam Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the joint founders had at the time of foundation appointed Chokalingam Chettiar who was the largest contributor as the manager and executive Trustee and the latter had constructed buildings for the Mutt and bought lands in Manakkarai village, Mannargudi taluk. .", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Manakkarai village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6418, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the joint founders had at the time of foundation appointed Chokalingam Chettiar who was the largest contributor as the manager and executive Trustee and the latter had constructed buildings for the Mutt and bought lands in Manakkarai village, Mannargudi taluk. ."}}, {"text": "Mannargudi taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the joint founders had at the time of foundation appointed Chokalingam Chettiar who was the largest contributor as the manager and executive Trustee and the latter had constructed buildings for the Mutt and bought lands in Manakkarai village, Mannargudi taluk. ."}}, {"text": "N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who alleged that the sole founder of the Mutt was the late N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar, his grandfather, who at first installed the Vinayakar image and also the 63 Nayanmars and established the pujas for the four Samayacharyars and the Nayanmars, He was also the sole trustee and was in exclusive management from the foundation of the trust till November 29, 1943 when by a registered instrument he appointed the second ?", "canonical_name": "N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar"}}, {"text": "November 29, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who alleged that the sole founder of the Mutt was the late N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar, his grandfather, who at first installed the Vinayakar image and also the 63 Nayanmars and established the pujas for the four Samayacharyars and the Nayanmars, He was also the sole trustee and was in exclusive management from the foundation of the trust till November 29, 1943 when by a registered instrument he appointed the second ?"}}, {"text": "N. S. Chockalingam Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that from the very\"date of contribution the plaintiffs never bargained for any rights as trustees but they accepted N. S. Chockalingam Chettiar as the sole trustee.", "canonical_name": "N. S. Chockalingarn Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Chockalingam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7846, "end_char": 7858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge of mis-management was totally denied by the defendants and it was said that the trust was being maintained and conducted on a much grander scale than during the trusteeship of the senior Chockalingam.", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Nayanmars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7956, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was asserted that the daily puja to the Vinayakar and the ordinary and special pujas to the Nayanmars and the Samayacharyars were all performed with scrupulous re~.ula- F rity."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Pudu-, klmtai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Pudu-, klmtai by his judgment dated January 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8129, "end_char": 8145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Pudu-, klmtai by his judgment dated January 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8770, "end_char": 8783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "99 of 1957 by its judgment dated April 4, 1961."}}, {"text": "Chocka!ingarn", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9029, "end_char": 9042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the High Court that the eVidence made it quite clear that the contributors agreed to leave the management of the trust solely in-charge of the senior Chocka!ingarn.", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 968] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 968] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Mr. N. C.\n\nChatterjee thafthe vilasam of the trust S.R.M.P.A.S. supports the claim of the appellants that they were joint founders.", "canonical_name": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12707, "end_char": 12725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-10 dated September 30, 1934, Ex."}}, {"text": "June 6, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12742, "end_char": 12754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-11 dated June 6, 1936 and Ex."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12774, "end_char": 12787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-12 dated April 5, 1937 are all sale deeds solely in the name of the senior Chockalingam."}}, {"text": "ChockaJingam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12915, "end_char": 12927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mutt bui)ding had always stood in the name of the senior ChockaJingam in the register of Alagapuri Panchayat Union.", "canonical_name": "Chockalingam Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Alagapuri Panchayat Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mutt bui)ding had always stood in the name of the senior ChockaJingam in the register of Alagapuri Panchayat Union."}}, {"text": "Jn In the Matter of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14713, "end_char": 14762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Earl of Selbome", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15072, "end_char": 15087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 308 of the Report Earl of Selbome, L.C. stated :\n\n\"Now let us consider what is the reasonable manner of applying to such a charity the word 'founder'."}}, {"text": "Ramalingam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17261, "end_char": 17271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Damodaram Chettiar(') there was a deed of trust executed by V in favour of 19 persons known as Chettithanakaras which stated that he a.lone was unable to make and set up idols of Ramalingam and Choudeswari Amman in the Choudeswari Amman Temple Devasthanam built by him and that the nineteen persons agreed to raise a fund and to put up the idol in the temple anj according to the aeei; n.ent that they set up the idols of Rama, ingam and Choudeswljff Animan and they agreed to purchase property for endowing the temple."}}, {"text": "Choudeswari Amman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17276, "end_char": 17293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Damodaram Chettiar(') there was a deed of trust executed by V in favour of 19 persons known as Chettithanakaras which stated that he a.lone was unable to make and set up idols of Ramalingam and Choudeswari Amman in the Choudeswari Amman Temple Devasthanam built by him and that the nineteen persons agreed to raise a fund and to put up the idol in the temple anj according to the aeei; n.ent that they set up the idols of Rama, ingam and Choudeswljff Animan and they agreed to purchase property for endowing the temple."}}, {"text": "Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17504, "end_char": 17508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Damodaram Chettiar(') there was a deed of trust executed by V in favour of 19 persons known as Chettithanakaras which stated that he a.lone was unable to make and set up idols of Ramalingam and Choudeswari Amman in the Choudeswari Amman Temple Devasthanam built by him and that the nineteen persons agreed to raise a fund and to put up the idol in the temple anj according to the aeei; n.ent that they set up the idols of Rama, ingam and Choudeswljff Animan and they agreed to purchase property for endowing the temple."}}, {"text": "Choudeswljff Animan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17520, "end_char": 17539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Damodaram Chettiar(') there was a deed of trust executed by V in favour of 19 persons known as Chettithanakaras which stated that he a.lone was unable to make and set up idols of Ramalingam and Choudeswari Amman in the Choudeswari Amman Temple Devasthanam built by him and that the nineteen persons agreed to raise a fund and to put up the idol in the temple anj according to the aeei; n.ent that they set up the idols of Rama, ingam and Choudeswljff Animan and they agreed to purchase property for endowing the temple."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17979, "end_char": 17996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Madras High Court that the deed of trust conferred the hereditary right to the trµsteeship upon V and tile nineteen Chettithankars."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Chetti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19108, "end_char": 19126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A is, that subscriptions were collected, funds were raised, a temple was built and idols were installed and the management was in the hands of Venkatarama Chetti and others and all of them.\""}}, {"text": "Pramatha Nath. Mullick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20554, "end_char": 20576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee, a suit can be brought in a civil court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.-( See, for example, Pramatha Nath.", "canonical_name": "Pramatha Nath. Mullick"}}, {"text": "Bi ma/ Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20849, "end_char": 20863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question has been discussed by the Ca!cu; ta High Court in Bi ma/ Krishna's case(8 ) and it was held in that case that a scheme for the administration of a private endowment can be framed by a Civil Court."}}, {"text": "Mookerjce", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20997, "end_char": 21006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mookerjce."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. observed in that case that in India the Crown is the constitutional protector of all infants and as the deity occupies in law the position of an infant, the shebaits who represent the deity are entitled to seek the assistance of the Court in case of mismanagement, fraud or maladministration on the part of the shebait and to have a proper scheme for managemept framed for the administration of the private trust."}}, {"text": "Pramatha Nath Mu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21429, "end_char": 21445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pramatha Nath Mu/lick's(') case to which we have already made reference, the Judicial Committee itself directed the framing of a scheme in the case of a private endowment and the case was expressly remanded to the trial court for that purpost..\n\nIo the present case the appellants being contributors to the trust are interested in the proper administration of the trust and, in out opinion, they h'ave a sufficient right to bring a suit in a Civil Court in case there is mismanagement or breach of trust on the part of the managing trustee and fer framing of a scheme.", "canonical_name": "Pramatha Nath. Mullick"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_102_110_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "GHASIRAM v.\n\nDAL SINGH & OTHERS\n\nFebruary 7, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND K. S. Hl!GDE, JJ.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act. 1951, s. 123(1), (2) .le (1)-Elecftd candidate being Minister b'!fore election using discretionary funds to remove publiC grlvances-1/ co\"upt practice.-Spending fu.nt/S for general prtblicgood only jus, before election-Evil practice. -\n\nThe first respondent was elected to the Haryana State Legislative Assem- My at the election held on February 19, 1967. The appellant challenged his election by an election pef..ition on the grounds, inter alia, that prior to his election, the respondent, who was a Minister in the State Government and had available to him certain discretionary funds, had used theae funds to bribe the v\"..ecs; it was alleged that prior to the election he had visited several villages in his constituency and the voters had told l>.im that they would not vote for him as he had done nothin~ for their uplift: he had therefore ma~ various discretionary grants to Oram Pan .. chayats. given funds for the construction of a sacred tank in one village. for building public utility works, community centres and for repairs of Harijan well in different villages. It was also alleged that he had used liis position as Minister 1to favour some of the villagers by providing certain irrigation facilities in some villages with a view to securing support for his candidature. The High Court dismissed the election petition.\n\nOn appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD : On the evidence before it, the High Court had rightly di!!· n1issed t'he petition.\n\nThe law requires that a corrupt practice involving bribery must be fully stablished. The evidence must show clearly that the promise or gift directly or indirectly was made to an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. The position of a Minister is difficult. It io; obvious that he cannot cease to function when his election is due.\n\nHe must of necessity attend to the grievances. otherwise he must fail. Hr n1ust imorove the image' of his administration before the public. If everv one of his official acts done bona fide is to be construed against him and an ulterior motive is spelled out of them, the administration must necc.ssarily come to a stand-still. [109 F-G] In the present case the money was not distributed among the voters directly but was given to Panchayats and the public at large.\n\nIt was t.o be used for th\" good of those for and those against the cannidate.\n\nNo doubt this had the effect of pushing forward the respondent's claims but that was inevitable even if no money was spent but good administra~ tion changed the people's condition. It could not therefore be held that there was any corrupt p'ractice.\n\nIf there was good evidence that the Minister bargained directly or indirectly for votes. he result might have been different, but there was no such evidence. [110 B..C]\n\nCase Jaw referred to.\n\nObiter Election is something which must be conducted fairly. Tc arrange t._~ SRend money on the eve of elections in different constituencies~\n\nGHASI RAM v. DAL SlNGH (Hidayatullah, /.)\n\nI 03\n\n:.ilthough for general public good is, when all is said, and do'ne, an evil practice, even if it may not be corrupt practice. The dividing line bet- \"''een an evil practice an.cl a corrupt practice .is a very thin one. It should\n\nte understood r.hat energy to do public good should be used not on. the eve of elections but much earlier and that even slight evidence might change this evil. practice into corrupt practice.\n\nPayments from discretionary grants on the eve of elections sho11ld be avoided. [110 D-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 16~2 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated September 12, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 24 of 1967.\n\nNaunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the appellant.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. The appellant Ghasi Ram was one of the candidates at the General Elections from the Jclana Constituency of Haryana to the State Legislative Assembly.\n\nThe respondents were other candidates. The election took place on February 19, 1967 and the results were declared two days later.\n\nThe first respondent was declared elected having secured 9,000 and oJd more votes than the appellant. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, September 12, 1967, by which the election petition was ordered to be dismissed. The petition was based on certain corrupt practices of the answering respondent who was a Minister for Irrigation & Power in the Ministry of Shri Bhagwat Dayal Sharma till the result of the election. He was charged with having used his position as Minister in various ways to further his own election. The High Court on an examination of the evidence came to the conclusion that no corrupt practice \\\\'.as, in fact, proved against him and the election could not be said to be void. Since the filing of the election petition the Haryana Assembly has been dissolved, but as allegations of corrupt practice were raised in the petition the appeal bas been pressed before us. After hearing learned counsel in the appeal we have reached the same conclusion as the High Court and we find the appeal to be unsubstantial.\n\nWe proceed to give our reasons briefly after stating the facts on which the election petition was founded.\n\nThe corrupt practices charged against the answering respondent can be divided under three heads. . The first is that he used certain discretionery funds to bribe the voters. The second is that he used his position to favour some Of the villages whit a view to securing support for his candidature, and the last is that he exer-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\ncised undue pressure upon two Patwaris to work for him; when cthey declined, he ordered their suspension.\n\nWe shall deal with these allegations in the same order.\n\nAfter the new State of Haryana was constituted on Novem ber I, 1966, the Government of Haryana placed at t]Je disposal of the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers certain sums of money for distribution at their discretion. This was by a Resolution of the Government in November, 1966 (Ex . . RW 14/1 ). This position is admitted. Since the answering respondent was a Minister, a sum of Rs. 50,000 was placed in his discretionary grant. From this sum the answering respondent made his discretionary grants and a sum of Rs. 12,500 in the aggregate was paid by him for various purposes in his constituency.\n\nThe allegation is that he macje this distribution as a bargain for votes in several villages and this amounted to corrupt practice.\n\nThe amount was cjistributed by him between December 8, 1966 and January 9, 1967. In most cases the money was paid after the poll but as promises were apparently made this makes no difference w the allegation of corrupt practice. Section 123 lays down what .are to be regarded as corrupl practices and it inter alia provides :\n\n\"123 .. Corrupt practices.-The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the PU!'!'Oses of this Act:-\n\n( 1) Bribery, that is to say,-\n\n( A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate . . . . of any gratification, to any person whomso- ever,. with the object, directly or indireclly of ind.ucing-\n\n( a)\n\n(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at gn\n\nelection . . .. . . . .\n\n(2) Undue intiuence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate . . . . . . . with the free exercise of any electoral right\n\n(7) The obtaining or pr<>curing or abetting or tempting to obtain or procure by a candidate . . . . . any assistance (other than the giving vote) for the furtherance of the ·prospects of that candidate's eletion,\n\nGIL\\SI RAM v. DAL SINGH (Hidayatullah, J,) 105\n\nfrom any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes, namely :-\n\n(f) revenue officers other than village revenue officers known as lamardars, m.alguzars, patels, deshmukbs or by aJJ'f other name, whose duty to collect land revenue and who are remunerated by a share of, or commission on, the amount of land revenue collected by them but who do not discharge any police functions; and\n\nA proini5e of a gift or offer is equally a corrupt practice but the dft, offer or premise must be made to an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election; and, similarly, undue influence and obtaining or procuring of the service of apy person in the service D of the Government must be with the same intention. We have to bear this in mind when we examine the three charges brought against the first respondent\n\nUnder the first head of charges it is stated that he promised a payment of Rs. 20,000 to the Grampanchayat, J; gra; Rs. 5,000 on February 13, 1967 for a sacred tank ip village Ram Rai; E Rs. 1,000 on January 9, 1967 to the Grampanchayat, Bahmanwas; Rs. 2,500 in December, 1966 to the Grampanchayat, Bibipur and Rs. 500 each on January 9, 1967 for public utility works to the Grampanchayat, Ram Rai, Dhanak Community Centre at Lajwana ,.(alan, the. Balmiki Harijan Community Centre at village Mehrra and Rs. 500 for the repair of a Harijan well at Lajwana Khurd.\n\nF It is said that before these grants were made. the Minister visited these several villages and the voters told him that they were not going to vote for him as he had done nothing for their uplift and on his promising the said sums the voters were won over with the result that the answering respondent secured the bulk of the votes from these villages. The High Court carefully 'considered the G evidence led to prove these allegations and came to the conclusion that it fell short of the requirements of s. 123 of the Act It is contended before us that the High Court was in error in reaching this conclusion both in fact and law. We shall first dispose of the facts before proceeding to examine what we consider to be corrupt practice in this context\n\nH The donation to the Grampanchayat, lgra is attempted to be proved through the evidence of one Mehtab Sin$11 (P.W. 10).\n\nHe stated that the answering respondent, as Chairman of Block Samiti had promised Rs. 5,000 but had not paid it. When be came U Sup. CI/68-8\n\n106 SUPREME COURT REPOll.Ta [1968] 3 s.C.ll..\n\nfor canvassing, the voters were unwilling to vote for him becall8e A he had not kept his rromise. He then persuaded them and prom!sed. to pay sme money .if they s.ave him. their .support. The High Court pomted out that this witness was a discharged Sub, Inspector .and the polling agent of the election petjtioner. He was foun<) to be telling lies when he said that the amount was received 7 days after the promise, becaUSe the record clearly showed that B this money was paid only in March, 1967, more than a month after the poll. Lakhi Ram (P .W. 5) admitted that there was a village schoql which was lying incomplete and money was needed for its completion.\n\nIt will be noticed, that this money was not paid directly to any voter or voters. It was handed over to the Grampanchayat for utilization. This meant that it would have gone to C the benefit of those who were going to support the answering respondent and also those who were opposed to him.\n\nTbe High Cou, t di4 not believe the evidence that there was any batgain for votes as requirt'.d by the definition of corrupt practice. On Ii reading of the l:vidence we are satisfied that the village CO!lllllunity\n\nasked him for help and the answering respondent promised to help them to complete works of public utility. The amOllllt was paid D after the election was over.\n\nSimilarly, the sum of Rs. 5,000 said to have been paid to Grampanchayat, Ram Rai ls proved through the evidence of Devi Dayal (P.W. 11) and Mangal Singh (P.W. 12). This money was sanctioned on December 8, 196~ even before the Congress had E given ticket to the answering respondent. The evidence here also does not show that there was any bargain for votes. The two witnesses were proved to be hostile to the answering respondent.\n\nDevi Dayal was his rival candidate in 1952 and had made sevel'l'~\n\napplications against the answering respondent. The application for the Congress ticket was .made by the answering respondent on F December 6, 1966 and the grant being made on Decetttber 8, 1966 the evidence of Devi Dayal that the grant was after the nomination was definitely false. Man gal Singh is the editor of a weekly journal, which published several complaints against the answering respondent. The answering respondent stated that he had collected Rs. 25,000 for the sacred talik even before he became Minister; that through his efforts a pucca road, a dispensary, a veterinary G hO!'pital, a post office and water works were established. He had also got a primary school upgraded. Ram Rai being his native village be was interested in the work of the Panchayat and as there was water shortage he gave the village Panchayat this amount to help them to improve the sacred tank. The High Court did not find any evidence which would bring the matter withins. 123. It H declined to believe tese hostile witnesses and on a comideration of the evidence we are not satisfied that the conclusion was erroneous.\n\nGBASI RAK v. DAL SNGH (Hidayatullah, /.)\n\nI 07\n\nA The sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid to the Grampanchayat, Bah manwas for a primary school. This was a month or a month and quarter before the election. This was sought to be proved through Ram Dutt (P.W. 20). It is in evidence that Ram Dutt was very friendly with the election petitioner and even gave his truck for the use of the petitioner. Evidence further shows that the school B building was without a roof for. some time and the children used to sit under trees.\n\nWe are satisfied that this amount cannot be described as a bribe.\n\nThere was no evidence to prove the payment of Rs. 2,500 to \"Bibipur and as none was brought to our notipe this point wa5 C .rightly decided against the eleetion .petitioner.\n\nThe four sums of Rs. 500 each were paid for improvement of Community Centres. The attempt to prove that they were a part of a bargain was discountenanced by the High Court. In respect of the amount paid to Lajwana Kalan the evidence was that . of Ram Singh (P.W. 13), the polling agent of the election petitioner, Shri Phula (P.W .14), whose demeanour was commented upon D by the learned Judge, and one of the candidates Mangeram (P.W.\n\n19) and Jailal (P.W. 21), a helper of one other candidate. Their evidence was found to be unsatisfactory either because of the interest in themselves or in other candidates or because of internal discrepancies and defects. We have read the evidence and we see no reason to differ. In support of the other tWo payments of E Rs. 500 each, the only objection raised before us was that the payments were made to the Dhanak and the Balmiki Communities with a view to obtaining their votes because, it was contended, that there was no community centre at these villages. Evidence, however shows that , there are Paras at these villages, where the Harijan Community ineets. In fact, in the petition, and the evid- F ence these are referrCd to as Community Centres. This action of the ; answering respondent was not found to amount to a corrupt pra, ctice and on a consideration of the evidence we are in agreeme!J.t with the High Court.\n\nThe next group of corrupt practices are said to involVe certiiin facilities provided in the matter of irrigation. For example, the G Distributory No. 8 at Jind was widened to give more 'water to Ramrai village, a footbridge over the Sunder Branch of Western Jumna canal for Nandgarh village, two outlets were promised from Distributory No, 2 for village Radhana, the size of the outlet of the .Sunder Br.anch was increased, a new Rajbaha or minor was opened to benefit village Dingaria and the Jind Distributories were u generally modified. None of these was accepted by the IDgh Conrt as eVidence of corrupt practice with a view to procuring the votes.\n\nIt seems that it was conceded in the IDgh Court itself that these orders were made by the first respondent in the ordinary course of\n\nIOS SUPREME COURT lU!POITS\n\n\nhis duties as Minister for Irrigation.· There was nothing to. show that the first respondent went out of his way to do this. The point was, therefore, rightly decided against the appellant.\n\nMr. Naunit Lal argued vehemently that any gift which has the effect of changing the minds of the voters is a corrupt practice.\n\nHe read out to us the judgments of Riilley and Bucknill, JJ. from 8 the Borough of Kingston-upon-Hull(') case. In that case the charge against Sir Henry Seymour King was that he had distributed coals and given boxes of sweets to die children of the schools at the time or just before his election.\n\nThe motive of Sir Hemy Seymour King was never in doubt. The gifts were made to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his membership of the Central Division of Hull. After examin, ng the cases on the subject of gifts such as the Windsor(') case the Salisbury(•) case, the Wigan(') case, etc. the learned Judges avoided the election. In that case the presents were gratitious and not in furtherance of any dlily\n\nwhich Sir Henry Seymour King owed in any other capacity. In\n\nour courts this question has come up in ererit forms before and a word may be said about the cases. In S. Mahar Singh v.\n\nUmrao Singh(\"), the Punjab High COurt held that a candidate ipaking a promise to get the grievances of certain refugees as a body remedied and even getting the Revenue Minister to reinforce his promise was not corrupt practice. It was pointed out that the proll!ise was l).Ot made to any particular voter or voters but to the general body of residents without distinguishing between those who ':Vere favourably inclined. and th060 not. The gist of the corrupt pracitce, theref9re, lay in attempting to do . something for those opposed to the candidate with a view to changing their votes; and as a bargain for votes. A case in point is1Maganlal Bagdl v. Hari Vishnu Kamath(') in which the .candidat¢ offered to construct a well in a village if the voters voted for him and not for the rival candidate. Money was actually deposited .for this purpose and P was. to await the result. of the election. . Here there was a clear bargain for votes. As observed by this 'Court. in Khader S1'eritJ\n\nv. Munnunvami Gounder and Ors.('} it may be meritorious to make a .donation for a charitable pUipOse but on the eve of an election, such a gift may be open to construction that it was made with the intention of buying votes. As held in the Wigan(') case \"charity at the election time ought to be kept by the politicians irr the background.\" But when a question does arise, corrupt\n\npractice Which is a char~ quasi-criminal in nature. must be proved like any other fact. The gift must be proved to have a direct or indirect connection with votes. The gift must admit of no other -.--·\n\n(I) 6 O'M .t. H 372.\n\n(2) 2'l O'M .t. 'II 88.\n\n(3) 40'M .t. H 28.\n\n(4) 40'M &H 13. (S) A. l.R.. 1961 Punjab 244.\n\n (7) A.JeR, 1955 S.C. 775.\n\n(6) IS E.L.R. 205.\n\nGHASI RAM v. DAL mNGH (Hidayatullflh, /.) 109\n\nreasonable excuse. In Khader Sheriff's(') case the payment of RS. 500 to the District Congress Colilillittee was not held to be a charitable donation but expenditure incurred for furthering the prospects of the candidate. Omission to show it as expenses. was regarded as corrupt practice. In Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar(') general promises by Ministers to redress certain public grievances or to erect certain public amenities like hospitals, if elected were held not to amount to corrupt practice.\n\nThey were treated as promises of general public action. In Gangadhar Maithani v. Narendra Singh Bhandari(') promises of public action were held excluded from corrupt 'practice. Therefore a. prQtllise by a candidate that if he was elected he would see that expendjtme on development plans was incurred in his constitµency was held pefmissible. In Ba/want Ral Tayal v. Bishan Saroop('), a promise to the Harijans of a locality by a candidate when he was\n\nCl\\PVassing. for votes, that he w.ould do his , best to help them in the matter. of retaining an old mosque as a temple and for getting land for building houses was not held to amount to corrupt practice.\n\nThese cases which were cited before us are slightly different. But they point in the same direction. In Amircluind v. Surendra Lal Iha(') it was laid down that if a Minister redresses the grievances of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders them any help, on the eve of an election, it is not corrupt practice unless he obtains promises from the voters in return, as a condition for .their help. In Anjaneya Reddy v, Gangi Reddy and others(•).\n\nIt was held that the proof required to establish a corrupt practice must be almost of the character required .to establish a criminal charge.\n\nIn our opinion the law requires that a corrupt practice involving bribery must be fully established. The evidence must show clearly that the promise or gift directly or indirectly was made to an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. The position of a Minister is difficult. It is obvious that he cannot cease to function when his election is due. He must of necessity atteod to the gyievances, otherwise he must fail. He must improve the\n\nimae of his administration before the public. If everyone of his official acts done bona fide is to be construed against him and an ulterior motive is spelled out of them, the administration must necessarily come to a stand-still.\n\nThe State of Haryana came into existence on November 1, 1966. With an election in the near future, the political party had to do acts of a public nature. The grant of discre?onary grants were part of the general scheme to better community development projects and to remove the imme-\n\n(I) A.LR. 1955 S.C. 11S.\n\n(3) 18 E.L.R. 124.\n\n(S) 10 E .. L.R. S1.\n\n(2) 12 E.I.R. 376.\n\n(4) 17 E.I.R. IOI\n\n(6) 21 B.I.R. 247~\n\n110 SUPlUlME COURT lUlPOllTS (1968] 3 S.c.ll,\n\ndiate grievances of the public. The money was required to be A spent in about 3 months' time.\n\nThe action of the Minister had often the concurrence and recommendation of his subordinate staff.\n\nIt is for this reason that the orders about the improvement of the supply of waters were not pressed. . They were incapable of being construed against the first respondent. Therefore, emphasis was placed upon the distribution of money.\n\nThe money B was not distributed among the voters directly but was given to Panchayats and the public at large. It was to be used for the good of those for and those against the candidate. No doubt they had the effect of pushing forward his claims but 'that was inevitable even if no money was spent, but good administration changed the peopl.e's condition. We 9annot, therefore, hold that there was any c corrupt practice. If there was good evidence that the Minister bargained directly or indirectly for votes, the result might have been different but there was no such evidence.\n\n. Although we have held in this case that the action of the first respondent cannot be characterised as not innocent, we are constrained to say that the attitude of Government is far from laudable.\n\nD Election is something which must be conducted fairly. To arrange to spend money on the eve of elections in different constituencies although for general public gciod, is when all is said and done an evil practice, even. if it may not be corrupt practice. The dividing line between an evil practice and a corrupt practice is a very thin one. It should be understood that energy to do public good E should be used not on the eve of elections but much earlier and that even slight evidence might change this evil practices into corrupt practice. Payments from discretionary grants on the eve of elections should be avoided. ·\n\n. As regards the last point we are satisfied that the conclusion of the High Court is correct. The evidence about influencing the f Patwaris is most unsatisfactory. We do not think it necessary to discuss the evidence over again.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and will be dismissed.\n\nThere shall be no order about costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nA.flpeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "GHASIRAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ghasi Ram", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAL SINGH & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAL SINGH & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Oram Pan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant challenged his election by an election pef..ition on the grounds, inter alia, that prior to his election, the respondent, who was a Minister in the State Government and had available to him certain discretionary funds, had used theae funds to bribe the v\"..ecs; it was alleged that prior to the election he had visited several villages in his constituency and the voters had told l>.im that they would not vote for him as he had done nothin~ for their uplift: he had therefore ma~ various discretionary grants to Oram Pan .. chayats."}}, {"text": "Harijan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for building public utility works, community centres and for repairs of Harijan well in different villages."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3700, "end_char": 3706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3884, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3899, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal and B. P. Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "G. N. Dikshit"}}, {"text": "R. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "G. N. Dikshit"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. The appellant Ghasi Ram was one of the candidates at the General Elections from the Jclana Constituency of Haryana to the State Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Ghasi Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. The appellant Ghasi Ram was one of the candidates at the General Elections from the Jclana Constituency of Haryana to the State Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "Ghasi Ram"}}, {"text": "February 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4265, "end_char": 4282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election took place on February 19, 1967 and the results were declared two days later."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, September 12, 1967, by which the election petition was ordered to be dismissed."}}, {"text": "September 12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4559, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, September 12, 1967, by which the election petition was ordered to be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat Dayal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was based on certain corrupt practices of the answering respondent who was a Minister for Irrigation & Power in the Ministry of Shri Bhagwat Dayal Sharma till the result of the election."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6117, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the new State of Haryana was constituted on Novem ber I, 1966, the Government of Haryana placed at t]Je disposal of the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers certain sums of money for distribution at their discretion."}}, {"text": "Novem ber I, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6144, "end_char": 6161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the new State of Haryana was constituted on Novem ber I, 1966, the Government of Haryana placed at t]Je disposal of the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers certain sums of money for distribution at their discretion."}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6167, "end_char": 6188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the new State of Haryana was constituted on Novem ber I, 1966, the Government of Haryana placed at t]Je disposal of the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and the Deputy Ministers certain sums of money for distribution at their discretion."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6901, "end_char": 6917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount was cjistributed by him between December 8, 1966 and January 9, 1967."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6922, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount was cjistributed by him between December 8, 1966 and January 9, 1967."}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Rai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 on February 13, 1967 for a sacred tank ip village Ram Rai; E Rs."}}, {"text": "Bibipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9173, "end_char": 9180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,500 in December, 1966 to the Grampanchayat, Bibipur and Rs."}}, {"text": "Lajwana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9300, "end_char": 9307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 each on January 9, 1967 for public utility works to the Grampanchayat, Ram Rai, Dhanak Community Centre at Lajwana ,.(alan, the."}}, {"text": "Mehrra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9366, "end_char": 9372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balmiki Harijan Community Centre at village Mehrra and Rs."}}, {"text": "Lajwana Khurd", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9421, "end_char": 9434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 for the repair of a Harijan well at Lajwana Khurd."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mehtab Sin$11", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10289, "end_char": 10302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall first dispose of the facts before proceeding to examine what we consider to be corrupt practice in this context\n\nH The donation to the Grampanchayat, lgra is attempted to be proved through the evidence of one Mehtab Sin$11 (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOll.Ta [1968] 3 s.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CI/68-8\n\n106 SUPREME COURT REPOll."}}, {"text": "Lakhi Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhi Ram (P .W. 5) admitted that there was a village schoql which was lying incomplete and money was needed for its completion."}}, {"text": "Ram Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11907, "end_char": 11914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 said to have been paid to Grampanchayat, Ram Rai ls proved through the evidence of Devi Dayal (P.W. 11) and Mangal Singh (P.W. 12)."}}, {"text": "Devi Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11949, "end_char": 11959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 said to have been paid to Grampanchayat, Ram Rai ls proved through the evidence of Devi Dayal (P.W. 11) and Mangal Singh (P.W. 12)."}}, {"text": "Mangal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11974, "end_char": 11986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 said to have been paid to Grampanchayat, Ram Rai ls proved through the evidence of Devi Dayal (P.W. 11) and Mangal Singh (P.W. 12)."}}, {"text": "December 8, 196~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12027, "end_char": 12043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This money was sanctioned on December 8, 196~ even before the Congress had E given ticket to the answering respondent."}}, {"text": "Devi Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12266, "end_char": 12276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devi Dayal was his rival candidate in 1952 and had made sevel'l'~\n\napplications against the answering respondent.", "canonical_name": "Devi Dayal"}}, {"text": "Decetttber 8, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12508, "end_char": 12526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for the Congress ticket was .made by the answering respondent on F December 6, 1966 and the grant being made on Decetttber 8, 1966 the evidence of Devi Dayal that the grant was after the nomination was definitely false."}}, {"text": "Devi Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12543, "end_char": 12553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for the Congress ticket was .made by the answering respondent on F December 6, 1966 and the grant being made on Decetttber 8, 1966 the evidence of Devi Dayal that the grant was after the nomination was definitely false.", "canonical_name": "Devi Dayal"}}, {"text": "Man gal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12616, "end_char": 12629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Man gal Singh is the editor of a weekly journal, which published several complaints against the answering respondent."}}, {"text": "Ram Dutt", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was sought to be proved through Ram Dutt (P.W. 20)."}}, {"text": "Bibipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14085, "end_char": 14092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,500 to \"Bibipur and as none was brought to our notipe this point wa5 C .rightly decided against the eleetion .petitioner."}}, {"text": "Lajwana Kalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14406, "end_char": 14419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the amount paid to Lajwana Kalan the evidence was that ."}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14447, "end_char": 14456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Ram Singh (P.W. 13), the polling agent of the election petitioner, Shri Phula (P.W .14), whose demeanour was commented upon D by the learned Judge, and one of the candidates Mangeram (P.W.\n\n19) and Jailal (P.W. 21), a helper of one other candidate."}}, {"text": "Phula", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14519, "end_char": 14524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Ram Singh (P.W. 13), the polling agent of the election petitioner, Shri Phula (P.W .14), whose demeanour was commented upon D by the learned Judge, and one of the candidates Mangeram (P.W.\n\n19) and Jailal (P.W. 21), a helper of one other candidate."}}, {"text": "Mangeram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14621, "end_char": 14629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Ram Singh (P.W. 13), the polling agent of the election petitioner, Shri Phula (P.W .14), whose demeanour was commented upon D by the learned Judge, and one of the candidates Mangeram (P.W.\n\n19) and Jailal (P.W. 21), a helper of one other candidate."}}, {"text": "Jailal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Ram Singh (P.W. 13), the polling agent of the election petitioner, Shri Phula (P.W .14), whose demeanour was commented upon D by the learned Judge, and one of the candidates Mangeram (P.W.\n\n19) and Jailal (P.W. 21), a helper of one other candidate."}}, {"text": "Ramrai village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15763, "end_char": 15777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 at Jind was widened to give more 'water to Ramrai village, a footbridge over the Sunder Branch of Western Jumna canal for Nandgarh village, two outlets were promised from Distributory No, 2 for village Radhana, the size of the outlet of the .Sunder Br.anch was increased, a new Rajbaha or minor was opened to benefit village Dingaria and the Jind Distributories were u generally modified."}}, {"text": "Nandgarh village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15842, "end_char": 15858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 at Jind was widened to give more 'water to Ramrai village, a footbridge over the Sunder Branch of Western Jumna canal for Nandgarh village, two outlets were promised from Distributory No, 2 for village Radhana, the size of the outlet of the .Sunder Br.anch was increased, a new Rajbaha or minor was opened to benefit village Dingaria and the Jind Distributories were u generally modified."}}, {"text": "Radhana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15922, "end_char": 15929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 at Jind was widened to give more 'water to Ramrai village, a footbridge over the Sunder Branch of Western Jumna canal for Nandgarh village, two outlets were promised from Distributory No, 2 for village Radhana, the size of the outlet of the .Sunder Br.anch was increased, a new Rajbaha or minor was opened to benefit village Dingaria and the Jind Distributories were u generally modified."}}, {"text": "Dingaria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16045, "end_char": 16053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 at Jind was widened to give more 'water to Ramrai village, a footbridge over the Sunder Branch of Western Jumna canal for Nandgarh village, two outlets were promised from Distributory No, 2 for village Radhana, the size of the outlet of the .Sunder Br.anch was increased, a new Rajbaha or minor was opened to benefit village Dingaria and the Jind Distributories were u generally modified."}}, {"text": "IOS SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16357, "end_char": 16374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that it was conceded in the IDgh Court itself that these orders were made by the first respondent in the ordinary course of\n\nIOS SUPREME COURT lU!POITS\n\nhis duties as Minister for Irrigation.·"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16581, "end_char": 16591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Naunit Lal argued vehemently that any gift which has the effect of changing the minds of the voters is a corrupt practice.", "canonical_name": "Naunit Lal"}}, {"text": "Riilley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16740, "end_char": 16747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He read out to us the judgments of Riilley and Bucknill, JJ."}}, {"text": "Bucknill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16752, "end_char": 16760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He read out to us the judgments of Riilley and Bucknill, JJ."}}, {"text": "Henry Seymour King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16852, "end_char": 16870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the charge against Sir Henry Seymour King was that he had distributed coals and given boxes of sweets to die children of the schools at the time or just before his election.", "canonical_name": "Henry Seymour King"}}, {"text": "Hemy Seymour King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17022, "end_char": 17039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The motive of Sir Hemy Seymour King was never in doubt.", "canonical_name": "Henry Seymour King"}}, {"text": "Hull", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17167, "end_char": 17171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gifts were made to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his membership of the Central Division of Hull."}}, {"text": "Punjab High COurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17622, "end_char": 17639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In S. Mahar Singh v.\n\nUmrao Singh(\"), the Punjab High COurt held that a candidate ipaking a promise to get the grievances of certain refugees as a body remedied and even getting the Revenue Minister to reinforce his promise was not corrupt practice."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18582, "end_char": 18584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Congress Colilillittee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19463, "end_char": 19494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 to the District Congress Colilillittee was not held to be a charitable donation but expenditure incurred for furthering the prospects of the candidate."}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21860, "end_char": 21876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21900, "end_char": 21916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22204, "end_char": 22206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.flpeal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24487, "end_char": 24495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K.P.S.\n\nA.flpeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_111_118_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "01\\t: PRABHA JAIN\n\nABNASH CHAND & ANR.\n\nFebruary 1, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JI.)\n\nElection-Minister makiv discretionary grant-When amounts to corrupt practice.\n\nThe State of Haryaoa came nto existence on 1st November 1966.\n\nThe Cabinet placed certain sums of money at the disposal of the ministeis, one of whom was the appellant to be used at their discretion for purposes of public utility, for the benefit Of the general public and for the uplift of backward communities. The money had to be disbursed before 31st March 1967 through Pancbayat, Municipal or Government agencies. The appellant sanctioned cetlain payments for building twO dharnwshakls in two wards of a Municipality. Long after the sanction, her candidature for election to the Vidban Sabha of the State was recognised by her party and she stood for election from a constituency which included these two wards. She was elected, and some time later, the money was made available to the wards though the recipients were writing that the money should be made available at once. The first respondent challenged the election alleging corrupt practices and later amend,. ed the petition giving better particulars.\n\nThe pleasin the petition COD tradicted each. other, the evidence tendered at the trial of the petition contradicted the pleas, and the witnesses were found to be thoroughly unreliable. In spite of this the petition was allowed on the ground that the\n\ncircumstances showed that the sums were in fact paid to bargain for votes and to influence the voters in favour of the appellant.\n\nIn ·appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The action Of the appellant could not be construed against her.\n\nIt was done in the ordinah' course of her duties as Minister and there was no evidence that it was, directly or indirectly, part of a bargain\n\nwith the voters. No hurry to make the money available to the recipients emanated from the appellant. It was only the persons who were to benefit by the discretionary grant that were anxious t.o lay hands on the money, as soon as possible, so that the grant might not be. cancelJed later by a change of attitude caused by the election going against tb.e particular party, [117 H; 118 A-C] . ·\n\nGhasi Ram v. Dal Singh & Ors. f1968] 3 S.C.R. 102 followed.\n\nBhagwan Dutta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 200 and Kandaswami v. Adiryan, 19 E.L.R. 260, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1862 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act 1951 from the judgment and order dated November 16, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 19 of 1967.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State from the Kaial constitu~!lCY has been ~Jared to be void. The election was held on February 19, 1967 and the result of the pool was declared on February 22, 1967.\n\nThe appellant had a margin of nearly 2000 votes over the fust\n\nrpondent who was the closest rival. One other candidate had also stood but we are not concerned with him in the present appeal since he has not shown any interest in it. He secured less than\n\n1000 votes and forfeited his security.\n\nThe election petition was based upon allegations of corrupt practice against the successful candidate. The gravamen of the charge was that she as a minister in the Government of Mr. Bhagwat Dayal Sharma used certain discretionary grants to bribe the voters of her constituency and in particular by paying two sums of Rs. 2,000 for the construction of two dharamsa/as for the Kumhar and the Sweeper Colonies at Kaithal. There were other allegations also against her but as they have been found against the election petitioner and have not been brought to oilr notice we need not say anything about them.. The learned Judge who tried the election petition did not accept the evidence tendered by the election petitioner to prove the corrupt practice outlined above but held on a general appraisal of the circumstances of the case that these sums were in fact paid to bargain for votes and to influence the voters in favour of the appellant. We shall now give a few facts of the case before stating our conclusion.\n\nThe election petition was filed on April 7, 1967. It was later amended and.better particulars were supplied on July 29, 1967.\n\nIn the original election petition as filed by the election petitioner it was stated that a sum of Rs. 2,000 from the discretionary grant of the appellant was paid to the Harijans of Keorak Gate, Kaithal for the construction of a dharamsala.\n\nThe allegation then was that in the beginning of January 1967 the Harijans were approached by the appellant and were asked to vote for her.\n\nThey flatly refused to vote for her.\n\nThereupon she promised to provide funds for the crnstruction of a dharamsala in their' basti and tempted by this offer they agreed to vote for her. In regard to the other discretionary grant it was stated in the original petition that the Kumhar voters who reside in Do1ifan Gate. Kaithal, were also\n\nOM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuilah, J.) ll3\n\napproached by the appellant in the beginning of January 1967 and were asked to vote for her. When they refused to vote she promised them a sum of Rs. 2,000 for building the dharamia/a in their locality. It was further pointed out that the first sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid through the Deputy Commissioner, Kamal. vide his Memo No. 78-BP-III/67 /335 of January 12, 1967. The second payment was also made on the same <!_ate through the' Deputy Commissioner, Kamal, vide Development Department Memo No. 47-BAP-III-67 /326.\n\nThe affidavit in support of the election petition was sworn by the election petitioner on information supplied by others and bee lieved to be true. It was stated in the verification clause that thi>\n\ninformation was received \"from my workers and believed to be true\".\n\nOn an objection being raised that the particulars of the corrupt practice were not adequate and on the other hand vague and that D the affidavit did not disclose the persons from whom the information was derived the Court ordered that better particulars be supplied and a fresh affidavit filed.\n\nThe amended election petition was then filed in July, 1967. In this election petition a change was iritroduced. It was stated that on December 22, 1966 the Harijans were called to a Canal Rest House through one Om Pra- E kash Shorewala. President of the Municipal Committee, KaithaL Other members of the Municipal Staff including the Executive Officer Bhalla were also present. Among those who came were one Khaki Ram, Banwari Lal and one Harijan Lamberdar whose name was not given, In the presence of these persons request was made to the Harijans to vote for the appellant, and when they\n\nrefused to do a sum of Rs. 2,000 was promised from the discretionary grant, and on this offer the Harijan voters consented to vote for the appellant.\n\nIt was further alleged that this. amo11J1t was ultimately paid to Khaki Ram and Banwari Lal through Shri Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4). As regards the second charge it was stated that on December 29. 1966 the Kumhar voters w\"e\n\nsummoned t~ the Canal Rest House and three persons, Thakru, Altra and. Lilloo came as the representatives of the Kumhar community.\n\nThe same procedure, viz., asking them to vote for her candidature waS followed by the appellant and on their refusal to do so a sum of Rs. 2,000 was promised to them for the construction of a dharamsala in their bastr at Dogran Gate. Kaithal. This induced them to change their views.\n\nThe affidavit was also corrected. It was stated that the allegation was based upon information received from Pandit Kailash Chander, s/o Pandit Harl.Ram of Kaithal and Cb. Inder Raj, ex-Municipal Commissioner, Chandena Gate Gamri, Kaithal. ·\n\n114 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS (1968] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nIn auswer to the amended election petition the written statement adued that the allegation was a pure concoction. The appellant pointed out that the grant for the construction of the dharamsa/as was made by the appellant as far tiack as December 19, 1966 and that the allegation that it was the result of a bargain either on December 22 or December 29, was a pure fiction.\n\nThe election petitioner examined fourteen witnesses.\n\nWe are, however, not concerned with all of them because they are eonnected with the other allegations in the election petition.\n\nWitnesses bearing upon this case were only four. They were Gurbax Singh\n\n(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W. 3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8), whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again introduced. It was attempted to be proved that the bargain which had been referred to in the election petitions actualiy took place on December 3, 1966. This time it was affirmed that the Kumhars and the Sweepers were called together. An objection was taken before the learned Judge that this evidence could not be considered because the plea was 'CjUite different. The learned Judge ruled that the objection would be decided later.\n\nIt appears that the learned Judge did not put too much emphasis on the change of pleading presumably because he found the evidence to be unsatisfactory and unreliable. On the side of the appellant were examined one R. N. Kapur (R.W. 1), the personal Secretary of the appeJlant who proved her tour programme to give a lie to some of the allegations in the election petition. Attroo (R.W. 3), who was said to have been present at the conferences, Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4 ), the Municipal President, Mr. Bllagwat Dayal Sharma (R.W. 5), the Chief Minister in whose Ministry the appellant was working as the Finance Minister and the appellant herself.\n\nIt is not necessary to go largely into what the witnesses said because the learned Judge himself observed as follows :-\n\n\"Whereas according to the respondent the fact of the grant is not disputed, but it is denied that the grant was made in consideration of these communities voting for G her. If the matter had remained at this stage and the executing agency (the Sub-Divisional Magistrate) had disbursed these grants I would not have been prepared . to accept the oral evidence regarding the bargain which\n\nled to the grants. But the manner, how the money was realised and disbursed, lends ample support to the evidence that the bargain was struck.\" H It is clear that the learned Judge was of the opinion that the evidence led to prove the conference and the bargain at the con-\n\nOM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuiiah,.J.j 115\n\nference was unacceptable. He, however, accepted it because it was supported by circumstantial. details of the withdrawing of the money which was sanctioned; but for this the learned Judge 'l'l\"OU!d not have accepted the election petition.\n\nWe shall glance at this evidence which hlis been led in the case. As. pointed out above the only witnesses from the conference are Thakru (P.W. 8) and Bhalla (P.W. 3). With regard to Thakru it is sufficient to point out what the learned Judge himself said at the end of the deposition of Thakru : \"The tei.timony of this witness has not at all. impressed me. I will place no reliance whatsoever on his testimony''. In view of this observation of the learned Judge we think we are entitled to ignore his testimony altogether. As regards Bhalla (P.W. 3), he seems to have deposed not only in respect of these two grants but evecy allegation made in the election petition. Mr. A. K. Sen, for the appellant, vecy pertinently described him as an omnibus witnes~.\n\nHis evidence is not convmcing. It appears on the record of this case (and it was in fact admitted by Bhalla) that the .appellant had taken action against him in respect of a house which fell down owing to the negligence of the Municipal Authorities. It appears to us that Bhalla was hostile to the appellant. There is enough material to show that he was tcying to get even with the appellant for her action in putting the blame upon' him for the falling down of a house from seepage of water from the municipal mains. The learned Judge did not place any direct relianre upon Bhalla's testimony.\n\nAs we have shown above, if it had not been for the circumstances attending the grant the learned Judge himself would have discarded his testimony. We must, therefore, proceed with extreme caution in dealing with Bhalla's evidence in the case.\n\nIt may be pointed out here that in the election petition as well as in the evidence it was itated that the Harijans and Kumhars were summoned through Bhalla and the peon was ordered by Om Prakash Shorewala to call the leaders of these two communities to !he Canal Rest House.\n\nSat Prakash, the peon was not examined m the case.\n\nOf the persons present on the first occasion viz., Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru.\n\nAttroo was eJ!:amined by the appeliant.\n\nWe have shown above that the learned Judge placed no 'reliance upon Thilkru's word He made a similar remark about Attroo also so that the case really comes to this that there is only the evidence of the parties and such other evidence as was furnished by Shorewala and Bhalla. The persons from whom information was derived as stated in the verification of the affidavit were not called as witnesses.\n\nWe have shown that Bhalla's testimony must not be taken oil its face value. Om Prakash Shorewaia was support-\n\nSUPREME COURT UPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ning !he.election petitioner but even so his evidence goes in favour of the appellant. The fact, however, remains that the election petitiol!er himself was fumbling with the facts and was not able to state quite categorically when the conferences took place and on what date and at which place. He changed the dates as more infonnation came to hand. This was not information about the conferences but the date on which the grant was sanctioned and the dates on which the appellant c<>U!d be expected to have held the conferences. In these circumstances, we are i.atisfied that in this case the oral evidence is practically non-existing.\n\nMr. ¥ehta, who lll'gue(j the case on behalf of the answering respondent stated that it was not necessary at all .to give the facts al; lout the coµ4lrences and that the charge of bribery wuld be proved eyen without the details of how the bn'be came .to be given.\n\nHe relied .up<;>n e judgment of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami v. S .. B. Adityan(1) _for the proposition that a bribe is a bribe altho1.1gh the date on which it is given may not be capable of\n\nllein~ spetjlie<! if it could be\" estabjshed oerwi$0 that th~ money was 111, fact paid; and he further relied on a iudgment of this Court .in Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratan; i O:upta & Ors. (2) that\n\neven if the fuli part.iculars be not gi\\ren evidence might still .be led to determine whether .a corrupt practiee had in fact tak:en place or not: We need not decide .in. this c&Se what the pleadings and\n\nth~:pr90f , shoulitbe\". l'he ordinary rule of. law is that evidence is to be given olily on a plea properly raised and not in contradic• tion <Jf the plea. Here the pleas wen; made on two different occasions and contradicted ePch other. The evidence which was tendered contradicted both the pleas. the source of the information was not attempted to be proyed and the witnesses who were brought were found to be thoroughly unreliabfo. In these circumstances we do not propose to refer to the evidence in this judgment any more.\n\nThis brings us to the question whether the circumstances of this case clearly demonstrated that there must have been some kind of bargain before the grant was made aiid that this bargain was with a view to inducing the voters to support the candidature of th~ appellant. n Ghasi Ram v . . Dill Singh & Ors. (8 ) in which the judgment of this Court was pronounced today, the law re'ating to eorrupt practiee specially in the matter of giving of discretionary grants has been considered and stated. It has been pointed out that a Minister in the discharge of his duties may be required to do some acts of administration including the granting of money for the uplift of certain.communities and this action of the Minister is not to be construed against him unless it can be established\n\n(I) 19 E.L.R. 26J.\n\n(2) A.I.R. l96J S.C. 21JO.\n\n(3) (1968] 3 S.C.R. I ' 2.\n\nOM l'RABHA v. ABNASH CHA.ND (Hidayatul/ah, I.) 117\n\nthat there was a bargain with the voters for getting thtjr assistance at the election.\n\nSince tbe oral evidence in this case is non'eXisting we must now look a. the circumstal!Ql!S whether this conclusion which has been drawn by the High Court can be irresistibly reached.\n\nB The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1,\n\n1966. Immediately afterwards the Cabinet placed certain sums of money at the disposal of the Chief Minister, the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers for. State and Deputy Ministers, to be used at their discretion for the uplift of the communities. A sum of Rs. 50,000\n\nwas placed in the discretionary grant of a Minister and the appel c !ant as the Finance Minister in the Ministry of Shri BhagwafDayal Sharma was required to spend this money. The money had io be disbursed before the. end of the Financial Year, that is to say, before March 31, 1967. It is reasonable to think that there must have been several demands in this State from the various. community centres for their own uplift and they must have been clamouring even before for money for the establishment of schools, D hospitals, supply of water, and so on. . The. policy tement attached to the sanction of the discionary grant stated the purp<ises for which the money could be utilised. It was stated quite clearly that the money shoulCI not be given to any private person but should be given through the Development Commissioner for. purposes of public utjlity and for benefit of the general I: public and that the execution of the works should be through certain named agencies such as Zilla Pill'ishad, Piznchayat Samit/es, the Panchayats concerned, the Public Works Department or any other Government Agencies or Municipality as the Millister may indicate. In the present case money was to be disbursed through the Municipal Committee.\n\nF It is argued that the money was withdrawn and made available a day before the poll suggesting thereby that this was done to assure the voters that the money had come in as a result of the bargain. The hurry in reacbh.tg the money to these two wards in the Kaithal Municipality is the main reason behind the learned Judge's conclusion that it must have been a part of a bargain.\n\nG Evidence, however shows that Bhalla (who was not favourable to the appellant) himself wrote saying that the money should be mad~ available at once; and this money came to the hands of Om Prakash\n\nShorewala, who, as we have alreitdy pointed out, was helping the answering respondent in his election. It appears to us that all this hnrry which did not emanate from the 'appellant was the result of ti an anxiety on the part of !he recipients the money should be made available as soon as possible. There is always a risk of a change of attitude partlcularly if the election goes against a particular party. The persons who were to benefit by the discretionary\n\n118 SUPREME OO'VaT UPOR.TS'\n\n[1963] 3 S.C.R.\n\ngrant !night themselves have n anxious to Jay hands on this money so that the grant might not be cancelled later. This money was actually made available not before the date of the poll but as late as March 3, 1967. No doubt the sanction was before the date of poll but that too was Jong before the date when even the candidature of the appellant was recognised by her party. The aetion of the appellant, therefore cannot be construed against her.\n\nIt must be accepted as done in the ordinary course of her duties as Minister. Since there is no evidence to show that it was a part of a bargain directly or indirectly the case does not satisfy the test which we have laid down in Ghasl Ram's(') case.\n\nThe appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed.\n\nThere will be no order about costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) [1968]. 3 S, C.R. 102.\n\n...", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "01\\t: PRABHA JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OM PRABHA JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ABNASH CHAND & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABNASH CHAND & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 1, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JI.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1968] 3 S.C.R. 102", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2394, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2486, "end_char": 2523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. L. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2746, "end_char": 2764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and A J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State from the Kaial constitu~!lCY has been ~Jared to be void.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State from the Kaial constitu~!lCY has been ~Jared to be void."}}, {"text": "November 16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2999, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State from the Kaial constitu~!lCY has been ~Jared to be void."}}, {"text": "Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan Sabha of Haryana State from the Kaial constitu~!lCY has been ~Jared to be void."}}, {"text": "February 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3176, "end_char": 3193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election was held on February 19, 1967 and the result of the pool was declared on February 22, 1967."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3237, "end_char": 3254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election was held on February 19, 1967 and the result of the pool was declared on February 22, 1967."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat Dayal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gravamen of the charge was that she as a minister in the Government of Mr. Bhagwat Dayal Sharma used certain discretionary grants to bribe the voters of her constituency and in particular by paying two sums of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwat Dayal Sharma"}}, {"text": "Kaithal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 for the construction of two dharamsa/as for the Kumhar and the Sweeper Colonies at Kaithal."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election petition was filed on April 7, 1967."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was later amended and.better particulars were supplied on July 29, 1967."}}, {"text": "Hidayatuilah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5441, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaithal, were also\n\nOM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuilah, J.) ll3\n\napproached by the appellant in the beginning of January 1967 and were asked to vote for her.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Kamal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ate through the' Deputy Commissioner, Kamal, vide Development Department Memo No."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6682, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated that on December 22, 1966 the Harijans were called to a Canal Rest House through one Om Pra- E kash Shorewala."}}, {"text": "Om Pra- E kash Shorewala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6759, "end_char": 6783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated that on December 22, 1966 the Harijans were called to a Canal Rest House through one Om Pra- E kash Shorewala.", "canonical_name": "Om Pra- E kash Shorewala"}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee, KaithaL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President of the Municipal Committee, KaithaL Other members of the Municipal Staff including the Executive Officer Bhalla were also present."}}, {"text": "Bhalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6900, "end_char": 6906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President of the Municipal Committee, KaithaL Other members of the Municipal Staff including the Executive Officer Bhalla were also present."}}, {"text": "Khaki Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6956, "end_char": 6965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among those who came were one Khaki Ram, Banwari Lal and one Harijan Lamberdar whose name was not given, In the presence of these persons request was made to the Harijans to vote for the appellant, and when they\n\nrefused to do a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Banwari Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among those who came were one Khaki Ram, Banwari Lal and one Harijan Lamberdar whose name was not given, In the presence of these persons request was made to the Harijans to vote for the appellant, and when they\n\nrefused to do a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Harijan Lamberdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6987, "end_char": 7004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among those who came were one Khaki Ram, Banwari Lal and one Harijan Lamberdar whose name was not given, In the presence of these persons request was made to the Harijans to vote for the appellant, and when they\n\nrefused to do a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Om Parkash Shorewala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7395, "end_char": 7415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "amo11J1t was ultimately paid to Khaki Ram and Banwari Lal through Shri Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4)."}}, {"text": "December 29. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7477, "end_char": 7494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second charge it was stated that on December 29."}}, {"text": "Thakru", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1966 the Kumhar voters w\"e\n\nsummoned t~ the Canal Rest House and three persons, Thakru, Altra and."}}, {"text": "Altra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1966 the Kumhar voters w\"e\n\nsummoned t~ the Canal Rest House and three persons, Thakru, Altra and."}}, {"text": "Lilloo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lilloo came as the representatives of the Kumhar community."}}, {"text": "Pandit Kailash Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated that the allegation was based upon information received from Pandit Kailash Chander, s/o Pandit Harl."}}, {"text": "Inder Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inder Raj, ex-Municipal Commissioner, Chandena Gate Gamri, Kaithal. ·"}}, {"text": "December 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8460, "end_char": 8477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pointed out that the grant for the construction of the dharamsa/as was made by the appellant as far tiack as December 19, 1966 and that the allegation that it was the result of a bargain either on December 22 or December 29, was a pure fiction."}}, {"text": "December 22 or December 29", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8548, "end_char": 8574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pointed out that the grant for the construction of the dharamsa/as was made by the appellant as far tiack as December 19, 1966 and that the allegation that it was the result of a bargain either on December 22 or December 29, was a pure fiction."}}, {"text": "Gurbax Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8839, "end_char": 8851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Gurbax Singh\n\n(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W. 3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8), whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again introduced."}}, {"text": "P. N. Bhalla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Gurbax Singh\n\n(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W. 3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8), whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again introduced."}}, {"text": "Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8925, "end_char": 8970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Gurbax Singh\n\n(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W. 3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8), whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again introduced."}}, {"text": "Abnash Chander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9029, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were Gurbax Singh\n\n(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W. 3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8), whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again introduced."}}, {"text": "December 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9242, "end_char": 9258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was attempted to be proved that the bargain which had been referred to in the election petitions actualiy took place on December 3, 1966."}}, {"text": "R. N. Kapur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9756, "end_char": 9767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the side of the appellant were examined one R. N. Kapur (R.W. 1), the personal Secretary of the appeJlant who proved her tour programme to give a lie to some of the allegations in the election petition."}}, {"text": "Attroo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9915, "end_char": 9921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attroo (R.W. 3), who was said to have been present at the conferences, Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4 ), the Municipal President, Mr. Bllagwat Dayal Sharma (R.W. 5), the Chief Minister in whose Ministry the appellant was working as the Finance Minister and the appellant herself."}}, {"text": "Bllagwat Dayal Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10047, "end_char": 10068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attroo (R.W. 3), who was said to have been present at the conferences, Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4 ), the Municipal President, Mr. Bllagwat Dayal Sharma (R.W. 5), the Chief Minister in whose Ministry the appellant was working as the Finance Minister and the appellant herself."}}, {"text": "OM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10977, "end_char": 11002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H It is clear that the learned Judge was of the opinion that the evidence led to prove the conference and the bargain at the con-\n\nOM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuiiah,."}}, {"text": "Hidayatuiiah,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11004, "end_char": 11017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H It is clear that the learned Judge was of the opinion that the evidence led to prove the conference and the bargain at the con-\n\nOM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuiiah,.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Bhalla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11418, "end_char": 11424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pointed out above the only witnesses from the conference are Thakru (P.W. 8) and Bhalla (P.W. 3)."}}, {"text": "Harijans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12973, "end_char": 12981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out here that in the election petition as well as in the evidence it was itated that the Harijans and Kumhars were summoned through Bhalla and the peon was ordered by Om Prakash Shorewala to call the leaders of these two communities to !"}}, {"text": "Kumhars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 12993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out here that in the election petition as well as in the evidence it was itated that the Harijans and Kumhars were summoned through Bhalla and the peon was ordered by Om Prakash Shorewala to call the leaders of these two communities to !"}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Shorewala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13051, "end_char": 13071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out here that in the election petition as well as in the evidence it was itated that the Harijans and Kumhars were summoned through Bhalla and the peon was ordered by Om Prakash Shorewala to call the leaders of these two communities to !", "canonical_name": "Om Pra- E kash Shorewala"}}, {"text": "Sat Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13143, "end_char": 13154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sat Prakash, the peon was not examined m the case."}}, {"text": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13246, "end_char": 13267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Lilloo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13269, "end_char": 13275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Attra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13280, "end_char": 13285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Harijan 'Lamberdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13294, "end_char": 13312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Aitrou", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13362, "end_char": 13368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Thakru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13373, "end_char": 13379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou and Thakru."}}, {"text": "Thilkru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13491, "end_char": 13498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have shown above that the learned Judge placed no 'reliance upon Thilkru's word He made a similar remark about Attroo also so that the case really comes to this that there is only the evidence of the parties and such other evidence as was furnished by Shorewala and Bhalla."}}, {"text": "Shorewala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have shown above that the learned Judge placed no 'reliance upon Thilkru's word He made a similar remark about Attroo also so that the case really comes to this that there is only the evidence of the parties and such other evidence as was furnished by Shorewala and Bhalla."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Shorewaia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13900, "end_char": 13920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Shorewaia was support-\n\nSUPREME COURT UPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ning !"}}, {"text": "ehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14616, "end_char": 14620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. ¥ehta, who lll'gue(j the case on behalf of the answering respondent stated that it was not necessary at all .to give the facts al; lout the coµ4lrences and that the charge of bribery wuld be proved eyen without the details of how the bn'be came .to be given."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14911, "end_char": 14928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relied .up<;>n e judgment of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami v. S .. B. Adityan(1) _for the proposition that a bribe is a bribe altho1.1gh the date on which it is given may not be capable of\n\nllein~ spetjlie<!"}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17204, "end_char": 17220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "November 1,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17244, "end_char": 17261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "BhagwafDayal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17640, "end_char": 17659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ant as the Finance Minister in the Ministry of Shri BhagwafDayal Sharma was required to spend this money.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwat Dayal Sharma"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17786, "end_char": 17800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "end of the Financial Year, that is to say, before March 31, 1967."}}, {"text": "Zilla Pill'ishad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18504, "end_char": 18520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purposes of public utjlity and for benefit of the general I: public and that the execution of the works should be through certain named agencies such as Zilla Pill'ishad, Piznchayat Samit/es, the Panchayats concerned, the Public Works Department or any other Government Agencies or Municipality as the Millister may indicate."}}, {"text": "Kaithal Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19015, "end_char": 19035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The hurry in reacbh.tg the money to these two wards in the Kaithal Municipality is the main reason behind the learned Judge's conclusion that it must have been a part of a bargain."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash\n\nShorewala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19324, "end_char": 19345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G Evidence, however shows that Bhalla (who was not favourable to the appellant) himself wrote saying that the money should be mad~ available at once; and this money came to the hands of Om Prakash\n\nShorewala, who, as we have alreitdy pointed out, was helping the answering respondent in his election.", "canonical_name": "Om Pra- E kash Shorewala"}}, {"text": "March 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20045, "end_char": 20058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This money was actually made available not before the date of the poll but as late as March 3, 1967."}}, {"text": "Ghasl Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20523, "end_char": 20532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since there is no evidence to show that it was a part of a bargain directly or indirectly the case does not satisfy the test which we have laid down in Ghasl Ram's(') case."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_119_129_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "PUTI'ARANGAMMA & 2 ORS.\n\nM. S. RANGANNA & 3 ORS.\n\nFebruary 8, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Joint family-Unilateral decalration to separate-Communicated to other members of family-Declaration withdrawn-Efiect.\n\nThe karta of a joint Hindu family fell ill. He had no male issue and in order to safeguard the interests of the appellant and fourth respondent, who were his daughters, he issued regfat.:ered notices to the other member. of the jont family declaring his unequivocal intention to separate from them. Later, he decided to withdraw the llDtices and instructed the poolal authorities not to forward them, but,. the unequivocal declaration of his intention to separate was conveyed to the other members of the joint family and they had full knowl\"lge of such intention.\n\nA few days thereafter he instituted a suit for partition and possession of his share of the property. The plaint was prepared by a responsible advocate, who explained the contents to the plaintiff (the karta), who was conscious and in full possession of his mental faculties, had his thumb impression affixed on the plaint and Vakalatnama. signed them both and had thdm filed in court.\n\nAfter the suit was filed. on the same day, the plaintiff died. .\n\nThe trial court decreed .l!he suit, but the High Oourt, in appeal, reversed tho decree.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, HELD : The mere withdrawal of the plaintiff's unilateral declaration _of intention to sq>arate, which already bad resulted in hls division in status because of the communication of the intention to the other members, did llDt nullify its effect so as to restore the family to its original joint status, or amount to an agreemnt to reunite; and lthe appellant and the fourth respondent, as the legal representatives of the plaintiff, were entitled to the decree. (126 G-H; 127 A-B; 129 DJ\n\nRadlwkrishna v. Satyanarayana, (1948) 2 M.L.J. 331, approved.\n\nCIVIL' APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated December 5; 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 81 of 1956.\n\nA. K. Sen and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the aJ>Pellants.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhri; for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J, This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated December 5, 1960 in R. A. No. 81 of 1956.\n\n120 SUPlll!Ml! COUllT IU!POl.TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe appellants and respondent No. 4 are the daughters and legal representatives of Savoy Rauganna who was the plaintiff in O.S. 34 of 1950-51 instituted in the court of the District Judge, Mysore. The suit was filed by the deceased plaintiff for partition of his share in the 11roperties mentioned in the schedule to the plaint and for granting him separate possession of the same.\n\nRespondent No. 1 is the brother's son of the Plaintiff. The rela B tionship of the parties would awear from the following pedigree :\n\nR..i I AlaJnma (Deft. 2)\n\n(Died 45 I . years \"\"')\n\nDodd& il.,.pmma\n\n(Deft. 2 (a)\n\nI Kenchanna (Suppl.\n\nDef).\n\nSavoy Ranganna (S\"\n\nSavoy Ranpnna\n\n(plaintiff)\n\nChikka l.Ran1•tnma Puita il.n..mma\n\n(Deft. 3) (!st L. R. of plaintiff) (2nd L. R. of plaintiff)\n\nI ChillaRa-\n\n(Diod in 1947\\ I M. S. R. Ranpnna, 3\n\n(Deft. I) lakkamma\n\n(D. W.10)\n\nChinnathayamma\n\n(3rd I. p •. of plaintiff)\n\nThe case of the plaintjlf was that he and the defendants livea together as members of a Joint Hindu family till January 7, 1951, plaintiff being the karta. The plaintiff had no male issue but had only four daughters, Chikka Rangamma, Putta Rangamma, Rangathayamml! . l!Jld Chinnathay; unma.\n\nThe first 2 daughters r were widows. The fourth daughter Chinnathayamma was living with her husband. Except Chinnathayamma, the other daughters with their families had been living with the joint family.\n\nThe plaintiff became ill and entered 'Sharda Nursing Home' for treat ment as an in-patient on January 4, 1951. In order to safeguard the interests of his daughters the plaintiff, Savoy Ranianna issued G a notice on January 8, 1951 to the defend:mts clring his unequivocal intention to separate from them.\n\nAfter the notices were registered at the post office certain well-wishers of die famify intervened and wanted to bring about a settlement. On their advice and request the plaintiff n_otified to the post office ti)at he intended to withdraw the registered notices. But as no agreement could 8 be subsequently reached between the parties the plaintiff instituted the present suit on January 13. 1951 for partition of his share of the joint family properties. The suit was contested mainly by\n\nD ,\n\nPUTTAll.ANGAMMA V. RANGANNA (Ramaswami, J.) 121\n\nrespondent no. 1 who alleged that there was no separation . of status either because of the notice of January 8, 1951 or because of the institution of the suit.on January 13, 1951.. J'he case of respondent no. 1 was that Savoy Ranganna was 85 years. of age and .in a weak state of health and was not in a position to understand the contents.of the plaint or to affix his. signatµre or thwnb impression thereon as well as on the. Vakalatnama.\n\nAs regards the notice of January 8, 1951, respondent no. 1 asserted that there w•s no communication o( any such notice to him and, in any case, the notices were withdrawn by Savoy Ranganna unconditionally from the post office. It was therefore contended that there was no disruption of the joint family at the time of the death of Savoy Ranganna and the appellants were not entitled to a decree for partition as legal representatives of Savoy Ranganna. Upon the examination of the evidence adduced in the case the trial court held that Savoy Ranganna had properly affixed his thumb impression on the plaint and the V akalatnama and the presentation of the plaint was valid.\n\nThe trial court found that Savoy RanganJ!a was not dead by the time the plaipt was presented. On the question whe- . ther Savoy Ranganna was separate in status the trial court held that the notices dated January 8, 1951 were a clear and unequivocal declaration of the intention of savoy Ranganna .to become divided in status and there was sufficient communication of that intention to respondent no .. 1 and other members of the family.\n\nThe trial court was also of the opinion that anhe time of the issue of the notices dated January 8, 1951 and at the time of execution of the plaint and the Vakalatnama dated January 13, 1951 Savoy Ranganna was in a sonnd state of mind and conscious of the consequences of the action he was taking. The trial court accordingly granted a decree in favour of the appellants.\n\nRespondent no. I took the matter in appeal to the Mysore High Court which by its judgment dated December 5, 1960 reversed the decree of the trial court <llld allowed the appeal. Hegde, J. one of the members of the Bench held that the suit could not be said to have been instituted by Savoy Ranganna as it was not proved that Savoy Ranganna executed the plaint As regards the validity of the notice Ex. A, and as to whether it caused any disruption in the joint family status, Hegde, J; did not think it necessary to express any opinion. The other member of the Bench, Mir. Iqbal Husain, J. held that the joint family of which the deceased Savoy Ran)!al!na was a member had not been disrupted by the issue of the notice dated January 8, 1951. The view taken by Mir Iqbal Husain, J. was that there was no prQOf that the notice was communicated either to respondent no. 1 or other members of the family and, in any event, the notice had been withdrawn by Savoy Ranganna and so there was no severance of joint status from the date of the notice.\n\nUSup.C.1168-9\n\nThe first question to be considered in this appeal is whether Savoy Ranganna died as a divided member of the joint family as alleged in the plaint. It is admitted that Savoy Ranganna was very old, about 85 years of age and was ailing of chronic diarrhoea.\n\nHe was Jiving in the family house tili January 4, 1951 when he was removed to the Sharda Nrsing Home where hJ: died on January 13, 1951 at 3 p.m. According to the case of respondent no. 1 Savoy Ranganna had a paralytic stroke m 1950 and was completely bed-ridden thereafter and his eyesight was bad for 5 to 6 years prior to his death.\n\nIt was alleged in the written statement. that Savoy Ranganna was unconscious for some days prior to .his death. The case of respondent no. 1 on this int is disproved by the evidence of D.W. 6, Dr. Venkata Rae. who was in charge of the Sharda Nursing Home on the material dates. This witness admitted that the complaint of Savoy Ranganna was that he was suffering from chronic diarrhoea for over five months. He was anaemic but he was not suffering from any attack of paralysis.\n\nAs regards the condition of Savoy Ranganna on January 8, 1951, the evidence of P.W. 1,.Dr. Subbaramiah is important. This witness is the owner of the Sh.arda Nursing Home and he has testified that the notice Ex. A was read over to Savoy Ranganna and after . getting it read the latter affixed his thumb mark thereon. The witness asked Savoy Ranganna whether he was able to understand the contents of the notice and the latter replied in the affirmative.\n\nThe witness has certified on the notice, Ex. A-1 that Savoy Rananna was conscious when he affixed his left thumb mark to the notice in his presence. No reason was suggested on behalf of the respondents why the evidence of this witness should be disbelieved.\n\nThe trial court was highly impressed by the evidence of this witness and we see no reason fcir taking a different .view.\n\nThe case of the appellants is that respondent no. 1 had knowledge of the notice, Ex. A because he was present in the Nursing Home on January 8, 1951 and he tried to snatch away the notice from the hands of P.W. 1 but he was prevented from so doing. P.W. 5.\n\nChinnanna stated in the course of the evidence that after P .W. 1 had signed the certificate in all the three copi.es, respondent no. 1 and one Halappa came to the .ward and tried to snatch away the notices.\n\nThe first respondent tried to snatch away the copy Ex. A-1 that was in the hands. of Dr. Subbaramiah and attempted to tear it. Dr. Subbaramian somehow prevented respondent no. 1 from taking away Ex. A and handed it over to\n\nP.W. -5.\n\nThe evidence of P.W. 5 with regard to the \"snatching incident\" is corroborated by Dr. Subbaramiah who stated that after Savoy Ranganna had executed the notices and he had signed the certificates, one or two persons came and tried to snatch e document. P .W. 1 is unable .to identify the first respondent as one of the persons who had taken part in the \"snatching incident\". The circumstance that P.W. 1 was unable to identify respondent no. 1\n\nis not very material, because the inc111ent took place about. three years before he .i:ave evidence in the court, but his evidence with regard 10 the \"snatching incident\" strongly corroborates the allegation of P.W. 5 that it was res[lj)ndent no. 1 who had come into the Nursing Home and attempted to snatch the notice. There is also another circce which supports the case of the appellants that respondent no. 1 had knowledge of the contents of Ex. A and of the unequivocal intention of Savoy Rangann'l to come divided in status from the joint family. According to P.W. 5 respondent no. 1 and his Wife and mother yisited Savoy Ranganna in the Nursing Home later on and pressed him. t<J withdraw the notices promising that the matter will be amicably settled. Sowcar T. Thammanna also intervened on their behalf. Thereafter the deceased plaintiff fastructed.his grandson P.W. 5 to withdraw the notice.\n\nAccordingly P.W. 5 prepared two applications for the withdrawal and presented them to the postal authorities.\n\nThe notice, Ex. A meant for the first respondent and Ex. E meant for the original second defendant were thheld by the postal authorities.\n\nThese notices were produced in court by the postal authorities during the hearing of the_case. In our opinion, the evidence of P .W. 5 must be accepted as true, because it is corroborated by the circumstance that the two notices, Bxs. A and E were intercepted in the post office and did not reach their destination. This circumstance also indicates that though there was no formal communication of the notice, Ex. A to the first respondent, he had sufficient knowledge of the contents of that notice and was fully aware of the clear and unequivocal intention of Savoy Ranganna to become separate from other members Qf the joint f!!ffiily.\n\nIt is now a settled doctrine of Hindu Law that a member of a joint Hindu family can b, ring about his separation in status by a definite, unequivocal and unilateral declaration of his intention to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty.\n\nIt is not necessary that there should be an agreement between all\n\nte oparceners for the disruption of the joint status. It is immatenal m such a. case whether the other copareeners give their a5sent to the separation or not. The jural basis of this doctrine has been expounded by the early writers of Hindu Law. The relevant portion of the commentary of Vijna!'eswara tates as follows :\n\n\"<:i\"ll'f \"\"''\"\"''\"; imrf<: \\If'!~\"! f<raf<: fir'i!Frl1\" arf; i'\"\"\"1!f'I' <ra~ qi;! l+f~oq f'ftWft \\TCffu'\" .. ' \"'\n\n[And thus though the mother is having her menstrual H courses (has not lost the capacity to bear children) and the father ha!! attachme!lt and does not desire a partition, yet by the will (or desire) of the son a partition of 'he grandfather's wealth does take place]\" ·\n\nSaraswathi Vilasa, placitum 28 states :\n\n\"~ m'lit 'ff\"11\\rt ITTr \"\"'~If f\"'1Jlr f<ff~: I 'l'IT'!f'Om\"'R\"f'!; fim lio; ii'lqll~f<f 11\"\n\n[From this it is known that without any speech (or explanation) even by means of a determination (or resolution) only, partition is effected, just an appointed daughter is constituted by mere intention without speech.)\" Viramitrodaya of Mitra Misra (Ch. II. pl. 23) is to the follow ing effect:\n\n\"<ll\"l'I' 'f'f~ rit ;; ft; rf~ 4•'11.,\"l\"fail1•i: f<r 'll'l<ll' • f\"\"1>rra 1 \" '\n\n[Here too there is no distinction between a partition during the lifetime of the father or after his death and\n\npartition at the desire of the sons may take place oc D even by the desire (or at the will) of a single ( oopar c.ener) ].\"\n\nVyavahara Mayukha of Nilakantabhatta also states :\n\n\"•oq1t1q.1'41q1tlfq mf~ f'l\"l!'Rr mr oq•*\"IMlf\"lfir 'lfm ~: I\n\nf.rfan1<1qti14 f~ f'f'llT'l': Ii qlf'liilfs.,44 ~\n\nII\"\n\n. [Even. in the absence of any common (joint family) property, severance does indeed result by the mere declaration 'I am separate from thee' because severance is a particular state (or condition) of the mind and the declaration is merely a manifestation of this mental. state (or condition).]\" (Ch: IV, S. iii-I).\n\n Emphasis is laid on the \"budhi visesha\" (particular state or condi ti on of the mind) as the decisive factor in producing a severance in status and the-declaration is stated to be merely \"abhivyanjika\" or manifestation which might vacy according to ciroumstances; In Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain(1) the Judicial Committee made the following categorical statement of the legal position :\n\n\"A definite and unambiguous indication by one member of intention to separate himself and to enjoy his share in severalty may amount to separation. But to have that effect the intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed .......... Suraj Narain alleged that he separated a few months later; there is, however, no\n\n(I) J.L.R. 35 All. 80. (P.C.)\n\nwriting in support of his allegation, nothing to show that at that time he gave expression to an unambiguous intention on his part to cut himself off from the joint undivided family.\" In a later case-Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj(') the Judicial Committee examined the relevant texts of Hindu Law and referred to the well-marked distinction that exists in Hindu law between a severance in status so far as the separating member is concerned and a de facto division into specific shares of the property held until then jointly, and laid down the Jaw as follows :\n\n\"One is a matter of individual decision, the d.esire on the part of any one member to sever himself from the joint family and to enjoy his hitherto undefined or unspecified share separtely from the others without being subject to the obligations which arise from the joim status; whilst the other is the natural resultant from his decision, the division. and separation of his share which may be arrived at either by private agreement among the parties, or on failure of that, by the intervel)tion of the Court.\n\nOnce the decision has been unequivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his co-sharers, his right to his right to have his share allocated separately from has a title is unimpeachable; neither the co.-sharers can\n\nquestion it nor can the Court examine his conscience to find out whether his reasons for separation were well- Jounded or sufficient; the Court has simply to give effect\n\nto his right to have his share allocated separately from the others.\"\n\nIn Syed Kasam v. Jorawar Singh( 2 ), Viscount Cave, in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, observed :\n\n\"It is settled law that in the case of a joint Hindu family subject to the Jaw of the Mitakshara, a severance of estate is effected by an unequivocal declaration on the part of one. of the joint holders of his intention to hold his share separately, even though no actual division takes place : and the commencement of a suit for partition has been held to be sufficient to effect a severance in interest even before decree.\"\n\nThese authorities were quoted '*ith approval by this Court in Addagada Raghavamma v. Addagada Chenchamma( 3 ), and it was hel!I tl1at a member of a joint Hindu family seeking to separate himself from others will have to make known his intention to Other members of his family from whom he seeks to separate.\n\nThe\n\n(I} l.L.R. 43 Cal. 1031. (P.C.)\n\n(2) l.L.R. SO Cal. 84. (P.C).\n\n(3) (1964] 2 S.C.R. 933.\n\n126 SUPUMB ()()Ul.T UPOl.TS\n\n[1968} 3 S.C.R.\n\ncorrect legal position therefore is that in a case of a joint Hindu family subject to Mitaksbara law, severance Qf status is effected by an unequivocal declaration on the part of one of the jointholders of his intention to hold the. share SCJl!lrafely. It is, however, necessary that the member Of the joint Hindu family seeking\n\nto separate himself must make known his intention to other membel'S of the family from whom he seeks tp SCQate. The process of communication may, however, vary in the circumstances of each particular case.\n\nIt is not necessary that there should be a formal despatch to or receipt by other members of the family of the communication announcing the intention to divide on the part of one member of the joint family. The proof of such a despatch or receipt of . the colll!!lunication is not essential, nor its absence fatal to the severance of the status. It is, of course, necessary that the declaration to be effective should reach the person or persons affected by some process appropriate to the given sitwition and circumstances of the particular case. Applying this principle to the facts found in the present case, we are of opinion that there was a definite and unequivocal declaration of his intention to separate on the part of Savoy Ranganna and that intention was conveyed to respondent no. l and other members 9f the joint famliy and respondent no. 1 had full knowledge of the intention of Savoy Ranganna.\n\nIt follows therefore that there was a division of status of Savoy Ranganna from the joint Hindu family with effect from January 8; 1951 which was the date of the notice.\n\nIt was, however, maintained on behalf of the respondents that on January 10, 1951 Savoy Ranganna had decided to .withdraw the two notices, Exs. A & E and he instructed the postal authorities not to forward the notices to respondent no. l and other members of the joint family.\n\nIt was contended that there could be no severance of the joint family after Savoy Ranganna had decided to withdraw the notices. In our opinion, there fa no warrant for this argument. As we have already stated, there was a unilateral declaration of an intention by Savoy Ranganna to divide from the joint family and there was sufficient communication of this intention to the other coparceners and therefore in law there was in consequence a disruption or division of the status of the joint family with effect from January 8, 1951. When once a communication of the intention is made which has resulted in the severance of the joint family status it was not thereafter open to Savoy Ranganna to nullify its effect so as to restore the family to its original joint status. If the intention of Savoy Raugauna had stood alone without giving rise to any legal effect, it could; of course, be withdrawn by Savoy Ranganna, but having communicated the intention, the divided status of the Hindu joint family had already come into exitence and the legal consequences had taken effect.\n\nIt was not, therefore, possible for Savoy Ranganna to get back\n\nto the old position by mere revocation of the intention. It is, of course, possible for the members of the family by a subsequent agreement to reunite, but the mere withdrawal of the unilateral declaration of the intention to separate which already had resulted in the division in status cannot amount to an agreement to reunite.\n\nIt should also be stated that the question whether there was a subsequent agreement'between the members to reunite is a question of fact to be proved as such, In the present case, there is no allegation in the written statement nor is there any evidence on the part of the respondents that there was any such agreement to reunite after January 8, 1951. The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Madras High Court in Kurapati Radhakrishna v. Kurapati Satyanarayana(') in which there was a suit for declaration that the sales in respect of certain family properties did not bind the plaintiff and for partition of his share and possession thereof and the plaint referred to an earlier suit for partition instituted by the 2nd defendant in the later suit. It was alleged in that suit that 'the plaintiff being unwilling to remain with the defendants has decided to become divided and he has filed this suit for separation of his one-fifth share in the assets remaining after discharging the family debts separated. and for recovery of possession of the same'.\n\nAll the defendants in that suit were served with the summons and on the death of the 1st defendant therein after the settlement of issues, the.., Jaintiff in that action made the following endorsement on the plamt : \"As the 1st defendant has died and as the plaintiff had to manage the family, the plaintiff hereby revokes the intention to divide expressed in the plaint and agreeing to remain as a joint family meniber, he withdraws the suit.' It was held by the Madras High Court that a division in status had already been brought about by the plaint in the suit and it was not open to the plaintiff to. revoke or withdraw the unambiguous intention to separate contained in the plaint so as to restore the joint status and as such the members should be treated as divided members for the purpose of working out their respective rights.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next question arising in this appeal whether the plaint filed on January 13, 1951 was validly executed by Savoy Ranganna and whether he had affixed his thumb impression thereon after understanding its contents. . The case of the appellants is that Sri M. S. Ranganathan prepared the plaint and had gone to the Sharda Nursing Home at about 9-30 or 10 a.m. on January 13, 1951. Sri Ranganathan wrote out the plaint which was in English and translated it to Savoy Ranganna who approved the same.\n\nP.W. 2, the clerk of Sri Ranganathan has deposed to this effect.\n\nHe took the ink-pad and affixed the left thumb impression of Savoy Ranganna on the plaint and also on the Vakalatnama.\n\nThere is the attestation of Sri M. S. Ranganathan on the (ff{f948) 2 M.LJ. 331.\n\nplaint and on the Vakalatnarna .. The papers were handed over to P.W. 2 who after purchasing the necessary court-fee stamps filed the plaint and the Vakalatnama. in the court at about 11.30 a.m. or 12 noon on. the same day.\n\nThe evidence of P.W. 2 is corroborated by P.W. 5 Chinnanna. tounsef on behalf of the respondents, however, criticised the evidence of P.W. 2 on the grou11d that the doctor, D.W. 6 had said that the mental condition of the patient was bad and he was not able Jo understand thfugs when he examined him on the morning of January 13, 1951.\n\nD.W. 6 deposed that he examined Savoy Ranganna during his usual rounds on January 13, 1951 between 8 and 9 a.m. and found \"his pulse imperceptible and the sounds of the heart feeble\". On the question as to whether Savoy Ranganna was sufficiently conscious to execute the plaint and the Vakalatnama, the trial court has accepted the evidence of P.W. 2, Keshavaiah in preference to that of\n\nD.W. 6.\n\nWe see no reason for differing from the es!imate of the trial court with regard. to the evidence of P. W. 2.\n\nThe trial court has pointed out that it is difficult to accept the evidence of D.W. 6 that Savoy Ranganna was not conscious on the morning of January 13, 1951. In cross-examination D.W. 6 admitted that on the night of January 12, 1951 Savoy Ranganna was conscious.\n\nHe further admitted that on January 13, 1951 he prescribed the same medicines to Savoy Ranganna as he had prescribed on January 12,\n\nI 951.\n\nThere is no note of the necessi\\!:Y data in the case sheet, Ex. I to suggest that Savoy Ranganna was not conscious on Janu~ ary 13, 1951. It is therefore not unreasonable assume that the condition of Savoy Ranga11na was the same on January 13, 1951 as on January 12, 1951 and there was no perceptible change noticeable in his condition between the two dates. In these circumstances it is not possible to accept the evidence of D.W. 6 that Savoy Ranganna was unconscious on the morning of January 13, 1951. It was pointed out on behalf of the respondents that D.W. 7, Miss Arnold has also given evidence that the condition of Savoy Ran_ganna became worse day by day and on the last day his condition was very bad and he could not understand much, nor could he respond to her calls. The trial court was not impressed with the evidence of this witness.\n\nIn our opinion, her evidence suffers from the same infirmity as of D.W. 6, because the case sheet, Ex. I does not corroborate her evidence.\n\nIt is also difficult to believe that D.W. 7 could remember the details of Savoy Ranganna's case after a lapse of three years without the help of any written case sheet.\n\nThere is also an important discrepancy in the evidence of D.W. 7. She said that on January 13, 1951 she called D.W. 6 at 12 noon since the r.ondition of the patient was very bad, but D.W. 6 has said that he did not visit Savoy Ranganna after 8 or 9 a.m. on that date. Comment was made by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that Sri Ranganathan was not examined as a witness to prove that he had prepared\n\nthe plaint and Savoy , Ranganna bad ed his tJiumb impression in his presence. In our opinion, the omission of Sri Ranganathan to give evidence in this case is unfortunate. It would have been proper conduct on his PS!t if J1e_had returned the brief of the appellants and given evidence in the case' as to the execution of the plaint and the V akalatnama.\n\nBut spite of this circumstance we consider that the evidence of the appellants on this aspect of the case must be accepted as true. It is necessary to notice that the plaint and the Vakalatnania are both counter-signed by Sri Ranganathan---a responsible Advocate-and it is not likely that he would subscribe his signatures to. these documents if they had been executed by a person who was unable to understand the contents thereof.\n\nAs we have already said, it is unfortunate that the Advocate Sri Ranganathan has not been examined as a witness, but in spite of this omission we are satisfied that the evidence adduced in the case has established that Savoy Ranganna validly executed the plaint and the Vakalatnama and that he was conscious and was in full possession of his mental faculties at the time of the execution of these two documents. It follows therefore that the appellants and respondent no. 4 who are the daughters and legal representatives of Savoy Ranganna are entitled to a decree in the terms granted by the District Judge of Mysore.\n\nFor the reasons expressed, we hold that this appeal should be allowed, the judgment of t!te Mysore High Court dated December 5, 1960 in R.A. no. 81 of 1956 should be set aside and that of the District Judge, Mysore dated October 31, 1955 in 0.S. no. 34 of 1950-51 should be restored.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed ..", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "PUTI'ARANGAMMA & 2 ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUTTARANGAMMA & 2 ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. S. RANGANNA & 3 ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. S. RANGANNA & 3 ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 8, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Vakalatnama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaint was prepared by a responsible advocate, who explained the contents to the plaintiff (the karta), who was conscious and in full possession of his mental faculties, had his thumb impression affixed on the plaint and Vakalatnama."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2100, "end_char": 2109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the aJ>Pellants."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the aJ>Pellants."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhri; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2170, "end_char": 2185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhri; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2190, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhri; for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2278, "end_char": 2287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J, This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated December 5, 1960 in R. A. No."}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2597, "end_char": 2602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Savoy Ranganna (S\"\n\nSavoy Ranpnna\n\n(plaintiff)\n\nChikka l.Ran1•tnma Puita il.n..mma\n\n(Deft.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranpnna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3119, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Savoy Ranganna (S\"\n\nSavoy Ranpnna\n\n(plaintiff)\n\nChikka l.Ran1•tnma Puita il.n..mma\n\n(Deft.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Chikka l.Ran1•tnma Puita", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Savoy Ranganna (S\"\n\nSavoy Ranpnna\n\n(plaintiff)\n\nChikka l.Ran1•tnma Puita il.n..mma\n\n(Deft."}}, {"text": "Chinnathayamma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) lakkamma\n\n(D. W.10)\n\nChinnathayamma\n\n(3rd I. p •. of plaintiff)\n\nThe case of the plaintjlf was that he and the defendants livea together as members of a Joint Hindu family till January 7, 1951, plaintiff being the karta.", "canonical_name": "Chinnathayamma"}}, {"text": "Chikka Rangamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff had no male issue but had only four daughters, Chikka Rangamma, Putta Rangamma, Rangathayamml! ."}}, {"text": "Putta Rangamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff had no male issue but had only four daughters, Chikka Rangamma, Putta Rangamma, Rangathayamml! ."}}, {"text": "Chinnathayamma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3719, "end_char": 3733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth daughter Chinnathayamma was living with her husband.", "canonical_name": "Chinnathayamma"}}, {"text": "Sharda Nursing Home", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff became ill and entered 'Sharda Nursing Home' for treat ment as an in-patient on January 4, 1951."}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranianna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4045, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to safeguard the interests of his daughters the plaintiff, Savoy Ranianna issued G a notice on January 8, 1951 to the defend:mts clring his unequivocal intention to separate from them.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "January 8, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to safeguard the interests of his daughters the plaintiff, Savoy Ranianna issued G a notice on January 8, 1951 to the defend:mts clring his unequivocal intention to separate from them."}}, {"text": "January 13. 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as no agreement could 8 be subsequently reached between the parties the plaintiff instituted the present suit on January 13."}}, {"text": "PUTTAll.ANGAMMA V. RANGANNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4668, "end_char": 4695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested mainly by\n\nD ,\n\nPUTTAll."}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4938, "end_char": 4952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was that Savoy Ranganna was 85 years.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Savoy RanganJ!a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court found that Savoy RanganJ!a was not dead by the time the plaipt was presented.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "savoy Ranganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ther Savoy Ranganna was separate in status the trial court held that the notices dated January 8, 1951 were a clear and unequivocal declaration of the intention of savoy Ranganna .to become divided in status and there was sufficient communication of that intention to respondent no .. 1 and other members of the family.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "January 13, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court was also of the opinion that anhe time of the issue of the notices dated January 8, 1951 and at the time of execution of the plaint and the Vakalatnama dated January 13, 1951 Savoy Ranganna was in a sonnd state of mind and conscious of the consequences of the action he was taking."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6696, "end_char": 6713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I took the matter in appeal to the Mysore High Court which by its judgment dated December 5, 1960 reversed the decree of the trial court <llld allowed the appeal."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I took the matter in appeal to the Mysore High Court which by its judgment dated December 5, 1960 reversed the decree of the trial court <llld allowed the appeal."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hegde, J. one of the members of the Bench held that the suit could not be said to have been instituted by Savoy Ranganna as it was not proved that Savoy Ranganna executed the plaint As regards the validity of the notice Ex."}}, {"text": "Mir. Iqbal Husain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other member of the Bench, Mir.", "canonical_name": "Mir. Iqbal Husain"}}, {"text": "Savoy Ran)!al!na", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iqbal Husain, J. held that the joint family of which the deceased Savoy Ran)!al!na was a member had not been disrupted by the issue of the notice dated January 8, 1951.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Mir Iqbal Husain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by Mir Iqbal Husain, J. was that there was no prQOf that the notice was communicated either to respondent no.", "canonical_name": "Mir. Iqbal Husain"}}, {"text": "January 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8000, "end_char": 8015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Jiving in the family house tili January 4, 1951 when he was removed to the Sharda Nrsing Home where hJ: died on January 13, 1951 at 3 p.m. According to the case of respondent no."}}, {"text": "Sharda Nrsing Home", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Jiving in the family house tili January 4, 1951 when he was removed to the Sharda Nrsing Home where hJ: died on January 13, 1951 at 3 p.m. According to the case of respondent no."}}, {"text": "Venkata Rae", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8495, "end_char": 8506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 on this int is disproved by the evidence of D.W. 6, Dr. Venkata Rae."}}, {"text": "Subbaramiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Subbaramiah is important."}}, {"text": "Savoy Rananna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9286, "end_char": 9299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-1 that Savoy Rananna was conscious when he affixed his left thumb mark to the notice in his presence.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Chinnanna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9871, "end_char": 9880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinnanna stated in the course of the evidence that after P .W. 1 had signed the certificate in all the three copi.es, respondent no."}}, {"text": "Halappa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10015, "end_char": 10022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and one Halappa came to the .ward and tried to snatch away the notices."}}, {"text": "Subbaramiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10169, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Dr. Subbaramiah and attempted to tear it.", "canonical_name": "Subbaramiah"}}, {"text": "Subbaramian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Subbaramian somehow prevented respondent no.", "canonical_name": "Subbaramiah"}}, {"text": "Savoy Rangann'l", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11246, "end_char": 11261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A and of the unequivocal intention of Savoy Rangann'l to come divided in status from the joint family.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Sowcar T. Thammanna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11518, "end_char": 11537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sowcar T. Thammanna also intervened on their behalf."}}, {"text": "Vijna!'eswara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13171, "end_char": 13184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the commentary of Vijna!'eswara tates as follows :\n\n\"<:i\"ll'f \"\"''\"\"''\"; imrf<: \\If'!~\"!"}}, {"text": "Vyavahara Mayukha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14344, "end_char": 14361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vyavahara Mayukha of Nilakantabhatta also states :\n\n\"•oq1t1q.1'41q1tlfq mf~ f'l\"l!'Rr mr oq•*\"IMlf\"lfir 'lfm ~: I\n\nf.rfan1<1qti14 f~ f'f'llT'l': Ii qlf'liilfs."}}, {"text": "Nilakantabhatta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14365, "end_char": 14380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vyavahara Mayukha of Nilakantabhatta also states :\n\n\"•oq1t1q.1'41q1tlfq mf~ f'l\"l!'Rr mr oq•*\"IMlf\"lfir 'lfm ~: I\n\nf.rfan1<1qti14 f~ f'f'llT'l': Ii qlf'liilfs."}}, {"text": "Suraj Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15459, "end_char": 15471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But to have that effect the intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed .......... Suraj Narain alleged that he separated a few months later; there is, however, no\n\n(I) J.L.R. 35 All."}}, {"text": "(1964] 2 S.C.R. 933", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18037, "end_char": 18056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 8; 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19672, "end_char": 19687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It follows therefore that there was a division of status of Savoy Ranganna from the joint Hindu family with effect from January 8; 1951 which was the date of the notice."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19788, "end_char": 19804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, maintained on behalf of the respondents that on January 10, 1951 Savoy Ranganna had decided to .withdraw the two notices, Exs."}}, {"text": "Savoy Raugauna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20792, "end_char": 20806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the intention of Savoy Raugauna had stood alone without giving rise to any legal effect, it could; of course, be withdrawn by Savoy Ranganna, but having communicated the intention, the divided status of the Hindu joint family had already come into exitence and the legal consequences had taken effect.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21894, "end_char": 21911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Madras High Court in Kurapati Radhakrishna v. Kurapati Satyanarayana(') in which there was a suit for declaration that the sales in respect of certain family properties did not bind the plaintiff and for partition of his share and possession thereof and the plaint referred to an earlier suit for partition instituted by the 2nd defendant in the later suit."}}, {"text": "M. S. Ranganathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23675, "end_char": 23692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the appellants is that Sri M. S. Ranganathan prepared the plaint and had gone to the Sharda Nursing Home at about 9-30 or 10 a.m. on January 13, 1951."}}, {"text": "Ranganathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23803, "end_char": 23814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ranganathan wrote out the plaint which was in English and translated it to Savoy Ranganna who approved the same."}}, {"text": "M. S. Ranganathan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24135, "end_char": 24152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is the attestation of Sri M. S. Ranganathan on the (ff{f948) 2 M.LJ."}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranganna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24778, "end_char": 24792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 6 deposed that he examined Savoy Ranganna during his usual rounds on January 13, 1951 between 8 and 9 a.m. and found \"his pulse imperceptible and the sounds of the heart feeble\"."}}, {"text": "Keshavaiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25098, "end_char": 25108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question as to whether Savoy Ranganna was sufficiently conscious to execute the plaint and the Vakalatnama, the trial court has accepted the evidence of P.W. 2, Keshavaiah in preference to that of\n\nD.W. 6."}}, {"text": "January 12,\n\nI 951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further admitted that on January 13, 1951 he prescribed the same medicines to Savoy Ranganna as he had prescribed on January 12,\n\nI 951."}}, {"text": "Savoy Ranga11na", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25861, "end_char": 25876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore not unreasonable assume that the condition of Savoy Ranga11na was the same on January 13, 1951 as on January 12, 1951 and there was no perceptible change noticeable in his condition between the two dates.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Arnold", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26233, "end_char": 26239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out on behalf of the respondents that D.W. 7, Miss Arnold has also given evidence that the condition of Savoy Ran_ganna became worse day by day and on the last day his condition was very bad and he could not understand much, nor could he respond to her calls."}}, {"text": "Savoy Ran_ganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26286, "end_char": 26301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out on behalf of the respondents that D.W. 7, Miss Arnold has also given evidence that the condition of Savoy Ran_ganna became worse day by day and on the last day his condition was very bad and he could not understand much, nor could he respond to her calls.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "Ranganathan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27157, "end_char": 27168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comment was made by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that Sri Ranganathan was not examined as a witness to prove that he had prepared\n\nthe plaint and Savoy , Ranganna bad ed his tJiumb impression in his presence."}}, {"text": "Savoy , Ranganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27245, "end_char": 27261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comment was made by Counsel on behalf of the respondents that Sri Ranganathan was not examined as a witness to prove that he had prepared\n\nthe plaint and Savoy , Ranganna bad ed his tJiumb impression in his presence.", "canonical_name": "Savoy Ran)!al!na"}}, {"text": "District Judge of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28611, "end_char": 28635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 who are the daughters and legal representatives of Savoy Ranganna are entitled to a decree in the terms granted by the District Judge of Mysore."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28859, "end_char": 28875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 of 1956 should be set aside and that of the District Judge, Mysore dated October 31, 1955 in 0.S. no."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_130_136_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "INDIAN HUME l'lft 00. LTD.\n\nv. mmt WORDIEN\n\nFebruary 8, 1968\n\n[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. llEGDE, JJ.] B\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Closure-Tribunal whethu can go into bona ftdes of closur.-Retrench,,..nt- 'Last co,,.. (int flO'-TribunaJ not compe- .tent to appv principle without plea beinr raised.\n\nThe lodQStrial Tribunal, deciding a dispule between. the appellant company and its workmen held that the notice of clooure given by the -compny waa not bona fide and that the ptjnciple of 'Jaat come first go' C should have been applied by the company in retrenching twelve of its workmen. In appear-to this Court.\n\nHELD: (i) Once the Tribunal finds that an employer has closed his factory as a mailer of fact it is not concerned to go into the question aa to the motive which guided him and to come to a conclusion that be- cause of the previous history -0f the dispute between the employer ond the employees the closure waa not justified Such a closure cannot give D rise to an industrial dispute. [l35 DJ\n\nPiprGich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. P.SM. Mazdoor Union, (1957) 1 L.L.J. 235, K. M. Padmanabha Ayyar v. State of Madras, [1954) 1 L.L.J. 469, Tea Districts Labour Association, Calcuttt.• v. Ex..employees of Tea Districts Labour .Association and Anr. [1960) 3 S.C.R. 207, Hatisi11gh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) ) S.C.R. 52~. Express E New•papers (P} Ltd; v. The Work.rs, A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 569 and Andhra Probha v. Madras Union of Journalist1; [1967) 3 S.C.R. 901, applied.\n\n(ii) The plea as to the application. of the principle 'last come first go' was not taken in ¢he written statement of the UniOn and the Tribunal was not competent to go into that qtlestion at all. (135 Fl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1829 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated June 30, 1967 of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-87 -of 1965.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. P. Mookerjee and l. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nlanqrdan Sharma and S. K. Nandi, for th.e respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an award dated June 30, 1967 of the Third Industrial Trjbunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-87 of 1965 finding that the retrenchment of 12 workmen and the closure of the factory of the appellant were both illegal and unjustified.\n\nThe Tribunal accordingly directed\n\nH •\n\nthat the workers whose services had been purported to be tenninated on the ground of closure must be deemed to be still in service of the company and they should receive all their wages and allowances with effect from the date when their services were terminated.\n\nThe two issues which '.!Vere referred by the order of the Government of West BC!lgal dated April 23, 1965 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act between the appellant Company and their workmen were :\n\n( 1) Whether the closure of the factory at Barakar is bona fide and in the circumstances justified ? To what relief, if any, are the workn)en entitled ?\n\n( 2) Whether the retrenchment of the following workmen is justified ? To what relief, if any, are they entitled?\n\n(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope.\n\nThe facts about which there is no dispute are as follows. The appellant is a big engineering concern with its head office at Bombay and factories and establishments numbering about sixty spread all over India and CeylOQ. In West Bengal it had two factories, one at Barakar and the other Rt Konnagore near Calcutta.\n\nThe distanee between the two factories is about 140 miles. The Barakar factory had about 85 workmen daily-rated as well as monthly-rated.\n\nThe factory was situated qwte close to Grand Trunk road.\n\nThe whole area of the factory and its surroundings including the Grand Trunk road was coal bearing land from which coal had been extracted towards the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century.\n\nOn December 18, 1962 there was a subsidence of the earth towards the north of the Grand Trunk road passing through Barakar town affecting a surface area of about I 00' X 60'. This is corroborated by a letter of the Inspecting Olficer, Circle m of the Coal Board Asansol to the Barakar Electric Supply Co. Ltd., a copy whereof was sent to the appellant.\n\nThis letter shows that the subsidence had affected a part of the premises of the factory of the appellant and appeared to have a trend of extending towards the occupied quarters of the appellant's factory. Simultaneously, there was a declaration of the Mines Department of India that Barakar town near Asansol had been declared unsa(e.\n\nThe declaration further shows that this was the second time when the town had been so declared unsafe aild according to the MinC5 Department this was\n\n132 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [ 1968] 3 s.cil.\n\ndUe to the fact that the area involved was above a 70 year old A abandoned colliery. It appears that there WllS another subsidellCe in the same area on May' 4, 1963 as a result whereof the approaCh road to the appallant's factory was badly damaged.\n\nThere was also damage to a portion of the manager's quarters near the factory gate.\n\nBy Jetter dated May 15, 1963 addressed to the Gtief Inspector of Mines, Government of India, the appellant wanted the B site to be inspected for the purpose of finding out whether ther, e was any chance of further subsidence. That the subsidences were real was not questioned before the Industrial Tribunal nbr is there any controversy regarding the same before us.\n\nThis has been referred to in. many official correspondence which have been exhibited in this case.\n\nOn July 18, 1963 there was a letter from c the office of the Chief Inspector of Mines to the appellant that its factory was situaje on a goaf made in the last part of the nineteenth century and was therefore dangerntt~ for habitation. It was also mentioned in that letter that the factory having been declared unstable, restarting of the factory on that site could not be recommended.\n\nOn September 12, 1963 the head office of the appellant at Bombay wrote to its office at Barakar that it was con- D sidering closing down of the above factory as a precautionary safety measure and that it was not thinki..\"'lg of shifting the factory but intended to close it completely. The last portion of the letter seems to have been necessitated by enquiries started by the factory at Barakar regarding the availability of suitable site not very far away to which the factory could be shifted. It appears that E inspection had been made of a plot at Rajbandh but the idea of shifting the factory to that site had to be given up because of the unavailability of high tension clectric line. The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory.\n\nOn September 23, 1964 the company served notices on twelve of its workmen to the effect that their services had become surplus G to the appellant's requirement and they were beinl? given one month's notice of termination of service and would be paid all legal dues i.e., earned wal!'!S, leave wa~, retrenchment compensation etc. on October 23, 1964. At the intercession of the Assistant LabOur Commissioner, Government of West Bengal, the appellant agreed .to retain these 12 workmen in their employment H at firs!!il! Novemher 4, 1964 and then bl! December 12, 1964.\n\nOn December 31. 1964 the company µvc notice of closure and termination of service to al! the workmen individually.\n\nThe\n\nworkmen were intimated that they would be paid one month's notice wages in lieu of one month's notice, retrenchment compensation as per provisions of .the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wages in lieu of earned leave due, if any, as on to-date as also for the proportionate earned leave for the current year till the last day of service, gratuity amount, if due, as per terms of settlement award, earned wages and such other legally due amounts, if any. Mention was also made of the bonus for the years 1962-63 and 1963-64.\n\nThere is no dispute that the factory was closed on December 31, 1964 and the dispute raised was referred to the Industrial Tribunal in April, 1965. The Tribunal noted inits award that the factory was closed by the appellant with effect from January l, 1965 but it went into the question as to whether the closure of the factory was bona fide and justified in the circumstances of the\n\ncase and came to the conclusion that the reason given by the company to justify the closure was mala fide for the purpose of dispensing with the services of the Barakar factory workrs who had since the formation of their union been fighting the appellant for betterment of their service conditions.\n\nThere can be no doubt that there had been disputes between the appellant and its workers from 1957 to 1961 and that other Industrial Tribunals had in the past criticised strongiy the labour practice of the appellant. Examining the evidence before it, the Tribunal was of the view that the decision of the heacl office of the appellant at Bombay to close the factory was in retaliation of the strike notice given by the Union in the middle of August 1963 over the question of bonus for 1961-62. The Tribunal sought to fortify its conclusion observing that the factory was not closed immediately or at a reasonable time after the actual subsidences in December 1962 or May 1963 and that it made no effort to render the factory area safe from further su.bsidence by sand stowing, a method which had been resorted to in respect of the subsidence of the Grand Trunk road.\n\nIt also referred to the evidence to the effect that several other concerns which had factories in the neighbourhood of the appellant did not close down their factories.\n\nIn our opinion, it was not open to the Tribunal to go into the question as to the motive of the appellant in closing down iis factory at Barakat and to enquire whether it was bona fide, or ma/a fide with some oblique purpose, namely to punish the workmen for the union activities in fighting the appeJlant. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that it is not for Industrial Tribunals to enquire into the motive to find out whether the closure is justified or not. As far back as 1957, it was\n\n134 SUPllEMJ! COURT llEPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nobserved by this Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. P. S. M.\n\nMazdoor Union(') that:\n\n\"where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that the .closure is real and bona fide any dispute arising with reference thereto would, as held in K. M. Padmanabha Ayyar v. State of Madras('), fall outside the purview of the Industrial pules Act.\n\nAnd that will a fortiori be so, if a dispute arises--if one such can be conceived-after the closure of the business between the quondam employer and employees.\"\n\nThe use of the expression 'bona fide' in the! above quotation does not refer to the motive behind the closure but to the fact of the closure. The question about the bona {ides of the closure had to be examined in the case of Tea Districts Labour Association, Calcutta v. Ex-employees of Tea Districts Labour Association and another(3 ). There two agencies of the appellant at Koraput and\n\nBerhmpur were closed by the appellant and that was the finding of the Tribunal. This Court held that once it was established that the agencies had in fact been closed the finding about the ma/a {ides of the closure would not \"justify the conclusion that the said\n\ntwo agencies should be deemed to continue\" and allow the Tribunal to make an award on that basis.\n\nIn Hatisingh Manufacturinf! Co. Ltd. v. Union of India(') it was observed that :\n\n\"Loss of service due to closure stands on the same footing as loss of service due to retrenchment, for in both cases, the. employee is thrown out of employment suddenly and for no fault of his and the hardships which he has to face are, whether unemployment is the result of retrenchment or closure of business, the sa)lle. If the true basis of the hnpugned provisions is the achie\\lement of social justice, it is immaterial to consider the motives of the employer or to decide whether the closure is bona fide or otherwise.\"\n\nReference may also be made to Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v.\n\nThe Workers(•). In this case the main questiQn was whether there was a closure or a lockout and it was observed by this Court (at p. 573):\n\n\"If the action taken by the appellant is not a lockout but is a cl6sure. bona fide and genuine, the dispute\n\n(2) (1954] I L.L.J. 469. (I) [1957] 11.L.J. 235 at 239.\n\n(l) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 2()7.\n\n(4) (1960] 3 s.c.R. 528 at 537.\n\n(5) A.l.R. 1%3 S.C. 569.\n\nwhich the respondents may raise in respect of such a closure is not an industrial dispute at all. On the other hand, if, in fact and in substance it is a lockout, but the said action has adopted the disguise of a closure, and a dispute is raised in respect of such an action, it would be an industrial dispute which industrial adjudication is competent to deal with.\"\n\nThe question of the motive of the employer in closing an establishment had to be examined by this Court again in Andhra Prabha\n\nv. Madras Umon of Journalists('). It was pointed out there that there might be more than one motive working in the mind of thee employer leading him to close his establishment and it was not for the Industrial Tribunal to examine that question meticulously and decide on the bona {ides of the motive.\n\nIn view of these decisions, our conclusion is that once thee Tribunal finds that an employer has closed its factory as a matter of fact it is not concerned to go into the questin as to the motivee\n\n0 . which guided him and to come to a conclusion that because of the previous history of the dispute betweoo the employer and the employees the closure was not justified.\n\nSuch a closure cannot give rise to an industrial dispute.\n\nThe above conclusion is sufficient to allow the appeal, but one last point remains.\n\nThe Tribunal had evidence before it of at.\n\nE least two workers of the Barakar factory having been transferred in the past to other places. On the basis of this evidence, the Tribunal werlt into the question as to whether the company even if it decided to effect a retrenchment of the 12 workmen should have applied the principle 'last come first go' and found out whether these workmen could be transferred to other places if they were\n\nsenior to those retained. It is not disputed that no such pleit was taken in the written statement of the union and with all respect to the Tribunal, it was not competent to go into that question at all. There is no evidence here as to the tenns of employment of the workers in other units of the factory.\n\nThe nearest units to the Barakar factory were the one at Konnagore and thee other at Patna at a distance of 200 miles from Barakar.\n\nThee point not having been raised by the union and without going intc the question as to whether it was feasible for the appellant to effect such transfers, the Tribunal should not have attempted to apply t)le principle of 'last come first go'.\n\nIn the result, we allow the appeal holding that me closure of' the factory at Barakar was bona fide and genuine. We also hold H that in view of that finding the Tribunal could not examine thee question of retrenchment of the 12 workmen and give them the-\n\n(1} [1967) 3 S.C.R. 901.\n\n:t36\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nrelief it sought to do.\n\nThere is no dis;:iute that the appellant did offer to pay the workmen all their dues on the buis of the closure.\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the award is set aside. We do not how- .ever propose to make any order as to costs of' this appeal.\n\n<J.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "February 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. mmt WORDIEN\n\nFebruary 8, 1968\n\n[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. llEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1960) 3 S.C.R. 207", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967) 3 S.C.R. 901", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1453, "end_char": 1472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "135 Fl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. P. Mookerjee and l. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Mookerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. P. Mookerjee and l. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "l. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1924, "end_char": 1936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. P. Mookerjee and l. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "lanqrdan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lanqrdan Sharma and S. K. Nandi, for th.e respondents."}}, {"text": "S. K. Nandi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 1989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lanqrdan Sharma and S. K. Nandi, for th.e respondents."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an award dated June 30, 1967 of the Third Industrial Trjbunal, West Bengal, in Case No."}}, {"text": "Government of West BC!lgal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two issues which '.!Vere referred by the order of the Government of West BC!lgal dated April 23, 1965 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act between the appellant Company and their workmen were :\n\n( 1) Whether the closure of the factory at Barakar is bona fide and in the circumstances justified ?"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2740, "end_char": 2754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two issues which '.!Vere referred by the order of the Government of West BC!lgal dated April 23, 1965 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act between the appellant Company and their workmen were :\n\n( 1) Whether the closure of the factory at Barakar is bona fide and in the circumstances justified ?"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2761, "end_char": 2766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "their workmen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2832, "end_char": 2845, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Barakar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two issues which '.!Vere referred by the order of the Government of West BC!lgal dated April 23, 1965 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act between the appellant Company and their workmen were :\n\n( 1) Whether the closure of the factory at Barakar is bona fide and in the circumstances justified ?"}}, {"text": "Kuldip Goala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3126, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Chandra Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3144, "end_char": 3159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Gour Baidyakar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Pradip Kumar Dey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Dular Chand Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Gangadhar Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3255, "end_char": 3270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3277, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Balai Chandra Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3306, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Surendra Kumbhakar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Sagar Chandra Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3360, "end_char": 3379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "Pares.h Gope", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3387, "end_char": 3399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1} Kuldip Goala, (2) Chandra Bahadur, (3) Gour Baidyakar, ( 4) Pradip Kumar Dey, ( 5) Dular Chand Prasad, (6) Gangadhar Pandey, (7) Mahendra Bhagat, ( 8) Sunil Kumar Chatterjee, ( 9) Balai Chandra Ghose, ( 10) Surendra Kumbhakar, ( 11 ) Sagar Chandra Ghose, ( 12) Pares.h Gope."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a big engineering concern with its head office at Bombay and factories and establishments numbering about sixty spread all over India and CeylOQ."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3626, "end_char": 3637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In West Bengal it had two factories, one at Barakar and the other Rt Konnagore near Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3707, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In West Bengal it had two factories, one at Barakar and the other Rt Konnagore near Calcutta."}}, {"text": "December 18, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 18, 1962 there was a subsidence of the earth towards the north of the Grand Trunk road passing through Barakar town affecting a surface area of about I 00' X 60'."}}, {"text": "Barakar town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 18, 1962 there was a subsidence of the earth towards the north of the Grand Trunk road passing through Barakar town affecting a surface area of about I 00' X 60'."}}, {"text": "Barakar Electric Supply Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is corroborated by a letter of the Inspecting Olficer, Circle m of the Coal Board Asansol to the Barakar Electric Supply Co. Ltd., a copy whereof was sent to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mines Department of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4747, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously, there was a declaration of the Mines Department of India that Barakar town near Asansol had been declared unsa(e."}}, {"text": "Asansol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously, there was a declaration of the Mines Department of India that Barakar town near Asansol had been declared unsa(e."}}, {"text": "May' 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that there WllS another subsidellCe in the same area on May' 4, 1963 as a result whereof the approaCh road to the appallant's factory was badly damaged."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Jetter dated May 15, 1963 addressed to the Gtief Inspector of Mines, Government of India, the appellant wanted the B site to be inspected for the purpose of finding out whether ther, e was any chance of further subsidence."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Jetter dated May 15, 1963 addressed to the Gtief Inspector of Mines, Government of India, the appellant wanted the B site to be inspected for the purpose of finding out whether ther, e was any chance of further subsidence."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5832, "end_char": 5845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 18, 1963 there was a letter from c the office of the Chief Inspector of Mines to the appellant that its factory was situaje on a goaf made in the last part of the nineteenth century and was therefore dangerntt~ for habitation."}}, {"text": "September 12, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 12, 1963 the head office of the appellant at Bombay wrote to its office at Barakar that it was con- D sidering closing down of the above factory as a precautionary safety measure and that it was not thinki..\"'lg of shifting the factory but intended to close it completely."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 12, 1963 the head office of the appellant at Bombay wrote to its office at Barakar that it was con- D sidering closing down of the above factory as a precautionary safety measure and that it was not thinki..\"'lg of shifting the factory but intended to close it completely."}}, {"text": "Rajbandh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6768, "end_char": 6776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that E inspection had been made of a plot at Rajbandh but the idea of shifting the factory to that site had to be given up because of the unavailability of high tension clectric line."}}, {"text": "Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7063, "end_char": 7094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory."}}, {"text": "Berhampore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory."}}, {"text": "Jilly 1\\J, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory."}}, {"text": "Barakar factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7342, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention to close down the factory is also apparent from letters written by it to several authorities including the Controller of Purchase and Stores, Durgapur Steel Plant, , Bunlwan dated November 12, 1963 and to F the Executive Enineer Ganga Barrage Investigation Division, Berhampore dated Jilly 1\\J, 1964 showing that in view of the intended closure of the factory it would not be in a position to execute the orders from the Barakar factory."}}, {"text": "September 23, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7363, "end_char": 7381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1964 the company served notices on twelve of its workmen to the effect that their services had become surplus G to the appellant's requirement and they were beinl?"}}, {"text": "October 23, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7692, "end_char": 7708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on October 23, 1964."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7909, "end_char": 7926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December 12, 1964."}}, {"text": "December 31. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7932, "end_char": 7949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 31."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8205, "end_char": 8234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 31, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute that the factory was closed on December 31, 1964 and the dispute raised was referred to the Industrial Tribunal in April, 1965."}}, {"text": "January l, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal noted inits award that the factory was closed by the appellant with effect from January l, 1965 but it went into the question as to whether the closure of the factory was bona fide and justified in the circumstances of the\n\ncase and came to the conclusion that the reason given by the company to justify the closure was mala fide for the purpose of dispensing with the services of the Barakar factory workrs who had since the formation of their union been fighting the appellant for betterment of their service conditions."}}, {"text": "Barakat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10434, "end_char": 10441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, it was not open to the Tribunal to go into the question as to the motive of the appellant in closing down iis factory at Barakat and to enquire whether it was bona fide, or ma/a fide with some oblique purpose, namely to punish the workmen for the union activities in fighting the appeJlant."}}, {"text": "Koraput", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11761, "end_char": 11768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There two agencies of the appellant at Koraput and\n\nBerhmpur were closed by the appellant and that was the finding of the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Berhmpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11774, "end_char": 11782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There two agencies of the appellant at Koraput and\n\nBerhmpur were closed by the appellant and that was the finding of the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "cl6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13012, "end_char": 13015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1960) 3 S.C.R. 2", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13118, "end_char": 13135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Konnagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15315, "end_char": 15324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nearest units to the Barakar factory were the one at Konnagore and thee other at Patna at a distance of 200 miles from Barakar."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15343, "end_char": 15348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nearest units to the Barakar factory were the one at Konnagore and thee other at Patna at a distance of 200 miles from Barakar."}}, {"text": "[1967) 3 S.C.R. 901", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15897, "end_char": 15916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_137_157_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD\n\nKALYAN BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY & ANR.\n\nFebruary 8, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., S. M. Snoo, J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDlALlNGAM, JJ.]\n\nElectricity (Supp(v) Act 54 of 1948; s. 49 as amended by the Electricity (S11pply) Amendment Act 30 of 1966, s. 24-Pow.er of Electricity Board to /ev, v uniform tariffs for different consumers-Valulity of s. 49 -Whether colourable exercise of taxing power-Whetf1er gives unguided po,.-er to Board--Ej/ect of s. 24 of Amendment Act.\n\nThe appellant the Maharashtra State Electricity Board which took over tho supply of electrical energy from the original linc<, nsec, increased the tariff and fixed a 11niform tariff for all its consumers. The respondentsconsume; s filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution. contending that (a) s. 49 of the Electricity (supply) Act 1948 .did not permit the Board to frame uniform tariffs for consumers in compact areas as well as consumers in sparse areas. so as to require the former to pay a part of the oost involved in the supply of electricity to the latter: and (b) if s. 49 gave such power to the Board it was ultra vii\"es and void, as it offended the provisions of the Constitution. The High Court allowed the writ J>Zlitions. The Board filed appeals to this Court and during its pcndency s. 49 was amended 1cb:ospectively by the Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act 1966 and by s. 24 of the Amendment Act tho imposition and cotlcc tion of cha1ges undeJ s. 49 was validated.\n\nHEID : The appeals must be allowed.\n\n(i) \"Ibc appellate-Board had ample powers to frame uniform tariffs and the levy was valid.\n\nIn the old s . .,.'> .. there was no such policy or direction indicated by the Legislature that ~Board is to frame uniform tariffs. Under that section, the Board had the po\\\\-er to supply electricity on such terms and conditions as it may from time to time fix, having regard to t!n matters referred to in the said section.' \"Ihe only restriction upon the Board's power was that it shall not show undue preferenee to any person in fixinR any such tef1n.;. and conditions. In s. 49 as it now stands tm Legislature hns empowered the Board to frame uniform tariffs and it has also indicated the. factor~ to 00 taken into account in fixing uniform tariffs. These two aspects arc contained in sn~. (1) and (2). The Legislature has also made it clear in sub-s. (3) that the Boan! in the special circumstances mentioned thcn:-- iii, has got power to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity. Subsection (4) directs the Board not to show undue preference to any person f01 fixing the tariffs and the terms and conditions for the supply of electricity.\n\nThough prima fade it would appear that sub-s. ( 4) will govern sub-ss. (1) to (3) in s. 49 the proper way to interpret sub-s. ( 4) will be to read it along with snb-s.. (7). When the e'ntire tariff is uniform for every consumer. there is no question of any undue preference as every customer will pay the same amount for the same benefit received br him.\n\n(153 CE] H So11th of Scotlcnd Electricity Board & Ors. v. British Oxygen Co. Ltd.\n\n(195~ 2 All E.R. 225 and Attorney-Gene/\"11 for Victoria v.\n\nMayor, Aldermen. Councillors and Citizens of Melbourne, [19071 A.C. 469, re· ferred' to.\n\nL4SUp.Cl./6S-10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1963] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board, it has been stated that ever sinoe its constitution, it has been carrying an its opuatiQlia\n\nat a loss and there has been no occas:on when any part of its revenues has bc, on passed to the consolidated fund of the State, as provided by the proviso to sub-<:l. (b) of cl. 10 of s. 67. Even otherwise, before the proviSo can come into operation, there are several other items in respect of which adjustments will have to be made, and there will be n9 occasion at an for th-e proviso to come ino effect. There is no force in ffie contention of the respondents that with a view to give effect to the proviso. the Board will so. fix <he tariffs as to enable them to have huge surplus, after meeting the various adjustments.\n\nIn case such a thing happens in future. the proviso, which is clearly severable, may have to be struck down. Therefore, this ground of attack, that there is a colourable exercise of taxing power, cannot be accepted. f.154 H-155 CJ ·\n\n(iii) Section 49 is not, in any way, bad on the ground that it gives an unguic!ed and arbitrary power to the Board to fix its tariffs as it likes.\n\nThe prmisions of the Act have the effect of properly guiding the activities of the Board, in its dealings with the consumers including the levy of tariffs. Section 49 itself is hedged in by various restrictions lllld directions which the Board will have •o comply in thp, matter of frattling uniform tariffs or in the matter of fixing different tariffs, and that section also provides a proper guide-line for framing uniform tariffs and different tariffs.\n\nTherefore, in particular, it may be noted that the extension and cJieapcning of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas undeF cl. (d) of__s. 49(2) of the Act can only be complied with by keeping the uniform rate\n\nat a minimum, consistently \\vith the requirement of s. 59, of not mnning at a Joss. [156 B-DJ\n\n(iv) The contention, that while restrictions have been placed on the licensees no such restriction has been placed on the Board in as much as that the licensee shall so adjust his charges for the sale of .electrici•y, whether by enhancing or reducing them that his dear profit in any year. of account shall not, as far as possible, exceed an amount of reasonable return, has no substance.\n\nThe lionsiees are persons who must have in~ vested considerable caoital in the matter of their business. and obviously. the Legislature thought that some directions will have to be given so as to enable them to have a reasonable return. [156 E-GJ\n\n( v) Section 24 of the Amendment Act, deals with all rates, as a matter of fact fixed under s. 49 of the Act. In this case, the Board has fixed tariffs under s. 49 of the Act. Therefore, s. 24 of the Amendment Act has full effect and force. [157 BJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 335 and 336 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated April 26, 27 and 28, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 1570 and 1571 of 1962.\n\nL. M. Slnghvi, B. Dutta and RavinJer Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals) .\n\nPoras A. Mehta, G. L. Sanghi, R. A. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwa?a, for the respondents (in both the.appeals).\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for intervener No. 1 (in both the appellls).\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidlalingam, !.) 139\n\nA. K. Sen and B. R. Agarwala, for intervener No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. These two appeals, by certificate, are directed against the common judgment of the. Bombay High B' Court, rendered in Special Civil Applications, Nos. 1570 & 157 i of 1962.\n\nThe circumstances, under which t.he two writ petitions were filed, by the respondent, in each of these two appeals, may be brielly stated. Till January 14, 1959, a company called the Kalyan Electricity Company (Private) Ltd., held a licence for supplying electrical energy to the town of Kalyan and the surrounding areas.\n\nThe licence of the said company was revoked hy the Government of Maharashtra, and, on option being given to purchase the undertaking of the said company, the appellant purchased the same, on January 15, 1959. The appellant, hereinafter to be referred to as the Board, continued to supply elec- D trical energy to the residents of Kalyan, according to the rates prescribed by the former Kalyan licensee, pending notification oE its standard rates of supply. In March 1962, a public notice was given by the Board, to the effect that in the Western Maharashtra area (which includes 'Kalyan) revised tariff would be\n\napplicable from the first day of the month next following the month .in which supply of Koyna power became available.\n\nAs the electrical energy from the Koyna Project became available from the month of June 1962, the Board caused another public notice to be issued, informing the public that the Board's revised tariffs would come into force from July 1962, and that bills, in respect of the power consum_ption, during that month, would be issued at the revised tariffs, in August 1962.\n\nThe Kalyan Borough Municipality, which is the respondent, in Civil Appeal No. 335 of 1967, was being supplied by the appellant, electrical energy for street lighting, till June 1962, on the same terms on which the ol, d Kalyan licensee was supplying.\n\nThe Board submitted a draft of the new agreement to the said G Municipality, in respect of the supply of electrical energy for street lighting, under which the charge which the Municipality had to pay, per unit of electricity, was slightly less than before, but the Municipality was required to pay several fixed charges, with the result that the total amount payable was greater tlian before. The Municipality, however, intimated its desire to enter H into the new agreement, only for a period of .one year, instead of seven years, as suggested by the Board. Tne Board was not prepared to accede to this request, of the Municipality, and, on the latter's failure. to pay bills for street lighting, according to the\n\n140 SUPREME COURT ).lll'Or.TS\n\n(196S} 3 S.C.R.\n\ndraft agreement, an intimation 'l\"lllS sent, by the appellant, on A October 12, 1962, that the supply of electricity, for stteet lighting, would be cut off, from October 22, 1962. The Municipality filed a writ petition, under Art. 226, being Special Civil Application No. 1570 of 1962, in the High Court, against the Board, seeking a writ of mandamus, prohibiting the appellant from enforcing the directions, contained in its notioe, dated October 12, B 1962.\n\nOne Dattatraya Pandurang Pimpale and other COllSUlllCIS of electricity formed an association called 'Kalyu-Dombivali-Vij\n\nGrahak Manda!', to protest against the steps taken, by the appellant, to levy increased charges, for the supply of electrical energy.\n\nAs the request of the Association, for not increasing the charges, was not heeded to, by the appellant, which threatened to stop supply of electricity to consumers, if the bills were not paid, according to the revised tariffs, the said Dattatraya filed, in the Higli Court, a writ petition, under Art. 226, being Special Civil Application No. 1571 of 1962, seeking directions to restrain the Board from disconnecting supply of electrical energy.\n\nIn both these writ petitions, the action of the Board, in increasing the tariffs, over and above the rate which was charged by the original Kalyan licensee, and fixing a unifOilll tariff, was challenged. Two contentions appear to have been raised, in the writ petitions, before the High Court, viz., (a) thats. 49, of the E Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act LIV of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Supply Act), did not permit the Board to frame uniform tariffs for consumers in compact areas as well as consumers in sparse areas, so as to require the former to pay a part of the cost involved in the supply of electricity to the latter; and\n\n(b) that, if s. 49 gave such power to the Board, it was ultra vires F and void, as it offended the provisions of the Constitntion.\n\nThe Board, by reference to the scheme and the provisions of the Supply Act, contended that the levy of a unifOilll tariff was valid and within its power and that s. 49 did not offend any provisions of the Constitution. At this stage, it may be mentioned that the High Court considered the contentions of the G parties, on the basis of s. 49, as it was, prior to the amendment of the Supply Act in 1966. Before the High Court, it appears to have been common ground that distn1mtion costs involved in the supply of electricity, per unit of consumption, to sparse areas. was higher than the distribution costs, involved in the supply of electricity, per unit of consumption, to compact areas. The High H Court has taken the view that one of the factors which the Board has to take into account, under s. 49, in framing its tariffs, is the location, where the consumer wants electrical to be sup-\n\n~· ,.\n\nMAHARASHTRA BLBC. v. XALYAN MUNIC, (Vaidialingam, 1.) 141\n\nplied to him, and' that this iinplies that if, on a consideration of this factor, the Board finds that the cost of supply of electricity to different areas, are widely divergent, different tariffs could be framed, in respect of such areas.\n\nOn this line of reasoning, the learned Judges of the High Court, came to the conclusion that, in framing the impugned tariffs, the Board did not have due regard to the provisions, contained in s 49, and therefore, the Board was not entitled to enforce the demand, made by it.\n\nThe leiimed Judges also seem to have been impressed with the objections. raised by the respondents, that the Board had assumed that s. 49 permitted it to frame its tariffs, in such a way that a part of the higher cost, involved in the supply of electrical energy, to undeveloped areas, may be borne, by consumers, in compact areas.\n\nAs the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents, that the Board had no power to fix uniform tariffs, so as to cast a higher burden, on the consumers, in a compact area, where the cost of supply was less, it did not express any opinion, regarding the constitutional validity of s. 49, though, there again, the High Court appears to have been inclined to hold that unguided and unfettered power had been given, to the Board, to fix its charges as high as it liked. Ultimately, the High Court allowed the writ petitions and prohibited the appellant, from enforcing its claim to recover the revised tariff, and disconnecting electric supply.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 335 of 1967 is against the order in Special Civil Application No. 1570 of 1962, in which the respondent is the KaJyan Borough Municipality; and Civil Appeal No. 336 of 1967 is against the order in Special Civil Application No. 1571 of 1962, in which the respondent is Dattatraya Pandurang Pim pale.\n\nDuring the pendency of the above appeals, Parliament enacted the Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act, 1966 (Act XXX of\n\n1966) (hereinafter called the Amendment Act), by which the Supply Act was amended, in various particulars. It is only necessary to refer to two sections of the Amendment Act, viz .. ss. 11. and 24. Section 11, substituted, witli retrospective effect new s. 49, in the place of old s. 49.\n\nThe new s. 49, runs as follows:\n\n\"49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees.-\n\n( 1) Subject to me provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such suuply frame uniform tariffs.\n\n1'2 SUPUMI ClOU&T d!Ot.TS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\n( 2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, tho Bolll'd shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely :-\n\n(a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required;\n\n(b) the coordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economieal manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee; ( c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies; ( d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas.\n\n(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard\n\nto the geographical position of any area, the E nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.\n\n( 4) In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person.\" Section 24, of the Amendment Act, validating the imposition and collection of charges for the supply of electricity, under s. 49. is, as follows :\n\n\"(1) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, all rates fixed under section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for the sale of electricity to any person, other than a licensee before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been vlidly fixed as if the provisions of the said section, as amended by this Act, had been in force at all material times when such rates were fixed and accordingly,-\n\n(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained\n\n\"r continued in any Court fQI: the refund of any\n\nMAHARASHTf.A ELEC. r. KALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidia/ingam, /.) 143\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\namount collected from any person on the basis of such rates;\n\nno Court shall enforce a decree or order directing the refund of any amount collected from such person on the basis of such rates;\n\nany amount due from any person on the basis of such rates before the commencement of this Act but not recovered before such commencement may be recovered in the manner provided under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.\n\n(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in sub-section (I) shall be construed as preventing any person from claiming refund of any amount paid by him in excess of. the amount due from him under the said Act, as amended by this Act and the rules or regulations made thereunder.\"\n\nIn view of the Atµendment Act, this Court permitted the parties to file affidavits, stating their case, wih respect to the amended section 49, and gave an opportunity to them, to raise their respective contentions.\n\nThe respondents have raised the contention that s. 24, of the Amendment Act, on a proper interpretation, does not validate the impugned rates of electricity supply, imposed on them, by the appellant.\n\nAccording to them, on a proper interpretation of s. 49, as amended, the Board is not empowered to fix uniform tariffs, in such a way tl!at a great part of the higher costs involved in the supply of electricity to sparse areas, is to be borne by consumers in developed or compact areas.\n\nIt is their further contention that, under the amended section, uniform tariffs can, if at all, be levied by the Board, with particular reference to the development in areas which are not. for the time being served at all, or adequately served, and it does not authorise the appellant to secure development of electricity in the sparse areas, at the cost of the consumers in areas which are already developed and adequately served, and hence the levy of the tariffs at the amended rate, is unauthorised and illegal. The respondents further contend that levy of uniform tariffs, as contemplated by s. 49(2), as amended, can be done only when the Board fixes uniform tariffs, for the whole State of Maharashtra.\n\nIn this connection, they point out, that the appellant has not fixed uniform tariffs for the entire State of Maharashtra, but, on the other hand, has fixed different tadffs, for different areas, for supply of electricity.\n\nAs an instance of the Board itself levyin)! different rates in different areas, the respondents have referred to the case of Poona City, which was formerly served by the\n\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nPoona Electricity Supply Company Ltd. In Poona City, the respondents point out, the Board has fixed a lower rate of tariff, viz., 13 paise per unit of electricity, whereas it has fixed 31 paisa per unit in other areas, including the Kalyan Municipality area.\n\nIt is the claim of the respondents that the appellant should have fixed tariffs for the Kalyan Municipality area also, in the same manner as it has done for the Poona City area.\n\nThe Board according to them, is not entitled to charge higher rate from consumers in the Kalyan Municipality area, in order to give cheaper supplies to other areas, in the western region. It is their further contention, that, under s. 49(2), as amended, the appellant may charge lesser rate than the cost of supply for the sparsely developed areas, but, in no case is it entitled to charge the compact areas, rates higher than warranted by the. cost of supply to such areas.\n\nThey point out that by charging consumers in compact areas more than the cost of supply, the Board has shown undue preference. The consumers, in the compact areas, are being made to pay more than what is due by them, i.e., more than the cost of supply, in order to charge less from consumers in undeveloped areas, i.e., less than what is due by them, and this offends sub-s. ( 4) of s. 49.\n\nThe respondents also co11tend that if s. 49, as amended, empowers the Board to levy and co!Iect, at the rate of the revised tariff, s. 49 is unconstitutional and void. They point out that by the Board charging consumers in compact areas more than what is due by them, i.e., more than the cost of supply, it was, in effect, taxing a class of consumers, which it had no power or authority to do, P, nder the Supply Act, as amended.\n\nNo maximum limit has been fixed, under the Supply Act, beyond which the Board cannot charge, for electricity supplied by it. They also point out that the consumers, to whom electricity is supplied by the Board, are treated differentially from the consumers who are supplied electricity, by licensees.\n\nIn respect of the latter class, they point out, that the Supply Act has placed several restrictions, regarding the manner in which the rate has to be fixed, whereas there is no such restriction, placed on the powers of the Board.\n\nThis amounts to discrimination, resulting in Art. 14, of the Constitution, being violated.\n\nOn these grounds, both the respondents\n\nure that the levy of uniform tariff, by the Board, is illegal and VOid.\n\nThe appellant Board has controverted the stand, taken by the respondents.\n\nAccording to it, the levy and collection at the revised uniform tariff, is perfectly legal and valid, and s. 24, of the Amendment Act, in any event, has validated such levy. The appellant points out that the fixing of uniform tariff\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. XALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidialingam, J;) 145\n\nis authorised by s. 49, as amended; and such uniform rates are fixed, not with the intention of making the developed areas bear the incidence of higher costs of supply to undeveloped areas, but really with a view to achieve the co-ordinated development of generation, distribution and supply of eJectrical energy, in the most efficient and economical manner, as required by the Supply Act. According to the Board, it is not necessary to fix one single uniform tariff for the whole State of Maharashtra, and that, on the other hand, it is empowered to fix region-wise uniform tariffs, having due regard to the provisions, contained in s. 49(2). In this connection, the Board a:so points out that both the respondents are consumers of electricity, at low tension, and that they are concerned only with tariffs for supply of electricity at low tension. The Board further avers that since April 1962, it has prescribed and applied, uniform tariffs for supply of electricity at low tension, in all the areas in the State of Maharashtra, which are served by it, except Poona area. With reference to Poona area, the Board has referred to the circumstances. under which a lower rate of tariff is -levied. Even in respect of Poona area, it is stated by the Board that it has intrduced uniform tariffs for. low tension electricity, with effect from January 1, 1966 except in regard to consumers of electricity for lights and fans and small power in residential buildings.\n\nRegarding the attack, on the constitutional validity of s. 49, as amended, the Board points out that there is no question of any taxing power being entrusted to it, under the said section. The Board points out that in view of the special circumstances under which a licensee is operating, certain provisions have been made in the Supply Act; but the special position occupied by the Board, which has been entrusted with various duties and functions has been recognised by the Supply Act. But no discrimination as alleged by the respondents has h'!en made by the statute between consumers who are supplied by the licensee and the consumers who are supplied by the Board. The Board fmther states that the Supply Act does not cast any duty on the Board to fix the tariff, in accordance with the cost of supply; and it points out that what is necessary, under s. 49, is the taking into account of the over-all economy of the Board's system of generatfon and supply of electricity.\n\nTue Board seeks to sustain the levy of uniform tariff, on the basis of the various provisions of the Supply Act, with particular reference to s. 49, as amended.\n\nIn view of the Amendment Act, it has becom; really unnecessary to consider the correctness or otherwise of the views, expressed by the High Court, regarding s. 49, as it stood prior to its amendment; and these appeals will have to be disposed of, on a consideration of the Supply Act, as amended in 1966, with special reference to s. 49, as it now stands.\n\n146 SUPREME COUJ.T REPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nTwo questions arise for consideration, in these appeals, viz.,\n\n(i) the proper interpretation to be placed, on s. 49, as amended, and the power of the Board to levy a unifoon taritf, as in this case; and (ii) the validity of s. 49, as amended.\n\nIt is necessary to state at this stage that both the respondents are consumers of electricity at low tension and that the Board bas fixed uniform tariff for the whole of the State of Maharashtra for supply of electricity at low tension, except in Poona city in respect of certain types of consumers. Even in respect of such cqnsumers, the Board bas stated. that it is taldng steps to levy a uniform tariff. It is on this basis that the contentions of the parties are being considered and dealt with in these appeals.\n\nIt is necessary now to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Supply Act as that will indicate the scheme underlying the Act.\n\nThe Supply Act, as the preamble shows, is an Act to pro vide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, for taking measures conducive to electrical development.\n\nChapter II deals with the Central Electricity Authority.\n\nSection 3<1) provides for the constitution by the Central Governmnt of a body cal!ed the Central Electricity Authority to exercise such functions and perform such duties under the Supply Act and in such manner as the Central Government may prescribe and direct. Chapter m deals with the constitution and composition of the State Electricity Board and certain other incidental matters.\n\nSection 5 provides for the State Government . constituting a State Electricity Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board.\n\nSection 16 deals with the constitution by the State Government of a State Electricity Consultative Council for the State.\n\nSubsec. (2) deals with the composition of the State Elec!ricity Consultative Council. It provides for inclusicin, in the said Council of representatives of cons11mers of elec•ricity also. Subsection ( 6) casts a duty on the State E'ectricity Board to place before the State Electricity Consultatitve Council the annual financial statement and supplementary statement if any. A duty is also cast upon the Boar<! to take into consideration any comments made on such stateme11t by the said Council before it is submitted to the State Government under s. 16 (1).\n\nChapter IV deals with the powers and , duties. of State Electricity Boards .. Section 18 cha•ges the Board with the neral duty of promoting the co-ordinated development of the generation supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the mosi efficient and economical manner. with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time ing served or adeauately served by any licensee.\n\nSection 49 as incorporated by the Amendment Act of 1966 retrospectively, makes provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidialingam, J.) 147'\n\nA licensees. As, in these appeals, the proper interpretation to be placed on that section arises for consideration, that section will be dealt with by us more exhaustively, in the latter part of the judgment. It is enough to note at this stage that the said section deals with the framing of uniforms tariffs and also offixing difierent tariffs as the case may be, in accordance with the principles.\n\nB laid down therein.\n\nChapter VI deals with the Board's finance, accounts and audit. Section 59, leaving out the proviso, states that the Board shall not, as far as. practicable, and after taking credit for any subventions from the State Government under s. 63, carry on its operations under the Supply Act at a loss, and that it shall adjust its charges accordingly from time to time.\n\nSection 61 directs the Board to submit in February of each year to the State Government a statement in the prescribed form of_ the estimated capital and revenue receipts and expenditure for the ensuing. year,\n\nSub-section (3) thereof makes it obligatory on the State Govern ment to place the said statement before the House or Houses, M. the case may be, of the State Legislature and it also provides that the said statement shall be open to discussion by the Legislature, but it is not subject to vote.\n\nSub-section ( 4) casts a dufy on the Board to take into consideration any comments that may be made on the said statement in the State Legislature. It may be noted that s. 61 realiy deals with the Board's preparing its budget for the succeeding year and making it available for discussion by the State Legislature.\n\nSection 63 gives power. to the State Government, with the approval of the State Legislature, to make subventions from time to time to the BOll)'d for the purposes of the Act on such term.s aitd conditions as the State Government may determine. Section 67 deals with the priorify and .discharge of liabilities by the Board and how the balance amount, i~ any, is to be utilised.\n\nSection 70(2) provides that save as otherwiseprovided, the provisions of the Supply Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation C)f, the . Indian Electricity Act, 1910\n\n(Central Act X of 1910). Section 7 5 ( 1 ) deals with the preparation and submission to ihe State Government by the Board soon after the end of each financial year a report giving aii account of its activities during the previous financial year. The report should also give an account of the activities, if any, which are likely to be undertaken by ihe Board in the next financial year. It also makes it obligatory on ihe !State Government to plaee the said rport before the State Legislature. Here again, it may be notetl, that the Board has to give a report ofits activities for the past year.\n\nSection 78 gives power to the State Government to make rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act.\n\nOne of the items in respect of which rules could be framed is that referred ti:i in cl. (g) of s. 7.8(2) namely the form in which, and\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS £196SJ 3 s.c.R.\n\n.the date by which, the annual report of the Board shall be submitted under s. 75; The State Government in this case has framed the Maharashtra Electricity (Supply) Rules, 1963. Rule\n\nSi thereof relates to the submission of annual reports under s. 7 5 (1 ) by the Board. Sub-s. ( 2) indicates the various matters that are to be included in the annual report that is sent by the Board.\n\nItem (q) of sub-r. (2) relates to details of the tariffs of the Board during the year.\n\nTherefore, it will be seen, that in the .annual report that is sent under s. 75 (1) by the Board to the\n\nState Government and which report, as already referred, is placed before the State Legislature, the Board, among various other matters, will have alsci to give details of the tariffs imposed by it during the year.\n\nUnder s. 78A(l), the Board is to be guided in the discharge of its functions by such directions on questions of policy, as may be given to it by the State Government. Section 79 enables the Board to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder.\n\nOne of the matters which may be covered by regulations made by the Board and to which reference is necessary to be made, is dealt with under cl. (j) to the effect, 'principles governing the supply of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees under section 49'.\n\nNow taking up the first question arising for consideration, namely, the power of the Board to levy uniform tariffs under s, 49 of the Supply Act as amended, Mr. Poras A. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, whose contentions have been also reiterated by Mr. A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the interveners, 'urges that in fixing the ratt of tariff, one of the essential matters to be taken into account by the Board is the cost of supply to particular areas concerned.\n\nThat is in other words, according to the respondents. the tariff must be based upon the cost of up\n\nply. It is their fu•ther contention that in fixin~ the tariff<, the cost incurred by the Board for supply of electricity to different areas must be given due consideration and importance. Extension of electricity to soarse areas or to areas which are not adequately supolied, should not be made at the cost of, and to the detriment of, consumers of electricity in already developed or compact areas.\n\nIt is also their contention that the Board may have, if at all, power to levy a lesser uniform rate of tariff in undeveloped or spa•se areas, and any loss that may be incurred by the Board in that regard will have to be compensated by the subventions that may be received by the Board from the State Government under s. 63 of the Supplv Act.\n\nIn no case, the counsel points out. can that burden be shifted to the consumers in the already well-Oeveloped a•eas.\n\nBy levying uniform tariffs in tlli< case on consumers whose area is already welldeveloped. they are being made to pay for the development schemes that are being carried out in sparse areas. That, accord-\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUNIC. (Valdia1i11gam, J.) 14 9\n\ning to them, is violative of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 49 by the Board, in as. much as, the consumers of spaise aieas to whom the cost of supply is more, are enabled to pay at the same rate as those in compact areas. In effect, they point out that there has been undue preference to the consumers in the sparse aieas in as much as they pay much less than the cost of supply.\n\nThe further stand taken on behalf of the respondents is that in this case, the question of imposing different tariffs hould have been considered by the Board under sub-s. (3) of s. 49 in view of the fact that the compact aiea is geographically different from sparse area.\n\nAccording to them, the rates should have been fixed more favourably in favour of the consumers in the compact area.\n\nThey also urge that sub-s. ( 4) of s. 49 which directs the Board not to show undue preference to any person in fixing the. tariffs and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, governs sub-ss. ( 1) to (J) of s. 49 and the Board, by fixing the same tariff in the sparse areas as in the compact areas, has shown undue preference to the fonner which is not pennissible in law.\n\nOn the .other hand, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, learned . co.unsel appearing for the Board pointed out that there is absolutely no indication in the Supply Act that the Board should fix its tariff, having regard to the cost of supply.\n\nCounsel points out that the Board is charged, under s. 18 of the Act, with the duty of promoting the co-ordinated development of generation, supply and distribution of electricity within the State in a most efficient and economical manner.\n\nNonnally, the Board which is deemed to be a company, under s. 80 of the Act, would be entitled to fix its own tariff for electricity supplied by it. Under the old s. 49 of the Act, a general power was conferred on the Board to supply electricity upon such terms and conditions as jt may, from time to time, fix, having regard to the matters referred to in that section.\n\nThe proviso tO the said section directed the Board not to show undue preference to any person in fixing the tariffs. Except this limitation in the exercise of its power, the Board was not placed under any further restriction. Section 49; as it now stands; has been incorporated with retrospective effect.\n\nUnder that section, the Board has been directed to frame uniform tariffs. The factors which are to be taken into account by the Board for tilting unifonn tariffs have also been indicated 'therein.\n\nIn particular circumstances , indicated therein, the Board has .been given the power to fix different tariffs.\n\nWhat was riginally the subjectmatter of the proviso in the old s. 49 has now been incorporated in sub-s. (4) of s. 49. Counsel points out that the question of showing undue preference cannot arise when the Board fixes uniform tariffs.\n\nTherefore, sub-s. ( 4) can govern only sub-s. ( 3) in the matter of fixing different tariffs.\n\nSub-s. ( 4) cannot\n\n15-0\n\n\ncut down the power given to the Board in the matter of fixing uniform tariffs. A\n\nCounsel also points out that going by the phraseology of sub-ss. ( 1) and (2) of s. 49, it is open to the Board to frame .uniform tariffs having regar<; l to the matters mentioned in sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 49.\n\nCounsel also points out that there is no question B of any development in sparse area be; ng made at the expense of the compact area. Under cl. (d) of s. 49(2), one of the factors to be taken into account for fixing uniform tariffs relates to the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely\n\ndeveloped areas.\n\nIf the Board supplies electricity at cheaper rates to sparsely developed areas, the compact areas also will stand to benefit, because the cheap rate> applicable to the former C area will be a uniform tariff governing the compact area consumers also.\n\nThere is no question of any undue preference being shown by the Board.\n\nWe have already referred to the material provisions of the Act which wi!l show the nature of the duties cast upon the Board.\n\nSection 59 Jays down that the Board, after taking subventions\n\nfrom the State Government shall not, as far as practicable, carry on its operations under the Act at a loss, and that the Board is to adjust its charges acc:ordingly from time to time.\n\nThat means that cost .has to be taken into account, though that is not the sole or only criterion for fixin, I! the tariff. There is also no indication in the Act that uniform tariffs can be fixed Qnly in respect of particular regions or areas.\n\nWe are not impressed with the contention of the respondent that by uniform tariffs being levied by the Board, it is making more profits in compact areas than in\n\nSj>arse areas, nor with the further contention that development of sparse areas is being done at the expense of compact areas.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents, certain English decisions have been brought to our notice wherein the expression 'undue preference' or 'discrimination' found in the corresponding Electricity Act have come up for consideration. One of the decisions is that of the House of Lords reported as South of Scotland Electrl -city Board and others v. British Oxygen Co. Ltd.(1). Section\n\n37(8) of the Electricity Act, 1947 which the House of Lords bad to construe provided :\n\n\"An area bo•rd, in fixing tariffs and making agreements under this ection, shall not show undue prefer. ence to any person or class of persons and shall not exercise any undue discrimination against any person or class of persons.\" ---- •(!) [1959) 2 All Jl.R. 225.\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUN!C. (Vaid1alingam, J.) 151\n\nThe House of Lords held that iu determining whether there has\n\nbeen discrimination as between high voltage consUnlers and low voltage consumers, the lesser cost of supplying high voltage power should be taken into consideration, and that, therefore, there might be discrimination against high voltage consumers notwithstanding that the price charged to them was a little lower than that charged to low voltage consumers.\n\nBut the English statute did not contain any provision similar to s. 49(1) and (2) of our i\\ct,\n\nregarding the fixation of nnifonn tariffs.\n\nIt is also seen that in that case, the question of costs appears to have been relied on by the Electricity Board. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the observations of Lord Reid in his dissenting judgment at p. 244 to the effect :\n\n\"W)Jat then is the standard by which preference -or discrimination is to be judged ?\n\nThe appellants say price charged to the consumer and the respondents say cost of supply.\n\nThe Act uses these words in connexion with the fixing of tariffs which deai with prices and not with cost of supply, and one would expect these words in this context to refer to price.\n\nMoreover, prices are easily ascertained by inspection of the tariff but costs of supply are not; their ascertainment probably involves highly contentious questions of costing and the like. So if preference is a matter of cost, it would be impossible to tell whether there is any preference or discrimination until an elaborate investigation had been made.'\n\nThe above observations in the dissenting judgment clearly bring out the difficulcy that will be felt by having to judge the question of undue preference or discrimination with reference to the cost of production. But as we have stated earlier the provisions in the English Act were entirely different.\n\nWe may also refer to another decision of the Privy Council . reported in Attorney-General for Victoria v. Mayor, A/de_rmen,\n\nCaunci/lors and Citizens of Melbourne(') in which the construction of s. 39 of the Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896 came up for consideration.\n\nSection 39 of the said Act as as follows:\n\n\"The undertakers shall not in making any agreements for a supply of electricity show any preference to any council company or person and the charge for such supply shall be unifonn throughout such area so that each council company or person shall be supplied at the same price and not less than any other council\n\n(l) (1907] A.C. 469.\n\n\ncompany or person, but such price shall not exceed the limits of price imposed by .-or in pursllance of the order authorising them to supply electricity.\"\n\nThe Privy Council, in construing that section, held that the preferen, ce prohibited therein is not as between customers dealing ilnder two different systems but only as between customers dealing under the same system.\n\nBased upon this decision, . counsel for the respondent argued that uniform tariffs under s. 49 of our Act can only be levied as against the same type of customers situated in the same area and that uniform tariff cannot be levied in respect of. same type of customers situated in• a different area.\n\nCounsel further urged that consumers regarding whom supply cost is more as in sparse areas, cannot be considered to be on par with consumers in compact areas in respect i:>f whom supply cost is Jess.\n\nIt is further pointed out that ii both these types of consumers are treated as same, that will amount to showing undue preference, which is prohibited under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 49. In view of the wording of s. 39 of the Australian Act, the reasoning of the Privy Council in construing the said section regarding the rule of uniformity cannot be applied when construing s. 49 of our Act But it is significant to note that as early as 1907, a system of levying uniform rates as indicated in s. 39 has been in vogue in Australia.\n\nAfter having charged the Board under s. 18 to supply and distribute electricity in the most efficient and economical manner, as already pointed out, s. 59 states that the Board shall not, as far as practicable, carry on its operations under the Act at a loss.\n\nSection 63 empowers the State Government to make subventions to the Board. It is entirely within the discretion of the State Government under s. 63 to make subventions to the Board.\n\nWe are referring to this aspect, because it has been stressed on behalf of the respondents that any development schemes in respect of sparse areas should be done by the Board only with the subventions. which the State Government pays and not by charging tlie consumers in the compact areas and sparse areas at uniform tariff.\n\nSection 49(1), as it now stands, provides that the Board is to frame uniform tariffs in the matter of supply of electricity to any person, not being a licensee; and sub-s. (2) lays down the factors which are to be taken into account by the Board in fixing uniform tariffs.\n\nIn this connection, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of s. 49 of the Act as it originally stood. It was as fol!ows:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any regulations made in this behalf, the Board may supply\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidiaiingam, !.) 153\n\nelectricity to any person not .being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purpose for which. it is required : Provided that in fixing any such terms and conditions the Board shall not show undue preference to any person.'' ·\n\nIn the old s. 49 extracted above, there is no such policy or direction indicated by the Legislature that the Board is to frame uniform tariffs.\n\nUnder that section, the Board had the powei to supply electricity on such terms and conditions as it may from time to time fix, having regard to the matters referred to in the said se.i:tion.\n\nThe only restriction upon the Board's power was that it sha!l not show undue preference to any person in fixmg any such tenns and conditions. In s. 49 as it now stands, the Legislature has empowered the Board to frame uniform tariffs •md it has also indicated the factors to be taken into account in fixing uniform tariffs. These two aspects are contained in sub-ss. (I ) and (2). The Legislature has also made it clear in sub-s. 131 that the Board. in the special circumstances mentioned therein, has got power to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity.\n\nSub-s. ( 4) directs the Board not to show undue preference to any person for fixing the tariffs and the terms and conditions for the supply of electncity.\n\nThough prima facie it would appear that sub-s. (4) will govern sub-ss. (1) to (3) ins. 49, the proper way to interpret sub-s. ( 4) will be to read it along with sub-s. (3).\n\nThe question of the .Board showing undue preference to any person in fixing the tariffs and terms and conditions for supply of electricity will not arise when the Board frames uniform tariffs under sub-ss. (I) and (2). When the entire. tariff is imifom1 for every consumer, there is no question of any undue preference as every ustomer will pay the same amount for the same benefit received by him.\n\nSub-s. (3) of s. 49 recognises the power of\n\nh~ Board to .fix _different tariffs for the supply of electricity and it is rea_lly here, 1f at all, that an occasion for any undue preference bemg shown, may arise.\n\nTherefore, in Qur opinion sub-s.\n\n(4) will control the action of the Board under sub-s. (3) f s. 49.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept the contention of the respondents\n\nthat the consumers in a compact area cannot be treated as o~ par with the consumers in sparse area and that uniform tariffs cannot be levied on both. In this case, V'1; have already referred to the fact that both the respondents are consumers of low tension electricity and that uniform tariffs have been levied for the entire State of Maharashtra excepting certain types of consumers in :L4Sup.C.J/68-l 1\n\n\n(1968.] J'S.C.R.\n\nPoona area: To conclude we are of the opinion, that the Board' It. had ample powers to frame uniform tariJfs as it has done in the case before us and the levy is valid.\n\nThe second question that arises for consideration, as indicated earlier, relates to the validity of s. 49, as amended. The attack on the validity of this section is made under different heads, as a indicated below. ·\n\nThe first ground of attack is that levying of a uniform tariff on 'the consumers in sparse areas and consumers in comp11t:t areas, which is not directly related to the. cost of. supply, amounts to a colourable exercise of taiting power by Parliament. In this connection, it is stated that the power to levy tax on the consumption or sale of electricity is conferred under entry 53 List U of the 7th schedule on the State Legislature. This attack is made on the basis that the tariff levied by the Board must be relatoo to the cost of supply.\n\nWe have already rejected the contention of the respondents in this regard; and we have held that the cost of supply is only one of the factors to be taken into account in fixing the tariff. If that is so, it follows, that in this case, there is no question of any levy of tax by Parliament through the medium of the Board. By reference to the proviso to sub-cl. (b) of cl. (10) of s. 67, it is. further urged by the respondents that the Board may fix tariffs in such a way that large surplus may be found by them from which one-half will be credited to the conso lidated fund of the State. This action, according to the respondents, amounts to levy of tax for which there is no power in law.\n\nWe are not inclined to accept this contention either. Section 61 of the Supply Act which occurs in Chapter VI rt)iating 10 the Board's finance, accounts and audit, deals with priority of liabilities of the oard. After meeting its operations, maintenance and management expenses and providing for the payment of tax on\n\nitii\" income and profits, s. 67 provides for the revenues of the Board, in so far as they are available, to be distributed in the order mentioned in els. 1 to 10. After adjustments have been made in respect of els. 1 to 9, cl. l 0 provides for the balance to be appropriated to a fund to be called the 'development fund'.\n\nClause 10 further provides that the development fund is to be utilised for two purposes, (a) purposes beneficial, in the opinion of the Board, to electricity development in the State; (2) repayment of Joans advanced to the Board under s. 64 and required to\n\nbe paid. It is after this that the proviso, on which reliance is placed by the respondents, states -that where no such Joan is outstanding, one-half of the balance shall be credited to the conso lidated fund. of the State. Jn the counter-affidavit filed on behalf H of the Board, it has been stated that ever since its constitution, it has been carrying on its operations at a loss and there bas been\n\n...\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUNIC. (Vaidialingam, I.) 155\n\nno occasion when any part of its revenues has been passed to the consolidated fund of the State. We have no hesitation to accept this statement made on behalf of the Board. Even otherwise, before the proviso can come into operation, there are several other items in respect of which adjustments will have to be made, and there will be no occasion at' all for the proviso to come into effect. We are also not inclined to accept the contention of the respondents that with a view to give effect to the proviso, the Board will so fix the tariffs as to enable them to have huge surplus, after meeting the various adjustments. In case such a thing happens in future the proviso which is clearly severable, may have to be struck down. Therefore, this ground of attack, that there is a colourable exercise of taxing power, cannot be accepted.\n\nThe next ground of attack against s. 49 is that it gives an unguided and arbitrary poweor to the Board to fix the tariff as it likes, and no maximum limit for the tariffs that may be fixed by the Board, has been stated. On first blush, it may appear that this contention has considerable force; but we are satisfied that no such unguided or arbitrary power has been conferred on the Board either in the matter of framing uniform tariffs or in the matter of fixing different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person, not being a licensee.\n\nNo doubt, the maximum as such, has not been fixed in the statute. But, in our opinion, there are sufficient restrictions placed upon the power of the Board. In this connection, reference may be made to some of the sections of the Supply Act.\n\nSection 16, as we have already indicated, provides for the State Government constituting a State Electricity Consultative Council for the State. That Council consists of the representatives of the various interests including representatives of consumers of electricity. The Board is bound to place before the State Electricity Consultative Council under sub-s. (6) the annual financial statement and supplementary statement and a duty is cast upon the Board to take into consideration any comments made on such statement. This annual financial statement will have then to be submitted to the State Government unper s. 61. Under that section, in February of each year, the Board\n\nha~ to submit to the State Government an annual financial statement in the prescribed form, of the estimated capital and revenue receipts and expenditure for the ensuing year.\n\nThat statement, under sub-s. (3) has to be placed before the State Leg'slature and it is open to discussion.\n\nAgain, sub-s. ( 4) of s. 61 casts a duty on the Board to take into consideration any comments made on the said statement in the State Legislature.\n\nSection 75 again provides for the Board submitting to the State Government a report giving an account of its activities during the previous financial year as also an account of its activities which are likely to be undertaken by it in the next financial year. The State Government is to place the said report before the Sta1e Legislature. We\n\n156 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS £1968) 3 s.c.R.\n\nhave already indicated, by reference to r. 57 cl. (q) of the rules framed by the State of Maharashtra that details of tariff will have to be furnished by the Board in its a!\"nual report. Under cl. (j) of s. 79, the Board has also to make reguJatio~ laying down the principles governing the supply of electricity by it to persons other than 'licensees under s. 49.\n\nIn our opinion, all these provisions have the effect of properly guidin, g the activities of the Board, in its dealings with the consumers including the levy of tariffs. Section 49 itself is hedged in by various restrictions and directions which the Board will have to comply in the matter of framing uniform tariffs or in the matter of fixing different tariffs, and that section, also in our opinion, provides a proper guide-line for framing uniform tariffs and different tariffs.\n\nTherefore, in particular, it may be noted that the. extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsoly developed areas under cl. (d) of s. 49(2) of the Act can only be complied with by keeping the uniform rates at a minimum, consistently with the requirement, under s. 59, of not running at a loss.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied, that s.-49 is not in any way, bad on the ground that it gives, an unguided and arbitrary power to the Board to fix its tariffs as it likes. ·\n\nThe next ground of attack is that consumers who are supplied electricity by the licensees are differently treated from similar consumers under the Board.. In this connection, reference is made to s. 57 of the Supply Act which provides for the 6th and 7th schedule to be deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee. Clause I of the sixth schedule provides that the licensee shall so adjust his charges for the sale of electricity, whether by enhancing or reducing them that his clear profit in any year of account shall not, as far' as possible, exceed the amount of reasonable return. It is argued that while restrictions have been placed on the licensees, no such restrictions have been placed on the Board. The distinction sought to be pointed out, in our opinion has no substance. The licensees are persons who must have invested considerable capital in the matter of their business, and obviously, the Legislature thought that some directions will have to be given so as to enable them to have a reasonable retnrn.\n\nBut we have already indicated that sufficient guidance has been\n\nlaid down in the matter of fixing of tariffs by the Board.\n\nTherefore this ground of attack also cannot be sustained.\n\nTherefore, both the grounds of attack, levelled by the respondents, will have to be rejected.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents, a feeble attempt was made to show that s. 24 of the Amendment Act has not validated the levy and collection in these cases.\n\nAccording to the respondents, in this case, there is nothing to show that the provisions of s. 49, as\n\nMAHARASHTRA ELEC. v. KALYAN MUN!C. (Vaidlt!lingam, /.) 157\n\namended, whi.ch is deemed to have been in force at all material times, have been complied with by the Board before the levy was made, and therefore, the levy in this case cannot be sustained. We are not inclined to accept this contention of the respondents.\n\nSection 24 of the Amendment Act, in our opinion, deals with all rates as a matter of fact fixed under s. 49 of the Act. In this case, the Board has fixed tariffs under s. 49 of the Act. Therefore, s. 24 of the Amfndment Act has full effect and force.\n\nThe result is that all the contentio11s of the respondents fail.\n\nThe order of the High Court, under attack is set aside and these two appeals are allowed. As the appellant succeeds in both these appeals on the basis of the Amendment Act, parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 196, "entities": [{"text": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KALYAN BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALYAN BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 8, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., S. M. Snoo, J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDlALlNGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. N. 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Slnghvi"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35859, "end_char": 35864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36107, "end_char": 36112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36211, "end_char": 36216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36645, "end_char": 36655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37098, "end_char": 37103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37147, "end_char": 37152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37556, "end_char": 37561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37673, "end_char": 37678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37832, "end_char": 37840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38460, "end_char": 38470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39422, "end_char": 39437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section\n\n37(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39613, "end_char": 39627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39635, "end_char": 39656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39977, "end_char": 39988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA ELEC."}}, {"text": "Vaid1alingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40013, "end_char": 40025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. KALYAN MUN!C. (Vaid1alingam, J.) 151\n\nThe House of Lords held that iu determining whether there has\n\nbeen discrimination as between high voltage consUnlers and low voltage consumers, the lesser cost of supplying high voltage power should be taken into consideration, and that, therefore, there might be discrimination against high voltage consumers notwithstanding that the price charged to them was a little lower than that charged to low voltage consumers.", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "s. 49(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40523, "end_char": 40531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Act, 1947", "statute": "the Electricity Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40781, "end_char": 40785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it is pertinent to note the observations of Lord Reid in his dissenting judgment at p. 244 to the effect :\n\n\"W)Jat then is the standard by which preference -or discrimination is to be judged ?"}}, {"text": "as we have stated earlier the provisions in the English Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41777, "end_char": 41836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42058, "end_char": 42063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But as we have stated earlier the provisions in the English Act", "statute": "But as we have stated earlier the provisions in the English Act"}}, {"text": "Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42071, "end_char": 42114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42143, "end_char": 42153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896", "statute": "the Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42988, "end_char": 42993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896", "statute": "the Victorian Electric Light and Power Act 1896"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43572, "end_char": 43577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43605, "end_char": 43610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43618, "end_char": 43627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the wording of s. 39 of the Australian Act, the reasoning of the Privy Council in construing the said section regarding the rule of uniformity cannot be applied when construing s. 49 of our Act But it is significant to note that as early as 1907, a system of levying uniform rates as indicated in s. 39 has been in vogue in Australia."}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43767, "end_char": 43772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43887, "end_char": 43892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43963, "end_char": 43968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44075, "end_char": 44080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44187, "end_char": 44197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44329, "end_char": 44334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44697, "end_char": 44710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45037, "end_char": 45042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45619, "end_char": 45624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46091, "end_char": 46096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46373, "end_char": 46379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47259, "end_char": 47264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47551, "end_char": 47556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48320, "end_char": 48325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49362, "end_char": 49367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49728, "end_char": 49738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50019, "end_char": 50024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50316, "end_char": 50325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50551, "end_char": 50556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51911, "end_char": 51916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52670, "end_char": 52680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53285, "end_char": 53290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53658, "end_char": 53663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53784, "end_char": 53794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54252, "end_char": 54272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "q) of the rules framed by the State of Maharashtra that details of tariff will have to be furnished by the Board in its a!\"nual report."}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54375, "end_char": 54380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54528, "end_char": 54533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54706, "end_char": 54716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55168, "end_char": 55176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55298, "end_char": 55303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55700, "end_char": 55705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56887, "end_char": 56892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57065, "end_char": 57070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57395, "end_char": 57405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57497, "end_char": 57502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57563, "end_char": 57568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57592, "end_char": 57597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_13_20_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "SAHODRABAI RAI v.\n\nRAM SINGH AHARWAR February 2, 1968\n\n[M. liIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, iJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, s. 83-Annexure to Election Petition-Necessity of service on respondent.\n\nThe appellant filed an election petition with a pamphlet as annexure thereto. A translation in English of the pamphlet was incorporated in the body of the election petition, and it was stated in the petition that it formed part of the petition. The first respondent raised an objection that a copy of the pamphlet had not been annexed to the copy of the election petition served on him and therefore, the election petiiion was liable to be dismissed\n\nunder s. 86 of the Representation of the People Act.\n\nThe High Court acoepted the objection and dismissed the election petition.\n\nIn appeal, this Court,\n\nHELD : The order of the High Court must be set aside.\n\nThe words used in s. 81(3) are only \"the election petition\". There is no mention of any document accompanying the election petition. Since the election petition itself reproduced the whole of the pamphlet in a translation in English, it could be said that the averments with regard to the pamphlet were themselves a Part of the petition, and therefore the pamphlet was served upon the respondents although in a translation and not in original. [19 B-H]\n\nEven if this be not the case, it is quite clear that's. 83(2) has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the\n\nelection petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures.\n\nDetails of averments too compendious for being included in the election\n\npetiion may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition.\n\nThe law then requires that even though they are outside the election petition, they must be signed and verified.\n\nThe annexures or schedules are then treated a'S integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the Tespondents if the requirement regarding service of election petition is to be wholly complied with. But this does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with election petitions. They are in no s..,.. an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those avebnents and in proof thereof. (19 H-20 DJ\n\nThe pamphlet, therefore. must be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition in so. far as averments are concerned. When the election petitioner said that it was to be treated as pan of her election petition she was merely indicating that it was not to be though that she had not produced the document in time.\n\nShe was insisting upon the document remaining with the petition so that it could be available whenever the question of the election petition or its contents arose. [20 D--EJ • CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1693 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People A Act, 19 51 from the judgment and order dated September 21, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 10 of 1967.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for the appellant.\n\nC. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga and Shureshta B Bagga, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatollah, J. This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, dated September 21, 1967, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellant on the preliminary ground that a proper copy of the election petition was not served upon the answering parties. The facts of the case are as follows :\n\nThe appellant was a candidate for election to the Sagar Lok Sabha Scheduled Castes cons!ituency No. 24. The election took place on February 20, 1967. There .were three other contesting candidates of whom the first respondent secured the largest num ber of votes and was declared elected. The appellant secured the second largest number of votes, her votes being less by just under\n\n300 th.an the successful candidate's votes. An election petition was thereafter filed by the appellant on April 5, 1967. In this election petition the appellant challenged the election of the first E respondent on four grounds. They were (a) wrongful accepiance of his nomination paper, (b) corrupt practice inasmuch as 'be appealed to religion through a pamphlet marked Annexure 'A',\n\n(c) undue influence, and (d) breaches of the Act and Rules.\n\nThe pamphlet to which reference is made was styled Bhayarikar Vajraghat and was published by Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mababbiyan Samiti, Deori Kalan Branch. It charged the party of the appellant namely the Congress with encouraging cow-slaughter and offending the Hindu Sentiment. Details were: given in it of the number of animals slaughtered every day in Madhya Pradesh\n\nand elsewhere and blamed the Congress with being a party to the practice. In the body of the election petition a translation in English of the Hindi pamphlet was incorporated. The original pamphlet was attached to the election petition and was marked Annexure 'A'.\n\nThe election petitioner proceeded to say in her petition \"it forms part of the petition\".\n\nWhen parties appeared the first respondent filed his written statement in great detail. He dealt with this pamphlet and answered the allegations of the election petitioner in relation thereto paragraph by paragraph. As a result of thes~ pleas a nun:ber <;>f\n\nissues were raised on July 18, 1967. No issue was raised m\n\nregard to the service of a defective copy of the election petition upon the respondents in general and the first respondent in particular. However, on August 3, 1967, a special objection was made by the first respondent claiming that the copy of the pamphlet had not been annexed to the copy of the election petition served upon him and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed in accordance with the provisions of s. 8 6 of the Representation of the People Act. A etailed reply to this objection was given by the election petitioner. She stated that this was an after-thought inasmuch as the translation of the pamphlet was incorporated in the election petition and the allegations regarding the pamphlet had been answered in detail by the answering respondent. The Court thereupon framed an additional issue on August 4, 1967. The issue ran as follows:\n\n\"Whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed for contravention of S. 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as copy of Annexure A to the pe'.ition was not given along with the petition for being served on the respondents\".\n\nParties first filed a number of affidavits pro and con. Later the Court ordered . attendance of the . depanents for crossexamination. In this way the appellant and her counsel who had filed affidavits earlier were examined.\n\nTheir case was that the copies of the election petition had been properly put together including in each copy an original pamphlet for service on the respondents.\n\nOn the other side the first respondent and two others filed affidavits s'.ating that when the copy of the election petition was received it was not accompanied by the pamphlet. hi their. examination in Court all maintained the same position and were cross-examined. The learned Judge trying the case also ordered the attendance of the Reader of the Deputy Registrar of the High Court who bad dealt with the election petition and he was examined as Court witness No. 1. He stated that the copies of the petition were complete except that the pamphlet was not annexed to each copy. He s'.ated that he had noted at the time this fact but had treated the pamphlet as a document and not as an Annexure to the election petition.\n\nThe learned Judge, on an appraisal of this material held that the copies of the election petition served upon the respondents were not accompanied by the pamphlet which was an Annexure to the elec'.ion petition. After examining the law on the subject the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the election petition should be dismissed under s. 86 of the Representation of the People Act and he accordingly dismissed it with costs. No other\n\nissue which was struck between the parties was gone into because the election petition failed at the very threshold.\n\nIn this appeal it is contended that the learned Judge was in error in thinking that the pamphlet ought to have accompanied the copies of the election petition or that the law required that it should have been annexed to the copy. of the election petition served on the respondents. In this connection our attention was drawn to the provisions of the Repn; sentation of the People Act to which we shall refer presently. On the oth()r side it was contended that whatever the meaning of the expressions \"the election petition\", \"annexures\" or \"schedules\" in the Act, the election petitioner by her own conduct had made this docu, ment a part of the election petition and therefore it was incumbent upon her to have served the whole of the election petilion and not only a part of it as she did and therefore the order now appealed against was correct. Before we come to these rival con!entions we find it necessary to refer first to the relevant provisions on the subject\n\nSection 81 of the Representation of the People Act occurs in Chapter II which is headed \"Presentation of Election Petitions to Election Commission\". It provides as follows:\n\n\"Presentation of Petitions :\n\n( 1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section ( 1) of section\n\n100 and section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.\n\n(3)\n\nExplanation :-In this sub-section, 'elector' means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.\n\nEvery elec!ion petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereto as there are respondents mentioned in the pe!ition and every such copy shall be attesff'..d by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.\"\n\nSAHODRABAI v~ RAM SINGH (Hidayatullah, 1.) 1 7\n\nA The first respondent draws pointed attention to the third subsection which says that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The dispute therefore is whether the pamphlet could be B described in this case as a part of the election petition. The answering respondent says that it is so and was considered to be so by the election pe!itioner herself when she stated that it was to be read as a part of the election petition.\n\nThe matter, in our opinion, is not to be resolved on how the election petitioner viewed the matter but from the point of view C of the requirement of the law on the subject. For this purpose we have to turn to s. 83 of the Representation of the People Act which provides what the contents of the election petition shall be.\n\nIt reads as follows :-\n\n( 1) An election petition-\n\n(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material\n\nI E\n\nfacts on which 1the petitioner relies;\n\n(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt\n\n prao'.ice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a sta•ement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and\n\n( c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings.\n\nProvided that where the petitioner alieges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the , Particulars thereof.\n\n(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.\n\nThe answering respondent herein again draws pointed atte'!tjon to the fact that the schedules and the annexures to the petition U are mentioned and •hey have to be signed and verified in e Sllll1; e manner as the petition meaning thereby that as e elec~n petitioner had made the pamphlet a part of the election petition she was required to sign and verify the pamphlet and also to serve a\n\n18 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.c.it.\n\ncoy. of it as required by sub-s. (3) of s. 81 when the election A petition was served.\n\nHe then relies upon s. 86 which provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of s. 81, s. 82 ors. 117.\n\nAn argument was raised in this case as to whether s. 86(1) is mandatory or merely directory. We need not go into this aspect 8 of the case. In our opinion, the present matter can be resolved on an examination of the relevant facts and the contents of tbe election petition as detailed in s. 83 reproduced above. It may be pointed out here that the trial of election petition has to follow as far as may be the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that it is permissible to look into tbe Code of Civil Procedure to see what exactly would have been tbe case if this was a suit and not a trial of an election petition.\n\nUnder the Code of Civil Procedure a suit is commenced by a plaint. This is provided by O.IV, r. 1 which says tliat every suit\n\nshall be instituted by presenting a plaint to tlie Court. After the plaint is receivded o 2 . V provides the summoning of the defendants D. in the case an r. of that order says that every summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint, and if so permitted, by a concise statement. We then turn to -the provisions of O.Vll which deals with the cQntents of a plaint. The first ruie mentioos the. particulars which must be in a plaint. It is not necessary to refer to them. The plaint has to be signed and verified. Rule 9 E then provides that the plaintiff shall endorse on the plaint and annex thereto a list of documents, if any, which he has produced along with it and, if the plaint is admitted, shall present as many copies on plain paper of the plaint as there are defendants unless the Court by reason of the length of the plaint or the number of defendants, or for any other sufficient reason, permits him to present a. like number of concise statements of the nature of the F claims made .etc.\n\nIt will be noticed here that what is required to be provided are copies of the plaint itself or the concise statement according to the number of defendants. There is no mention here of any other documents of which a copy is needed to be presented to the Court for service to the defendants. Then we come tor. 14 which states that where a plaintiff sues upon a docn- G ment in his possession or power he shall produce it in court when the plaint is presented and shall at the same time deliver the document or a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint. It will be noticed that he is required to file only one copy of the document and not as many copies as there are defendants in the case.\n\nIt would therefore follow that a copy of the document is no! ex- H peeled to be delivered. with the copy of the plaint to the answering defendants when summons is served on them. In the. schedules to the Code of Civil Procedure we have got Appendix B which\n\nA prescribes the forms for summons to the defendants. There. is. only one form of summons in Appendix B, (Form No. 4) in which. the copy of the negotiable jnstrument is to accompany the copy of. the plaint. That is so, b&:ause of the special Jaw applying to the negotiable instruments and the time limit within which pleas to that document have to be raised and this is only in summary suits.\n\nB No other form makes any mention of any document accompanying the summons with the copy of . the plaint. We need not go into more details. It is clear that the documents which are filed with the piaint have to be accompanied by one copy of thi>Se documents. This is because the copy is compared with the original and the copy is endorsed by the clerk of court and the document c is sometimes returned to the party to be produced into Court later.\n\nThe copy takes the place of the document concerned and is not to be sent out to the parties with the plaint.\n\nWe may now see whether the election Jaw provides anything different.\n\nThe only provision to which our attention has been drawn is sub-s. (3) of s. 81 and sub-s. (2) of s. 83. The first D provides that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and that every such copy shall be an authenticated true copy. The words used here are only \"the election petition\".\n\nThere is no mention of any document accompanying the election petition. H, the matter stood with only this sub-section there would E be no doubt that what was intended to be served is only a copy of the election petition proper. Assistance is however taken from the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 83 which provides that iny schedule or any annexure to the petition shall also be signed' by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. It is contended that since the pamphlet was an annexure to the petition F it was not only necessary to sign and verify it, but that it 'shciuld have been treated as a part of the election petition itself and a copy served upon the respondents. In this way, non-compliance with the provisions of s. 86 ( 1) is made out. In our opinion, this is too strict a reading of the provisions. We have already pointed out that s. 81 (3) speaks only of the election petition. Pausing here, we would say . that since the eleetion petition itself reproduced the whole of the pamphlet in a translation in English; it G\n\ncould be said that the avermen!s with regard to the pamphlet were themselves a part of the petition and therefore the pamphlet was served upon the respondents although in a translation and not in original. Even if this be not the case, we are quite clear that subs. (2) of s. 83 has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the electic:>n petition but in he accompanying schedules or annexures. We can\n\nSU~REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\ngive quite a number of exampleS from which it would be apparent A that many of the averments of the election petition are capable of being put as schedules or annexures: For example, the de.tails of the corrupt practice there in the former days used to be set out separately in the schedules and which may, in some .cases, be so done even after the amendment of the present law.\n\nSimilarly, details of the averments too compendious for being B included in the election petition may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition. The law then requires that even though they are outside the election petition, they must be signed and verified, but such annexures or schedules are then treated as integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the respondent if the requirement regarding C service of the election petition is to be wholly complied with.\n\nBut what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with the election petitions. They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only D evidence of those averments and in proof thereof. The pamphlet therefore must be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition in so far as averments are concerned. When the election petitioner said that it was to be treated as part of her election petition she was merely indicating that it was not to be thought that she had not produced the document in time.\n\nShe was insisting upon the document remaining with the petition E so that it could be available whenever the question of the election petition or its contents arose. It would be stretching the words ofsub-s. (2) of s. 83 too far to think that every document produced as evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the election petition proper. In this particular case we do not think that the pamphlet could be so treated.\n\nWe are, therefore, of F the opinion that whether or not s. 86(1) is mandatory or directory there was no breach of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act in regard to the filing of the election or the service of the copies thereof and the order under appeal was therefore erroneous.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order and remand the case for G trial from this stage. The costs of the appellant will be costs in the cause. The respondent will bear his own costs.\n\nY. P.\n\nAppeal allowed and case remanded.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "SAHODRABAI RAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAHODRABAI RAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM SINGH AHARWAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM SINGH AHARWAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAHODRABAI RAI v.\n\nRAM SINGH AHARWAR February 2, 1968\n\n[M. liIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, iJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, s. 83-Annexure to Election Petition-Necessity of service on respondent."}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 903, "end_char": 911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 83(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1392, "end_char": 1400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "G. N. Dikshit"}}, {"text": "R. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and R. N. Dikshit, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "G. N. Dikshit"}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga and Shureshta B Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Uma Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3320, "end_char": 3329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga and Shureshta B Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3331, "end_char": 3342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga and Shureshta B Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shureshta B Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Uma Mehta, S. K. Bagga and Shureshta B Bagga, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hidayatollah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatollah, J. This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, dated September 21, 1967, dismissing the election petition filed by the appellant on the preliminary ground that a proper copy of the election petition was not served upon the answering parties."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election took place on February 20, 1967."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An election petition was thereafter filed by the appellant on April 5, 1967."}}, {"text": "Bhayarikar Vajraghat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pamphlet to which reference is made was styled Bhayarikar Vajraghat and was published by Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mababbiyan Samiti, Deori Kalan Branch."}}, {"text": "Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mababbiyan Samiti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pamphlet to which reference is made was styled Bhayarikar Vajraghat and was published by Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mababbiyan Samiti, Deori Kalan Branch."}}, {"text": "Deori Kalan Branch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pamphlet to which reference is made was styled Bhayarikar Vajraghat and was published by Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mababbiyan Samiti, Deori Kalan Branch."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It charged the party of the appellant namely the Congress with encouraging cow-slaughter and offending the Hindu Sentiment."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Details were: given in it of the number of animals slaughtered every day in Madhya Pradesh\n\nand elsewhere and blamed the Congress with being a party to the practice."}}, {"text": "August 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, on August 3, 1967, a special objection was made by the first respondent claiming that the copy of the pamphlet had not been annexed to the copy of the election petition served upon him and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed in accordance with the provisions of s. 8 6 of the Representation of the People Act."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 4, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court thereupon framed an additional issue on August 4, 1967."}}, {"text": "S. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6599, "end_char": 6604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8229, "end_char": 8234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8242, "end_char": 8274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9435, "end_char": 9467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section\n\n100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9760, "end_char": 9772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9777, "end_char": 9788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11414, "end_char": 11419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11459, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12961, "end_char": 12966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13029, "end_char": 13034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13150, "end_char": 13155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13157, "end_char": 13162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13224, "end_char": 13232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13598, "end_char": 13625, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13696, "end_char": 13719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13832, "end_char": 13859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "O.Vll", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We then turn to -the provisions of O.Vll which deals with the cQntents of a plaint."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15852, "end_char": 15879, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17007, "end_char": 17012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17031, "end_char": 17036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18052, "end_char": 18057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18173, "end_char": 18178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20740, "end_char": 20745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21013, "end_char": 21021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21093, "end_char": 21125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_158_162_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MOD LAL BANKER\n\nMAHRAJ KUMAR MAHMOOD HASAN KHAN February 9, 1968\n\n(R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. ~HARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nCivU Procedure Code, 19os, •· 47 and 0.21 \"· 2-Execution procutiings ending in compromise whereby interest .at rate higher than dttrttd rate agreed to be paid-if 1uch agreement enforceable in execution Droceedings.\n\nA suit filed by the appellant ended in a compromi&e nd was decreed on March 24, 1953 in. terms of the compromise. 1be decree direcital the respondent to pay within six months Rs. 22,500 plus interest at 6%. As the respondent failed to pay, 4he appellant commenced execution proceedings on May 23, 1954 for Rs. 24,150 in the same court and these proceedings also ended in a compromise on May 29, 1954 whereby the respondent agreed to pay within two months Rs. 24,150 \"ith imerest at I% per month. The compromise was recorded by the executing court.\n\nUpon the .respondent's continued failure to pay, the appellant commenced the present execution proceedings on February 18, !955 for realization of Rs. 24.150 and interest at 1 %. The respondent filed objections under s. 47 C.P.C. and one of these was that the appellant could not realise interest at I% per month in execution of the decree.\n\nThe executing court dismissed the objections.\n\nOn appeal to tm High Court and upon a reference by • Division Bench, a Full Bench of ¢he High Ccurt held that a compromise entered in a proceeding for execution of a decree by which the judgment-debtor undertakes to pay interest at a rate higher than the decree rate of interest, is not enforceable in a proceeding for execution of the decree.\n\nOn appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD : (i) is open to the parties to enter into a compromise with reference to their rights and obligations under a decree.\n\nThece is nothing in the Cede of Civil Procedure which prevents the parties from entering into such a compromise. If the compromise amounts l!o an adjustment of the docree, it must be recorded unde'r 0. 21, r. 2 and if not so recorded, it cannot be recognised by any Conrt executing I.he decree. The compromise of May 29. 1954 was so recorded within the prescribed period of limitation and was a fair bargain to postPone the execution of the decree on payment of reasonable interest. The terms of the compromise l'<!ated to the execution of the decree, the executing court has power to detennine all questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution of the decree and to give 811Ptopriate relief on such determination.\n\nExclusive power to determine such question is given to the executing court by s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The agreement to pay the higher interest is enforceable in execution of the decree. [160 F-161 BJ\n\nMr. Hasan Khan v. Moti/al, A.I.R. 1961 All. 1; overruled.\n\nThe Oudh Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Thakurain Bind Barni Kzur, (1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 84, 100-103; Sreeshteedhur Shaha v. Woomeshnath Roy, (1866) 5 W.R. (Miscellaneous Appeals) I; and Lakshmana v. Sukiya Bai, (1884) l.L.R. 7 Mad. 400 referred to.\n\nll8\n\nMOTILAL v. MAHMOOD HASAN (Bachawat, J.) 159\n\nA The jurisdiction of the executing court to enforce suc; h a compromise\n\nunder s. 47 and O. 21. r. 2 is not affected by the provisions of 0. 23, r. 4, or 0. 20, r. 11 or o. 20, r. 3. [161 DJ\n\nPrudyumna Kumar Mullick v. Dinendra Mullick, [1937] L.R. 64 I.A. 302, referred to.\n\nThe compromise decree of May 29, 1954 was also enforceable on the ground tha! as the execution proceedings were started in the same Court which passed the decree, that Court had the p0wer to pass an order under\n\n0. 20, r. II in tenns of the comproinise of May 29, 1954 directing postponement of the execution of the decree on the term that the judgmentdebtor would pay interest at the rate of I per cent per month until realisation. The prescribed period of limitation of six molithS under Art. 175 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 for an appiidtioii for payment of the decretal amount by instalments did not apply to the Co_mpromise petition as it did not ask. for payment of the decretal amount by instalments but for postponement of the execution of the decree for two months. In any eyent the order passed art the petitioi; i was binding on the P.arties un.til it was set\n\naside and could be enforced in execution proceedings. (162 BcD]\n\nMonmo/Jcn v. K/Ja/ishk/Jali Cooperdlive Bank, (1937) 41 C.W.N. 480; referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 387 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated September 17, 1963 of the Allahabad High . Court, Lucknow Bench in First Execution Decree Appeal No. 11 of 1956.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacllawat, J. The appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lu.cknow against the respondent and his brother, Amir Ali Khan, claiming a decree for Rs. 41,500.\n\nThe suit enifed in a compromise. On March 24, 1953, the suit was decreed in terms ()f the compromise. Under the decree, Amir Ali Khan was liable to pay Rs. 16,500 with.in a year. He discharged his liability liy paying this amount.\n\nThe decree directed the respondent to pay within six months Rs. 22,500 carrying interest at 6 per cent per annum. The respondent failed to pay the decretal amount. On May 23, 1954, the appellant took out execution for Rs. 24,150 and attached Iqbal Man:i:il. The application for .execution was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge.\n\nMohanlalganj, Lucknow.\n\nThe execution proceedings ended in a compromise.\n\nThe appellant agreed not. to execute the decree for two months.\n\nThe respondent agreed to pay within two months Rs. 24, 150 with interest at I per cent per month until realisation. In default of payment, the appellant was authorised to realise the amount due under the compromise in execution\n\n160 SUPREME COUR:r REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nproceedings, The parties agreed that in the meantime Iqbal Manzi! would continue to remain at!ached. The executing Court recorded the compromise.\n\nOn February 18, 1955, the appellant filed the present execution application for realisation of Rs. 24,150 and interest thereon at I per cent per month.\n\nThe respondent filed objections under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Proce.dure giving rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 79 of 1955.\n\nOne of the objections was that the appellant. could not realise interest at 1 per. cent per month in execution of the decree. The objections were dismissed by the executing Court.\n\nThe respondent filed an appeal against thi~ order.\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court referred to a Full Bench the. question whether it was open to the parties in execution proceedings to enter into a compromise postponing the execution of the decree on condition of paying enhanced interest.\n\nAt the hearing of the reference, a Full Bench of the High Court reframed the. question.\n\nThe question as reframed by the Full Court was: \"Is a compromise entered in a proceeding for execu'.ion of a decree by which the judgment-debtor undertakes to pay interest at a rate higher than the decree rate of interest. enforceable in a proceeding for execution of .the decree ?\" The Full Bench by a majority judgment reported in Md. Hasan Khan\n\nv. Motilal(') answered the question in the negative. The matter came up for final hearing. before a Division Bench.\n\nThe Bench gave effect to the Full Bench ruling and held that the compromise dated May 29, 1954 could not be enforced in execution proceedings.\n\nIn other respects, !he Bench onfim1ed the order of the Civil Judge dismissing the objections and dismissed the appeal. It is from this order .that this appeal has been filed by the appellant after obtaining special leave. The sole question in this appeal is whe.ther the compromise of May 29. 1954 is enforceable in execution proceedings.\n\nIt is open to the parties to enter into a compromise with reference to their rightsand obligations under a decree.\n\nThere is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prevents the parties from entering into such a compromise.\n\nIf the compromise amounts to an adjustment of the decree, it must be recorded. uncle\"r 0. 21, r. 2 and if not so recorded, it cannot be recognised by. any Court executing the decree.\n\nThe compromise of May 29, 1954 was so recorded within the prescribed period of limitation. The compromise was a fair bargain to postpone tile execution of the decree on payment of reasonable interest. The tenns of te comproniise related to the execution of the decree.\n\nThe executing Court has power to determine at! questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution of\n\n(I) A.1.R. J961 All. l,\n\nH •\n\nMOTILAL v. MAHMOOD HASAN (BachDil'll!, /.) 161\n\nthe decree and to give appropriate relief on such determination.\n\nExclusive power to determine such questions is given to .the executing Court by s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The executing Court can determine all questions relating to .the agreement postponing the execution of the decree and the incidental term as to payment of the higher rate of interest.\n\nThe agreement to pay the higher interest is enforceable in execution of the decree, see The Oudh Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. Thakurain Bind Basni Kuer('). On the question whether the agreement to pay\n\ninterest at a rate higher than the rate provided in the decree can: be enforced in execution proceedings there was a conflict of judicial opinion. The Privy Council decision settled the law on this point.\n\nThere were also earlier decisions which held that execution could issue both for the sum decreed and for the interest promised, . see Sreeshteedhur Shaha v. Woomeshnath' Roy(') and Lakshmana v. Sukiya Bai(').\n\nThe jurisdiction of the executing Court to enforce such a compromise is not taken away by 0. 23, r. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The effect of 0. 23, r. 4 is that O. 23, r. 3 does not apply to execution proceedings.\n\nIndependently of 0. 23, r. 3, the provisions of 0. 21, r. 2 and s. 47 enable .the executing Court to record and enforce such a compromise in executioff proceedings. Nor does 0. 20, r. 11 (2) affect this power of the executing Court. Order 20, r. 11 enables the C:durt passing the decree to orcfer postponement of the payment of the decretilI\n\namount on such terms as to the payment of interest as it thinks fit on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder. It does not affect the power of the executing Court under s. 4 7 and 0. 21, r. 2.\n\nNor dbes 0. 20, r. 3 affect the power of the executing Court to record and enforce the compromise. Order 20, r. 3 provides that a judgment once signed cannot afterwards be amended or altered save as provided by s. 152 or on review. The decree is drawn up in accordance with the judgment.\n\nThe parties cannot by an agreement confer upon the Court the power to amend the decree in contravention of 0. 20, r. 3 or the power to G enforce the amended decree.\n\nSee Pradyumna Kumar Mullick v. Dinendra Mullick('). Order 20, r. 3 should be read with\n\n0. 20, r. 11 which shows that after the passing of the decree the Court may order that payment of the amount decreed shall be:- . postponed or shall be mad.~ by instalments on such tenns as. to payment of interest as it thinks fit.\n\nThe .two provisions read together show that a direction for postponement of payment of H (I) 11939] 1.R. 66 : J.A. 84, i0<'-!03.\n\n(2) (1866] S W.R. (Miscellaneous Appeals) 1.\n\n(3) [1884] T.L.R. 7 Mad. 4)).\n\n(41 (1937] L.R. 64 I.A. 3)2. 318 ..\n\n162 'SUPREME COUB.T ltEPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R •\n\nthe decreta! al:IM;>Ullt 11pon t~ tenn that 1he ju, dgment-debtor A sho11ld pay a reas()llable ra, te of interest is not an iilteration of or ad, d.ition to tl), e decree. We are of Qte opini9n that the compromise of May 29, 1954 as to payment of interest can be enf9rced ii;1 execution proeeedings.\n\nB compromise is ell{orc.able in execution proceedings on anotlwground. The ree passed On March 24, 1953 by the Coµ, rt of the Civ, il J~, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow.\n\nExecution proceedings were started in the Slll); le Court. As the Court which the dee~ it had the power to pass a_n order under Q. 20, r. 11 in terms of the compromise of May, 29, 1954 directing postponemnt of the excuJion of the decree on the term that !he judgment-debtor would pay interest at the rate of C 1 per cent p, er nionth until realisation. prescribed period of lintitation under Art. 175 of the :Wdian imitation Act, 1908 for an applica\"tion for paym!lllt of the decretal amount by instalments was s.i.it months from tbe date of the decree.\n\nThe com pro• petitlon cl.id l\\Ot ask for payment of the decretal amount by instats. It asked for postponement o_f the exec11tion of D the decree for two l\\lOntt\\S. Article 17 5 did not apply to the petition. :even if kt,: l 15 appied to the petition, the order pas&¢. on the petitlo11 is binQ.ing on the parties u, ntil it is set aside an4 l\\lay be enforced in execution proceedings, see Monmoha11\n\nv. Kha/ishkhali Co.operative Qank(').\n\nE In the result, tl; J.e appeal is al.lowed with costs, and it is declared that thr compromil)e of May 29 1954 can be enforced in the execution pr<>eee@lgs.\n\nRX.P.S.\n\nA ppea/ allowed.\n\n(I) (1937) 41C.W.N.480.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "MOD LAL BANKER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOTI LAL BANKER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHRAJ KUMAR MAHMOOD HASAN KHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHRAJ KUMAR MAHMOOD HASAN KHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 9, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOD LAL BANKER\n\nMAHRAJ KUMAR MAHMOOD HASAN KHAN February 9, 1968\n\n(R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. ~HARGAVA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CivU Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 29, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 708, "end_char": 720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24,150 in the same court and these proceedings also ended in a compromise on May 29, 1954 whereby the respondent agreed to pay within two months Rs."}}, {"text": "February 18, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 980, "end_char": 994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the .respondent's continued failure to pay, the appellant commenced the present execution proceedings on February 18, !"}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CivU Procedure Code", "statute": "CivU Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1093, "end_char": 1098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "May 29. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2068, "end_char": 2080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The compromise of May 29."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2578, "end_char": 2583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2614, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 84", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2834, "end_char": 2856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 302", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3311, "end_char": 3327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3849, "end_char": 3876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High . Court, Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 17, 1963 of the Allahabad High ."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4586, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. P. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and J. P. Aggarwal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bacllawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacllawat, J. The appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lu.cknow against the respondent and his brother, Amir Ali Khan, claiming a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4782, "end_char": 4807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacllawat, J. The appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lu.cknow against the respondent and his brother, Amir Ali Khan, claiming a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Amir Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4858, "end_char": 4871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacllawat, J. The appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lu.cknow against the respondent and his brother, Amir Ali Khan, claiming a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "March 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1953, the suit was decreed in terms ()f the compromise."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1954, the appellant took out execution for Rs."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Manzi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In default of payment, the appellant was authorised to realise the amount due under the compromise in execution\n\n160 SUPREME COUR:r REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nproceedings, The parties agreed that in the meantime Iqbal Manzi!"}}, {"text": "February 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 18, 1955, the appellant filed the present execution application for realisation of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6224, "end_char": 6229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8893, "end_char": 8898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8902, "end_char": 8929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9835, "end_char": 9862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10016, "end_char": 10021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10506, "end_char": 10510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10742, "end_char": 10748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 64 I.A. 3", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ree passed On March 24, 1953 by the Coµ, rt of the Civ, il J~, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow."}}, {"text": "Art. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12455, "end_char": 12463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wdian imitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12472, "end_char": 12497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12782, "end_char": 12792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wdian imitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Wdian imitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "May 29 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13155, "end_char": 13166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E In the result, tl; J.e appeal is al.lowed with costs, and it is declared that thr compromil)e of May 29 1954 can be enforced in the execution pr<>eee@lgs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_163_188_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "A :\n\nNAIR SE~VICE SOCJf:TY L'ID. v.\n\nREV. FAtllER K. C. ALEXANi>l!; R & ORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, s. M. SIKlll ANO K. s. HEGDE, JJ.]\n\nSpecific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), ss. 8 aild 9-Suit under s. 8 wheiher must he based on proof of title-Jus-tertli-lndian Evidence Act, 1872 (!of 1872), s. 110 presumption under-The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) Arts. 64 and 65-Travancore Limikztion Regulation (VI of 110 M.E. s. 32)-Travancore Specific Relief.Act XJ/l of 1115, ss. 7 and 8-(Trcvancore) Regulation IV of 1091-Effect <Jf incurring penalty under Regulations on right to bri111: suit for recovry of pos, ression -of land -Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), 0. VJ, r. 11-Amem/.\n\nment of pkadings-Effect of /aches.\n\nAfter a case under the Travancore Land Conservancy Regulation IV of 1094 M.E. the plaintiff was evicted from 160 acres of Poramboke land.\n\nThereafter in August 1938 the appellant Society applied for a Kuthakapattom lease of this area which was granted and the Society entered inti) possession in July 1939. The suit land was adjacent to the above land. In the map prepared by the, Court Commissioner the suit land was marked as L(l) and tho area of 160 acres aforesaid as L(2). In his suit which was filed in 1942 the plaintiff alleged that after entering into possession of L(2) the Society in October 1939 through its agents forcibly dispossessed him of L(l) as well. He. asked for restoration of session of L(I) and for related relief.\n\nThe Society in its defence contended that the plaint lands were Government Reserve and that the plaintiff was dispossessed by Government from these lands when he was dispossessed of L(2). In 1948 the Society was granted Kuthakapa•tom lease in respect of a party of L(I) as well, .and this portion was marked as L(l)(b), the rest of the suit land being marked as L(l)(a). 1he Society in its written statement did not aver that it was not in possession of L(l)(a). Subsequently, it attempted by argument to limit its defence to L(l)(b) on the !IQis of the 1948 base, But although thesuit was pending iii the trial cou'rt for 17 years no application for amendmen! of the pleadings to this effect was made. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for L(l)(a). In the High Court the Society applied on the last day of the hearing of the aJlpeal, for amendment of its wntten statement limiting its defence to portion L( I )(b), disclaiming all interest in portion L(l)(a). The High Court rejected the application as belated and decreed the suit against the Society in respect of L(l)\n\n(b) as well. The Society appealed, by certificate to this Court. The main contention urged on behalf of the Society based on the Travancore law corresponding to ss. 8 and 9 of the. Indian Specific Relief Act. was that after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession a suit folr possession without proof of title was incompetent. On facts the Society's plea was that the plaintiff bad been evicted by the Government from the suit lands at the same time as he was evicted from L(2).\n\nHELD : (i) The High Court accepted the plaintijf's allegations as to his forcible dispossession from the suit land by the Society. On examination Of the evidence there was no reason to depart from the finding of the High Court. [171 D-E]\n\n(ii) It cannot be said that the distinction between ss. 8 and 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act was based on the distinction that was at one 163\n\ntime drawn in R_qman Law bet,\\\\'.en the two kinds of Interdicts namely, tie vi cotidlana and de vi crmilta. In the time of Justinian the two Interdicts de vi ~-ere fused and there was only one action representing both. The appeal to Roman Law, l\"as therefore of no .assistance. [)74 B-C]\n\n(iii) The contention that while under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act a SJ.lit based mereJy on prior possession must be filed within six months, while a suit unper s. 8 based on proof of title may be filed within 12 years can~ not be sustained. Section 8 of the Act does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays down that the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. This i_s very different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after the expiry of 6 months. Under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself all suis of a civil nature are triable excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. There is no prohibition expressly barring a suit based on possession alone. [175 F-GJ\n\nRam Harakh Rai v. Scheodihal Joti, (1893) 15 All. 384, considered.\n\nMustapha Sahib v. Santha Pillai. l.L.R. 23 Mad. 179, .and Kutta11 Naraya111an v. Thonunan Mat.hcti, (1966) Kerala Law Times 1, applie.d.\n\nA.'\n\nThe uniform view of the courts is that if s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is ultilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defen dant does not ayaiJ him. When, ho\\vever, the period of 6 n1onths has passed questions of title can be raised by the defendent and if he doeiil so the plain- D tiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words the right is restricted to possession only in a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act as recently an1cnded bring out this difference. Article 64 enable, a suit within 12 years fron1 dispossession for poSSession of immovable property bi:.::; ed on possession and not on title, when the . plaintiff while in possession of the property has been disprissessed.\n\nE Article 65 is for posscsion of immovable property or any interest there~ in ba'Sed on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the Jaw.\n\nIn the present case therefore, the plaintiff's suit was competent. fl77 A-DJ .\n\n(iv) The Society could not on the basis of possession claim a presumption of title in. its favour relying on s. 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. 'fhis presumption can hardly arise when the fac~ arc known. When the F facts disclose no title, possession alone decides. Jn the present case neither party had title and therefore s. 110 of the Evidence Act was immaterial. [177 E-Fl\n\n(v) The plea of jus terlii on behalf of the appellant could not succeed.\n\nThe plea is base<! on Doe v. Barnard (1849] Q.B. 945 which was departed from in Sher v. Whitlock, (1885] 1 Q.B 1 and was overruled in Pe\".v v, C/issold. (1907] A.C. 73. The view taken in Perry v. C/issold that a person G in possession of land has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner_. has been consistentJy accepted in India . and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act has given approval tothat proposition. Accordifigly the :Society was_ not e}1titl\"ed to plead in te. present case that the title to the suit land lay 1n the State. Such a plea 1f allowed will always place the defendant in a position of dominance. He :has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title isin some one else. The Jaw does not countenance the doct'rine of 'findings keepinw.'. u\n\n[179 H, 182 F-G] Perry v . . Cllsso/d, [1907] AC. 73, Burlin/! v. Read, 11 Q. B. 904 and Smith v. Oxenden. 1 Ch. Ca 25, appJ; ed.\n\n. '\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, !.) 165\n\nDlzc.rani Kllanta Lalliri v. Garbar Ali Khan, 25 M.LJ. 9 P. C. and Afa/u; hir Prasad v. Ja1nuna _Singh, 92 LC. 31 P.C. distinguished,\n\n(vi) The plaintiff's claim could not be refused on ground that he was an offender liable to pZnalty under Regulation IV of 1091 M.E. and other connected Regulation and rules. The Regulations were intended to regulate the relation of Government and persons but had no bearing upon the 8 relations between persons claiming to be in possession. The penalty under the Regulations were a fine for wrongful occupation and in no sense a punishment for crime. The illegality of possession was not. thus a criminal act and the. regaining lost possession could not he described as an action to takeadvantage of one's own illegal action. In fact the plaintiff was not required to rely upon any illegality, Which is the consideration which makes the courts deny their assistance a party. [183 C-D]\n\nC Ho/mas v. Johnson, (1775) 1 Cowpar 341, referred to.\n\n(vii) The Society had failed to amend its pleadings in .respect of suit land marked L(l)(b), and had made a request to the High Court to ailow such amendment only at the eleventh hour. But on thefacts and circunis.!ances of the case it was desirable. to allow the amendment in order to determine the effect of the 1948 lease On the rights of the parties in L(l)(b). Without amendment another suit based on the second Kuthaka pattom was inevitable.\n\nThere is good authority for the proposition tltat Subsequent events may be. taken note of if they tend to reduce litigation.\n\nThis was not one of those cases in which there was likelihood of prolonged litigation after remand or in which a new case would begin. [Case remanded to trial court to try issue arising out of amendment in respect of L(l)(b)]. [187 D-E] .\n\nCa<:\"\"-law referred to.\n\n(viii) The exact implications of the second Kuthakapattom after _the amendment of pleadings as allowed were for the trial court to determine but it was clear that the second Kuthakapattom could ncit be regarded as\n\nreroactive from the date -of the grant of the first Kuthakapattom. The document granting the 1948 lease. did not mention that it was retrospective.\n\nA formal document which has no ambiguity cannot be varied by reference to othe'r documents which are not intended to vary it. [187 G]\n\n(ix) In respect of portion of the land L(l)(a) the appeal must be di1missed. [188 DE]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1632 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated December 23, 1965 of !he Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 406 of 1961.\n\nM. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, T. P. Paulooe, B. Dutta, Annamma Alexander, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatull8'a, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by .certificate from. the judgment of the High Court of Kerala, December 23, 1965, reversing the decree of the Sub-Court, Mave!ikara.\n\nBy the judgment and decree under appeal the suit of the first respondent, Rev .. Father K. C. Alexander (shortly the plaintiff) was decreed in respect of the suit lands of which he had sought possession from the appellant, Nair Service Society Ltd. (shortly the Society or the first defendant) and some others who are shown as respondents 2 to 6. The facts in this appeal are as follows : The plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis on October 13, 1942 against ihe Society, its Kariasthan (Manager) and four others for possession of 131.23 acres of land from Survey Nos. 780/1 and 780/2 of Rannipakuthy in tb.e former State of Travancore and for mesne profits past and future with compensation for waste. The suit lands are shown as L( 1) on a map Ex. L prepared by Commissioners in CMA 206 of 1110 M.E. and proved by P.W. 10. The two Survey Nos. are admittedly Government Poramboke lands.\n\nThe plaintiff claimed to be in possession of these lands for over 70 years. In the year 1100 M.E. a Poramboke case for evicting hiin from an area shown as L(2) measuring 173.38 acres, but described in the present suit variously as 160, 161 and 165 acres, was started under the Travancore Land Conservancy R.egulation IV of 1094\n\nM.E. (L.C. ce No. 112/1100 M.E.) by Paanamathitta Taluk Cutchery. This land is conveniently described as 160 acres and has been so referred to by the High Court and the Sub-Court.\n\nThe plaintiff was fined under the Regulations and was evicted from the 160 acres.\n\nThe Society applied for Kuthakapattom lease of this area 011 August 11, 1938. The lease was granted but has not been produced in the case.\n\nIt was for 165 acres and the Society was admittedly put in possession of it on July 24, 1939 or thereabouts.\n\nThe lease was for 12 years.\n\nPlaintiff's case was that on 13/16 October, 1939 a nµmber of persons acting on behalf of the Society trespassed upon and took possession of the suit lands (131.23 acres) in addition to the 160 acres.\n\nThe plaintiff, therefore, claimed possession of the excess land from the Soci.ety, its Manager and defendants 3 to 6, who were acting on behalf of the Society. The plaintiff also claimed mesne profits and compensation for waste.\n\nThe Society contended that the plaint lands were Government Reserve and that the plaintiff was dispossessed by Government from these lands when he was dispossessed of .the 16o' acres.\n\nThe suit land is in two parts. Ex. L. shows these two parts as L (I )(a) and L 0 .)(b).\n\nThe Society had apP.lied for another\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 167:\n\nKuthakapattom lease in respect of L(l)(b) and obtained it during the pendency of the suit on March 10, 1948. In this Kl/thakapattom, which is Ex. l, the land is shown as 256.13 acres and the lease is made without limit of time. Simultaneously a demand was made from the Society for arrears of Pattom at 1he same rate as for the Kuthakapattom in respect of the whole land after setting off the amount already paid by the Society.\n\nThe Society in its written statement did not aver that it was not in possession of L(l)(a) and resisted the suit in regard to the entire suit lands. Subsequently it attempted by argument to limit its defence to L ( 1 )(b) which was additionally granted to it in the Kuthakapattom Ex. 1. Although the suit pended for 17 years in the Sub-Court no application for amendment was made.\n\nThe Society asked for amendments several times, .the last being on October 15, 1958 .. However, on the last day of hearing of the appeal in the High Court (December 14, 1965) the Society applied for an amendment of the written statement limiting its defence to portion L(l)(b) disclaiming alt interest in portion 0 LI 1 )(a) and attempted to plead the grant of the second Kuthakapattom in its favour on March 10, 1948. The High Court rejected this application by its judgment under appeal and' awarded possession against the Society of the entire suit land.\n\nThe Society in its case denied the right of the plaintiff to bring a suit for ejectment or its liability for compensati.On as claimed by the plaintiff. In the alternative, the Society claimed the value E of improvements effected by it, in case the claim of the plaintiff\n\nwas. decreased against it. The other defendants remined ex-parte in the suit and did not appeal. They have now been shown as proforma respondents by the Society.\n\nThe suit went to trial on 13 issues.\n\nThe main issues were\n\n(a) whether the plaintiff was in possession of lands L(l) for over 70 years and had improved these lands; (b) whether the first defendant was entitled to possession of any area in hcess of the first K uthakapattom for 12 years; and ( c) whether tlie\n\ntrespas~ was on 13/16 October, 1939 or whether the plaintiff was evicted on July 24, 1939 by the Government from the suit land in addition to the 160 acres in respect of which action was taken in the Land Conservancy case. other issues arose from therival claims for mesne profits and compensation to which refer~\n\nece has alreay J:>een mde. The suit was dismissed by !he tnal Judge agamst the Society but was decreed against defendants 3 to 6 in respect of land L(t)(a) with mesne profits and compensation for waste. The trial Judge held that the possession of the plaintiff dated back only to 1920-21 and that he was evicted from portion L(l )(b) as per plan AZ and that the Society was in possession from the time it entered into possession of 160\n\n.acres.\n\nThe trial Judge held that as the land was Poramboke .and the plaintiff has been ousted by Government he could not claim possession.\n\nThe subsequent , grant of Kuthakapattom (Ex. 1) was not considered relevant and the suit was decided on the basis of the facts existing on the date of the commencement of the suit.\n\nThe trial Judge, however, held that if . the plaintiff was entitled to ecover possession he would also be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3,392/- from tlctober\n\n16, 1939.\n\nThe defendants' improvements were estimated at Rs. 53,085;-: Possession of L(l) (a) was decreed with costs, mcsne profits past and future, and compesation for waste against defendants 3 to 6.\n\nThe plaintiff filed an appeal in forma pauperis.\n\nThe High Court reversed the decree of the trial Judge and decreed it against the Society and its Manager ordering possession of the entire suit lands witlr mesne profits past and future, and compensation for any waste. The High Court held that the Society had admitted its possession in respect of the entire suit land and that the grant of Kuthakapattom in respect of L(I )(a) to defendants 3 to 6 by the Government was immaterial. The High Court held that the evidence clearly established that the plaintiff was in possession of the plaint lands at least from 1924 to 1925 and that it made no difference whether the plaintiff was dispossessed on October 16, 1939 as stated in the plaint or July 24, 1939 as alleged by the Society.\n\nThe main controversy, which was decided by the High Court, was . whether the plaintiff could maintain a suit for possession (apart from a possessory suit under the Travancore laws analogous to s. 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act) without proof of title basing hil11self mainly on his prior possession and whether the Society could defend itself pleading the title of the Government.\n\nOn both these points the dcision of the High Court was in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nIn this appeal the first comenuon of the Society is that it did not dispossess the plaintiff on October 16, 1939 but on July 24, 1939 when he was evicted from the 160 acres in respect of which. G Poramboke case was started against hirn.\n\nAccording to the Society, if the plaintiff's possession was terminated by the rightful owner and the Society got its possession from the rightful owner the suit for ejectme.nt could not lie. It may be stated here that the plaintiff had applied for an amendment to implead . Government but the amendment was disallowed by the trial H Judge.\n\nIn 1928 the plainti~ had filed O.~. 156/1~~3 3:gaint the Government for declaration of possess10n and miunction m respect of the 160 acres of land and L(l)(b), but the suit was\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 169\n\ndismissed in default and a revision application against the order of dismissal was also dismissed by the High Court of Kerala: The suit had delayed the Poramboke case as a temporary injunction has been issued against Government.\n\nOn the dismissal of that suit the first Kuthakapattom lease was granted to the Society. The next contention of the Society is that a suit in ejectment cannot lie wihout title and a prior trespasser cannot maintain the suit generally against the latter trespasser and more particularly in this case in respect of lands belonging to Government specially when the Iatteitrespasser (even' if it was one) had the authority of the true owner either given originally or subsequently but relating back to the date of the trespass. The Society also submits that as trespass on Government land was prohibited by law the plaintiff could not get the assistance of the court. The Society, also contends more specifically that there is no true principle of law that possession confers a good title except against the owner or that possession is a conclusive title against all but the true owner. In its submission, if a possessory suit analogous to s. 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act was no'. filed by the plaintiff's only remedy was to file a suit for ejectrnent pleading and proving his title to the suit land. A mere possessory suit after the expiry of 6 months was not possible. There are other branches of t)Jese main arguments to which reference need notl be made here. They will appear when these arguments will be considered.\n\nThe first question to settle .is when dispossession took place, According to the plaintiff he was dispossessed on October 16, 1939 and according to the Society plaintiff was dispossessed on July 24, 1939 when he was evicted from 160 acres. The trial Judge accepted the case of the Society and the High Court that F of the plaintiff. The High Court, however, remarked that it did not mater when thil, plaintiff was first dispossessed, The difference in dates is insisted upon by the Society because if it can show that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the true owner, namely, th~ State, it can resist the suit pleading that it was in possession under the authority of the owner and that the possession of the G plaintiff was already disturbed and a suit in ejectment did not . lie against it.\n\nThere are; howeve, r, several circumstances which indicate that the plaintiff's case that dispossession took place in October 1939, is true. ·\n\nTo begin with we are concerned with three areas. The Land Conservancy case concerned L(2) or 160 acres. The other two areas are L(l)(a) 55.47 acres and L(l)(b) 75.76 acres. These\n\ntotal t9 291.23 acres.\n\nThesuit.was filed·. to obiain possession\n\nL4 Sup CI/68-12\n\nof 131.23 acres, that is to say, 291.23 acres minus the 160 acres.\n\nThe Society attempted to disclaim all interest in L( 1 )(a) and even attempted to deny that defendants 3-6 were in possession of it. This was not allowed for very good reasons. In the written statement no distinction was made between L(l)(a) and L(l) (b). Although amendments were allowed, no amendment of the written statement to withdraw L(l)(a) from dispute was asked for.\n\nThe attempt consisted of oral arguments which the Court did not entertain. Even in the High Court the written statement was sought to be amended as late as December 14. 1965, the last day of the arguments.\n\nThe application had two prayers.\n\nAbout the second of the two prayers we shall say something later but the amendment we are dealing with was not only belated but also an after thought. The High Court rightly points out that a defendant, who after trial of the suit for 16 years orally asks for the withdrawal of an admission in the written statement, cannot be allowed to do so.\n\nTherefore, the dispute covered the entire 131.23 acres and the Society was claiming to bein possession. The plaint had asserted that the defendants 2-6 were in possession and that defendant 2 was acting for the Society.\n\nIn reply the Society claimed to be in possession.\n\nIt, however, led evidence on its own behalf that L(l)(a) was not in its possession. That could not.be considered in view of the admission in .the pleadings. The contrary admission of the plaintiff that defendants 3-6 were in possession was cited before us as it was before the High Court. But the High Court has already given an adequate answer when it observes that the plaintiff only said he had heard. this.\n\nTherefore, we are of opinion that the issue was joined between the plaintiff and the Society with respect to the entire suit land.\n\nThe alternative contention of the Society is that the plaintiff F was dispossessed by the rightful owner, that is, the State. This contention was accepted by the trial Judge but rejected by the High Court.\n\nWe shall now consider it.\n\nIt is an admitted fact that eviction in tlte Land Conservancy case took place on 8-12- 1114 M.E. corresponding to July 24, 1939. Since the order was to evict the .plaintiff from 160 acres, it is fair to assume that he would be evicted from that area only. The Mahazar Ex. AG. proved by the village Munsiff who was personally present, establishes that eviction was from 160 acres.\n\nThe High Court judgment mentions the names. of several other witnesses who have also deposed in the same way.\n\nThe High Court also points out that the rubber quotas from the rubber treeil continued to be in the name of the plaintiff except in 160 acres in which the quotas were transferred to the name of Government.\n\nAll this was very clear evidence. Further even if some n\\ore area was taken over\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, /.) 171\n\nfrom the plaintiff, it would be small and not as much as 131.23 acres or even 75. 76 acres. It is to be noticed that the Society applied on August 11, 1939 for grant of a Kuthakapattom only in respect of 165 acres and this was on the basis of p<>sSession.\n\nIf the Society was in possession of 291.23 acres, it would not have\n\nomitted on August 11, 1939 to apply for the additional area as well. Another application was made for a second Kuthakapattom in respect of the additional land on the basis of possession but only after certain events happened. On September 29, a ' complaint (Ex. AO) was made by Phillippose Abraham (P.W. 8), the Manager of the plaintiff, that the land was trespassed upon by the Society's men . who had harvested the paddy. On October\n\n2. 1939 the second defendant made a counter complaint Ex. AS.\n\nThis. made a mention of 'land from which the 1st accused (plaintiff) was evicted'. It is, however, to be seen that in the Mahazar (Bxs. AT, AT-1 and AT-2) the encroached area is shown as 160 acres.\n\nOn October 13, 1939 one Krishna Nair made a complaint (Ex. AH) against plaintiff's men of beating and dacoity.\n\nOn October 16, the servants of the plaintiff were arrested. Bail. was delayed and was only granted on October 20,. 1939.\n\nOn October 24, 1939 the plaintiff complained of dispossession. The case of dacoity was virtually withdrawn and the accused were discharged.\n\nThe High Court accepted the. plea that the false charge of dacoity and the arrest were a prelude to dispossession and a ruse to get the servants of the plaintiff out of the way. On looking into the evidence we cannot say that this inference is \"Tong.\n\nThe Society, however draws attention to several circumstances from which it seeks to infer the contrary.\n\nWe do not think that they are cogent enough to displace the other evidence. We may, however, refer to them.\n\nThe Society first refers to plaintiff's application (Ex. 16) on July 28, 1939 that he was dispossessed of suit buildings and requesting that 160 acres be correctly\n\nde~rcated. In oter documents also the plaintiff complained of\n\nevclln from land 11;1 excess o! 160 acres and dispossession from butldrngs. The Society submits that the evidence showed that there were no buildings in 160 acres and that only bamboo huts were to b~ found. . The map Ex. L shows some buildings in L(2). It 1s more likely that as these buildings were close to the western boundary between L(2) and L(l), the plaintiff hoped that he would be abl!\" to save them as on admeasurement they :vould . e found outside 160 acres. It may be mentioned that m add1t10n to 160 acres, land 20 acres in extent was further encroachd upon. _This land is shown in plan Ex. BB and represents httle extens10ns all round the 16(,) acres. If this area was taken into account and 160 acres admeasured then there was a possibility of the buildings being saved. This is a ore rational\n\nexplanation than the contention that as many as 13 i.23 acres were additionally taken in possession when the plaintiff was dispossessed from 160 acres.\n\nWe have therefore, not departed from the finding of the High Court which we find to be sound.\n\nFailing on the facts, the Society takes legal objections to the suit. According to the learned counsel for the Society the suit in e jectment, based on possession in the character of a trespasser was not maintainable. His contention is that a trespasser's only remedy isto file a suit under s. 32 of the Travancore Limitation Regulation (VI of 1l 00) as amended by Regulations IX of 1100\n\nand 1 of 1101, but within 6 months.\n\nThis section corresponds to s. 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act. Now if dispossession was by Government the suit could not be filed because there was a .bar to such a &11it. If dispossession was by the Society a suit under s. 32 was competent. The question is whether after the expiry of 6 months a regular suit based on prior possession withol, it 'proof of 'title was maintainable. This is the main contention 'on merits. although it has many branches.\n\nWe now proceed to consider it.\n\nThis aspect of the case was argued by Mr. Nambiar . with great elaboration for a number of days.\n\nThe argument had many facets and it is convenient to deal with some facets separately because they have no inter connection with others and some.others together. The main argument is that a suit by a trespasser does\n\nnot lie for ejectment of another trespasser after the period of 6 months prescribed by s. 32 of the Travancore Limitation Act (VI of 1100). The provisions of the Travancore Specific Relief Act {XIII of 1115)' are iil pari materia and also i[JSissima verba with 1he Indian Specific Relief Act and are set out below•.\n\n•ACT XIII OF lllS.\n\n\"S. 7. Recovtry of specific lmin.ovahle property, A person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in themanner pres cribed .bY the Code of _Civil Procedure.\"\n\n\"S. 8. Suit by person dispoJMeSNil of immovable prorty. Jf any person is disp9ssessed without his c; onsent of immovable property otherwise than in due G course of I.aw, he or any person claiming through him may be -suit recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title~ that may be set up in such -suit.\n\nNothing in this Section shaU bar any person from suf:ig to establish. his title o such property and to recover possession thereof. .\n\nNo suit under this section sha11 be brought aa.ainst Our Government.\n\nNo appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit imtituted under this secticr.i. nor shall anv review of any such order or decree be .allowed.\" ·\n\n\" 1\n\nNAIR ~UYICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, !.) 17 3\n\nIt is convenient to refer to the Indian Act.\n\nAccording to Mr.\n\nNambiar a contrast exists between ss. 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act. These Sections are reproduced below*. Mr. Nambiar submits that s. 8 refers to suits for possession other than those under s. 9, and while question of title is immaterial in suits under s. 9, under s. 8 a suit for e jectment must be on the basis of title.\n\nIn other words, in a suit under s. 8 title must be proved by a plaintiff but under s. 9 he need not.\n\nOnce the period of six months has been lost a suit brought within 12 years for obtaining possession by ejectment must be based on title and not bare prior possession alone.\n\nIn support of this argument Mr. Nambiar refers to Roman Law of Interdicts and urges that the same distinction also existed there and has been borrowed by us through the English practice.\n\nWe may first clear this misconception.\n\nPossession in Roman Law was secured to a possessor by two forms of Interdicts-Utipossidetis for immovables and utrubi for moveables. But we are not concerned with these, but with actions to recover possession which were compendiously called recuperandae possessionis causa.\n\n•ACT YI OF 1110.\n\n\"S. 32. Right to sue for recovery of unlawfully dispossessed property by person so disposSessed or his representative. Jf any person is dispos$essed with out his consent of any house. building or land otherwise than in due coutse of law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit instituted within the period prescribed in Article 2 of the First Scl.iedule appended to this Regula~ tion, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.\n\nExcep1io11 : Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and torecover possession thereof.\n\nBar to sttit against Gover11111e11t 1111der this sectio11. No suit under this section shall be brought against our Government.\"\n\nINDIAN SPECIFIC RELIEF /\\CT.\n\n\"S. 8. Recovery of Specific immoveable property. A person entitled to the possession of specific immoveable property may rover it in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.\"\n\n\"S. 9. Sttit by person di.possessed of inunoveable property.\n\nIf any person i<> dispossessed without hi~ consent of immoveable property: otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may. by suit. recover possession thereof, notwithsta:iding any other title that maY be set up in such suit.\n\nNothing in this section. sha,11 bar any per..bn from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.\n\nNo suit under this section shaU be brought against the Central Government. or any State Government.\n\n'No appeal shall lie from any order or decree. passed in any suit instituted under this section. nor shall any review of any such order or decree he\n\nallowed.\"\n\n174 SUPREMll COUllT REP()f.TS\n\n{1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThere: werl} two interdicts known as deprecario and de vi. Of the latter two of tbe branches were the Iaterdict de vi cotidiana by whic)J. possession was ordered \"to be restored on an application made within the year where one had been ejected from land by force, provided there had not been vi dam.· aut precario from the ejector.\" The other d evi armata for ejection by armed force,\n\nwas without restriction of time.\n\nMr. Nambiar says that the same distiQ.cti<>l) exists between suits under ss. 9 and 8 of the Specific Relief Act. This is aa ingenious way of explaining his point of view but it does not appear that these principles of Roman Law at all influenced law making.\n\nThese principles were in vogue ia early Roman Law. In the time of Justinian the two Interdicts de vi were fused a.nd there was only one action represeating both.\n\nEven the clausa about vi clam aut precario disappeared and the restriction toi a year applied to be.th. The appeal to Roman Law does not, therefore, assist us.\n\nWe may now consider whether ss. 8 aad 9 are to be distinguished on the lines suggested.\n\nIn Mulla's Indiaa Contract and Specific Relief Acts there is a commentary which explains the words 'in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure' by observing-\n\n\"that is to say by a suit for ejectment 011 the basis of title: Lachman v. Shambu Narain (1911) 33 All. 174\" The question in that case in the words of the Full Bench was-\n\n\"The sole questioa raised in this appeal is whether a plaintiff who sues for possession an, d for ejectment of the defendant 011 the basis of title and fails to prove his title is still entitled to a decree for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, if he can prove possession within six months anterior to the date of his dispossession.\" In the course of decision the Full Bench dissented from the earlier view in Ram Harakh Rai v. Sheodihal Joti(') and observed:\n\n\"With great respect we ate unable to agree with this view. Section 8 of the Act provides that a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the maaner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, by a suit for ejectment 011 the basis of title. Section 9 gives a summary remedy to a person who has without his consent been dispossesSed of immovable property, otherwise than in due course of law, for recovery of possession without establishing title,\n\nIt) [1893] JS All. 384.\n\n:<AIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER ( Hidayatullah, I.) 17 5\n\nprovided that his suit is brought within six months of the date of dispossession. The second .paragraph of the section provides that the person against whom a decree may be passed under the first paragrap~ my, notwithstanding such decree, sue to establish his title and to recover possession.\n\nThe two sections give alternative remedies and are in our opinion mutually exclusive. If a suit is brought under section 9 for recovery of possession, no. question of tite c~ be raised or. determined.\n\nThe obiect of the section 1s clearly to d1SC011rage forcible dispossession and to enable the person dispossessed to recover possession by merely proving title, but that is not his only remedy.\n\nHe may, if he so chooses, bring a suit for possession on the basis of his title.\n\nBut we do not think that he can combine both remedies in the same suit and that he can get a decree for possession even if he fails to prove title. Such a combination would, to say the least of it, result in anomaly and inconvenience.\n\nIn a suit under section 9_ no question of title is to be determined, but that question may be tried in another suit intuted after the decree in that suit. If a claim for establishment of title can be combined with a claim under section 9, the court will have to grant a decree for possession or dispossession being proved, in spite of its finding that the plaintiff had no title and that title was in the defendant.\"\n\nWe agree as to a part of the reasoning but with respect we cannot subscribe to the .view that after the period of 6 months is over a suit based on prior possession alone, is not possible.\n\nSection 8 of the Spei:ific Relief Act does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays down that the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. This is very different from\n\nsaying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after the expiry of 6 months.\n\nUnder s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself all suits of a civil nature are triable excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly' or impliedly barred.\n\nNo prohibition expressly barring a suit based on possession alone has been brought to our notice, hence the added attempt to show an implied prohibition by reason of s. 8 (s. 7 of the Travancore Act) of the Specific Relief Act.\n\nTbefe is, however, good authority for the contrary proposition. In Mustapha Sahib\n\nv. Santha Pillai('), Subramania, Ayyar J. observes :\n\n\" .... that !I party ousted by a person who has no better right is, with referenc!l to the person so ousting, entitled to recover by virtue of the possession he had held before\n\n(0 l.L.R. 23 Mad. 179 at 182.\n\nthe ouster even though that possession was without any A. title.\"\n\n;'The rule in question is so firmly established as to render a lengthened discussion about it quite superfiuous. Asher v. Whitlock (L.R. 1 Q.B. 1) and the rulings a of the Judicial Committee in M 11sammat Sundar v. m11ssammat Parbati (16 I.A. 186) and Ismail Arif] v.\n\nMahomed Ghouse (20 I.A. 99) not to mention numerous other decisions here and in England to the same effect, are clear authorities in support of the view stated above. . . . . . Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act canc not possibly be held to take away any remedy available with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed in Pollock and Wright on possession thus :- Possession in law _is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the owner's title (p. 19)\". In the same case O'Farell J. point> out that\n\n\"all the dictum of the Privy Council in Wise v. Ameerunissa Khatoon (7 I.A. 73) appears to amount to is this, that where a plaintiff ill. possession without any title seeks to recover possession of which he has been forcibly deprived by a defendant having good title, he can E only do so under the provisions of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and not otherwise.\"\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to the other authorities some of which are already referred to in the judgment under appeal and in the judgment of the same court reported in K11tta11 Narayaman v.\n\nThomman Mathai(').\n\nThe last cited case gives all the extracts from the leading judgments to which we would have liked to refer.\n\nWe entirely/ agree with the statement of the law in the Madras case from which we have extracted the observations of the learned Judges. The other cases on the subject are collected by Sarkar on Evidence under s. 110.\n\nThe Limitation Act, before its recent amendment provided a period of twelve years as limitaio~ to recov_er possess.ion of immovable propert_y when the plam!I~, w~1le m posses_s1on of the property was dispossessed or had d1scontm.ued posess10n ad the period was calculated from the date of d1spossess1on or discontinuance.\n\nMr. Nambiar argues that there cannot be two periods of limitation, namely. 6 months and 12 years for suits based on possession alone and that the longer period of limitation\n\n(I) 1966 Kenlln J.nw Times 1.\n\n.I!\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 177\n\nrequires proof of title by the plaintiff.\n\nWe do not agree.\n\nNo doubt there are a few old cases in which this view was expressed. but they have since been either overruled or disented fom. Te\n\nuniform view of the courts is tbat if s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him.\n\nWhen, however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the defend-· ant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail.\n\nIn other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one.\n\nThe present amended articles 64 and 65 bring out this difference.\n\nArticle 64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for posses-· sion of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the plafotiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed.\n\nArticle 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the law.\n\nIn our judgment the suit was competent.\n\nMr. Nambiar a!So relies in this connection upon s.· 110 of the Indian Evidence Act and claims that in the case of. the Society\n\nthere is a presumption of title.\n\nIn other words, he relies upon the principle that possession follows title, and that after the expiry of 6 months, tbe plaintiff must prove title. That possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known.\n\nWhen the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.\n\nIn this case s. 110 of the Evidence Act is immaterial because neither party had tiile. It is for this reason that Mr.\n\nNambiar places a greater emphasis on the plea that a suit on \\>are possession cannot be maintained after the expiry of 6 months and that the Society has a right to plead jus tertii. The first must be held to be unsubstantial and the second is equally un-. founded.\n\nThe proposition of law on the subject has been summed up by Salmond on Torts (13th Edn.) at page 172 in the following words:\n\n\"The mere de facto and wrongful possession of land is a valid title of right against all persons who cannot show a better title in themselves, and is therefore sufficient to support an action of trespass against such Jiersons.\n\nJust as a legal title to land without the possession of it is insufficient for this purpose, so conversely the possession of it without legal title is enough.\n\nIn other words, no defendant in an action of trespass can plead\n\nthe jus tertii-the right of possession outstanding in some third person--as against the fact of possession in the plaintiff.\"\n\nThe maxim of Jaw is Advers11s extraneous vitiosa possessio prodesse so/et,• and if the plaintiff is in possession the j11s tertii .does not afford a defence. Salmond, however, goes on to say :\n\n\"But usually the plaintiff in an actibn of ejectment is not in possession : he relies upon his right to possession, unaccompanied by actual pos5e5sion. In such a case he must recover by the strength of his own title, without any regard to the weakness of the defendant's.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that in action of ejectment the jus te11ii is in practice a good defence. This is sometimes spoken of as the doctrine of Doe v. Barnard [1849] l3 Q.B. 945.\"\n\nSalmond, however, makes two exceptions to this statement and the second he states thus :\n\n\"Probably, if the defe11dant's possession is wrongful as against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may succeed though he cannot show a good title : Doe d. Hughes v. Dyba/I\n\n(1829) 3 C & P 610; Davision v. Gent (1857) 1 H & N 744. But possession is prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title. If such prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title in a third person the plaintiff with prior possession will reeover. So in Asher v. Whitlock ((1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1] where a . man inclosed waste land and died without having had\n\n20 years' possession, the heir of h, is devisee was held entitled to recover it against a person who entered upon it without any title. This decision, although long, doubtful, may now be regarded as authoritative in consequence of its express recognition of the Judicial Committee in Perry v. C/isso/d [1907] A.C. 73.\"\n\nMr. Nambiar strongly relies upon the above exposition of the 'law and upon institutional comments by Wiren ''lbe Plea of ; us\n\nterlii in ejectment\" (1925) 41 L.Q.R. 139, Hargreaves \"Terminology and Title in Ejectment .(1940) 56 L.Q.R. 376 and Holdsworth's article in 56 L.Q.R. 479.\n\nIn our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our problem.\n\nTo express our meaning we may begin by reading Perry v. Clissold to discover if the principle that\n\n0possession is\n\n• Prior possession i~ a good title of ownership against all who cannot show a better.\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, 1.) 179\n\ngood against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.\n\nPerry v. Clisso/d reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly :\n\n\"It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in . the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner.\n\nAnd if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case; his right is _for ever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.\" Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was . entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him.\n\nThe uction of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions :o! the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised.\n\nAs this was a suit of latter Jcind title could be examined.\n\nBut whose title ? Admittedly neither side could establish title. The plaintiff at least pleaded the statute of Limitation and asserted that he had perfected' his title by adverse possession. But as he did not join the State in his suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not rested his case on an acquired title.\n\nHis suit was thus limited to reco, ering possession from one who had trespassed against him. The enquiry, thus narrows to this : did the Society have any title in itself, was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or was it just pleading a title in a third party? To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. It is clearly in the negative.\n\nSo the only question is whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the State ? Since in every s_uch case between trespassers the title\n\nust be ?'!!standing i~ a third party a defendant will be placed ID a position of dominance.\n\nHe has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is in someone e~. Er!e, J. put it in Burling v. Read (11 0.B. 904) 'parties ~1ght 1magme tat they. acquired some right by merely. intrudng upon land. 1°; the ~1ght;. running up a hut and occupying it beore mmg. Thi~ will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in Perry v. C/issold.\n\nThe law does not therefore countenance the doctrine of 'findings keepings'.\n\nIndeed Ashr v. Whitlock [1885j 1 Q.B.\n\nI goes much further.\n\nIt laid down as the head-note correctly summarizes :\n\n180 SUPREME COUl.T llEPOR.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA person in possession of land without other title has a devisable interest, and the heir of his devisee can maintain ejectment against a person who had enter¢ upon the land cannot show title or possession in any one prior to the testator. No doubt as stated by Lord Macnagthen in. Perry v.\n\nClissold, Doe v.\n\nBarnard (supra) lays down the propo,'>ition that \"if a person having only a possessory title to land be supplanted in the possession by another who has himself no better title, and afterwards . brings an action to recover the land, he must fail in case he shows in the course of the proceedings that the title on which he seeks to recover was merely possessory\".\n\nLord Macnaghten observes further that it is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile Asher v. Whitlock with Doe v. Barnard and then concludes:\n\n\"The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., is clear on the point.\n\nThe rest of the Court concurred and it may be observed that one of the members of the court in Asher v. Whitlock (Lush, J.) had been counsel for the successful party in Doe v. Barnard. The conclusion at which the court arrived in Doe v. Barnard is hardlyconsistent with the views of such eminent authorities on real property law as Mr. Preston and Mr. Joshua Williams.\n\nIt is opposed to the opinions of modern textwriters of such weight and authority as Professor Maitland and Holmes, J. of the Supreme Court of the United States (see articles by Professor Maitland in the Law Quarterly Review Vols. 1, 2 and 4; Holmes, Common Law p. 244;\n\nProfessor J. B. Ames in 3 Harv. Law Rev. 324 n.\")\n\nThe differenca in the two cases and which made Asher v. White prevail was indicated in that case by Mellor, J .. thus :\n\n\"In Doe v. Barnard the plaintiff did not rely on her own possession merely, but showed a prior possession in her husband, with whom she was unconnected in point of title. Here the first possessor is connected in. title with the plaintiff; for there can be no doubt that the testator's interest was devisable.\" The effect of the two cases is that between two claimants, neither of whom has title in himself the plaintiff if dispossessed is entitled to recover possession subject of course . to the law of limitation. If he proves that he was dispossessed within 12 years he can maintain his action.\n\nIt is because of this that Mr. Nambiar claimed entitled to plead jus tertii. His contention is that in action of ejectment (as opposed to an action of trespass) jus tertii is capable of\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, !.) 181\n\nbeing pleaded.\n\nThe old action of ejectment was used to try freehold titles but it was abolished in 1873. It was .also used\n\n\"for recovery of land by one who claimed not the righf to seisin but the right to possession by virtue of some chattel interest such as a term of year.\" In such cases \"the defence of jus tertii admits that the plaintiff had such a right of entry as would generally entitle him to succeed, but seeks to rebut that conclusion by setting up a_ better right in some third person\" or that the plaintiff had no right of entry at all.\n\nTo summarize, the difference between Asher v. Whitlock and Doe v. Barnard is this : In Doe v. Barnard the principle settled was that it is quite open to the defendant to -rebut the presumption that the prior _possessor has title, i.e., seisin. This he can do by showing that the title is in himself; if he cannot do this he .can show that the title is in some third person.\n\nAsher v. Whitlock Jays down that a person in possessiop of land has a good title against the world except the true owner and it is wrong in principle for any one without title or authority of the true owner to dispossess him and relying on his position as defendant in ejectment to remain in possession.\n\nAs Loft in his Maxim No. 265 puts it Possessio contra omnes velet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the ve1y right): See Smith v. Oxenden I Ch. Ca 25. A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.\n\nIt is to be noticed that Ames (Harvard Law Review Vol. III p. 313 at .37J; Carson (Real Property Statutes 2nd Ed. p. 180); Halsbury (Laws ?f England, Vol. . 24, 3rd Ed. p. 255 f.n.(o); Leake (Property m Land, 2nd Ed.· p. 4, 40); Lightwood (Time Limit on Actions pp. 120-133); Maitland (supra), _Newell (Action in Ejectment, American Ed. pp. 433-434); Pollock (Law of Torts, 15th Ed. p. 279); Salmond Law of Torts (supra); and William and Yates (Law of Ejectment, 2nd Ed., pp. 21&; 250) hold that Doe v.\n\nJ!arnard does _not represent true law.\n\nWiner (to whom I am mdebted for much of the infom1ation) . gives a list .. of other writers w.ho adhere still to.the-view that jus tertii can be pleaded.\n\nMr. N ambiar pressed upon us the view that we should not accept Perry v. Cllssold. It must be remembered that that case\n\nwas argued twice before the Privy Council and on the second occasion Earl . of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case.\n\nLord Macnaghten's judgment is brief but quite clear .. Mr. Nambiar relies upon two other cases of the Privy Council and a reference to them is necessary. In Dhara'ni Kanta Lahiri' v. Garbar Ali Khan, 25 M.L.J. 95 P.C. a sliit\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nin ejectment was filed. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the lands of which they complained dispossession were ever in their\n\npossession within 12 years before suit and that the lands were not the lands covered by a sanad which was produced by the defendants.\n\nThe case is distinguishable.\n\nIt is to be noticed that Lord Macnaghten was the President of the Board and the judgment of the Board, December 5, 1912, did not base the case on Doe v. Barnard or even refer to it. The second is Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh, 92 I.C. 31 P.C.\n\nIn this case the Board observed as follows :-\n\n\"Counsel for the appellant (defendant) admits that in the face of the ruling by the Board he could not impugn the reversionary right of the plaintiff's vendors, but he contends that the defendant is in possession and in order to . eject him the plaintiff must show that there is no other reversionary heir in the same degree or nearer than his assignors whose title he (the defendant) can urge against the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. In other . words, the action being one of\n\nejectment the defendant is entitled to plead in defence the right of someone else equally entitled with the plaintiff's vendors.\" After observing this the Board held that the defendant had failed to prove his point. The observation does not lead to the conclusion that a defendant can prove title in another unconnected with his own estate. The case is not ati authority for the wider proposition; The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold. No subsequent case has been brought to our notice departing from that view.\n\nNo doubt a great controversy exists over the two cases of Deo\n\nv. Barnard and Asher v. Whitlock but it must be taken to be finally resolved by Perry v. Clissold.\n\nA similar view has been consistently taken in India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act has given approval to the proposition accepted in Perry v. Clissold an.d may be taken to be declaratory of the law in India. We hold that the suit was maintainable.\n\nIt is next submitted that the High Court should not have given its assistance to the plaintiff whose passi:ssion was unlawful to begin with especially when, by grantmg the decree, an illegality would be condoned and perpetuated. In support of this case the Society relies on the provisions of Regulation IV of 1091\n\nand other connected Regulations and rules. It points out that under Regulation IV of 1091, it was unlawful for anyone to occupy Government land and a punishment of fine in addition\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) Is 3\n\nA to eviction was prescribed, and all crops and other products were liable to confiscation. If eviction was resisted the Pewan could order the arrest and detention in jail of the offender. Section 18 barred Civil Courts from taking any action in respect of orders passed 11!1.der the said Regulation except only when it was established that the land was not government land. The civil court, B it is submitted, could not grant a decree for possession nor set up the possession of a person who was an offender under the Regulation.\n\nJn our opinion these submissions are not well-founded. The Regulations were intended to regulate the relation of Government and persons but had no bearing upon the relations between C persons claiming to be in possession.\n\nFurther the penalty was. a fine for wrongful occupation and in no sense a punishment for crime. The illegality of the possession was thus not a criminal act and the regaining of lost possession cannot be described as an action to take advantage of one's own illegal action. In fact the plaintiff was not required to rely upon any illegality which\n\n0 'is the consideration which makes courts deny their assistance to a party. The Society relie\\I upon the oft-quoted observations of Lord Mansfield, C.J. in Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 1 Cowper 341:\n\n\"the objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may say so. The principle of public policy is this : ex dolo malo non orit11r actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or. an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise the cause of action appears to. arise ex turpicausa or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake qf the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintifi.\n\nThese .are general observations applicable to a case ?f illegality on which a party must rely to succeed. In a case m which a plaintiff must rely upon his own illegality the court may refuse\n\nhi~ .ssistance. But there is the other pro1>'?5ition that if a pl am tiff does not have to rely upon any such illegality, then although the possession had begun in trespass a suit .can be maintained. for restitution of possession. Otherwise the oppasite\n\nparty can make unjust enrichment although its own possession is worngful against the claimant. It is to be noticed that the Jaw regards possession with such favour that even against the rightful owner a suit by a trespasser is well-founded if he brings the suit' within 6 months of dispossession. We have also shown that there is ample authority for the proposition that even after the expiry of these 6 months a suit can be maintained within 12 years to recover possession of which a person is deprived by one who is not an owner or has no authority from him.\n\nThe Society next argues that since it has -got a second Kuthakapattom we must relate it back. to the original dispossession and treat it as a statutory order under the laws of Travancore.\n\nIt refers us to the Travancore Survey and Boundaries Regulation of May 1942 (Rule 9), the Land Conservancy Regulation (as amended from time to time), the Puduval Rules and the Land Assignment Regulations and some other rules to show that the forest lands were property of Government and the plaintiff could not be said to be holding land under a grant from Government but the Society is.\n\nWe think that this argument is of the same character as the argument about jus tertii.\n\nThe case is between two persons neither of whom had any right to the suit lands and were trespassers one after the other.\n\nNo question -of implementing a statutory order arises.\n\nThe grant of the second Kuthakapattom is not relaioo back to the grant of ihe original grant and can only be considered if and when it is pleaded. It is therefore not necessary to consider this point at the moment when we are riot in possession of the case of the plaintiff which he may set up in answer to this case.\n\nThis brings us to the q11estion whethr the High Court should have allowed the am_endment sought in 1965. The suit was filed in 1942 and the second Kuthakapattom, was granted in\n\n1948. The last amendment was asked for in 1~58. Before this the plaintiff had pointedly drawn attention to the fact that arguments based on the new Kuthakapattom were likely to be pressed.\n\nThe trial Judge had ruled that arguments could not be shut out in advance.\n\nThese circumstances have to be borne in. lllind in approaching the problem.\n\nIt is, however, plain that after the grant of Kuthakapattom in 1948 the possession of th_e Society became not only de facto biit also de jure unless there was a flaw in the grant. It is equally plain that the Society could only resist the present suit by proving its title or ihe authority of the true owner, namely, the State. The former was not open to the Society before ] 948 but the latter was after the grant. . The Soc<iety contends that even if the facts were not pleaded the documents were before the _Court . and the parties knew of them and indeed the plaintilf had himself\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/a/1, J.) 185\n\ncaused some of them to be produced. It was the duty of the court to take note of them and suo motu to frame an issue. This point has hardly any force.\n\nThe Society could take advantage of such evidence as was provided by the plaintiff but it had to put it in support of a plea. Issue No. 2 on which great reliance is placed was not concerned with an abstract proposition but what flowed from the pleas.\n\nNor could the court frame an issue from documents which not the Society but the plaintiff had caused to be brought on file. The cases reported in Ganoo & Anr. v. Shri Dev Sideshwar & Ors.('), Shamu Patter v. Abdul Kadir Ravlllhan and Ors.(') and Kunju Kesavan v. M. M. Philip, l.C.S., and Ors.( 3 ) do not help the Society. If the plea had been raised by the Society it would undoubtedly have been countered and one does not know what use the plaintiff would have made of the\n\ndocuments he had got marked. Therefore it cannot be said that the trial Judge was in error in not considering the documents.\n\nThis brings us to the general proposition whether the High Court should have allowed the amendment late as it was.\n\nThe plaintiff is right that the application was made literally on the eve of the judgment. This argument is really based on delay and !aches. The application has not been made for the first time in this Court when other considerations might have applied. It was made in the High Court after the argument based on the documents on record was urged. This argument was also urged in the court of trial. The contention of the Society was thus present on both the occasions and it would have been better if 'the Society was directed to amend the pleadings before the argument was heard. The omission, however, remained.\n\nNow it is a fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on the original cause of action and this principle govems not only the trial of suits but also appeals.\n\nIndeed the appeal being a continuation of the suit new pleas are not considered.\n\nIf circumstances change they can form the subject of some other proceedings but need not ordinarily be considered in the appeal. To this proposition there are a few exceptions. Sometimes it happens that the original relief claimed becomes inappropriate, or the law changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such cases courts may allow an ameadment pleading the changed circumstances.\n\nSometimes also the changed circumstances shorten litigation and then to avoid circuity of action the courts allow an amendment.\n\nThe practice of the courts is very adequately summarized in Ram Ratan Sahu v; Mohant Sahu('). Mookerjee and Holmwood, JJ. have given the kind of changed circumstances which the courts usually take notice, with illustrations from decided cases.\n\nThe\n\n(I) 26 .Dom. 360.\n\n(2) 3S Mad. 637 P.C.\n\n(3) [19641 3 S.C.R. 634.\n\n(4) [l9a7] 6 C.L.J. 74, L4 Sup. Cl/68-13\n\n186 SUPREME COUll.T REPOR.TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\njudgment in that case has been consistently followed in India.\n\nIn Raicharan Manda/ v. Biswanath Manda/(') other cases are to be found in which subsequent events were noticed. The same view was taken by the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Cha11dl111ri(') following the dictum of Hughes, C.J., in Patterson v. State of Albama(\"). In S11ri11der\n\nKuiilar & Ors: v. Gian Cha11d & Ors. (') this Court also took subsequent events into account and approved of the case of the Federal Court. In view of these decisions it is hardly necessary to cite further authorities.\n\nMr. Gupte on behalf of the plaintiff has strenuously oppos.:d the request for amendment.\n\nHis objection is mainly based on the ground of delay and !aches. He relies on Gajadhar Mah/011 C\n\nv. Ambika Prasad Tiwari(\"), R. Sha11n111ga Rajeshwara Seth11pa1hie v. Chidambaram Chettiar(') and Kanda t'. Wagh11(1) in which the Judicial Committee declined amendment before it.\n\nThese cases' were differerrt.\n\nJn the first case the Judicial Committee held that it was within its discretion to allow amendment but did not feel compelled to exercise the discretion. In the second case the runendment was no doubt refused because it was asked for at the last moment but the real reason was that under it a relief of a wide and exceptional nature was granted.\n\nThe point was so intricate that it required careful and timely pleading and a careful trial.\n\nIn the last case the Judicial Committee relying on the leading case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo H110ung('> he1d that it was not open to allow -an amendment of the plaint to cover a new issue which involved setting up a new case.\n\nAs against these cases, this Court in L. I. Leach & Co. v.\n\nJardine Skinner & Co. (1) Pungonda Hongo11da Patil v. Kalgo111/a Sl1idgonda Plllil(10) and A. K. Gupta and So11s v. Damodar Valley\n\nCorprr.(11) allowed amendments when a fresh claim would have been \"time-barred. The cases of 1his Court cannot be said to be dirf in point. They do furnish a guide that amendment is a discrettonary matter and although amendment at a late stage is not to be granted as a matter of course, the court must hear in favour of doing full and complete justice in the case where the party against whom amendment is to be allowed can be compensated by costs or otherwise. Also the amendment must be on~ which does not open the case or take the opposite party by surprise.\n\n(0 A.l.R. l91S Cal. 103.\n\n(2) [19-10] F.C.R. 8-1 <tis;.\n\n(3) [1934] 294 U.S. 600 at 607. (-ll [1958] S.C.R. S-18\n\n(S) A.t.R. 192S p.c. 169, 110.\n\n(6) [1938] P.C. m. \"\n\n(7) LR. 77 I.A. lS. (Sl 1921 LR. -18 I.A. l-1. 217.\n\n(9) r19s11 s.cR. 4Js. 11oi r19;11 s.c.R. s~5. (1 ll [1966] I S.C.R. 7%.\n\nNAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatu//ah, /.) 187\n\nIn the present case the amendment sought was not outside the suit.\n\nIn fact issue No. 2 could have easily covered it if a proper pica had been raised.\n\nThe Society was perhaps under an impression that the fresh Kuthakapattom would be considered and the trial Judge had also said that the argument could not be shut out.\n\nAlthough it is not possible to say that parties went to trial in regards to the fresh Kuthakapattom, it cannot be gainsaid that the plaintiff had himself caused all the documents necessary for the plea to be brought on the record of the case. No doubt plainti!I tried to implead Government with a view to obtaining an injunction but as no notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was given this was an exercise in futility. But the Society was under no disability except its own inaction. If it had made a timely request it would have been granted.\n\nThus it is a question of the delay and !aches on the part of Society. In so far as the court was concerned the amendment would not have unduly prolonged litigation; on the other hand, it would have cut it short. Without the amendment another suit based on the second Kuthakapattom is inevitable.\n\nAs we have >hown above there is good authority in support of the proposition that subsequent events may be taken note of if they tend to reduce\n\nlitiation. This is not one of those cases in which there is a likelihood of prolonged litigation after remand or in which a new case will begin.\n\nThe amendment will prima facie allow the Societv to show to the court that in addition to possession it has aiso title. This will enable the court to do complete justice, if the plea is found good, without the parties having to go to another trial.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that we should allow the amendment.\n\nOf course, the plaintiff will be at liberty to controvert the new plea but he will not be allowed to raise new picas of his own having no relation to the grant of the second Kuthakaoattom.\n\nAs this amendment is being allowed w~ do not consider it advisable to state at this stage what the implications of the new grant will be under 1he Jaw applicable in 1948.\n\nWe are, however, clear for reasons, already given, .that $, e second Kuthakapattom cannot be regarded as retroactive from the date of the grant.of the first.Kuthakapattom. We wish to add that the document Ex. 1 does not mention that it was to be retrospective. Now a formal document which has no ambiguity cannot be varied by reforence to othe~ documents not intended to vary it. The only' ot11er documents are Ex. 6, the order conferring the second Kuthakapattom and Ex. 7 a demand by the Tahsildar of the Pattom caiculated at the same rate from the date of the first Kuthakaoattom. This follows from the Rules.\n\nAny person in unlawful possession may be compelled under the Rules to pay pattom and\n\nSUPREME COUKT REPORTS\n\n\nthis is what appears to have been order::d. There is also nothing to show that this was not the Tahsildar's own interpretation of the facts and the documents. We are therefore quite clear that the second Kuthakapattom must be read prospectively from the date of its grant, if it be held that it is valid.\n\nThere are only two other matters to consider. They are the question of mesne profits and improvements. The rate of mesne profits has already been decided and no argument was addressed to us about it. We say no more about it except that the rate will be applicable to the new state of facts in the case after the amendment. It is also not necessary to go into the question of improvements now because in answer to the pleas to be raised hereafter the question of improvements will have to be gone into de novo in the light of the findings reached.\n\nThe argument of the parties that the Rules do not contemplate payment for improvements is neither here nor there. That applies between Government and a private partyand not between two private parties. These matters will be left for determination in the proceedings hereafter to be taken.\n\nIn the result we dismiss the appeal as to portion L(l) (a) both in regard to possession and mesne profits and improvements.\n\nAs regards L(l )(b) the amendment based on the second Kuthaka pattom will be allowed and parties will go to trial on that amendment. The plaintiff will be entitled to raise his defence in reference to the second Kuthakapattom. The question of mesne profits and improvements in relation to L( 1 )(b) will be reconsidered in the light of the finding regarding the second Kuthakapattom but the rate of mesne profits as already determined shall not be altered. The plaintiff wjjl, .of course, be entitled to mesne profits till the date of the grant of the second Kuthakapattom.\n\nF There is no dou'bt that the Society was wrongly advised and allowed the question of amendment to be delayed. At the same time by not allowing the amendment the plaintiff forces the issue regarding possession of L(l)(b). In our judgment the Society must pay the costs thrown away, that is to say, that it must bear the costs incurred in the High Court and the court of fitst instance G by the plaintiff in addition to costs on its own account. In so far as the costs of this Court are concerned parties will bear the costs as ihe case is being sent to the trial court for further trial.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal a/lowed in part 'and case remanded.", "total_entities": 197, "entities": [{"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. SIKlll ANO K. s. HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. 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"metadata": {"in_sentence": "has been consistentJy accepted in India ."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6728, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9873, "end_char": 9890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9924, "end_char": 9937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. A. Subramanian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Velayudhan Nqir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9958, "end_char": 9976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. K. Unnithan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10013, "end_char": 10028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir, T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Mahinder Narain"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10050, "end_char": 10061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, T. P. Paulooe, B. Dutta, Annamma Alexander, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "T. P. Paulooe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10063, "end_char": 10076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, T. P. 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Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10142, "end_char": 10157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Mahinder Narain"}}, {"text": "Hidayatull8'a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatull8'a, J.\n\nThis is an appeal by .certificate from.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "K. C. Alexander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10486, "end_char": 10501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the judgment and decree under appeal the suit of the first respondent, Rev .. Father K. C. Alexander (shortly the plaintiff) was decreed in respect of the suit lands of which he had sought possession from the appellant, Nair Service Society Ltd. (shortly the Society or the first defendant) and some others who are shown as respondents 2 to 6."}}, {"text": "Nair Service Society Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10645, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTD", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "October 13, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10835, "end_char": 10851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in this appeal are as follows : The plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis on October 13, 1942 against ihe Society, its Kariasthan (Manager) and four others for possession of 131.23 acres of land from Survey Nos."}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11026, "end_char": 11036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "780/1 and 780/2 of Rannipakuthy in tb.e former State of Travancore and for mesne profits past and future with compensation for waste."}}, {"text": "011 August 11, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11940, "end_char": 11959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society applied for Kuthakapattom lease of this area 011 August 11, 1938."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12102, "end_char": 12115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was for 165 acres and the Society was admittedly put in possession of it on July 24, 1939 or thereabouts."}}, {"text": "13/16 October, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12191, "end_char": 12210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plaintiff's case was that on 13/16 October, 1939 a nµmber of persons acting on behalf of the Society trespassed upon and took possession of the suit lands (131.23 acres) in addition to the 160 acres."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 167:\n\nKuthakapattom lease in respect of L(l)(b) and obtained it during the pendency of the suit on March 10, 1948.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "March 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13055, "end_char": 13069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 167:\n\nKuthakapattom lease in respect of L(l)(b) and obtained it during the pendency of the suit on March 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13841, "end_char": 13857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society asked for amendments several times, .the last being on October 15, 1958 .. However, on the last day of hearing of the appeal in the High Court (December 14, 1965) the Society applied for an amendment of the written statement limiting its defence to portion L(l)(b) disclaiming alt interest in portion 0 LI 1 )(a) and attempted to plead the grant of the second Kuthakapattom in its favour on March 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13930, "end_char": 13947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society asked for amendments several times, .the last being on October 15, 1958 .. However, on the last day of hearing of the appeal in the High Court (December 14, 1965) the Society applied for an amendment of the written statement limiting its defence to portion L(l)(b) disclaiming alt interest in portion 0 LI 1 )(a) and attempted to plead the grant of the second Kuthakapattom in its favour on March 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society asked for amendments several times, .the last being on October 15, 1958 .. 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ALEXANDER (Hidayatullah, J.) 169\n\ndismissed in default and a revision application against the order of dismissal was also dismissed by the High Court of Kerala: The suit had delayed the Poramboke case as a temporary injunction has been issued against Government."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19766, "end_char": 19770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "14. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21967, "end_char": 21975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the High Court the written statement was sought to be amended as late as December 14."}}, {"text": "8-12- 1114 M.E.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23520, "end_char": 23535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is an admitted fact that eviction in tlte Land Conservancy 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33385, "end_char": 33404, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33904, "end_char": 33909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33968, "end_char": 33973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mulla's Indiaa Contract and Specific Relief Acts there is a commentary which explains the words 'in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure' by observing-\n\n\"that is to say by a suit for ejectment 011 the basis of title: Lachman v. Shambu Narain (1911) 33 All."}}, {"text": "Indiaa Contract and Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33976, "end_char": 34015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34093, "end_char": 34120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34537, "end_char": 34546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indiaa Contract and Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Indiaa Contract and Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34554, "end_char": 34579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34856, "end_char": 34865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35001, "end_char": 35028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35094, "end_char": 35103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35792, "end_char": 35801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35899, "end_char": 35908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36409, "end_char": 36418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36621, "end_char": 36630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37000, "end_char": 37009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37122, "end_char": 37149, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37294, "end_char": 37298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37302, "end_char": 37329, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37628, "end_char": 37632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37634, "end_char": 37638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37669, "end_char": 37688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tbefe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37691, "end_char": 37696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbefe is, however, good authority for the contrary proposition."}}, {"text": "Subramania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37795, "end_char": 37805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mustapha Sahib\n\nv. Santha Pillai('), Subramania, Ayyar J. observes :\n\n\" .... that !"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37807, "end_char": 37812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mustapha Sahib\n\nv. Santha Pillai('), Subramania, Ayyar J. observes :\n\n\" .... that !"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38453, "end_char": 38460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asher v. Whitlock (L.R. 1 Q.B. 1) and the rulings a of the Judicial Committee in M 11sammat Sundar v. m11ssammat Parbati (16 I.A. 186) and Ismail Arif] v.\n\nMahomed Ghouse (20 I.A. 99) not to mention numerous other decisions here and in England to the same effect, are clear authorities in support of the view stated above. . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38550, "end_char": 38559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38567, "end_char": 38586, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38707, "end_char": 38714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act canc not possibly be held to take away any remedy available with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed in Pollock and Wright on possession thus :- Possession in law _is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the owner's title (p. 19)\"."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38719, "end_char": 38725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act canc not possibly be held to take away any remedy available with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed in Pollock and Wright on possession thus :- Possession in law _is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the owner's title (p. 19)\"."}}, {"text": "O'Farell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38910, "end_char": 38918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case O'Farell J. point> out that\n\n\"all the dictum of the Privy Council in Wise v. Ameerunissa Khatoon (7 I.A. 73) appears to amount to is this, that where a plaintiff ill."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39251, "end_char": 39260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39268, "end_char": 39287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39689, "end_char": 39695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We entirely/ agree with the statement of the law in the Madras case from which we have extracted the observations of the learned Judges."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39818, "end_char": 39824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other cases on the subject are collected by Sarkar on Evidence under s. 110."}}, {"text": "s. 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39843, "end_char": 39849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39856, "end_char": 39870, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40673, "end_char": 40677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40685, "end_char": 40704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41058, "end_char": 41062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41070, "end_char": 41089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "articles 64 and 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41241, "end_char": 41259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41288, "end_char": 41298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41507, "end_char": 41517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41761, "end_char": 41780, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42239, "end_char": 42245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42671, "end_char": 42678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proposition of law on the subject has been summed up by Salmond on Torts (13th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Holdsworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45163, "end_char": 45173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nambiar strongly relies upon the above exposition of the 'law and upon institutional comments by Wiren ''lbe Plea of ; us\n\nterlii in ejectment\" (1925) 41 L.Q.R. 139, Hargreaves \"Terminology and Title in Ejectment .(1940) 56 L.Q.R. 376 and Holdsworth's article in 56 L.Q.R. 479."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46496, "end_char": 46515, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Macnagthen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48580, "end_char": 48590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt as stated by Lord Macnagthen in.", "canonical_name": "Macnagthen"}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48992, "end_char": 49002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Macnaghten observes further that it is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile Asher v. Whitlock with Doe v. Barnard and then concludes:\n\n\"The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., is clear on the point.", "canonical_name": "Macnagthen"}}, {"text": "Cockburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49149, "end_char": 49157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Macnaghten observes further that it is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile Asher v. Whitlock with Doe v. Barnard and then concludes:\n\n\"The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., is clear on the point."}}, {"text": "Lush", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49303, "end_char": 49307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest of the Court concurred and it may be observed that one of the members of the court in Asher v. Whitlock (Lush, J.) had been counsel for the successful party in Doe v. Barnard."}}, {"text": "Preston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49525, "end_char": 49532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusion at which the court arrived in Doe v. 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B. Ames", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49839, "end_char": 49849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2 and 4; Holmes, Common Law p. 244;\n\nProfessor J. B. Ames in 3 Harv."}}, {"text": "Mellor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49980, "end_char": 49986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law Rev. 324 n.\")\n\nThe differenca in the two cases and which made Asher v. White prevail was indicated in that case by Mellor, J .. thus :"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52614, "end_char": 52622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 180); Halsbury (Laws ?"}}, {"text": "Leake", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52676, "end_char": 52681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 255 f.n.(o); Leake (Property m Land, 2nd Ed.·"}}, {"text": "Lightwood", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52720, "end_char": 52729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 4, 40); Lightwood (Time Limit on Actions pp."}}, {"text": "Time Limit on Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52731, "end_char": 52748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maitland", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52767, "end_char": 52775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "120-133); Maitland (supra), _Newell (Action in Ejectment, American Ed.", "canonical_name": "Maitland"}}, {"text": "Newell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52786, "end_char": 52792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "120-133); Maitland (supra), _Newell (Action in Ejectment, American Ed."}}, {"text": "Winer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53035, "end_char": 53040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Winer (to whom I am mdebted for much of the infom1ation) ."}}, {"text": "N ambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53194, "end_char": 53202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N ambiar pressed upon us the view that we should not accept Perry v. Cllssold.", "canonical_name": "N ambiar"}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53423, "end_char": 53428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case."}}, {"text": "Robertson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53430, "end_char": 53439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case."}}, {"text": "Atkmson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53441, "end_char": 53448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case."}}, {"text": "Srr Ford North", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53450, "end_char": 53464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case."}}, {"text": "Arthur Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53473, "end_char": 53486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Hasbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson heard the case."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54167, "end_char": 54183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noticed that Lord Macnaghten was the President of the Board and the judgment of the Board, December 5, 1912, did not base the case on Doe v. Barnard or even refer to it."}}, {"text": "Perry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55565, "end_char": 55570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt a great controversy exists over the two cases of Deo\n\nv. Barnard and Asher v. Whitlock but it must be taken to be finally resolved by Perry v. Clissold."}}, {"text": "India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55631, "end_char": 55683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56594, "end_char": 56604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "India and the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Mansfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57646, "end_char": 57655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society relie\\I upon the oft-quoted observations of Lord Mansfield, C.J. in Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 1 Cowper 341:\n\n\"the objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant."}}, {"text": "Regulation of May 1942", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59884, "end_char": 59906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64571, "end_char": 64580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mookerjee and Holmwood, JJ."}}, {"text": "Holmwood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64585, "end_char": 64593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mookerjee and Holmwood, JJ."}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65188, "end_char": 65194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was taken by the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Cha11dl111ri(') following the dictum of Hughes, C.J., in Patterson v. State of Albama(\")."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65241, "end_char": 65244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65477, "end_char": 65482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gupte on behalf of the plaintiff has strenuously oppos.:d the request for amendment."}}, {"text": "Kanda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 65759, "end_char": 65764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relies on Gajadhar Mah/011 C\n\nv. Ambika Prasad Tiwari(\"), R. Sha11n111ga Rajeshwara Seth11pa1hie v. Chidambaram Chettiar(') and Kanda t'."}}, {"text": "S. 600", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67373, "end_char": 67379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68322, "end_char": 68327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68331, "end_char": 68358, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_189_197_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "DALPAT SINGH & ANR. v.\n\nSTA'IE OF RAJASTHAN\n\nFebruary 13, 1968\n\n[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)\n\nIndian Penal Code, 1860 (4S of 1860), ss. 120B and 161-Public servants threaten ill-treatment and harassment unle.rs money paid to them- JVhetht-r C<o'li be convicted under. s. 161.\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 o/ 1947), ss. S(l)(a), S(I) C (d) and S(2)--0ffence not under s. 161 IP.C.-1/ conviction under s.\n\nS(l)(a) possible-Scope of s. S(l)(d).\n\nOn the allegation that the first appellant•Havaldar and the second appellant-a Subedar in the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, were demanding certain amount from a perron accusing him of indulging in blackmarketing and constandy visiting Pakistan and unless he paid the amount demanded he would be beaten and prcoecuted. a police trap was successfully laid, and the appellants convicted under ss. 161 and !20B I.P.C.\n\nD and under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(a) ands. 5°(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In appeal, this Court.\n\nHELD: The conviction of the appellants under s. 120B and 161 as well as under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Co<Tuption Act must be set aside.\n\nThe second appellant\"s wnviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1}(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act must be sustained. The first appellant's conviction be altered to one under s. 5(2) of E the Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 114 I.P.C.\n\nThe first appellant was a subordinate of second appellant. From the evidence it is clear that both the appellants were acting togetl::er. It is obvious that tho second appellant was mainlv responsible for the exto'rtions complained of and the first appellant was aiding him in his activities.\n\nHence there was no need to charge the appelllll& under s. 120 B. I.P.C.\n\nF The evidence clearly showed that neither the appellants intended to show any official favour to the-persoos from whom they exlll<ted money nor those persons expected any official favour from them. The amounts in question were paid solely with a view to avoid being ill-treated or harassed. Therefore, it is diflicult to hold that the acts complained can be held to constitute offences under s. 161 I.P.C.\n\nState of Ajmer v. Shivji Lal, [1959] !!opp. 2 S.C.R. 739 and State of C Uttar Pradesh v. Kuljas Rai. Cr. A. No. 177 of 1960 dated 22-8-62, referred to.\n\nBefore an offente can be held to come within s. 5 (I)( a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the requirements of s. 161 I.P.C., have to be satisfied. If an offence does not fall under s .• 161 l.P.C. it cannot come -.ithin s. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [196 CJ\n\nI • But so far as s. 5 (I)( d) . of the Prevention of Corruption Act is con- H cerned, that stands on a different footing.\n\nTo bring home an offence Wider s. S(l)(d), it is not necessary to prove that the acts complained of were done by the appellants in the discharge of their official duties. Oause 5(l)(d) is much wider in scope than cl. S(IHa). (196 D-197 BJ\n\n190 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS (1968 j 3 S.C.R.\n\nState of Ut1ar Pradesh v. K11/ja5 Rai, Cr, A. No. 177 of 1960 dated A 22-8--62 a11d Dhanesh1var Narain S(L\\\"ena v.\n\nTlte Dellri Adniinistration, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 195, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 1 December 14, 1964 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal Appeal No. 656 of 1963.\n\nK. R. Chaudlmri, for the appellants.\n\nK. Balde\" Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by c\n\nDegele, J. The two appellants were convicted by the High Court of Rajasthan under ss. 120 B and 161, IPC, and under ss. 5 ( 1) (a) and 5 ( 1 )( d) read with s. 5 ( 2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They have come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nD The first appellant was a Havaldar and the second appellant a Subedar in the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary.\n\nAt the relevant point of time they were serving in the outpost at Sajan- Ka-Par in Barmer district of Rajasthan State, which was a border outpost.\n\nThat post was within two miles from the Pakistan border.\n\nThe prosecution case is that the two appellants cons- E pircd to extort money as well as other valuable things from the villagers by using force or threat of force or by harassment.\n\nThough they were indulging in these activities for quite some time, the matter came to a head when they tried to compel PW 1 Mohammad to give them Rs 100.\n\nIt was said that about. the middle of September 1962, the first appellant came to the field of Mohammad ; md took him to the outpost saying that the F second appellant wanted him to go over there. At the outpost the seeond appellant told him that he was constantly visiting Pakistan; he was also blackrnarketitig; hence unless he gave him (2nd appellant) Rs. 200 he would send him to prison. PW I pleaded that he was innocent He also pleaded that he was a poor man and hence he was unable to pay the amount demand- G ed. As the second appellant insisted on the payment he agreed to pay him Rs. I 00 but as he had no money at that time PW 3 Kalla stood surety for him. After a few days when PW 1 was sitting in the shop of PW 5 Bhoja, he happened to talk about the illegal activities of the appellants. It so happened that a CID officer was th, ere who evidently passed on that information to H PW 17 Kaneihalal the puty Superintendent of Police in the Special Police Establishment. On getting that information .PW 17 came to the village on September 30, 1962 and checked up the\n\nl>ALPAT SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Hegde, J.) 191\n\nfacts \\\\'ith PW 1.\n\nOn the morning of October 1, 1962 PW 1 was ain called to the outpost by the 2nd appellant. and told that the amount should be paid iu, unediately.\n\nHe promised to pay rhe same that afternoon and asked the appellants to come to hiti house that afternoon to which they agreed. Thereafter he passed on that information to PW 17 and gave him the complaint Exh. Pl. Then a trap was arranged. PW 1 produced before PW\n\n17, Rs. 100 in ten rupee currency notes. PW 17 noted down their numbers in the presence of panch witnesses PW 2 Bhakha and PW 4 Ballu and returned the amount to PW 1 with instructions to give the same to the appellants if they again demilnded money. At the same time he instructed PWs 2 and 4 to be with PW 1 so that they may witness the payment of the money. Then PW 17 posted himself in a house near the house of PW 1. On the evening of that day the first appellant came to the house of PW 1 and demanded the money. He told PW 1 that the second\n\nappl>llant could not come as he was not well. Then PW 1 took out il\\e currency notes whose numbers had been noted down earlier and paid the same to the first appellant. The first appellant rlut them in his pocket. On receipt of that information, PW\n\n17 0ame to the place and asked the first appellant to produce\n\nthos~ currency notes.\n\nOn seeing PW 17, the first appellant\n\nbeclne pale and nervous.\n\nAfter some hesitation he took out the notes in question from his pocket and gave them to PW 17 On examining their numbers it was found that they were the very notes which had been returned to PW 1 after noting their numbers.\n\nAs soon as the villagers came to know of the trap,· several of them came forward with complaints against the appellants.\n\nAfter investigating all those complaints this case was launched. It was tried by the special judge, Balotra, who accepted the prosecution case in full and convicted the appellants under ss. 161 and 120B. IPC and under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(1)(a) and 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In appeal\n\nthe~ High Court of Rajasthan affirmed the convictions of the\n\naplants in respect of all the charges levelled against them. It did not award any separate sentence in respect of the offence undcls. 161 or s. 120 B, !PC. As regards the other offeriCe.' it G :edul:ed the sentence .awarded by the trial court.\n\n,1We shall IJOW proceed to consider the evidence relating to the various charges levelled against the appellants. It is' not disputed that both the appellants were public servants.\n\nSo far a.' the evidence relating to the trap is concerned, we have the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4 and\n\n17. Their evidence ha' been believed by the trial court as well as the High Court. The plea of the 1st appellant was that on that evening\n\nwhen he was. j!Oing in front of the house of PW 1, PWs 1 and\n\n192 SuPRBMll CotlllT UPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R. ,\n\n2 and others caught hold of him and struggled with him; lit that \" time his note book fell down; thereafter he saw them pucing the currency notes in question before PW 17. This is a : very artificial story. The same has been disbelieved by the .trial court as well as the appellate court. No case is made out to intC:ifere with ··.their findings.\n\nThe evidence relating to the trap does not by itself collllect\n\nthe second appellant with that incident, but then the evidence of PWs 1. and 3, which has .been accepted by the trial. court as well as the '.High Court; shows that it was .the 2nd appellant who compe!Led PW 1 to give that amount.\n\nThe contention of the st:CC)nd. appellant that he had incurred the displeasure of the C vil, lagers because he was a strict officer and because he came in their way of smuggling goods from Pakistan .to India and from India to Pakistan and therefore he was victimised, was ,. not accepted either by the trial court or the High Court. lfhose courts also did not accept his version that several days before the trap was laid he had reported against most of the prosecution D witnesses in this case. The defence evidence led by him ; was disbelieved by those courts d even the documents produce\\i by him were rejected either on the ground that they were 11ot u~ for the purpose of this case or as having been tampered with. 'This court being a court of special jurisdiction, does not interfere with findings of facts reached by the High Court except under E exceptional circumstances.\n\nNo such circumstance is available in .this case.\n\nWe are unable to accept the contentiori of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and other proseeution witneiises to whose evidence we shall presently refer, F should be consiOered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars bcjore being accepted.· On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants . cannot be considered as accomplices as the same was extorted from them.\n\nTliough PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be considered as interested witnesst'5 as• regards their evidence relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is C not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see the State of Bihar v. Baswan Singh(').'\n\nThe next incident is that spoken to by Bhoja PW 5 and Hussain, PW 6, Their evidence was that on June 22, 1962 the second appellant along with the first appellant visited the shop of PW 5 and told him that he was blackmarketing and that people\n\n[1959] S.C.R. 195.\n\nI:.\n\n' from Pakistan were visiting him. , He denied those charges. Then the sec()'nd appellant told him that unless he (PW 5) paid him Rs. 50 he would involve him in some case some day. But still PW 5 did not give any money to the second appellant.\n\nThen the second appellant insisted that he should give at least the wrist watch that he was wearing.\n\nFinding no alternative he gave him the watch, article 3. According to him when all these things happened PW 6 was in his shop. PW 6 fully corroborated PW 5. It was not denied that PW 17 Seized the watch in question from the second appellant. But his explanation was that that watch had been pledged by PW 5 with Shriram PW 4 for Rs. 50 but that amount had been advanced to DW 4 'by him (appellant No. 2); DW 4 left the watch with him and that is how he happened to be in possession of the watch. Neither the trial court ngr the appellant court accepted this version. On the orher hand they relied on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 coupled with the\n\ncircumst$ce that the watch was seized from the second appellant. We see no reason to disturb the findings reached by those courts. ·\n\nPW '18 Ukaram spoke to the fact of having paid a sum of Rs. I 01'. to the second appellant in the presence of the first appellant on August 13, 1962. Though his evidence was believed by\n\nthe trial court, the same was not relied on by the High Court.\n\nTherefore we exclude that evidence from consideration.\n\nWe next co1ne to the evidence of PWs 8, 11 and 12. PW 8 is one Kastura.\n\nHis evidence is that some days prior to October I, 1962 the first appeilant came and took him to the outpost.\n\nThere the second appellant accused him of being in the habit of visiting Pakistan.\n\nWhen be denied that charge he was asked to kneel down. Sometimes thereafter he was asked to pay Rs. 100. As he had no money he was kept in the outpost during the nignt. On the next mommg Imam PW 11 and Bhakha PW\n\n2 happ.el; ed to come to the post. PWs. 8, 11 and 12 pleaded with 1 he second appellant to accept a lesser sum. Ultimately the second appellant agreed to receive Rs. 50.\n\nThereafter PW 11 was s.ent to the house of PW 8 tc;>,8ell his goats and getRs. 50.\n\nHe accoitlingly went to the age, sold some goats of PW 8 and got Rs .. 50. During this incident, according to the evidence of the abOlve witnesses, the fitst appellant was also present in the outpost.\n\nSadiq PW 13 speaks to the fact that about nine days prior to his arrest the first appellant . went to his house and took him tO\n\nthe outpost saying that he was wanted by the second appell'ant.\n\nThere he was faliely acc1111ed of -selling goats in Pakistan; then he was beaten by the second appellant. and. theteafter he: was told by .the second appellant that he should pay him Rs. 100. As\n\n194 SUPlllMl! COlJl.T UP91lTS [196f 3 S.C.R.\n\nI ' .he could not make t.he payment in q11estion he was kept .in the A outpost that night.\n\nNext day his brot.her Gafoor came there and paid a sum of Rs. 80 to the sec0nd appellant.\n\nIi. is only thereafter he was allowed to go back. At about the time when money was extorted from PW 13, Alladin PW 14 was aid to have been in the outpost. PW 14 corroborated the testimony of PW 13. PW 14 has his own grievance against the appellants. His B case was I.hat about 25 days prior his 'arrest, the first appellant\n\name to his field and demanded his camel for cultivation of his field.\n\nBut as he himself required the camel he refused to give it. After about 8 or 9 days both the appellants came to his field .and forcibly took him to the outpost and beat him. Thereafter I.hey demanded from him a sum of Rs. 60 and he was told c that •if he did not pay that amount, he would be prosecuted in some folSl\" case.\n\nNext we come to the evidence of Murad PW 7 an{ Subhan PW 9. The evidence of these two witnesses was that about seven or eight days before the first appellant was arrested , tloth the appellants came to their houses in the village Talab-Ka-Par and D took them to the outpost. There they were made to kneeL down'.\n\nFurther they were falsely accused of indulging in smi; ggling of goods and visiting Pakistan without valid permits. Thereafter Rs. 80 were demanded from PW 7 and Rs. 200 from PW 9. Ultimately it was settled that PW 7 should pay Rs. 50 and PW 9 Rs. 150.\n\nBy that time Kalla PW 3 came there. He was sent to E the house of those witnesses to get money. He got Rs. 40 for PW\n\n7 and Rs. 130 for PW 9.\n\nThOSe amounts were paid to the second appellant.\n\nNext we come to the .evidence of Miriimal PW 10. His version was that in July or August 1962 his brother-in-law died and in that connection a feast had been arranged. w, hen the F feast was about to commence the first appe!lant came .there and told him that unless he paid a sum of Rs. 100 he would not be allowed to have the feast.\n\nAs he refused to pay that money be was taken to the outpost. There the second appellnt again demanded from him Rs. 100. Ultimately PW 10 P!lid the\n\nseeond appellant Rs. 30.\n\nG • Lastly we come to the evidence of Nemichand PW 15. His case was that about a month before the first appellant was trapped he had come to his shop and told him that he should go an~ meet the second appellant at the <>utpost.\n\nAccordingly he went to the outpost. There lhe second appellant accused him of H indulging in black-marketing and demanded from him Rs. 100. and he was told that -if he did not pay that amount Ke would be beaten and prosecuted. Ultimately it was settled that be should\n\npay Rs.; 50. Thereafter he was allowed to go home and get tlie money.: On the next day he went to the outpost and paid Rs. 50 o the second appellant.\n\nThe evidence of all the witnesses mentioned above excepting PW 18 has been accepted by the \\rial court .as well as by the appellate court, and we see no reason to differ from them.\n\nThis takes . us to the question whether on the basis of the evidence accepted by the High Court both or any of .the appel Jants could in law have been convited for any of the offences with which they were charged. .\n\nThe first appellant was a subordinate of the second appellant.\n\nFrom the evidence referred to earlier it is clear that both the apJ!CllaiJ.ls were acting together.\n\nIt is obvious that the second appellant was mainly responsible for )he extortions complained of and tfie first appellant was aiding him in his activities. Hence there ws no need to charge the appellants under s. 120 B, lPC even in:respect of the amount received from PW 1. The evidence adduceil by ihe prosecution shows that eveiy single act. com plainecf of amounts to an extortion in Jaw. ·\n\nBefore an offence is held to faJI under s. 161 IPC, the following requirements have. to be satisfied: ( 1) the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to. be, a public servant, (2) that he accepted, or obtained, or areed to accept,. or attempted to obtain from some person a gratdication, (3) .that such gratification was not a legal remuneration due to him, and ( 4) that he accepted the gratification in question as a motive or reward, for (a) doing or forbearing to do an official act; or (b) showing, or forbearing to show favour or djsfavour 'to some one in the exercise of his official functions: or ( c) rendering, or attempting to\\ render,. any service or disservice to .. some one, with .the Centrafor any State Government or Parliament or the .Legislature of any State, or with any public . servant As mentioned earlier dmtttedly the appellants were public servants. It is also estab!islied that they obtained from the . several witnesses examined in this case illegal gratification. 1be word 'obtain' is a strong word. It includes also things. received by extortion. But can it be .said that they obtained the gratifications in question as a motive or reward for doing or for forbearing to do an official act or for showing or for forbe:lring to show favour or disfavour to the persons in question in the exercise of their official fu11Ctions.\n\nThe evidence .on record clearly shows that neither the appellants intended to show any official favi>ur to the persons from whom they extorted money or valuable things, nor those persons expected any official favour from them. They 'paid the amounts in question solely with a View to 'avoid being ill-treated\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • [1968:] 3 s.c.R.\n\nor harassed. The scope of s. 161, IPC had been considered by this Court in State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lal(') as well as in State of Uttar Pradesh v. K:tlias Rai('). Though the fonner decision was overruled in certain respects by a later decision of thi~ Court\n\nto which reference will be made hereinafter, that part of the decision which considered the requirements of s. 161 I.P.C. was not differed from. Therefore it is difficult to hold that the acts complained against the appellants can be held to constitute offences under s. 161, IPC.\n\nBefore an offence can be held to come within cl. (a) of subs. I of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the requirements of s. 161, IPC have to be satisfied. If an offence does not fall under s. 161, IPC, it cannot come withins. S(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. f\n\nBut so far as cl. ( d) of sub-s. 1 of s. 5 of the Prevtion of Corruption Act is coneerned, that stands on a different footing.\n\nAt the relevant time thai sub-section read : l\n\n\"A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty-1\n\n( d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or f.or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.\"\n\nTherefore if it is proved that the appellants had by illegal means or by otherwise abusing their position as public servants obtained for themselves money or other valuable things, then, they can be said to have committed the offence of criminal mis<; onduct in the discharge of their official duties. To bring home an'offence under s. 5 ( 1 )( d), it is not necessary to prove that the acts complained of were done by the appellants in the discharge \\Of their official duties.\n\nThe contrary view taken by this Court in State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lm(') was over-ruled by this Cm1rt in\n\nDhaneshwar Nal'ain Saxena v. The Delhi Administration('). In that case it was observed that tho words occurring in s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act \"in the discharge of his duty\" do not constitute an essential ingredient of the offence under s. 5\n\n(1 )( d), the ingredients of that offence being (1 ) that the accused should be a public servant, (2) that he should use some corrupt or illegal means or othernise abuse his position as a\n\n(I) [1959) SUPI\" 2 S.C.R. 739.\n\n(2) Cr. Appcal 177of1961, decided on 22-8-412.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 195.\n\nF •(\n\n...\n\npublic~ servant; ( 3) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, and ( 4) for himself or any other persol). That decision was followed in State of Uttar Pradesh v.\n\nKuljas Rai('). It must be noted that clause 5(1)(d) is much wider in scope than clause 5(1)(a).\n\nTherefore, the conviction of the appellants under s. 5 (1 )\n\n(d) read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act\n\nands on a firm ground.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the State that if this Court holds that the conviction of the appellants under s. 161, IPC and under s. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not sustain- C able, their conviction may be altered to one under s. 384, IPC.\n\nIt was, said that such an alteration cannot be said to prejudice the appellants though they were no charged and tried for that offence.' We have not thought it necessary to examine that question as in any event the appellants are liable to be convicted under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruptio!'- Act.\n\nIn the result we partly allow the appeal and . acquit the appellants under ss. 120 B and 161, IPC, as well as under s. 5\n\n(2) read withs. 5(1) (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nThe second appellant's conviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5 (1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is sustained and for that offence the sentence of 18. moriths rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, in default further imprisonment of two months imposed by the High Court is affirmed. The conviction of the first appellant is altered to one under s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 114, IPC and for that offence he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\n(I) Cr. 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS (1968 j 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2986, "end_char": 3026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196 D-197 BJ\n\n190 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS (1968 j 3 S.C.R.\n\nState of Ut1ar Pradesh v. K11/ja5 Rai, Cr, A. No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudlmri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3424, "end_char": 3439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudlmri, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Balde\" Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Balde\" Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Degele", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c\n\nDegele, J. The two appellants were convicted by the High Court of Rajasthan under ss."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c\n\nDegele, J. The two appellants were convicted by the High Court of Rajasthan under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3628, "end_char": 3635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohammad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though they were indulging in these activities for quite some time, the matter came to a head when they tried to compel PW 1 Mohammad to give them Rs 100."}}, {"text": "Mohammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the middle of September 1962, the first appellant came to the field of Mohammad ; md took him to the outpost saying that the F second appellant wanted him to go over there."}}, {"text": "Kalla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 00 but as he had no money at that time PW 3 Kalla stood surety for him."}}, {"text": "Bhoja", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5193, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a few days when PW 1 was sitting in the shop of PW 5 Bhoja, he happened to talk about the illegal activities of the appellants."}}, {"text": "Kaneihalal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5366, "end_char": 5376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It so happened that a CID officer was th, ere who evidently passed on that information to H PW 17 Kaneihalal the puty Superintendent of Police in the Special Police Establishment."}}, {"text": "Bhakha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6133, "end_char": 6139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 17 noted down their numbers in the presence of panch witnesses PW 2 Bhakha and PW 4 Ballu and returned the amount to PW 1 with instructions to give the same to the appellants if they again demilnded money."}}, {"text": "Ballu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 17 noted down their numbers in the presence of panch witnesses PW 2 Bhakha and PW 4 Ballu and returned the amount to PW 1 with instructions to give the same to the appellants if they again demilnded money."}}, {"text": "Balotra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was tried by the special judge, Balotra, who accepted the prosecution case in full and convicted the appellants under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7521, "end_char": 7524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7614, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "SuPRBMll CotlllT UPOllTS", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j!Oing in front of the house of PW 1, PWs 1 and\n\n192 SuPRBMll CotlllT UPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant that he had incurred the displeasure of the C vil, lagers because he was a strict officer and because he came in their way of smuggling goods from Pakistan .to India and from India to Pakistan and therefore he was victimised, was ,."}}, {"text": "Hussain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10852, "end_char": 10859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next incident is that spoken to by Bhoja PW 5 and Hussain, PW 6, Their evidence was that on June 22, 1962 the second appellant along with the first appellant visited the shop of PW 5 and told him that he was blackmarketing and that people\n\n[1959] S.C.R. 195."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10894, "end_char": 10907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next incident is that spoken to by Bhoja PW 5 and Hussain, PW 6, Their evidence was that on June 22, 1962 the second appellant along with the first appellant visited the shop of PW 5 and told him that he was blackmarketing and that people\n\n[1959] S.C.R. 195."}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shriram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11726, "end_char": 11733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But his explanation was that that watch had been pledged by PW 5 with Shriram PW 4 for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ukaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW '18 Ukaram spoke to the fact of having paid a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12327, "end_char": 12342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the second appellant in the presence of the first appellant on August 13, 1962."}}, {"text": "Kastura", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 8 is one Kastura."}}, {"text": "Sadiq", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13439, "end_char": 13444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadiq PW 13 speaks to the fact that about nine days prior to his arrest the first appellant ."}}, {"text": "sec0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14039, "end_char": 14043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alladin", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14162, "end_char": 14169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about the time when money was extorted from PW 13, Alladin PW 14 was aid to have been in the outpost."}}, {"text": "Murad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14811, "end_char": 14816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next we come to the evidence of Murad PW 7 an{ Subhan PW 9."}}, {"text": "Subhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14826, "end_char": 14832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next we come to the evidence of Murad PW 7 an{ Subhan PW 9."}}, {"text": "Talab-Ka-Par", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15009, "end_char": 15021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of these two witnesses was that about seven or eight days before the first appellant was arrested , tloth the appellants came to their houses in the village Talab-Ka-Par and D took them to the outpost."}}, {"text": "Miriimal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next we come to the .evidence of Miriimal PW 10."}}, {"text": "P!lid", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16010, "end_char": 16015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately PW 10 P!lid the\n\nseeond appellant Rs."}}, {"text": "Nemichand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16085, "end_char": 16094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G • Lastly we come to the evidence of Nemichand PW 15."}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17469, "end_char": 17475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17694, "end_char": 17700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17701, "end_char": 17704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19400, "end_char": 19406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19408, "end_char": 19411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19741, "end_char": 19747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19748, "end_char": 19753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19901, "end_char": 19907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19909, "end_char": 19912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19982, "end_char": 19986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19994, "end_char": 20022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20044, "end_char": 20050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20052, "end_char": 20055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20112, "end_char": 20118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20120, "end_char": 20123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20164, "end_char": 20192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20227, "end_char": 20231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20995, "end_char": 20999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21361, "end_char": 21365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21373, "end_char": 21401, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21496, "end_char": 21500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22-8-412", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21760, "end_char": 21768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appcal 177of1961, decided on 22-8-412."}}, {"text": "clause 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22038, "end_char": 22052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22081, "end_char": 22095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22148, "end_char": 22152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22173, "end_char": 22180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22188, "end_char": 22216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22351, "end_char": 22357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22359, "end_char": 22362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22373, "end_char": 22383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22391, "end_char": 22419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22489, "end_char": 22495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22497, "end_char": 22500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22762, "end_char": 22766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22781, "end_char": 22785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22911, "end_char": 22918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22930, "end_char": 22933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22952, "end_char": 22956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22990, "end_char": 23018, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23061, "end_char": 23068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23079, "end_char": 23083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23100, "end_char": 23128, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23383, "end_char": 23387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23399, "end_char": 23427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23438, "end_char": 23444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23446, "end_char": 23449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_198_206_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "A. VISHWANATII RAO ETC. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.\n\nFebruary 16, 1968\n\n• '\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAM~SWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nMotor Vehicles Act 1939, ss. 68•8, 68.C, 68-D, awd 68-E; Rood Tramport Act 1950, s. 20; Constitution of Jndia, Art, 14;-Mysore State Transport Corporation preparing sclle1ne to take over route partly in Mysor~ nnd partly in A11dhra Pradesh-Both State Governments and Centrcl\n\nGovernment approving final schemt-failure to prepare scheme accordiFlg to s. 20 of 1950 Act if mere irregu/arity.-Scheme prescribing wide dispa; ity between nwximuni and 1ni11im&1m n11mber of vehicles and servicesif fraud on ss. 68.C and 68-E-Exclusion only of Mysore and not~Andhra Pradish pr; vate operators-if discrbninatory.\n\nThe appellants were tralisport operators plying a stage carriag.e on an inter-State route 28 mile. Ion~ oi which a portion of 5 miles is situated in the State of Andhra Prade.h and the rest in the State of Mysore. A draft scheme was prepared and published by the second respondent Mre State Road Transport Corporation under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, proposing to take over the Stage Carria&e Services oil tho route to the complete exclusion of othe'r operators. After objections against the scheme had been heard by the Chief Minister of the State of Mysore under s. 68B of the Act, tbe draft scheme was. approved by his order dated March 7, 1964 with two modifications whereby, firstly, it specified the mini mum number_ of vehicles and daily servioes and, secondlf, it res!rictcd the exclusion of other operators only to that part of the route which was in the State of Mysore. The approval of the Central Government was accorded to the scheme under the proviso to s. 6l!-D(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the final scheme was published by the Mysore Government in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964.\n\n1be appellants challenged the notification of the Mysore Government approving tho final scheme by. a writ petition under Art. 226 .., f the Constitution but the petition was dismissed by the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellants (i) that the provisions or s; 20 of. the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, were not l:Omplied with and the final scheme published by the first respondent w..S ull.ra vin'.s:\n\n(ii) that whereas in the draft scheme the maximum number of vehicles and daily services were specified and not the minimum number, the final scl1eme provided the maximum number of vehicles a.\\ 18 and the( mini mum as one, and the maximum number of daily services as 10 and the minimum as 3; it was contended that by permitting such a great disparity between the maximum and minimum number of vehicles and daily .services there was a virtual modification of the draft scheme and therefore the procedure prescribed by s. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act should have been followed; and (iii) that the approved scheme violated Art, 14 of the Constitution as there was a complete exclusion of the private Operators on the portion of the route located in the M}'IOre State. while permitting those. who were plying their vehicles on the portion of the route lying in the Slate of Andbra Pradesh.\n\nHELD : dismissing the appeal :\n\nV~WANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Rama.nvami, I.) 199\n\n(i) Even assuming !hat the reqoirements of s. 20 of the Road T r•nsp<)rt Corporations Act should also be followed in a case where the Central Government has given its sanction mder s. 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, it must be held that there had been sufficient compliance with the '.requirements of the Road Transport Corporations Act in the present case. It was not disputed that .the concurrence of the Sta•c of Andhra Pradesh was secured for the final acheme and the Gowrnment of the State of Mysore bad also accorded its approval to it. Jn these circumbtances the omission of -the first respondent to make the scheme in the precise manner in which \" 20 of the Road Transport Corporation Act directs the prepai'ation of the scheme was ii mere irregularity which could not lead to the nullification of the final acheme. (203 H-204 BJ\n\n(ii) In the present case the distance of the route in question was a >hort distance of 28 miles, and the order of the Chief Minister shows that there was seasonal variation of traffic density nnd during marriage and other seasons it was ncce.\"!.sary to operate extra services. There was also variation on account of auspicious nd inauspicious days .. It was felt by the Chief Minister that the scheme would have to be 5ufficicntly flexible to enable adjustment of services and vehicles to cater for the actual traffic needs. Jn the context of the particular facts of the case the gap between\n\nthe minimum -and maximttm number of vehicles and services was not w great as to amount to a fraud on 5. 68.C and 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act. [205 F-H] .\n\nB. H. A.<wathanarayan Singh and Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1966] 1 S.C.R. 87, di•tinguisbed.\n\n(iii) It is manifest tha! operator. plying in the Slate of Mysore and those plying in the Slate of Andhra Pradesh constitute two different classes of persons and therefore no question of discrimination (%1.n arise if there is complete exclusion of the operatOrs within the State of Mysore and if there is relaxation with regard to those ope'rating in the State of Andbra Pradesh. [206 A-BJ CIVIL APPE.LLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 8 and 9 of 1968.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 27, 19~( o( the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1720 and 1722 of 1964.\n\nP. Babula Reddy and K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nShyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramaniurthi and Vi11eet Kumar, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\nR. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 3 (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave from the judgment of the Mysore High-Court dated October 27, 1967 dismissing Writ Petitions Nos. 1720 and 1722._of 1964;\n\nThe appellants are transport operators plying a stage carriage on the .route Yadgir to Narayanapet on the strength of permits issued by the Regional Transport A11thority, Gulbarga. The route\n\n.200 SVPREMB COUllT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nYadgir to Narayanapet is an inter.State route of a distance of 28 miles out of which a portion of 5 miles is situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh ana the rest is in the State of Mysore. A draft scheme was prepared by the second respondent, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, proposing to take over the Stage Carriage Services on the inter-State route Yadgir to Narayanapet to the complete exclusion of other operators.\n\nThe draft scheme was published in the Gazette on June 21, 1962. The appellants and some others filed their objections against the proposed scheme. The objections were heard by the Chief Minister of the State of Mysore under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and the draft scheme was approved with certain modifications by his order dated March 7, 1964. The approval of the Central Government was later on accorded under the proviso to sub-section (3) of s. 68- D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Tue approved scheme made two modifications to the draft scheme.\n\nThe first was that it specified the minimum number of vehicles and daily services. The second modification was that it restricted the exclusion of other operators only to that part of the route which was in the State of Mysore.\n\nThe approved scheme was published by the Government of Mysore in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964. The appellants moved the High Court of Mysore for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification of the Mysore Government dated July 16, 1964 approving the final scheme. The main ground of challenge was lhat the approved scheme violated E the provisions of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act,\n\n1950 (Act 64 of 1950). It was also contended that there was an infringement of the requirements of s. 68-C and s. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act 4 of 1939) as modified by Act\n\n100 of 1956, but the writ applications were dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated October 27, 1967.\n\n•• Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939) by the Amending Act 100 of 1956 with effect from February 16, 1957. Section 68-C which is incorporated in Ch. IV A reads :\n\n\"Where any State transport underlaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing at• efficient, adequate, economical and proper! y co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme\n\nVISllWANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Ramaswami, J.) 201\n\ngiving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed 10 be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be' prescribed, and shall cause very such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct.\" Section 68-D provides as foll()ws :\n\n\" ( 1 ) Any . person affected by the scheme published . under section 68C may, within thirty days frO)ll the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official\n\nGazette, file objections thereto before the State Government.\n\n(2) The State Government may, after censidering the objections and• after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire; approve or modify the scheme. ( 3) The scheme as approved or modified under sub-seetion (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon becO)lle final and shall be called the approve\" scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route :\n\nProvided that no such scheme which relates •to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheine unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previoiis approval of the Central\n\nGovernment.\"\n\nF Section 68-E stara :\n\n\"Ariy sce published under sub-section (3) of section 68D may at any time be cancelled or modified by . the State .transport undertaking; and the procedure laid down in section 68C and section 68D shall, G so far as it can be made applicable, be followed in every .case whete the scheme is pi:oposed to be modified as if the modification proposed were a separate scheme;\"\n\nSection 3 of the 'Road Transport Corporations Act, 19~0 provides for establishment of Road Tr11nsport Corporations arid reads as follows :\n\n\"The State Government, having regard to--\n\n(a) the' advantages offered to the public, traile and\n\nindustI'y by the development' of road transport; L4Sup.Cl/68-14\n\n202 SUPREME eotlaT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.CR.\n\n(b) the desirability of co-ordinating 811.Y form of road transport with any other form of transport;\n\n( c) the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and economical system of road transport service therein;\n\nmay, by notification in the Officiat Gazette, establish a Road Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the State under such name as may be specified in the notification. ff\n\nSection 4 states :\n\n\"Every Corporation shall be body corporate by the name notified under section 3 having perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall by the said name sue and be sued.\"\n\nSection 18 is to the following effect :\n\n\"It shall be the general duty of a Corporation so to exercise its powers as progressively to provide or secure or promote the provision of, an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services in the State or part of the State for which it is established and in any extended area:\n\nprovided that nothing in this section shall be, construed as imposing on a Corporation, either directly or indirectly, any form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any court. or tribunal to which it would not otherwise be subject. ff ·\n\nSection 19 ( 1) provides as follows:\n\n\" ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corporation shall have power-\n\n( a) to operate road transport services in the State\n\nand in any tended area;\n\n\" •.\n\nSection 20 deals with extension of the operation of the road transport service of a Corporation to areas within another State.\n\nSection 20 reads as follows :\n\n\"20. ( 1) If a Corporation considers it to be expedient in the public intereSt to extend the operation of any of its road transport servi~ to any route or area 'situated within another State, it may, with the permis-\n\nVISHWANATII llAO v. :MYSORP. (Ramaswami, J.) 203\n\nsion of the State Government, negotiate with the Government of the other State regarding the proposed extension.\n\n( 2) If the Government of the other State approves the proposed extension, the Corporation shall prepare a scheme for the purpose and forward the same to the other Government for its consent, and after such consent has been received, the Corporation may, with the previous approval of the State Government, sanction the scheme.\n\n( 3) After the scheme has been so sanctioned, it shall be competent for the Corporation to extend the operation of its road transport service to such route or area and when the operation of such service is so extended, the Corporation shalt operate the service on that roilte or in that area subject to the provisions of any Jaw in force in the other State within which such route or area is situated.\n\n\" Section 2 ( c) defines an \"extended area\" to mean \"any area or route to which the operation of any road transport service of a Corporation has been extended in the manner provided in section 20.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it was• contended; in the first place, !hat the provisions of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 were not complied with and the final scheme published by respondent No. 1 was ultra vires. We are unable to accept this argument as correct: It is not necessary to examine in this case, whether there is any inconsistency between the pro- F visions of s. 20 of the RoS!i Transport COrporations Act,.1950. and the proviso to s. 68-D 'of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is li!so not necessary to express any _opinion as to whether the requirements of s. 2o of the Road Transport, Corporations Act should be complied witli even in the case of a scheme relating to inter-\n\nState route to which the Central Government has accorded approval under the proviso to• s. 68-D of the Motor Vehiclles Act. We shall assume in favour of the appellants that the requirements of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act should also be followed in a case where the Central Government has given sanction under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.\n\nEven upon that asumption we hold that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act in the present case. It is not disputed that the concurrence of the State of Andhra Pradesh wa~ secured for the final scheme and .fue Government of the State of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nMysore had also accorded its approval to it.\n\nIn these circumstances the omission of respondent No. 1 to make the scheme in the precise manner in which s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act directs the preparation of the scheme is a mere irregularity which cannot lead to the nullification of the final scheme published on July 16, 1964.\n\nWe pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants that in the draft scheme the maximum number of vehicles and daily services was specified and not the minimum,. but in the final scheme approved under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act there was specification of the minimum number of vehicles and daily services in respect of the route in question. The approved scheme stated that the maximum number of vehicles was 18 and the minimum was 1. It was, also, stated that the maximum number of daily services was 10 and the minimum was 3. It waS maintained on behalf of the appellants that by prescribing the maximum and minimwn n11mber of vehicles and daily services and by pennitting such a great disparity between the maximum and minimum number of vehicles and daily services there was a virtual modification of the draft scheme and the procedure prescribed bys. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act should have been followed. In our opinion, there is no justification for this argument. It is true that in B. H. Aswathanarayan Singh and Ors. v.\n\nState of Mysore and Ors.('), it was pointed out by this Court that if the proportion which the minimum bears to the maximum is so great, and the gap between the two, is so wide as to make the prescription of the maximum and the minimum amount to a fraud on ss. 68-C and 68-E, the scheme will stand vitiated. But at the same time it was explained that it was not possible to Jay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum and maximum would turn into frau_d; but it is only when the gap between the minimum and maximum is so great that it amounts •to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a court to hold that the scheme is not in compliance with s. 68-C and is hit by s. 68-E.\n\nThe gap between the minimum and maximum would depend upon a number of factors, particularly on the variation in the demand for tranport at different seasons of the year. At page 97 of the Repott, Wanchoo, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as follows:\n\n\"There is no doubt that though fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips with respect to each route is pennissible under s. 68-C and would not be hit by s. 68-E, the proportion between the minimum aµd maximum should not be so great as to make the fixing of minimum and maximum a fraud on\n\n/1) [!966] t S.C.R. 87.\n\nVISHWANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Ramaswami, J.) 205\n\nss. 68-C and 68-E of the Act. It is not possible to lay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum and maximum would turn into fraud; but it is only when the gap between the minimum and maximum is so great that it amounts to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a coun to hold that the scheme is not in compliance with s. 68-C and is hit by s. 68-E. The gap between the minimum and maximum would depend upon a number of factors, particularly on the variation in the demand for transpon at different seasons of the year. Even so if the approved scheme were to fix minimum and maximum with very wide disparity between the two, it may be possible for the coun to hold after examining the facts of the case that such fixation is not in accordance with s. 68-C and is a fraud on s. 68-E.\n\nBut, with respect, it seems to us that a variation in minimum and maximum from 6 to 12 or 5 to 9 can hardly be pf such an order as to amount to fraud on the Act. The observations with respect to fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme made in Rowjee's case [(1964) 6 S.C.R.\n\n330] must therefore be treated as obiter as in that case they did not require determination. In the present case the gap is not of such a wide nature.\"\n\nIn the present case, the distance between Yadgir and Naray; urnpeUs a short distance of twenty-eight miles and the order of the Chief Minister shows that there was seasonal variation of traffic density and during marriage and other seasons it was necessary to operate extra services. There was also variation on account of auspicious and inauspicious days. The scheme had to provide for operating extra services during J athras, Car festivals and other occasions like Dasara fair at Mysore, Ulvi fair at Ulvi, Shivrarathri fair at Gokarn etc. It was felt by the Chief Minister that the scheine will have to be sufficiently flexible to enable the State Transport Undertaking to adjust its services and vehicles to cater to Shandy or weekly Bazar traffic to various places. In the context of the panicular facts of this case we are of opinion that the gap between the fixation of minimum and the maximum number of vehicles and of daily services is not so great as to amount to a fraud on s. 68-C and 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act.\n\nWe accordingly reject the argument of the appellants on this aspect of the case.\n\nLastly, it was contended that the approved scheme violated Art. 14 of the Constitiition as there was a complete exclusion of the private operators on the portion of the route located in the Mysore State while permitting those who are plying their\n\n206 SUPaEMB COURT aEPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nvehicles on the portion of the route lying in Andllra Pradesh State.\n\nWe do not consider there is any substance in this argument. It is manifest that operators plying in the State of Mysore and those plying in the State of Andhra Pradesh constitute two different classes of persons and therefore no question of discrimination can arise if there is complete exclusion of the operators within the State of Mysore and if there is relaxation with regard to those operating in the State of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nFor the reasons expressed we hold that there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed with costs-there will be one set of hearing fees for both the appeals.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nB , c", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "A. VISHWANATII RAO ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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1837, "end_char": 1850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approval of the Central Government was accorded to the scheme under the proviso to s. 6l!-D(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the final scheme was published by the Mysore Government in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2142, "end_char": 2179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2812, "end_char": 2830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Andbra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who were plying their vehicles on the portion of the route lying in the Slate of Andbra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3459, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3661, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed that .the concurrence of the Sta•c of Andhra Pradesh was secured for the final acheme and the Gowrnment of the State of Mysore bad also accorded its approval to it."}}, {"text": "5. 68.C and 68-E", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the context of the particular facts of the case the gap between\n\nthe minimum -and maximttm number of vehicles and services was not w great as to amount to a fraud on 5."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 S.C.R. 87", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. Babula Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Babula Reddy and K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5562, "end_char": 5584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Babula Reddy and K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Shyama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5629, "end_char": 5635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramaniurthi and Vi11eet Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramaniurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramaniurthi and Vi11eet Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vi11eet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramaniurthi and Vi11eet Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave from the judgment of the Mysore High-Court dated October 27, 1967 dismissing Writ Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Mysore High-Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5929, "end_char": 5946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave from the judgment of the Mysore High-Court dated October 27, 1967 dismissing Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Yadgir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1720 and 1722._of 1964;\n\nThe appellants are transport operators plying a stage carriage on the .route Yadgir to Narayanapet on the strength of permits issued by the Regional Transport A11thority, Gulbarga."}}, {"text": "Narayanapet", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6113, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1720 and 1722._of 1964;\n\nThe appellants are transport operators plying a stage carriage on the .route Yadgir to Narayanapet on the strength of permits issued by the Regional Transport A11thority, Gulbarga."}}, {"text": "Mysore State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A draft scheme was prepared by the second respondent, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, proposing to take over the Stage Carriage Services on the inter-State route Yadgir to Narayanapet to the complete exclusion of other operators."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6553, "end_char": 6558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6568, "end_char": 6586, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 21, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The draft scheme was published in the Gazette on June 21, 1962."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6935, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objections were heard by the Chief Minister of the State of Mysore under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and the draft scheme was approved with certain modifications by his order dated March 7, 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6972, "end_char": 6990, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7203, "end_char": 7221, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approved scheme was published by the Government of Mysore in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7640, "end_char": 7660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants moved the High Court of Mysore for grant of a writ under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7687, "end_char": 7695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7902, "end_char": 7907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7915, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8048, "end_char": 8053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporations Act,\n\n1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporations Act,\n\n1950"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8060, "end_char": 8065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporations Act,\n\n1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporations Act,\n\n1950"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8075, "end_char": 8099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 27, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8230, "end_char": 8246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that there was an infringement of the requirements of s. 68-C and s. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act 4 of 1939) as modified by Act\n\n100 of 1956, but the writ applications were dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated October 27, 1967."}}, {"text": "Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8252, "end_char": 8303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "February 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•• Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939) by the Amending Act 100 of 1956 with effect from February 16, 1957."}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9454, "end_char": 9465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10428, "end_char": 10438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10495, "end_char": 10506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10618, "end_char": 10629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10634, "end_char": 10645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10840, "end_char": 10871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11639, "end_char": 11648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "statute": "Road Transport Corporations Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "statute": "Road Transport Corporations Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11832, "end_char": 11842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "statute": "Road Transport Corporations Act"}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12453, "end_char": 12463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12656, "end_char": 12666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13931, "end_char": 13940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14218, "end_char": 14223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14231, "end_char": 14268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14520, "end_char": 14525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Transport COrporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14592, "end_char": 14597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14608, "end_char": 14626, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14712, "end_char": 14716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14920, "end_char": 14925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15025, "end_char": 15030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15038, "end_char": 15069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15158, "end_char": 15163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15173, "end_char": 15191, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15294, "end_char": 15299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport COrporations Act", "statute": "Transport COrporations Act"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15307, "end_char": 15338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the concurrence of the State of Andhra Pradesh wa~ secured for the final scheme and .fue Government of the State of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Government of the State of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nMysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15473, "end_char": 15546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the concurrence of the State of Andhra Pradesh wa~ secured for the final scheme and .fue Government of the State of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15692, "end_char": 15697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15705, "end_char": 15736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16097, "end_char": 16102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16112, "end_char": 16130, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16788, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17193, "end_char": 17199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17595, "end_char": 17600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17617, "end_char": 17622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17823, "end_char": 17830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 97 of the Repott, Wanchoo, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as follows:\n\n\"There is no doubt that though fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips with respect to each route is pennissible under s. 68-C and would not be hit by s. 68-E, the proportion between the minimum aµd maximum should not be so great as to make the fixing of minimum and maximum a fraud on\n\n/1) [!"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18036, "end_char": 18041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18068, "end_char": 18073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18275, "end_char": 18281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18631, "end_char": 18636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19038, "end_char": 19043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19064, "end_char": 19069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rowjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19350, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations with respect to fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme made in Rowjee's case [(1964) 6 S.C.R.\n\n330] must therefore be treated as obiter as in that case they did not require determination."}}, {"text": "(1964) 6 S.C.R.\n\n330", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Naray", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19588, "end_char": 19593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the distance between Yadgir and Naray; urnpeUs a short distance of twenty-eight miles and the order of the Chief Minister shows that there was seasonal variation of traffic density and during marriage and other seasons it was necessary to operate extra services."}}, {"text": "Ulvi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20039, "end_char": 20043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme had to provide for operating extra services during J athras, Car festivals and other occasions like Dasara fair at Mysore, Ulvi fair at Ulvi, Shivrarathri fair at Gokarn etc."}}, {"text": "Gokarn", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20066, "end_char": 20072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme had to provide for operating extra services during J athras, Car festivals and other occasions like Dasara fair at Mysore, Ulvi fair at Ulvi, Shivrarathri fair at Gokarn etc."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20521, "end_char": 20526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20545, "end_char": 20563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20707, "end_char": 20714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andllra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20987, "end_char": 21002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitiition as there was a complete exclusion of the private operators on the portion of the route located in the Mysore State while permitting those who are plying their\n\n206 SUPaEMB COURT aEPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nvehicles on the portion of the route lying in Andllra Pradesh State."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_1_7_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nDHARAM SINGH\n\nFebruary, 2, 1968\n\n(K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nG. K: MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, 11.)\n\nPunjab Educational S•rv/ce (Provinciali.red Cadre) Class Ill, Rules, 1961, r. 6(3)-Prohationer a.flainst permanent post allowed to continue after period of probation-Effect-When amounts to confirmation.\n\nThe resPondents, who were teachers in District Board Schools were taken over by the State of Punjab with effect from !st October 1957 when the Local Dodies Schools in the State were provincialised. The Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class l!l Rules were framed in 1961 but wore deemed to ha\\'e come into force on !st October 1957.\n\nUnder r. 6(1) of the Rules the respondents, who were officiating in per- \"\"\"'\"11t posts against permanent vacancies were deemed to have held their\n\nposts on probation, in the first instance, for one year from ls.t October\n\n1957. On the completion of this initial period of probation on !st October 1958, tour courses of action were open ro the appointing authority under r. 6(3), namely, (a) to extend the period of probation, provided the total period of probation, incl ud!ng extensions, would not exceed three years, or (b) to reven the employee t<f his former post if he was promoted from some lower pest. or (c) to. dispense with his services if bis work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or .(d) to conflnn him in his appointment. As the respondents were not promoted from lower posts there was no question of their reversion. No other order was however passed. but the authority continued them in their posts for three years, that is, ur.to lsit October 1960 and even thereafter; allowed them to draw nnnual increments of sa!ary including the increment which fell due on 1st October 1962; and some time in 1963, termina~ their services. The orders of termination were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opponity to make any tcpresentation.\n\nThe writ petitions filed by the respondel>!s challenging the orders were allowed by the High Court.\n\nThe High Coun held that the respondents were not temporary employees that on the expiry of three years' period of probation they must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts, that the impugned ordel'S having deprived them of their right to those posts, amounted to removal from service by way of punishment and were in violation of Art. 311 and the Punjab CiVI1 Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, HELD : The impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court. [7 El\n\nWhere on the completion of the specified period of probation an employeo is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the Service Rules, the initial period of probation is deaned to be extended by necessary ii:tplica!ion. J!ut, where, as _in the present case, the Service Rules fix a certain penOd of time beyond which the\n\nprobationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed. to CC!Dtinue in that post after the completion of the maximum periOd of probat!on ~out an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to contm.ue. tn that -post as a prohationer. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period .beyond the aximum period fixed by it. In sueb a case, it is permissible to draw the mfeNncc that the cn1ployee allowed to continue in the p<_lSt on comple.tion.of, thl! maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by 1mphcation.\n\n[5 C, G; 6 A-BJ\n\nCase law rcferrd to.\n\nNarain Singh Ahluwc.lia v. Sltlte of P1mj<1b, C.A. No. 492 of 1963 dated 29th January 1964; explained and followed.\n\nC!VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 787 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 26, 1964 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 354 of 1963 and Civil Appeal No. 1017 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dutd D January 7, 1965 oi ilie Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 162 of 1964.\n\nVikram Mahajan and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A.\n\nNo. 787 of 1966). •\n\nR. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A.\n\nNo. 1017 of E 1966).\n\nMohan Behari Lal, for the respondent (in both the appea19\n\nThe Judgment. of the Court was delivered by\n\nBachawat, J. These two connected appeals raise a common question of construction of r. 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961. .Before October 1, 1957, Dharam Singh and Dev Raj, the respondents to these appeals, were junior teachers in District Board schools. The District Board schools were provincialised, and the services of the respondents were taken over by the Punjab State with effect from October 1, 1957 in pursuance of a scheme of provincialisation of Local Bodies schools in the State. On February 13, 1961, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution framed the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class HI Rules, 1961 regulatiug the conditions of service of the teaching staff taken over by the State Government from the local authorities. Rule 1 provides that the rules will be deemed 10 have come into force with effect frnm October 1, 1957. Rule 3 created the Punjab Educa-\n\nPUNJAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bacltawat, I.) 3\n\ntional (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Service consisting of .the posts shown in Ap;; endix .A. ; It i< co1; llmon cas~ that the posts held by the respondents are mcluded m AppcndL--:: A n::! crry time scales of pay. Rule 6 is in these terms:\n\n\"6(1). Members of the Service, officiating or to be promoted against permanent posts, shall be on probation in the first instance for one year.\n\n(2) Officiating service shall be reckoned as period spent on probation, but no member who has officiated in any appointment for one year shall be entitled to be confirmed unless he is appointed against a permanent vacancy.\n\n(3) On the completion of the period of probation the authority competent to make appointment may confirn1 the member in his appointment or if his work or conduct during the period of probation has been in his opinion unsatisfactory he may dispense with his services or may extend his per!od of prob.:.!tion hy suc; h period !!~ he may deem fit or revert him to his fonner post if he was promoted from some lower post.\n\nProvided that the total period of probation including extensions, if any, shall not exceed three years.\n\n( 4) Service spent on deputation to a corresponding or higher post may be allowed to count towards the period of probation, if there is a permanent vacancy against which such member can be confirmed.\"\n\nThe respondents were officiating in permanent posts and under r. 6(3) they continued to hold those posts on probation in the first instance for one year. The maximwn period of probation fixed by the rules was three years which expired on October 1, 1960.\n\nThe respondents continued to hold their posts after October 1,\n\n1960, but formal orders confirming them in their posts were not passed. Under r. 7, the Director of Public 1nstruction, Punjab was the appointing authority. By two separate orders passed on February 10, 1963 and April 4, 1963, the Director terminated their services. The order in each case stated that the services of the respondent concerned \"are hereby terminated in accordance with the terms of his employment. The order shall take effect after one month from the date it is served on him.\" Rule 12 provides that in matters relating to discipline, punishment and appeals, members of the service shall be governed by the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The orders dated February 10 and April 4, 1963 were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opportunity •of making representations against the action\n\ntaken against them. The respondents filed separate writ petitions in the Punjab High Court challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground that they had acquired sulistantive rights to their posts, and that the orders amounted to removal from service, and were passed in violation of Art. 3 ll of the Constitution. The appeliants pleaded that the respondents were temporary employees, that their services were terminated in accordance with the terms of their employment, and that the impugned orders did not aJ!IOUnt to removal from service and were not in violation of Art. 311.\n\nLearned single Judges of the High.Court rejected the respondents' contentions. and dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nThe respondents filed separate Letters Patent appeals against these judgments. The appellate Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. The appellate Court held that the respondents were not temporary employees, that they held the posts on probation, that on the expiry of three years' period of probation they must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts, that the impugned orders having deprived them of their right to those posts amounted\n\n.to removal from service by way of punishment and were passed in ;-iolation of. Art. 311 and the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment D and Appeal) Rules, 1952. It is against these appellate orders that the present appeals have been filed after obtaining special leave.\n\nThe High Court found that the respondents were officiating in permanent posts against permanent vacancies as contemplated by r. 6 ( 1), and that on the coming into force of the rules, they must be deemed to have held their posts under r. 6 ( 1) on probation in the first instance for one year from October 1, 1957. The correctness of these fiodings is not disputed by the appellants.\n\nThe High Court also held that in the circumstances of these cases, on the completion of three years' period of probation on October\n\nl, 1960, the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their appointments. The appellants attack this finding. They submit that in the absence of formal orders of confirmation tlJl respondents must be deemed to have continued in their posts as probatipners. In the alternative, they submit that on completion of three years' period of probation, the respondents must be deemed to have been discharged from service and re-employed as temporary employees. We are unable to accept these contentions.\n\nThis Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the em, eloyee is allowed to con!inue in the post after the expiry of the penod without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the servlce rules. In such a case,\n\nPUN.TAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bachawat, I.) 5\n\nan express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post, and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed. . Th.is view was taken in Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab('), G. S. Ramaswamy v.\n\nThe Inspector-General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore('), The Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior v. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar('), D. A. Lyall v. The Chief Conservator of Forests, U.P. and others(') and State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali(').\n\nThe reason for this conclusion is that where on the completion of the specified period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take in the absence of anything fo the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules, is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implication. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an {ndefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period.\n\nThe same view was taken in Narain Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab and another(').\n\nIt was suggested before us that the service rules in that case provided for a maximum period of pro: bation of two years beyond which the probationary period could not be extended. The judgment in that case does not refer to such a rule, nor does it appear from the judgment that before the appellant was reverted to his substantive post, the maximum period of probation in the post to which he had been promoted had expired. A reference to the paper book in that case shows that in November, 1957 the appellant was promoted as a superintendent and on June 26, 1959 before the expiry of the maximum period of probation he was reverted to his substantive post.\n\nHe thus continued to hold the post of superintendent as a probationer when the. order of reversion was passed.\n\nIn the present case, r. 6(3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be ex'.ended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after , completion of the mximum period of probation without an express order of confirmatmn, he cannot be deemed to\n\n(1) [1963) (I) S.C.R. 416, 424-426\n\n(2) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 278, 288-289\n\n(3) C.A. No. 548 of 1962 decided on Janua,.y 23, 1964.\n\n(4) C.A. No. 259 or 1963 decided OD l'ebruary 24, 1965.\n\n(5} (1966] 3 S.C.R. 821, 825-826. !6) C.A. No. 492 of 1963 decided on Janua,.y 29, 1964.\n\ncontinue in thal post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negativ~ by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum od fix.ed by it. In such a case,___it is permissible to dra~ the inference that the employee allowed fo continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been c, 1firmed in the post by implication.\n\nThe employees referred to in r. 6( 1) held tb.eir posts in the first instance on probation for one year commencing from October 1.\n\n1957. On completion of the one year period of probation of the employee, four courses of action were open to the appointing authority under r. 6(3). Tb.e authority could either (a) extend the period of probation prf?vided the total period of probation including extensions would not exceed three years, or (b) revert the employee to .his former post if he was promotec; I from some lower post, or ( c) dispense with his services if his work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or (d) confirm him in his appointment. It could pass one of these orders in respect of the respondents on completion of their one year period of probation. But the authority allowed them to continue in their posts thereafter without passing any order in writing under r .. 6(3). In the absence of any formal order, the question is whether by necessary implication from the proved facts of these cases, the authority should be presumed to have passed some order under r. 6 (3) in respect of the respondent,, aad if so, what order hould be presumed to have been passed.\n\nThe respondents were not promoted from lower posts and there was no question of their reversion to such posts at any time under r. 6(3).\n\nThe initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October !, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation. the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October l, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to r. 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso tor. 6'(3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960. or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers.\n\nImmediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on com-\n\nPUN.JAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bachawat. J.)\n\nA pletion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass all)'. test or to fulfil any other condition before con• firmation.\n\nThere was I!_O compelling .reason for dispensing with 6 their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they wer_e so discarged fr?m service . and reemployed. In these circumstances, tJ.ie High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal c orders of confirmation in writing, it. should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue . in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under r. 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows , that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to D hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming .to the constitutional requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitutiol). As the E procedure laid down Jn the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Art. 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court.\n\nIn the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DHARAM SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHARAM SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February, 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nDHARAM SINGH\n\nFebruary, 2, 1968\n\n(K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT,\n\nG. K: MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, 11.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K: MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1st October 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but the authority continued them in their posts for three years, that is, ur.to lsit October 1960 and even thereafter; allowed them to draw nnnual increments of sa!ary including the increment which fell due on 1st October 1962; and some time in 1963, termina~ their services."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vikram Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Mahajan and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Mahajan and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondent (in both the appea19\n\nThe Judgment."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4547, "end_char": 4555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court was delivered by\n\nBachawat, J. These two connected appeals raise a common question of construction of r. 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961."}}, {"text": "Class III Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Before October 1, 1957, Dharam Singh and Dev Raj, the respondents to these appeals, were junior teachers in District Board schools.", "canonical_name": "DHARAM SINGH"}}, {"text": "Dev Raj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4758, "end_char": 4765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Before October 1, 1957, Dharam Singh and Dev Raj, the respondents to these appeals, were junior teachers in District Board schools."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4986, "end_char": 5001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Board schools were provincialised, and the services of the respondents were taken over by the Punjab State with effect from October 1, 1957 in pursuance of a scheme of provincialisation of Local Bodies schools in the State."}}, {"text": "February 13, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5089, "end_char": 5106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 13, 1961, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5124, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 13, 1961, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Class III Rules, 1961", "statute": "Class III Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Class HI Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "tional (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Service", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 3 created the Punjab Educa-\n\nPUNJAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bacltawat, I.) 3\n\ntional (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Service consisting of .the posts shown in Ap;; endix .A. ; It i< co1; llmon cas~ that the posts held by the respondents are mcluded m AppcndL--:: A n::!"}}, {"text": "October 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The maximwn period of probation fixed by the rules was three years which expired on October 1, 1960."}}, {"text": "October 1,\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7246, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents continued to hold their posts after October 1,\n\n1960, but formal orders confirming them in their posts were not passed."}}, {"text": "February 10, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By two separate orders passed on February 10, 1963 and April 4, 1963, the Director terminated their services."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7470, "end_char": 7483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By two separate orders passed on February 10, 1963 and April 4, 1963, the Director terminated their services."}}, {"text": "February 10 and April 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7957, "end_char": 7986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orders dated February 10 and April 4, 1963 were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opportunity •of making representations against the action\n\ntaken against them."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents filed separate writ petitions in the Punjab High Court challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground that they had acquired sulistantive rights to their posts, and that the orders amounted to removal from service, and were passed in violation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8707, "end_char": 8715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9381, "end_char": 9389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October\n\nl, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10078, "end_char": 10094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court also held that in the circumstances of these cases, on the completion of three years' period of probation on October\n\nl, 1960, the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their appointments."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12987, "end_char": 13000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference to the paper book in that case shows that in November, 1957 the appellant was promoted as a superintendent and on June 26, 1959 before the expiry of the maximum period of probation he was reverted to his substantive post."}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R. 278", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13693, "end_char": 13712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1966] 3 S.C.R. 821", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13840, "end_char": 13859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 1.\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14462, "end_char": 14478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The employees referred to in r. 6( 1) held tb.eir posts in the first instance on probation for one year commencing from October 1."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16889, "end_char": 16904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.)\n\nA pletion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18235, "end_char": 18243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18417, "end_char": 18425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_207_213_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "AMBALAL PURSHOTIAM ETC.\n\n11.\n\nAHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.\n\nFebruary 19, 1968\n\nB [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MlTTEll, JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition Act--Slruclures made after s. 4 notice, on urtderta/...- ing b, v owners not to claim conipensation-TenGnts, if can choUengc- Acquisition for Municipality, if any restrictions.\n\nBombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (Born. Act 18 of 1925) ss. 52, 114--Powers of Municipality to acquire-Whet/1er attentpt to purchase by private treaty prerequisite.\n\nFor widening a street, the respondent-municipality requested the State Government to acquire the lands within the \"line of the street\" prescribed by the Municipality.· After the State Government issued notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the owners of the lands put up temporary structures upon the lands with the pormission of'the Municipality on giving an undertaking that they would not claim compensation for those structures in the land acquisition proceedings. The structures were let out t.o the appellants. Notifications were issued under s. 6 and compensation payable de!ermiued.\n\nWhen attempts were made to take possession of the land acquired, the tenants-appellants, moved writ petitions in the High Court The High Court rejected the petitions. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,\n\nHELD : By the compulsory acquisition for a public purpose, subject to payment of compensation, no fundameutat rights guaranteed under Arts~ 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution were infringed. The lands were properly notified for acquisition. The compensation payable in respect of the lands was determi~. If there was any grievance which the appellants were entitled to raise in respect of the compensation determined as payable, their remedy lay in approaching the Courts competent to determine that question~\n\n[210 D-E]\n\nFor the purpose of widening the street, th~ Municipality had the pawcr under s. 114 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 to purchase land, and under s. 52 of the Act the Municipality could request the local Government to take action for compulsory acquisition of the land and for\n\nvesting the same in the Municipality.\n\nThe power of the appropriate Government under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to notify land needed or likely to he needed for a public purpose is not subject to the restriction that when the public purpose is of a municipality the municipality h'\"' attempted to purchase the land by private treaty and has failed in thot attempt. [211 G, 212 B.C]\n\nThe appellants as lessees of the structures had no right in the land on. which the structures stood. The structures belonged to the owners of the land, and were allowed to be put up after the date of the notification ur.der s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on the undertaking that no compensation shall be claimed in resP\"..ct of the structures. The appellats were not on the lands al the date of the notification under s. 4, and bemg tenants of the structures they acquired, prima facie, no intemit in\n\nthe lands. Even assunung that they had acquired, by virtue of their respective tenancies, an interest in the lands, their remedy was to approachi\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968]3 5.C.R.\n\nthe Land Acquisiti'on Authorities for claiming apportionment of compen sation. [212 G, HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1369 to 1407 and 1564 to 1578 of 1967.\n\nAppeals by Certificates/Special leave from the judgment and order dated February 1966 of the Gujarat High Court, in Special Civil Application Nos. 912, 916, 918, 920, 922, 923, 925, 929,\n\n930, 931, 938 and 941 of 1964, and 917, 926, 927, 928, 932. 933, 934, 921, 935, 942, 924, 939 and 940 of 1964 respective!)-.\n\nVlthalbhai Patel and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 1396 to 1407 of 1967).\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and /, N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 1564 to 1578 of 1967).\n\n R. H. Dhebar, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayyar, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 , in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, 1. On June 6, 1941, the Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad prescribed a \"line of the street\" along an important thoroughfare in the town of Ahmedabad and resqlved that steps be taken for compulsory acquisition of lands falling \"within the line.\" On June 9, 1941 a notification was issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. that the lands set out .in the Schedule \"were likely to be needed for the public purpose set out in column 6 of the Schedule thereto, viz., for road widening\", and that \"any contracts for the disposal of any of the said lands by sale, lease, mortgage, assignment, exchange or otherwise, or any outlay or improvements made therein without the sanction of the Collector, . • . . . after the date of this notification will, under section 24 ( seventhly) of the said Act, be disregarded by the officer assessing compensation for such parts of-the said lands as may be finally acquired.\" The Government of Bombay issued a notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act sometime in 1943, and als() appointed the Special Land Acquisition Officer to take order for acquisition of the lands.\n\nAfter the publication of the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, structures on the lands notified were burnt down H by rioters. The owners of the lands put up temporary structures upOn the. lands with the permission of the Municipal Borough ¢Ying an undertaking that they will not claim compensation for\n\nAMBi; LAL v. MUNICIPAL .. COOPERAT!ON (S/tah, /.) 209\n\nA these structures in the land acquis\"ion prorudings. The struc\n\ntures were let out to different tenants.\n\nProceedings for assessment of compensation were not immediately taken in hand, but negotiations were started by the Municipal Borough with the owners of the lands, and between the years 1944 and 1952 some lands were purchased by the Municipal Borough by private treaty and the lands so purchased were withdrawn from the notification for acquisition. Finding that it was not possible to persuade the other owners to sell their lands, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was moved to make his\n\naward.• The Special Land Acquisition Officer made a common award on August 13, 1960. When the Special Land Acquisition Officer attempted to take possession of the lands acquired, the tenants of the structures moved petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat for writs quashing or setting aside the notifications under S$. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the awards and the notices issued for obtaining possession from the petitioners.\n\nThe High Court rejected the petitions. Against the orders rejecting the petitions, these appeals have been filed with special leave.\n\nIn these appeals counsel for the appellants contended that- ( 1) the notification issued by the Government of Bombay, the E award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and the proceedings subsequent to the award were invalid as infringing Arts. 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution in that the appellants were deprived of their right to property otherwise than in accordance with law; (2) that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to acquire the lands under the ; Land Acquisition F Act being absent, alt the proceedings including the notillcation under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were invalid; (3) that the rights of the appellants in the structures occupied by them as tenants were not affected by the award as no notices were served upon them by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under s. 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, and they could not be deprived of G their right in the structures; and ( 4) that the notifications under ss. 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were without jurisdiction because there was \"no possible need\" of the lands by the Municipal Corporation, and the proceedings were commenced not fore\n\nthe purpose for which they may under the law be commenced. but for a collateral purpose, viz., to acquire the !and in future -H at rates pegged down to the date on wich the notification under s. i was issued.\n\n. In o~ judgment mere is no substance in any of the contenuons ra1Sed. lit may be recalled that the appellants in these\n\n210 SUPJU!MB COUR.T llBPOl.TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R,\n\nappeals are not the owners of the lands acquired : they are tenants in occupation of structures pennitted to be constructed upon the lands after the date of the notification under s. 4 of the La.'ld Acquisition Act, on condition that the owners of the lands will not claim compensation for those structures. If the land owners\n\nare not entitled to claim compensation for the structures, evidently the persons who occupy tliose structures and who have come to B occupy the same after the notification, have, no interest in the lands or the compensation and they cannot bold up the acquisition proceedings by preventing the Special Land Acquisition Officer from taking over possession of the lands.\n\nThe Land Acquisition Act authorises the appropriate Government to notify land for acquisition which is or is likely to be needed for a public purpose : and road widening in a town is undoubtedly a public purpose.\n\nAfter considering the report of the Collector under s. s:A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government of Bbmbay published a notification under ~. 6( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act that the lands were needed for a public purpose. That declaration was, by virtue of s. 6(3) of the Act, conclusive evidence that the lands were needed for a public purpose.\n\nBy the compulsory acquisition for a public purpose, subject to payment of compensation, no fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 & 31(2) of the Constitution were infringed.\n\nThe lands were properly notified for acquisition.\n\nThe compensation payable in respect of the lands .has been determined. If there is any grievance which the appellants are entitled to raise E in respect of the compensation determined as payable, their remedy lies in approaching the courts competent to determine that question. The plea of infringement of fundaµiental rights of the appellants is wholly unsubstantial and was rightly not raised before the High Court in the writ petitions out of which these appeals arise.\n\nIn considering the second contention that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to acquire lands have not been fulfilled, it is necessary (irst to refer to certain provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 18 of 1925.\n\nS. 52 \"When there is any hindrance to the perma- G nent or temporary acquisition by a municipality! upon payment of any land or building required for the pur .. poses of this Act, the Provincial Government may, after obtaining possession of the same for itself under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or other existing law, vest such land or building in the municipality on its H paying the compensation awarded, and on its repaying to the Provincial Government all costs incurred by the Provincial Government on account of the acquisition.\"\n\nSection 63 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act by the first sub-section authorises the Municipal Borough to acquire and. hold property both movaltle and immovable, whether within or without its limits.\n\nSection 118 authorises the Chief Officer of the municipality, subject to the approval of the municipality, to prescribe a line. on each side of every public street within the: municipal borough and from time to time to prescribe a fresh line in substitution of any line so prescribed or for any part thereof.\n\nBy cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 118, except under the provisions. of s. 143 no person shall construct or reconstruct any portion. of any building within the regular line of the public street without the permission of the Chief Officer under s. 123. Clause (b) of sub-s .. ( 3) of s. 118 provides that when the Chief Officer refuses permission to construct or reconstruct any building in any area within the regular line of the public street, such area shall with the approval of the municipality be added to the street and shall'\n\nthenceforth be deemed part of the public street and shall be vested in the municipality.\n\nClause (c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 118' provides that the amount of compensation shall be determined in- D the manner provided by s. 198 which shall be paid by the muni-- cipality to the owner of any land added to a street under cl. (b) of sub-s. ( 3). Section 114 ( 1) of the Act provides that it shall' be lawful for a municipality to Jay out and make new pubJic streets to construct tunnels and other works subsidiary to publicstreets; to widen, open, enlarge or otherwise improve, and to tum. divert, discontinue or stop up any public street. '\n\nOn a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, had the power to acquire land needed for municipal purposes including widening, opening, enlarging or otherwise improving any public street or municipal road. The municipality laid down a line of the street : after the line of the street was laid down, it was open to the municipality to decline permission to construct or reconstruct any building on the land and the lands were to be deemed added to the street. But the municipality did permit construction on the lands. The provisions of cl. (b) of s. 118(3) were therefore not a_ttracted. For the purpose of widen-ing the street, the municipality had the power under s. 114 to purchase the land, and under s. 52 the municipality could request the local Government to take action for compulsory acquisition of the land and for vesting the same in the municipality.\n\nCounsel for the appellants urged that the power confe.ued upon the municipality could only be exercised when there was any ''hindrance to the permanent or temporary acquisition\" by the municipality of any land required\n\nfr the purposes of the Act, and since there is no proof of such\n\nh1drance, all the proceedings for acquisition must be deemed void. In our judgment, the argument is misconceived.\n\nSection\n\n212 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n52 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, authorises the municipality to purchase property required for th~ purpose of the Act by private treaty or to approach the Government for compulsory acquisition of the land for a v.ublic purpose.\n\nSection 52 merely sets out alternative modes of acquiring property : it does not provide that before a Municipal Borough may move the Government to acquire land under the Land Acquisi. ti on Act, the Borough should have made attempts , to purchase .the land by private treaty and have failed in that attempt.\n\nIn .any case, the power of the appropriate Government under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to notify land needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose is not subject to the restriction that when the public purpose is of the municipality, the municipality has attempted to purchase the land by private treaty and has fa.iled in that attempt. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that whenever the land is needed for a public purpose or is likely to be needed for a public purpose, the Government may resort to the machinery provided under the Act for acquiring the land. Where the public purpose is the purpose of a local authority and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are put in force for acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority, s. 50 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from.such fund. There is no other bar statutory or otherwise to the acquisition of the land for purposes of a municil'ality. In issuing the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate Government is therefore not prevented, merely because the municipality has not attempted to acquire the land by private treaty. There wa.s, therefore, no condition precedent to the acquisition of the land before a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued which was not romplied with.\n\nThe contention that the proceeding for making of his award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was invalid has also no substance.\n\nThe appellants as lessees of the structures had no right in the land on which the structures stood. The structures 'belonged to the owners of the land, and were allowed to be put up after the date of the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acqui- sition Act was issued, on the undertaking that no compensation shall be claimed in respect of the structures. The appellants were not on the lands at the date of the notifica!ion under s. 4, and being tenants of the structures they acquired, prima facie, no 'interest in the lands. Even assuming that they had acquired, by virtue of their respective tenancies, any interest in the lands, their remedy was to approach the Land Acquisition authorities for -claiming apportionment of compensation. It may be pointed .out\n\nthat this contention was not raised beforethe High Court and has been raised for the first time in this Court.\n\nThe last argument raised by counsel for the appellants is, in our judgment futile. The notification issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was by operation of sub-s. ( 3) conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose. No inquiry was thereafter permissible that the land was not needed for a public purpose. It is true that no stegs were immediately taken by the Land Acquisition Officer authorities to make awards of compensation and to take possession of the lands. But the reason apparently was that tlie municipality was still trying to purchase the land by private treaty and when it was found that it could not purchase the lands, the Land Acquisition Officer was requested to expedite the determination of compensation.\n\nWe are unable to bold that there is any evidence that the Government of Bombay issued the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, not for the bona fide purpose of acquisition, but with the object of pegging down prices so that the lands may when needed be obtained at those rates in future.\n\nThe land was within the line of the street and could not without the sanction of the municipality be put to any profitable use. If either the land owners or the tenants were aggrieved by the delay. it was open to them to claim writs or orders compelling the State Government to complete the assessment and payment of compensation.\n\nWe are not hereby to be understood as suggesting that after issue of the notifications under ss. 4 & 6 the appropriate Government would be justified in allowing the matters to drift and to take in hand the proceeding for assessment of compensation whenever they think it proper to do. It is intended by the scheme of the Act that the notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any unreasonable delay.\n\nBut on the facts of the present case, it does not appear that there was any scope for holding that with a view to prevent the land owners or the persons claiming derivative title from them from getting the benefit of the rise in prices, notifications under ss. 4 and 6 were.issued without any intention to take steps for acquisition of the lands.\n\nThe appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearina fee in all the appeals. Separate costs will be paid by the appellant~ to the Corporation and to the State Government.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals dismissed_", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "AMBALAL PURSHOTIAM ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMBALAL PURSHOTTAM ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 19, 1968\n\nB [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MlTTEll, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 337, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 52, 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 727, "end_char": 731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1928, "end_char": 1962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1991, "end_char": 1996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2208, "end_char": 2212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2736, "end_char": 2740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2943, "end_char": 2947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "212 G, HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Vlthalbhai Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3706, "end_char": 3722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vlthalbhai Patel and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vlthalbhai Patel and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3857, "end_char": 3877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and /, N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and /, N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayyar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3971, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayyar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 4002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayyar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 6, 1941, the Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad prescribed a \"line of the street\" along an important thoroughfare in the town of Ahmedabad and resqlved that steps be taken for compulsory acquisition of lands falling \"within the line.\""}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4243, "end_char": 4252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 6, 1941, the Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad prescribed a \"line of the street\" along an important thoroughfare in the town of Ahmedabad and resqlved that steps be taken for compulsory acquisition of lands falling \"within the line.\""}}, {"text": "June 9, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 9, 1941 a notification was issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 9, 1941 a notification was issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4425, "end_char": 4429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4437, "end_char": 4463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4892, "end_char": 4902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5101, "end_char": 5105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6299, "end_char": 6314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finding that it was not possible to persuade the other owners to sell their lands, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was moved to make his\n\naward.• The Special Land Acquisition Officer made a common award on August 13, 1960."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6498, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat for writs quashing or setting aside the notifications under S$. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the awards and the notices issued for obtaining possession from the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition F Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition F Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition F Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7660, "end_char": 7667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition F Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition F Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 4 & 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7802, "end_char": 7811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition F Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition F Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8550, "end_char": 8554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bbmbay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9374, "end_char": 9394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After considering the report of the Collector under s. s:A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government of Bbmbay published a notification under ~. 6( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act that the lands were needed for a public purpose."}}, {"text": "s. 6(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9547, "end_char": 9554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 & 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10855, "end_char": 10881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11125, "end_char": 11135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11329, "end_char": 11340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11707, "end_char": 11713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11879, "end_char": 11885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11918, "end_char": 11924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12287, "end_char": 12293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12385, "end_char": 12391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12508, "end_char": 12519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 118(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13418, "end_char": 13427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13537, "end_char": 13543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13576, "end_char": 13581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14135, "end_char": 14147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14173, "end_char": 14192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14200, "end_char": 14235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14433, "end_char": 14443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14803, "end_char": 14807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15538, "end_char": 15543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15813, "end_char": 15817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16096, "end_char": 16100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16528, "end_char": 16532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16737, "end_char": 16741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17324, "end_char": 17328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18074, "end_char": 18078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 & 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18955, "end_char": 18959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19345, "end_char": 19356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_214_223_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 20, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER., JJ;] B\n\nMcdhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahal<.\n\nAlienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Act 1 of 1951)-Right to collect /-st produce-Whether a pr_oprietar, v righ~Whtther vests in State under pro-- •visions of Act.\n\nComtitUlion of India, Art. 299-Contract not complying with Article whether valid.\n\nIndian Contract Act (9 of 1872), s. 10-Applicability of-Conditions 'lUr/der which restitution should be made.\n\nBefore the coming into force on April 1, 1951 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,\n\n1950 (Act 1 of 1951), the appellant had purchased from certain proprieton D .of land the right to collect forest produce from the said land dunna the years !951, 1952 and 1953. The right was to be enjoyed after April l, 1951 on which date under the aforesaid Act, the propnetary rights cam< . lo vest in the State of Madhya Prad .. h. The Deputy Commissioner achng\n\nunder s. 7 of the Act prevented the appellant from enjoying the rights he had acquired from the proprietors, and in April 1951 auctioned the right to\n\ncollect forest produce from the land. 11te appellant deposited Rs. 10, UOO to acquire the right of collecting lac from the said land during 1951, 1952 E and 1953. He collected some lac but thereafter filed a suit clatmtcg refund of the deposit of Rs. 10,000 on the basis that there was no valid .contract between him and the State of Madhya Pradesh as the provistoo&\n\nof Art. 299 of the Constitution were not complied with and the contract was void. The trial court granted him a dec'ree but the High Court dtci <led against him. With certificate the appellant came to this Court.\n\nHELD : (i) .The right to collect fOrest produce was a proprietary ri)!ht F and vested in the State Government by the operation of s. 4(1)(a) of the Abclition Act. The contrary view taken in Chhotabhai J.ihabhai Patti & .\n\nCo.'s case, was expressly overruled by this Court in State of Madhya 'Pradesh v. Yakinuddin.\n\nThe present case was directly coveted by the latler case. [219 G-220 CJ\n\nStall! of Madhya Pradesh v. Yakinuddin [1963) 3 S.C.R. 13, relied on.\n\nChhotcbhai lethabhai Patel & Co. v. State of Madh.va Pradesh, [1953) s.C.R. 476 and Mahadco v. State of Bombay, [19591 2 Supp. S.C.R. 339, :referred to.\n\n(ii) The provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution like the l'rovisi\"'1S of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 have not\n\nbeen enacted for the sake of mere form but they have been enacted fo• saieguarding the Government against unauthorised contracts. The formalities which arc embodied therein on grounds of public policy cannot be\n\nwaived or dispensed with. The appellant was right in his contention hat the contract cn~'red into by him was void because Art. 299 bad not been .complied with. [221 E-Fl\n\nSeth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Urrion of India, [1962) 2 S.C.R. 880. and State of West Bengal v. Mis. B. K. Monda/&: Sons, [1962) 1 Supp, S.<;.R. 876, relied on.\n\n(iii) However the refund of Rs. 10,000 claimed by the appellant could not be allowed as he did not satisfy the conditions of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act. 1be person who seeks restitution has a duty to account to the def<mdant for what he has received in the transaction from which his right to restitution arises.· The appellant had not produced sufficient evidence to show to what extent he worked the contract and wnat was the profit made by him in the year 1951 and the succeeding y<.arS. In the absence of reliable evidence on this point the appellant was not entitled to restitution or refund of the deposit he bad made.\n\n[223 A-CJ\n\nFibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1943) A.C. 32 and Nelson v. N'7ho/t [1948] 1 K.B. 330 applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 393 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated March 21, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Coun in First Appeal No. 34 of 1958.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the cOun was delivered by Rammwami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on E behalf of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated March 21, 1961 in First Appeals Nos. 34 and 64 of 1958.\n\nThe appellant had purchased a right to pll!ck, collect and remove the forest produce Jike Jae, tendu leaves etc. from the proprietors of the different Malguzari jungles for the years 1951 1952 and 1953 as detailed in Sch. A attached to the plaint. This right he had acquired before the proprietary rights in those forests came to vest in the State of Madhya Pradesh under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Act No. 1 of 1951}, hereinafter called the 'Abolition Act', and the rit was to be enjoyed by the appellant after April l, 1951 on which date the proprietary rights came to vest in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was alleged by the appellant that the Deputy Commissioner of Balaghat acting under s. 7 of the Abolition Act took charge of the entire Malguzari jungles on April 1, 1951 and prevented the appellant from enjoying the rights he had already acquired. In the month of April. 1951 the Deputy Commissioner auctioned the forest produce of villages covered under the purchases of the appellant.\n\nOut of the forest produce only the tendu leaves crop for the year 1951 was allowed to be enjoyed by the appellant on his depositing a sum of Rs. 3,000 in the Government Treasury, Balaghat under\n\n216 SUPl.U!Ml! COURT REPORTS f1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\na written permit dated April 30, 1951.\n\nThe deposit was made by the appellant to save the tendu leaves crop of 1951 from being sold to others by the Deputy Commissioner of Balaghat.\n\nThe case of the appellant was that he was entitled to the refund of the amount as therigh\"t to collect tendu leaves for the year 1951 had already .been purchased by him.\n\nSimilarly, the appellant claimed refund of the amount of Rs. 10,000 which he was required to deposit towards the right to collect lac from those\n\nforest~ for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953. The refilnd was claimed on the basis that there was no valid contract between the appellant and the State of Madhya Pradesh as the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution were not complied with and the contract was void.\n\nThe respondent contested the suit mainly on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner, Balaghat had validly taken charge of the Malguzari jungles under the provisions of the Abolition Act and the appellant having removed lac fron1 the jungles on the basis of the contract, was not entitled to any refund.\n\nThe trial Judge held that the appellant was not entitled to claim the refund of the sum of Rs. 10,00,0, firstly, on the ground that the contract was good even though not in conformity with Art. 299 of the Constitution; and secondly, because the appellant was allowed to enjoy the right of collecting lac and theappellant actually availed himself of that right. As regards the appellant's claim for damages for breach of contract, the trial court was of the view that the contracts were mere licences and enforeable against the State of Madhya Pradesh even after vesting of the proprietary interests under the Abolition Act. Acting in accordance with the view expressed by this Court in Chhotabhai Jet/ta bhai Patel & Co., v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') the trial court held that the appellant was entitled to enforce the contracts against the State of Madhya Pradesh and was consequently entitled to damages for breach of the contracts.\n\nThe trial court accordingly gave a decree in favour of the appellant to the extent of Rs. 57,281 and dismissed the rest of the claim of the appellant.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh took tlle matter in appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe appe!Jant also preferred an appeal to the High Court with regard to the claim which was disallowed by the trial court. By its judgment dated March 21, 1961, the High Court allowed the first appeal of the respondent and set aside the decree of the District Judge in Civil Suit No. 24-B of 1954 and dismissed the entire suit. The appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed. 'Ilte High Court took the. view that the decision of this Court in CTthotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') was overruled in a later decision of this Court in Mahadeo v. The State of Bombay(2),. and in contracts similar to those of the present case it\n\n(I) (1953] S.C.R. 476.\n\n(2) [1959] 2 Supp; S.C.R. 339.\n\nMULAMCHAND v. M. P. STATE (Rama; wami, J.) 217\n\nwas held that there was a transfer of proprietary rights in the estates to the grantees and the effect of the Abolition Act was that all such proprietary rights vested in the State with effect from April 1, 1951 free from all encumbrances and the State could therefore lawfully exclude the grantees from enjoying any such rights secured to them under the contracts.\n\nSection 3 of the Abolition Act states :\n\n\"3. Vesting of proprietary rights in the State.-( 1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as the case may be, in the area specified in the notification, vesting in a proprietor of such estate, mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor or such other person to and. vest in the State for the purposes of the State free of all encumbrances.\n\n(2) After the issue of a notification under subsection ( 1), no right shall be acquired .in or. over the land to which the said notification relates, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the State .and no fresh clearing for cultivation or for any other prpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf.\n\n\" .................. ' ....................... .\n\nSection 4 (1 )(a) provides :\n\n\"4. Consequences of the vesting.-\n\n( 1) When the notification under sec. 3 in respect of any area has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter , setfcirth shall, from the be&inning of the date specified in such notification (heremafter referred to as the date of vesting) ensue, namely :-\n\n(a)· all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary riht through the proprietor in such area including\n\n218 SUPllMB COUll.T lll!PORTS [196SJ 3 s.c.R.\n\nland (cultivable or barren), grass land, serub jungle, forest, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, 'ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, village sites, hats, bazars and melas; and in all subsoil, including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State for purposes of the State free of all encumbrances; and the mortgage debt or charge on any proprietary right shall be a charge on the amount of compensation payable for such proprietary right to the proprietor under the provisions of this Act;\" ·\n\nSection 5 is to the fol!owing effect :\n\n\"5. Certain properties to continue in possession of proprietor or other person.-Subject to the provisions in Secs. 47 and 63-\n\n(u) all open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes and in continuous possessions for twelve years immediately before 1948-49; all open house-sites purchased for consideration; .aJl buildingi; places of worship; wells situated in and tres standing on lands included in such enclosures or house-sites or land appertaining ta such buildings or places of ownership; within the limits of a village-site belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by such proprietor or other person, as the case may be; and the land thereof with the areas appurtenant thereto shaJ1 be settled :with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as it may determine;\n\n( b) all private weUs and buildings on oceuplcd land belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by such proprietor or other pers'on;\n\n( c) all trees standing on land comprised in a homcfarm or homestead and belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by such proprietor or other person;\n\n( d) all trees standing on occupied land other than fand comprised in home-farm or homestead and belongill.g to or held by a person other than the outgoing proprietor shall continue to belong to or be held by such r.erson; ·\n\n( e) all tanks situate on occupied land and belonging to or held hy the outgoing proprietor or any other\n\nperson shall continue to belong to or be neld by such proprietor or other person; ( f) all tanks, belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor which are situate on land other than village site or occupied land and in which no person other than such proprietor has any rights of irrigation, shall belong to or be held by .such proprietor;\n\n(g) all tanks and embankments (bandhans) belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person which are situate on land other than village site or occupied land and the beds of which are under cultivation of such proprietor or such other person .. shall belong io or be held by such proprietor or such other person and the land under such tanks and embankments shall be settled with such prorietor or such other person on such terms and conditions as the State Government may determine;\n\n(h) all groves wherever situate and recorded in village papers in the name of the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by .such proprietor or such other person and the land under such groves shall be settled with such proprietor or such other person by the. State Government on such terms and conditions as it may determine.\"\n\nSection 6(1) states:\n\n\"6, Certain transfers to be void.-( 1) Except as provided in sub-section (2), the transfer of any right in the property which is liable to ves.t in the. State under this Act made by the iiroprietor at imy time after the 16th March, 1950 shall, as from the date of vesting, be void.\"\n\nIt was contended, in the first place, on behalf of the appellant that the contracts did not confer settlement of any interest in immoval1le property and as such the appellant could not be equated with a person having interest in the proprietary right falling within G the purview of the Abolition Act It is not possible for us to accept.this argument The' question has already been the subjectmatter ofconsideration by this Court in State of Madhya Pradeshv. Yakinuddin (1). In that case also, the respondents. by grants from and agreements with the proprietors, acquired the rit tri propaAAte lac, collect tendu leaves and gather fruits and !lowers H of Mahua leaves in certain estates; It was held by this Court that whatever rights the respondents had acquired from the proprietors ceased to have effect by the operation of s. 4 (1 )(a) of the Aboli-\n\n(ll (1963] 3 S.C.R. 13.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntion Act. It was further held that the rights claimed by the respondents were in the nature of proprietary rights falling within s. 4(1) (a) of the AboHtion Act and upon the issue of a notification under s. 3 of the Abolition Act the rights of the respondents had passed and became vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nIt was further pointed out that the rights created by the transactions between the respondents and the grantors did not come under s. 5 of the Abolition Act.\n\nIn the course of this judgment the previous judgment of this Court in Chlwtab/iai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1 ) was expressly overruled.\n\nIn our opinion the present case falls directly within the ratio of the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yaki11-\n\n11ddin('). It follows that the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case must be rejected.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next question raised on behalf of the appellant, viz., whether he was entitled to a refund of the deposit of Rs. 10,000 which he had made towards the right to collect lac from the forests for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953. The contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is that the contracts were not in confonnity with Art. 299 of the Constitution and were consequently void and had no effect.\n\nIt was claimed that the appellant was entitled to compensation under s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act which is applicable to the case. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondent that there was no formal compliance of the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution but it was said that the bids were accepted by the Deputy Commissioner Balaghat and were communicated to the appellant who worked the contracts and actually collected lac in the forests in question.\n\nThe trial court refused to grant a decree to the appellant in this case with regard to this claim on the ground that the contract was not void and although there was no conformity with the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution there was nothing to prevent the ratification of such contracts if they are for the benefit of the Government.\n\nThe trial court further observed that the appellant had performed his part of the contract and worked and collected lac from the jungles in pursuance of the agreement and was therefore not entitled to refund of the amount in deposit. The Jin ding of the trial court on this point has been affirmed by the High Court which also came to the conclusion that the appellant had worked for some time on the basis of the contracts granted to him but tho appellant abandoned the contracts of his. own accord and the State cannot therefore be held liable for, the refund of the amount of deposit. In our opinion, the reasoning adopted by the trial court and by the Hih Court for rejecting the claim of the appellant is not\n\nc?rret_. _!!now well-established that where a contract between\n\n(11 (1953J S.C.R. 476.\n\n(2) [1963J 3 s.c.R. tJ,\n\nthe Dominion of India and a private individual is not in the form required bys. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, it was void and could not be enforced and therefore the Dominion of India cannot be sued by a private individual for breach of such a contract (See the decision in Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of lndta('). It was stated in that case that under s. 175(3) of the Governmeht of India Act, 1935, the contracts had (a) to be expressed to be made by the Governor-General, (b) to be executed on behalf of the Governor-General and ( c) to be. xecuted by officers duly appointed in that behalf and in such manner as the Governor-General directed or authorised. The evidence in the case showed that the contracts were not expressed to be made by the Governor-General and were not executed on his behalf. It was held by this Court that the provisions of s. 175(3) were mandatory and the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which was not liable for damages for breach of the contracts.\n\nThe same principle was reiterated by this Court in a later case-State of West Bengal v.\n\nM/s. B. K. Monda/ and D Sons('). The principle is that the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or the corresponding provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution of India are mandatory in character and the contravention of these provisions nullifies the contracts and makes them void.\n\nThere is no question of estoppel or ratifkation in such a case.\n\nThe reason is that the provisions of\n\nsection 175 (3) of the Government of India Act and the corresponding provisions of Art. 299 ( 1) of the Constitution have not been enacted for the sake of mere form but they have been enacted for safeguarding the Government against unauthorised contracts.\n\nThe provisions are embodied in s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act and Art. 299(1) of the Constitution on the ground of public policy--0n the ground of protection of general publicand these formalities cannot be waived or dispensed with. If the plea of the respondent regarding estoppel or ratification is admitted that would mean in effect the repeal of an important constitutional provision intended for the protection of the general public.\n\nThat is why the plea of estoppel or ratification cannot be permitted in such a case.\n\nBut if money is deposited and goods are supplied or if services are rendered in terms of the void contract, the provisions of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act may be applicable.\n\nTn other words, if the conditions imposed by s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act are satisfied then the provisions of that section can be invoked by the aggrieved party to the void contract.\n\nThe first condition is that a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him; the second condition is that !n doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must not mtend to act gratuitously; and the third condition is that the other\n\n(I) (t96212 S.C.R. 880.\n\n(2) [1962] I Supp. S.C.R. 875.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nperson for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. If these conditions .are satisfied, s. 70 imposes upon the latter person the liability to make compensation to the former in respt of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.\n\nThe important point to notice is that in a case falling under s. 70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot SUe for the specific performance of the contract, nor ask for damages for the brl'l!ch of the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delives something.\n\nSo where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under s. 70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between. the parties but on a different kind of obligation.\n\nThe juristic basis of the obligation in such a case is not founded upon any contract or tort but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi contract or restitution.\n\nIn Fibrosa v. Fairbairn(') Lord Wright has stated the legal position as follows :\n\n\" ............ any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of that has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retainine the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep.\n\nSuch remedies in English Law are generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and\n\nare now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.\" In Nelson v. Larholt(\"f Lord Denning has obseryed as follows:\n\n\"It is no longer appropriate to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the niceties o( the old forms of action. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the imprtant category of cases where the court orders restitution if the justice of the case so requires.\" Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that the appellant would have been entitled to compensation under s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act if he had adduced evidence in support of his claim, but the trial court has examined the evidence on this point and reached )he conclusion that the appellant did\n\n(I) (19431 A.C. 32, 61.\n\n(2) (194811 K.JI, 330, 343.\n\ncollect lac in the jungles in the year 1951 but later on abandoned the working of his own accord. It is well-established that a person who seeks restitution has a duty to account to the defendant for what he has received in the transaction from which his rigi11 to restitution arises. In other words, an accounting by the plainti.if is a condition of restitution from the defendant (See 'Restatement of the Law of Restitution', American Law Institute, 1937 Edn., p. 634). The appellant did not produce sufficient evidence to show to what extent he worked the contract and what was the profit made by him in the year 1951 and the succeeding year. In the absence of reliable evidence on this point the appellant was not entiUed to restitution or refund of the deposit he had made.\n\nThe case of the appellant with regard tu this part of his claim was therefore rightly disallowed both by the trial court and the High Court and the respondent is therefore not liable to refund the amount of deposit.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed wih costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 42, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 20, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER.,"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000 on the basis that there was no valid .contract between him and the State of Madhya Pradesh as the provistoo&\n\nof Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhotabhai J.ihabhai Patti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1943, "end_char": 1969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contrary view taken in Chhotabhai J.ihabhai Patti & ."}}, {"text": "[1963) 3 S.C.R. 13", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2181, "end_char": 2199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2390, "end_char": 2401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2464, "end_char": 2493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1962) 2 S.C.R. 880", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2929, "end_char": 2948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3182, "end_char": 3201, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rammwami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the cOun was delivered by Rammwami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on E behalf of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated March 21, 1961 in First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4177, "end_char": 4205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the cOun was delivered by Rammwami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on E behalf of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated March 21, 1961 in First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the cOun was delivered by Rammwami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on E behalf of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated March 21, 1961 in First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1951}, hereinafter called the 'Abolition Act', and the rit was to be enjoyed by the appellant after April l, 1951 on which date the proprietary rights came to vest in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Balaghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the appellant that the Deputy Commissioner of Balaghat acting under s. 7 of the Abolition Act took charge of the entire Malguzari jungles on April 1, 1951 and prevented the appellant from enjoying the rights he had already acquired."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5033, "end_char": 5037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the appellant that the Deputy Commissioner of Balaghat acting under s. 7 of the Abolition Act took charge of the entire Malguzari jungles on April 1, 1951 and prevented the appellant from enjoying the rights he had already acquired."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6267, "end_char": 6275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Balaghat had validly taken charge of the Malguzari jungles under the provisions of the Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6432, "end_char": 6532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Balaghat had validly taken charge of the Malguzari jungles under the provisions of the Abolition Act", "statute": "Balaghat had validly taken charge of the Malguzari jungles under the provisions of the Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7748, "end_char": 7771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh took tlle matter in appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "MULAMCHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8569, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MULAMCHAND", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8974, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10236, "end_char": 10242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11421, "end_char": 11430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14526, "end_char": 14542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State under this Act made by the iiroprietor at imy time after the 16th March, 1950 shall, as from the date of vesting, be void.\""}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15417, "end_char": 15421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1963] 3 S.C.R. 13", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15449, "end_char": 15467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15639, "end_char": 15646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15714, "end_char": 15718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15963, "end_char": 15967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16893, "end_char": 16898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16906, "end_char": 16925, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17495, "end_char": 17503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18468, "end_char": 18485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. tJ,\n\nthe Dominion of India and a private individual is not in the form required bys."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18558, "end_char": 18587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18835, "end_char": 18844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Governmeht of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18852, "end_char": 18881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19334, "end_char": 19343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Governmeht of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Governmeht of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19420, "end_char": 19434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by this Court that the provisions of s. 175(3) were mandatory and the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which was not liable for damages for breach of the contracts."}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19660, "end_char": 19669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Governmeht of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Governmeht of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19677, "end_char": 19706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19742, "end_char": 19753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19761, "end_char": 19782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20084, "end_char": 20092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20289, "end_char": 20295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20335, "end_char": 20346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20921, "end_char": 20926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20934, "end_char": 20953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21019, "end_char": 21024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21032, "end_char": 21051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21498, "end_char": 21526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21673, "end_char": 21678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21882, "end_char": 21887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22293, "end_char": 22298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22610, "end_char": 22616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fibrosa v. Fairbairn(') Lord Wright has stated the legal position as follows :\n\n\" ............ any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of that has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retainine the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep."}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23899, "end_char": 23918, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_21_33_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "SOUTH BIHAR SUGAR MILIS LTD., ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 5, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT AND C. A. VAmIALINGAM, JJ.J\n\nCentral Excise & Salt Act. 1944 Schedule 1. Item 14A-Appellants manufacturing mixture of gases containlng carbon dioxide by burning limestone with coke in lime-Using only the carbon dioxide from the mixture for refining sugarcane juice and for producing soda ash by solvay ammonia soda process-Whether tire mixture of gases was kiln gas or compressed carbon dioxide covered by Item 14-H.\n\nThe appellant companies manufactured sugar by carbonation process and paid excise duty on sugar manufacture(! by them under Item 1 of Sch.\n\nI to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. According to an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, these manufacturers employed a process of burning lime-stone with coke in a lime kiln with a regulated amount of air whereby a mixture of gases was generated consisting of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen and a small quantity of carbon monoxide. The gas thus produced was thereafter compressed so as to achieve pressure exceeding atmospheric pressure and then passed through a tank containing sugarcane juice so as to remove impurities from it and to refine the juice. For this process of refining it was only the .carbon dioxide in the gas which was used and the other gases i.e. nitrogen, oxygen and carbon monoxide escaped into the atmosphere by a vent provided for the purpose: The carbon dioxide r.ontent in this mixture of gases ranged from 27 to 36.5%. Similarly, another company manufactured soda ash by solvay ammonia soda process for which also carbon dioxide is required and this was produced by the petitioner by burning lime-stone with coke in a kiln in the same man .. ner as the appellant sugar manufacturing companies employing the carbon ation process. - The respondents regarded all the companies as manufacturers of complressed carbon dioxide and levied excise duty on them under Item 14-H in Sch. 1 to the Act.\n\nThe appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of this excise duty but these petitions were dismissed.\n\nIt was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the appellants that the lime kiln was maintained. to generate a mixtw\"e of gases and not carbon dioxide and at no stage in the process of generating this mixture and passing it through the sugarcane juice was carbon dioxide-which formed orie of the contents of the mixiure-either compressed, liquidified or .solidified. The mixture of gases so generated was not carbon dioxide as known to the market nor was it according to the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards JnstitU1ion which required the carbon dioxide content to be at least. 99%.\n\nTherefore the excise duty sought to be recovered on the content of carbon dioxide in the mixture of gases could not fall under Item 14-H. Furthermore the duty being on goods it could be charged only on goods known as carbon dioxide in the trade and marketable as. such.\n\nHELD : The .8'1-! generated by the appellant compani.,. was kiln gas .and not. carl;>on dioxtde as known to the trade, i.e., to those who deal in it or who use 1t The kiln gas in questioo therefore is neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as such to ihe commercial community and therefore cannot attract Item 14-H in the First &:hedule.\n\nIr was not correct to say that because the sugar manufacturer wants .carbon dioxide for. °'!fbonation P'!'J?OSCS and sets up a kiln for it that he produces carbon d1oxtde alid not lilln gas. In fact what he produces is a mixture known both to trade and science as kiln gas one of the oonstituents of which is, no doubt, carbon diexide. The kiln gas which is generated in th\"8C cases is admlttedly never liquified nor solidified and is therefore\n\nneithtr liquified nor solidified carbon dioxide, assuming that it can be mrroed carbon dioxide.\n\nIt cannot be called compressed carbon dioxide as un9erstood in the market among those who deal in compressed carbon dioxide. Compressed carbon dioxide is understood gene<ally as carbon dioxide compressed in cylinders with pressure ranging from 1,000 to 1,800 lbs. per sq. inch. The mere fact that at one stage or the other kiln gas is pressed at 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch by a pump or otherwise cannot mean that it is comp\"'ssed carbon dioxide. At the same time the duty being on manufaoture and not on sale the mere fact that kiln gas generated by theoe concerns is not actually sold would not make any drence if what they generate and use in their manufacturing processes is carbon dioxide.\n\nThe fact that the gas so generated ha~ carbon dioxide below 99% and does not conform to the specifications Of the Indian Standards Institution also would not matter for the gas may be sub-<tandllrd, provided what is produced is carbon dioxide. [32 D-H)\n\nUnion of India v. Del/ii .Cloth & General Mills Ltd. {1963) Supp. I S.C.R. 586, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JU1USDICTION : Cilvil Appeal!> Nos\" 289 to 311 of 1965 and 999 to 1001 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgments and orders dated July 13, 1964 of tlle Punjab High Court in Civil Writs Nos. 587-D, 590-D,\n\n592-D, 595-D, 643-D, 851-D, 852-D, 1163, 1164, 1167 and 1196 of 1963, 45-D of 1964, and 994, 588-D, 589-D, 591-D, 593-D, 594-D, 1165, U66, 1168, 1169, 1197, 1240, 1216 and 1155 of 1963 respectively and Writ Petition No. 212 of 1966. ·\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 289 to 311 of 1965). .\n\nRameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 999 of 1967). s: Sorabji, D. S. Dang and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants\n\n(in ~: A. No. 1000 of 1967)'.\n\nS. V. Gupte and K. K. Jain, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 1001 of 1967). ·\n\nA N. A. Palkhivala; F. N. Kaka, 0. P. Malhotra, (); C. Mathilr aod Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W .P. , No .. 21'.l. of 1966). . . . .\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W. P. No. 212 of 1966-) 8 and the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 289 to 311 of 1965).\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney~General, and R. H. Dhebar for the respondents (fu C.As. Nos. 999, 1000 and 1001 of 1967.).\n\nN.· A. P-alkhivala, 0. C. Mathur and Rilvinder Narain, 'fw <: the intervener (in C.As. Nos; 28 9 tci 311 of 1965).\n\nThe Judgment of. the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J. These appeals, by certificate, are against the com, mon judgment of the High Court of Punjab. which dismissed the writ petitious filed by the. appellant companies challenging the legality' of eitcise dufy levied: against them under Item 14-H in 8 Sch. 1 to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1 of 1944. Writ Petition 212 of 1966 by Tata Chca!s Ltd. also raises the same. question.\n\nAs both the appeals and the writ petition raise a common question of law they were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. • ·\n\nThe appellant companies manufacture sugar by carbonation E process as against sulphitation process employed by some other manufacturers of sugar and pay excise duty on the sugar manufactured by them under Item 1 of Sch. 1 -to the Act. According to the affidavit of V. J. Bakre, Deputy Chief Chemist of the Cent; ral Revenue Control LaboratOfY, these manufacturers bum timeitone with coke in a lilile kiln with a regulatea amount of F 3ir and generate. it mixture of gases consisting of carbon dicrude, nitrogen; oxygen. and a .small .quantity of carbon monoxide. Most of the oxygen. from the air is used up by the coke in the process of burning itself.\n\nThe coke so burnt supplies the heat whicl:\\ decomposes the limestone so as to generate carbon dioxide. The gas thus produced is suclald by a pump through a pipe which G connects the kiln with the inlet side of the pump. The gas entera the chamber of the pump and is then immediately compressed by means of the compression stroke of the pump. At this stage the gas is forced into a narrower space and as a result of the compression stroke it acquires pressure exceeding the atmospheric pressure. The gas so compressed is let into the delivery pipe whioh connects the outlet side of the pump with the iank containiil.g ff the sugarcane juice and enters the sugrcane juice with_ the acquired pressure behind it. But for the compression resulting in pressure the gas would not bubble in the sugarcane juice. In the\n\nt.ank there is besides the sugarcane juice milk of lime which is A ed so as t? rmove. the impurity in and refine the juice. Thus, it JS carbon d1ox1de which reacts on the lime and what is produced is an. insoluble content known as calcium carbonate. Tue .oilier gases, viz., nitrogen, oxygen, carbon monoxide do not contnbute\n\niii. the process of clarification of lhe sug; ircane juice. These are innocuous so far as the process of clarification of sugarcane juice B i.s concerned, and escape into the atmosphere by a vent provided in the sugarcane juice tank.\n\nAlong with these gases a cert3in amount of carbon dioxide which remains unabsorbed also escapes.\n\nThe carbon dioxide content iii the mixture of gases ranges. from 27 to . 36.5 % . Thus, the process involves the forcing of impure carbon dioxide into a narrower space within the cliamber of the c pump where it is compressed and pushed first into the delivery pipe and then into the tank containing the juice. The respondents' case therefore was that the process employed by the appellant companies involves compressing carbon dioxide and with the pressure achieved pushing it through sugarcane iuiCll.\n\nThe appellant companies theref2re produced carbon diide 0 through the lime kiln which was taken first to the Co2 pump and there compressed and then pushed into the tank.\n\nThe Tata Chemi; cals J.-td. manufactuJJes among other products soda ash by solvay animonia soda process.\n\nThe solvay process as described by the said V. J. Bai>re is as follows :-'\n\nFirst common salt is dissolved in water and animonia gas is passed through such dissolved salt called brine. The ammonia\n\ngas. gets absorbed in the brine. The solution so formed, is called AB solution, that is, ammoniated brine.\n\nThe AB solution is introduced at the top of a carbonating tower and passed from section to section. from the top to the bottom o~ the tower. At the bottom of the tower compressed carbon dioxide is forced F through at a pressure of 40 to 50 pounds per square inch and is bubbled through the liquid in all the sections of the tower. The chemical reactions involved in the tower are: (i) Ammonia Gas plus, (ii) Carbon dioxide plus, (iii) water of the brine solution. These react together to form ammonium bicarbonate which reacts with salt in brine to produce sodium bicarbonate and aminonium chloride. The sodium bicarbonate thus formed being much less soluble in the liquid is precipitated and is then taken out from the bottom of the tower. It is then filtered and the sodium bicarbonate in moist condition is left on the bed of the filter and the solution which is mostly of ammonium chloride is pumped to animonia reaction tower where ammonia is produced. Moist sodium bicarbonate is then washed and is heated in a calciner at 200° centigrade.\n\nThe sodium bicarbonate gets decomposed to give s0da ash, water and carbon dioxide. Carbon\n\nd.;.xide thus produced is reutilised in the cycle of manufacture of soda ash.\n\nIt contains. 853 pure carbon dioxide (according to the Company's expert 50 to 603) and is mixed with carbon\n\ndioxide sucked by the compressor from the lime kiln. The whole\n\nmi.rure, which contains about 60% of pure carbon dioxide is compressed in the compressor to a pressure of 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch.\n\nThus carbon dioxide is essential in the production of .; oda ash and is produced by burning limestone with coke in a kiln in the same manner as by the sugar manufacturing concerns which employ carbonation process.\n\nThe carbon dioxide so produced in the kiln is first compressed in the compressor during the compression stroke, and thereafter the piston compresses the gll!' in the said cylinder at p_ressure of more than 40 to 50 pounds per square inch.\n\nThe gas so compressed is compressed carbon dioxide which comes out of another valve in the cylinder and\n\noomes into the delivery side of the compressor admixed with carl>on dioxide from the calciner.\n\nThis gas is throughout at a pressure of 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch. This gas so manufactured .\n\nis independent of soda ash.\n\nThe compressed carbon dioxide so produced does not lose its identity of being compressed carbon dioxide.\n\nPure compressed carbon dioxide is isolated from the admixture of gases in the carbonating tower where chemical reaction takes place and is used in the manufacture of soda ash.\n\nAccording to the Revenue the processes employed by the appellant companies and by _Tata Chemicals Ltd. thus involve production of compressed carbon dioxide which is amenable to excise duty.\n\nItem 14-H of Sch. I reads as {ollows :\n\n\"14-H. Compressed, liquefied or solidified gases, the following :\n\n(iv) Carbon acid (carbon dioxide) Fifty per cent ad va/orem\n\nl>y a notification dated March 2, 1963 issued under r. 8 (I) of the Central Excises Rules, 1944 the Central Government exempt.ed\n\na.~ from April 24, 1962 carbonic acid utilised in manufac!ure of sugar within the factory of production for clarifying and bleaching sugm:cane juice or syrup from so much of the excess of ~- 25 /- per metric tonne.\n\nTue contentions raised on behalf of the appellant companies :md Tata Chemicals Ltd. may be summarised as follows :--\n\n(l) that the lime kiln is maintained to generate a mixture oi gases and ; not carbon dioxide;\n\nL~.C.1./68-3\n\n(2) that at no stage in .the process of generating this mixture and sucking it into the sugarcane juice for refining, carbon dioxide which forms one of the contents of tire said mixture is either compressed, Jiquidified or solidified;\n\n( 3) that the mixture of gases so generated is not carbon dioxide as known to the market;\n\n( 4) that according to the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards Institution carbon dioxide content has to be at least 993;\n\n( 5) that the mixture of gases so generated has no other use except for processing sugarcane. juice;\n\n( 6) that the said mixture is neither sold nor is marketable nor known to the trade;\n\n(7) that the exc.ise duty sought to be recovered on the content of carbon dioxide in the said mixture of gases cannot fall under Item 14-H;\n\n( 8) that these concerns are not manufacturers of carlioo dioxide as carbon dioxide is not separated from the said mixtw:e of gases by any process nor is the carbon dioxide content in the said mixture compressed, liquefied or solidified;\n\n(9) that the mere fact that the said mixture of gases is passed E through a conduit pipe by a process of suction cannot mean that carbon dioxide becomes compressed carbon dioxide at that or any other stage; .\n\n( 10) that the term \"compressed\" in Item 14-H contemplates the form in which the. article sought to be levied is manufactur- F ed.\n\nThere is no separation of carbon dioxide from the said mixture at any stage nor is it compressed or stored as carbon dioxide in cylinders; and lastly\n\n( 11 ) that the duty being. on goods it can be charged only on goods known as carbon dioxide in the trade and marll:etable as •uch.\n\nThe contentions of the Revenue, on the other hand; were :-\n\n( 1 ) that the mixture of gases generated as aforesaid is nolfling but impure carbon dioxide in the sense that during the process of burning limestone with coke a small quantity of cadlon monoxide is released by the burning of coke, the other gases in 8\n\nthe mixture being nitrogen and oxygen derived from the air which is Jet into the kiln to aid CCllllbustion;\n\nBiHAll. SUGAR MILLS V. UNION (She/at, J.) 27\n\n(2) that these concerns require carbon dioxide for refining sugarcane juice and manufacture it out of limestone and coke.\n\nThe other gases which get mixed up are unavoidable on account of the process employed by them;\n\n(3) that these extraneous gases can be separated and the manufacturers would separate them if what they require is pure carbon d; oxide.\n\nThey do not do so because carbon dioxide mixed with other gases produces the same effect in the process of refining as without them;\n\n( 4) that the fact. that iii the process of its manufacture carbon dioxide gets mW:d up with other gases does not mean that C carbon dioxide which is intended to be and is in fact produced loses its cbaracteris?cs as such. The gas thus produced contains\n\n30 to 35 % carbon dioxide;\n\n( 5) that the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards Institution are not relevant as .they are for cylindered carbon dioxide bought and sold in the market as pure carbon dioxide;\n\n( 6) that carbon dioxide produced by these concerns can be sold in the condition in which it is produced and used by other sugar mills and by factories manufacturing soda ash by solvay process.\n\nIn support of their contentions the appellant companies as also the Tata Chemicals Ltd. relied on the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards Institution and the several affidavits made by concerns using carbon dioxide for the manufacture of their respective goods.\n\nAs most of them are identical, it is sufficient to take the affidavit of one Shantilal Patel as typical.\n\nThe deponent there asserts that the company of which he is the senior chemist uses carbon dioxide in considerable quantity in manufacturing. aerated waters, that carbon dioxide so used contains 99 .5 % of pure carbon dioxide, that compressed liquidified or solidified carbon dioxide as known to the trade or sold in the market contains a minimum of 993 carbon dioxide confom1ing to the specifications of the Indian Standards Institution, that such G carbon dioxide is contained in steel cylinders under a pressure of minimum of 1000 lbs. per sq., inch and .that kiln or calciner gas is not known to the trade as carbon dioxide nor is it marketed as such. Dr. Homi Ruttonji whose affidavit was produced by Tata .Chemicals Ltd. states that for the purpose of manufacturing carbon dioxide an elaborate plant shown in the annexure to H his affidavit would have to be set up separate from the plant and\n\nequipment used in ; the manufacture of soda ash and refutes the statement of the said Bakre that compressed carbon dioxide is forced through at a pressure of 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch or that\n\nat the bottom of the said carbonating tower pure compressed carbon dioxide is or can be isolated from the mixture of gases . in that tower where chemical reaction takes place. He also refutes the statement that the. pro~. of generating kiln gas is independent of the manufacture of soda ash and states that the process of manufacture of soda ash is a continuous and integrated process wherein a certain quanti(¥ of kiln gas is released • which is directly utilised without removal or storage in the manufacture of soda ash.\n\nAccording to him, _kiln gas released during the manufacture of soda ash is never known as carbon dioxide in the market.\n\nTo obtain. J11arketable carbon dioxide from kiln gas an elabora'.e plant would be required for separation and purification and it is such carbon dioxide which becomes c marketable after it is compressed at a pressure of 1000 i.o 1800\n\nlbs. per sq. inch in cylinders of the specUications laid down by the Government of India under Rule 11 of the Gas Cylinder Rules, 1940.\n\nNotwithstanding the divergence of opinion between the two experts one thing is clear and that is that in the case of both D sugar and soda ash the manufacturer does require carbon dioxide for the purpose of producing the two articles and sets up lime kiln for that purpose. The question is whether what he actually produces by combusting limestone with coke is carbon dioxide and if so whether i: is compressed carbon dioxide as contemJilatd by Item 14-H.\n\nIn the cour£.e of their arguments counsel referred .to certain 1; orks on Chemistry in general\" and sugarcane industry in particular.\n\nThere are observations in som~ of them which might throw some light on the question before us.\n\nThe Handbook of Cane Sugar Engineering by E. Hugot (1960 ed.) at pp. 286 to 289 states that carbon dioxide necessary for the carbonaticin pro-\n\nJ!' cess is produced at the same time as lime in a limekiln adjacent to the sugar factory. The combustion of limestone with coke produces kiln gases consisting of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxygen, nitrogen and a certain amount of moisture.\n\nThe proportion of carbon dioxide in these kiln gases varies from 25 to 33% averaging about 30%. The carboh dioxide leaving the\n\nG washer is at a temperature of 60°C. Its pressure at the suction of the pump varies from 1.6 to 5 in. of mercury and lhedelivcry pressure varies from 4 to 10 lbs. per sq. inch. It\"is also stated that the pumps known as Co2 pumps are fuUy analogotis 10 air ptimps. (see also Cane Sugar Handbook by Guildord L.\n\nSpencer and G. P. Meade, p. 138). The carbonatiOn H according to Hut is one of the ceapest, clea~( and . most reliable process m the sugarcane industry ensuring standard\n\nquality of sugar. Roger's Industrial C/ieniistry, {6th ed.) p. 415\n\nin the chapter dealing with \"Alkali and Chlorine production• states thus :-\n\n\"The kilns used in the process are built and operated with special precautions to produce as high a concentration of Co, as possible.\n\nIn practice 41 to 43 per cent of Cods obtained in kiln gases with very little Co or 02, the rest of the gas being N15/2.\" At pp. 415 to 417 of the said work the solvay process is descril>- ed in the same terms as in the affidavit in support of the petition of Tata Chemicals Ltd. J.A. Timm in his General Chemistry,\n\n(4th ed.), p. 4 70 states that commercial carbon dioxide can be obtained as a bye-product of certain industries, e.g., flue gases.\n\nR. Norris Shreve in his Chemical Process Industries, (3rd ed.) states that there are three important processes for commercial production of carbon dioxide, viz., flue gases by burning carbonacious material, bye-product from fermentation industries through dextrose breakdown into alcohol and carbon dioxide and byeprcduct of lime kiln operation. He also states that an absorption system is used for concentrating Co, gas obtained from sources 1 and 3 to over 99%, and that in all cases the almost pure carbon dioxide must be given various chemical treatments for the removal of minor impurities which contaminat.~ the gas. Similarly, Kirk- Othmer in the Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, (2nd ed) Vol. 1 :p. 722 observe as follows :-\n\n\"The carbon dioxide evolved consists of both that generated by the decomposing limestone and that resulting from combustion of the carbon in the coke.\n\nThe kiln gases are considerably diluted with nitrogen from the air used to burn the coke; they usually contain 37% to 42% carbon dioxide together with stone dust, coke ash, particles and gaseous impurities.\n\nThe gas is cooled to some extent in the kiln itself by the upper layers of stone; it is further cooled and purified in water scrubbers until it is absolutely free from dust and tarry matters, and then, in the more modern plants which make a very pure soda ash, the gas is finally purified electrostatically.\" Arthur and Elizabeth Rose, in their Condensed Chemical Dictionary, (7th ed.) p. 178 divide commercial carbon dioxide into two grades, both of them having at least 99% carbon dioxide.\n\nSuch carbon dioxide when solidified is packed in 50 lbs. blocks in insulated boxes and is at a temperature of 109' below zero.\n\nWhen liquified it is packed in steel cylinders.\n\nThe uses of solidified or liquefied carbon dioxide are refrigeration of foods, carbonated beverages, industrial refrigeration, fire extinguishers, welding etc.\n\nThese extracts show that commercial carbon dioxide as brought to the market for being bought or sold and used for the purposes enumerated above has content of at least 993 of carbon dioxide and is either compressed and packed in steel cylinders or liquefied or solidified.\n\nAs the Revenue argued these concerns undoubtedly require carbon dioxide in the processes employed by them while manufacturing sugar and soda ash and to meet their requirement they have set up lime kilns by which they produce kiln gas which includes carbon dioxide to the extent of about 30 to 353, which they in fact use after compressing it through a pump or otherwise, at one stage or the other in their manufacturing processes. Nonetheless, is it possible to say that the lime kilns set up for the aforesaid purpose produce carbon dioxide and even if it be so, that, at one stage or the other, through the pump or otherwise, the carbon dioxide so produced becomes compressed carbon dioXide as envisaged by the legislature when it decided to introduce Item 14-H in the First Schedule ? It cannot be gainsaid that by burning Jime5tone with coke in the kiln the manufacturer actually produces kiln gas of which one of the constituents undoubtedly is\n\ncarbon dioxide and which he utilises while producing his ultimate excisable goods. But if it is possible to say that what he produces is carbon dioxide during the process which Mr. Palkhiwala termed as an integrated and continuous manufacturing process or separately as the Revenue insisted, it is equally possible to say that the combustion of limestone with coke results in the manufacture of nitrogen, whose content in the kiln gas is about 53 % .\n\nAs the text-books produced before us and the affidavits show, the correct !Jicture is that what is produced is kiln gas which consists of several gases, viz., carl?<>n dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxygen and nitrogen,. the last one being in a larger quantity than carbon dioxide. The mixture of gases so generated is known as kiln gas in the trade, i.e. to those who manufacture sugar and soda ash.\n\nThe affidavits of concerns which use carbon dioxide definitely assert that. kiln gas is never known in the market as carbon ilioxide nor is it a marketable article in the sense that it is loose and is not transportable nor is it bro.ugh! to the market for being bought and sold unless carbon dioxide is extracted out of it.\n\nSuch extraction requires an. elaborate plant.\n\nAfter extraction it would have to be compressed in cylinders of certain pecifications or liquefied or solidified before it can become a marketable article.\n\nIt is true as .the Revenue contended that the gas produced through thei kiln can be made marketable in .the sense that it can be sold in the very same condition in which it is produced to concerns interested in the carbonation process through, for example, pipes. But, apart from such a method of disposal being\n\nuneconomic and hardly likely to be employed by the trade, though it is possible in theory, what would be transported is that which is produced through the kiln, viz., the kiln gas containing among other things a certain quantity of carbon dioxide.\n\nAs one of the text-bO\\lks points out carbonation process is employed by manufacturers of sugar because it is one of the cheapest methods to ensure production of sugar of standard quality.\n\nThe fact is that employing carbonation process the manufacturer who requires carbon dioxide produces kiln gas and as that mixture of gases contains carbon dioxide he pumps through a pipe that mixture of gases and not carbon dioxide alone extracted from it. Therefore, in truth and in fact what he uses is the kiln gas produced by him in the lime kiln. Even assuming that this gas is compressed either through a narrow pipe what is compressed is. the kiln gas and it is that kiln gas containing no doubt a certain percentage of carbon dioxide which is inducted in the sugarcane juice for refining. The same must also be said of the solvay process used in the production of soda ash though in that case the percentage of carbon dioxide is larger than in the case of refining sugarcane juice.\n\nThe Act charges duty on manufacture of goods.\n\nThe word \"manufacture\" implies a change but every change in the raw material is not .manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and dilferent article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use.\n\nThe duty is levied on goods.\n\nAs the Act does not define goods, the legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The\n\ndictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market. That it would be such an article which would .attract the Act was brought out in Unio11 of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd.(1) The contention there was that in the course of manufacture of vanaspati, a vegetable product from groundnut and ti!· oil, the respondents brought into existence at an intermediate stage of manufacturing refined oil which fell within the description of \"vegetable nonessential oil, all sOrts,\" in Item 23 of the First Schedule.\n\nThe contention would seem to assume that the goods subjected to duty must be goods known as such in the market. The contention was that the respondents, after they bought raw' oil with all its impurities, manufactured, by application of certain Processc:-~ of refinement, refined oil which was the same as refined oil available in the market and that it was \"refined oil\" which became after further processes the ultimate vege!able product. It was argued that the fact that the vegetable product was the ultimate\n\n(I} (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 586.\n\n32 SUPRE.ME COURT llPORTS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nproduct and was chargeable to duty did not alter the position that at an earlier stage, the respondents manufactured \"refined oil\" as known to the market and that the fact that they did not put this \"refined oil\" in the market but used it to produce the finished product did not affect their liability. This Court held that if a new substance was brought into existence from raw materials and that substance was the same as \"refined oil\" as known to the.market it would be subject to duty. The question, therefore, was, was the subs!ance sought to be charged \"refined oil\" known to the market ? The affidavits showed that deodorization was nec:essary before the product could be called \"refined oil\". It was not .in dispute that that process was employed after hydrogenation and not at the stage when what was called \"refined oil\" came into, existence at an intermediate stage. No evidence was produced by the Union of refined oil being brought to the market without deodorization.\n\nIt was held that raw oil purchased by the respondents for the purpose of manufacturing vanaspati did not become at any stage \"refined oil\" as known to the consumers and the commercial community.\n\nThe affidavits filed in the instant cases and the scientific works referred to above show that the mixture of gases produced from the kiln 'is known bo'.h in trade and in science as kiln gas and not as carbon dioxide. The Revenue has not produced any affidavit of persons dealing in carbon dioxide to show that kiln gas. is known to the market as carbon dioxide.\n\nThe aforesaid affid'avits show that carbon dioxide known to and brought in the marl<:et for being bought and sold for its diverse uses is carbon\n\ndioxide compressed, liquefied or solidified as Item 14-H describes it. the analogy given by the learned Attorney-General of a manufacturer of cotton cloth also producing at ah intermediate stage cotton yarn and such cotton yarn being liable to excise duty would not help the Revenue as cotton ya~ obtained by such a manufacturer is known as such in the commercial community and brought to the market for being bought and sold. That cannot be said of kiln gas. If kiln gas were to be offered in discharge of a contract to supply carbon dioxide it would certainly be rejected on the ground that it is no'. carbon dioxide but is kiln gas. It is also not correct to say that because the sugar manufacturer wants carbon dioxide for carbonation purpose and sets up a kiln for it that he produces carbon dioxide and not kiln gas. In fact what he produces is a mixture known both to trade and science as kiln gas, one of the constituents of which is, no doubt, carbon dioxide.\n\nThe kiln gas which is generated in these cases is admittedly never liquefied nor solidified and is therefore neither Equefied nor solidified carbon dioxide, assuming that it can be tenned carbon dioxide. It cannot be called compressed carbon dioxide as\n\nA understood in the market among those who deal in compressed carbon dioxide.\n\nCompressed carbon dioxide is understood generally as carbon dioxide compressed in cylinders with pressure ranging from 1000 to 1800 lbs. per sq. inch. The mere fact that at one stage or the other kiln gas is pressed at 40 to 45 lbs. per sq. inch by a pump or otherwise cannot mean that it is compressed B carbon dioxide. At the same time the duty being on manufacture and not on sale the mere fact that kiln gas generated by these concerns is not actually sold would not make any difference if what they generate and use in their manufacturing processes is carbon dioxide. The fact that the gas so generated has carbon dioxide below 99% and does not conform c to the specifications of the Indian Standards Institution also would not matter for the gas may be sub-standard, provided what is produced is carbon dioxide.\n\nIn our view, the gas generated oy these concerns is kiln gas and not carbon dioxide as known to the trade i.e., to those who deal 'in it or who use it. The kiln gas in question therefore is D neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as such to the commercial community and therefore cannot attract Item 14-H in the First Schedule.\n\nIn this view it is not necessary for us to consider certain other contentions raised by the appellants and the petitioners in the writ petition.\n\nIn the result, the appeals and the writ petition must be allowed and the orders passed by the High Court in the appeals must be set aside.\n\nWe hold that the demand notices served on these concerns are illegal and must be quashed. The respondents in these appeals as also in the writ petition wi]] pay costs to the appellants and the petitioner in the writ petition. The costs will be one hearing fee for the appeals and a separate set of costs in respect of the writ petition.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals\" and Petition allowed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "SOUTH BIHAR SUGAR MILIS LTD.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOUTH BIHAR SUGAR MILLS LTD., ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 5, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT AND C. A. VAmIALINGAM, JJ.J\n\nCentral Excise & Salt Act."}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Schedule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5529, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5561, "end_char": 5576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in C.As.", "canonical_name": "Rilvinder Narain"}}, {"text": "Sorabji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5721, "end_char": 5728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s: Sorabji, D. S. Dang and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants\n\n(in ~: A. No."}}, {"text": "S. Dang", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5733, "end_char": 5740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s: Sorabji, D. S. Dang and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants\n\n(in ~: A. No."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5745, "end_char": 5760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s: Sorabji, D. S. Dang and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants\n\n(in ~: A. 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K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6038, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W. P. No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6072, "end_char": 6078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W. P. No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W. P. No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6097, "end_char": 6108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W. P. No."}}, {"text": "A. P-alkhivala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.· A. P-alkhivala, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Rilvinder Narain, 'fw <: the intervener (in C.As."}}, {"text": "Rilvinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Rilvinder Narain, 'fw <: the intervener (in C.As.", "canonical_name": "Rilvinder Narain"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J. These appeals, by certificate, are against the com, mon judgment of the High Court of Punjab."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6577, "end_char": 6597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court was delivered by\n\nShelat, J. These appeals, by certificate, are against the com, mon judgment of the High Court of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Tata Chca!s Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Writ Petition 212 of 1966 by Tata Chca!s Ltd. also raises the same."}}, {"text": "V. J. Bakre", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7298, "end_char": 7309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the affidavit of V. J. Bakre, Deputy Chief Chemist of the Cent; ral Revenue Control LaboratOfY, these manufacturers bum timeitone with coke in a lilile kiln with a regulatea amount of F 3ir and generate.", "canonical_name": "V. J. Bakre"}}, {"text": "V. J. Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9984, "end_char": 9993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The solvay process as described by the said V. J. Bai>re is as follows :-'\n\nFirst common salt is dissolved in water and animonia gas is passed through such dissolved salt called brine.", "canonical_name": "V. J. Bakre"}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11340, "end_char": 11342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tata Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12918, "end_char": 12937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the Revenue the processes employed by the appellant companies and by _Tata Chemicals Ltd. thus involve production of compressed carbon dioxide which is amenable to excise duty."}}, {"text": "Central Excises Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13262, "end_char": 13289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Standards Institution", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17187, "end_char": 17215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of their contentions the appellant companies as also the Tata Chemicals Ltd. relied on the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards Institution and the several affidavits made by concerns using carbon dioxide for the manufacture of their respective goods."}}, {"text": "Shantilal Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17406, "end_char": 17421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As most of them are identical, it is sufficient to take the affidavit of one Shantilal Patel as typical."}}, {"text": "Homi Ruttonji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18094, "end_char": 18107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Homi Ruttonji whose affidavit was produced by Tata .Chemicals Ltd. states that for the purpose of manufacturing carbon dioxide an elaborate plant shown in the annexure to H his affidavit would have to be set up separate from the plant and\n\nequipment used in ; the manufacture of soda ash and refutes the statement of the said Bakre that compressed carbon dioxide is forced through at a pressure of 40 to 45 lbs."}}, {"text": "Tata .Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18140, "end_char": 18160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Homi Ruttonji whose affidavit was produced by Tata .Chemicals Ltd. states that for the purpose of manufacturing carbon dioxide an elaborate plant shown in the annexure to H his affidavit would have to be set up separate from the plant and\n\nequipment used in ; the manufacture of soda ash and refutes the statement of the said Bakre that compressed carbon dioxide is forced through at a pressure of 40 to 45 lbs."}}, {"text": "Uications laid down by the Government of India under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19451, "end_char": 19508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gas Cylinder Rules, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19519, "end_char": 19543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "E. Hugot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20276, "end_char": 20284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Handbook of Cane Sugar Engineering by E. Hugot (1960 ed.)"}}, {"text": "Guildord L.\n\nSpencer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21052, "end_char": 21072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "see also Cane Sugar Handbook by Guildord L.\n\nSpencer and G. P. Meade, p. 138)."}}, {"text": "G. P. Meade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21077, "end_char": 21088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "see also Cane Sugar Handbook by Guildord L.\n\nSpencer and G. P. Meade, p. 138)."}}, {"text": "Roger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21254, "end_char": 21259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roger's Industrial C/ieniistry, {6th ed.)"}}, {"text": "R. Norris Shreve", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21965, "end_char": 21981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Norris Shreve in his Chemical Process Industries, (3rd ed.)"}}, {"text": "Kirk- Othmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Kirk- Othmer in the Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, (2nd ed) Vol."}}, {"text": "Arthur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23372, "end_char": 23378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arthur and Elizabeth Rose, in their Condensed Chemical Dictionary, (7th ed.)"}}, {"text": "Elizabeth Rose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23383, "end_char": 23397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arthur and Elizabeth Rose, in their Condensed Chemical Dictionary, (7th ed.)"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24939, "end_char": 24953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palkhiwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25300, "end_char": 25310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if it is possible to say that what he produces is carbon dioxide during the process which Mr. Palkhiwala termed as an integrated and continuous manufacturing process or separately as the Revenue insisted, it is equally possible to say that the combustion of limestone with coke results in the manufacture of nitrogen, whose content in the kiln gas is about 53 % ."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29071, "end_char": 29085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33821, "end_char": 33835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_224_233_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "TARAK NAm GHOSH v.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.\n\nFebruary 22, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.,\n\nS. M. SIKRI, J.M. Sm!LAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAJDIAL!NGAM, JJ.)\n\nCo11sti111tion of India, Art. 314-All India Servict9 Act, 1951-The Indicn Police ServU:e C&cruitment) Rules 1954; The All India ServU:u '(Discipline and Appeal) Rules 19SS; Civil Services (C/IJSsificatlon, Contr0l\n\nand Appeal) Rules, 1930, r. SS-Appellant recruited to the Indian Police in 1931-Enquiry ordered against him and susp.enslon under 19SS Ru/ts -:If valid-Whether he became member of Indian Police Strvice-Therefore iJ gov_erned b, y service conditions accordingly.\n\nThe appellant was appointed to the Secretary of States ServiQ! known as the Indian .Police in 1937. On June 29, 1965 while he was wrotina as a Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Bihar, an order was mad< by the State Government placing him under suspension pending an enquiIJ.\n\nLater, this order was partially amended by_ the Central Government which itself passed an order of. suspension in vie.w of the pending enquiry. Tho appellant challenged these orders by a writ petition It was contended by him that he had never become a member of the Indian Police Service which was constituted in August 194 7, therefore the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 19SS, did not apply to him and consequently the enquiry directed under rr. 4 and S could not be instituted against him under these rules, that in any case in view of r. SS of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, which applied to him by virtue of Ari. 314 of the Constitution, the Bihar Government had no power to order an enquiry against him as it was not the authority entitled to pass an order of dismissal removal or reduction in rank; only the Central Government could have, have ordered the inquiry. It was 1urther contended that if the enquiry itself had been invalidly instituted, the order of suspension automatically became invalid.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petition. On appeal to this Court, HELD : dismissing the appeal,\n\nOn the passing of the Indian Independence Aet, the appellant ceased to be a member of the service constitut<:d by the Secretary of State but he continued to serve the Government of India and the Province of Bihar, as a result of which certain rights relating to conditions of service and disciplinary matters. \"'hich \\\\\"ere earlier applicable to him. were presened.\n\nAt the time when the Indian Polioe (Cadre) Rules, 1950, were framed,\n\nthe appellant was not a member of any regularly constituted service and G his position remained the same until, under the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 19S4, he was included in the Indian Police Service and again became a member of a regularly constituted service; he could be competently incl)lded in that service, because on that date he was only holding a cadre post, but \\\\'as not a member of any other regular service.\n\nConsequently, the contention that the Rules of 1955 did not apply to the appellant must he rejected, because. when those Rules came into force, the appellant was already a member of the Indian Police Service. [229 H- H\n\n230 DJ Those persons, who were. appointed to the Indian Police under the Crown before Independence, ceased to be members of any regularly co.n\n\n•tituted Service when the Indian Independence Act came into force in 1947.\n\nCoder the agreement that was entered into by the new Indian Government with the British GovernmenJ, provision was made that members of the previous Secretary of State's Service could continue to serve tho Govern nlent of India on a provincial Government and certain rights were preserved to them if they continued to do so. There was, however. no pro~ vision that the old Secretary of State's Service would continue, so that with the passing of the Indian Independence Act, Secretary of State's Police\n\nceased to exist. [228 G, HJ\n\nStotc of Madras & Anr. v. K. M. Rajagopalan, [19SS] 2 S.C.R. S4!, R. p, Kapur v. Union of India & Anr. [1964J $.C.R. 431, referred to.\n\nUnder Ari. 314 of the Constitution, the right that continued to enure to the benefit of the appellant was that the enquiry to be held in his con. duct nfost comply with the requirements of r. 55 of the Rules of 1930.\n\nAn enquiry ordered under the Rules of 19S5 is in no way detrimental to tlie interest of the person against whom the enquiry is held as compared with an enquiry under r. SS of the Rules, of 1930. Under both sets of Rules, the enquiry could be ordered by the authority under whom the person concerned happened to be serving, so that the order made bv the Bibar Government for enquiry did not in any way violate the rights which tlie appellant possessed under r. SS of the Rules of 1930 and which were preserved to him by Art. 314 of the Constitution. The preliminary enquiry under r. SS of the Rules of 1930 was not required to be initiated or to be held by the Secretary of State in the case of a member of an All India Service, and it was only at the subsequent stage when the order of dis missal had to be passed that the Secretary of State was required to give 111 opportunity of showing cause to the officer concerned under s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act. The language used in r. SS shows that that rule is only concenred with the holding of an enquiry and lays down the procedure for the enquiry.\n\nIt does not at all deal v1ith the question E of passing an actual order of dismissal, removal or reduction. It is clear that that rule \\Vas confined to making provision for an enquiry whereafter, if an order of dismissal had to be made, the appropriate auhority under s. 240(2) of the Government of India Act, 193S had to take up the p!'°\"eedings and pass the final order. The expression \"authority concerned\"\n\nin. r. 55 in these circumstances, must clearly be interpreted as referring to the authoriiy under which the officer concerned happcnc; to be serving at the relevant time. [231 F-232 C; 232 A-CJ F\n\n. High Commissioner for India and H; gfi Comn1irsfoner for Pakistan Y.\n\nI. M. Lal. 1S I.A. 225. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2432 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated October 4, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 784 of 1965.\n\nB. C. Ghosh and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Tarak Nath Ghosh, was appointed y the Secretary of Stat~ for India to the Secretary of State's Semce known as the Indian Police on 25th January, 1937.\n\nWhen agreement took place with the British Government for inde-\n\n226 SVPR.EMB COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S C.R.\n\nA pendence of India, the Central Government, on 21st October, . 1946, in agreement with a number of Provincial Governments in.-\n\nclading the Government . of Bihar, constituted another S'ervioe blown as the Indian Police Service. Recruitment to this Indiaa\n\nPolice Service began on 15th August, 1947, after India attained Dominion status.\n\nSubsequently, on 23rd January, 1950, the Governor-General, in consultation with the Provincial Govern ments, promulgated rules for forming a cadre for the Police Officers. The Rules, known as the Indian Police (Cadre) Rules, 1950, came into force on 23rd January, 1950, and laid down that ; i number of posts mentioned in the Schedule would be treated as cadre posts and no cadre post shall be filled otherwise than by a cadre officer. Amongst the cadre officers defined in the Rules were included. members of the Indian Police and of the Indiaa.\n\nC Police Service. On 26th January, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and provision was made in Art. 312(1) empowering Parliament by law to provide for the creation of one or more .~India services common to the Union and the States, and to\n\nTlate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons al>'\n\npointed to any such service. Article 312(2) laid down that the services known at the commencement of the Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service shall\n\nbe deemed to be services created by Parliament under this article.\n\nIn pursuance of the power given to Parliament under this Article,.\n\nParliament passed an Act for constituting all-India services. That Act is fin: Ail-Iu.:liii &ryices Act, 1951 (No. 61 of 1951) (hercinl\\fter referred to as \"the Act\"). The Act recognised the existence of the two All-India Services mentioned in Art. 312(2) of the Constitution and, by section 3, empowered the Central Government, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, 10 make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All-India Service. Section 4 laid down that all rules in force immediately before the commencement of the Act and applicable to an All-India Service shall continue to be in force and shall be deemed to be rules made 11nder this Act. In exercise of the powers granted by s. 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated the Indian Police Ser vice (Recruitment) Rules, 1954. Under these Rules, it was laid down that. the Indian Police Service was to consist of the following persons, viz. :-\n\n(a) members of the Indian Police;\n\n(b) members recruited to .the Service before the commencement of these rules; and\n\n(c) persons recruited to the Service in accordance with the provisions of these rules. ff The Rules defined \"member of the Indian Police\" to mean a person who, having been appointed to the police service under the Crown\n\nin India, known as th\\) Indian Police, continues on and after the commencement of these rules, to serve under the Government. of India, or a State. Thus, under these Rules, persons appointed to the Indian Police, who had been appointed by the Secretary of State and had continued to serve the Government of India, became members of the Indian Police, and Under clause 3 of the Rules, the Indian Police Service included these members of the Indian Police. Subsequently, in exercise of the. powers conferred by s.\n\n3(1) of the Act, the Central Government, after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, made rules for regulating the dicipline in the Indian Police Service. These Rules, which were enforced with effect from 1st September, 1955, came to be known as the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.\n\n1955 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Rules of 1955\"). Rule 4 of these Rules was amended subsequently on 23rd July, 1960.\n\nOn 29th June, 1965, while the appellant was working as the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Bihar, an order was made by the State Government placing the appellant under suspension pendipg an enquiry. This order was partially amended by the Central Government by pas.gng an order of suspension of the appellant in view of the enquiry instituted by the State Government.\n\nOn 13th JUiy, 1965, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Patna challenging these orders passed against him. The order for institution of an enquiry made by the State Government, which had been directed in pursuance of Rules 4. and 5 of the Rules of 1955,. was challenged on two grounds. One ground was that the appellant had never become a member of the Indian Police Service and these Rules did not, therefore, apply to him, so that no enquiry could be instituted against him under these Rules. The second ground was that, in any case, in vie.w of Rule 55 of the Civil Service.s (CidSsification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Rules of 1930\") read with Article 314 of the Constitution, the Government of the State of Bihar had no power to order institution of an enquiry against the appellant, even if it be held that he had become a member of the Indian Police Service. The order of suspension was challenged <in the sole .ground that if the enquiry itself had been invalidly instituted, the order of ; uspension automatically became invalid. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding on both points against the appellant and consequently, the appellant has come up to this Court under certificate gra1!ted by the High Court.\n\nThe first contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant never became a member of the Indian\n\nPolice Service as deem¢ to have been created by virtue of Art. 312(2) of the Constitution has no force. It is true that the appellant was originally appointed on 25th January, 1937 to the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police and when the\n\n\"228 SUPllJ!MB CO'UllT UPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIndian Police Service was first constituted on 21st October, 1946, persons, who were members of the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police, did not bel; ome members of this newly constituted Indian Police Service. The Indian Police (Cadre) Rules, 1950 also did not bring about any merger of the two Services. All that those Rules did was to constitute cadre posts which were to be filled by Officers belonging to either the Indian Police -0r the Indian Police Service as it existed at that time. Article .312(2) of the Constitution simply provided that the existing Indian\n\nPolice Service constituted on 21st October, 1946 shall be deemed .to be created by Parliament underr that Article. Thereafter, Par\n\nliamcnt passed the All-India Services Act, 1951 and under section 3 of the Act the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) RuleS, 1954 were promulgated laying down that persons, who had been .appointed to the Secretary of State's Servico-Indian Police, were to be inciuded in the Indian Police Service. Consequently, from the time that these Recruitment Rules of 1954 came into force,' all persons, who had been appointed to the Secretary of Staie:s Service-Indian Police, became members of the Indian Police Service, so that, thereafter, they were governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant was that the provisions in the Recruitment Rules of 1954 that the Indian Police Service shall .consist, inter alia, of members of the Indian Police, could not make them members of the Jndian Police Service, because, under the Act, the only power that was conferred on the Central Government was to make Rules regulating recruitment to the Service, and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Service, and did not empower the Government to include within the Service persons who were already members of another Service. The argu ment has to be rejected, because, in our opinion, the provisi<m\n\nlaying down that the Indian Police Service shall consist, inter alio of members of the Indian Police, amounts to a rule recruiting the members of the Indian Police to this Indian Police Service. It may be mentioned that those persons, who were appointed to. the Indian Police under the Crown before Independence, ceased to be members of any regularly constituted Service when the Indian Independence Act came into force in the year 194 7. When independence was achieved by India, the Secretary of State and the crown ceased to have any authority in India, so that no Service of the Secretary of State or the Crown could continue thereafter.\n\nUnder the agreement that was entered into by the new Indian Government with the British Government, orovision was made that members of the previous Secretary of State's Service could continue to serve the Government of India or a Provincial Government and certain rights were preserved to them if they continued io ·-do so. There was, however, no provision that the old Secretary <Of State's Service would continue, so that with the passing of the\n\nA Indian. Independece Act, Secretary of State's Services. like the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police ceased to exist.\n\nThe cffect of the Indian Independence Act on the Secretary of State's Services was considered in detail by this Court in State of Madras and Another v. K. M. Rajagopalan(') and it was held :\n\n\"Thus, the essential structure of the Secretary of State Services was altered and the basic foundation of the contractual-cum-statutory tenure of the service disappeared.\n\nIt follows that the contracts as weU as the statutory protection attached thereto came to an automatic ilbd legal tcnnjnatiOn ....•... \" C The effect of the decision in that case was also noticed by this Court in the case of R. P. Kapur v .. Union of India and Another(') where this Coun held that in the case of K. M. Rajagopalan ( 1) it had been decided that :\n\n\"the conferral of Independence on India brought about an automatic and legal termination of service on the date of Independence. But all persons previously holding civil posts in India are deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue in service, except those governed by 'general or special orders or arrangements' affecting their respective cases. The guarantee about prior conditions of service and the previous statutory safeguards relating to disciplinary action continue to apply to those who are thus deemed to continue in service but not to others.\" In.the latter case of R.P. Kapur('), the Court proceeded further to take notice of s. I 0 of the Indian Independence Act under which every person appointed by the Secretary of State to a civil\n\nservice of the Crown in India, who continued on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof, was entitled to receive the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto as changod circumstances may permit G as . that person was enritl-d to immediately before the allOOinted day, I.e., Angust lS, 1947. This, it was clearly reccgniaed by this Court that the Services constituted by the Secretary of Stateearlier disappeared with the passing of the Indian Indeoendence Act, though persons, who continued to serve thereafter under the Indian Dominion or any Province, were entitled to Cl':11ain e rights in reg~ to remner!li\"?n, !ave, pensi11n and disciolinary matters. In View of th1s dec1s10n, 1t has to be held that OTI the passing of the Indian Independence Act, the anpellant ~Sl!d to\n\n(I} (19SS] 2 s.c.R. 541, 662. .\n\n(2) (1964) 'S.C.R. 431.\n\nSUPREME OOUP.T UPO&TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nbe a member of the Service constituted by the Secretary of State A but he continued to serve the Government of India and the Province of Bihar, as a result of which certain rights relating to conditions of service and disciplinary matters, which were earlier applicable to him, were preserved. At the time when the Indian Police (Cadre) Rules were framed, the appellant was not a member of any regularly constituted Service and bis position remained 8 the same until, under the Recruitment Rules of 1954, he was included in the Indian Police Service. With effect from the date of enforcement of these Rules, he again became a member of a regulady constituted service and he could be competently included in that service, because on that date he was only holding a cadre post, but was not a member of any either regular service. While he was simply holding a cadre post, there was no bar to the Central C Government making a Rule llllder s. 3 of the Act so as to illclude him in the Indian Police Service. Consequently, the first ground of attack on behalf of the appellant that the Rules of 1955 did not apply to him must be rejected, because, when those Rules came into force, the appellant was already a member of the Indian Police\n\nService which service was governed by those Rules. o\n\nThe second grouJ!d of attack on behalf of the appellant is based on the contention that under Art. 314 of the Constitution the appellant was entitled to the same rights as respects.' disciplinary matters, or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances permitted as the appellant was entitled to immediately before the commencement of 'the Constitution. According to the appellant immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, he was governed in the matter of discipline by the Rules of 1930, so that the rights which he was entitled to under those Rules were preserved to him under Art. 314.\n\nThis proposition is not disputed op behalf of the respondents. What is, however, disputed is the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant on r. 55 of the Rules of 1930. The appellant urged that, under r. 55 of those Rules, an enquiry against a member of the Indian Police could only be instituted at the instance of the authority entitled to pass an order of dismissal, removal or reduction and by no other authority. On this ground, it was urged that until the Indian Independence J\\ct c; une into force, an enquiry could only be ordered by the Secretary of State, whereas, thereafter, until the enforcement of the Constitution, the enquitr could be ordered by the Central Government only, because, dunng these two periods, the Secretary of Stat~ and the Central Government were the appropriate authorities entitled to pass orders of dismissal or removal.\n\nWe are unable to accept this interpretation of r. 55 urged on behalf of the appellant.\n\nRule 55 of the Rules of 1930 is as follows:-\n\n\"Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Jnquitjes Act, 1850, no order of dismissal,\n\nT. N. GHOSH v. BIHAll (Bhargava, I.)\n\nremoval or reduction shall be passed on a mber of a Service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a Court Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is propos~ to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged togeth.\\:r t~ a statement of the allegatins on which each charge 1s based and of any other cU\"Cumstances which it is proposed to take into considertion in passing orders on the case.\n\nHe shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concernned so direct, an oral inquiry shall be held.\n\nAt that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness.\n\nThe proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of. the findings and the grounds thereof.\"\n\nIt is true that the first sentence of this Rule purports to lay down the procedure where an order of dismissal, removal or reduction is sought to be passed. In the next sentence, the Ruic requires that the grounds on which.it is. proposed to take action must be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges and they must be communicated to the person charged, together with other necessary material.\n\nThe person charged is then required to put in a written statement of his defence within a. reasonable time and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. After this stage comes the mntion of the authority who is .to take action by laying down that, 1f the person charged so desires or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held.\n\nThe argument is that the autllority concerned referred to in. this sentence must necessarily mean the autllority entitled to pass the order of dismissal, removal or reduction.\n\nWe are unable to accept this submission.\n\nThe language used in r. 55 shows tllat that rule is only concerned with the holding of an enquiry and Jays down the procedure for tile enquiry. It does not at all deal with the qnest!on of passin~ an actual order of dismissal, removal or reduct10~. At tile tim!l .when t!te appell3!1t was appoin_ted to the Indian Police,. the prov1S1on which prescribed tile authority who could L6Sup.C.J./68-2\n\nSUPIU!MJI COT.11.T UPO&TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\npass an order of dismissal . in respect of the appellant was contained in sub-s. (2) of section 240 of the Government of . India Act, 1935, as a result of which the appellant .could only be dismissed from service by the Secretary of State who had appointed him. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930, which then applied to him, did not, however, require that the enquiry under that rule must be initiated by the Secretary of State. In fact, that rule made no mention at all of the authority who was empowered to pass the order of dismissal. On the face of it, it is clear that that rule was confined to making provision for an enquiry whereafter, if an order of dismissal had to be made, the appropriate authority under s. 240(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 had to take up the proceedings and pilss the final order, The expression \"authority concerned\" in r. 55, in these circumstances, must clearly be interpreted as referring to the authority under. which the officer concerned happens to be Serving at the relevant time. If the officer was serving under. the Government of India, the Government of India or such officer thereof as may be competent in that 11ehalf would be the authority to take proceedings under r. 55 and, in doing so, to initiate the proceedings also. If the officer happened to be serving under a Provincial Government, that Government or such officer thereof as may be competent in that behalf would be the authority concerned for initiating and holding the enquiry.\n\nThereafter, of course, if the officer happened to be a member of the Secretary of State's Service, neither the Government of India nor the Provincial Govent could pass an order of dismissal, and, on conclusion of the enquiry, the report necessarily would have to be submitted to the Secretary of State who alone could pass the order of dismissal. At that stage, the officer was entitled to a fresh\"Show-cau!l!l notice under s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 as held by the Privy Council in the case of\n\nHigh Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal('), It is clear in these circumstances that the preliminary enquiry under r. 55 of the Rules of 1930 was not required to be initiated or to be held by the Secretary of State in the case of a member of an All-India Service, and it was only at the subsequent stage when the order of dismissal had to be passed that the Secretary of State was required to ive an opoortunity of showing cause to the officer concerned under s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act. . In this connection, we may take notice of the fact that the High Court has held that, as a matter of fact also, prior to the Independence of India, whenever an enquiry was initiated in the conduct of a member of one of the Secretary of State's Services, the order was made by the Government of India and not by the Secretary of State, so that even at that time the Secretary of State as well as the Government proceeded on this very interpretation of r. 55 which we are inclined to accept.\n\n(I) 7S I.A. 225.\n\nT. N. GHOSH v. BIHAll (Bhargava, !.) 233.\n\nThe result of the view that we have taken is that, under Art 314 of the Constitution, the right that continued to enure to the benefit of the appellant was that the enquiry to be held in his conduct must comply with the requirements of r. 55 of the Rules of\n\n1930. We find that an enquiry ordered under the Rules of .1955 is in no way detrimental to the interest of the person against whom B the enquiry is held as compared with. an enquiry under r. 55 of the Rules .of 1930. The Rules of 1955 lay down the .same. type of opportunity to be given as did rule 5? of the Rules of 1930.\n\nUnder both sets of Rules, the enquiry could be ordered by the autliority under whom. the person concerned happened to be serving, so that, in the case of the appellant, the order made by the.\n\nC Government of Bihar for enquiry does not in any way violate the rights which the appellant possessed under r. 55 of the Rules of\n\n1930 and which were preserved to him by Art. 314 of the Constitution. The second ground of attack also, therefore, fails.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances Of this case, we make no order as to costs .\n\n.R.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissd.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "TARAK NAm GHOSH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Tarak Nath Ghosh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 22, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.,\n\nS. M. SIKRI, J.M. Sm!LAT,\n\nV. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAJDIAL!NGAM, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1965 while he was wrotina as a Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Bihar, an order was mad< by the State Government placing him under suspension pending an enquiIJ."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1965 while he was wrotina as a Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Bihar, an order was mad< by the State Government placing him under suspension pending an enquiIJ."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, this order was partially amended by_ the Central Government which itself passed an order of."}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "314 of the Constitution, the Bihar Government had no power to order an enquiry against him as it was not the authority entitled to pass an order of dismissal removal or reduction in rank; only the Central Government could have, have ordered the inquiry."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2239, "end_char": 2258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to this Court, HELD : dismissing the appeal,\n\nOn the passing of the Indian Independence Aet, the appellant ceased to be a member of the service constitut<:d by the Secretary of State but he continued to serve the Government of India and the Province of Bihar, as a result of which certain rights relating to conditions of service and disciplinary matters. \"'"}}, {"text": "Service when the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3320, "end_char": 3360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coder the agreement that was entered into by the new Indian Government with the British GovernmenJ, provision was made that members of the previous Secretary of State's Service could continue to serve tho Govern nlent of India on a provincial Government and certain rights were preserved to them if they continued to do so."}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service when the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Service when the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "Bibar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under both sets of Rules, the enquiry could be ordered by the authority under whom the person concerned happened to be serving, so that the order made bv the Bibar Government for enquiry did not in any way violate the rights which tlie appellant possessed under r. SS of the Rules of 1930 and which were preserved to him by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4792, "end_char": 4800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 240(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. C. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Ghosh and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6313, "end_char": 6329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Ghosh and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6376, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Tarak Nath Ghosh, was appointed y the Secretary of Stat~ for India to the Secretary of State's Semce known as the Indian Police on 25th January, 1937.", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "Tarak Nath Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6483, "end_char": 6499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.\n\nThe appellant, Tarak Nath Ghosh, was appointed y the Secretary of Stat~ for India to the Secretary of State's Semce known as the Indian Police on 25th January, 1937.", "canonical_name": "Tarak Nath Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Government . of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1946, in agreement with a number of Provincial Governments in.-\n\nclading the Government ."}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recruitment to this Indiaa\n\nPolice Service began on 15th August, 1947, after India attained Dominion status."}}, {"text": "23rd January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on 23rd January, 1950, the Governor-General, in consultation with the Provincial Govern ments, promulgated rules for forming a cadre for the Police Officers."}}, {"text": "Indiaa.\n\nC Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "members of the Indian Police and of the Indiaa."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7654, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th January, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and provision was made in Art."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 312(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7742, "end_char": 7753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7765, "end_char": 7775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "312(1) empowering Parliament by law to provide for the creation of one or more .~India services common to the Union and the States, and to\n\nTlate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons al>'\n\npointed to any such service."}}, {"text": "Article 312(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7981, "end_char": 7995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 312(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8524, "end_char": 8535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8799, "end_char": 8808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9202, "end_char": 9223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Indian Police Service was to consist of the following persons, viz. :-"}}, {"text": "Government. of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff The Rules defined \"member of the Indian Police\" to mean a person who, having been appointed to the police service under the Crown\n\nin India, known as th\\) Indian Police, continues on and after the commencement of these rules, to serve under the Government."}}, {"text": "Indian Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, under these Rules, persons appointed to the Indian Police, who had been appointed by the Secretary of State and had continued to serve the Government of India, became members of the Indian Police, and Under clause 3 of the Rules, the Indian Police Service included these members of the Indian Police."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9974, "end_char": 9982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10122, "end_char": 10130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st September, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10352, "end_char": 10371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Rules, which were enforced with effect from 1st September, 1955, came to be known as the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules."}}, {"text": "23rd July, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10553, "end_char": 10568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 4 of these Rules was amended subsequently on 23rd July, 1960."}}, {"text": "29th June, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10574, "end_char": 10589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th June, 1965, while the appellant was working as the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Bihar, an order was made by the State Government placing the appellant under suspension pendipg an enquiry."}}, {"text": "13th JUiy, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10949, "end_char": 10964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th JUiy, 1965, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Patna challenging these orders passed against him."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11008, "end_char": 11019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11047, "end_char": 11066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th JUiy, 1965, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Patna challenging these orders passed against him."}}, {"text": "Article 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11692, "end_char": 11703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One ground was that the appellant had never become a member of the Indian Police Service and these Rules", "statute": "One ground was that the appellant had never become a member of the Indian Police Service and these Rules"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second ground was that, in any case, in vie.w of Rule 55 of the Civil Service.s (CidSsification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Rules of 1930\") read with Article 314 of the Constitution, the Government of the State of Bihar had no power to order institution of an enquiry against the appellant, even if it be held that he had become a member of the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "Art. 312(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12460, "end_char": 12471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the appellant was originally appointed on 25th January, 1937 to the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police and when the\n\n\"228 SUPllJ!MB CO'UllT UPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIndian Police Service was first constituted on 21st October, 1946, persons, who were members of the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police, did not bel; ome members of this newly constituted Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "21st October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12756, "end_char": 12774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the appellant was originally appointed on 25th January, 1937 to the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police and when the\n\n\"228 SUPllJ!MB CO'UllT UPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIndian Police Service was first constituted on 21st October, 1946, persons, who were members of the Secretary of State's Service known as the Indian Police, did not bel; ome members of this newly constituted Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "liamcnt passed the All-India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13490, "end_char": 13499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Par\n\nliamcnt passed the All-India Services Act, 1951", "statute": "Par\n\nliamcnt passed the All-India Services Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Jndian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission of learned counsel for the appellant was that the provisions in the Recruitment Rules of 1954 that the Indian Police Service shall .consist, inter alia, of members of the Indian Police, could not make them members of the Jndian Police Service, because, under the Act, the only power that was conferred on the Central Government was to make Rules regulating recruitment to the Service, and conditions of service of persons appointed to the Service, and did not empower the Government to include within the Service persons who were already members of another Service."}}, {"text": "Service when the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15066, "end_char": 15106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15398, "end_char": 15415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the agreement that was entered into by the new Indian Government with the British Government, orovision was made that members of the previous Secretary of State's Service could continue to serve the Government of India or a Provincial Government and certain rights were preserved to them if they continued io ·-do so."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15425, "end_char": 15443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the agreement that was entered into by the new Indian Government with the British Government, orovision was made that members of the previous Secretary of State's Service could continue to serve the Government of India or a Provincial Government and certain rights were preserved to them if they continued io ·-do so."}}, {"text": "K. M. Rajagopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16599, "end_char": 16616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It follows that the contracts as weU as the statutory protection attached thereto came to an automatic ilbd legal tcnnjnatiOn ....•... \" C The effect of the decision in that case was also noticed by this Court in the case of R. P. Kapur v .. Union of India and Another(') where this Coun held that in the case of K. M. Rajagopalan ( 1) it had been decided that :\n\n\"the conferral of Independence on India brought about an automatic and legal termination of service on the date of Independence."}}, {"text": "R.P. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17236, "end_char": 17246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In.the latter case of R.P. Kapur('), the Court proceeded further to take notice of s. I 0 of the Indian Independence Act under which every person appointed by the Secretary of State to a civil\n\nservice of the Crown in India, who continued on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof, was entitled to receive the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto as changod circumstances may permit G as ."}}, {"text": "Angust lS,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that person was enritl-d to immediately before the allOOinted day, I.e., Angust lS, 1947."}}, {"text": "OTI the passing of the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18371, "end_char": 18417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME OOUP.T UPO&TS [1968] 3 s.c.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18501, "end_char": 18536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME OOUP.T UPO&TS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Central C Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19434, "end_char": 19454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While he was simply holding a cadre post, there was no bar to the Central C Government making a Rule llllder s. 3 of the Act so as to illclude him in the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19477, "end_char": 19481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19923, "end_char": 19931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20429, "end_char": 20437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Jnquitjes Act, 1850", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21451, "end_char": 21529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24544, "end_char": 24555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24579, "end_char": 24594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25167, "end_char": 25176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25184, "end_char": 25213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 240(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26372, "end_char": 26381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26389, "end_char": 26418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 240(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26959, "end_char": 26968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27612, "end_char": 27619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28334, "end_char": 28353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Government of Bihar for enquiry does not in any way violate the rights which the appellant possessed under r. 55 of the Rules of\n\n1930 and which were preserved to him by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 314", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28504, "end_char": 28512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_234_245_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STA'll!: OF PUNJAB a AN1L\n\nSHRI SlJKH RA1 BAii;\\ DUR\n\nFebruary 22, 1968 [], C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MiTTEll; 11:]\n\nCivil Service-Completion of probation-If probationer •ntltld to tub-· stanllve oppointment-Reversiun to sub.rtanti•• par,,__Whon O/J!Utllts \"' punishment. The respondent who was a permanent oJ!icial in the Delhi Administra lion was appointed to the Punjab Civil Service (I!Xecutive Blanch). He was on probation in the new post for a period of 18 mootba mbject to ex tension of the period and subject to his completing training; He passed all the departmental examinations. The periDd of probation expired in 1uly 1954, and there was no i; xtension of it. In January 1957, he received a charge-oheet with a Jetter from the Anti-Corruption Department liskin1!: him to reply to the charge sheet and to state whether he would like to be lioard in person. 'The respondent replied that he wanted an opportunity of being heard in person. There was however no enquiry at all, and much later, by an order dated 23/26th May 1958, the Punjab Government reverted him to his substantive post in the Delhi. Administration without making any reference to the charges.\n\nThe respondent thereupon challenged the order on the grounds namely : ( 1) that on the expiry of the period of probation and on his passing the departtnental exarilinations he became entitled to a substantive permanent\n\nappointment; (2) that the impugned order terminated his servioe under the Punjab Government and removed him from the said service, in viola• tion of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution; and (3) under r. 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishinent and Appeal) RUies, 1952, it was mandatory that, before his employment as a probationer could. be terminated, he should have been apprised of the grounds of the proposed termination and given an opportUnity to show cause against it.\n\nThe High Court accepted the second contention and allowed the petition.\n\nIn appeal to thiS Court,\n\nHELD : (1) Merely because the respondent had passed all the depart mental examinations and completed the period of probation fixed, ho could not be considered to be holding the post substantively, or as being entitled to it. [239 E-FJ\n\n(2) The J'OllpODdent could not complain againat the order reverting G him to his form..- post because, the order of reversion was not by way of puni5h!nent. [239 Fl The cil'cwmtante$ preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service of a public servant have to be examined in each case, for deter mining whether the order was by way of punishment. The mot!\\\" behind it is immaterial. It is only in a case wliether either of the two tests, namely, (a) , Whether the public servant had a right to the post or rank, or (b) wbedier the public servant, no matter whether he WD a pi; obationer R or a temporary llOl'Vilnt, has been visited with evil' consequences.· or an aspersion baa been cast on his character or integrity, that the order could be il8id to be by way of' punishment. BiJt !lie serviCes of a temporacy\n\n• .\n\nPUNJAB v. SUXH llAJ (Mitter, 1.) 235\n\nservant or :a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more, \\\\ill not attract the operation of Art. 311. [240 A; 244 A-B, C.D]\n\nParshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (1958] S.C.R. 828, State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 606, R. C. Lac, y v. State of Bihar, C.A. No. 590 of 1962 dated 23-10,63, A G. Benjamin v. Union of\n\nlndi<.·, CA. No. 1341/66 decided on 13-12-66, followed.\n\n\nGopi Kishore Prasad, A.l.R. 1960 S.C. 689 and Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449, referred to . ..\n\n(3) As the High Court had not considered the contention of the respondent based on r. 9 of the Punjab Qvil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Ruks, J 952, the matter should be remanded to the High Court for consideration of that question. [244 HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 433 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the iudgment and order dated January 7, 1963 of the, Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 157 of 1957.\n\nVikram Chand Mahajan, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants .\n\nSardar Bahadur, Arub B. Saharya, Vishnu B. Saharya and Youginder Khushalani, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the C2urt was delivered by Mitter, J. This appeal is by a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution against its judgment and order dated January 7, 1963 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 157 of 1959 reversing a decision of a single Judge of that Court who had dismissed a writ petition filed by the respondents on 'June 7, 1958 to declare that the order of the first appellant reverting him to his permanent post in the Delhi Administration was invalid and to quash the same.\n\nThe facts laid in the writ petition are as follows.\n\nThe petitioner, Sukh Raj Bahadur, respondent herein was a permanent official of the office of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi. On Decem- Oer 9, 1952 he was accepted as a candidate for the post of Extra Assistant Commissioner on the Register A~II of the Punjab Government along with two otliers, on the advice of the Punjab Public\n\nService O>mmission. He was posted as Inspector, Local Bodies, Jullundur Division and Assistant to Commissioner, Jullundur Division.\n\nLater on, he acted as Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar. On being relieved from the Delhi State Government on January 15, 1953 he assumed charge of the post of Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar in the P.C.S. (Executive Branch Cadre) on January 24, 1953. He passed all the departmental examinations prescribed under rule\n\n236 SUPlWll! ~T Ul'Ol.TS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n21 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930.\n\nUnder r. 22 of the aforesaid rules, he was to remain on proba tion for a period of 18 months subject to his completing the training and subject to further extension of the period of probation as the case may be. In his case, the period of probation expired in July 1954. '.J'he same was however not extended by any order of the Governor of Punjab. The petitioner claimed that Jlllder r. 24 of the said rules he became qualified for substantive permanent appointment to the P.C.S. (Executive Branch).\n\nHe , received a charge sheet with a letter dated January 14, 1957 from the Secretary to the Government of PJllljab, Anti-Corruption Department, asking him to reply to the charge sheet within a fort night and to inform whether he would produce defence or whether he would like to be heard in person. The petitioner replied to the charge sheet on January 28, 1957 stating that he wanted an opportunity of being heard in person. By order of the Punjab State dated 23/26th May 1958 puxporting to be one Jlllder r. 23 of the aforesaid rules, he was reverted by the Punjab State Government to his substantive post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration with immediate effect.\n\nAccording to the petitioner, the said order of 23 /26th May 1958 terminated his service under the Punjab State Government and permanently removed him from the Punjab Civil Service.\n\nThe petitioner also complained that under r. 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, he should have been apprised of the grounds to terminate his employment as probationer for any specific fault or on account of any unsatis factory record or unfavourable reports implying his unsuitability for service and given an opportunity to show cause against the\n\nsme, before any orders were passed by th~ authority competent to terminate the appointment. The petitioner was never apprised of the grounds of any such proposal nor given an opportunity to show cause against it before the order reverting him to the post of Superintendent mentioned above was made.\n\nThere was thus a clear breach of r. 23 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules.\n\nAccordinly the petitioner prayed that the said order of 23/26th May 1958 be quashed and suitable relief be given to him.\n\nThe order complained of runs as follows :- \"The Governor of Punjab is pleased to revert Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, officiating, from P.C.S. (Executive Branch) to the post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, with immediate effect.\" In the written statement of the respondents to the petition it was stated that the impugned order was not a penalty calling for compliance with the provisions regarding penalty etc. and the\n\nPUN.JAB v. SUKH RA.J (Mitter, .J.) 237\n\nPunjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules were not applicable. It was submitted that he was appointed to the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) as a nominee of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, who was one of the nominating authorities under r. 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1930 along with some of the officers of the Punjab Government. By passing the departmental examinations in November 1956, the petitioner was due for confirmation thereafter.\n\nThe absence of confirmation implied that the probationary period was extended under r. 22(c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules. Lastly, it was said that the reversion of a probationer to his substantive rank could not amount to a punishment.\n\nIt is not necessary to examine the charges which were levelled against the petitioner in the charge sheet. Suffice it to say that they were all of a fairly serious nature.\n\nThe points put forward before the learned single Judge who heard the petition were :\n\n(l) On the expiry of the period of probation and on his passing the departmental examinations, the petitioner became qualified for substantive permanent appointment.\n\n(2) The impugned order in fact terminated Ins services under the Punjab State Government and removed him from the said service. The petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to show cause against the charg.es contained in the charge sheet or against the proposed punishment.\n\nAs such there was violation of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.\n\n(3) The petitioner being a probationer, r. 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was applicable. The procedure prescribed by the rule was not followed although it was mandatory that before his employment as a probationer could be terminated, he should have been apprised of the grounds of the prop.osed termination and given an opportunity to show cause agamst it .\n\n. The learned single Judge held that the Petitioner had not acqmri:d the status of a permanent member of the Punjab Civil Service merely by efflux of time and by reason of his having passed the epartmenta! examinat!os. He futher held that the petitioner contmued only m an officiatmg capacity. The second point also\n\nwa~ turned down by th.e learned Judge holing_ that the petitioner's case was one of revers10n and not of termmatton of service as the\n\npetiti?er wa.s never ai;>pointed in a permanent capacity and was not VlSlted with any evII consequences. In comin~ to this conclusion the learned single Judge relied, on several decisions starting from the case of Parshotam Lal Dltingra v. Union of India(').\n\n(Il [I968J s.c.~. 828.\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe learned single 1 udge examined the third point at some length. It was urged before him that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of a 'probationer' in rule 2.49 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume I, Part I. On behalf of the petitioner, reference was made to the definition of 'Government' contained in r. 2.24 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules and the definition of 'cadre' contained in r. 29 and \"it was submitted that if the petitioner had held a substantive post in a cadre under the Punjab Government and had been appointed on probation to another post, then the term 'probationer' would not have. covered his case, but since the petitioner held a lien on a post in Delhi State and . not under the Punjab Government, he could not be deemed to fall within the exception contained in the definition of a 'probationer' in r. 2.49.\" Reference was made to a number of other rules on behalf of both the parties. Ultimately, on examination of the respective contentions of the parties, the learned Judge concluded that the petitioner \"could not be regarded as a probationer within the meaning of r. 2.49 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules\" and \"he could not claim the benfit of r. 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952.\" He however did not think it necessary to decide whether in the presence of r. 23 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules the Punishment and Appeal Rules would apply at all. Further, even if the said rule applied, the petitioner did not fall within the meaning of the word 'probationer' as given in rule 9. The learned Judge was of the view that there was force in the contention that r. 9 of the Punishment and Appeal Rules could not cover the case of revision as r. 9 only dealt with a case where it was proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer. In the result, he dismissed the application.\n\nThe appeal was allowed by the Letters Patent Bench. It appears that the Bench examined only the second point urged before the learned single 1 udge and over-ruling his decision allowed the appeal quashing the ol:der reverting the writ petitioner from the P.C.S. (Executive Branch). The Bench relied principally on the judgment of this Court in Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab(') and The State of Bihar v. Gopi Klshore Prasad('). According to the Bench the enquiry started with a notice which expressly stated that it was being made under sub-r. (2) of r. 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. Sub-r. (1) of r. 7 provided that an order of dismissal, removal or reduction shonld not be passed unless the person concerned had been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action prooosed to be taken in regard to him while sub-r. (2) laid down the manner in which the enquiry was to be held. From this the Bench inferred that:\n\n(1) (1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1960 S.C. 689.\n\n' I f\n\nA \"When the c_harge sheet was sent to the appellant (writ petitioner), the object and the intention of the State Government was to punish him either by way of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, . . . .\n\nSuch an enquiry and any action consequent on such an enquiry would not be covered by principle of Ram a N flT, ayan Das' s case, as laid down by the Supreme COurt\n\nin Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab & others(').\".\n\nThe Bench however observed that altliough no enquiry in the proper sense of the word had been held the omission to hold such an enquiry could not be made a ground for saying that the case difiered in principle either from Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2 ) case or Madan Gopafs(') case. Accordingly the conclusion reached was that \"the reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment and amounted either to reduction in rank or removal from the P.C.S. (Executive Branch)\" and as \"these actions could not be taken without affording the appellant, adequate opportunity of showing cause against the punishment\" there was violation of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept the reasoning or the conclusion arrived at by the learned J udgcs of the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court. It is not necessary to examine in detail the earlier decisions of this Court which bear on the issue before us. In this case, the respondent did not cease to be a probationer at the time when the impugned order w&s passed on him. Although the period of probation was fixed at 18 months and although the respondent had passed all the departmental examinations, he could not merely, as a consequence thereof, be considered to be holding a post substantively. Apart from the question as to the right of the respondent under the Punjab Civil Service Rules, the respondent could not complain merely because he had been reverted to the post formerly held by him. He would have cause to complain if he could show that the order of reversion was by way of punishment. As was pointed out in Parshotam LalDhingra's(8 ) case.\n\n\"The mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules the ricrht to reduce him to a lower' post does not mea~ that an~ order ?f reduct?on of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot m any c1Tcumstances be a punishment.\n\nThe real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. . . . . the court has to apply the two\n\n(I) [1963] 3 S.C., R. 716.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689.\n\n(3) [1958) S.C.R. 828.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\ntests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to ? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service. . • • • .'' In the case of State of Orissa and another v, Ram Narayan Das(') the respondent who was a Sub-Inspector of Police on probation in the Orissa Police Force, was served with a notice to show cause why he should not be discharged from service \"for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work\". He submitted an explanation whii:h was considered by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as unsatisfactory. The said authority passed an .order discharging the respondent from service \"for unsatisfactory work and conduct''.\n\nThe respondent's contention.was that the order was invalid because he had . not been given a reasonable opportunity to Show cause against tbe proposed actioJ.1 in terms of Art. 311 (2) and that he was not given an opportunity to be heard nor was any evidence taken on the charges. It was pointed out by this Court that the enquiry against the respondent was only for ascertaining whether he was fit to be confirmed, and although \"an order discharging a public servant, even if a probationer, in an enquiry on charges of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications, may appropriately be regarded as one by way of punishment, an order discharging a probationer following upon an enquiry to ascertain whether he should be confirmed, is not of that nature.\" The Court distinguished Gopi KiShore Prasad's(2 ) case on the ground that there the pu.blic servant had been discharged from service consequent upon an enquiry into alleged misconduct and the. Enquiry Officer had found that the public servant was 'unsuitable for the post'. Finally it was held by this Court in Ram Narayan Das's(') case that\n\n\". . . the fact of the holding of an enquiry is not decisive of the question. What is decisive is whether the order is by way of punishment in the light of the tests laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's(8 ).\"\n\nIn the result the appeal of the State was allowed.\n\nReference may also be made to the case of R. C. Lacy v. The State of Bihar and others('). In this case the appellant who was working as an Assistant Professor of Botany in Class II Bihar Educational Service was temporarily promoted to Class I of the said service against a permanent post created in April 1949 and\n\n(1) [1961) 1 S.C.R. 606.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 196° S.C. 689.\n\n(3) (1958) S.C.R. 828.\n\n(4) Civil Appeal No. 590/1962\n\ndecided on 23-10-63.\n\nPUNJAB v. SUKH RAJ (Mitter, /,) 241\n\nappointed Professor of Botany in the college where he was work ing. He was informed that Government would consider him for permanent appointment depending on the efficiency with which he ran the department, the extent to which he enjoyed the good will of his colleagues and the devotion to research work that he revealed during the course of the year. In April 1950 the appellant moved the Government for confirmation in Class I.\n\nThe.\n\nGovernment however decided to continue his temporary service in Class I for another year with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission. Following an incident on February 9, 1951, the Commissioner of Patna Division was appointed to make an enquiry into the same. The report of the enquiry was against the appellant. On August 21, 1951, the Government passed an order reverting the appellant to his substantive post in Class II and trans ferred him from Patna College to Ranchi College. The appellant filed a suit which was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. Losing appeal before the High Court, the appellant came to this Court by special leave. It was contended on his behalf that the order of 21st August, 1951 amounted to infliction of punishment. In dismissing the appeal, it was pointed out by this Court that\n\n\"the enquiry which was held by the Commissioner in this case was in the nature of a preliminary enquiry to en able the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken against the appellant. . . . It is clear .however that the Government did not decide to hold any enquiry for the purpose of. taking disciplinary action against the appellant, for no enquiry officer was appointed, no charges were framed and no regular de partmental enquiry as envisaged by the rules and Art. 311(2) of the Constitution was ever held.\"\n\nAccording to this Court the action of the Government was in pursuance of its right to revert an officer holding a higher post temporarily if he was not found fit for the purpose.\n\nIn Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab(') the termination of the appell.ant:s service was held to be in violation of Art. 311 (2) of the Cons1ttut10n. There the appellant, Madan Gopal, was appointed an Inspector of Consolidation \"on temporary basis and terminable with one month's notice\". He was served with a charge sheet to the effect that he had received illegal gratification and called uoon\n\nt~ show cause why disciplinary action .should not be taken against hnn. The appellant submitted his explanation and the Settlement Officer who had se1;1t , out the charge sheetsubmitted his report to !he Deputy Co!11m1ss1oner that the charge relating to receipt of\n\n11lgl grat1ficalion had. been proved. Thereupon the Deputy Comm1ss10i:er ordered tat !he services of Madan Gopal be terminated forthwith and that m heu of notice he would receive one month's\n\n\n~42 SUPRBMB COURT REPOllTS\n\n\npay as required by the rules. It was held by this Court that the enquiry made by the Settlement Officer was with the object of ascertaining whether disciplinary action should be taken against the appellant for his misdemeanour and the purpose of the enquiry was to take punitive action including dismissal or removal from service if the charge was substantiated.\n\nAfter discussing Ram Narayan Das's(1) case, the conclusion arrived at was that:\n\n\"Such an enquiry and order consequent upon the report made in the enquiry will not fall within the principle of Ram Narayan Das' s(') case.\"\n\nIn the result, the appeal was allowed.\n\nIn Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India(') this Court allowed 'the appeal of the appellant who was appointed as a temporary second division clerk in the General Post Otlice, Lahore for a period of six months in October 1946.\n\nHis appointment was continued from time to time when the impugned order was passed terminating his services. It was pointed out by this Court that even before discharging a temporary servant the authority may have to examine the question about the suitability of the said servant to be continued and :\n\n\"acting bona fide in that behalf, the authority may also give a chance to the servant to explain, if any complaints are made against him, or his competence or suitability is disputed on some grounds arising from the discharge of his work; but such an enquiry would be held only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not.\n\nThere_ is no element of punitive pmceedings in such an enquiry; the idea in holding such an enquiry is not to punish the temporary servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not . . . . . . . . in some cases, the authority may choose to exercise its power to dismiss a temporary servant and that would necessitate a fonnal departmental enquiry in that behalf. If such a formal enquiry is held, and an order terminating the services of a tempcrary servant is passed as a result of the finding recorded in the said enquiry, prima facie the termination would amount to the dismissal of the temporary servant.\" The Court however was careful to add that considerations of the motive operating in the mind of the authority had to be eliminated in determining the character of the tennination cf service of a temnorary servant and that the form in which the order terminal ing his services was expressed would not also be decisive.\n\nIf a\n\n. (I) [1961] I S.C.R. 6~6.\n\n(2) AJ.R. 1964 S.C. 449 .\n\nformal departmental enquiry had been held in which findings wero. recorded against the temporary servant and as a result of tho said findings, his services were terminated, the fact that the order by which his services were terminated, ostensibly purported to be a mere order of discharge would not disguise the fact that in substance and in law the discharge in question amounted to the dis missal of the temporary servant. The order of discharge of the appellant ran as follows :\n\n\"Shri Jagdish Mitter, a temporary Second Division Clerk of this office having been found undesirable to be retained in Government service is hereby served with a month'8 notice of discharge with effect from November\n\n1, 1949.\" According to this Court, the order cast an aspersion on the tern porary servant and in substance it amounted to an order of dis missal<\n\nThe last decision to which we may refer is the one in A.· G.\n\nBenjamin v. Union of India('). In this case, the appellant was temporarily employed as Stores Officer in the Central Tractor Organisation.\n\nAs he was not a confirmed government servant, his services could be terminated under r. 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 with one month's notice on either side. The services of the appellant were terminated on April 23, 1954. There. had been certain complaints against him in respect whereof the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisa tion sent a notice to him asking him to show cause why discipli nary action . should not be taken against him and an Enquiry Officer was appointed, but before the enquiry could be completed, the Chairman recommended that the services of the appellant should be terminated under r. 5 observing in his note to the\n\nSeretary that :\n\n\"The deoartmental proceedings will take a much Ion ger time and we are not sure whether after ing through all the formalities we will be able to deal with the accus cd in the way he deserves.\"\n\nActing upon this suggestion the appellant was served with the order complained of. The order was to the effect that the appel lant was being informed that his services were no longer required in the organisation and the same were terminated with effect from the .date on which the notice was served on him. He was further informed that in lieu of the notice one month's pay and allowances due to him, he would be given the same for that\" period.\n\nThis Court distinguished the facts in this case from those in Madan Gopal's(') case and held that the principle of that case could not be applicable.\n\n(ll Civil Appeal No. 1341/1966 decided on 13-12·196b.\n\n\n244 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nOn a conspectus of these cases, the following propositions are.\n\nA .cJear:\n\n1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such ter mination without anythin¥. more would not attract the operation of Art. 311 of the ConstJtution.\n\n2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial.\n\n3. If the order visits the public servant with any evil co!lse quences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant.\n\n4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in ser vice, does not attract the operation of Art. 311 of the Constitution.\n\n5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Art. 311 I.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of tmni nation of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article.\n\nIn this case the departmental enquiry did not proceed beyond the stage of submission of a charge sheet followed by the respon dent's explanation thereto. The enquiry was not proceeded with; there were no sittings of any Enquiry Officer, no evidence record ed and no conclusion arrived at on the enuiry. In these circum\n\nstances, the principle in Madan Gopal's( ) case or Jagdish Mit ter's(') case will not be applicable. The case is in line with the decisions of this Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Nlll'ain.Das(1), R. C. Lac, v v. The State of Bihlll'(') and A. G. Benjamin v. Union of India(').\n\nIn this view of the matter, we are unable to concur with the opinion ot the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court.\n\nThis does not however conclude the matter. The respondent also complained against the non-observance of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules.\n\nThe learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court does not appear to have ex pressed himself definitely on the third point canvassed before him although he observed that the contention of the Advocate General about the inapplicability of r. 9 was not without force.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Division Bench did not consider this\n\n(I) [1963J 3 S.C.R. 716.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449.\n\n(3) [l961J I S.C.R.616.\n\n(4) C.A. No. 590/1962\n\n(5) C.A No. 1341/66 dated 13-12·66. docidtd Ob 23-10-68.\n\nA question at all. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Punjab High Court and remand the matter to that court for consideration of the respective contentions of the parties based on Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952.\n\nThe costs of this appeal will abide by the decision of the High Court.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed and case remanded.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "February 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF PUNJAB a AN1L\n\nSHRI SlJKH RA1 BAii;\\ DUR\n\nFebruary 22, 1968 [], C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MiTTEll; 11:]\n\nCivil Service-Completion of probation-If probationer •ntltld to tub-· stanllve oppointment-Reversiun to sub.rtanti•• par,,Whon O/J!Utllts \"' punishment."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MiTTEll", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF PUNJAB a AN1L\n\nSHRI SlJKH RA1 BAii;\\ DUR\n\nFebruary 22, 1968 [], C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MiTTEll; 11:]\n\nCivil Service-Completion of probation-If probationer •ntltld to tub-· stanllve oppointment-Reversiun to sub.rtanti•• par,,Whon O/J!Utllts \"' punishment."}}, {"text": "23/26th May 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was however no enquiry at all, and much later, by an order dated 23/26th May 1958, the Punjab Government reverted him to his substantive post in the Delhi."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was however no enquiry at all, and much later, by an order dated 23/26th May 1958, the Punjab Government reverted him to his substantive post in the Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi. Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was however no enquiry at all, and much later, by an order dated 23/26th May 1958, the Punjab Government reverted him to his substantive post in the Delhi."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1564, "end_char": 1572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3254, "end_char": 3262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R. 606", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3383, "end_char": 3402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vikram Chand Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Chand Mahajan, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4134, "end_char": 4148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Chand Mahajan, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4153, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Chand Mahajan, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants ."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, Arub B. Saharya, Vishnu B. Saharya and Youginder Khushalani, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Arub B. Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, Arub B. Saharya, Vishnu B. Saharya and Youginder Khushalani, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Vishnu B. Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4221, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, Arub B. Saharya, Vishnu B. Saharya and Youginder Khushalani, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Youginder Khushalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4243, "end_char": 4263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, Arub B. Saharya, Vishnu B. Saharya and Youginder Khushalani, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the C2urt was delivered by Mitter, J. This appeal is by a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4411, "end_char": 4419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukh Raj Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4897, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sukh Raj Bahadur", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4983, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, Sukh Raj Bahadur, respondent herein was a permanent official of the office of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Decem- Oer 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4993, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Decem- Oer 9, 1952 he was accepted as a candidate for the post of Extra Assistant Commissioner on the Register A~II of the Punjab Government along with two otliers, on the advice of the Punjab Public\n\nService O>mmission."}}, {"text": "Jullundur Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was posted as Inspector, Local Bodies, Jullundur Division and Assistant to Commissioner, Jullundur Division."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, he acted as Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar."}}, {"text": "(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n21", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5718, "end_char": 5737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".J'he same was however not extended by any order of the Governor of Punjab."}}, {"text": "P.C.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner claimed that Jlllder r. 24 of the said rules he became qualified for substantive permanent appointment to the P.C.S. (Executive Branch)."}}, {"text": "Government of PJllljab, Anti-Corruption Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He , received a charge sheet with a letter dated January 14, 1957 from the Secretary to the Government of PJllljab, Anti-Corruption Department, asking him to reply to the charge sheet within a fort night and to inform whether he would produce defence or whether he would like to be heard in person."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6645, "end_char": 6661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner replied to the charge sheet on January 28, 1957 stating that he wanted an opportunity of being heard in person."}}, {"text": "Punjab State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Punjab State dated 23/26th May 1958 puxporting to be one Jlllder r. 23 of the aforesaid rules, he was reverted by the Punjab State Government to his substantive post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "Punjab State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Punjab State dated 23/26th May 1958 puxporting to be one Jlllder r. 23 of the aforesaid rules, he was reverted by the Punjab State Government to his substantive post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6953, "end_char": 6973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Punjab State dated 23/26th May 1958 puxporting to be one Jlllder r. 23 of the aforesaid rules, he was reverted by the Punjab State Government to his substantive post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "23 /26th May 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner, the said order of 23 /26th May 1958 terminated his service under the Punjab State Government and permanently removed him from the Punjab Civil Service."}}, {"text": "Punjab Civil Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7157, "end_char": 7177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the petitioner, the said order of 23 /26th May 1958 terminated his service under the Punjab State Government and permanently removed him from the Punjab Civil Service."}}, {"text": "Sukh Raj Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order complained of runs as follows :- \"The Governor of Punjab is pleased to revert Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, officiating, from P.C.S. (Executive Branch) to the post of Superintendent under the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, with immediate effect.\"", "canonical_name": "Sukh Raj Bahadur"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1963] 3 S.C.R. 716", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14110, "end_char": 14129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ayan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14488, "end_char": 14496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an enquiry and any action consequent on such an enquiry would not be covered by principle of Ram a N flT, ayan Das' s case, as laid down by the Supreme COurt\n\nin Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab & others(').\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme COurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14526, "end_char": 14539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an enquiry and any action consequent on such an enquiry would not be covered by principle of Ram a N flT, ayan Das' s case, as laid down by the Supreme COurt\n\nin Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab & others(').\"."}}, {"text": "Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14817, "end_char": 14841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench however observed that altliough no enquiry in the proper sense of the word had been held the omission to hold such an enquiry could not be made a ground for saying that the case difiered in principle either from Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2 ) case or Madan Gopafs(') case.", "canonical_name": "Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2"}}, {"text": "Madan Gopafs", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14852, "end_char": 14864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bench however observed that altliough no enquiry in the proper sense of the word had been held the omission to hold such an enquiry could not be made a ground for saying that the case difiered in principle either from Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2 ) case or Madan Gopafs(') case.", "canonical_name": "Madan Gopafs"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15387, "end_char": 15404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find ourselves unable to accept the reasoning or the conclusion arrived at by the learned J udgcs of the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court."}}, {"text": "Apart from the question as to the right of the respondent under the Punjab Civil Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15863, "end_char": 15957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parshotam LalDhingra's(8", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16188, "end_char": 16212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out in Parshotam LalDhingra's(8 ) case.", "canonical_name": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra's(8"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16851, "end_char": 16864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Ram Narayan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17327, "end_char": 17342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of State of Orissa and another v, Ram Narayan Das(') the respondent who was a Sub-Inspector of Police on probation in the Orissa Police Force, was served with a notice to show cause why he should not be discharged from service \"for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work\".", "canonical_name": "Ram Narayan Das's(1"}}, {"text": "Orissa Police Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17415, "end_char": 17434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of State of Orissa and another v, Ram Narayan Das(') the respondent who was a Sub-Inspector of Police on probation in the Orissa Police Force, was served with a notice to show cause why he should not be discharged from service \"for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 17983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopi KiShore Prasad's(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18601, "end_char": 18624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court distinguished Gopi KiShore Prasad's(2 ) case on the ground that there the pu.blic servant had been discharged from service consequent upon an enquiry into alleged misconduct and the.", "canonical_name": "Gopi Kish_ore Prasad's(2"}}, {"text": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra's(8", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19099, "end_char": 19124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is decisive is whether the order is by way of punishment in the light of the tests laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's(8 ).\"", "canonical_name": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra's(8"}}, {"text": "[1961) 1 S.C.R. 606", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19501, "end_char": 19520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23-10-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19616, "end_char": 19624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "590/1962\n\ndecided on 23-10-63."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20218, "end_char": 20243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government however decided to continue his temporary service in Class I for another year with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20270, "end_char": 20286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following an incident on February 9, 1951, the Commissioner of Patna Division was appointed to make an enquiry into the same."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20308, "end_char": 20313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following an incident on February 9, 1951, the Commissioner of Patna Division was appointed to make an enquiry into the same."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20427, "end_char": 20442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 21, 1951, the Government passed an order reverting the appellant to his substantive post in Class II and trans ferred him from Patna College to Ranchi College."}}, {"text": "Patna College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20561, "end_char": 20574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 21, 1951, the Government passed an order reverting the appellant to his substantive post in Class II and trans ferred him from Patna College to Ranchi College."}}, {"text": "Ranchi College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20578, "end_char": 20592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 21, 1951, the Government passed an order reverting the appellant to his substantive post in Class II and trans ferred him from Patna College to Ranchi College."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20804, "end_char": 20821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on his behalf that the order of 21st August, 1951 amounted to infliction of punishment."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21412, "end_char": 21423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21753, "end_char": 21761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21808, "end_char": 21819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the appellant, Madan Gopal, was appointed an Inspector of Consolidation \"on temporary basis and terminable with one month's notice\".", "canonical_name": "Madan Gopafs"}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22401, "end_char": 22412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he services of Madan Gopal be terminated forthwith and that m heu of notice he would receive one month's\n\n~42 SUPRBMB COURT REPOllTS\n\npay as required by the rules.", "canonical_name": "Madan Gopafs"}}, {"text": "Ram Narayan Das's(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22903, "end_char": 22922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After discussing Ram Narayan Das's(1) case, the conclusion arrived at was that:\n\n\"Such an enquiry and order consequent upon the report made in the enquiry will not fall within the principle of Ram Narayan Das' s(') case.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Narayan Das's(1"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25549, "end_char": 25563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of discharge of the appellant ran as follows :\n\n\"Shri Jagdish Mitter, a temporary Second Division Clerk of this office having been found undesirable to be retained in Government service is hereby served with a month'8 notice of discharge with effect from November\n\n1, 1949.\"", "canonical_name": "Jagdish Mit ter"}}, {"text": "November\n\n1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of discharge of the appellant ran as follows :\n\n\"Shri Jagdish Mitter, a temporary Second Division Clerk of this office having been found undesirable to be retained in Government service is hereby served with a month'8 notice of discharge with effect from November\n\n1, 1949.\""}}, {"text": "Central Tractor Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26078, "end_char": 26106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the appellant was temporarily employed as Stores Officer in the Central Tractor Organisation."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26349, "end_char": 26363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The services of the appellant were terminated on April 23, 1954."}}, {"text": "Central Tractor Organisa tion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26451, "end_char": 26480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had been certain complaints against him in respect whereof the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisa tion sent a notice to him asking him to show cause why discipli nary action ."}}, {"text": "Seretary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26789, "end_char": 26797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "should not be taken against him and an Enquiry Officer was appointed, but before the enquiry could be completed, the Chairman recommended that the services of the appellant should be terminated under r. 5 observing in his note to the\n\nSeretary that :\n\n\"The deoartmental proceedings will take a much Ion ger time and we are not sure whether after ing through all the formalities we will be able to deal with the accus cd in the way he deserves.\""}}, {"text": "13-12·196b.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27640, "end_char": 27651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1341/1966 decided on 13-12·196b."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27658, "end_char": 27697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "244 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nOn a conspectus of these cases, the following propositions are."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27963, "end_char": 27971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28636, "end_char": 28644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28729, "end_char": 28737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdish Mit ter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29313, "end_char": 29328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circum\n\nstances, the principle in Madan Gopal's( ) case or Jagdish Mit ter's(') case will not be applicable.", "canonical_name": "Jagdish Mit ter"}}, {"text": "13-12·66.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30279, "end_char": 30288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1341/66 dated 13-12·66."}}, {"text": "23-10-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30300, "end_char": 30308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "docidtd Ob 23-10-68."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_246_250_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "AMOLAK CHAND v.\n\nRAGHUVEER SINGH\n\nFebruary 22, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nRepre:\"nt\"tion of the People Act, 1955, ss. 33, 36-0ne el.ctor whetlier niay propose two candidates in a single me, nber constituency-Candidale\n\nunnenarily filling caste colu111n in nomlnation paper-Nomination paper whether liable to he rejecud.\n\nThe appellant and the respondent were rival candidates for election to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly in the 1967 general election.\n\nBesides t~ two other candidates had filed nomination papers but these were rejected on the ground that they had both been proposec\\ by the same elector.\n\nThe appellant won the election.\n\nThe respondent in his election petition before 1hc High Coun urged that the election had to be set aside because the nomination papers of the aforesaid two candidates had been wrongly rejected. The High Court held the election to be void.\n\nUnder s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 the appellant came to this Court,\n\nHELD : The appeal must be dismissed.\n\n(i) After the amendment made by Act 27 of 1956, there is no longer any express ban or prohibition under ss. 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act against an \"?leotor proposing more than one candidate in a single seat constituency, nor' is there such a necessary implication in any other provision of the Act. On the other hand the said amendment indi cotes that it was the intention of Parliament that there should be no ban on the. number of candidates to be proposei by an elector for a single seat constituency. [248 D-249 BJ • ·\n\n(ii) The two candidates whose nomination papers were rejected, un~ necessarily filled the column indicating their caste. Such a requirement is there only for resei:ved seats. But there is nothing in s. 33 (2) or in the rules forbidding the candidate from mentioning his caste, and the mention of cate therefore did not invalidate the nomination papers. [249 HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1352 of 1967.\n\nAppeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Election Petition No. 2 of 1967.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nD. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by H Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought unde; s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the\n\nA Act', from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated August 25, 1967 in Election Petition No. 2 of 1967 whereby the High Court held that he election of the appellant from Barwaha Vidhan Sabha Constituency held on February 20, 1967 was void.\n\nThe appellant was a candidate at the election of the Legisla live Assembly of the State of Madhya Pradesh from Barwaha Constituency held on February 20, 1967. The respondent was a candidate for election from the same Constituency. Besides the appellant and the responden.t, there were two other candidates, namely,· Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram.\n\nThere were two nomination papers filed for Nathu son of Rupa, one nomination paper (R-3) was filed on January 19, 1967 at 2.12 p.m. and the second nomination paper (R-1) was filed on January 20, 1967 at 12.47 p.m. The nomination paper of Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram (Rl) was also filed on January 20,\n\n1967 at 2.32 p.m. In all the three nomination papers, the name of the candidate was proposed by one Sharawan son of Gheesa, an elector from that Constituency. On January 21, 1967, the Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers of the two candidates, Nathu son of R, upa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram on the ground that the same elector could not propose two different candidates for the same Consituency. At the polling which took E place on February 20, 1967 the appellant was declared elected to the Assembly from the aforesaid Constituency on February 22, 1967 by the Returning Officer.\n\nOn March 29, 1967, the respondent filed an Election Petition under s. 80 of the Act in the High Court against 1he appellant. The respondent sought a decla ration that the election of the appellant was void under s. lOO(c)\n\nof the Act on the ground that the nomination papers of Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram were improperly rejected.\n\nBy its judgment dated August 25, 1967, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondent and declared the elec lion of the appellant from Barwaha Constituency to be void.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant Mr. Gupte put forward the argument that under the scheme and policy of the Act an elector can propose only one candidate for a single seat Constituency and not more than one candidate and if more than one nomination is made for a single seat Constituency, all the i:iominations should be taken to be null and void. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 33(2) of the Act, as it was originally enacted in 1951, contained an express ban against the same elector proposing more than one candidate for a single seat Constituency-Section 33(2) states:\n\nL6Sup.C.l./68-3\n\n\"Any person whose name is registered in the electoral roll of the constituency and who is not subject to any disqualification mentioned in section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 may subscribe as proposer or seconder as many nomination papers as there are vacancies lo be filled but no more.\"\n\nSection 36(7)(b) reads as follows:\n\n\"(7) For the purposes of this section\n\n(b) where a person has subscribed, whether as r ·. ooser or seconder,· a larger number of non1ina- 110;1 papers than there are vacancies to be filled, those of the papers so subscribed which have been first receiv. cd, up to the number of vacancies to be filled, shall be deemed to be valid.\"\n\nBut by the Amending Act 27 of 1956, ss. 33 and 36 have been re :ast and do not contain any ban as that contemplated by s. 33\n\n(2) of the unamended Act.\n\nSection 33(1) & (2) <ifter the amendment reads thus :\n\n\"33. Presentation of nomination paper and requirements for a valid nomination.-(1) On or before the date appointed under clause (a) of section 30 each candidate shall, either in person or by his proposer between the hours of eleven o'clock in the forenoon and three o'clock in the afternoon deliver to the returning officer at the place specified in this behalf in the notice issued under section 31 a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and signed by the candidate and by an elector of the constituency as proposer.\n\nProvided that no nomination paper shall be delivered to the returning officer on a day which is a public holiday.\n\n(2) In a constituency where any seat is reserved. a candidate shall not be deemed to be qualified to be chosen to fill that seat unless his nomination paper contains a declaration by him specifying the particular caste or tribe of which he is a member and the area in relation to which that caste or tribe is a Scheduled Caste or, as the case may. be, a Scheduled Tribe of the State.\"\n\nJt is true thats. 33(6) as it stands at present enables a proposer to file more than one nomination paper in respect of the same candidate, but this sub-section has no bearing on the question presented for determination in the present appeal. It is manifest\n\nthat there is no express ban or prohibition under s. 33 or s. 36 of the present Act against an elector proposing more than one candidate for a single seat Constituency.\n\nMr. Gupte. has not been able to point out anything in the context or language of other sections of the Act for leading to the necessary implication that an elector cannot propose more than one candidate for a single seat Constituency. On the other hand, the amendment to s. 33 of the Act by the Amending Act 27 of 1956 indicates that it was the intention of Parliament that there should be. no ban on the number of nomination papers or the number of candidates to be proposed by an elector for a single seat Constituency. On behalf of the appellant reference was made to page 13 3 of Schofield's 'Parliamentary Elections', Second Edition in which it is said that \"no person is permitted to sign more than one nomi\n\nnation paper at the same election and if he does then his signature is operative only in the case of the paper which is first deJi, ered\". But this statement is based on r. 8(2) of the Parliamentary Elections Rules of the British Parliament.\n\nThere is no such statutory provision made under the Act for parliamentary elections in India and the analogy is not applicable.\n\nWe are accordingly of the opinion that Counsel for the appellant has been unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case.\n\nIt was contended, in the next place, that Nathu and Sita Ram had mentioned in the nomination papers that they were Balais belonging to the Scheduled Caste and this was contrary to the direc.tion that the column indicating caste or tribe should be struck off except in the case of reserved seat. It was therefore argued . that the nomination papers of Nathu and Sita Ram were rightly rejected by the returning officer. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The printed form 2-A is meant both for General and Rerved Constitu.encies but while it i; obligatory for candidates in the reserved constituency to make a deelaration in the proper column that he is a member of a particular caste or tribe, there is no such rule . with regard to a General Constituency.\n\nSection 3 3 ( 2) of the Act imposes an obligation on the candidate in the reserved constituency to make a declaration in the proper column, but there is no such direction in the statute with regard to the General Constituency.\n\nIn our opinion, the mention of the caste of the candidate in the nomination form was a clear superfluity because it was not nsary for the candidate to fill in the colum~ when he was conte:dng in a General Constituency; but there is nothing either in the section or in the rules forbidding the candidate from mentioning his caste. In our opinion, there is no violation of the provisions of s. 33 of the Act or the breach of general directions\n\ncontained in Rule 4 and the nomination papers cannot be !:dd to be invalid on this account.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that the judgment of the MaJhya Pradesh High Court dated August 25, 1967 is correct and '.his appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismis.<cd.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "AMOLAK CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMOLAK CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUVEER SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUVEER SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMOLAK CHAND v.\n\nRAGHUVEER SINGH\n\nFebruary 22, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nRepre:\"nt\"tion of the People Act, 1955, ss."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "People Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 33, 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1955", "statute": "the People Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 925, "end_char": 931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1955", "statute": "the People Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 941, "end_char": 975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1174, "end_char": 1206, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1794, "end_char": 1799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2048, "end_char": 2082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2230, "end_char": 2244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. D. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2286, "end_char": 2297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Varma and Ganpat Rai for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought unde; s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the\n\nA Act', from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated August 25, 1967 in Election Petition No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2422, "end_char": 2428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought unde; s. 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the\n\nA Act', from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated August 25, 1967 in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the appellant and the responden.t, there were two other candidates, namely,· Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "Rupa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3092, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the appellant and the responden.t, there were two other candidates, namely,· Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the appellant and the responden.t, there were two other candidates, namely,· Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the appellant and the responden.t, there were two other candidates, namely,· Nathu son of Rupa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two nomination papers filed for Nathu son of Rupa, one nomination paper (R-3) was filed on January 19, 1967 at 2.12 p.m. and the second nomination paper (R-1) was filed on January 20, 1967 at 12.47 p.m. The nomination paper of Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram (Rl) was also filed on January 20,\n\n1967 at 2.32 p.m. In all the three nomination papers, the name of the candidate was proposed by one Sharawan son of Gheesa, an elector from that Constituency.", "canonical_name": "Nathu"}}, {"text": "January 20,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two nomination papers filed for Nathu son of Rupa, one nomination paper (R-3) was filed on January 19, 1967 at 2.12 p.m. and the second nomination paper (R-1) was filed on January 20, 1967 at 12.47 p.m. The nomination paper of Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram (Rl) was also filed on January 20,\n\n1967 at 2.32 p.m. In all the three nomination papers, the name of the candidate was proposed by one Sharawan son of Gheesa, an elector from that Constituency."}}, {"text": "Sharawan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3529, "end_char": 3537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two nomination papers filed for Nathu son of Rupa, one nomination paper (R-3) was filed on January 19, 1967 at 2.12 p.m. and the second nomination paper (R-1) was filed on January 20, 1967 at 12.47 p.m. The nomination paper of Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram (Rl) was also filed on January 20,\n\n1967 at 2.32 p.m. In all the three nomination papers, the name of the candidate was proposed by one Sharawan son of Gheesa, an elector from that Constituency."}}, {"text": "Gheesa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two nomination papers filed for Nathu son of Rupa, one nomination paper (R-3) was filed on January 19, 1967 at 2.12 p.m. and the second nomination paper (R-1) was filed on January 20, 1967 at 12.47 p.m. The nomination paper of Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram (Rl) was also filed on January 20,\n\n1967 at 2.32 p.m. In all the three nomination papers, the name of the candidate was proposed by one Sharawan son of Gheesa, an elector from that Constituency."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3591, "end_char": 3607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 21, 1967, the Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers of the two candidates, Nathu son of R, upa and Sita Ram son of Sadhu Ram on the ground that the same elector could not propose two different candidates for the same Consituency."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the polling which took E place on February 20, 1967 the appellant was declared elected to the Assembly from the aforesaid Constituency on February 22, 1967 by the Returning Officer."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the polling which took E place on February 20, 1967 the appellant was declared elected to the Assembly from the aforesaid Constituency on February 22, 1967 by the Returning Officer."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 29, 1967, the respondent filed an Election Petition under s. 80 of the Act in the High Court against 1he appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4093, "end_char": 4098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated August 25, 1967, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondent and declared the elec lion of the appellant from Barwaha Constituency to be void."}}, {"text": "Barwaha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated August 25, 1967, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondent and declared the elec lion of the appellant from Barwaha Constituency to be void."}}, {"text": "Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant Mr. Gupte put forward the argument that under the scheme and policy of the Act an elector can propose only one candidate for a single seat Constituency and not more than one candidate and if more than one nomination is made for a single seat Constituency, all the i:iominations should be taken to be null and void."}}, {"text": "Section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4950, "end_char": 4963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5129, "end_char": 5142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5308, "end_char": 5318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 36(7)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "by the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5885, "end_char": 5898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But by the Amending Act", "statute": "But by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But by the Amending Act", "statute": "But by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But by the Amending Act", "statute": "But by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But by the Amending Act", "statute": "But by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6446, "end_char": 6456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But by the Amending Act", "statute": "But by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7399, "end_char": 7404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7408, "end_char": 7413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the amendment to s. 33 of the Act by the Amending Act 27 of 1956 indicates that it was the intention of Parliament that there should be."}}, {"text": "Schofield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8103, "end_char": 8112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant reference was made to page 13 3 of Schofield's 'Parliamentary Elections', Second Edition in which it is said that \"no person is permitted to sign more than one nomi\n\nnation paper at the same election and if he does then his signature is operative only in the case of the paper which is first deJi, ered\"."}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this statement is based on r. 8(2) of the Parliamentary Elections Rules of the British Parliament."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no such statutory provision made under the Act for parliamentary elections in India and the analogy is not applicable."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9522, "end_char": 9531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10139, "end_char": 10144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MaJhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10337, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons we hold that the judgment of the MaJhya Pradesh High Court dated August 25, 1967 is correct and '.his appeal must be dismissed with costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_251_311_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v.\n\nBIRLA COTION, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI\n\nAND ANOTHER February 23, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH,\n\nS. M. S!KRI, V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT\n\nAND C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM, JJ.j Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1951 ss. 113 and 150-Powcr to Corporation under ss. 113(2) and 150 to levy optional taxes subject to Ce111ral Governmenfs approval-if excessive delegation and therefore ultra vi:res.\n\nDtlhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act 35 of 1966-Wlrether effectively validated levy of tax between July I, 1959 and March 31, 1966.\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 11-Centrcl Governmenfs sanction signed by Deputy Secretary without the words \"By order oJ the President'• or similar words-Whether deficiency made up by subsequent affidavit sta.tin~\n\napproval given by minister-If Deputy Minister assigned certain work can give effective approval-or whether matter must go to Cabinet Minister also.\n\nOn February 9, 1959, the appellant Corporation passed a resolution under section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 for the levy of certain taxes including a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity, Under s. 150(2) the Central Government sanctioned the l'!J<\n\nwith'effect from July I, 1959 and also modified the rates of tax. The Corporation resolved on June 24, 19S9 under s. 150(3 )' to determine the rates sanctioned by the Central Government as the rates at which the tax would be leviable for the year 1959-60. The respondent challenged the levy of the tax by a writ petition which was allowed in appeal and it was held, inter alia, that the Central Government could not modify the rates but only withhold .or &fant sanction.\n\nParliament th<'n passed Act 35 of 1966 te> validate the levy of the electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966. On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates.\n\nThe respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the levy of tax by the\n\nresolutions of February 17, and December 27, 1965, and the vires of the Validation Act. The High Court allowed the petitions holding that though the Validation Act validated the levy and collection of tax from July !. 1959 to March 31. 1960 it did not do so for the period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966. It also held that section 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra virt.~.\n\nThe respondent appealed to this Court.\n\n HELD: (i) (By the Full Court) : The Validation Act 35 of 1966 validly levies and imposes tax on consumption Or sale of electricity till March 31, 1966.\n\n(Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the\n\nperiod from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act meiely validatc, d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period.\n\nWhen\n\ncction 2(1) lays down that the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966 it must be understood to sanction the Icvy and collection of tax at the rates fixed. This is implicit in the word ''actual'' which governs the words\n\n11rates oj the tax\". Even if there was some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2(1), that doubt is resoJv .. cd by the words of s. 2(2), which lays down that \"all taxes on the con .. sumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have h.::en Jevie<l or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in sub-- section (I) shllll, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always beep. validly levied or collected.\" This clearly shows that the vali<latlo11 was not merely of the rate of tax hut of levy and collection also for the entire period from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966, A reading of s. 2(1) ; md s. 2(2) together shows that Parliament not only validated what was done but also itself impoo>d the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24. 1959 and authorised the levy and collection thereof for the entire period from July I. 1959 to March 31. 1966 notwithstanding anything contained in any judgmnt, decree or order of any court to the contrary.\n\nI :!76 H-278 BJ\n\n(ii) (Per Wanchoo, C.J. and Shelat, J.) : On a consideration of the various provisions of the Act, it must be held that the power conferred by section 150 of the Act on the Corporation is not unguided and cannot be said to amount to excessive delegation.\n\nAlthough the delegation made in relation to the optional taxes under ss. 113(2) and 150 is wide, there arc sufficient guidelines, limits, controls or safeguards provided by the legislature in view of the fo11owing: la) The dele.gation has been made to an elected body respons'blo to he people including those who pay the taxes; 1his is an important check on the elected CounciJlors acting unreasonably and fixing unreasonable rates of taxation; (b) the limit to which the Cor· poration can tax is cifcun1scribed by the need to .finance the functions, obligatory or optional, which it has to or mal' un<Nrtakc to perform, under the Act. It \\viii not be. opn to the Corporation by the use of taxing pO\\\\'Cr to collect more than it needs for the functions it performs; though the mere tact that specific purposes and functions are set out in an itn· pugnec.i Act may not be conclusive it is one of the factors which should be taken into account along with othr relevant factors; ( c) budget estin1atc:; J1a'\\iC to be adopted each year as laid do, vn in section 109 of the Act; (d) under section 150(2). the maximum rates fixed by the Corporation have to be submitted to the Central Govcrnment for its sanction; thou11:h there~ forz the legislature may not have provided ttiat the rates of tax shall bo , ubmitted to it for approval. the fact that they have to he suhmitl'd to Governn1ent for approval and the Government in its turn is r-sponsiblc\n\nto the legislature is a factor \\Vhich has to be taken into account when\n\nconsidring whether the tlelcg:ition by s<:ction 150 of the. Act iscxc~&sive or not. [275 B; :!71 D; 272 D; H; 273 E]\n\nFurthermore, should the Corporation fix ra 1es v.:hich are unrcasoaablc it would always be open lo the Courts to strike down such in1post. Kruse\n\nv. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B.D. 91; referred to. [274 El\n\nUnder certain circums'.ances fixation of rates of taxation can also be delegated to subordinate authorities v.-ith propr guidance. and !-.UhjC?Ct to safeguards and limitations. lI\n\nPandit Banarsi Dc.s Bhanot v. lhe Stale of Madhya Prad£'.\\h, [1959.1 S.C.R. 427; considered.\n\nMUNL. CORPN. DELHl V. BJRLA. MllLS _ 253\n\n--------~ \\\\'There is a clear distinction between delgation of power to fix the Z?-te of a tax like sales tax tothe State Government and delegation of fi-nng rates of certain taxes for purposes of local taxation.\n\nThe needs of the S[ate are unlimited and the purposes for which the State exists are also urdimited.\n\nOu the other hand, in the case of a municipality, however large may be the amount required by it for its purposes, it cannot be unlimited, for the amount that a municipality can spend is limited by the purposes for which it is created. [268 D-Gl\n\n(Per Hidayatulla!J and Ranzasn:ami; JJ.) : \\Vhile the provisions \\vbfch have been characterised as safegUards {wh_ere found necessary) are desirable~ the proper test-ta apply is not the existence of safeguards but \\vh.:t!-..cr lhe Igislative will to impose the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind those who have to pay the tax. This requires an examination of the poliC\"f and provisions of the Act with a v:cw to determining \\vhether the legislative will is fully expressed to invest tho;!- ~Iunicipal Corporation \\\\.t:th t::e po .. ver to levy the tax subject, of course, toa proper procedure beirt~\n\nevolved. [280 D, El\n\nThe doctrin~ that Parliament cannot delegate its po\\.\\oers must be unJt:rstood in a limlted Vlay .. It only means that the legislature must not efface itself but mus.t give the legislative sanction to the imposition of the ta..\"t. and must keep the control in its own hands. There is no specific provision\n\ni~ the Constitution which says that the Parliament cannot delegate to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its o\\vn \\\\.ill. TLlc question always is whether the legis!a•ive vrill has been cxrciscd or not.\n\nOnce it is established. that the legislature itself ha3 \"illeJ. that a parti..:clar thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted. \"With its control there can be nQ question of excessive delgation..\n\nIf the delegate acts contrary to the v.ish:s of the legislature, the legislature can undo •.vhat the delegate has_ Jone. Even the courts may be asked to intervene when the Jclcgat\\! exceeds its pov.; ers and functions. The observations and theories in Amrican case:; cannot be applied in our country without reflection. Even in America the doctrine is much \\Vatered down especially v.hen it is. a qu:stion of inves:ing municipalities 'Nith power of such taxation. In the present case~\n\nin addition to prescribing the mode. the legislature has kept a check by rnaking Government. answcrable to itself. the supervising authority. This\n\nis not a safeguard. hut is indca•ive of the exercise of the legislative will by the legislature itself. The details of the tax are to be consiJercd by the supervising authority and if 1he tax is no~ what th~ legio; lature intended should be imposed. the t:c\"< cannot be imposed. [287 B-Gl ·\n\nAs local bo<les are intended to carry on local self-governm.znt. the po\\\\oer of taxation is a ncary adjunct to their other pov.ers.\n\nThey function under the supervision of the Government.\n\nThis supervi., ion is considetcd necessary because lunicipal Councillors as a rule are Un\\.i.-illing to tax in 3. manner likely to affect them.selves.. To insis~ that the lt!gislaturc .<, hould provide for every matter connccl.ed v.ith municipal taxation \\YOuld rr1akc n1unicipalities mere tax collecting departments of Government and not self-governing bodies wh'ch they are intended to be. [288 E, Fl\n\n(Per Sikri, J.) : Parliament h;.is full power to delegat: leglsiativc authority to subordinate bodies. This po\\.\\o'er flO\\.VS from A'rt. ::!46 of the Con3titution. The \\vord exclusive\" in that Article means exclusive of any other legislature and not exclusive of subordinate body. There is. hov,; ever. one\n\nres.triction in this respect and that is also contained in Art. '.!-1-6.\n\nParliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the relevant legislJ.tive list.\n\nNegatively, this means that Parliament cannot abdicate its functions. This was th.! position under the various Government of India\n\nActs, and the Constitution has made no difference in this respect.\n\n1309 H-310 BJ\n\n.In 3!1-Y event howver, in the present case there is adequate guide, or pocy, m the expression \"purposes of the Act\" in s.- 113. The Act has pomte~ out the objectives or the results to be achieved, and taxation can be .levied on!Y for .the purpose of achieving the obje.c•ives or the results.\n\nThIS JS sufficient guidance especially to a self-governing body like the Delhi Municipal Corporation. It is not necessary to rely on the safeguards to B sustain the delegation under s. 113(2) and s. 150. [310 OJ\n\n(Per Shah c.nd Vaidialingam, JI. dissenting) : Section 150(1) of the Act 66 of 1957 is void as permitting excessive delegation of legislative authority to the Corporation.\n\nAuthority to legisla:e in respect of powers of local bodies may encompass authroity to confer power upon the local bodies to tax within certain specific fields in the appropriate list.\n\nBut the power conferred by the Jegislative entry cannot override the constitutional limitations against abdi. cation of Jegislative authority. The expression j'power'' therefore does not include authority to delegate the essential legislative function without disclosi\"g principles, policy, or standard guiding the local bodies in the exercise of the power. [302 C-D]\n\nThe vice of delegation lies not in its capacity for abuse, but in its delegation beyond permissible limits and contrary to the constitutional scheme.\n\nUndoubtedly delegation of the authority to legislate is always subject to the rule that action of the delegale which amounts to unreasonable exercise of the powers will be invalid.\n\nBut that does not alter the true character of the rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority. It cannot be said that this rule may be departed from on the ground that the delegate is hedged in by controls or restrictions which will prevent it from abusing its authority. Safeguards against abuse do not alter the character of unauthorised delegation of legislative power. They cannot be a substitJte for the guidance which the constitutional scheme requires that the Parliament must give to a delegate. As. the validi'y of the constitutional protection cannot be judged in the light of what the character. capacity or the special aptitude of the delegate may be, it cannot also be adjudged in the light of the provisions made against abuse of power.\n\nIn the present case the Act leaves it to the Corporation by resolution to define the maximum limits of tax to be levied. the class or classes of persons, or description or descriptions of articles and propert:es to be taxed. the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted. The Act discloses by eXpress enactment no 'Standard, no principle and no policy laid down by the Parliament to guide the Corporation in levying and collecting the optional taxes. By providing in sub-section (2) of s. 150 that the resolution will come into force on or from the date as may be specified in the order of sanction of the Centrl Governmel?-t an overriding authority is conferred upon the Union Executive, but that is not a substitute for, guidance. [303 C-El The Corporation is competent to levy tax only \"for the purposes of the Act\" and for no other purpose, and by providing expressly what is implicit i~ a statute relating to municipal taxation no guidanee is furnished to the Corporation in the exercise of the power delegated. It cannot be held that because the delegate is a local authority which \"needs\" large funds depending upon diverse and changing circumstances, the power conferred upon the Corporation to adjust the tax to its varying need~ may be regarded as an adequate guide.\n\nThe circumstance that the affairs of\n\nMUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 255 •\n\n. .\\ the Corporation are administered by the elec!ed representatives responsibleto lhe people is wholly irrelevant in determining whether the rule against excessive delegation may be departed from. If that excr.ption be tme, the Parliament may justifiably delegate its power to enact laws to other bodie5 merely by the expedient of constituting those bodies from among the representatives of the people.\n\nCase Jaw r-:viewed.\n\n(iii) (Per Wanclwo C.J. and Size/at, J,) : There was no force in the contenlion that the sanction of the Central Government given under section 150(2) was .not in accordance with the Constitution as it was: glven by a Deputy Secretary to the Government wlio had no authority to do so.\n\nAlthough the words \"\"by the orders of the Central Government\" or \"by the order of the President\" were not used above the signature of the Deputy Secreta'ry and the authentication therefore was not quite in accordance with the provisions of Art. 77 of the Constitution, that deficiency had been made up by the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government in which it was stated that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy Home Minister and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom 1he work relating to the Corporation was assigned by the Home Minister.\n\nFurthermore, i.'. is not necessary \\\\'here business has been assigned by a Cabinet Minister to a Minister or a Deputy Minister that the malt!r should he put before the Cabinet Minister also after the Minister or the Deputy\n\nMinistr has approved of it in accordance, wi_th the assignment made in his favour. [275 E-276 DJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISD!CTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1857 and 1858 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated October 9, 1967 of the Delhi High Comt in Civil Writ No. 105 of 1967, and Writ Petition No. 564-D of 1966 respectively.\n\nC. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D.\n\nChawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nA. K. Sen, B. Parthasarthy, J. B . ., Dadachanji and Ravinder F Narain, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nR. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\nM. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. .\n\nN. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachanji, and Ravinder Narain, for in'erveners Nos. 2. 5 and 6.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for intervener No. S-.\n\nS. T. Desai and I. N, Shroff, for intervener No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.\n\nThe fac'.s are not in dispute and may be briefly narrated.\n\nOn February 9, 1959, the Corporation passec a molution purporting to be under sub-section (I) of s. 150 or the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, No. 66 of 1957. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for levy of three taxes, includini;\n\na tax on the consumption or sale of electricity.\n\nSection 113 ot the Act which confers powers on the Corporation to impose taxes has divided them into two kinds, namely, obligatory taxes. which the Corporation must impose [s. 113(1)], and optiona'. taxes which the Corporation may impose [section 113(2)].\n\nFur:her s. 150(1) of the Act provides that maximum rate of la\"\" to be levied in the case of optional taxes will be specified by '' resolution of the Corporation. After the maximum rate has 1hu.i been specified, the resolution. has to be submit'.ed to the Centra: Government for sanction under s. 150(2), and if sanctioned by Government, the rate comes in'.o force on and from such dat~\n\nas may be specified in the Order of. sanction.\n\nUnder subsection ( 3) of s. 150 the Corporation lhen passes another resolu:ion determining the actual rates at which the tax is l.vied and the tax comes into force on the first day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolutio11 is pa5'ed. The Corporation forwarded the resolution dated February 9. 1959 which was somewhat defect.iv.~ inasmuch as it die not specify the maximum rates, but merely the rates, which were to be enforced for the ensuing year, to Government for sanction On June 20, 1959, the Central Government sanctioned the tax on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from July I, 1959 In giving the sanction the Central Government modified the rates On June 23, 1959, the Standing Committee took the Government\n\nsanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporatim'. that rntes of tax as sanctioned by Government be detenninec under sub-s. (3) of s. 150 as !he actual rates at which the ta:- would be leviable for the year 1959-60. On June 24, 1959, the Corporation resolved that the recommendations of lhc :>tanding Committee regarding tax on consumption or sale of ,~Jectricity be approved.\n\nThen followed demands by the Corporation on the basis of the imposition of tax from July 1, 1959.\n\nWhen the tax was demanded from the respondent, it filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the levy of the tax This writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge.\n\nTh~\n\nMUNL, CORPN. PELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 257\n\nrespondent then went in appeal, and the appeal court allowed the appeal holding inter a/ia (i) that the Central Uovernment could not modify the rate; spedied in the resolution under s. 150 ( 1) but could only either withhold sanction thereto or sanction them, and (ii) that the liability to pay tax could not commence earlier than April 1, 1960. in view of the provisions contained in s. 109(2) read withs. 150(4) of the Act.\n\nOn December 3, 1966, Parliament passed the Delhi M\\!nicipal Corporation (Validation of Electrici'ty Tax) Act, No. 35 of 1%6 (hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act).\n\nBy :his Act, it purported to validate the levy of electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966 (both days inclusive). In view of the Validation Act, fresh demands were made by the Corporation on the respondent.\n\nOn February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution in pursuance of s. 150(1) and this time provided maximum rates for the levy of tax on consumption or sale of electricity.\n\nThese rates were higher than the rates fixed by the resolution of February 9, 1959. This resolution was submitted to Government and was sanctioned, on December 8, 1965. Thereafter the Corporation passed the second resolution under s. 150(3) of the Act resolving that the maximum ratei should be adopted as the actual rates for the levy of tax. This resolution was passed on December 27, 1965. Then followed two writ petitions by the respondent.\n\nBy the first writ petition it challenged the levy of tax by resolutions of February 17 and Dec.ember 27, 1965, and by the second writ petition the appellant challenged the vires of the Validation Act.\n\nWe may now refer to the grounds of the challenge.\n\nSo far as the Validation Act is concerned, it is contended that the Validation Ac't has failed in its object inasmuch as it did not provid~ for the levy of tax and merely validated the rates fixed by the resolution of June 24, 1959. Other grouncjs were also stres•ed in this connection but it is unnecessary to refer to them as they have not been pressed before us. As to the aitack on the. resoluiqns dated February 17, 1965 and December 27, 1965, the main contention is thats. 150 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and is therefore\n\nultra vires and no tax could be levied by the Corporation thereunder.\n\nThere are some other minor points raised in this connection to which we shall refer later.\n\nThe High Court held, so far as the Validation Act is concerned, that though it validated the levy and collection of tax from July I. 1959 to March 31, 1960, it failed to validate the levy and collection from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966 on\n\n258 SuPRBMB COUllT REPORTS\n\nthe ground that there was no Jevy of tax for this latter period, even though the rates were specified in the Validation Act.\n\nOn the question of excessive delegation, 'the High Court held that s. 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra vires. In consequence, the two writ petitions succeeded except as to the period from July\n\nI, 1959 to March 31, 1960. The Corporation then applied for and obtained certificates and that is how the rnater has come up before us.\n\nBefore we deal with the main question that has been argued before us, namely, whether s. 150 of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, we may briefly refer to certain provisions of the Act whiCh are material for our purposes. Section 3 of the Act creates a Corporation from such date as the Central Government may by notification in the official i:azet•e, appoint and this Corporation is charged with the municipal government of Delhi and is to be known as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Section 7 of the Act provides that the persons entitled to vote at elections of co11ncillors shall be .the persons registered by virtue of the provisions of the constitution and the Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1950, as voters at elections to the House of t.'1e People. It wilJ be seen therefore that the Councillors of the Corporation are elected by universal adult suffrage.\n\nThe total number of councillors is 80 and to these are added 6 eldermen, and they toether form the Corporation. Section 42 Jays down certain obligatory functions of the Corporation. It is not necessary to refer to them in detail; it is enough to say that the main obligatory functions of the Corporations are . the supply of water for public and private purposes, the constructlOll, maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works and of public latrines, the scavenging, removal and disposal of fil!h, the consiruction or purchase, maintenance, extension, management and conduct of (i) any undertaking for the generation or supply 11nd distribution of electricity to the public, and (ii) any undertaking for providing road transport servis by mechanicaDy propelled vehicles, the establishment and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity and child welfare entres nd carrying out of other measures necessary for public medical relief, the construction and rnain•enance of municipal markets and slaughter houses and regulation thereof, the construction, maintenance, alteration and irn provements of public streets, bridges, culverts, cau5eways and ihe like, the lighting, watering and cleansing of public streets and other public places, the\n\nesablishment, maintenance of, and aid to, schools for primary education and the maintenance of a fire-brigade and the protection of life and property in case of fire.\n\nMUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 259\n\nSection 43 provides for optional functions of the Corporation which it may in its discretion prqvide and a large number of such functions are enumerated therein. Some of these optional func•\n\ntions are : the establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, libraries, museums, art galleries, boianical or zoological collections, the providing of music or other entertainments in public places or places of public resort and the establishment of theatres and cinemas, the construction and maintenance of (i) rest houses, (ii) poor houses,\n\n(iii) infirmaries, (iv) children's homes, (v) houses for the deaf and <!umb and for disabled and handicapped children, (vi) shelters for destitute and disabled persons, and (vii) , asylums for persons of unsound mind, the organisation or management of chemical or bacteriological laboratories for the examination or analysis of water, food, and drugs for the detection of diseases or research connected with public health or medical relief; the provision for relief to destitute and disabled persons; the establishment and maintenance of veterinary hospitals; the organisation, construction, maintenance\n\nand managenient of swimming pools, public wash houses; bathing places and other institutions designed for the improvement of public health; the organisation and management of farms and dairies within or without Delhi for the supply, distribution and processing of milk and milk products for the benefit of the residents of Delhi; the organisation and management of cottage industries, handicraft centres and sales emporia; the provision for unfiltered water supply; the improvement of Delhi in accordance with improvement schemes approved by the Corporation; and the provisions of housing accommodation for the inhabitants of any area or for any class of inhabitants.\n\nThese duties, both obligatory and optional, which have been placed on the Coryoration requir~ large funds and for that purpose the Corporation has been given the power to levy taxes under s. 113 of the Act. Section 113 consists of two sub-sections; the first suD-sectfon provides for obligatory taxes and they are six in number. These six taxes have been dealt with in detail in sections 114 to 149. It is not necessary to refer to these sections except to say generally that in most cases the Act has fixed a maximum for the obligatory taxes except in the case of water tax, scavenging tax and tax, the rates of which have to be fixed. at a reasonable am()unt by the Corporati<>n.\n\nThen com~ s. 150, which deals with optional taxes and with which we are particularly concerned. It reads thus :\n\n\"(1) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a resolution for the levy of any <>f the taxes specified in sub-section (2) 6f secti<>n 113, defining the maximum\n\nrate of the tax to be levied, the class or cla!!Ses of\n\npersons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.\n\n(2) Any esolution passed under sub-section (1) shall be submitted to the Central Government for its sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government shall come into force on and from sue!\\ date as may be specified in the order of sanction.\n\n(3} After a resolution has come into force under sub-section ( 2), the Corporation may, subject to the maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable; and the tax shall come into force on the> fi!'St day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolution is passed,\n\n( 4) After a tax has been levied in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 109, shall apply in relation to such tax as they apply in relation to any tax imposed under sub-section ( l) of section 113.\"\n\nIt will be seen that sub-section (1) of s. 150 leaves it to the Corporation, at a meeting, to pass a resolution for the levy of any of the optional taxes by prescrib:ng the maximum rate. The Corporation is also given the power to. fix the class or classes E of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, for this purpose. It has also the power to lay down the system of asseisment and exemptions, if any, to be granted. Th' contention of the respondent is that s. 150\n\n( 1) delegates completely unguided power to the Corporation in the matter of optional taxes and suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is upcopstitutional.\n\nWe may also refer. to certain o'.her sections which deal with revenue and expenditure of the Corporation.\n\nSection 99 deals with the constitution of the municipal fund, in which all moneys of the Corporation go.\n\nSection 109 provides for adoption of budget estimates. It lays down that the Corporation shall on or before the 31st day of March of every year adopt for the ensuing year four budget estimates, namely, (iJ budget estimates (general), (ii) budget estimate (electric supply), (iii) budget\n\nestima~ (transport) and (iv) budget estimate (water supply and sewage disposal). Section 109(2) lays down that on or before the 15th day of February of each year, the Corporation shall determine the rates at which various municipal taxes, rates and cesses shall be levied in the next following year.\n\nSection 102 inter alia provides that no payment of any sum out of the\n\nMUNL. CORPN. DELHI I\". BIRLA MILLS (Wane/Joo, C.J.) 261\n\nmunicipal fund shall be made unless the expenditure of the sume is covered by a current budget-grant.\n\nIt is in the light of these provisions that we have 10 consider whether the delegation made to the Corporation by s. 150 in the mat!er of imposing optional taxes is within the penuissible limits of delegation.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the appellant is !hat in view of these provisions there is sufficient guidance to the Corporation in the matter of fixing the rates of optional taxes and levying them on the inhabitants of the area and it cannot be sa'd that Parliament by enacting s. 150 transgressed the limits of pennissible delegation. ·\n\nThe question as to the limits of permissible delegation of legislative power by a legisla'.ure to a subordinate authority has come before th's Court in a number of cases and the law as laid down by this Court is not in doubt now.\n\nConsidering the complexity of modern life it is recognised on all hands that legislature cannot possibly have time to legislate in every minute detail. That is why it has been recognised that it is open to the legislature to delegate to subordinate authorities the power to make ancillary rules for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the leg:slature indicated in the law which gives power to frame such ancillary rules.\n\nThe matter came before this Court for the first time In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912( 1), and it was held in tha: case that it could not be sa'd that an unlimited right of delegation was inherent in. the legislative power itself.\n\nTh:s was not warranted by the provisions of the Cons'.itution. which vested the power of legislation either in Parliament or Sta'.e legislatures and the le2itimacy of delegation depended upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature considered to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effec'.ive'ly and completely.\n\nTht.: legislature must retain in its own hands the essential Jeg'slative functiop. Exactly what constitu1ed \"essential legislative function\", it was held further, was difficult to define in general tenus, but this much was clear that the essential legislative function mnst at least consist of th.~ de'.ermination of the legisiative policy and its fonnulation as a bind'ng rule. of conduct.\n\nThus where the law passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays down '.he standard which is enacted into a rnle of law. it can leave the task of subordinate leglslation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies. i.e., the makin•r of rules, regulations or bye-laws.\n\nThe subordinate authority must do so within the frame-work of the law which makes the delegafon, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent with he law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the\n\n(I) [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n\nlimits of the policy and standard laid down in the Jaw. l'rovidetl the legislative policy is emmciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.\n\nIn Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration Committee(') the same question arose and it was held that \"an execuilve authority can be authorised by a statute to modify either existing or future Jaws but not in any essential feature.\n\nExactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciat\n\ned in general terms but it is clear that modification cannot in elude a change of policy.\n\nEssential legisla1ive function consists in the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct.\"\n\nIn Han'shankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('). s. 3, of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. In that case reliance was placed on the re in Delhi Law Act(') where the majority held ¢hat \"the essential powers of legislation carmot be delegated and that the legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body empowered to execU'te the law. Applying these pri11ciples this Court held that the Act there impugned had laid down the principle and that principle was the maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availabi lity at fair prices. It was further held that this sufficienily fonnu lated the legislative policy and the ambit and the character of that Act was such that the details of that policy could only be worked out by delegating that power to a subordinate authority within the frame-work of that policy. The Court therefore held that s. 3 of the-impugned Act was not ultra vires the legislature on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power.\n\nIn the Western India Theatres Limited v. Municipal Corpo ration of the City of Poona('), a question arose with respect to the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which gave power to the municipality to levy \"any other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor in Council sha!J haVll been obtained prior to the selection contemplated in sub-cl. (i) of cl. ( ~) of section 60\". This provision was attacked as unconstitu tional on the ground .that the legislature had completely abdicated its function and delegated essential legislative power to the municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed\n\n(1) [1955] l S.C.R. 290.\n\n(2) [1955] l S.C.R. 3~0.\n\n(3) [t95l] S.C.R. 747.\n\n(4) [1959) Suppl. 2. S.C.R. 71.\n\nMUNCL. COR.PN ... OELHI v. BlllLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 263\n\nA on the ratepayers and that power was unguided, uncanalised and vagaranit.\n\nThe delegation was upheld b.J this Court on the ground that s. 59 authorised the municipality to impose tax\n\nthereunder for the purposes of the Act.\n\nThe Act there under consideration defined tho obligations and functions cast upon the municipality and it was observed that taxes could only be B levied for implementing those purposes and not for any other\n\npurpose.\n\nIt was finally observed that the impugned section did lay down the procedure which the municipality had to follow in\n\nimposing a tax and the legislature could not in the circumstances be said to have . abdicated Its function in favour of the municic pality.\n\nJn Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India('), this Court struck down one provision of the impugned Act as the legislature had established no critedon or standard and had not prescribed any princ'ple on which the particular disease or condition was to be specified. It .will be seen that the same principle that the legislature could not delegate unguided D power to a subordinate body was the basis of this decision.\n\nJn Vasant/al Maganbhai Sanjanwal v. The State of Bom• bay('), the question of delegation of legislative power arose.\n\nThis Court . enunciated the principle thus :\n\n1 \"Although the power of delegation is a CO!!Stituent element of the legislative power, it is well-settled that a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case and before it can delegate any subs!diary or ancillary powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislative policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper guidance in implementing the same.\n\nA statute challenged on the ground of excessive delegation must therefore be subjected to two tests, ( i) whether it delegates essential legislative function or power and (2). whether the leg'slature has enunciated its policy and principle for the guidance of the delegate.\"\n\nIn Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Terri• tory of Delhi('), in connection with the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, it was observed that \"so long as the legislature indicated in the operative prov'sions of the sta\"ute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that •he legislation was skeletal or that very detail H of the applicaion of Jaw to a particular case, was not laid down in\n\n tn 119601 2 s c.R. 671. 12> [19611 1 s.c.R. 341.\n\n(1) 11962] 2 S C.R. m.\n\nL6Sup.C.l/6~\n\nthe enactment itself or the fact that a discretion was left to those A entrusted with administering the law, afforded no basis either for the contention that there had been an excessive delegation of legislative power so as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested was uncanalised and unguided so as to amount to a carte blanc he to discriminate.\"\n\nThe last case to which reference may be made is Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab(').\n\nThere the law on the subject of excessive delegation on was summarised thus at p. 1901:\n\n\"The Constitution confers a power and imposes a duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functiom in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious ac'.ivities of a welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation.\n\nIt must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An over-burdened lesislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly overstep the limMs of delegation. It may not Jay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general te'111s; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy lrua down l>y it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the said liberal construction should not be carried by the Courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities. It is the duty of the Court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature.\"\n\nIt may be added that Devi Das's(') case did not differ from the Liberty Cinema(') case.\n\nWhat was held there was that there\n\n(I) A.l.R. [1967] S.C. 1895.\n\n(2} (1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS ( Wanchoo, CJ.) 265\n\ncan be no general principle that merely the needs of the delegate can necessarily and always be a guideline.\n\nIt was further held that each statute has to be examined to find out whether there are guidelines the1ein which prevent delegation from being excessive.\n\nIt is in the light of these general principles which are wellsettled that the constitutionality of the delegation in s. 150 has to be considered. However, as we are particularly concerned with the fixation of rates of a tax, we may refer to certain cases which deal with th:s aspect of the 1matter. In Pandi~ Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('), this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like.\"\n\nThe appellant relies on this observation to show that the delegation in s. 150 of the Act cannot be said to be excessive as 1he rates of tax cannot be said to be an essential feature of the law relating to taxation. On the other hand, Jearned1 counsel for the respondent cont.ends that this observation is much too wide if it means that it is open to the legislature to delegate without any guidance whatsoever the power to fix the rate of tax. In particular, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the cases which have been referred to in support of this conclusion in Pt. Banarsi Das case(') do not support the proposition laid down there if it is to be read as giving unqualified power to fix the rate without any guidance, control or safeguard. With respect, it seems to us that if this observation means that it is open to the legislature to del.egate the power to fix the rate of tax to another authority without any qualification, guidance, control or safeguard, it ts too widely stated and does not appear to be supported by the authorities on which it is based, though those authorities do Indicate that in certain cases it is open to the legislature to give power to another authority to fix rates under proper guidance, contrbl and safeguard. Take the case_of Powell v. Apollo Candle Company Limited(\"). In that case s. 133 of tlle Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of New South Wales was under attack. That section ran thus :\n\n\"Whenever any article of merchandise then unknown to the collector is imported, which, in the opinion of the collector or the commissioners, ts apparently a substitute for any known dutiable article, or is\n\n(I) [1959) S.C.R. 427.\n\n(2) L.R. (1885) X A.C. 282.\n\npprently designed. to evade uty, but possesses properties 1n the whole or ill part which can be used or were intended to be applied for a similar purpose as such dutiable article, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct that a duty be levied on such article at a rate to be fixed in proportion to the degree in which such unknown article approximates in its qualities or uses to such dutiable article; and such rate thus fixed shall be published in a Treasury order in the Gazette, and one other newspaper published in Sydney, and exhibited in the long room or other public place in the Custom House, and a copy of all such Treasury orders shall, without unnecessary delay, be laid before both Houses of Parliament.\" - A bare perusal of the section shows that though the power was delegated to the Governor to levy the duties, it gave complete guidance to him in the manner of fixing the rate of duty and finally provided that the order passed by the Governor would be laid Jiefore both Houses of- Parliament without unnecessary delay.\n\nThe observations of the Privy Council in that case have in our opinion to be read in the context of the words of s. 133 where full guidance was provided as to the fixation of the rate.\n\nIn J. W. Hampton v. United States('), the Congress gave power to the President to make changes in the rates ptovided in the Tariff Act of 1922. That was challenged as a forbidden <!elegation of legislative power to executive. authority.\n\nBut the challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the Congress had laid down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person authorised to fix the rate of customs duties on imported merchandise was to conform. In that case the President could vary the rates with the aid of his advisers after proper investigation on the ground of\n\ndifferences of cost of production in the United States and abroad l\\Ild to make, such increases and decreases in rates of duty as were found . neces8ary to equalise the cost of production.\n\nThe limit of such change was also fixed upto 50 per centum of the rates specified in the law. This case does not support the proposition that rates of tax can be delegated to a subord!nate authorl!y withou! any guidance, though it is an authority for the proposition that this can be done if guidance is given for the purpose.\n\nThe observation in Banarsl Das's case(') tha! rates of tax are not essential features of legislation therefore seems, with respect, to be too broadly sta'ed, though it may be admitted that rates of taxation also can in certain circumstances be delegated to a subordi nate author'ty with proper guidance and subjeot to safeguards and limitations in that behalf.\n\n(I} 72 l;>.w Ed. 624 : 276 U.S. 624.\n\n(2) (1959) S.C.R. 427.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELIU v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.l.) 267\n\nA The next case to which referenee may be made is Corporation of Calcutta and Another v. The Liberty Cinema(1) where the majority upheld the fixation of a tax on cinema shows, even though the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951 prescribed no limits\n\nto which the tax could go. In that case the majority referred to the view taken in Pandit Banarasi Das's case(') and inteipreted B the dictum in that case to mean :that the fixation of rate can be left to a non-legislative body but this was qualified by the observation that when the power to fix the rate of trut was reft to another body, the legislatum must provide guidance for such fixation. Tu\n\nthat case the maP.fity found guidance in various provisions of the statute to which it is not necessary to refer, though the c minority was of the opinion that there was no guidance therein.\n\nThe question again arose in Municipal Board, Hapur v.\n\nRaghuvendra Kripal('). There the U.P. Municipalities Act No. 2 of 1916, gave power to the municipality to fix rates of trut and provided an elaborate procedure for doing so and also provided for sanction of Government. But one provision of that statute D raised a conclusive presumption that the procedure prescribed hadbeen gone through on a certain notification being issued by Government and the question arose whether by reason of such :a conclusive presumption there was not a delegation of essential legislative function. In that case the majority while dealing with the question of excessive delegmion observed that the taxes in E question were local taxes for local needs for which local enquiries\n\n_had to be made and so they were left to the representatives of the local population which would bear the tax. It was further observed that such taxes must vary from town to town, from one Board to another, and from one commodity to another. Regard\n\nbeing had to the democratic set-up of the municipalities which need the proceeds of these taxes for their own administration, (it was observed) it was proper to leave to these municipalities the power to impose and collect those truces, which were pre-determined along with a procedure for consulting the wishes of the people concerned. -Over and above that there was power given te\n\nthe State Government to check their action. In those circwnstances delegation as to the fixing of rate of tax to the Municipal Board was upheld as permissible delegation. The minority judgment also accepted these propositions and observed that though generally speaking, the rate of tax was one of the essentials of taxing power given to the legislature, it must be recognised that there might be situations where the legislature might delegate to a subordinate authority that power under proper safeguards. It was also observed that in the matter of local taxation, like taxation by municipal boards, district boards and bodies of that character,\n\n(l) [1%5) 2 S.C.R. 477.\n\n(2) [ 1959] S.C.R. 427.\n\n(3) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 950.\n\n268 SUPREMB COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.CR.\n\n\" there was pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of the A rate of tax to the local body, the reason for this being that problems of different municipalities might be different and one municipality might require one kind of tax at a particular rate at a particular time while another municipality might need another kind of tax at another rate at some other time. It was further observed that \"the legislature can in the case of taxation by local bodies B delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body provided it has taken care ro specify the safeguards for the purpose.\" The difference between the majority and the minority only was that the majority thought that the conclusive presumption raised by' one of the provision was valid while the minority thought that by reason of the conclusive presumption all the safeguards were c wiped 'OUt at one stroke and therefore it became a case of excessive delegation.\n\nThe last case to which reference may be made is Devi Das Gopal Krish11an( 1). This was not a case of municipal taxation.\n\nIn this case the legislature gav(; l power to the State Government to fix sales tax at. such rates as the State Government thought fit.\n\nThe case of Liberty Cinema(•) was distinguished in this case and it was pointed out that the needs of the S'ate and the purposes of\n\nthe Act could not give sufficient guidance for the purpose of fixing\n\nrate of sales tax by the State Government. There is in our opinion a clear distinction between delegation of fixing the rate of tax like sales tax to the State Government and delegation of fixing rates E of certain taxes for purposes of local taxation. The needs of the State are unlimited and the purposes for which the State exists are also unlimited. The result of making delegation of a tax like sales tax to the State Governmem means a power to fix the tax without any limit even if the Meds and purposes of the State _are\n\no be taken into account. On the other hand, in the case of a F municipality, however large may be the amount 'required by it for its purposes it cannot be u11rimited, for the amount that a municipality can spend is limited by the purposes for which it is created. A municipality cannot spend anything for any purposes other than those specified in the Act which creates it. Therefore in the case of a municipal body, however large may be its needs, there is a limit to those needs in view of the provisions of the Act creating it. In such circumstances there is a ~!ear distinction between delegating a power to fix rates of tax, like the sales tax, to ¢be State Government and delegating a power to fix certain local taxes for local needs to a municipal body.\n\nA review of these authorities therefore leads to the conclusion that so far as this Court is concerned the principle is well estab-\n\n(1} A.J.R. 1967 S.C. 1895.\n\n\n;~~\n\ni ,\n\n' -\n\n>- '. \\.\n\n: \\< MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.I.) 269 \\ - . .\n\nlished that essential legislative functioo consists of the deteimination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot. be delegated by the legislature. Nor is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative . power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Con-·\n\nsti!ution. The legisjature must retain in its own hands the essential B legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where !he legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the Court has to deal including' its preamble.\n\nFurther it appears to us that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether there is suffiicent guidance in the matter\n\nof delegation. · ·· ·\n\n, What form the guidance should take is again a matter which .cannot be stated in general tenll.s. _It will depend upon the circumstances of each statute under consideration; in some cases guidance in broad general terms may be enough; in other cases more detailed guidance may be necessary.\n\nAs we are <:On- . cemed in the present case .with the field of taxation; let us\n\n)ook at the nature of guidance necessary in this field. The guid- E ance. may_ take the form of providing maximum rates of tali: upto which a local body may be given the discretion to make its choice, cir it may take the. form of providing for consultation with the . people of the local aq:a and then fixing the rates after such consultation. It may also take the form of subjecting the rate to be fixed by the local body to the approval of Government which acts F as a watch-dog on the actions of the local body in this matter on\n\n. behalf of the legislature, There may be. other ways in which guidance may be provided. But the purpose of guidance, what.\n\nsoever may be the manner thereof, is to see that the local body fixes a reasonable rate of taxation for the local area concerned.\n\nSo long as the legislature has made provision to achieve that\n\nreasonable rates of taxa!ion are fixed by local bodies, whatever may be the method employed. for this purpose-provided it is effective-, it may be said that there is guid:yice for the purpose of fixation of rates of taxation. The reasonableness of rates may oo ensured by fixing a maximum beyond which the local bodies inay not go. It may be ensured by. providing safeguards laying , down the procedure for consulting the wishes of the local inhabitants. It may consist in the supervision by Government of the rate of taxation by local bodies. So long as the law has provided a method by which the local body can be controlled and there is\n\n270 SUPRBMB COUllT llBPOll.TS\n\n\nprovision to see that reasonable rates are fixed, it can be said thi!! there is guidance in the matter of fixing rates for local taxation.\n\nAs we have already said there is pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of rates of tax to the local body and so long as the legislature has provided a method for seeing that rates fixed are reasonable, be it in one fonu or another, it may be said that there is guidance for fixing rates of taxation and the power assigned to the local body for fixing the rates is not uncontrolled and uncanalised. It is on the basis of these principles that we have to consider the Act with which we are concerned.\n\nWe may, before we consider the provisions of the Act, refer to the position prevaleDt in the United States of America so far as local taxation is concerned. Even though the doctrine of sq>aration of powers prevails in that country, it is recognised there that delegation of power to local authorities for fixing rates of taxes for local purposes does not amount to excessive delegation by the legislature. This conclusion has been reached there on the basis of historical facts. Whenever a municipal corporation is created, and is charge4 with carrying on certain specified functions, it is necessary to provide it with funds, for otherwise it cannot carry on the purposes for which it has been created. Thi: funds may be provided as grants; but the general pattern hlis always been that power of local taxation is vested in a municipal body as an essential attribute for all the purposes of its existence.\n\nThus in the United Sates of America, even though the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the Government, it may be delegated by the legislature to municipal corporations : [See United States v. City of New Orleans(')] .\n\n. Though delegation as to municipal taxation is held to be !?fr missible under the U. S. Constitution, it is so because of histoncal reasons peculiar to that country. The American example may not be an apt analogy bu~ the history of municipal Acts in our country indicates tha.t for nearly a century or more power of taxation has been delegated to municipal bodies. In some Acts aU taxes delegated to the municipiil bodies are compulsory; in o'.her Acts all taxes so delegated are optional: (see U.P. Municipalities Act). In some cases some taxes are compulsory and some taxes are optional as is the case in the present Act. In some cases maximum limits are provided for some taxes and not for others; in some cases no maximum is provided, though there are restric,. lions and safeguards within which the municipal bodies must act.\n\nIn all cases however, there has been a large area of delegation of taxing power for local purposes to local bodies subject to con tr61 by Government or to such other procedural safeguards as the legislature considers necesiary in the matter of imposition of\n\n(I) 25 1. Ed. 225.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wa11choo, C.J.) 271\n\ntaxes. According to our history also there is a wide area of delegation in the matter of imposition of taxes to local bodies subject to controls and safeguards of various kinds which partake of the nature of guidance in the matter of fixing rates for locali taxation. It is in this historical background that we have to examine 'die provisions of the Act impugned before us.\n\nWe have already set out. s. 150 of the Act which delegates power to the Corporation to levy any of the optional taxes at such rates as it thinks fit and further gives power to it to specify persons, and articles and properties on which tax will be levied and the system of assessment to be adopted and exemptions if any to be granted.\n\nThe delegation thus made is certainly wide and the question is whether there is any guidance in the form already indicated to the Corporation in carrying out the duti.es imposed upon it under s. 150 of the Act.\n\nThe first circumstance which must be taken into account in this connection is that the delegation has been made to an elect- D ed body responsible to the people including those who pay taxes.\n\nThe councillors have to go for elec!ion every four years. This means that if they have behaved unreasonably and the inhabitants of the area so consider it they can be thrown out at the ensuing elections. This is in our opinion a great check on the elected councillors acting unreasonably and fixing unreasonable ralei of taxation. This is a democratic method of bringing to book the E elected representatives who act unreasonably in such matters. It ii however urged that s. 490 of the Act provides for the superie<>sion of the Corporation in case it is not competent to perfonn or persistently makes default in the perfo_ ,.lance of the duties imposed upon it by or under the Act or a._, y other law or exceeds\n\nor abuses its power. In such a case the elected body may be superseded and all powers and duties conferred and imposed upon the Corporation shall be exercised and performed by such officer or authority as the Central Government may provide in this behalf.\n\nIt is urged that when this happens the power of taxation goes in the hands of some officer or authority appointed by Government who is not accountable to the local electorate and who may exercise all the powers of taxation conferred on the elected Corporation by the Act. This however has not happened in the present case and we nel'..d not express any opinion on the question whether such officer or authority would be competent to increase the rates of taxes already fixed when the Corporation is superseded or can impose new taxes which were not there at the time of supersession. That is a matter which may have .to be considered when such a situation arises; but so long as the power of taxation conferred by s. 150 is exercised by the elected body there will always be a check in the form of the members thereof having to face the\n\nelect.orate after every four years with lhe liability of being thrown A out 1f they act unreasonably. This check which is inherent in an elected municipal body, must enter into the verdict whether the delegation to such a body, even though it is wide in extent, can be .upheld on the basis that this is a method of controlling the actions of the elected body and setting a limit to which it can go in the matter of taxation, even though no maximum as such is pro- B vided in the Act.\n\nAnother guide or control on the limit of taxation is to be found in th~ pul'Jloses of the Act.\n\nThe Corporation has been assigned\n\nerta1n obligatory functions which it must perform and for which 1t must find money by taxation. It has also been assigned certain discretionary functions. If it undertakes any of them it must fin<\\- C money.\n\nEven though the money that has to be found may be large, it is not, as we have already indicated, unlimited for it must be only for . the discharge of functions whether obligatory or optional assigned to the Corporation. The limit to which the Corporation can tax is therefore circumscribed by the need to finance the functions, obligatory or optional which it has to or may undertake to perfonn. It will be not open to the Corporation by the use of taxing power to collect more than it needs for the functions it performs. It cannot, for example, raise the rate of taxation to such an extent, as to provide a surplus which is much more than what it needs for its existence in carrying out the functions assigned to it, subject to its having the minimum cash balance of Rs. 4,00,000 as provided in the Act at the end of a year. This is in our opinion another check which will guide the Corporation in fixing its rates of tax under s. 150 after taking into account the yield from obligatory taxes.\n\nThough the mere fact that specific purposes and functions are set oµt in an impugned Act may not be conclusive--it is one of the factors which should be taken into account along with other relevant factors. It cannot therefore be said that there is no guidance to the Corporation\n\nii) the matter of fixing rates of optional. taxes, though it must be admitted that a large d'scretion is left to it in thts behalf. Even so there are limits to which the Corporation can go in fixing these taxes and .those limits fke the maximum fixed for obligatory taxes are the guidelines within which the taxing power of the Corporation with respect to optional taxes must be exercised. This power is exercised by the Corporation after debate by the elected represen•atives of the local area which the Corporation administers. In such circumstances we think that there is a limit and guidelines provided by the Act beyond which the Corpora!ion cannot go.\n\nAnother limit and guideline is provided by the necessity of adopting budget estimate~ each year as laid down in s. 109 of the Act. That section provides for division of the budget of the\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. B!RLA MILLS (Wane/zoo, C.J.) 273\n\nCorpora:tion into four parts i.e., general, electricity supply, transport, water and sewage disposal. The budget will show the revenue and expenditure and these must balance so that the limit of taxation cannot exceed the needs of the Corporation as shown in the budget to be prepared under the provisions of the Act. These four budgets are prepared by four Standing Committees of the Corporation and are presented to the Corporation where they are adopted after debate by the elected representatives of the local area.\n\nPreparation.of budget estimates and their approval by the Corporation is therefore another limit and guideline within which the power of taxation has to be exercised.\n\nEven though the needs may be large, we have already indicated that they cannot be unlim!ted in the case of the Corporation, for its functions both obligatory and optional are well defined under the Act. Here again there is a limit to which the taxing power o.f the Corporation can be exercised in the matter of optional taxes as well, even though there is no maximum fixed as such in the Act.\n\nThen there is the provision in s. 150 itself which says that the maximum rates fixed by the Corporation at its meeting by a resolution have to be submitted to the Govermnent for its sanction and without such sanction there can be no imposition of tax.\n\nAs we have already stated the legislature has made Government the watch-dog to control the actions of the Corporatio11 in the matter of fixing rates and other incidents of the taxes and that is also a check to see tha! reasonable rates are fixed by the. Corporation when it proceeds to impose taxes under s. 150. We have a parliamentary system of government in which the Government is responsible to the legislature. That is also a circumstance which may be taken into account in cons'dering the check imposed by the Act upon the taxing power of the Corporation, namely, that the rates fixed by it have to be sanctioned by Government which in its turn is responsible to Parliament. Though therefore the legislature may not have provided that the rates of tax shall be submitted to it for approval. the fact that it has provided that such ra.tes shall be submitted to Government for approval and the Government in its turn is respomible to the legislature is a factor which has to be taken into account when considering whether the delegation by s. 150 of the Act is excessive or not. It stands to reason that Government which is responsible to the legislature would act with care and circumspection when exercising its function as the watch-dog on behalf of the legislature on the taxing power Conferred by the legislature on the Corporation.\n\nUnder these circumstances we do not think that it can be said that there are no guidelines, limits, controls or safeguards urovided by the legislature in the matter of the exercise of the power of taxation under s. 150 of the Act by the Corporation. The legislature cannot in the circumstances be said to have abdicated its power for\n\nit has indicated the taxes which the Corporation caq, impose. The Corporation cannot go beyond the taxes the imposition of which has been entrusted to it by the legislature. In .the case of obligatory taxes, the legislature itself has provided the maximum in some cases or the fixation of reasonable rates in other cases like water, tax, scavenging tax or fire tax. In the case of optional taxes, however, greater freedom has been left to the Corporation to arrange its budgets and fix rates of taxation; but this freedom is circumscribed and guided and controlled under the various provisions qi. the Act which we have already referred to and which must be taken to limit the taxing power of the Corporation even though no\n\npecific maximum has been fixed in the Act for optional taxes.\n\nIt seems to us therefore that considering that the power is entrusted to the elected representatives of the local area who are liable to go for election before the local electorate every four yearn, the nature of guide given by the Act is sufficient for the purpose of keeping the Corporation within limits. In such circumstances, considering the constitution and set up of the municipal corporation, its need for finance to carry out the functions entrusted to it, its elective character, its responsibility to the electors, the safeguards and controls provided in the Act, procedural and otherwise,.it is difficult to hold that the power of taxation conferred on it is either uncanalised, arbitrary or without guidance or policy.\n\nFinally there is another check on the power of the Corporation which is inherent in the matter of exercise of power by sub- .ordinate public representative bodies, such as municipal boards.\n\nIn such cases if the act of such a body in the exercise of the power conferred on it by the Jaw is unreasonable, the courts can hold that such exercise is void for unreasonableness. This principle w8$ laid down as far back as 1898 in Kruse v. Johnson(') in connection with a bye-law made by a county council. In that case the county council made a certain bye-law and its validity was challenged on the ground that it was unreasonable. The Court held that a bye-law could be struck down on the ground of unreason;- .ableness _but took pains to point out that in determining the validity of a bye-law made by a public representative body, such as a county council, the court ought to be slow to hold that the byelaw was void for unreasonableness. The Court further held that \"a bye-law so made out ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interlerence with the liberty of those subject to it.\" The same principle would apply to the fixation of rates of taxation and if per oehance the Corporation fixes rates which are unreasonable, there\n\n(l) [1898] 2 Q.B.D. 91.\n\nJ.IUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.l.) 275.\n\nis control in the court to strike down such an unreasonable, impost.\n\nOn a careful consideration therefore of the various provisions. of the Act, we must hold that the power conferred by s. 150 of the Act on the Corporation is not unguided in the circumstances. and cannot be said ti> amount io excessive delegation.\n\nThis brings us to two minor points raised before us. It ls urged that the tax was imposed on the production of electricity and not on consumption as required by the Act and as provided in item 53, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n\nWe cannot accept this contention. The resolution which was C passed on February 9, 1959, shows that the tax was imposed\n\ninter alia on the consumption of electricity by a person generating it for his own consump1ion. The words used in the resolution are somewhat inapt but the meaning in our opinion is quite clear, namely that a tax at the rate of 5 n.p. per KWHR is imposed on the consumption of electricity on a person generating it for his D own consumption. The tax is thus on the consumption of electricity where it is generated by a person for his own consumption and not on the production of electricity. ·\n\nThen .it is urged that the sanction by Government was not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that in this case the sanction was given by the Deputy Secretary to Govem- E ment who obviously had no authority to do so. We are of opin:on that there is no force in this contention. The order conveying sanction specifically says that \"the Central Government hereby sanctions the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi under sub-section (1) of sec!ion 150.\" It s true that the order is signed by the Deputy Secretary but that does not mean F that it was the Deputy Secretary who sanctioned the rates. It is also true that the words \"by the order of the Central Government\" or \"by the order of the Preident\" are not there above the signature of the Deputy Secretary and the authenfcation therefore is no'. quite in accordance with the provisions of Art. 77 of the Constitution; but that deficiency has been made up by the affidavit G filed on behalf of the Central Govemmen'. in wb' ch it is stated that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy Home Miniser and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom the work relat'ng to the Corporation was assigned by the Home Minister. Reliance in this connection was placed on the Gov-; ernment of India (Allocation of Business) Rules. 1961, pai<ed on January 14, 1961 to the effect tha• \"in relafon to the bus:ness 8 allotted to a Minister, another Minis'er or Deputy Minister may be associated to orm such functions as may be assigned to him.\" That in our opinion clearly means that a Cabinet Minister may\n\nbe assisted in the performance of functions allotted to him by A another Minister or Deputy Minister. It is not necessary where business has been assigned by a Cabinet Minister to a Minister or a Deputy Minister thaf the matter shbuld be put before the Cabinet Minis'.er also after the Minister or the Deputy Minister has approved of it in accordance with the assignment made in his favour.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the sanction; has B been given by the Central Government as required by the Act.\n\nThat talc es us to the question of validation.\n\nThe Validation Act was passed in December 1966 and section 2 thereof wl!h 'Which we are concerned reads thus :-\n\n\" ( 1 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 150 read with sub-section (2) of section 109 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the resolution of the Delhi Municipal Corporation dated the 24th Juru;, 1959, passed under sub-section (3) of section 150 aforesaid, insofar as the said resolution relates to the determination of the rates at which tax shall be leviable on the consumption or sale of electricity shall. be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law and the ra!es specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of.the tax under the said Act with effect on and from 1st day of July 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 196.6.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary, all taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have been \"levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in subsection ( 1 ) shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been, validly levied or colle-Oted .. \"\n\nThe argument which found favour with the High Court was 1hat the words of s. 2 only validated the levy and collection of tax\n\nfor the year ending March 31, 1960 and no further, though the G '.Section 1n terms refers to the period from July 1, 1959 to March\n\n.31, 1966. The contention, which was accepted by the High Court, was that though fixation of rate of tax was validated up to March 31, 1966, the levy of the tax was not validated for the -whole period by s. 2 of the Validation Act. The same argument was raised before us in support of the contention that the Valida- H tion Act failed in its purpose so far as the period from April l, 1960 to March 31, 1966 is concerned. We are of opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that the levy and collec-\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 277\n\ntion was not validated for the period from April J, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act merely validated the fixation of rate of tax for that period. Section 2 (1) which is said to have failed in validating the levy and collection of tax for the period from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966 is in two parts. In the first place it valida'.es the resolution of the Corpo..\n\nration dated June 24, 1959 by which rates were fixed under s. 150(3) for the year ending March 31, 1960. As the High Court says-and rightly so-this mean~ that everything that went before the resolution of June 24, 1959 was passed was validated.\n\nIt was on this ground that the High Court held that the Validation Act validated the levy and collecfon of tax at the c rates fixed for the period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960.\n\nThe High Court seems to have over-looked the second part of s. 2 (I ) which lays down , that the rates specified in the resolution of June 24, 1959 in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity under the Act with effect on and from the !st day of July, 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 1966\n\nD shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of the tax.\n\nBy this part of s. 2 (1), Parliament has clearly approved the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24, 1959 as the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966. This could only be to validaje the levy and collection of tax at that rate for that period, for otherwise we can see no sense in the Validation Act. It is however said that the E words \"at which 'tax shall be levied and collected\" do not appear after the words \"the actual rates of the tax\" in s. 2 (I ) and therefore the section must be taken to have validated the rates only. It has neither provided for levy and collection of tax nor validated its levy and collection for the period mentioned therein. It seems to us that when s. 2 (1 ) lays down that the rates deducible from F the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966, it must be understood to sanction the levy and collection of tax at the rates fixed. This to our mind is implicit in the word \"actual\"\n\nwhlch governs the words \"rates of the tax\". We may add that even if there was some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2 G (1), that doubt is resolved by the words of s. 2(2), which lays down that \"all taxes on the consumptjon or sale of electricity levied or collected or pm; porting to have been levied or collected in pursuance of .the resolution referred to in sub-section ( 1 ) shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been validly levied or collected.\" This clearly shows that the validation was not merely of the rate of tax but of levy and collection also for H the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966. We cannot therefore agree with the High Court that only the rates of tax were validated and not levy and collection thereof for the\n\nperiod from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966. We may go fur- It ther and say that as we reads. 2(1) ands. 2(2) together it seems to us that Parliament not only validated what was done but\n\nalso itself imposed the rates deducible from the resolll'tion of 1 une 24, 1959 and authorised the levy and cgllection thereof for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966 notwithstaDding ariything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any B court to the contrary. ·\n\nWe therefore allow the appeals, set aside the order of the High Court insofar as it is against the appellant and dismiss the writ petitions. No order as to costs throughout.\n\nHidayatnllah, J.-The Delhi Municipal Corporation in exer- C cise of powers under its constituent Act has levied a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity.\n\nThis power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957). Section 113(2)(d) and (3) reads:\n\n\"(2) In adfiition to taxes specified in sub-section (1) the corporation may, for the purposes of this Act, levy any of the following taxes, namely :\n\n(d) a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity.\n\n(3) The taxes specified in sub-section (2) shall be E levied, assessed and collected in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the bye-laws made thereunder\".\n\nThe Act provides further in s. 150 :\n\n\"150. Imposition of other taxes.\n\n(1) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a resolution for the levy of any of the taxes specified in sub-section (2) of section 113, defining the maximum rate of the tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.\n\n(2) Any resolution passed under sub-section (1) shall be submitted to the Central Government for its sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government, shall come into force on and from such date as may be specified in the order of sanction.\n\n(3) After a resolution has come into force under sub-section (2), the Corporation may, subject to the\n\n,...\n\nMUNCL, CORPN. DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Hidayatul/ah, J.) 279\n\nmaximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable, and the tax shall come into force on the first day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolution is passed. ( 4) After a tax has been levied in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the pro\".i sions of sub-section (2) of section 109, shall apply m relation to such tax as they apply in relation to any tax imposed under sub-section (1) of section 113\".\n\nOn February 9, 1959 the Municipal Corporation passed a resolution stating the rate at which the tax would be levied. The resolution was submitted to the Central Government for its ap proval. The Central Government modified the rate by enhancing it.\n\nOn June 23, 1959 the Standing Committee of the Corporation recommended the rate sanctioned by the Governmeat as the actual rate to be imposed. The Corporation then resolved on June 24, 1959 that the tax was imposed at that rate.\n\nThe respondent cnallenged the imposition of the tax by a writ petition in the Punjab High Court: A learned single Judge dismissed the petition but on appeal in the High Court the decision was reversed. It was held that the Central Government lacked power to alter the rate. On December 3, 1966, Parliament pass ed the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act, purporting to validate the rate of tax. On February 17, 1965, the Municipal Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) stating the maximum rate of tax. This resolution was approved by Government and a second resolution was then adopted under s. 150(3) naming the maximum rate as the actual rate. This was on December 27, 1965. Two writ petitions were filed by the respondent in the High Court of Delhi. The first questioned the imposition -0f the tax by the resolutions of February 17 and December 27, 1965 and the second questioned the legality of the Validation Act. These petitions succeeded and the present appeals followed.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in his judgment .has upheld the validity of the Validation Act.\n\nAs we are of opinion that the earlier resolutions were also legal, we need say nothing about the Validation Act. We agree, however, that the Validation Act cannot be questioned. The learned Chief Justice has adequately answered the objections and although we might have stated our reasons separately we do not find it necessary to do so. We agree that the relevant appeal must be allowed.\n\nOn the other point we agree with the conclusions of the learned Chief Justice that the other appeal must also be allowed.\n\nL6Sup.C.J/68-S\n\nSUPREME COUAT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn our opinion, the Delhi Municipal Corporation was legally invested with the power to levy the electricity tax. We are satisfied that there is no flaw in the conferral of power on the Municipal Corporation by s. 113 and 150 of the Act and the resolutions passed thereunder. The objection in this connection is that the parliamentary Act itself is invalid inasmuch as it amounts to an excessive delegation of essential legislative functions by Parliament to an outside body. The learned Chief Justice has upheld s. 150 by pointing out certain inbuilt safeguards in the Act which, in his view, save it from being characterised as a piece of excessive delegation.\n\nWith all due respects we think this is not the only approach to the problem. We do not wish to be understood as saying that the conferral of a power of taxation on Municipalities must always be accompanied by a detailed enumeration in the constituent Act of the rate of the tax, the persons to be taxed, the manner of the levy and collection, before it can be said that there are sufficient safeguards.\n\nNor do we think that these matters cannot be left to the determination of the Municipal Corporation subject, cif course, to such controls as the legislature may think necessary to effectuate its own will. While the provisions which have been characterised as safeguards (where found necessary) are desirable the proper test to apply is not the existence of safeguards but whether the legislative will to impose the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind those who have to pay the tax. This requires an examination of the policy and provisions of the Act with a view to determining whether the legislative will is fully expressed to invest the Municipal Committee with the power to levy the tax subject, of course, to a proper procedure being evolved. We shall briefly indicate reasons which compel us to give our opinion separately.\n\nThe charge here B that the power to impose the tax granted by ss. 113 and 150 amounts to an excessive delegation of essential legislative functions without adequate control or guidance of Parliament and, therefore, the grant is beyond the competence of Parliament.\n\nThis contention is raised because of the gloss put upon the Delhi Laws Act(') case in some subsequent cases which seem to carry the observations in that case to fields which. perhaps, were not in the minds of the Judges who gave the Advi' sory opinion.\n\nIn those fields other consider_ations apply which unfortunately have been overlooked more particularly when the question is of investing a Municipal Corporation with the authority to levy taxes.\n\nThe Delhi Laws Act(') case was concerned with certain legislation which conferred a general power on the Executive Governn1ent to apply any Act in force in British India, to certain\n\n(I) [19511 S.C.R. 747.\n\nMUNCL. COJ!.PN. DELHI v. B!RLA MILLS (Hidayatullah, 1.) 281\n\nareas with such modifications, amendments, restrictions (involving repeal of Jaws already in force) as the Executive Government might consider expedient or necessary. The Executive Government was not contained in its discretion by any direction on the subject. This made it free to choose any Jaw and to modify it as it thought fit before applying it and incidentally to repeal such Jaws as were already in force in those areas. The general observations in the case were that the proposed measures there considered in several respects amounted to the effacing of the legislature and the setting up of a parallel legislature. The issue obviously was a narrow and a special one. It concerned direct legislatfon in an area by imposition of Jaws at the hands of the Executive. The legislature gave too free a hand to the Executive.\n\nThe Advisory opinion ought, therefore to be read secumdam subjectam materiam and need not be extended to those cases in which the legislature outlines the entire policy of the municipal administration and keeping the control in its own hands authorises the Municipal Committee to leyy taxes which it itself determines and sanctions. How deeply must the policy of a law be searched, of course, depends upon the kind of the Jaw and its purpose.\n\nThis obvious point has got lost in the application of this Delhi Laws Act(') case, particularly in Devidas Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab(') where it received an extension to fields to which the observations could not logically extend.\n\nIn other cases many points were evolved to get over the difficulties of accepting those observations simpliciter.\n\nThe observations were, of course, m:>t statutory prescriptions.\n\nThe result is that the courts seem to struggle to discover what have been variously d.escribed as the policy of the Jaw, the guidance, the safeguards, the limits, the standards and the restrictions. These attempts merely show that what is intended to be found out is whether the legislature has expressed its own will in unequivocal terms so as to make the law a binding rule of conduct. The several expressions here enumerated do not, of course, mean the same thing. Nor can it be said that an aggregate of all of them must clearly appear from the impugned statute because if they do there will be no need for the agent.\n\nThe agent is then only an executing authority and not acting in aid of the legislature which is the underlying principle on which delegated legislation is upheld. The result as noticeable from case to case has been somewhat strange. A search has been made in the various Acts from the policy of law as stated in the preamble to the operative parts, from the positive directive enactments to what may be considered as mere policy statement to sustain the law. No search appears to have been made from the standpoint whther the legislature has or has not expressed its\n\no) 119s11 s.c.R. 747.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 18~5.\n\nSUPREME COURT IU!PORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nown will completely leaving the application of the law to those circumstances which the legislature has already pre-determined.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice resolves the present controversy by highlighting the provisions which indicate that there are \"safeguards\", \"guidelines\" and \"limits\" in the Municipal Corporation Act. In reaching his conclusion the learned Chief Justice emphasises that there are 'safeguards sufficient! to enable the Municipal Corporation to validly impose the tax. If any such \"safeguards\" (as to which \\ve do not consider it necessary to express an opinion here) were necessary, it is sufficient to point out that the scheme of the Municipal Act as a whole, the function£ the Municipality is expected to perform, the resources it must have, the gradation of compulsory taxes, their limits, the control of Government and various other provisions, furnish a sufficient answer. They are safeguards enough to sustain the Act.\n\nBut, in our opinion, this matter goes further.\n\nWhether a legislature can confer on a Municipal Corporation a power to levy a tax and how, is a very different question from that which was resolved in the Delhi Laws Act(') case. It involves a consideration of what our Constitution enables to be done under the relevant legislative entry and the nature of the Munici1;1al administration. It must be resolved on the basis of sovereignty which the legislative entries are intended to confer.\n\nThe entry in question is Entry No. 5 in the State List. It reads:-\n\n\"5. Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers f municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration.\" Under this entry power is given to the legislature to create selfgoveming units. It has always been understood, as we shall show presently, that such self-governing units must have resources for their own administration and duties. There are only two methods by which money can be made available : one is to give them a grant; and the other is to allow them to raise funds by fees and taxes. The second method is generally followed and the legislatures in India on times out of number have invested these local self-governing units with powers of taxation. No .such legislation has been questioned on the ground that it offends against the competency of the legislature. It is now contended that such exercise of power by the legislature offends against the doctrine of separation of powers and also is hit by the maxim deletatus\n\nnonpotest delegare.\n\nWe shall now discuss these two questions.\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n\nMUNCL. COR.PN. DELffi v. BIR.LA MILLS (Hidayatu//ah, J.) 283\n\nOur Constitution no doubt divides the functions of the State between three organs of the Government but it does not make a clean-cut division of the functions of these three organs as do some other Constitutions.\n\nFor example, the Constitution of Massachusetts carries the provision-\n\n\"the legislative departments shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them.\" Even the Constitution of the United States in Article I section (1) provides:\n\n\"Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representative.\" The Australian Constitution also makes a much more rigid cut between the three organs. By reason of such provisions the theory of separation of powers advanced by Montesquieu (who regarded the separation of powers as the best feature of the British Constitution) has played a great part. Montesquieu, of course, was not quite right in imagining that there was a complete separation of powers in England. The other theory, which has played a part flows from the maxim already quoted. In the Bonus case of Jalan Trading Co. Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union(') we had the occasion to say that that theory was wrongly understood.\n\nWe may recall here what we then said :\n\n\"This doctrine, it has been accepted on all hands was originated by the glossators and got introduced into English Law by a misreading of Bracton as a doctrine of agency and was applied by Coke in decisions to prevent the exercise of judicial power by another agency and later received its present form in the United States.\" This theory has been discountenanced even in America where in spite of a iomewhat rigid separation of powers delegated legislation is permitted in various fields. No doubt the Donoughmore Committee in England recommended that delegation should be put within bounds. But the example of the United States is to the contrary.\n\nThe question was examined by the Moreland Commission, the Brownlow Committee and the Acheson Committee.\n\nThey permitted the delegation of ancillary powers to instrumentalities other than the legislatures. The Donoughmore Committee had before if the opinion of the First Parliamentary Counsel in these words :\n\n(I) [1967] I S.C.R. IS at 59.\n\n\" ... it would be impossible to produce the amount and the kind of legislation which Parliament desires to pass and which the people of this country are supposed to want, if it became necessary to insert in the Acts of Parliament themselves any considerable portion of what is now left to delegated legislation.\"\n\nTherefore, in England and America many writers (for example, Lowell) have pointed out that previously English and American statutes were over-burdened with details and tried to provide in advance fof all matters. Things have now changed. Delegated legislation is now held \"inevitable\" and the criticism of it is only because of 'nostalgic yearnings for an era that had passed'. The result is noticeable in England, America, Australia, Canada and in our country. Take any statute and it will be found that quite a lot of things are left to be done by some other instrumentality.\n\nThe rule making power, 'the appointed day' clauses, the provisions for extending the Act, for granting exemptions and so on and so forth are to be met with everywhere.\n\nOtherwise, how can one justify the controls which have come into existence in India? The Gold Control Order sprang from the Defence of India Act without there being any statement in the Defence of India Act of any \"guidelines\" or \"safeguards\". The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was sustained by reading the preamble without maldng a search for \"guidelines\", \"limits\" or \"safeguard\"-see Harishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') . . In Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration Committee('), the power to modify existing statutes was recognised provided no essential feature was changed.\n\nIn Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Poona('), a general provision that the Municipality may impose \"any other tax\" to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor-in-Council was obtained was held valid only because the tax was imposed \"for the purposes of the Municipality.\" In Hamdard Dawakhana(•) case the selection of diseages or conditions was left to the Executive but was held not to be an instance of excessive delegation. In Pandit Banarsidas Bhanot v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh(•), it was observed:\n\n\"Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and the like.\"\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 380.\n\n\n(3) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 71.\n\n\n(5) [1959] S.C.R. 427.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS Uiidayatullah, J.) 285\n\nThis was justified on the ground that in doing this the legislature could not be considered to have lost its perfect control since it retained the power to interpose its own authority. The principle was accepted on the basis of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.('). The learned Chief Justice has expressed that the case was wrongly read but with all due respects it has always been understood in this sense.\n\nLastly in Liberty Cinema(') case the rate of a tax was not considered a part of the essential legislative function.\n\nThese cases in themselves cover the present matter.\n\nThe principle now advocated that the legislature must itself impose the tax by laying down the rate, the persons to be affected and the manner of levy and collection when it concedes power to Municipal Corporation appears to be a novel doctrine which ha~ not been accepted even in the land where the doctrine about delegated legislation took its birth.\n\nIt is not necessary to clog this judgment by many citations but an extract from United States\n\nv. City of New Orleans(') may usefully be cited:\n\n'The position that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated by the Legislature to municipal corporations, which are merely instrumentalities of the State for the Detter administration of the govermnent in matters of local concern. When such a corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited. For the accomplishment of those purposes, its authorities, however limited the corporation, must have the power to raise money and control its expenditure. In a city, even of small extent, they have to provide for the preservation of peace, good order and health, and the execution of such measures as conduce to the general good of its citizens; such as the opening and repairing of streets; the construction of sidewalks, sewers and drains; the introduction of water, and the establishment of a fire and police department. In a city like New Orleans, situated on a navigable stream, or on a harbor of a lake or sea, their powers are usually enlarged, so as to embrace the building of wharves and docks or levees for the benefit of commerce, and they may extend also to the construction of roads leading to it, or the contributing of aid\n\n(I) [1885] IO A.C. 282.\n\n(2) [1952) 2 S.C.R. 477\n\n(3) 25 L. Ed. 225 at 226.\n\ntowards their construction. The number and variety of works which may be authorized, having a general regard to the welfare of the city or its people, are mere matters of legislative discretion. All of them require for their execution considerable expenditure of money.\n\nTheir authorization without providing the means for such expenditure would be an idle and futile proceeding. Their authorization, therefore, implies and carries with it the power to adopt the ordinary means employed by such bodies to raise funds for their execution, unless such funds are otherwise provided. And the ordinary means in such cases is taxation. A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.\"\n\nIt is argued that in America this is held to fall outside excessive delegation because of the history of t.1.e municipal corpora- .tions in that country.\n\nThere is no essential difference between the United States and India in this respect. M•micipal Corporations have a hoary past in our country also. The first Municipal Corporation was created in India by a Ro, al Charter in 1687 at .Madras.\n\nIn 1726 three Charters established Municipal Corporations at Bombay Calcutta and Madras. Since then scores of statutes have established municipalities all over India. The Conservancy Act X of 1842, which applied to Bengal, allowed municipalities to tax houses. The Act remained a dead letter. But in 1882 Lord Rippon's Government passi:d the well-known Resolution extending Local Self-Goverument in India and the municipalities have since been accepted as a limb of local self-government. Every Municipal Act (whether for a single municipality or for a group) contains ahnost identical provisions regarding taxation.\n\nIt is one of the attributes of the local self-government.\n\nThe various Constitutions which have governed us have always included the power to set up local self-government and provided that it must be financed and must have the power of raising funds.\n\nTherefore the constituent Acts have ahnost in every instance provided for raising of funds through taxes in the local areas subject to control of Government. Today the entry in the Constitution also recognises this power in the legislature. The provisions about taxes have followed the same method as in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act.\n\nSometimes the provision enables pubt; c opinion to be elicited before the tax is imposed but this is not an invariable rule. The exercise of the power has not been questioned as it has been in recent years.\n\nWe are concerned here with Parliament which by a concentration of all the powers of legislation derived from all the three Legislative Lists becomes the most competent and potent legisla-\n\n:11.UNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Hidayatullah, J.) 287\n\nture it is possible to erect under our Constitution. The doctrine that it is a delegate of the people which coloured certain American decisions does not arise here.\n\nIt has been discarded also in America. The old plea that the Indian legislatures were delegates of the British Parliament and therefore could not delegate further, (rejected in a string of cases by the Judicial Committee), is not open today.\n\nThe doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way. It only means that the legislature must not efface itself but must give the legislative sanction to. the imposition of the tax and must keep the control in its own hands.\n\nThere is no specific provision in the Constitution which says that the Parliament cannot delegate to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its own will.\n\nThe question always is whether the legislative will has been exercised or not. Once it is established that the legislature iiself has willed that a particular thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted with its control) there can be no question of excessive delegation. If the delegate acts contrary to the wishes of the legislature the legislature can undo what the delegate has done. Even the courts, as we shall show presently, may be asked to intervene when the delegate exceeds its powers and functions. The observations and theories culled from American cases cannot be applied in our country without reflection.\n\nEven in America the doctrine is much watered down especially when it is a question of investing municipalities with power of such taxation. Parliament, when it confers such powers, cannot be said to abdicate or efface itself unless it can be said that it has lost its control over the action of the delegate. In the present case. in addition to prescribing the mode, it keeps a check by making Government, answerable to itself, the supervising authority.\n\nThis is not a safeguard in the sense in which the matter has been accepted in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, but is indicative of the exercise of the legislative will by the legislature itself.\n\nThe details of the tax are to be considered by the supervising authority and if the tax is n9t what the Jegis- lature intended should be imposed, the tax cannot be imposed.\n\nIt is no use comparing compulsory taxes with optional taxes in the Municipal Corporation Act. Even in the compulsory taxes [see for examples. 114(1)(a)(b)(c)] much of what may. otherwise, be described as essential is left to the determination of tl1e Municipal Corporation.\n\nThe percentage in each case is not named and has been left to the determination of the Municipal Corporation. No standards are prescribed nor are there any restrictions to ensure that the percentage will not be unduly high. No doubt in some of the taxes limits are fixed but even below the maximum\n\nlimit or between the maxima and minima there is still a broad discretion in the Municipal Corporation.\n\nIn making bye-laws there is no direction, guidance or safeguards except the approval of the Government. If section 150 is to be questioned the other sections must equally be bad.\n\nIf the Corporation cannot be trusted to do this and the vesting of the power in it is illegal it must be so in the other cases.\n\nThe respondents, however, do not criticise the compulsory taxes as bad.\n\nThere is nothing to show in what order the optional taxes are to be chosen and imposed. Further, there is no indication of the proportion wltich the compulsory taxes must bear between themselves.\n\nThere is no difference in principle between what is intended to be doRe by s. 150 and that which is to be done by s. 114 and several other sections. In fact, s. 150 is mild when compared with some of the other sections. We cannot agree to the proposition which has been urged before us that s. 150 is excessive delegation when these sections are not characterised as excessive delegation.\n\nLocal bodies are subordinate branches of governmental activity.\n\nThey are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They fnnction for public purposes and take away a part of the government affairs in local areas. They are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of State functions.\n\nAs they are intended to carry on local selfgovernment the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government.\n\nThis supervision is considered necessary, because Municipal Councillors as a rule are unwilling to tax in a manner likely to affect themselves. House-holders seek to transfer burdens to tradesmen and vice-versa. To insist that the legislature should provide for every matter connected with municipal taxation would make municipalities mere tax collecting department; of Government and not self-governing bodies which they are intended to be. Government might as well collect the taxes and make them available to the municipalities. That is not a correct reading of the history of Municipal Corporations and other selfgoverning institutions in our country.\n\nThe tax has not been challenged as unreasonable. If it had been it might have been necessary to consider it from another angle.\n\nThe delegation to the Municipal Corporation of the power to levy taxes and fees is for the purpose of its own duties under the Act.\n\nThe power must be reasonably exercised for attaimnent of those purposes.\n\nThese purposes include supply of water, running of transport services, lighting of streets and their maintenance, conservancy, establishment of hospitals and so on.\n\nThe interrelation of taxes with expenditure has to be maintained. This relation must be reasonable. Suppose it were\n\nMUNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Hidayatul/ah, J.) 289\n\nto become unreasonable.\n\nIs there no remedy ? Now the rule regarding reasonableness of byelaws was laid down in Kruse v.\n\nJohnson('). This rule has been universally accepted and applied in India and elsewhere.\n\nThe same rule is applied to fees and taxes imposed by the Mt:nicipal bodies. Since illustrative cases were not cited at the BBI it is not necessary to give a full list. A few representative cases, selected by us , at ran!lom may be seen in Mewa Ram v.\n\nMunicipal Board, Mathura('), Corporation of Madras v.\n\nSpencer & Co. Ltd('), V. M. Raghavalu v. Corporation of Madras('), Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. Sooratee Bara Bazar Col. Ltd.(•), Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Balli Bros.('). Nor is the reasonableness of a tax open to question in relation to municipalities alone. It was even considered in relation to legislatures by the Judicial Committee in Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada('). An unreasonable tax can be considered by the courts but it must be a cleaI!y exorbitant tax which goes so high as to be extortionate.\n\nWe do not agree that our view will make it easy for the legislatures to name a tax and leave it to be imposed by the Executive at its sweet will.\n\nThese horrible imaginings need not detain us because neither does this flow from our view nor it is possible that such action will go unchallenged. The position of self-governing bodies is different from that of the Executive.\n\nFor these reasons we agree with the learned Chief Justice that the tax was validly imposed and the appeal in relation to it must be allowed. We agree in the order regarding costs proposed by him. 1\n\nShah, J. The facts which give rise to the appeals have been set out in the judgments just delivered, and need not be repeated.\n\nTwo principal questions arise for determination in these appeals:\n\n(1) Whether the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act 35 of 1966 effectively imposes liability to pay tax on consumption or sale of electricity for the period April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966; and\n\n(2) Whether by enacting s. 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 which confers authority upon the Corporation by resolution to levy tax\n\n(I) [1898j2 Q.B. 91.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 1939 Allahabad 710.\n\n(3) l.L.R. 52 Mad. 764.\n\n(4) I.L.R. 53 Mad, 722. (S) J.L.R. S Rang. 139.\n\n(6) A.l.R. 1931 Mad. 497.\n\n(7) A.LR. 1939 P.C. SJ, 57.\n\nin respect of the optional taxes specified in s. 113(2), the Parliament has violated the rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority.\n\nSub-section ( 1) of s. 113 of Act 66 of 1957 requires the Corporation to levy for the purposes of the Act six named taxes-(a) property taxes; (b) a tax on vehicles and animals; ( c) a theatretax; (d) a tax on advertisements other than advertisements published in the newspapers; (e) a duty on the transfer of property; and (!) a tax on buildings payable along with the application for sanction of the building plan.\n\nBy sub-s. (2) the Corporation is authorised, in addition to the taxes specified in sub-s. ( 1 ) , to levy for the purposes of the Act any of the following taxes, namely :-\n\n(a) an education cess;\n\n(b) a local rate on land revenues; ( c) a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments; ( d) a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity;\n\n( e) a betterment tax on the increase in urban land values caused by the execution of any development or improvement work; ( f) a tax on boats; and\n\n(g) tolls.\n\nBy sub-s. (3) it is provided that the taxes specified in sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) shall be levied, assessed and collected in accordance with tlie provisions of the Act and the bye-laws made thereunder.\n\nThe Act proceeds by ss. 114 to 149 to make detailed provisions in respect of the taxes set out in s. 113 (1) about the levy and imposition of taxes, the system of assessment, and maximum rates or the standards to guide the determination of the rates of taxes and incidental matters. In respect of the optional taxes it is pro vided in s. 150 of the Act that :\n\n\"(l) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a resolution for the levy of any of the taxes specified in sub-section (2) of section 113, defining the maximum rate of the tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.\n\n(2) Any resolution passed under sub-section (1) shall be submitted to the Central Govermnent for its sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government, shall come into force on and from such date as may be speci lied in the order of sanction.\n\nH •\n\nI ' \"' . - \\ \\ I\n\nMUNCL.~CORPN. DELHI. V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)\n\n(3) After a resolution has. come into force under sub-section (2), the Corporation may, subject to the maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable; and the tax shall come into force on the first day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolution is passed.\n\n(4) After a tax has been levied in acc'°ordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the provisions of sub-section\n\n(2) of section 109, shall apply in relation to such tax as they apply in relation to any tax imposed under sub-section (I) of section 113.\" ·\n\nThere is, it is manifest, a significant difference in the schemes relating to. the levy -arid imposition of compulsory and optional taxes, fixation of rates and systems of taxation.\n\nSections 114 to 149 set out elaborate provisions relating to the maximum rates of tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be\n\ngranted.\n\nIn s. 114 the property taxes are divided under four heads : water tax, scavenging tax, fire tax and general tax.\n\nThe rates of water tax, scavenging tax and fire tax are to be such percentages of the rateable value of lands and buildin£s as the Corporation may deem reasonable for providing water supply, for providing.scavenging services and for the conauct and management of the Fire Service Undertaking .. The Parliament has, besides specifying the persons liable to tax and the system of assessment also set out standards or guidelines for determining the rates of tax.\n\nThe general tax which is leviable in addition is to.be not less than ten per cent and not more than twenty per cent of the rateable value of lands and buildings within the urban areas and such lower rates in the rural areas as may be determined by the Corporation.\n\nSections 114 to 135 enact a complete code relating to the levy of property taxes. Schedules 3 to 6 to the Act set out the maximum rates which may be charged as tax on vehicles and animals, theatretax and taxes on advertisements and buildings, and by. diverse provisicins in Ch. VIII the persons or properties to be charged are specified and the mechanism of assessment is P.rescribed.\n\nThe Act also prescribes the maximum rate of duty on transfer of property leviable in the form of a surcharge on the duty imposed by the Indian Stamp Act.\n\nBut in respect of optional taxes the Parliament has merely enumerated the taxes in sub-s. (2) of s. 113, and has provided by sub-s. ( 3) of s. 113 that the taxes_ specified in sub-s. (2) shall be levied, assessed and collected in accordance with the provisions of the Act_ ii_nd the bye-laws made thereunder.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n\nSection 109 deals with the adoption of the annual budget estimates of the Corporation. It is provided by the first sub-s. of s. 109 that the Corporation shall, on or before the 31st day of March of every year, adopt for the ensuing year the budget estimates of the income and expenditure of the Corporation to be received and incurred on account of the municipal government of Delhi, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Delhi Transport Undertaking and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking.\n\nBy sub-s. (2) it is enacted that on or before the 15th day of February of each year the Corporation shall determine the rates at which various municipal taxes, rates and cesses shall be levied in the next following year and save as otherwise provided in the Act the rates so fixed shall not be subsequently altered for the year for which they have been fixed.\n\nBy s. 110 power is reserved to the Corporation to alter the budget estimates in certain circumstances and in the manner provided therein.\n\nThe scheme of levy and imposition of taxes readin, g ss. 113 to 150 with the provisions relating to the adoption of budget estimates, is that the Corporation determines in the first instance the rates at which the municipal taxes, rates and cesses may be levied in the nex1 following year and then prepares the budget estimates in the light of the estimate of income and expenditure. The compulsory taxes have to .be levied subject to the limits or standards prescribed in that behalf by 1he Statute : in respect of the opti011al taxes ihe Co1por::ion is left free to pass a resolution to levy all or any of the optional taxes, prescribin, g the maximum rates, system of assessment, the incidence of taxation and exemptions, if any.\n\nHaving noticed the relevant statutory provisions we may deal with the effect of the Validating Act 35 of 1966.\n\nThe High Cout was of the view that by merely fixing the rates of tax on consumption or sale of electricity, for the period April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966, the Parliament bad not effectivelv imposed liability upon the tax payers to pay that tax. The first sub-section of s. 2 of the Validating Act consists of two parts. It commences with the non-obstante clause and proceeds to enact-(a) that the resolution of the Corporation dated June 24, 1959, insofar as it relates to the determination of the rates at which tax shall be le viable on the consumption or sale of electricity shal! , be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law; and (b) that the rates specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of tax under the Act \"with effect on and from the 1st day of July, 1959 and upto and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 1966\".\n\nThe non-obstante clause plainly governs both the parts of s. 2 ( 1). It is clear that it was the intention of the Parliament to declare that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 150(2) ands. 109(2) of Act' 66 of 1957, the resolution dated\n\nMUNCL. CORPN. DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 293\n\nJune 24, 1959, purporting to be made under s. 150(3) shall be deemed to be in accordance with law insofar as it relates to the rates of electricity tax. The effect of the first part of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 2 is therefore to impose liability un the consumption or sale of electricity purported to be levied under the resolution of the Corporation under s. 150(3). The High Court has accepted that position.\n\nBy the second part of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 2 liability is imposed for payment of tax for the period April l, 1960 to March 31, 19~6. at the same rate, that is the rate which was adopted by the resolution dated June 24, 1959. The function of both the parts is to impose liability for tax levied under resolution of the Corporatian under s. 150(2). It is true that the second part does not expressly levy tax for the period to which the rates were extended, but by sub-s. (2) the Parliament has provided that all taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity \"levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution dated June 24, 1959, shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, 2nd to have always been, validly levied or collected.\" The Corporation bad year after year passed resolutions in purpmted exercise llf authority under s. 150(1) of the Corporation Act for the levy of tax on consumption or sale of electricity, and by virtue of s. 2 (l) of the Validating Act notwithstanding anything contamed ms. 150 and sub-s. (2) of s. 109 the rates undtr the resolution dated June 24, 1959, were to be deemed the rates for the years 1960-61 to 1965-66.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 2 of the Validating Act in terms deems the tax levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in sub-s. 0). The resolution re(erred to in sub-s. (2) is the resolution dated June 24, 1959; the rates prescribed by that resolution are by the terms of sub-s. (l) made rates of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity for the period July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966; and the tax is deem to be validly levied and co!lected for the entire period. If the view which found favour with the High Court be correct, the taxes collected by or paid to the Corporation would not be liable to be refunded by the Corporation, suits filed for refund of tax may not be instituted or continued, for the tax already paid, and the acts and proceedings taken in pursuance of the resolution will be deemed to be done in accordance with Jaw, but there being no levy of tax, liability for payment of tax for the period referred to in sub-s. ( l) of s. 2 could be enforced.\n\nThis could not have been the intention of the Parliament.\n\nThe Parliament was faced with the decision of the Punjab High Court that the levy of the tax pursuant to the resolution dated June 24, 1959, passed by the Corporation which undoubtedly was restricted to the year 1959-60 was invalid, because the Union\n\nGovernment had modified the rates fixed urlder the resolution of the Corporation under s. 150(1) for the year 1\\159-60.\n\nBefore the High Court decided the dispute, several years had elapsed and the tax was collected on the footing that the resolution dao.ed June 24, 1959, and the resolutions subsequently passed were valid. If the Parliament intended to enact an Act only for validating the levy of tax under the resolution dated June 24, 1959, it was plainly 1:11lllecessary to enact the second part of s. 2(1). The decision of the High Court which necessitated the enactment of the Validating Act was undoubtedly the judgment of the Punjab High Courr which related only to the \".!llidity of the resolution levying tax for the year 1959-60, but that is not a ground for implying that !he Parliament was seeking to validate the levy of tax only for the year 1959-60.\n\nWe may tum now to the second question on which the argument was mainly advanced. It was conceded by the Attorney- General that under our Constitutional scheme, the Parliament cannot abdicate its essential legislative functions and set up another authority or body to perform essential legislative functions either generally or in respect' of a particular head of legislation or even in respect of a part of the subject-matter of that particular head.\n\nAgain the power to enact subordinate or ancillary legislation to carry out the details of parliamentary Acts may undeniably be invested in other bodies.\n\nThe increasing complexity of modern administration, the difficulty of passing compltcated 111easures through the method of parliamentary debate aud discussion, and the number of details and technical matters which must of necessity be provided for in statutes, have led to an increase in the practice of entrusting power. to executive or other agencies to make subsidiary or ancillary legislation.\n\nBy entrusting that power to another body, the Parliament does not delegate its essential legislative functions.\n\nBut the authority .to entrust subsidiary or ancillary power is not unrestricted : the power cannot be conferred upon a delgate without setting out some principle, policy, or standard which is to guide the delegate in dischargin~ its delegated funcuons. Jf the Parliament Jays down by legislative act adequate guidance, whatever form it takes, and the delegate is required to confom1 to that J!Uidance, entrustment of authority to the delegate to mke :.ubordinate legislation will be upheld.\n\nThe power of delegating legislative authority cannot, however, be extended to investment of authority in another body in respect of matters relating to principle or policy of legislation, to the amendment of Parliamentary Acts so as to affect the substance thereof or to investment in the executive power when no guidance or standard is laid down in that behalf or to authorize the executive to encroach upon the judicial power of the State.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, /.) 295\n\nIn Panama Refining Company v. A. D. Ryan('), Hughes, C.J., pronouncing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States observed :\n\n\"The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will et'l!ble c\n\nit to perform its function in laying down policies -and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits anti the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such proVisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the !imitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.\" Again Chief Justice Hughes observed : (at p. 426)\n\n\"Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed, have constantly been sustained. Moreover, tho ll Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out tho declared legislative policy, that is, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it, \"to fill up the details\" under the general provisions made by the Legislature.\" G The observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made in Archibald G. Hodge v. The Queen(') in relation to the nature of delegated powers exercisable by the local legislature of the self-governing dominions do not imply a different role. In Archibald G. Hodge's case(') the Judicial Committee observed that the local legislature was competent under s. 92 of the British H North America Act, 1867, to make Regulations in the nature of police or municipal regulations of a merely local character for the g<J09 government of taverns. It was contended that assuming that\n\n(l) 293 U.S. 388 : 79 L. ed. 446.\n\n(2) [1883! 9 A.C, 117.\n\nL6Sup.C.I/68-6\n\nthe local legislature of Ontario Province had power to legislate to the full extent of the resolutions passed by the License Commissioners, and to have enforced the observance of otheir enactments by penalties and imprisonment, the Imperial Parliament had conferred no authority upon the local legislature to delegate those powers to the License Commissioners or any other persons, and therefore the power conferred upon the. Imperial Parliament on the local legislature could be exercised in full by the local legislature alone and no body else.\n\nThe Judicial Committee rejected that eontention on the ground that the maxim \"de/egatus non potest delegare\" had no application within the limits of subjects and areas prescribed by s. 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within those limits of subjects and areas the local legislature was supreme, and had the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the :rarliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make bye-laws or resolution as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect. The Judicial Committee regarded the power to make the bye-laws as ancillary to legislation, that without it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail, that entrustment of a limited discretionary authority to others has many illustrations of its necessity and convenience, and othat the legislature by \"committing important regulations to agents or delegates\" does not efface itself.\n\nThe Judicial Committee in In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(') struck down the Initiative and Referendum Act (6 Geo. 5,\n\nc. 59, Manitoba) on the ground that it would compel the Lieutenant-Governor to submit a prOpOsed' law to a body of voters totally distinct from the legislature of which he is the constitutional head and would render him powerless to prevent it from becoming an actual law if approved by those voters. The offending p1ovisiom of the Act being so interwoven with its scheme as not to be severable, the Colonial Laws Validity Act, i865, could not be applied to validate any part of the Act.\n\nOpinion in this Court has with the passage of time become crystallized. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912(2 ) two views were broadly propounded. Patanjali Sastri, J., was of the view that the Indian Parliament acting within the limits circumscribing its legislative powers, intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as thQse of the British Parlianumt, and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit was to be found in the Constitution\n\n(I )(1919] A.C. 935.\n\n(2) (1951] S.C.R. 747.\n\nG ;\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 297\n\nActs.\n\nThe Indian Parliament is therefore competent to make a law delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively as is the British Parliament, and in the absence of any constitutional inhibition, delegation of legislative power, however extensive, could be made so long as the delegating body retained its own legislative power intact. But for the effacement of its power a positive enabling provision in the constitutional document was required. The learned Judge further observed that the O>urt\n\ncannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because the Parliament decides in aparticular instance to entrust its legislative power to its appointed inS'lrumeµtality, however repugnant such entrustment may be to the democratic process.\n\nFaz! Ali and S. R. Das, JJ., expressed views though not identical closely approximating that opinion.\n\nOn the other hand Kania, C.J., was of the opinion that the essentials of legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. If the legislature having made its laws leaves the details for working out and for carrying an enactment into operation to another subordinate agency or to some executive officer, there is no delegation of legislative power. While the so-called delegation which empowers the making of rules and regulations has been recognised as ancillary to legislative power, the Constitution Acts in India do not recognise a general power in the legislature to abdicate legislative authority.\n\nAbdication of its powers by a legislature need not necessarily amount to complete effacement of itself : it may be partial. If full powers to do everything that the legislature can do are conferred on a subordinate authority, although the legislature retains the power to control the action of the subordinate authority by recalling such power by or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority, there is still an abdication or effacement of the legislature conferring such power.\n\nMahajan, J., agreed with Kania, C.J. According to him not only the nature of legislative power, but the very existence of representative government depends on the doctrine that legislative powers cann.ot be. transferred. The legislature cannot substitute the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of any other body, for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.\n\nUnless. the power of the delegation is expressly given by the Constitution, the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function to any other body, and since the Indian Constitution does not give such a power to the Legislature it has no power to delegate the essential legislative functions to any other body and that abdication by a legislative body need not necessarily amount to complete effacement. When in respect of a subject in the Legislative List the legislative body says in effect that it will\n\nnot legislate but will leave it to another to legislate on that subject, there is abdication of legislative authority.\n\nMukherjea, J., was of the opinion that the legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions which consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make it.\n\nProvided the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts may not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.\n\nBose, J., without definitely committing himself to either view, observed that the Indian Parliament may legislate alqng the lines of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Queen v. Burah('), that is to say, it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which are, or may be, in existence at that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative control of Parliament, whether those laws are enacted by Parliament or by a State Legislature set up by the Constitution, and that he saw no reason for extending the scope of legislative delegation beyond the confines which have been hallowed for so long.\n\nSince opinion in that case was delivered, in several cases brought before this Court, the extent of the power which the Legislature possesses to delegate legislative authority was discussed. A brief summary of some of those cases may be attempted.\n\nIn Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and Anr.(') Bose, J., attempted to summarise the effect of the various opinions expressed in the Delhi Laws Act case(3 ), and speaking for a unanimous Court observed that an executive authority can be authorised by a statute to modify either existing or future laws, but not in any essential features. Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, but it is clear that modification cannot include a change of policy.\n\nEssential legislative function consists in the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct.\n\nModifications which are authorised are limited to local adjustments or changes of minor character and do not mean or involve any change of policy or change in the Act.\n\nIn Hrrrishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madh, va Pradesh(') in dealing with the validity of cl. 3 of the Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order, 1948, promulgated by the Central Govern-\n\n(l) 5 I.A. 178.\n\n(3) [1951] S C.R. 747.\n\n(2) [1955] IS.C.R. 290.\n\n(4)[1955] IS.CR. 380.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI 1'. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 299\n\nment under s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, it was observed that the Legislature IJmst declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law, and where the Legislature has laid down such a principle in the Act and that principle is the maintenance or increase in supply of essential c9mmodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at given prices, the exercise of the power was valid.\n\nWithin the frame-work of the case law so far developed, Venkatarama Aiyar J., in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(') speaking for the majority observed:\n\n\". . . . the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for .the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like.\"\n\nThe learned Judge held that the power conferred on the State Government by s. 6(2) of the Central Provinces aml Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, to amend the Schedule relating to exemptions was in consonance with the accepted legislative practice relating to the topic and was not unconstitutional.\n\nIn The Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona(\") it was held that by enacting ins. 59(1)\n\n(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, that the Municipality may levy \"any other tax\" to the nature and object of which lhe approval of the Governor-in-Council shall have been obtained prior to the selection the Legislature has not abdicated to the Municipality its legislative authority.\n\nSince the section authorised the imposition of taxes alone as were necessary for the purpose of the Act, the taxes could, it was held by the Court, be levied only for implementing those purposes and for no others, and delegation on that account was not unguided.\n\nIn Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay and Ors.(') the validity of s. 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948 which authorised the Provin cial Government by notification in the Official Gazette to fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands situate in any particular area or to fix such rate on any other suitable basis a~ it thought fit fell to be determined.\n\nSpeaking for the majority of the Court, Gajendragadkar, J., observed that although the power of delegation was a constituent element of\n\n(I) [1959] S.C.R. 427.\n\n(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71.\n\n(3) [1961] S.C.R. 341.\n\nlegislative power, the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case and before it can delegat.e any subsidiary or ancillary powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislature policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper guidance in implementing the same.\n\nIn Corporation of Calcutta and Anr. v. Liberty Cinema('), it was held that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation had power to levy fee pursuant to a resolution, in exercise of the power under s, 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, at such rates as may from time to time be fixed by the Corporation. It was observed by the majority that the fixing of the rate of a tax not being of the essence of legislative power may be left to !I non-legislative body, but when it is so left to another body the legislature must provide guidance for such fixation, and that in the case before the Court there was sufficient guidance in the Act for determining the rate of\"the levy under s. 548.\n\nTwo recent cases may also be noticed : In B. Shama Rao v.\n\nUnion Territory of Pondicherry(2 ) this Court held that a statute which extended the Act passed by another Legislature as it stood immediately -before the date on which it was to be brought into force by a notification issued by the Government was \"void and still-born'', because the Legislature in enacting the Act in that manner had totally abdicated its legislative functions and had surrendered it in favour of another Legislature.\n\nIn M/ s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab and Ors.('), Subba Rao C.J. speaking for the Court observed in dealing with a case under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948:\n\n\"The Constitution confers . a power and' imposes a duty on the legislature to make laws.\n\nThe essential legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another.\n\nBut in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation.\n\nH must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An overburdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly pverstep the limits of delegation.\n\nIt may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down\n\n(I) 11965] 2 S.C.R. 477.\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1967 S.C. 1480\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1895, 1901.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. B!RLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 301\n\nany standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation.\"\n\nOn a review of the cases the following principles appear to be well-settled: (i) Under the Constitution the Legislature has plenary powers within its allotted field; (ii) Essential legislative function cannot be delegated by the Legislature, that is, there can be no abdication of legislative function or authority by complete effacement, or even partially in respect of a particular topic or matter entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislature; (iii) Power to make subsidiary or ancillary legislation may however be entrusted by the Legislature to another body of its choice, provided there is enunciation of policy, principles, or standards either expressly or by implication for the guidance of the delegate in that behalf.\n\nEntrustment of power without guidance amounts to excessive delegation of legislative authority; (iv) Mere authority to legislative on a particular topic does not confer authority to delegate its power to legislate on that topic to another body.\n\nThe power conferred upon the Legislature on a topic is specifically entrusted to that body, and it is a necessary intendment of the constitutional provision which confers that power that it shall not be delegated without laying down principles, policy, standard or guidance to another body unless the Constitution expressly permits delegation; and (v) the taxing provisions are not exception to these rules.\n\nIt was asserted that the doctrine of excessive delegation of legislative power is inapplicable to the conferment of taxing power on local authorities. It was said that the power to tax is in its essence a sovereign power of the State, and since a Municipal Corporation exercises auxiliary authority in the important business of local self-government, in exercising the power to tax for limited municipal purPQses, it is not acting as a delegate, but on behalf of the State. We are unable to accept the broad proposition that when authortiy is conferred upon a local authority by the Legisla ture to tax, the local authority exercising power so conferred acts as an agent of the State.\n\nA local authority is undoubtedly an instrument of the State in the matter of local government restricted to a particular area in which it functions.\n\nBy investing a local authority with powers of legislation for administration of the Act relating to local government, sovereign power of the State is entrusted to the. body for limited purpose : but the entrustment of power is as a delegate, and must in our view be within the\n\nlimits of permissible entrustment consistent with the constitutional A scheme.\n\nThe power of the State to legislate in mattenl of taxation within the allotted field is plenary, but in entrusting that power to a local authority the legislature cannot confer unguided authority.\n\nIn our judgment, the constitutional power to legislate in respect of a particular topic such as local government-in Entry 5 List II of the Seventh Schedule,-does not carry with it the power to delegate the legislative functions of the .State. Entry 5 List II confers upon the State the authority to legislate in respect of local government that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining se!'tlement authorities and other local authorities for the .Purpose of local self-government or village administration. Authority to legislate\n\nin respect of powers of local bodies may encompass authority to confer power upon the local bodies to tax within certain specific fields in the appropriate list.\n\nBut the power conferred by the legislative entry canno.t override the constitutional limitations against abdication of legislative authority. The expre5!1ion \"power'' D therefore does not include authority to delegate the essential legislative function without disclosing principles, policy, or standard guiding the local bodies in the exercise of the power.\n\nAgain the guidance which saves delegation from the vice of excessiveness may be express or may be implied : and the extent of the guidance must be determined by the subject-matter of legislation and the power entrusted. But, in our judgment, the delegation cannot be upheTd, merely because of the special status, character, competence or capacity of the delegate or by reference to the provisions made in the statute to prevent abuse by the <lelegate of i~ authority.\n\nThe question is one of the restriction upon the power of the legislative body to delegate the power of legislation and that restriction is not removed because the delegate is a high dignitary of the State or is especially versed in a particular branch of administration or has special information or is in a position to collect that information, or is not likely to abuse its authority. The Constitution entrusts the legislative functions to the legislative branch of the State, and directs that the functions shall be performed by that body to which the Constitution has entrusted and not by some one else to whom the Legislature at a given time thinks it proper to delegate the function entrusted to it.\n\nA body of experts in a particular branch of undoubted integrity or special competence may probably be in a better-position to exercise the power of legislation in that branch, but the Constitution has choren to invest the elected representatives of the people to exercise the power of legislation, and not to such bodies of experts. Any attempt on the part of the experts to usurp, or\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (S/tah, J.) 303\n\nof the representatives of the people to abdicate the functions vested in the legislative branch is inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. Power to make subordinate or ancillary legislation may undoubtedly be conferred upon a delegate, but the Legislature must in conferring that power disclose the policy, principles or standards which are to govern the delegate in the exercise of that power so as to set out a guidance. Any delegation which transgresses this limit infringes the constitutional scheme.\n\nIt is necessary then to consider whether in the present case the Parliament bas disclosed any policy, principles, standards or guidance in conferring authority upon the Corporation to fix the rates of tax selected by the Corporation out of the list contained in s. 113(2), to select persons to be rendered liable to tax, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted. The Act leaves it to the Corporation by resolution to define the maximum limits of tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons, or descriptions or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted. The Act discloses by express enactment no standard, no principle and no policy laid down by the Parliament to guide the Corporation in levying and collecting the optional taxes.\n\nBy providing in sub-s. (2) of s. 150 that the resolution will come into force on or from the date as may be specified in the order of sanction of the Central Government, an overriding authority is conferred upon the Union Executive, but that is not a substitute for guidance; Counsel for the Corporation and some interveners contended that the Act contained some indications of policy and principles governing the exercise of the power to tax.\n\nThey relied upon the use of the expression \"for the purposes of this Act\" ins. 113(2) and contended that this was sufficient guidance to the Corporation. The Corporation is undoubtedly competent to levy tax only for the purposes of the Act, and for no other purpose and by providing expressly what is implicit in a statute relating to municipal taxation no guidance is furnished to the Corporation in the exercise of the power delegated.\n\nEven if the expression \"for the purposes of this Act\" were not used in s. 113(2), the Corporation could not levy or collect taxes for purposes other than those for which it is set up by the Act. The Corporation is a statutory body charged with municipal admini1tration. It is a body corporate with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property in its name, and is charged with municipal government, and can exercise its powers only for the purposes of the Act, and for no other purpose. Again by the use of the expression \"for the purposes of this Act\" no principfo, policy, or stllndard is disclosed in the matter of the rates of tax, liability of persons, objects or transactions to be taxed, and the scheme or system of taxation to be adopted.\n\n304 SUPREME COUllT llEPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nIt was then urged that the delegate being the Corporation which is traditionally associated with the exercise of functions in the sphere of local government, it has the same powers which the State has within the limited field allotted to it, and therefore when the Legislature of the State confers upon the Corporation the power to tax, it is not in substance delegating any legislative function, but investing the Corporation :.vith the State's power to tax.\n\nAs we have already observed, the power to tax vested in the State is because of the exigencies of administration invested for limited purposes in local bodies, but the investment is as a delegate of, and not as an agency of, the State.\n\nIt was also said that the standards or guidance furnished by the Act for exercising the delegated authority are to be found in \"the needs of the Corporation\", and \"needs of the Corporation\" are of necessity an adequate guidance. Strong reliance in that behalf was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the Liberty Cinema's case('), which we have already referred.\n\nSarkar, J., speaking for the majority of the Court observed at p, 494 :\n\n\"It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court which support the proposition that for a statutory provision for raising revenue for the purposes of the delegate, as the section now under consideration is, the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power was conferred on it, may afford sufficient guidance to make the power to fix the rate of tax valid.\"\n\nThe learned Judge proceeded to derive the principle stated by him from the decisions in The Western India Theatres Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona('); Vasant/al Maganbhai' Sajanwa/a v. The State of Bombay('); Union of India v. Bhana Ma( Gu/zari Mal('); Harishankar Bag/av. The State of Madhya Pradesh(•). But the cases cited did not make the needs of the taxing body a test for determining whether guidance was furnished to the delegate in exercising the power to tax.\n\nWhile we agree with the view expressed by Sarkar, J., that in the case of a self-governing local authority with taxinp; power, a large amount of flexibility in the guidance to be provided for the exercise of that power must exist, we are unable to hold that because the delegate is a local authority which \"needs\" large funds, depending upon diverse and changing circumstances, the power conferred upon the Corporation to adjust the tax to its varying needs may be regarded as an adequate guide.\n\n\n(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71.\n\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 305•\n\nIf the needs of a local body be an indication of guidance, the rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority is reduced to a varnishing paint. The requirement of a large degree of flexibility in the matter of municipal taxtion can in any event be no guidancein determining the persons, propertie~ or transactions which are to be taxed and the system of taxatt_on to be adopted.\n\nFailure to give a guidance in respect of all these matters exposes the legislation to the vice of excessive delegation. In the Liberty Cinema's ease(') the Corporation was invested with the po, wer to fix the rates : the persons who were liable to pay the tax, and the system of assessment were easily determinable by the scheme of the Act and no question of exemption fell to be detem1ined.\n\nIn M/s. Devidas Gopal Krishnan's case('), Subba Rao, C.J.,. speaking for the Court observed :\n\n\"The argument of the learned Counsel (for the State) that such a policy could be gathered from the constitutional provisions cannot be accepted, for, if accepted, it would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation.\n\nIt would also sanction conferment of power by Legislature on the executive Government without laying down any guidelines in the Act.\"\n\nThe Court was concerned with the delegation of uncontrolled' power to the executive Government to fix rates of sales tax.\n\nIn our judgment, in the case of a statute delegating taxing power to a municipality, the same rule applies and a guideline cannot be inferred from the constitutional provision conferring power to tax.\n\nIt was also said that the action of the Corporation in levying and imposing optional taxes is subject to a two-fold control : ( 1) the Act expressly prescribes that the resolution of the Corporation shall be sanctioned by the Central Government before it becomes effective; and (2) that the act of levying tax together with aU incidental matters is entrusted to a body of elected representatives of the people who are responsible to the electorate. We do not think that the existence of either of these controls warrants a departure from the rule against excessive delegation. They may probably operate as effective safeguards against abuse.\n\nBut the Constitution has entrusted the power of legislation to the Parliament and has also imposed a restriction against delegation of its authority without setting out guidance to the delegate; the Parlia ment cannot by providing against abuse of its functions by its delegate reduce the rigour of the rule against excessive delegation of authority. The rule against excessive delegation of legislative power is a restriction upon the power of Parliament : whether' in a given instance the rule is violated must depend on the nature\n\n\n(2) A.J.R. !967 S.C. !895, 1901.\n\nand the extent of delegation and not by the application of the test that delegation of authority to some other body may more effectively administer the Act. If the argument that by imposition of controls which ensure that the power delegated wjll not be abused by the Corporation is regarded as determinative of the JY.:>licy or principle guiding the Corporation, it may be open to the Legislature in many other cases e.g. 'in statutes relating to 'Income-tax Wealth-tax, Sales-tax and the like, to delegate the power to tax including the fixation of rates, persons, objects and transactions\n\nto be charged, the system of taxation to be adopted and other related matters to persons of unimpeachable credit and undoubted technical competence, with avenues and means f()r collecting 1he\n\nnecessary information and for acting upon it.\n\nWhether that C scheme of levying a tax may, on practical considerations be. deemed better suited lo effective administration of the taxing Acts than the vote of the elected representatives of the people is a matter On which no opinion need be expressed. It may suffice to state that such entrustment of legislative power with'()ut guidance is in consistent with the basic concept on which our constitutional scheme is founded.\n\nOur Constitution-makers have entrusted the power of legislation to the elted representatives of the people\n\no that the power is exercised not only in the name of the people but by the people. The rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority is a necessary postulate of the S\\'.lvereignty of the people.\n\nIt is not claimed to be nor intended to be a panacea 3gainst the shortcomings of public administration.\n\nGovernance of the State in manner determined by the people through their representatives being of the essence of our form of government, the plea that a substitute scheme for governance through delegate; may .be more effective is destructive of our political structure. If it be remembered that legislation on a given topic is intended to be a declaration of the popular will relating to the administration of that topic in the larger public interest, the futility of the argument that a delegate of the Legislature which is invested with the power to determine and announce the popular will, may either because of its special competence, or because of controls on it will be as good as, or even better than, the legislature, becomes obvious.\n\nThe circumstance that the affairs of the Corporation are administered by the elected representatives responsible to the people is in our judgment, wholly irrelevant in determining whether the rule against excessive delegation may be departed from. If that exception be true, the Parliament may justifiably delegate its power to enact laws to other bodies merely by the expedient of constituting those bodies from among the representative of the people.\n\nIt may also be noticed that under s. 490 of the Delhi Municipal <'orporation Act, 1957, in certain eventualities t11e Central\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, /.) 307\n\nGovernment may supersede the Corporation for such period as may be specified in the order. When the order of supersession is passed\n\nall concillors and aldermen vacate their offices and during the period of supersession of the Corporation, all powers and duties conferred and imposed upon the Corporation are exercisable and performable by such officer or authority as the Central Government may appoint in that behalf, and that would include power of taxation.\n\nCertainly during the period that the Corporation remains under supersession, the power to tax would be exercised. by a nominee of the Central Government and not by the representatives of the people.\n\nc The Parliament has undoubtedly at any given time power to withdraw the delegated power in favour of the Corporation. But by retaining authority to withdraw power from the delegate, no principles, policy, or standards governing the delegate are set out.\n\nIf an express provision which ensures against abuse is not a substi\n\ntute for guidance in another garb, the power of the Parliament to withdraw authority will not for the like reason be a substitute.\n\nIt was then sid that there has been a long standing practice in the Indian Legislatures for conferring upon the Corporations and Municipalities power to tax in the form in which it is conferred by s. 113 ( 2). But the issue of constitutional validity of the provisions under challenge cannot be permitted to be clouded by reference to a practice, assuming that it is of a long duration. We have not thought it necessary to, and it would be impossible for us to examine all the statutes under which the power has, it is claimed, been conferred upon the Corporations or Mwtlcipalities in the form in which it has been conferred by s, 113(2) of the Act.\n\nF It was also said that it is impossible for the Legislature, having regard to the varying needs of the Municipalities to lay down any guidance, principles or policy to govern them in the imposition of diverse taxes.. But that argument has, in our judgment little substance. In the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 19S7, the imposition of major taxes set out in sub-s. (1) of s. 113 is made subject to clear and precise provisions providing for principles.\n\nG policy and standards. It is only in respect of the oPtional taxes set out in sub-s. ( 2) of s. 113 that no such guidance is =closed ..\n\nIt was also urged that fixing a maximl!m rate is not any 'dance. because it would be possible for the Legislature to fix a m um rate which is wholly unrelated to the realities, and the formal requirement of idance may, by prescribing that unreal maxl- H mum, be complied with. But it is not suggested that in all cases by fixing a maximum rate, . a guidance would be deemed to be\n\nsupplied. Fixing . of maximum rate which prevents the Corporation or Municipality from levying a tax at a rate higher than that\n\nSUPRBMB COURT, REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S C.R.\n\nrate, to be a guidance, must not be wholly unrelated to the demands of the Corporation, the capacity of the tax-payers to bear the liability and the other relevant matters.\n\nReliance was sought to be placed upon the minority judgment Of this Court in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal and Ors. (1). The primary question which fell to be determined in that case related to the validity of s. 135(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act 2 of 1916, which shut out all enquiry into the regularity of the procedure by which tax has been imposed 3fter the sanction of the Government to a resolution of the Municipality selecting a tax for imposition had been obtained. It was held by the majority 1hat the rule of conclusive evidence in s. 135 ( 3) did .not shut out all enquiry by courts. The Court incidentally con- :sidered the question whether the enactment of s. 135(3) amounted to delega1ion of legislative power to tax insofar as the rate and incidence. were concerned and in the minority judgment it was observed that the Legislature may delegate to a subordinate authority the power to fix rates under proper safeguards, and it is not :necessary to specify all the situations under which this can be done. It was observed at p. 970 : \"But there can be no doubt that in the matter of local taxation Jike taxation by municipal boards, district boards and bodies of that character there is pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of the rate of tax to the local body, be it a municipal board or a district board or some other board of that kind. The reason for this is that problems of different municipalities or districts may be differept and one municipality may require one kind of tax at a particular rate at a particular time while another municipality may need another kind of tdX at another rate at some other time. Therefore, the legislature can in the case of taxation by local bodies delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body provided it has taken care to specify the safeguards in the form of procedural provisions or such other forms as it considers necessary in the matter of fixing the rate.\"\n\n'If thereby it is meant that the rule against excessive delegation of 1egislative power may be departed from on the ground that the delegate is hedged in by controls or restrictions which will prevent 'it from abusing its authority, we are unable to agree. Safeguards against abuse do not alter the character of unauthorised dele11:ation of legislative power. They cannot be a substitute for the guidance which the Constitutional Scheme requires that the Parliament must give to a delegate.\n\nAs the validity of the constitutional protection .cannot be judged in the light of what the character, capacity or\n\n(I} (1966] I S.C.R. 9SO.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Sikri, J.) 309\n\nthe special aptitude of the delegate may be, it cannot also be adjudged in the light of the provisions made against abuse of power.\n\nTurning to the terms of s. 113(2) of the Act, we are of the opinion that the Parliament has not set out the limits of the tax which will be levied, persons from whom or the transactions on which the taxes will be levied, the system of taxation which will be adopted, and the eXeihptions, if any, which will be grauted. All these matters are left to the Corporation.\n\nIn possible cases such a power is capable of the grossest abuse.\n\nWe may, however, hasten to observe that the vice of delegation lies not in its r.apecity for abuse, but in its delegation beyond peri'nissible limits and contrary to the constitutional scheme.\n\nUndoubtedly delegation of the authority to legislate on those mat:ers is always subject to the rule that the action of the delegate which amounts to unreason· able exercise of the powers will be invalid. But that does not alter the true character of the rule against excessive delegation of legi~ lative authority.\n\nIn our view, the provisions of s. 150(1) insofar as they leave to the Corporation to fix the maximum rates of taJt to be levied, class or classes of persons, or the description or description of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions if any to be granted are invalid. We hold that the Validating Act 35 of 1966 validly levies and imposes tax on consumption or sale of electricity till March 31, 1966. It will however be declared thats. 150(1) is void as permitting excessive delegation of legislative authority to the Corporation.\n\nSikri, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by the learned Chief Justice Hidayatullah, J., and Shah, J. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeals be atlowed and with the order regarding costs.\n\nI further agree with the reasons given by him for holding (a) that the tax was imposed on consumption of electricity (b) that the sanction by Government was in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and ( c) that the Validation Act validated the levy and collection for the period April 1, 1960, to March, 1966. But as I hold different views as to the powers of legislatures in India, I would briefly indicate them.\n\nApart from authority in my view Parliament has full power to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. This power flows, in my judgment, from Art. 246 of the Constitution. The word \"exclusive\" means exclusive of any other legislature and not exclusive of any subordinate body. There is, however, one resriction in this respect and that is also contained in Art. 246.\n\n310 SUPREME OOUIT REl'O&TS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nParliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the relevant list. Negatively this means that Parliament cannot abdicate its functions. It seems to me that this was the position under the various Government of India Acts, and the Constitution has made no difference in this respect. I read Hodge v. R. (') and Powell v. Appollo Candle Co.(2) as laying down that legislature like Indian legislatures had full power to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. In the judgments in these cases no such word as \"policy\" \"standard\" or \"guidance\" is mentioned.\n\nIt is true that in Hodge v. R. (1) the words 'ancillary to legislation' are mentioned but if we examine ss. 4 and 5 of the Liquor License Act, 1877, it would bl found that no guidance is contained in these sections for defining the conditions and qualifications requisite to obtain tavern licenses, for limiting the number of tavern and shop licenses, and the nature of the penalty to be irnPosed for the infraction thereof.\n\nAny person drafting these conditions and qualifications and other matters will find no guidance in s. 4 or s. 5 of the Liquor License Act. It is, however, true that the objective to be achieved is given in the Act and the words \"ancillary to legislation\" in the context must mean ancillary to the objective underlined in the legislation.\n\nThe case of In re : The Initiative and Referendum Act(1) provides an instance of abdication of functions by a legislature.\n\nNo inference can be drawn from this case that delegatiollS of the type with which we are concerned amount to abdiC<ltion of func tions.\n\nThe question then arises : Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, a law with respect to any of the items in List II? The answer is plainly in the affirmative. I can see no sign of abdication of its functions by Parliament in this Act. On the contrary Parliament has constituted the Corporation and prescribed its duties and powers in great detail.\n\nBut assuming I am bound by authorities of thi' Couft to test the validity of s. 113(2)(d) ands. 150 of the Act by ascertaining whether a guide or policy exists in the Act, I find adequate guid~ or policy in the expression \"purposes of the Act\" in s. 113. The Act has pointed out the objectives or the results to be achieved and taxation can be levied only for the purpi>se of achieving the objectives or the results.\n\nThis, in my view, is sullicfont guidance especially to a self-governing body like the Delhi Municipal Corporation. It is not necessary to rely on the safeguards mentioned by the learned Chief Justice to sustain the delegation.\n\nThere is no need to think that delegations of the prnt ty~ )Vill lead to arbitrary taxation or rules. Fmt, we must have farth\n\n(IJ 9 A.G 117.\n\n(2). 10 A.C. 282.\n\n(3) [1919] A.C. 935.\n\nMUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BlllLA MILLS (Sikri, J.) 311\n\nA in our reptative bodies and secondly, I ame .with the learned Chief Justice and Hidayatullah, J., that in suitable cases taxation in pursuance of delegated powers by a Municipal Corporation can be struck down as unreasonable by Gourts. If Parliament chooses to delegate wide powers it runs the risk of the bye-Jaws or the rules framed under the delegated power being challenged as B umeasonable.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majoliiy, the appeals are allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside in so far as C it is against the appellant and the writ petitions filed by the respondent a\"e dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs throughout.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nL6Sup. Cl/68-7", "total_entities": 357, "entities": [{"text": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIRLA COTION, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIRLA COTTON, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 194, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 204, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 235, "end_char": 266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 113 and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "statute": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 113(2) and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321, "end_char": 339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "statute": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 9, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 9, 1959, the appellant Corporation passed a resolution under section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 for the levy of certain taxes including a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity, Under s. 150(2) the Central Government sanctioned the l'!J<\n\nwith'effect from July I, 1959 and also modified the rates of tax."}}, {"text": "section 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1104, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1211, "end_char": 1220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 9, 1959, the appellant Corporation passed a resolution under section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 for the levy of certain taxes including a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity, Under s. 150(2) the Central Government sanctioned the l'!J<\n\nwith'effect from July I, 1959 and also modified the rates of tax."}}, {"text": "June 24, 19S9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1360, "end_char": 1373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation resolved on June 24, 19S9 under s. 150(3 )' to determine the rates sanctioned by the Central Government as the rates at which the tax would be leviable for the year 1959-60."}}, {"text": "s. 150(3 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1843, "end_char": 1857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament th<'n passed Act 35 of 1966 te> validate the levy of the electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1862, "end_char": 1879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates."}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1929, "end_char": 1938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Decen1ber 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates."}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 to March 31."}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the\n\nperiod from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act meiely validatc, d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2911, "end_char": 2917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the\n\nperiod from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act meiely validatc, d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period.", "canonical_name": "Shelat"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3581, "end_char": 3588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4172, "end_char": 4182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This clearly shows that the vali<latlo11 was not merely of the rate of tax hut of levy and collection also for the entire period from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966, A reading of s. 2(1) ; md s. 2(2) together shows that Parliament not only validated what was done but also itself impoo>d the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24."}}, {"text": "June 24. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This clearly shows that the vali<latlo11 was not merely of the rate of tax hut of levy and collection also for the entire period from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966, A reading of s. 2(1) ; md s. 2(2) together shows that Parliament not only validated what was done but also itself impoo>d the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24."}}, {"text": "March 31. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 and authorised the levy and collection thereof for the entire period from July I. 1959 to March 31."}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 113(2) and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatulla!J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268 D-Gl\n\n(Per Hidayatulla!J and Ranzasn:ami; JJ.) :", "canonical_name": "Hidayatulla!J"}}, {"text": "Ranzasn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7512, "end_char": 7519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268 D-Gl\n\n(Per Hidayatulla!J and Ranzasn:ami; JJ.) :"}}, {"text": "ami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7520, "end_char": 7523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268 D-Gl\n\n(Per Hidayatulla!J and Ranzasn:ami; JJ.) :"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9250, "end_char": 9257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in America the doctrine is much \\Vatered down especially v.hen it is."}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11049, "end_char": 11052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ThIS JS sufficient guidance especially to a self-governing body like the Delhi Municipal Corporation."}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India\n\nAct", "statute": "Government of India\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11622, "end_char": 11628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India\n\nAct", "statute": "Government of India\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "Per Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11640, "end_char": 11648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "310 OJ\n\n(Per Shah c.nd Vaidialingam, JI."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11654, "end_char": 11666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "310 OJ\n\n(Per Shah c.nd Vaidialingam, JI.", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "Section 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11686, "end_char": 11700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India\n\nAct", "statute": "Government of India\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13988, "end_char": 13994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15312, "end_char": 15319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) (Per Wanclwo C.J. and Size/at, J,) : There was no force in the contenlion that the sanction of the Central Government given under section 150(2) was .not in accordance with the Constitution as it was: glven by a Deputy Secretary to the Government wlio had no authority to do so."}}, {"text": "section 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15827, "end_char": 15834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16061, "end_char": 16085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "77 of the Constitution, that deficiency had been made up by the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government in which it was stated that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy Home Minister and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom 1he work relating to the Corporation was assigned by the Home Minister."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16760, "end_char": 16773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D.\n\nChawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "D. D.\n\nChawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16775, "end_char": 16788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D.\n\nChawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16793, "end_char": 16814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D.\n\nChawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16858, "end_char": 16867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, B. Parthasarthy, J. B . .,"}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarthy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16869, "end_char": 16884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, B. Parthasarthy, J. B . .,"}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16896, "end_char": 16906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dadachanji and Ravinder F Narain, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "Ravinder F Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16911, "end_char": 16928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dadachanji and Ravinder F Narain, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Ravinder F Narain"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16975, "end_char": 16989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17036, "end_char": 17050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. ."}}, {"text": "D. R. Thadani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17052, "end_char": 17065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. ."}}, {"text": "Da/ip K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17067, "end_char": 17081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. ."}}, {"text": "Bhuvanesh Kumari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17083, "end_char": 17099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. ."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17101, "end_char": 17117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. ."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17122, "end_char": 17137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. .", "canonical_name": "Ravinder F Narain"}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhiva", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachanji, and Ravinder Narain, for in'erveners Nos."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachanji, and Ravinder Narain, for in'erveners Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17255, "end_char": 17275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17280, "end_char": 17292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for intervener No.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17318, "end_char": 17329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and I. N, Shroff, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "I. N, Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17334, "end_char": 17346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and I. N, Shroff, for intervener No.", "canonical_name": "I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17387, "end_char": 17394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17405, "end_char": 17411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Shelat"}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17447, "end_char": 17459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Hidayatulla!J"}}, {"text": "RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17519, "end_char": 17528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17574, "end_char": 17578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "VAID!ALINGAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17639, "end_char": 17651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966.", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17720, "end_char": 17739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966."}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17994, "end_char": 18024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18265, "end_char": 18271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18279, "end_char": 18310, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18452, "end_char": 18463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18625, "end_char": 18634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18691, "end_char": 18705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18717, "end_char": 18726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19169, "end_char": 19175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 9. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19467, "end_char": 19483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation forwarded the resolution dated February 9."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19665, "end_char": 19678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 which was somewhat defect.iv.~ inasmuch as it die not specify the maximum rates, but merely the rates, which were to be enforced for the ensuing year, to Government for sanction On June 20, 1959, the Central Government sanctioned the tax on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from July I, 1959 In giving the sanction the Central Government modified the rates On June 23, 1959, the Standing Committee took the Government\n\nsanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporatim'."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19858, "end_char": 19871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 which was somewhat defect.iv.~ inasmuch as it die not specify the maximum rates, but merely the rates, which were to be enforced for the ensuing year, to Government for sanction On June 20, 1959, the Central Government sanctioned the tax on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from July I, 1959 In giving the sanction the Central Government modified the rates On June 23, 1959, the Standing Committee took the Government\n\nsanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporatim'."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20061, "end_char": 20067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 24, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20149, "end_char": 20162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 24, 1959, the Corporation resolved that the recommendations of lhc :>tanding Committee regarding tax on consumption or sale of ,~Jectricity be approved."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20392, "end_char": 20404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then followed demands by the Corporation on the basis of the imposition of tax from July 1, 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20832, "end_char": 20838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20981, "end_char": 20994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 257\n\nrespondent then went in appeal, and the appeal court allowed the appeal holding inter a/ia (i) that the Central Uovernment could not modify the rate; spedied in the resolution under s. 150 ( 1) but could only either withhold sanction thereto or sanction them, and (ii) that the liability to pay tax could not commence earlier than April 1, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 109(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21035, "end_char": 21044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21080, "end_char": 21096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3, 1966, Parliament passed the Delhi M\\!nicipal Corporation (Validation of Electrici'ty Tax) Act, No."}}, {"text": "July I, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21322, "end_char": 21334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By :his Act, it purported to validate the levy of electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966 (both days inclusive)."}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21550, "end_char": 21559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21808, "end_char": 21824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This resolution was submitted to Government and was sanctioned, on December 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21888, "end_char": 21897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22031, "end_char": 22048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This resolution was passed on December 27, 1965."}}, {"text": "Dec.ember 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22194, "end_char": 22212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the first writ petition it challenged the levy of tax by resolutions of February 17 and Dec.ember 27, 1965, and by the second writ petition the appellant challenged the vires of the Validation Act."}}, {"text": "So far as the Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23587, "end_char": 23593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July\n\nI, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23771, "end_char": 23784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, the two writ petitions succeeded except as to the period from July\n\nI, 1959 to March 31, 1960."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23788, "end_char": 23802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, the two writ petitions succeeded except as to the period from July\n\nI, 1959 to March 31, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24000, "end_char": 24006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24156, "end_char": 24165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24359, "end_char": 24364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of the Act creates a Corporation from such date as the Central Government may by notification in the official i:azet•e, appoint and this Corporation is charged with the municipal government of Delhi and is to be known as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24423, "end_char": 24432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24605, "end_char": 24637, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24928, "end_char": 24938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26300, "end_char": 26310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28298, "end_char": 28304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28317, "end_char": 28328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 114 to 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28489, "end_char": 28508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28803, "end_char": 28809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30013, "end_char": 30024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30133, "end_char": 30144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30188, "end_char": 30194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30649, "end_char": 30655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30931, "end_char": 30941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31037, "end_char": 31048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 109(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31406, "end_char": 31420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th day of February of each year", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31453, "end_char": 31486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 109(2) lays down that on or before the 15th day of February of each year, the Corporation shall determine the rates at which various municipal taxes, rates and cesses shall be levied in the next following year."}}, {"text": "Section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31626, "end_char": 31637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MUNL. CORPN. DELHI I\". BIRLA MILLS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31697, "end_char": 31731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 102 inter alia provides that no payment of any sum out of the\n\nMUNL."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31971, "end_char": 31977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32344, "end_char": 32350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "matter came before this Court for the first time In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33071, "end_char": 33150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35541, "end_char": 35545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36626, "end_char": 36630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36874, "end_char": 36909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37137, "end_char": 37147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "statute": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37692, "end_char": 37697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "statute": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39636, "end_char": 39684, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Devi Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42341, "end_char": 42349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be added that Devi Das's(') case did not differ from the Liberty Cinema(') case."}}, {"text": "(1965] 2 S.C.R. 477", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42479, "end_char": 42498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42939, "end_char": 42945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43628, "end_char": 43634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banarsi Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44137, "end_char": 44148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banarsi Das case(') do not support the proposition laid down there if it is to be read as giving unqualified power to fix the rate without any guidance, control or safeguard.", "canonical_name": "Banarsi Das"}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44891, "end_char": 44897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44906, "end_char": 44928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sydney", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45784, "end_char": 45790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to evade uty, but possesses properties 1n the whole or ill part which can be used or were intended to be applied for a similar purpose as such dutiable article, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct that a duty be levied on such article at a rate to be fixed in proportion to the degree in which such unknown article approximates in its qualities or uses to such dutiable article; and such rate thus fixed shall be published in a Treasury order in the Gazette, and one other newspaper published in Sydney, and exhibited in the long room or other public place in the Custom House, and a copy of all such Treasury orders shall, without unnecessary delay, be laid before both Houses of Parliament.\" -"}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46415, "end_char": 46421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46765, "end_char": 46799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the Congress had laid down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person authorised to fix the rate of customs duties on imported merchandise was to conform."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47159, "end_char": 47172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the President could vary the rates with the aid of his advisers after proper investigation on the ground of\n\ndifferences of cost of production in the United States and abroad l\\Ild to make, such increases and decreases in rates of duty as were found ."}}, {"text": "Banarsl Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47655, "end_char": 47666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observation in Banarsl Das's case(') tha!", "canonical_name": "Banarsi Das"}}, {"text": "S. 624", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48027, "end_char": 48033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandit Banarasi Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48445, "end_char": 48464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the majority referred to the view taken in Pandit Banarasi Das's case(') and inteipreted B the dictum in that case to mean :that the fixation of rate can be left to a non-legislative body but this was qualified by the observation that when the power to fix the rate of trut was reft to another body, the legislatum must provide guidance for such fixation."}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S.C.R. 950", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51053, "end_char": 51072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gopal Krish11an", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52118, "end_char": 52133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last case to which reference may be made is Devi Das Gopal Krish11an( 1)."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57863, "end_char": 57887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may, before we consider the provisions of the Act, refer to the position prevaleDt in the United States of America so far as local taxation is concerned."}}, {"text": "United Sates of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58690, "end_char": 58713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus in the United Sates of America, even though the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the Government, it may be delegated by the legislature to municipal corporations : [See United States v. City of New Orleans(')] ."}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60501, "end_char": 60507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61004, "end_char": 61010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61689, "end_char": 61695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62901, "end_char": 62907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64781, "end_char": 64787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65900, "end_char": 65906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67148, "end_char": 67154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67675, "end_char": 67681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68415, "end_char": 68421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68926, "end_char": 68932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72212, "end_char": 72218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72555, "end_char": 72571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Govem- E ment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73394, "end_char": 73407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then .it is urged that the sanction by Government was not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that in this case the sanction was given by the Deputy Secretary to Govem- E ment who obviously had no authority to do so."}}, {"text": "Art. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74092, "end_char": 74099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 14, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74553, "end_char": 74569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961, pai<ed on January 14, 1961 to the effect tha• \"in relafon to the bus:ness 8 allotted to a Minister, another Minis'er or Deputy Minister may be associated to orm such functions as may be assigned to him.\""}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75420, "end_char": 75429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75528, "end_char": 75539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75569, "end_char": 75580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75588, "end_char": 75625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "24th Juru;, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75687, "end_char": 75703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Validation Act was passed in December 1966 and section 2 thereof wl!h 'Which we are concerned reads thus :-\n\n\" ( 1 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 150 read with sub-section (2) of section 109 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the resolution of the Delhi Municipal Corporation dated the 24th Juru;, 1959, passed under sub-section (3) of section 150 aforesaid, insofar as the said resolution relates to the determination of the rates at which tax shall be leviable on the consumption or sale of electricity shall."}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75737, "end_char": 75748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "1st day of July 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76185, "end_char": 76205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law and the ra!es specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of.the tax under the said Act with effect on and from 1st day of July 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 196.6."}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 196.6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76237, "end_char": 76261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law and the ra!es specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of.the tax under the said Act with effect on and from 1st day of July 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 196.6."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76725, "end_char": 76729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76843, "end_char": 76852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March\n\n.31, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76902, "end_char": 76918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary, all taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have been \"levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in subsection ( 1 ) shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been, validly levied or colle-Oted .. \"\n\nThe argument which found favour with the High Court was 1hat the words of s. 2 only validated the levy and collection of tax\n\nfor the year ending March 31, 1960 and no further, though the G '.Section 1n terms refers to the period from July 1, 1959 to March\n\n.31, 1966."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77113, "end_char": 77117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April l, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77285, "end_char": 77298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same argument was raised before us in support of the contention that the Valida- H tion Act failed in its purpose so far as the period from April l, 1960 to March 31, 1966 is concerned."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77642, "end_char": 77651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77922, "end_char": 77931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78354, "end_char": 78358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78597, "end_char": 78620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st day of July, 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 1966\n\nD shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of the tax."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78711, "end_char": 78715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79190, "end_char": 79194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79426, "end_char": 79430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79592, "end_char": 79600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that when s. 2 (1 ) lays down that the rates deducible from F the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966, it must be understood to sanction the levy and collection of tax at the rates fixed."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79859, "end_char": 79863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79910, "end_char": 79917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July l, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80355, "end_char": 80367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This clearly shows that the validation was not merely of the rate of tax but of levy and collection also for H the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966."}}, {"text": "1 une 24, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80773, "end_char": 80787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(2) together it seems to us that Parliament not only validated what was done but\n\nalso itself imposed the rates deducible from the resolll'tion of 1 une 24, 1959 and authorised the levy and cgllection thereof for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966 notwithstaDding ariything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any B court to the contrary. ·"}}, {"text": "Hidayatnllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81172, "end_char": 81184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatnllah, J.-The Delhi Municipal Corporation in exer- C cise of powers under its constituent Act has levied a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity.", "canonical_name": "Hidayatulla!J"}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81193, "end_char": 81220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatnllah, J.-The Delhi Municipal Corporation in exer- C cise of powers under its constituent Act has levied a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity."}}, {"text": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81342, "end_char": 81420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 113(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81435, "end_char": 81452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81876, "end_char": 81882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82042, "end_char": 82053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83086, "end_char": 83097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83204, "end_char": 83215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 83777, "end_char": 83794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent cnallenged the imposition of the tax by a writ petition in the Punjab High Court: A learned single Judge dismissed the petition but on appeal in the High Court the decision was reversed."}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84202, "end_char": 84211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84335, "end_char": 84344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 17 and December 27, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84566, "end_char": 84599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first questioned the imposition -0f the tax by the resolutions of February 17 and December 27, 1965 and the second questioned the legality of the Validation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 113 and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85593, "end_char": 85607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85895, "end_char": 85901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 113 and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87349, "end_char": 87364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 88159, "end_char": 88172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi Laws Act(') case was concerned with certain legislation which conferred a general power on the Executive Governn1ent to apply any Act in force in British India, to certain\n\n(I) [19511 S.C.R. 747."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91206, "end_char": 91245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nown will completely leaving the application of the law to those circumstances which the legislature has already pre-determined."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93465, "end_char": 93470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second method is generally followed and the legislatures in India on times out of number have invested these local self-governing units with powers of taxation."}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94642, "end_char": 94651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Montesquieu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94968, "end_char": 94979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By reason of such provisions the theory of separation of powers advanced by Montesquieu (who regarded the separation of powers as the best feature of the British Constitution) has played a great part."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95200, "end_char": 95207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Montesquieu, of course, was not quite right in imagining that there was a complete separation of powers in England."}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95663, "end_char": 95667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may recall here what we then said :\n\n\"This doctrine, it has been accepted on all hands was originated by the glossators and got introduced into English Law by a misreading of Bracton as a doctrine of agency and was applied by Coke in decisions to prevent the exercise of judicial power by another agency and later received its present form in the United States.\""}}, {"text": "Moreland Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96157, "end_char": 96176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was examined by the Moreland Commission, the Brownlow Committee and the Acheson Committee."}}, {"text": "Lowell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96840, "end_char": 96846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, in England and America many writers (for example, Lowell) have pointed out that previously English and American statutes were over-burdened with details and tried to provide in advance fof all matters."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 97203, "end_char": 97212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result is noticeable in England, America, Australia, Canada and in our country."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 97214, "end_char": 97220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result is noticeable in England, America, Australia, Canada and in our country."}}, {"text": "Hamdard Dawakhana(•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98478, "end_char": 98497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hamdard Dawakhana(•) case the selection of diseages or conditions was left to the Executive but was held not to be an instance of excessive delegation."}}, {"text": "Liberty Cinema", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99649, "end_char": 99663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly in Liberty Cinema(') case the rate of a tax was not considered a part of the essential legislative function."}}, {"text": "New Orleans", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101425, "end_char": 101436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a city like New Orleans, situated on a navigable stream, or on a harbor of a lake or sea, their powers are usually enlarged, so as to embrace the building of wharves and docks or levees for the benefit of commerce, and they may extend also to the construction of roads leading to it, or the contributing of aid\n\n(I) [1885] IO A.C. 282."}}, {"text": "[1952) 2 S.C.R. 477", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 101754, "end_char": 101773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 102948, "end_char": 102955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first Municipal Corporation was created in India by a Ro, al Charter in 1687 at .Madras."}}, {"text": "Bombay Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 103019, "end_char": 103034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1726 three Charters established Municipal Corporations at Bombay Calcutta and Madras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 103039, "end_char": 103045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1726 three Charters established Municipal Corporations at Bombay Calcutta and Madras."}}, {"text": "Conservancy Act X of 1842", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103129, "end_char": 103154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 103173, "end_char": 103179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Conservancy Act X of 1842, which applied to Bengal, allowed municipalities to tax houses."}}, {"text": "Rippon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103268, "end_char": 103274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in 1882 Lord Rippon's Government passi:d the well-known Resolution extending Local Self-Goverument in India and the municipalities have since been accepted as a limb of local self-government."}}, {"text": "Every Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103447, "end_char": 103466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104136, "end_char": 104167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 104898, "end_char": 104916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The old plea that the Indian legislatures were delegates of the British Parliament and therefore could not delegate further, (rejected in a string of cases by the Judicial Committee), is not open today."}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107804, "end_char": 107815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108351, "end_char": 108357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108390, "end_char": 108396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108434, "end_char": 108440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108567, "end_char": 108573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BBI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 110844, "end_char": 110847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since illustrative cases were not cited at the BBI it is not necessary to give a full list."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112154, "end_char": 112158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\nShah, J. The facts which give rise to the appeals have been set out in the judgments just delivered, and need not be repeated.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112596, "end_char": 112605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112613, "end_char": 112644, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "I.L.R. 1939 Allahabad 710", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 112754, "end_char": 112779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) I.L.R. 1939 Allahabad 710."}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112958, "end_char": 112967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113082, "end_char": 113088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114 to 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114220, "end_char": 114234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114298, "end_char": 114304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114535, "end_char": 114541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114684, "end_char": 114695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115736, "end_char": 115747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115855, "end_char": 115866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 114 to 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116055, "end_char": 116074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116349, "end_char": 116355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 114 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117187, "end_char": 117206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Stamp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117709, "end_char": 117725, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117825, "end_char": 117831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117868, "end_char": 117874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118062, "end_char": 118073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118187, "end_char": 118193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118446, "end_char": 118479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is provided by the first sub-s. of s. 109 that the Corporation shall, on or before the 31st day of March of every year, adopt for the ensuing year the budget estimates of the income and expenditure of the Corporation to be received and incurred on account of the municipal government of Delhi, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Delhi Transport Undertaking and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking."}}, {"text": "Delhi Transport Undertaking", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118481, "end_char": 118508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is provided by the first sub-s. of s. 109 that the Corporation shall, on or before the 31st day of March of every year, adopt for the ensuing year the budget estimates of the income and expenditure of the Corporation to be received and incurred on account of the municipal government of Delhi, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Delhi Transport Undertaking and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking."}}, {"text": "s. 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118930, "end_char": 118936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 113 to 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119119, "end_char": 119133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Having noticed the relevant statutory provisions we may deal with the effect of the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119800, "end_char": 119898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120183, "end_char": 120187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having noticed the relevant statutory provisions we may deal with the effect of the Validating Act", "statute": "Having noticed the relevant statutory provisions we may deal with the effect of the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "1st day of July, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 120777, "end_char": 120798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law; and (b) that the rates specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of tax under the Act \"with effect on and from the 1st day of July, 1959 and upto and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 1966\"."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120914, "end_char": 120918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121035, "end_char": 121044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121194, "end_char": 121203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121351, "end_char": 121355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121500, "end_char": 121509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121592, "end_char": 121596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 19~6.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 121669, "end_char": 121684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the second part of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 2 liability is imposed for payment of tax for the period April l, 1960 to March 31, 19~6."}}, {"text": "s. 150(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121888, "end_char": 121897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122424, "end_char": 122433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122533, "end_char": 122537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122624, "end_char": 122630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122765, "end_char": 122769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122885, "end_char": 122889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123710, "end_char": 123714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124133, "end_char": 124142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124551, "end_char": 124558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Courr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 124682, "end_char": 124699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the High Court which necessitated the enactment of the Validating Act was undoubtedly the judgment of the Punjab High Courr which related only to the \".!llidity of the resolution levying tax for the year 1959-60, but that is not a ground for implying that !"}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127065, "end_char": 127071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, /.) 295\n\nIn Panama Refining Company v. A. D. Ryan('), Hughes, C.J., pronouncing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States observed :\n\n\"The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128388, "end_char": 128394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again Chief Justice Hughes observed : (at p. 426)\n\n\"Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed, have constantly been sustained.", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128861, "end_char": 128869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, tho ll Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out tho declared legislative policy, that is, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it, \"to fill up the details\" under the general provisions made by the Legislature.\""}}, {"text": "Archibald G. Hodge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129222, "end_char": 129240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Archibald G. Hodge's case(') the Judicial Committee observed that the local legislature was competent under s. 92 of the British H North America Act, 1867, to make Regulations in the nature of police or municipal regulations of a merely local character for the g<J09 government of taverns."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129330, "end_char": 129335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British H North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129343, "end_char": 129376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129559, "end_char": 129565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British H North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British H North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 130050, "end_char": 130069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Imperial Parliament on the local legislature could be exercised in full by the local legislature alone and no body else."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130354, "end_char": 130359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British H North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British H North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132026, "end_char": 132053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132093, "end_char": 132109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, J., was of the view that the Indian Parliament acting within the limits circumscribing its legislative powers, intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as thQse of the British Parlianumt, and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit was to be found in the Constitution\n\n(I )(1919] A.C. 935."}}, {"text": "Indian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 132140, "end_char": 132157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, J., was of the view that the Indian Parliament acting within the limits circumscribing its legislative powers, intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as thQse of the British Parlianumt, and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit was to be found in the Constitution\n\n(I )(1919] A.C. 935."}}, {"text": "MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 132519, "end_char": 132539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G ;\n\nMUNCL.", "canonical_name": "MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI"}}, {"text": "Indian Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 132582, "end_char": 132599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Parliament is therefore competent to make a law delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively as is the British Parliament, and in the absence of any constitutional inhibition, delegation of legislative power, however extensive, could be made so long as the delegating body retained its own legislative power intact."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133350, "end_char": 133358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!"}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133363, "end_char": 133372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali and S. R. Das, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133471, "end_char": 133476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand Kania, C.J., was of the opinion that the essentials of legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134610, "end_char": 134617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., agreed with Kania, C.J. According to him not only the nature of legislative power, but the very existence of representative government depends on the doctrine that legislative powers cann.ot be."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135645, "end_char": 135654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea, J., was of the opinion that the legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions which consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make it."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136316, "end_char": 136320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose, J., without definitely committing himself to either view, observed that the Indian Parliament may legislate alqng the lines of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Queen v. Burah('), that is to say, it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which are, or may be, in existence at that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative control of Parliament, whether those laws are enacted by Parliament or by a State Legislature set up by the Constitution, and that he saw no reason for extending the scope of legislative delegation beyond the confines which have been hallowed for so long."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138144, "end_char": 138149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MUNCL. CORPN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 138332, "end_char": 138344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUNCL.", "canonical_name": "MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI"}}, {"text": "BIRLA MILLS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138357, "end_char": 138368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.) 299\n\nment under s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, it was observed that the Legislature IJmst declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law, and where the Legislature has laid down such a principle in the Act and that principle is the maintenance or increase in supply of essential c9mmodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at given prices, the exercise of the power was valid."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138396, "end_char": 138400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139004, "end_char": 139021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within the frame-work of the case law so far developed, Venkatarama Aiyar J., in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139549, "end_char": 139556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces aml Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139564, "end_char": 139611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139905, "end_char": 139940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140542, "end_char": 140549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "statute": "the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140927, "end_char": 140941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the majority of the Court, Gajendragadkar, J., observed that although the power of delegation was a constituent element of\n\n(I) [1959] S.C.R. 427."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 141498, "end_char": 141528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Liberty Cinema('), it was held that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation had power to levy fee pursuant to a resolution, in exercise of the power under s, 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, at such rates as may from time to time be fixed by the Corporation."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141625, "end_char": 141653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142096, "end_char": 142102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142666, "end_char": 142675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao C.J. speaking for the Court observed in dealing with a case under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948:\n\n\"The Constitution confers ."}}, {"text": "Court observed in dealing with a case under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142698, "end_char": 142780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1965] 2 S.C.R. 477", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 143618, "end_char": 143636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147033, "end_char": 147049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MUNCL. CORPN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 149579, "end_char": 149591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any attempt on the part of the experts to usurp, or\n\nMUNCL.", "canonical_name": "MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI"}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150405, "end_char": 150414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151043, "end_char": 151049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Counsel for the Corporation and some interveners contended that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151289, "end_char": 151360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151968, "end_char": 151977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Counsel for the Corporation and some interveners contended that the Act", "statute": "Counsel for the Corporation and some interveners contended that the Act"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153760, "end_char": 153766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J., speaking for the majority of the Court observed at p, 494 :\n\n\"It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court which support the proposition that for a statutory provision for raising revenue for the purposes of the delegate, as the section now under consideration is, the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power was conferred on it, may afford sufficient guidance to make the power to fix the rate of tax valid.\""}}, {"text": "Harishankar Bag", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 154538, "end_char": 154553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge proceeded to derive the principle stated by him from the decisions in The Western India Theatres Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona('); Vasant/al Maganbhai' Sajanwa/a v. The State of Bombay('); Union of India v. Bhana Ma( Gu/zari Mal('); Harishankar Bag/av."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh(•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 154562, "end_char": 154587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh(•)."}}, {"text": "Devidas Gopal Krishnan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156131, "end_char": 156153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In M/s. Devidas Gopal Krishnan's case('), Subba Rao, C.J.,."}}, {"text": "s. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161026, "end_char": 161032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162488, "end_char": 162494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163225, "end_char": 163256, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163319, "end_char": 163325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163495, "end_char": 163501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT, REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 164049, "end_char": 164088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of maximum rate which prevents the Corporation or Municipality from levying a tax at a rate higher than that\n\nSUPRBMB COURT, REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S C.R.\n\nrate, to be a guidance, must not be wholly unrelated to the demands of the Corporation, the capacity of the tax-payers to bear the liability and the other relevant matters."}}, {"text": "s. 135(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164489, "end_char": 164498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164826, "end_char": 164832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164954, "end_char": 164963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167077, "end_char": 167086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168027, "end_char": 168036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "hold that the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168323, "end_char": 168351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168584, "end_char": 168589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by the learned Chief Justice Hidayatullah, J., and Shah, J. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeals be atlowed and with the order regarding costs."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168682, "end_char": 168694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by the learned Chief Justice Hidayatullah, J., and Shah, J. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeals be atlowed and with the order regarding costs.", "canonical_name": "Hidayatulla!J"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169401, "end_char": 169409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169616, "end_char": 169624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170356, "end_char": 170367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Liquor License Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 170375, "end_char": 170399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170777, "end_char": 170781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Liquor License Act, 1877", "statute": "the Liquor License Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170785, "end_char": 170789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Liquor License Act, 1877", "statute": "the Liquor License Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 171305, "end_char": 171349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 113(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171711, "end_char": 171723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171881, "end_char": 171887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957", "statute": "Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_312_321_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "WESTERN U.P. ELECTRIC POWER AND SUPPLY CO. LTD.\n\nA v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.\n\nFebruary 23, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., S.M. S1KR1, J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA\n\nAND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.)\n\nIndian Electricity Act (9 of 1910), s. 3(2)(e)-Board supp/yiog energy to consu, ner at lower rate than to licensee whether discriniinatory-Notification directing supply to consunter, reqirements.\n\nThe petitioner company a licensee was supplying electrical energy to the 3rd respondent. By the Electric Supply Act 1948 the Electricity Board was consti•uted and by Indian Electricity (U.P.) Amendment Act, 1961, the disability of the Board to supply directly electrical energy to consumers such as the 3rd respondent was removed.\n\nThe Sta1e Government issued a notification directing the Board to directly supply energy to the 3rd respondent. The rates chargeable by the Board for energy supplied to licensees were higher than the rates the direct consumers. The 3rd respondent terminated the ri.gn:cment with the petitioner company.\n\nThe petitioner mpany filed a pe:ition under Art. 32 of the onstitution.\n\nHELD : (Per Full Court) : The notification could not be sustained as a valid notification as it was discriminato'ry.\n\nIf the Board were to supply energy directly to the 3rd respondent it had to do so at rates lower than the rates at which electricity was supplied by it to the petitioner company. 'The petitioner-company being thus charged at higher rates must as a distnbutor charge higher rates from its other consumers with the result that the 3rd respondent would get energy at substantially lower rates than other consumers including other industrial establishments in the area. The noti fication thus resulted in discrimination between the 3rd respondent on the one hand the other consumers on the other as also between the 3rd res pondent and the petitioner company. [319 B-DJ (Per Wanchoo C.J., Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.). The Board could not have. distributed energy to the consumers though it was a licensee under 1910 Act unless (a) there was a scheme dr (b) that it was authorised in public interest under the amended s. 3(2)(e). Nei•her of these two conditions having been fulfilled the notification and the direction contained therein to the Board to supply energy to the 3rd respondent were in breach of the petitioner-company's rights under its licences and the require .. ments of the amended s. 3(2)(a). [318 HJ\n\nThe allegation that the 3rd respondent suffered in production and looses as a result of short or .defective supply by the petitioner-company was not borne out by the reeded in this case. If there was any justification for the allegation now made by the respondents it is inconceivable that for all these years the 3rd respondent would not have made any complaint for such defective supply either to the Board or to the State GovernmenL\n\n(Per Bhargava, J.) The notification cannot be held to be invalid on the ground that it was issued in breach of the amended s. 3 ( e) of the Act.\n\nIf the State Government was competent under the original s. 3(2)(e) of the Act of 1910 to grant a licence to any person for supply of electricity\n\nWEST U.P. ELEC. CO. v. U.P. STATE (She/at, J.) 313\n\nin the areas covered by the licences issued to the petitioner-company, it cannot be seen why a similar result could not 00 validly brought about by legislation by the appropriate~ legislatures creating a statutory licensee for purposes of the Act of 1910. Consequently the power granted to the Electricity Board by the notification to supply electricity to a consume'r in the area covered by one of the licences of the petitioner-company could not be held to 1>~ in violation of the conditions of the licence.\n\nIn view of the langua~ of the provisions contained in the amended 3(2)(e.) of the Act of 1910, it was not competent for this Court in this writ petition. on the material available, to declare that the notification \\Vas invalid for the reason that the direction contained therein was not ll, lade by the State Government in public interest. As long as the State Go\\'ernment based its order on an opinion formed on relevant material, it was not open to the cours to examine and take a diffrent view on the. ba:sis of otfier materials. [320 G-321 BJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 151 of 1967.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nM. C. Chagla and Mohan Behari Lal, for the petitioner.\n\nD S. T. Desai and 0 . .P. Rana, for respondent No. 1.\n\nC. B. Aganvala and 0. P. Rana, for respondent No. 2.\n\n0. P. Rana, for respondent No. 3.\n\nP. M. Mukhi, Bishamber Lal and H, K. Puri, for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIA- LINGAM, JJ. was delivered by SHELAT, J. BHARGAVA, J., delivered a separate opinion.\n\nShelat, J. On August 17, 1934 the Governor-in-Council of the then United Provinces, in exercise of powers under s. 3 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act, IX of 1910 issued three licences to Mis. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. for the supply of electrical energy within the tahsil areas of Firozabad in the district of Agra Shikohabad in the district of Mainpur and Etawah in the district of Etawah. The licences inter alia provided that the licensee would be supplied electrical energy in bulk by the Public Works Department, U.P. and the licensee in itS. iiiin should transmit the same on its own high tenskin mains within the areas of the licences.\n\nThe licences also provided that the responsibilty for the maintenance of supply of electrical energy in the licensee's plant shall be borne entirely by the Public Works Department and thereafter by the licensee .. In 1937 the licences were assigned by the said M/s.\n\nAlopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. to the petitioner company with the consent of the Government. The petitioner company has sin~ then been supplying under the said licences electricity to consumers within the said areas of the licences. It is an admitted\n\n314 SUPRBMI! COURT RBPOll.TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nposition that though the petitioner company had the said licences A assigned to it it did not acquire any exclusive or monopolistic right of supplying electrical energy within the said areas. Clause\n\n(e) of sec. 3(2) of 1910 Act which governed the srud licences provides that the grant of a licence thereunder shall not in any way hinder or restrict the grant of a licence to another person within the same area of supply for a like purpose.\n\nB The Electricity (Supply) Act, LIV of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 1948 Act) by sec. 5(1) enjoins upon the State Government to constitute a State Electricity Board. Sec. 19(1) provides that the Boarcl may, subject to the provisions of this Act, supply electricity to any licensee or person requiring such supPiy in any area in which a scheme sanctioned under Chapter V is C in force.\n\nThe proviso to Sec. 19 ( 1), however, lays down that the Board shall not :-\n\n\" (b) supply electricity for any purpose to any person, not being a licensee for use in any part of the area of supply of a licence without the consent of the licensee. unless the maximum demand of the licensee, being D a distributing licensee and talang a supply of energy in bulk is, at the time of the request, less than twice the maximum demand asked .for by any such person; or the licensee is unable or unwilling to supply electricity for such purpose in the said part of such area on reasonable terms and conditions and within a reasonable time.\" E Section 26 provides that\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board shall, in respect of the whole State, have all the _powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and this Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act' F\n\nThe definition of a licensee in s. 2(6) of 1948 Act, however, states that it would not include the Board. Though the Board is not a licensee for the purposes of the 1948 Act the Act being deemed to be the licence for the Board under Sec. 26 it is a licensee under the 1910 Act. Sec. 26 however is subject to the G provisions of the Act which means that it is inter alia subject to the pro\\isions of sec. 19. Therefore, in the absence .of a scheme under Chapter V, the Board, though a licensee llll'dcr the 1910 Act was not competent to supply directly elegtiical energy to\n\nconumers such as the 3rd respondent. This wajthe position until 1961 when the U.P. legislature to remove this disability of the Board passed the Indian Electricity (U.P.) Amendment Act, XXX 'of 1961. Section 2 of the Amendment Act substituted the following for cl. (e) of sec. 3(2) of the 1910 Act:\n\nWEST U.P. ELEC. co. v. U.P.sTATE (She/at, I.) 315\n\n\" ( e) grant of a licence under this Part for any purpose shall not in any way hinder or restrict- ( i) the grant of licence to another person within the same area of supply for a like purpose; or\n\n(ii) the supply of energy by the State Government or the State Electricity Board wihin the same area, where the State Government deems such supply necessary in public interest.\" It also added after sub-sec. 2, the following sub-sec. 3:\n\n\" ( 3) Where the supply of energy in any area of the State Electricity Board is deemed necessary under subclause (ii) of clause (e) of sub-se.ction (2), the Board may, subject to any tenns and con4!ltions that may be laid down by the State Government, supply energy in that area notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948.\" Sec. 3 of the Amendment Act also added a new sub-sec. (1-B) in sec. 28 of the 1910 Act. The new sub-section reads as under:-\n\n\"(1-B). The State Government may notwithstanding that sanction for engaging in the business of supplying energy to the consumer in an area has been given to any person under sub-section ( 1), whether before or after coming into force of the Indian Electricity (U.P.\n\nSanshodhanJ Adhiniyam, 1961, give direct supply, or authorise the State Electricity Board to give direct supply, in the same area.\" This sub-section has no application to the licensees for, it empowers the State Government either to supply directly or authorise the Board to directly supply energy even in an area for which it has given sanction to a person other than a licensee to engage in the business of supplying energy to the public in such area.\n\nA perusal of these provisions makes it clear that the Board can directly supply electricity to the consumers and the State Government also can auhorise the Board to do o provided the State Government deems it necessary in public interest that it should be so doue. The condition precedent for the direct supply by the Board to the consumers in the area where a licence has been granted to a licensee is that such supply by the Board must be deemed necessary by the State Government in public interest.\n\nIn pursuance of the powers under secs. 46 and 49 of the 1948 Act, the Board by a notification dated April 24, 1962 fixed the rates and tariffs for electrical energy for the Ganga-Sarda\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nGrid. These were to .apply to both the licensees obtaining bulk supply from the Board and to consumers to whom electrical energy was being supplied direct by the Board in the area covered by the said Grid. According to these rates, consumers to whom electrical energy was being supplied direct by the Board would pay a demand charge at the rate of Rs. 8 /- per KV A and on energy charge at the rate of 4.5nP per KWH for the first 170 KWH per KVA, at the rate of 3.5nP for the next 170 KWH per KVA and at ihe rate of 3.0 nP per KWH for the remaining KV A consumed during the month. For the licensees, the rates were Rs. 12.75 per KVA for the demand charge for the first 500 KVA, Rs. 10 per KVA for the next 1500 KVA and Rs. 8.50 per KVA for above 2000 KVA of the chargeable demand during the month.\n\nFor energy charge, the rates were 5 nP per KWH for the first 170 KWH per KVA, 4nP per KWH for the next 170 KWH per KVA and 3nP per KWH for the remaining KWH per KVA of chargeable demand consumed during the month. The rates chargeable from licensees were thus higher than those applicable to the consumers both in respect of demand and energy charges even though licensees would be larger customers who in the normal course of business would be charged lower rates !han the consumers. The notification is not under challenge before us and therefore it is not necessary for. us to consider its validity.\n\nAs the Board was not yet authorised by the State Government to supply elecricity directly to the consumers within the areas of E the petitioner company's licences the 3rd respondent entered into an agreement in 1964 for a period of 3 years under which the petitioner company was to supply electricity to it. On September 21, 1966 the State Government issued a notification which stated that the Governor deemed it necessary in public interest that the State should supply energy to the 3rd respondent and in exercise F of the power under sec. 3(2){e) of the 1910 Act as amended by Act XXX of 1961 directed the Board to give direct supply of energy lo the 3rd respondent on the same terms and conditions on which the Board was supplying energy to other consumers. Thereupon the 3rd respondent by its notice dated January 19, 1967 terminated the said agreement. It seems that the Board was still G not ready to supply energy direct to the 3rd respondent and therefore on April 18, 1967, only one day before the said agreement would have ended, the 3rd respondent withdrew the said notice.\n\nOn June 23 1967, the 3rd respondent, however, gave a fresh notice tem1inating the said agreement as from September .. 23,\n\n1967. The result of the notification dated September 21, 1966 was two-fold : (1) .tha• notwithstanding the subsistance of the petitioner company's licences and its right tereunder to supply H energy .to consumers within the areas of its ltcences, the Board\n\nWEST U.P. ELEC. co. v. U.P. STATE (She/at. J.) 317\n\nwas directed to supply energy to the 3rd respondent and (2) that the Board was directed to supply energy to the 3rd respondent at rates lower than the rate charged by the Board from the petitioner company as the licensee.\n\nMr. Chagla apparing for the petitioner company raised the following three conten'.ions : (I ) that the amended sec. 3 ( 2) ( e) was invalid on the ground that it amounted to acquisition of the petitioner company's property and as no compensation hl\\s been provided for such acquisition cl. (e) of s. 3 (2) was in violation of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution;\n\n(2) that the notification dated September 21, 1966 was ultra vi res sec. 3 ( 2 )( e) as the direction by the State Government to the Board to supply electricity directly to the 3rd respondent was not founded on public interest; and\n\n( 3) that the said direction to supply electricity at rates chargeable from the consumers as against the rates chargeable to the licensees was discriminatory.\n\nThe respondents, on the other hand, contended that the 3rd respondent was a concern in which the Government has an interest to the extent of 51 % of its share capital, that therefore it was almost a public utility concern, that supply by the petitioner company to the 3rd respondent was found to be defective resulting in lay off of labour on several occasions and consequent loss in production and that therefore the Government was justified in public interest to issue the said notification. In support of these allegations the respondents filed an annexure to their couriteraffidavit showing low voltage and high tension trippings during the months of April, May and June 1966. It was alleged that owing to . defective and short supply by the petitioner company there were high tens'on trippings on numerous occasions resulting in low voltage, the consequence Whereof was that the 3rd respond.erit was obliged to stop the working of the jllil!s sometimes for several hours. The pe!itioner company's case, however, was that these allegations were an afterthought and that the real object in issuing the notification dated September 21, 1966 was to subvert the petitioner company's rights under .the said licences.\n\nWe are inclined to think that there is considerable force in the contention of the petitioner company. Though the allegation was that supply of energy by the petitioner company to the 3rd respondent suffered from shortage and other defects the 3rd respondent does not seem to have at any time made any complaint about such shortage or defects either to the petitioner company or to the Board or to the state Government. Similarly, the Board also does\n\n318 SUPIUIMB COURT llEPOB.TS (1968] 3 S.c.R.\n\nnot seem to have at any time complained to the petitioner comp11Dy about such defective supply. Even when the petitioner company, after the said notification was issued, mad_e a representation to the State Government to reconsider its decision the Government did not, while rejecting it, rely upon the fact that the petitioner company was not in a position to give full and proper supply ol' energy to the 3rd respondent or that supply by it was, as now alleged, short or defective. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner company has been throughout all these years supplying high tension energy to the 3rd responaent and the 3rd respondent has been converting such high tension energy into low tension energy through its own transformers.\n\nThe aforesaid annexure shows that though the high te11Sion trippings were only for a few minutes except on three or four occasions low voltage was for several hours. In some cases though there was no tripping at all . there was low voltage for as long as sixteen hours. It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner company had no difficulty in maintaining supply of high tension electrical energy to the 3rd respondent and there must have been some defect in the stepping down system of the 3rd respondent resulting in low voltage. It is impossible thus to find from the annexure that the petitioner company was guilty in any manner of shortage or defective supply of high tension energy to the 3rd respondent. The allegation therefore that the 3rd respondent suffered in production and losses as a result of shbrt or defective supply by the petitioner company is not borne out by the record in this case. If there was any justification for the alJegation now made by the respondents it is inconceivable that for alJ these years the 3rd respondent would not have made any complaint for such defective supply either to the Board or to the State Government.\n\nIt is certain that but for the amendment of sec. 3 (2)(e) of 1910 Act, the Board, though a licensee under that Act, could not have supplied energy direc'.ly to the 3rd respondent in the absence of a scheme under sec. 19 of 1948 Act. Under the proviso to that section the Board would not have been entitled to supply energy for any purpose to any person not being a licensee for use in any part of the area of supply of a licensee without the\n\nconsent of such licensee. It is true that under its licences the petitioner company was not conferred monopolistic rights to supply energy to the consumers and the Government could have granted another licence to another licensee. But fhe Government has not granted such licence to any other person. But it was said that the Board was another such licensee. As already stated the Board could not have distributed energy to the consumers though it is a licensee under-1910 Act unless (a) there was a scheme or (b) that it was authorised in public interest under the amended sec. 3 (2 )( e). Neither of these two conditions having been fulfilled it\n\nWEST U.P. ELEC. co. v. U.P. STATE (Bhargava, 1.) 319\n\nis clear that the notification of September 21, 1966 and. the direction contained therein to the Board to supply energy to the 3rd respondent were in breach of the petitioner company's rights under its licences and the requirements of the amended sec. 3 (2)(e). ·\n\nApart from its being in breach of the amended sec. 3(2)(e) and the petitioner company's rights under its licences, the notification and the Government's direct on to the Board therein results in clear discrimination.\n\nIf ihe Board were to supply energv directly to the 3rd respondent it has to do so at rates lower than the raies at which electricity is supplied by it to the petitioner company. The petitioner company being thus charged at higher rates must as a distributor charge hlgher rates from its other consumers with the result that ihe 3rd respondent would get energy at substantially tower rates than other consumers including other industrial establishments in the area. The notification thus results in discrimination between the 3rd respondent on the one hand and the other consumers on the other as also between the 3rd respondent and the petitioner company.\n\nIt follows therefore that the notification of September 21, 1966 cannot be sustained as a valid notification as 1t is discriminatory and is also in breach of the amended sec. 3 ( 2 )( e) of I 910\n\nAct. In that view the Board is not entitled to supply direc'ly electricity to the 3rd respondent as the direcfon contained in the said notification which is the only authority under which it could so supply is invalid in law. In this view, it is not neces, ary for us •o decide the question whether the amended sec. 3(2)(e) amounts to acquisition and whether such acquisition is in violation of Art. 31 of the Constitu'ion. The said notification being thus invalid respondents 1 and 2 are directeu not to supply elec- trical energy d'rectly to the 3rd rcsparicent.\n\nThe respondents will pay to the petitioner company the costs of this petition.\n\nBhargava, J. I agree with my brother She lat J. that the notijicafon of September 21, 1966 cannot be sustained as a valid notifieation because it is discriminatory and consequently I concur in the order proposed by him. I am, however, not prepared to hold that that notification is also invalid on the other two grounds, viz., that 'be notification and the directions contained therein to he Electricity Board to supply energy to the third respondent were in breach of the pe'itioner Company's rights under its licence and of the requirements of the amended section 3(a)(e). I may briefly indicate the reasons for my view.\n\nIt is admitted on all hands that under its licences, the petitioner Company was •not conferred monopolistic rights to supply energy\n\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nto the consumers in the area covered by the licences and the Government could have granted another licence to anoth_er licensee to supply energy in the same areas without violating any provision of the Electricity Act of 1910 or of the conditions on which licences were granted to the pe'.itioner Company.\n\nIt is true that the Government has not granted any such licences to any other person but, in my opinion the effect \\>f the subsequent legislation is to bring into existence another statu'.ory Jicencee, viz., the Electricity Board and any directions prmitting the Electricity Board to supply electricity in the areas covered by the petitioner Company's licences cannot be held to be in violation of the conditions of those licences. By the Electric Supply Act 1948, the Board was constituted a bcensee for purposes of the Electricity Act of 1910, though section 26, which brought about\n\nthis iesult, provided that in that capacity, the Board was subject to other provisions of the Electric Supply Act 1948. One such provision ls co'!tained ins. 19(1) of the Act of 1948. The U.P.\n\nEl.ectricity Amendment Act 1961, however, fotroduced provisions in the Act of 19 JO the result of which was that the Board, in acting as a licensee under .'the Act of 1910, was no longer subject to the limitation laid down in s. 19 ( 1 ) of the Act of\n\n1948. It has not been contended that either the Supply Act of 1948 or 'the U.P. Electricity Amendment Act of 1961 was not competently enacted by the appropriate legislature.\n\nThe. Supply Act of 1948 was no doubt passed by the Central Legislature in respect of a concurrent subject but the U.P. Electricity Amnd ment Act of 1961 was reserved for the assent of the President and, having received the assent of the President, the provisions of that Act would prevail to the extent to which they may be inconsistent with the Central Act of 1948.\n\nThe result of this leg'slation was that the Electricity Board became a licensee under the Electricity Act of 1910 and was no longer subject to the Iimi'ation laid down in s. 19 ( 1) of the Electricity Supply Act of\n\n1948. The only-limitation after the enactment of the U.P. Electricity Amendment Act 1961 that remained was that the Board could sqppTy electricity only after the State Government issued a valid notification under clause ( e) of section 3 ( 2) of the Act of 1910. If the State Government was competent under the original section 3(2) (e) of the Act of 1910 to grant a licence to any person for supply of elctricity in the areas covered by the licences issued to the petitioner Company, I do not see why a similar result could not be validly brought about by. legislation by the appropriate legislatures creating a statutory ltcensee for purpos!IS of the Act of 1910. Consequently, the power granted to the Electrici!)i Board by the notification of September 21, 1966 to suppy electricity to a .c.onsumer in the area covered by one of the ltcences of the petitioner Company cannot be held to be in violation of the conditions of the licence.\n\nWEST U.P. ELEC. co. v. U.P. STATE (Bhargava, J.) 321\n\nI further considered that, in view of the language of the provisions contained iii the amended section 3 (2) ( e) of the Act of\n\n1910, i~ is not competent for this Court in this writ petition, on the material available, to declare that the notification of SeptembCr 21, 1966 is invalid because the direction contained therein. was not made by the State Government in public interest. The B power under the amended section 3 ( 2) ( e) is to be exercised when Government deems it necessary in public interest.\n\nThe notification, on the face of it, shows that the State Government did apply its mind before issuing that notification and form the opinion that in this particular case it was necessary in public interest that the Board should be directed to supply electricity c to respondent No: 3 i°' the area c.overed by one of the licences of the petitioner Company.\n\nThe opinion was formed by the State Government on material which I do not think can be said to be totally irrelevant for the purpose of forming such opinion.\n\nAs Jong as the. State Government based its order on an opinion formed on relevant material, it is not open to the courts to examine and take a different view on the basis of other materilil such as want of coinplaints by respondent No. 3 to the Government that the supply of energy by the petitioner Company was not satisfactory. It is not for courts to sit in judgment over the view of the State Government which the State Government is required to form in order to make an order under the amended section 3(2) (e). Consequently, I cannot hold_ that the notification of September 21, 1966 was invalid on the ground that it was issued in breach of the amended section 3 (2) ( e) of the Act of 1910.\n\nY.P.\n\nPetition allO}Yed.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "WESTERN U.P. ELECTRIC POWER AND SUPPLY CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WESTERN U.P. ELECTRIC POWER AND SUPPLY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 23, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 23, 1968\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., S.M. S1KR1, J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA\n\nAND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Electricity Act", "statute": "Indian Electricity Act"}}, {"text": "By the Electric Supply Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Per Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "319 B-DJ (Per Wanchoo C.J., Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1895, "end_char": 1900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "319 B-DJ (Per Wanchoo C.J., Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "Sikri"}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "319 B-DJ (Per Wanchoo C.J., Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "Shelat"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1913, "end_char": 1925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "319 B-DJ (Per Wanchoo C.J., Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "VAIDIA- LINGAM"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2132, "end_char": 2142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2412, "end_char": 2422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2871, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there was any justification for the allegation now made by the respondents it is inconceivable that for all these years the 3rd respondent would not have made any complaint for such defective supply either to the Board or to the State GovernmenL\n\n(Per Bhargava, J.) The notification cannot be held to be invalid on the ground that it was issued in breach of the amended s. 3 ( e) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2993, "end_char": 2997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4359, "end_char": 4380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4425, "end_char": 4437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and Mohan Behari Lal, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4442, "end_char": 4458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and Mohan Behari Lal, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "D S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D S. T. Desai and 0 ."}}, {"text": ".P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4503, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".P. Rana, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": ". P. Rana"}}, {"text": "C. B. Aganvala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aganvala and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4556, "end_char": 4565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aganvala and 0.", "canonical_name": ". P. Rana"}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": ". P. Rana"}}, {"text": "P. M. Mukhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. M. Mukhi, Bishamber Lal and H, K. Puri, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. M. Mukhi, Bishamber Lal and H, K. Puri, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "H, K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4656, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. M. Mukhi, Bishamber Lal and H, K. Puri, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIA- LINGAM, JJ."}}, {"text": "SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIA- LINGAM, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Sikri"}}, {"text": "SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIA- LINGAM, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Shelat"}}, {"text": "VAIDIA- LINGAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIA- LINGAM, JJ.", "canonical_name": "VAIDIA- LINGAM"}}, {"text": "BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4786, "end_char": 4794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SHELAT, J. BHARGAVA, J., delivered a separate opinion.", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4981, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mis. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5019, "end_char": 5049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shelat, J. On August 17, 1934 the Governor-in-Council of the then United Provinces, in exercise of powers under s. 3 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act, IX of 1910 issued three licences to Mis."}}, {"text": "Firozabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5113, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. for the supply of electrical energy within the tahsil areas of Firozabad in the district of Agra Shikohabad in the district of Mainpur and Etawah in the district of Etawah."}}, {"text": "Agra Shikohabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. for the supply of electrical energy within the tahsil areas of Firozabad in the district of Agra Shikohabad in the district of Mainpur and Etawah in the district of Etawah."}}, {"text": "Etawah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. for the supply of electrical energy within the tahsil areas of Firozabad in the district of Agra Shikohabad in the district of Mainpur and Etawah in the district of Etawah."}}, {"text": "Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5743, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The licences also provided that the responsibilty for the maintenance of supply of electrical energy in the licensee's plant shall be borne entirely by the Public Works Department and thereafter by the licensee .. In 1937 the licences were assigned by the said M/s.\n\nAlopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. to the petitioner company with the consent of the Government."}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6246, "end_char": 6255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7505, "end_char": 7515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7680, "end_char": 7708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7719, "end_char": 7798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7835, "end_char": 7842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8081, "end_char": 8088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8202, "end_char": 8209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "U.P. legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8455, "end_char": 8471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This wajthe position until 1961 when the U.P. legislature to remove this disability of the Board passed the Indian Electricity (U.P.) Amendment Act, XXX 'of 1961."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8649, "end_char": 8658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act", "statute": "Act shali be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9543, "end_char": 9549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948", "statute": "Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9606, "end_char": 9613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948", "statute": "Act or the Electricity SupPly Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "SanshodhanJ Adhiniyam, 1961", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government may notwithstanding that sanction for engaging in the business of supplying energy to the consumer in an area has been given to any person under sub-section ( 1), whether before or after coming into force of the Indian Electricity (U.P.\n\nSanshodhanJ Adhiniyam, 1961, give direct supply, or authorise the State Electricity Board to give direct supply, in the same area.\""}}, {"text": "April 24, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10994, "end_char": 11008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46 and 49 of the 1948 Act, the Board by a notification dated April 24, 1962 fixed the rates and tariffs for electrical energy for the Ganga-Sarda\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nGrid."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12833, "end_char": 12851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1966 the State Government issued a notification which stated that the Governor deemed it necessary in public interest that the State should supply energy to the 3rd respondent and in exercise F of the power under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13060, "end_char": 13069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13334, "end_char": 13350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the 3rd respondent by its notice dated January 19, 1967 terminated the said agreement."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13491, "end_char": 13505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems that the Board was still G not ready to supply energy direct to the 3rd respondent and therefore on April 18, 1967, only one day before the said agreement would have ended, the 3rd respondent withdrew the said notice."}}, {"text": "June 23 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13613, "end_char": 13625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 23 1967, the 3rd respondent, however, gave a fresh notice tem1inating the said agreement as from September .. 23,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "September .. 23,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13715, "end_char": 13737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 23 1967, the 3rd respondent, however, gave a fresh notice tem1inating the said agreement as from September .. 23,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14270, "end_char": 14276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chagla apparing for the petitioner company raised the following three conten'.ions : (I ) that the amended sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14377, "end_char": 14383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14592, "end_char": 14599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14694, "end_char": 14700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPIUIMB COURT llEPOB.TS (1968] 3 S.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16692, "end_char": 16730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the Board also does\n\n318 SUPIUIMB COURT llEPOB.TS (1968] 3 S.c."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18681, "end_char": 18687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18849, "end_char": 18856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19653, "end_char": 19659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20029, "end_char": 20035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20093, "end_char": 20105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21092, "end_char": 21098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21430, "end_char": 21442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21514, "end_char": 21521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21765, "end_char": 21773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J. I agree with my brother She lat J. that the notijicafon of September 21, 1966 cannot be sustained as a valid notifieation because it is discriminatory and consequently I concur in the order proposed by him.", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "She", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21802, "end_char": 21805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J. I agree with my brother She lat J. that the notijicafon of September 21, 1966 cannot be sustained as a valid notifieation because it is discriminatory and consequently I concur in the order proposed by him."}}, {"text": "lat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21806, "end_char": 21809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J. I agree with my brother She lat J. that the notijicafon of September 21, 1966 cannot be sustained as a valid notifieation because it is discriminatory and consequently I concur in the order proposed by him."}}, {"text": "section 3(a)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22323, "end_char": 22338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22742, "end_char": 22757, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "By the Electric Supply Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23279, "end_char": 23310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23368, "end_char": 23383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23400, "end_char": 23410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Electric Supply Act 1948", "statute": "By the Electric Supply Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Board was subject to other provisions of the Electric Supply Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23482, "end_char": 23551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23640, "end_char": 23658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23853, "end_char": 23858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Electricity Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Amnd ment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24174, "end_char": 24199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act would prevail to the extent to which they may be inconsistent with the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24326, "end_char": 24412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24513, "end_char": 24528, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24594, "end_char": 24599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act would prevail to the extent to which they may be inconsistent with the Central Act", "statute": "Act would prevail to the extent to which they may be inconsistent with the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Electricity Amendment Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24697, "end_char": 24727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24867, "end_char": 24876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electricity Amendment Act 1961", "statute": "Electricity Amendment Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24959, "end_char": 24971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electricity Amendment Act 1961", "statute": "Electricity Amendment Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25729, "end_char": 25738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SeptembCr 21, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25890, "end_char": 25908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "co. v. U.P. STATE (Bhargava, J.) 321\n\nI further considered that, in view of the language of the provisions contained iii the amended section 3 (2) ( e) of the Act of\n\n1910, i~ is not competent for this Court in this writ petition, on the material available, to declare that the notification of SeptembCr 21, 1966 is invalid because the direction contained therein."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26048, "end_char": 26057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27159, "end_char": 27171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27320, "end_char": 27329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_322_329_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "ARBIND KUMAR SINGH\n\nNAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS.\n\nFebruary 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nCo11stitu1io11 of India, 1950, Art. 133-'Civil Proceeding', Scope of.\n\nMotor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 41, 48 and 64A-Scope of-'Pass such further order as it thinks fit', Meaning of.\n\nNatural Justice-Revising authority ca/Ung /or additional evidence- . Duty to disclose to parties.\n\nIn 1950-51, the appellant was plying his motor buses in Bihar. Bibar Act 17 of 1950 imposed a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles.\n\nAs the imposition of the tax was found to '- invalid the appellant did not pay the tax. In 1961, the tax was reimposed by Act 17 of 1961 with effect from 1st April 1950 and the imposition was found to be valid. Therefore, the appellant was liable to pay the transport tax for 1950-51. This liability was outsanding on 15th January 1965, on which date, the Regional Transport Authority ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage be granted to him on condition that he produced a clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of the Order failing which the grant will stand automatically cancelled and the permit will be granted to the first respondent. As the appellant failed to .carry out the condition the permit was cancelled and given to the first respodent.\n\nThe order was confirmed by the Government, in 'revision, under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Bihar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1950, after calling for and considering a report from the Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, that the. transport tax was due from the appellant for 1950-51. The writ petition in the High Court to quash the Government order was dismissed.\n\nThe appelJant appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nThe respondent contended that the High Coult was not competent to grant the certificate in proceedings under Art. 226; and the appellant con tended that : (I) on the date of the order granting the permit there was no liability to pay the tax as there was no assessment; (2) the condition regarding payment of tax was invalid; (3) the Minister of Transport who dispo&ed of the revision to the Government had no right to call for any additional evidence; and (4) the report of the Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes should have been disclosed by the Minister to the aypellant.\n\nHELD: (I) The words 'civil proceedings' in Art. 133 cover all proceedinS'l which directly affect civil rights, and therefore the High Court was competent to grant the certificate in a proceeding under Art. 226 in- VQ!ving civil rights. [324 E-F]\n\nS. A. L. Narayan Row v. lshwar Lal Bhagwandas, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 190 . and Rcmesh v. Seth Genda/a/ Moti/a/ Patni, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 198, followed.\n\n(2) Under the scheme of the Act the liability to pay tax arises by statutory injunction and not from any order of assessment.\n\nTherefore, there was a liability to pay the transport tax outstanding, against the appd- •Jant, on the date of the order granting him the permit and failure to\n\nA produce the clearance certificate in reiipect of the tax disentitled him to the g'rant of a permit. [326 H; 327 CJ Raipur Transport Co. (P.) v. M. P. Singh, A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 36 distinguished\n\n(3) If it be held that the grant of a permit was to be bject only to such of the.matters specified under s. 47(1) (a) to (f) and to such of the B conditions as may be prescnbed under s. 48, the order of the Regional Transport Authority in the present case must be deemed to be an order refusing the permit. and. tbe appellant should have challenged, by way of appeal, the validity of the imposition of the condition relating to payment of tax; he could not ignore the conditi0n subject to which the permit was aranted. [328 D-EI\n\n( 4) The expression 'pass such order as it thinks fit' in s 64A, as amended by the Bihar Act, is not restricted to the passing of final orders. If for; the purpose of doing complete justice between the parties, the authority who hears the revision petition is satisfied that it is necessary to call for additional evidence, he may do so. There is no bar in the Act or the Rules aa:ainst an appellate or revising authority taking into consideration the additional evidence brou)tht on rncord. [328 G-HJ\n\n(5) Such additional evidence must undoubtedly be disclosed to the parties and they must be given an opportunity to meet an inference that D may arise from it. In the present case. the High Court, on a c<insideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that the additional evidence called for by the Minister of Transport was disclosed by him, at the hearing, to the appellant's counsel and there was no reason for this Court to disagreo with that view. [329 A-B. HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1943 of 1967; Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 24, 1967' of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jllrisdiclion Case No. 283 of 1966.\n\nBasudev Prasad and S. N. Prasad, for the appellant.\n\nF M. C. Chagla, Saptmi Iha and B. P. Iha, . for respondent' No. 1.\n\nu. P. Singh, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri-Bhabua route be granted to Arbirid Knmar Singh-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-\"on pduction of all valid documents of 1964 model bus alone: with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order; failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad ........ \".\n\nOn application submitted by Nand Kisbore Prasad-who will hereinafter be referred to as 'the respondent'-that the appellant had failed to\n\nSUPREME COURT .IEPORTS [1968] 3 s:c.R.\n\ncarcy out the condition relating to the grant of permit, the Chair man of the Regional Transport Authority by order dated February 20, 1965, cancelled the permit and directed that a permit be given to the respondent.\n\nThe order of the Chairman was reversed in appeal by the Appellate Board. In the view of the Board \"the clearance certificate\" filed by the appellant showed that all the taxes due hy him were paid.\n\nThe respondent then moved the State Government of Bihar under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the Bihar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act l7 of 1950.\n\nThe Minister of Transport who heard the petition reversed the order of the Appellate Board, h9lding that the appellant had failed to carry out the conditions subject to which the Regional Transport Authority had ordered that the permit be given to him.\n\nA petition un.der Art. 226 of the Constitution moved by the appellant in the High Court of Patna against the order of the Minister of Trans. port was dismissed. The appellant has appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court.\n\nThe plea raised by counsel for the respondent that the appeal was liable to be dismissed because the High Court_ w.as incompetent\n\nto grant a .certificate of fitness under Art. 133 ( 1 )(a) or Art. 133(1)(b) of the Constitution against the judgment of the High Court exercising extraordinary original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is without substance. This Court has held in S. A. L. Narayan Row & Anr. v. /shwarlal Bhagwandas & Anr.(') that the words \"civil proceeding\" used in Art. 133 of the Constitution cover all proceedings which directly affect civil rights.\n\nA proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ to bring up a proceeding for consideration concerning civil rights is there fore a civil proceeding. This Court has further held in Ramesh and Anr. v. Seth Genda/al Moll1al Patni and Ors.(') that the High Court is competent to certify on appeal against an order passed by a Division Bench of a High Court in exercise of extraordinacy original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution if the dis. pute decided thereby concerns civil rights of the parties. Hidaya- tullah, J., speaking for the Court observed at p. 203 :\n\n\"Mr. Gupta's contention that under that article (Art. 133) an appeal can on1y lie in respect of a judg- ment or decree or final order passed in the exercise of appellate or ordinary original civil jurisdiction but not of extraordinacy original civil jurisdiction, is. not right. . . . Article 133 not only discards the distinction between appellate and original jurisdiction but deliberately used words which are as wide as language can\n\n{I) (1966) l S.C.R. 19J.\n\n(2) [1966) 3 S.C.R. 198\n\nARB!ND KUMAR V. NANO KISHORE (Shah, /.) 325\n\nmake them.\n\nThe intention is not only to include all judgments, decrees. and\\ orders passed in the exercise of appellate and ordinary original civil jurisdiction but also to make the language wide enough to cover other jurisdictions under which civil rights would come before the High Court for decision.\" The plea raised by counsel for the respondent that the High Court was not competent to grant the certificate must therefore be rejected.\n\nThe Bihar Legislature enacted Bihar Act 17 of 1950, imposing tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar. Validity of this levy was upheld by the High Court of Patna. But after the decision of this Court in Atiabari Tea Co.\n\nLtd. v. State of Assam('), the appeals filed by the operators who challenged the levy were allowed by this Court.\n\nThe State of Bihar thereafter issued Bihar Ordinance II of 1961 which was replaced by Bihar Act 17 of 1961. By that Act the tax was reimposed with effect from the 1st day of April, 1950. That imposition of tax was again challenged in writ petitions filed before the High Court of Patna, but without success, and the order of the High Court was confirmed by this Court in Rai Ramkrishna and\n\nOrs. v. State of Bihar('). Section 1(3) of Act 17of1961 declares that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of April, 1950. By s. 2(i) 'tax' means tax payable under the Act and includes the fixed amount determined under s. 8.\n\nBy s. 3 charge of tax is imposed. It provides by sub-s.\n\n(1) :\n\n\"On and from the date on which this Act is deemed to have come into force under sub-section ( 3) of section 1, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all passengers and goods carried by a public service motor vehicle; such tax shall be levied and paid at the rate of twelve and a half per cenrum of the fares and freights payable to the owner of such vehicles : Provided • . \" Section 6 requires the owner of the vehicle to make prescribed G return to the prescribed authority within such period as may be prescribed. Section 7 prescribes the machinery for assessment of tax. . Section 9 (1) provides that the amount of tax or penalty. if any, payable by an owner under the Act shall be paid in the manner hereinafter provided.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 9 provides\" that before any owner furnishes any return under the Act he shall, H in the prescribed manner pay into the Government Treasury the full amount of tax due ftom him under the Act according to such return and shall furnish along with the return a receipt from the\n\n(t) (1961] l S.C.R. 809.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1667.\n\n326 SUPllEMl! COtJiT l.BPOll.TS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ntreasury showing payment of the said amount By s. 22 power is A conferred upon the State Government to make rules not inconsistent with the Act for all matters expressly required or allowed by the Act to be prescribed and generally for c; arrying out the purposes of the Act and regulating the procedure to be followed, forms to be adopted and fees to be paid in connection with proceedings under the Act and all other matters ancillary or incl- B dental thereto. In exercise .of the power conferred by s. 22, the State of Bihar has framed the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Rules, 1966.\n\nRule 11 provided that every owner shall furnish to. the authority presc1ibed in r. 16, a monthly return, in Form V within a period of fifteen days of the close of the month to which such return relates. Rule 18 provides that where any sum is payable by an C owner under the Act or the rules or any amount due. for which a notice is to.be given under sub-section (4) of s. 9, the authority prescribed in r. 16 shall serve notice in Form XI, and shall also fix a date by which the owner shall produce a receipted challan in proof of such payment. It is clear from the scheme of the Act and the rules that by s. 3 a charge is imposed upon an owner of D the vehicle to pay tax to the State 'Government on all passengers and goods carried by a public service motor vehicle at the rates fixed by the statute and the owner must make monthly returns within fifteen days from the expiry of the month to which the return relates.\n\nThe decision of the Maclhya Pradesh High Court in Raipur E Transport Co., Private Ltd., Raipur v. M. P. Singh and Ors.(') on which reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant has, in our judgment, no bearing on the question which falls to be determined in this appeal.\n\nSection 10 of the Mo!-0r V chicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, passed by the State of Madhya Pradesh provided that in cases referred to in ss. 7, 8 and 9, the F Tax Officer shall serve on the operator a notiee of demand for the sums payable to the State Government. That in the view of the High Court pre-supposes that an order of assessment has been made under the earlier provisions of the Ac{, and therefore an order of assessment was necessary not only for the validity of the notice of demand, but also for enabling the appellate authority to see whether the tax had been correctly assessed or not and the demand made against the operator was or was not justified. We are in the present case not concerned to determine the validity of a notice of demand. The liability to pay tax under Bihar Act 17 of 1961 clearly arises by statutory injunction and not from the order of assessment.\n\nIn terms s. 3 says that there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all passengers and goods carried by a public service motor vehicle. ·\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1968 M.P. 36.\n\n•i \\'\n\n/ '\n\nThe appellant plied his motor buses in 1950-51 and on the plea that the tax was invalid did not pay the tax levied under Act 17 of 1950. After the reimposition of the tax by Act 17 of J 961, there survived no ground on which the liability to pay tax could be resisted.\n\nOn January 15, 1965, a condition had been imposed upon the appellant that a permit would be granted to him 8 provided he produced a clearance certificate.\n\nLiability to pay transport (ax amounting to Rs. 1,675/- was outstanding against the appellant for nearly fifteen years and that liability was discharged by payment on March 5, 1965. It cannot, in the circumstances, be contended that there was no liability to pay transport\n\ntax outstanding against the appellant on the date of the order granting him the permit. Failure ro produce the clearance certi- 5cate in respect of the transport tax clearly disentitled the appellant to the grant of a permit.\n\nCounsel for the appellant, however, contended that the imposition of a condition that the appellant shall produce a , clearance certificate in respect of the transport tax was invalid 'and the condition was liable to be ignored py the appellant. Section 4 7 (1 ) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, insofar as it is material provides:\n\n\"A Regional Transport Authority shall, in consider ing an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely :-\n\n(a) the interests of the public generally; (b 1 the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; ( c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other mans, between the places to be served;\n\n( d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities\n\nlikely to be afforded by the serviee;\n\n( e) the operation by the applicant of other transport\n\nse:Vi!:7s, includin~ those in rspect of which appllcatmns from him for permits are pending;\n\n(f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area;\n\nand shall also talce into consideration any representation\n\nma~~ . by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route L6Sup. Cl/68-8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nor area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies :\n\nProvided \"\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 47 sets out the conditions under which the Regional Transport Authority may refuse to grant a stage carriage permit; and sub-s. (3) provides for the conditions in which, having regard to the matters specified in sub-s. ( 1), the Regional Transport Authority may limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permit may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region.\n\nIt was urged that under s. 47 the Regional Transport Authority is bound to consider only the matters which are specified in els. (a) to (f) of sub-s. (1) of s. 47, and if the applicant is found qualified for a permit no conditions may be imposed by the Regional Transport Authority. We need express no opinion on that argument. If the argument raised by counsel for the appellant has any substance, and if it be held that the grant of a permit is to be subject only to such of the conditions as may be prescribed under s. 48, the order made by the Regional Transport Authority must be deemed to be an order refusing the permit.\n\nThe appellant could, if so advised, hav~ challenged the validity of the imposition of the condition relating to the payment of tax, but he could not ignore the conditions subject to which the permit was granted.\n\nFinally, it was urged that the Minister of Transport acted illegally in taking into account evidence which was not on the record of the Regional Transport Authority, and alternatively, that the Minister violated the fundamental rules of natural justice in basing his judgment upon a document received from the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, intimating that the transport tax was due by the appellant without. bringing it to the notice of the appellant and calling for an explanation.\n\nSection 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended .by Bihar Act 17 of 1950 authorises the State Government to call for, in the course of any proceedings taken under the Chapter, from any authority or officer subordinate to it, the records of such proceedings, and after examining such records pass such order as it thinks fit. The expression\n\n\"pass such order as it thinks fit\" is not restricted to the passing of orders which are final in character. If for the purposes of doing complete justice between the parties, the authority who hears the reviSion petition is satisfied that it is necessary to call for additional evidence, he may call for such evidence. There is no bar in the Act or the rules against an appellate or the revising authority\n\nARBIND KUMAR V. NAND KISHORE (Shah, J.) 329\n\ntaking into consideration additional evidence brought on the record, if the authority requires additional evidence to be brought on the record or allows it to be brough1: on the record to do complete justice between the parties. The evidence must undoubtedly be disclosed to the parties and they must be given an opportunity to meet an inference that may arise from such additional evidence.\n\nWe are unable to hold that the Minister of Transport in taking into consideration the report received from the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Intelligence Branch, that an amount of Rs.1,675/- was outstanding on February 16, 1965, against the appellant in respect of the two buses plied in th, e year 1950..51 acted in violation of the rules of natural justice. The circumstances in which this document was brought on the file of the Minister are not clear on the record.\n\nBut, as stated by the Minister, the document was disclosed to counsel for the appellant and counsel was asked to give a reply thereto. The Minister also recorded in his judgment that counsel for the appellant explained that since there was no demand for payment of the dues, it was not correct to say that the amount of Rs. 1,675/- was due against the appellant on February 16, 1965. The Minister of Transport rejected that argument. Before us it was contended that the document was never shown to the appellant's counsel and he was never asked .to render his explanation in that behalf. If this were true, the appellant would, we have no doubt, have approached the Minister who was exercising quasi-judicial functions, and would have asked him to review his order. This admittedly has not been done.\n\nAgain, if the grievance now raised were true, the averments made in paragraph-19 of the petition before the Higli Court would not have taken the form which they have taken. In paragraph-19 it .is stated that \"the so-called report of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Intelligence Branch, Patna, under Memo No. 8527 dated 24-7-1965 was never shown to the petitioner and the petitioner had no opportunity to meet the said report.\" Whereas the Minister of Transport had recorded that the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, was shown to counsel for the appellant and the counsel had given certain information the petition before the High Court merely stated that the appellant was not shown the report of the Deputy Commissioner.\n\nThe High Court on a consideration of the evidence has come to the conclusion that the claim made by the appellant that the document was not disclosed at the hearing before the Minister of Transport, and the Minister acted upon that document withoi•t infonning the appellant, cannot be accepted, and we do not see any reason to disagree with the view expressed by the High Court.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "ARBIND KUMAR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Arbirid Knmar Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 41, 48 and 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "1st April 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1961, the tax was reimposed by Act 17 of 1961 with effect from 1st April 1950 and the imposition was found to be valid."}}, {"text": "15th January 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This liability was outsanding on 15th January 1965, on which date, the Regional Transport Authority ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage be granted to him on condition that he produced a clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of the Order failing which the grant will stand automatically cancelled and the permit will be granted to the first respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1423, "end_char": 1429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1437, "end_char": 1461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 1995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2499, "end_char": 2507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2657, "end_char": 2665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 S.C.R. 190", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2750, "end_char": 2769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 198", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 47(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 24, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4935, "end_char": 4951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1943 of 1967; Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 24, 1967' of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jllrisdiclion Case No."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4960, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1943 of 1967; Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 24, 1967' of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jllrisdiclion Case No."}}, {"text": "Basudev Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudev Prasad and S. N. Prasad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basudev Prasad and S. N. Prasad, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "F M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F M. C. Chagla, Saptmi Iha and B. P. Iha, ."}}, {"text": "Saptmi Iha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F M. C. Chagla, Saptmi Iha and B. P. Iha, ."}}, {"text": "B. P. Iha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5112, "end_char": 5121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F M. C. Chagla, Saptmi Iha and B. P. Iha, ."}}, {"text": "u. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5149, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "u. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5228, "end_char": 5232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri-Bhabua route be granted to Arbirid Knmar Singh-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-\"on pduction of all valid documents of 1964 model bus alone: with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order; failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad ........ \"."}}, {"text": "South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri-Bhabua route be granted to Arbirid Knmar Singh-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-\"on pduction of all valid documents of 1964 model bus alone: with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order; failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad ........ \"."}}, {"text": "Arbirid Knmar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri-Bhabua route be granted to Arbirid Knmar Singh-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-\"on pduction of all valid documents of 1964 model bus alone: with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order; failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad ........ \".", "canonical_name": "Arbirid Knmar Singh"}}, {"text": "Nand Kishore Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On January 15, 1965, the South Bihar Regional Transport Authority, Patna, ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on Dehri-Bhabua route be granted to Arbirid Knmar Singh-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-\"on pduction of all valid documents of 1964 model bus alone: with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order; failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked, and permit will then be given to the deserving candidate Nand Kishore Prasad ........ \".", "canonical_name": "NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "Nand Kisbore Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On application submitted by Nand Kisbore Prasad-who will hereinafter be referred to as 'the respondent'-that the appellant had failed to\n\nSUPREME COURT .IEPORTS [1968] 3 s:c.R.\n\ncarcy out the condition relating to the grant of permit, the Chair man of the Regional Transport Authority by order dated February 20, 1965, cancelled the permit and directed that a permit be given to the respondent.", "canonical_name": "NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS"}}, {"text": "State Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent then moved the State Government of Bihar under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the Bihar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act l7 of 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6426, "end_char": 6431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6441, "end_char": 6465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution moved by the appellant in the High Court of Patna against the order of the Minister of Trans."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7207, "end_char": 7215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7640, "end_char": 7648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8042, "end_char": 8050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidaya- tullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidaya- tullah, J., speaking for the Court observed at p. 203 :\n\n\"Mr. Gupta's contention that under that article (Art."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidaya- tullah, J., speaking for the Court observed at p. 203 :\n\n\"Mr. Gupta's contention that under that article (Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8256, "end_char": 8264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8492, "end_char": 8503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966) 3 S.C.R. 198", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8675, "end_char": 8694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9189, "end_char": 9206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Legislature enacted Bihar Act 17 of 1950, imposing tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9318, "end_char": 9323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Legislature enacted Bihar Act 17 of 1950, imposing tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9563, "end_char": 9577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar thereafter issued Bihar Ordinance II of 1961 which was replaced by Bihar Act 17 of 1961."}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9722, "end_char": 9744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that Act the tax was reimposed with effect from the 1st day of April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9977, "end_char": 9989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10104, "end_char": 10111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10197, "end_char": 10201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10207, "end_char": 10211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10368, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10811, "end_char": 10820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10871, "end_char": 10880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11041, "end_char": 11045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11925, "end_char": 11930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12431, "end_char": 12435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12668, "end_char": 12672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maclhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13003, "end_char": 13029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Maclhya Pradesh High Court in Raipur E Transport Co., Private Ltd., Raipur v. M. P. Singh and Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13258, "end_char": 13268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13343, "end_char": 13366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 10 of the Mo!-0r V chicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, passed by the State of Madhya Pradesh provided that in cases referred to in ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14165, "end_char": 14169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 15, 1965, a condition had been imposed upon the appellant that a permit would be granted to him 8 provided he produced a clearance certificate."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14946, "end_char": 14959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,675/- was outstanding against the appellant for nearly fifteen years and that liability was discharged by payment on March 5, 1965."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15526, "end_char": 15535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15550, "end_char": 15574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17002, "end_char": 17007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17494, "end_char": 17499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17627, "end_char": 17632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17989, "end_char": 17994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18807, "end_char": 18817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18827, "end_char": 18851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ARBIND KUMAR V. NAND KISHORE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19564, "end_char": 19592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no bar in the Act or the rules against an appellate or the revising authority\n\nARBIND KUMAR V. NAND KISHORE (Shah, J.) 329\n\ntaking into consideration additional evidence brought on the record, if the authority requires additional evidence to be brought on the record or allows it to be brough1: on the record to do complete justice between the parties."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20223, "end_char": 20240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to hold that the Minister of Transport in taking into consideration the report received from the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Intelligence Branch, that an amount of Rs.1,675/- was outstanding on February 16, 1965, against the appellant in respect of the two buses plied in th, e year 1950..51 acted in violation of the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21583, "end_char": 21588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph-19 it .is stated that \"the so-called report of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Intelligence Branch, Patna, under Memo No."}}, {"text": "24-7-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21616, "end_char": 21625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8527 dated 24-7-1965 was never shown to the petitioner and the petitioner had no opportunity to meet the said report.\""}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_330_338_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "INSTITUTE O~' CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA A v.\n\nP. K. MUKHERJI AND ANR. ·\n\nF elYruary 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND 0. K. MITTl!R, JJ.J B\n\nChartered Accountants Act 38 of 1949-S. 21 and Schedule, itent.r (o),. (p) and (q)-Chcrtered accountant appointed by company und1r Provident Fund Rules to audit accounts of the Fund-Writi1111 to company dpprovlng certain 1ransac1lons in contravention of Rule.r. but not cone. ,,..ntl1tf( on them in hir report on. the account:t-lf RUilt; v of profmll1fllll misconduct-Whether owt!d duty only to company who appointed him or C al.Jo to beneficiaries of provident fund.\n\nA joint stock company had an employees provident fund scheme which wu being manaae<J by a board of trustees. The tint reepondent, a cbar- 'lered accountant, was appointed by the board of directors of the company\n\nto audit the accounts of the Provident Fund for the years 1953 and 1954.\n\nDuring 1954 the trustees of the Fund made certain advances of over rupeea six lakhs to the company in c<intraventioo of the Rules of the Fund.\n\nThe company issued various cheques in yment of the ad\".lll!Ce$ but, Ill the request of the company, tho cheques were not cashed and were bpt by the trustees.\n\nAfter receiving the cheques the trumade book en- .:tries showing repayment of the advances though the cheqlies were un-\n\n<:aShed. On May 25, 1955, the first respondent wrote to the compeny -disapproving the advances aa not being m accordance with the Rules as well as the fact that the cheques iSSUed by the company in repayment were\n\nnot cashed promptly. At a meeting of the Trustees on May 27, 1955 it wu regretted that the cheques, were not cashed at he company's request and resolved that they should be returned to the company and interest char.,.t\n\nfrom the date of issue of the cheques.\n\nThe first respondent signed the statements of accounts of the Prorideot Fund for 1953 on May 14, 1954 and for 1954 on June 30, 1955 and\n\ncertified them as \"checked with the books and accounts produced and found correct\". 1be second respondent filed a complaint against him with the. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India alleging that as the auditor, he had failed to disclose in his certificate on the statement of\n\nacc:ounts that advances were made to the company in contraventioo of.\n\nRules of the Fund or to draw attention to the fact that a large amount of. cash was. shown as cash in hand in the statements of accounts also iD <:ontraverition of the Rules. After an enuiry under a. 21 of the Chartered Accountant• Act, 1949. the Disciplinary Committee of the Institute fOIUld the flnt respondent guilty of professional misconduct und\" items (o), (p) and ( q) of the Schedule to the Act and the Council of the Institute confirmed this finding and referred the case to the High Court for final orders. The High Court set aside these findinp and absolved the Ont reepondent of the cr&jlllS of misconduct.\n\nOn appeal to this Court,\n\nHBLD : Allowing the appeal : H (!) On June 30, 1955, when the first respondent signed the statement of accounts for 1954 he fully knew that a loan had been. granted by the tnistees to the company in violation of the Rules; and furtll\", that chequa ·\n\nA received in repayment were not cashed and, indeed, were not intended to ht: cashed, and were issued by the Company for a false indication of ad- ent at the end of the accounting year. Jn these circumstances it WIS the duty of the first respondent to point out in the statement of acc:ounL•\n\nthat a maj<lr pan of the cash in hand represooted uncashed cheques,. that the cheques were apparently given by the company for repayment of the loan and that the transaction was in violatioo of the Rules of the Provident 8 Pond. His failure in not pointing out these facts constituted professional\n\nmil; conduct falling within cl. (o) of the Schedule to the Act. (336 A. E-OJ\n\n(ii) It was no defence for the first respondent to say that he had di,.. closed the irregularity to the company by his Jetter dated M•Y 5. 1955 and that he owed a duty only to the company which appointed him to audit the accoun!s of the Provident Fund but not to the beneficiaries of the Fund.\n\nOn the tontraryt a breach of duty on his part not to have made a disclosure to the eficiaries of the Provident Fund in the statement of accounts. The mary object of auditing the Fund was to apprise the beneficiaries othe true financial position of the accounts and investments_ made from titn.e to time and in such a case the auditor is under a clear duty towards the beneficiaries. \"to probe into the transac!ion\" and to repon on their true character. [338 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 5, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 78 of 1959.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, R. K. P. Shankardas, H. K. Puri and K. K.\n\nJain for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Chag/a, S. V. Gupte and K. Ba/dev Mehta, for respondent No. 1.\n\n£. Udayarathnam, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswaml, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 5, 1962 in matter No. 78 of 1959.\n\nAnanda Bazar Patrika Limited is a Joint Stock Company, ltereinafter referred to as the 'Company' and has got an employees' Provident.Fund Scheme which was ing managed by a Board of Trustees. Respondent No. 1 is a Chartered Accountant and wa.• appointed by the Board of Directors of the Company to audit the accounts of the Provident Fund for the years 1953 and 1954. It appears that in the year 1954 the Trustees of the Fund had made certain advances ainounting to about Rs. 6,21,864/- to the Company in contravention of the Rules of the Fund. The Director of the O>mpany issued various cheques in repayment of the advance, but at the request of the management of the Company the cheques were kept with the Trustees of the Fund uncashed and not credited in the account of the Fund. After receipt of the cheques\n\nthe Trustees of the Fund made book entries showing the repayment of the loan so granted to the Company, though in fact note of these cheques had been cashed when such entries were made.\n\nIn his letter dated May 25, 1955 respondent No. 1 wrote to the Company as follows :\n\n\"It appears that certain loans were granted_ by the Trustees of the Fund to the Compy in 195~ which although adjusted within the_ accounting year; does not appear to be in accordanee with the Provident Fund Rules.\n\nWe disapprove such transaction and believe it will not recur in future. Cheques issued by you to .the Fund should also be cleared promptly.\"\n\nAfter receipt of the letter from respondent No. 1 a meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on May 27, 1955 when a resolution was passed to the following effect :\n\n\"This meeting records with regret that the cheques amounting to Rs. 6,21,864/- could not be presented to the bank on the verbal request of the management of the Anand Bazar Patrika Ltd., this meeting considering all the relevant facts resolves that all the cheques be returned to the Company to the debit of the loan account bearing an interest of 6% per annum with effect from the date of issue of the cheques.\"\n\nRespondent No. 1 signed the statement of Accounts ending December 31, 1953 on May 14, 1954 and the statement of Accounts ending December 31, 1954 on June 30, 1955. The statement was signed by the Trustees of the Fund and respondent No. 1 after signing the statements gave the following ertificate :\n\n\"Checked with the books and accounts produced and found correct.\"\n\nThough respondent No. 1 pointed out in his letter dated May 25, 1955 that loans were granted and adjustment was made during the accounting year, he did not disclose this fact in his note when he signed the statement of account on June 30, 1955 knowing fully well that the cheques were not only uncashed but were returned to the Company in pursuance of the resolution of the Trustees dated May 27, 1955. Respondent No. 1 also failed to point out in the statement of account that adjustment of loans was made by showing in a very vague manner cash in hand (Cheques and cash) as Rs. 6,21,864 and the proportion of the cheques to the cash was not specified.\n\nLater on Kishori Lal Dul'ta, respondent No. 2, President of the Employees' Union filed a complaint against respondent No. 1 before the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, hereinafter referred to as the 'Institute'. It was alleged in\n\nl.C.A. v. MUKHERJJ (Ramaswami, J.) 333\n\nthe complaint that (1) the loan granted to the Company was in contravention of Rule 12 of the Provident Fund Rules and the auditor failed to disclose this in the statement of account, and (2) the auditor failed to invite attention to the fact that huge amount was shown as cash in band in. the financial statement for the years 1953 and 1954 in contravention of Rule 11 of the Fund. The complaint was referred by the Council of the Institute to the Disciplinary Committee for an inquiry under s. 21 of the_ Chartered Accountants Act (Act 38 of 1949), hereinafter calied the 'Act', read with regulation made thereunder. The Disciplinary Committee made a report on September 13, 1958. The Disciplinary Committee found that the loans were admittedly granted by the Trustees in contravention of the Provident Fund Rules and respondent No. J should have brought out this fact in his report and that respondent No. 1 was guilty of not disclosing the fact that a large amount of loan was given out of the fund of the Provident Fund to the Company and that the cheques received in payment of these loans and shown as cash in hand \"Cheques and cash\" were not encashed at least upto the day on which be wrote the Jetter to the Directors i.e., May 25, 1955 and the non-disclosure of this material information was an act of misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Disciplinary Committee held that the Joans were given in contravention of the Rules of the Provident Fund and failure to report on the default in clearing the cheques received in repayment of the loans amounted to a failure to report on a material mis-statement known to respondent No. I. Accordingly the Disciplinary Committee held that respondent No. 1 was guilty of misconduct under items (o), (p) and (q) of the Schedule to the Act. The Council of the Institute agreed with the report of the Pisciplinary Committee and held respondent No. 1 guilty of professional misconduct.\n\nUnder s. 21 of the Acf the matter was referred to the Calcutta High Court for final orders. By its judgment dated December 5, 1962 the High Court set aside the findings of the Disciplinary Committee as confirmed by the Council of the Institute and absolved respDndent No. 1 of the charges of misconduct.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to examine the scheme of the material provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 2 (I )(b) of the\n\nct defines a \"Chartered Accountant\" as meaning \"a person who rs a member of the Institute and who is in practice.\" Section 6 Jays down that no member of the Institute shall be entitled to practise unless he has obtained from the Council a certificate of practice. Section 8 deals with disabilities. Any person who incurs any one of the disablities enumerated in sub-els. (i) to (vi) of s. 8 shall not be entitled to have his name entered in or borne of the Register.\n\nSub-clause (vi) deals with the disability in case where the chartered accountant is found on an inquiry to be guilty\n\nof conduct which renders him unfit to be a member of the Institute.\n\nUnder s. 20(2) it is provided that the Council shall remove from the Register the name of any member who has been found by the High Court to have been guilty of conduct which renders him unfit to be a member of the Institute. Chapter V deals with the question of misconduct. It consists of ss. 21 and 22.\n\nSection 21 deals with the procedure of enquiries relating to misconduct of members of the Institute. It reads thus :\n\n\"21. ( 1 ) Where on receipt of information or on receipt of a complaint mde to it, the Council is of opinion that any member of the Institute has been guilty of conduct which, if proved, will render him unfit to be a member of the Institute, or where a complaint against a member of the Institute has been made by or on behalf of the Central Government, the Council 11hall cause an inquiry to be held in such manner as may be prescribed, and the finding of the Council shall be forwarded to the High Court. ( 2) Ort receipt of the finding, the High Court shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause notice of the day so fixd to be given to the member of the Institute concerned, the Council and to the Central Government, and shall afford such member, the Council and the Central Government an opportunity of being heard before orders are passed on the case.\n\n(3) The High Court may, thereafter, either pass such final orders on the case as it thinks fit or refer it back for further inquiry by the Council and upon receipt of the finding after such inquiry, deal with the case in the manner provided in sub-section (2) and pass final orders thereon.\n\n\" .......................................\n\nSection 22 defines misconduct. It reads thus :\n\n\"For the purposes of this Act, the expression 'conduct which, if proved, will render a person unfit to be a member of the Institute' shall be deemed to include any act or omission specified in the Schedule, but nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or abridge in any way the power conferred on the Council under subsection ( 1) of section 21 to inquire into the onduct of any member of the Institute under any other circumstances.'' Clauses ( o), ( p) and ( q) of the Schedule read as follows :\n\n\"A charteredaccountant shall be deemed to be guilty of conduct rendering him unfit to be a member of the institute, if he-......... .\n\n( o) fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in a financial statement, but dis~ closure of which is necessary to make the financial statement not misleading; ( p) fails to report a material misstatement known to him to appear, in a financial statement with which he is concerned in a professional capacity; ( q) is grossly negligent in the conduct of his professional duties;\" Rules 11 and 12 of the Ananda Bazar Patrika Provident Fund provide as follows :\n\n\"11. The Manager shall from time to time pay into the Bank approved by the trustees to the credit of an account to be styled 'The Ananda Bazar Patrika Provi. dent Fund Account' all moneys received by him. All moneys to the credit of such account shal! be dealt with only in accordance with these rules and regulations and any or all portion of such moneys shall be withdrawn from such account only by cheques bearing the signatures of the Manager and one of the trustees.\"\n\n\"12. All moneys not immediately required for the purpose of the fund shall from time to time be invested by the trustees at their discretion in any of the following securities, that is to say, of the rupee securities of the Government of India or any securities, the interest on which is or shall be guaranteed by the Government of India or in bonds, debentures, securities of or issued by Public municipal or local body or authority in India, with a power' for the trustees at their discretion from time to time to vary or to transpose such investment or for others of any nature hereinbefore authorised. So however, that the securities in which the contn'butions ade / by the subscribers, after the date of recognition of the Provident Fund and the interest on the accumu-· lated balance of such contributions are invested are payable both in respect of capital and of interest in India.\" Rule 28 states :\n\n''The accounts of the Fund shall be audited yearly by an auditor appointed by the Company.\" The question to be considered in this appeal is whether respondent No. I was guilty of professional misconduct falling within els. ( o), ( p) or ( q) of the Schedule to the Act. It is the admitted position in this case that respondent No. 1 signed the statement of aecount for 1954 on June 30, 1955, At the time when he signed\n\nthe statement he was aware that Joans were granted by the trustees of the Fund to the Company in 1954 and cheques had been issued in repa}'ment of the loan. This is apparent from the Jetter of respondent No. 1 dated May 25, 1955 addressed to the Company in which he pointed out that the loans granted by the trustees do not appear to be in accordanee with the Provident Fund Rules and the cheques issued by the Company should be cleared promptly.\n\nAs a sequel to this letter the trustees passed a resolution on May 27, 1955 that the cheques amounting to Rs. 6,21,864/- and odd were not presented to the Bank on the verbal req11est of the Com pany and that the cheques should be returned to the Company and the amount should be debited to the loan account bearing interest at 6% p.a. with effect from the issue of the cheques. It is manifest therefore that on June 30, 1955 when respondent No. I signed the statement of accounts he fully knew that a loan had been granted by the trustees to the Company in violation of Rules\n\n11 and 12 anti further that cheques received in repayment of the loan were not cashed and, indeed, were not intended to be cashed.\n\nIn other words, the 'cheques were issued by the Company not with the intention of repayment of the loan by their being cashed but they really represented acknowledgement of the loan by the Company. In fact, the cheques had been returned to the Company uncashed by virtue of the resolution of the Board of trustee.' dated May 27, 1955 before the statement of account was signed\n\nby respondent No. 1. To put it differently, the cheques were apparently issued by the Company not so much for repayment of E the loan as for a false indication of adjustment at the end of the accounting year.\n\nWe are of opinion that in these circumstances it was the duty of respondent No. 1 to point out in the statement of account that a major part of the cash in hand represented uncashed cheques and that the cheques were apparently given by the Company for repayment of the loan and the transaction was in violation of Rules 11 and 12 of the Provident Fund Rules. We accordingly consider that the failure of respondent No. 1 in not pointing out these facts in the statement of acco11nts for the year 1954 constituted professional misconduct falling within cl. ( o) of the Schedule to the Act. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on whether the case also falls within els. (p) and (q) of the Schedule.\n\nOn behalf of respondent No. 1 Mr. Chala put forward th~ argument that since the cheques had already been given by the Company .the loans stood cleared and, in any event, respondent\n\nNo. 1 had already informed the Com!)anv of the irregularity in his letter dated May 25. 1955. It was therefore contended that there H was no professional misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that the cheques had been given by the Company before the close of\n\nthe year 1954. but respondent No. 1 knew that the cheques were\n\nnot really intended to be encashed by the trustees. Respondent No. 1 also knew of the resolution of the trustees dated May 27, 1955 that the cheques were to be returned to the Company and tllc amount was ordered by the trustees to be entered and. carried oYer to the loan account. It was also maintained by Mr. Chagla that respondent No. 1 owed a duty only to the Company which appointed him to audit the accounts of the Provident Fund and there was no duty owed by respondent o. 1 to the beneficiaries of the Fund. It is not possible for us to accept this argument.\n\nRespondent No. 1 owed a duty to all the subscribers of the Provident Fund who were in the position of beneficiaries. It is not correct to say that respondent No. 1 owed a duty only to the Company which had appointed him to perform the auditing. The contributors to the Provident Fund had a beneficial interest in the Fund and the primary object of auditing the Fund wlls to appraise them of the true financial position of the accounts and investments made from time to time. Respondent No. 1 therefore owed a duty to the contributors to the Provident Fund for making a true report to them of the financial position. In other words, the auditing was intended for protection of the beneficiaries and the auditor was expected to examine the accounts maintained by the trustees with . a view to inform the beneficiaries of the true financial position.\n\nThe auditor is, in such a case, under a clear duty towards the beneficiaries \"to probe into the transactions\" aµd to report on their true character. In our opinion, the legal position of the auditor in the present case is similar to that of the auditor under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. In such a case the audit is intended for the protection of the shareholders and the auditor is expected to examine the accounts maintained by the Directors with a view to inform the shareholders of the true financial position of the Company. The Directors occupy a fiduciary position in relation to the shareholders and in auditing the accounts maintained by the Directors the auditor acts in the interest of the shareholders who are in the position of beneficiaries. In London Oil Storage Co. Ltd.\n\nv. Seear, Hasluck & Co., (1 ) Lord Alverstone stated as follows :\n\n\"He must exercise such reasonable care as would satisfy a man that the accounts are genuine, assuming that !here is nothing to arouse his suspicion of honesty and 1f he does _that he fulfils his duty; if his suspicion is aroused, his duty is to 'probe the thing to the bottom• and tell the director8 of it and get what information he can.\" ( Vide also the observations in-'ln re : London General Bank (No. 2)';(')-'ln re: Kingston Cotton\n\nMill Co. (No. 2)'(8 ) and-'ln re: City Equitable Fire.Insurance Co. Ltd.'(')\".\n\n(1) Dick,.. on Auditing., 17th Edn., p. 632.\n\n(3) (1896) 2 Ch. 279.\n\n(2) (1895) 2 Ch. 673.\n\n(4) (1925) Ch. 407.\n\n. It was therefore no defence for respondent No. 1 in this case to say that he had disclosed the irregularity to the Company by hi.~ letter dated May 25, 1955. On the contrary it was a breach of duty on. his part not to have made a disclosure th.:reof to the beneficiaries of the Provident Fund in the statement of accounts for the year 1954 which he signed on June 30, 1955.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that the eharge of professional misconduct is established against respondent No. 1 falling under cl. ( o) of the Schedule to the Act. The only question which now remains is the final order to be passed against respondent No. 1.\n\nIn our opinion, the conduct of respondent No. 1 is wholly unworthy of a Chartered Accountant who is eitpected--to maintain a high\n\nstandard of professional conduct. The proper punishment woiJld have. been the removal of the respondent No. l's name from the Register for a limited period but in view of the fact that the proceedings have been pending against respondent :No. 1 for a Jong time, we think that the ends of justice will be served in this particulat case if respondent No. I is severely reprimanded for his mis\n\ncon\\fuc~ under s. 21(2) of the Act. We also direct respondent No. I to pay the cost of the appellant in this Court and in the High Court.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order of the High Court dated December 5, 1962 and allow this appeal with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nApptal a/low.td.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "INSTITUTE O~' CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. MUKHERJI AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. K. MUKHERJI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Chartered Accountants Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chartered Accountants Act", "statute": "Chartered Accountants Act"}}, {"text": "Provident Fund Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 25, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 25, 1955, the first respondent wrote to the compeny -disapproving the advances aa not being m accordance with the Rules as well as the fact that the cheques iSSUed by the company in repayment were\n\nnot cashed promptly."}}, {"text": "May 27, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a meeting of the Trustees on May 27, 1955 it wu regretted that the cheques, were not cashed at he company's request and resolved that they should be returned to the company and interest char."}}, {"text": "Institute of Chartered Accountants of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Institute of Chartered Accountants of India alleging that as the auditor, he had failed to disclose in his certificate on the statement of\n\nacc:ounts that advances were made to the company in contraventioo of."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2985, "end_char": 2998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 30, 1955, when the first respondent signed the statement of accounts for 1954 he fully knew that a loan had been."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, R. K. P. Shankardas, H. K. Puri and K. K.\n\nJain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. P. Shankardas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4833, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, R. K. P. Shankardas, H. K. Puri and K. K.\n\nJain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, R. K. P. Shankardas, H. K. Puri and K. K.\n\nJain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nJain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4869, "end_char": 4880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, R. K. P. Shankardas, H. K. Puri and K. K.\n\nJain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, S. V. Gupte and K. Ba/dev Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4915, "end_char": 4926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, S. V. Gupte and K. Ba/dev Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Ba/dev Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chag/a, S. V. Gupte and K. Ba/dev Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Udayarathnam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Udayarathnam, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswaml", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5054, "end_char": 5063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswaml, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 5, 1962 in matter No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswaml, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 5, 1962 in matter No."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswaml, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 5, 1962 in matter No."}}, {"text": "Ananda Bazar Patrika Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5205, "end_char": 5233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda Bazar Patrika Limited is a Joint Stock Company, ltereinafter referred to as the 'Company' and has got an employees' Provident."}}, {"text": "Anand Bazar Patrika Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6973, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,21,864/- could not be presented to the bank on the verbal request of the management of the Anand Bazar Patrika Ltd., this meeting considering all the relevant facts resolves that all the cheques be returned to the Company to the debit of the loan account bearing an interest of 6% per annum with effect from the date of issue of the cheques.\""}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal Dul'ta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8257, "end_char": 8275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on Kishori Lal Dul'ta, respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9024, "end_char": 9029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chartered Accountants Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 13, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9194, "end_char": 9212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Disciplinary Committee made a report on September 13, 1958."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10870, "end_char": 10879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11282, "end_char": 11286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11841, "end_char": 11854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11857, "end_char": 11867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12309, "end_char": 12327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ) Where on receipt of information or on receipt of a complaint mde to it, the Council is of opinion that any member of the Institute has been guilty of conduct which, if proved, will render him unfit to be a member of the Institute, or where a complaint against a member of the Institute has been made by or on behalf of the Central Government, the Council 11hall cause an inquiry to be held in such manner as may be prescribed, and the finding of the Council shall be forwarded to the High Court. ("}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13187, "end_char": 13197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13580, "end_char": 13590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15066, "end_char": 15085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All moneys not immediately required for the purpose of the fund shall from time to time be invested by the trustees at their discretion in any of the following securities, that is to say, of the rupee securities of the Government of India or any securities, the interest on which is or shall be guaranteed by the Government of India or in bonds, debentures, securities of or issued by Public municipal or local body or authority in India, with a power' for the trustees at their discretion from time to time to vary or to transpose such investment or for others of any nature hereinbefore authorised."}}, {"text": "Chala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18661, "end_char": 18666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Mr. Chala put forward th~ argument that since the cheques had already been given by the Company .the loans stood cleared and, in any event, respondent\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "Chagla"}}, {"text": "May 25. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18889, "end_char": 18901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had already informed the Com!)anv of the irregularity in his letter dated May 25."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19512, "end_char": 19518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also maintained by Mr. Chagla that respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Chagla"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20881, "end_char": 20907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Alverstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21444, "end_char": 21454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In London Oil Storage Co. Ltd.\n\nv. Seear, Hasluck & Co., (1 ) Lord Alverstone stated as follows :\n\n\"He must exercise such reasonable care as would satisfy a man that the accounts are genuine, assuming that !"}}, {"text": "London General Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21857, "end_char": 21876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide also the observations in-'ln re : London General Bank (No."}}, {"text": "Dick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21999, "end_char": 22003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Dick,.. on Auditing.,"}}, {"text": "s. 21(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23278, "end_char": 23286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_339_345_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "ff -·\n\nRAJA DHRUV DEV CHAND\n\nHARMOHINDER SINGH & ANR.\n\nMarch 1, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nContract Act, s. 56-Doctrine of frustralion, if applies, to lease$ of agricultural land.\n\nThe appellant obtained lease of a land in the undivided Punjab and carried on agricultural operations in it.\n\nFollowing the partition Of India and allotment of the t\"ritory in which the lands were situate to Pakistan tJic appellant migrated to India. The appellant commenced an action for a decree for refund of the rent on the plea that the l'Onsideration for tbe lease failed, beoauSe the covenants of the lease had become impossible of performance as a fflluit of communal riots in that locality and the inability of nonmuslims to continue to mide in that area. The claim was decreed but the High Court reversed the decree.\n\nDismissina the ftP, peal this urt,\n\nHELD: Where the propeny leased is not destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit, the lessee cannot avoid that lease even 'if be does not or is unable to use the land for purposes for which it is\n\nlet to him. Under a lease of land there is a transfer of right to enjoy that land. If any material part of the propeny be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and pcrmanntly unfit for the purpose for which it was let out, because of fire, tempest, flood, violence of an army or a mob, or other irresistible force, the lease may, at the option of the lessee, be avoided. This rule is incorporatod in s. 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act and applies to leases of land to which the Tran:sfer of Property Act applies, and the principle thei'eof applies to agricultural leases and to\n\nleases in areas to which the Transfer of Property Act is not extend!>!.\n\n{345 D-F]\n\nIn the present case the relation between the appellant and the reopandents did not rest in contract. It is !'rue that the representative Of the respandents-owners had accepted the tender of the apPe}lant and had granted him a lease on agreed terms. But the rights of the parties did not after the lease was aranted rest in contract. By s. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. That oection however cannot be read as enacting that the provisions of the Con- 1lact Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act. There is a clear distincton between a completed conveyance and an executory contract,\n\nand events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer. [342 E-HJ\n\nGranting that the parties at the date of the lease did not cootemplate that there may be riots in the area rendering it unsafe for the apPe}lant tO\n\ncarry on cultivation or that the crops grown by him may be looted, there was no covenant in the lease that in the event of, the appellant being unable to remain in poasession and to cultivate the land and tO collect the crops, he will not be liable to pay the rent. Inability of the appellant to cultivate the land or to collect the crops becall!e Of widespread riots cannot in the event that transpinod clothe him with the right to claim refund of the rent paid, [343 0-EJ ,\n\nParadlne v. laM, (1647) Aleyn. 26, Denny Mott end Dickson Ltd. v. lmnes B. Fraser & Co. Ltd. [19441 A.C. 265, Satybrata Ghose v.\n\nMugneeram Bangur & Co. & Anr. [19541 S.C.R. 310, Abdul Hashem & Anr. v. Balahari Monda! & Ors. A.J.R. 1952 Cal. 380 Tarabai Jivanlal Parekh v. Lela Padamchand A.1.R. 1950 Bom. 89, Alanduraiappar Koil Chithakkadu b, v its Trustee M. Ramananda Nainar & Ors. v. T. S. A.\n\nHamid and Anr, A.1.R. 1963 Mad. 94, Sri Amuruvi Perumal Dew:stltanam v. K. R. Sabapathi Pillai & Anr. A.LR. 1962 Mad. 132 and Jnder Pershad Singh v. Campbell, L.1.R. 7 Cal. 474, referred to.\n\nParshotam Das Shankar Da.• v. Municipal Committee, Batala A.I.R. 1949 E.P. 301, overruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated September 23, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in R.F.A. No. 143 of 1952.\n\nVikram Chand Mahajan and Hardev Singh, for the appellant.\n\nB. P. Malieshwari, Sobhag Mal Jain and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, .J. The appellant obtained from the Court of Wards, Dada Siba Estate, a lease of five squares of land in Tahsil Okara.\n\nDistrict Montgomery in the undivided Punjab for the Kharif season 1947 and Rabi season 1948. Following upon the partition of India in July 1947 and allotment of the territory in which the lands were situate to Pakistan, the appellant migrated to India.\n\nAn action commenced by the appellant against the Court of Wards in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala for a decree for refund of the rent paid by him was decreed.\n\nBut the High Court of Punjab reversed the decree holding that the doctrine of frustration of contract did not apply to leases of immovable property and that in any event on the facts proved there was no case of frustration established by the appellant.\n\nWith certificate granted by !Ae High Court, this appeal is preferred by the appellant.\n\nRaja Harmohinder Singh and Kanwar Rajinder Singh have now been substituted in place of the Court of Wards as the respondents.\n\nThe appellant claimed a decree for refund of the rent on the ground that the consideration for the lease failed, because the covenants of the lease had become impossible of perfonnance as a result of communal riots in the District of Montgomery and the inability of non-Muslims to continue to reside in that area. The High Court rejected the contention.\n\nThe following findings of the High Court are not challenged before us:\n\nDHRUV DEV I'. HARMOHINDER (Shah, J.) 341\n\nA After obtaining possession of lands from the Court of Wards the appellant carried on agricu:tural operations for Kharif cultivation and \"partly enjoyed benefit therefrom by taking fodder etc,\" that the right to the demised land continued to remain vested in the appellant even after he migrated to India, that the lands demised with neither destroyed nor bad they become permanently unfit B for the purpose of agriculture, and that there was no agreement express or implied-that the rent was payable only if the appellant\n\nwas able personally 10 attend to or supervise the agricultural operations.\n\nUnder the English common law the earlier cases laid down the rule of \"absolute contract\" that when a duty was cast upon a person who bound himself by contract absolutely to do a thiug, he could not escape liability for damages for breach by proof that as events turned out performance was futile or even impossible : see Paradine\n\n'\" Jane(').\n\nThis rule was later mitigated by an exception that if further fulfilment of the contract is brought to an abrupt stop by 'ome irresistible and extraneous cause for which .neither party is responsible, the contract shall terminate forthwith and the parties be discharged: see Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. James B.\n\nFraser & Co. Ltd.(2). The rationale of the doctrine of frustration under the English common law need not be considered, for in India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act have turned a limited exception under the English common law into a positive general rule in s. 56 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 56, insofar as it is material provides :\n\n\"An agreement to do an act impassible in itself is void.\n\nA contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.\n\nUnder s. 56, where an event which could not reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made renders performance impossible or unlawful the contract is rendered oid, ad e parties are excused from' performance of their\n\nresecl!ve ohgattons. _Thei:efore where performance is rendered by mtervenllon of law mvahd, or the subject matter assumed by the parties to continue to exist is destroyed or a state of thing assumed to be the foundation of the contract fails, or does not happen, or wher~ the perormance is to be rendered personally and the person dies or 1s disabled, the contract stands discharged.\n\n(1) (1647) Aleyn, 26.\n\n(2) [19441 A.C. 26S.\n\nIt has been held by this Court that the rule in s. 56 exhaus- 1ively deals with the doctrine of frustration of contracts, and it cannot be extended by analogies borrowed from the English common law. In Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. and Anr.('), Mukherjea, J., observed at p. 319:\n\n\" ...... the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the Jaw of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act. It would be incorrect to say that section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to cases of physical impossibility and that where this section is not applicable, recOurse can be had to the principles of English law on the subject of frustration. It must be held also that to the extent that the fndian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the ame and it is not permissible to import the principles of English law dehors these statutory provisions.\"\n\nNo useful purpose will be served by referring to the judgmeijnts of the Supreme Court of the United States of America and Court of Session in Scotland to which our attention was invit .\n\nSection 56 of the Contract Act lays down a positive rule relating to frustration of contracts and the Courts cannot travel outside the terms of that section. The view eXpressed by the East Punjab High Court in Parshotam Das Shankar Das v. Municipal Committee,\n\nBatala('), thats. 56 of the Contract Act is not exhaustive of the law relating to frustration of contracts in India must be deemed not to be good law to that extent.\n\nWe are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant in the present case that the relation between the appellant and the respondents rested in a contract. It is true that the Court of Wards bad accepted the tender of the appellant and had granted him a lease on agreed terms of lands of Dada Siba Estate. But the rights of the parties did not after the lease was granted rest in contract.\n\nBy s. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. That section however does not enact and cannot be read as enacting that the provisions of the Contract Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThere is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer.\n\n(l) [19S4) s.c.R. 310.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1949B.l'. 301.\n\nDHRUB DEV V. HARMO!IlNDER (Shah,/.) 343\n\nA By its express terms s. 56 of the Contract Act does not apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer. The !ICC<>nd paragraph of s. 56 which is the only paragraph material to cases of this nature has a limited application to covenants under a lease.\n\nA covenant under a lease to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible or by reason of some event which the B promisor could not prevent unlawful, becomes void when the ac't becomes impossible or unlawful.\n\nBut on that account the transfer of property resulting from the lease granted by the lessor to the lessee is not declared void.\n\nBy the agreement of lease the appellant undertook to pay rent for the year 1947-48 and the Court of Wards agreed to give on c lea5e tlle land in its management. It is not claimed that the agreement of lease was void or voidable.\n\nNor is it the case of the appellant that the lease was determined in any manner known to law.\n\nThe appellant obtained possession of the land.\n\nHe was unable to continue in effective possession on account of circumstances beyond his control. Granting that the parties at the date of the lease did not contemplate that there may be riots in the D area rendering it unsafe for the appellant to carry on cultivation, or that the crops grown by hiin may be looted, there was no covenant in the lease that in the event of the appellant being unable to remain in possession and to cultivate the land and to collect the crops, he will not be liable to pay the rent.\n\nInability of the appellant to cultivate the land or to collect the crops becauSe of E widespread riots cannot in the events that transpired clothe him with the right to claim refund of the rent paid.\n\nAuthorities in the Courts in India have generally taken the view that s. 56 of the Contract Act is not applicable when the rights and obligations of the parties arise under a transfer of property under a lease. In Abdul Hashem and another v. Balahari F Monda! and Others('), the Calcutta High Court held that in a case where during the continuance of a tenancy, a notice was served on the tenant requiring him to place a part of the land under his tenancy at the disposal of the Land Acquisition Collector, and the Collector took possession of the premises let out to him, it was held that even though the occurrence was unforeseen G and was not contemplated by the parties when the lease was created, the occurrence was not so fundamental as to be regarded in law to strike at the root and destroy the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant.\n\nIn Tarabai Jivanlal Parekh v. Lala Padamchand(') it was\n\nhe!~ that monthly tenants of residential premises from whose occu~ H pahon the premises were requisitioned continued to remain the monthly tenants of the landlord as before and that by reason of the requisition there was no eviction by title paramount or a\n\n(l) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 380.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 89.\n\nL6Sup, CJ/68-9\n\nfrustration of adventure.\n\nThe Court in that case observed that the doctrine of frustra1ion did not apply where there is a lease whether the term is one for a fixed period or one which can be terminated by notice to quit, as the estate vested in the lessee by a lease is not extinguished by the order of requisition which is of a temporary nature.\n\nIn Alanduraiappar Kail Chithakkadu by its Trustee M. Ramananda Nainar and Ors. v. T. S. A. Hamid and Another('), a lessee of a shandy tape agreeing to pay an annual rent for a period of five years was held not to be entitled to remission merely for the reason that the shand, v was hit by two cyclones during the period of lease and that for some period on account of the cyclone, \"the shandy did not form properly or regularly and the Jessee did not get any income\". The Court held in that case that in the absence of any provision for remission on account of losses, no such remission can be granted by the Courts.\n\nIn Sri Amuruvi Perumal Devasthanam v. K. R. Sabapathi Pillai and another(') the plaintiff Devasthanam granted a lease of lands in open auction to the defendant on the terms and conditions set out in the auction no1ices and a deed of lease was executed by the Devasthanam and the defendants. The Government of Madras thereafter promulgated Ordinance IV of 1952 which restricted the quantum of rent payable by the tenants to the landlords. The defendants remained in possession till after the expiry of the period of the lease, but neglected to pay rent and failed to comply with the terms of the lease. It was held that the plaintiff was held entitled to recover the stipulated rent from the defendants.\n\nOur attention was, however, invited to certain cases in which counsel claimed that the doctrine of frustration had been applied to leases. In Inder Pershad Singh v. Campbell(') the plaintiff agreed to cultivate indigo for the defendant for a specified number of years in certain lands with respect to a portion of which lands the plaintiff was a sub-tenant only.\n\nDuring the continuance of the contract, the plaintiff Jost possession of those lands through his immediate landlord having failed to pay the rent, and having been in consequence ejected therefrom by the owner. Jn a suit by the plaintiff to have so much of the contract as related to those lands cancelled, on the ground that it had become impossible of perforn1 ance through no neglect on his part, it was held that the case fell within cl. 2 of s. 56 of t1te Contract Act.\n\nBut between the parties to the litigation there. was no relation of landlord and tenant. .The pl, aintiff was unable to raise indigo and supply to the defendants because the plaintiff's landlord failed to pay .the rent due, and the plaintiff was on that .account ejected from the land. That case' (l).J.R. 1963 Mad. 94.\n\n(2) A.J.R. 1962 Mad. 132.\n\n(3) J.L.R. 7 Cal. 474.\n\nDHRUB DEV v. HARMOHINDER (Shah, J.) 345\n\ndoes not, in our view, support the contention that the doctrine of frustration applies to the case of a lease.\n\nThe case strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant was Gurdarshan Singh and Anr. v. Bishen Singh('). In that case a lease was executed on January 8, 194 7 in respect of agricultural land situated in an area which on partition of India fell within West Pakistan.\n\nThe Court found that possession of the demised land was not given to the lessee, and the landlord was on account of riots unable to deliver possession.\n\nObviously on that finding the tenant was entitled to claim refund of the rent, paid.\n\nBut the Court proceeded to consider the question \"whether the doctrine of frustration applies to a contract of lease of agricultural lands\" and recorded an answer that the doctrine of frustration applies to leases. The Court observed at p. 13-,-\"that the doctrine of frustration does apply to leases, but even if it does not' apply in terms to a contract of lease of agricultural land the broad principle of frustration of contract applies to leases\". We are unable to agree with that observation, and the observation at p. 11 that \"According to Indian law, sales of land as also leases are contracts\". Under a lease of Jaw there is a transfer of right to enjoy that land. If any material part ()f the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let out, because of fire, tempest, flood, violence of an army or a mob, or other irresistible force, the lease may, at the option of the lessee, be avoided.\n\nThis rule is incorporated in s. 108 ( e) of the Transfer of Property Act and applies to leases of land, to which the Transfer of Property Act applies, and the principle thereof to agricultural leases and to leases in areas where the Transfer of Property Act is not extended. Where the property leased is not destroyed or substantially and permanently unfit. the lessee cannot avoid the lease because he does not or is unable to use the land for purposes for which it is Jet to him.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nA ppea/ dismissed.\n\n(I) I L.J!., (1962J_Puojab 5", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA DHRUV DEV CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA DHRUV DEV CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARMOHINDER SINGH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARMOHINDER SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 1, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the partition Of India and allotment of the t\"ritory in which the lands were situate to Pakistan tJic appellant migrated to India."}}, {"text": "s. 108(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1491, "end_char": 1500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2133, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2167, "end_char": 2191, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Vikram Chand Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Chand Mahajan and Hardev Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vikram Chand Mahajan and Hardev Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Malieshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Malieshwari, Sobhag Mal Jain and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4154, "end_char": 4169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Malieshwari, Sobhag Mal Jain and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Malieshwari, Sobhag Mal Jain and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, .J. The appellant obtained from the Court of Wards, Dada Siba Estate, a lease of five squares of land in Tahsil Okara."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An action commenced by the appellant against the Court of Wards in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala for a decree for refund of the rent paid by him was decreed."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4833, "end_char": 4853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the High Court of Punjab reversed the decree holding that the doctrine of frustration of contract did not apply to leases of immovable property and that in any event on the facts proved there was no case of frustration established by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Raja Harmohinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5167, "end_char": 5189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Harmohinder Singh and Kanwar Rajinder Singh have now been substituted in place of the Court of Wards as the respondents."}}, {"text": "Kanwar Rajinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5194, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Harmohinder Singh and Kanwar Rajinder Singh have now been substituted in place of the Court of Wards as the respondents."}}, {"text": "Montgomery", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant claimed a decree for refund of the rent on the ground that the consideration for the lease failed, because the covenants of the lease had become impossible of perfonnance as a result of communal riots in the District of Montgomery and the inability of non-Muslims to continue to reside in that area."}}, {"text": "Paradine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6685, "end_char": 6693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the English common law the earlier cases laid down the rule of \"absolute contract\" that when a duty was cast upon a person who bound himself by contract absolutely to do a thiug, he could not escape liability for damages for breach by proof that as events turned out performance was futile or even impossible : see Paradine\n\n'\" Jane(')."}}, {"text": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7152, "end_char": 7202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7296, "end_char": 7301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7309, "end_char": 7328, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7657, "end_char": 7662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "India by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Aleyn", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) (1647) Aleyn, 26."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8383, "end_char": 8388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea, J., observed at p. 319:\n\n\" ...... the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the Jaw of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act."}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8923, "end_char": 8933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No useful purpose will be served by referring to the judgmeijnts of the Supreme Court of the United States of America and Court of Session in Scotland to which our attention was invit ."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9510, "end_char": 9518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No useful purpose will be served by referring to the judgmeijnts of the Supreme Court of the United States of America and Court of Session in Scotland to which our attention was invit ."}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9555, "end_char": 9565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9739, "end_char": 9761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view eXpressed by the East Punjab High Court in Parshotam Das Shankar Das v. Municipal Committee,\n\nBatala('), thats. 56 of the Contract Act is not exhaustive of the law relating to frustration of contracts in India must be deemed not to be good law to that extent."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10377, "end_char": 10381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10447, "end_char": 10471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10529, "end_char": 10554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10687, "end_char": 10711, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10995, "end_char": 11000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11111, "end_char": 11116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12957, "end_char": 12976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others('), the Calcutta High Court held that in a case where during the continuance of a tenancy, a notice was served on the tenant requiring him to place a part of the land under his tenancy at the disposal of the Land Acquisition Collector, and the Collector took possession of the premises let out to him, it was held that even though the occurrence was unforeseen G and was not contemplated by the parties when the lease was created, the occurrence was not so fundamental as to be regarded in law to strike at the root and destroy the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant."}}, {"text": "Devasthanam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sri Amuruvi Perumal Devasthanam v. K. R. Sabapathi Pillai and another(') the plaintiff Devasthanam granted a lease of lands in open auction to the defendant on the terms and conditions set out in the auction no1ices and a deed of lease was executed by the Devasthanam and the defendants.", "canonical_name": "Devasthanam"}}, {"text": "Devasthanam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15142, "end_char": 15153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sri Amuruvi Perumal Devasthanam v. K. R. Sabapathi Pillai and another(') the plaintiff Devasthanam granted a lease of lands in open auction to the defendant on the terms and conditions set out in the auction no1ices and a deed of lease was executed by the Devasthanam and the defendants.", "canonical_name": "Devasthanam"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Madras thereafter promulgated Ordinance IV of 1952 which restricted the quantum of rent payable by the tenants to the landlords."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16388, "end_char": 16393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 8, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17097, "end_char": 17113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case a lease was executed on January 8, 194 7 in respect of agricultural land situated in an area which on partition of India fell within West Pakistan."}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18460, "end_char": 18466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18479, "end_char": 18503, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18548, "end_char": 18572, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18664, "end_char": 18688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_346_353_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "SHAH DHANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL v.\n\nDAUCHAND VIRCHAND SHROFF AND OlllERS\n\nMarch 1, 1968\n\n(J.C. SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT ANDG. K. MITTER, JJ.) Bombay Rents Hotel and Lddging House Rates Control Act, 1947-Ss. 12(1) and 12(3)(b)-Conditions for benefit under.\n\nThe appeJlant was a tenant of the respondent. Havjng fallen into arrears of rent he was given a notice (a) demanding arrears of ront and permitted increases nnder the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and (b) terminating his tenancy in terms of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, Receiving no response to the notice the respondent filed a suit against the appellant. On the first day of the hearing of the suit and during its pendency the appellant deposited part of the arr,.rs in Court but not the full amonnt due. The trial Court passed a decroe against him which was confirmed by the appellate Court.\n\nThe High Court dismissed his revision petition. With special leave he appealed to this Court and urged that (i) he was entitled to the benefit of s. 12(1) of the Act and that (ii) even ifs. 12(3)(b) was applied he was not liable to be ejected.\n\nHELD : (i) Section 12(1) must be read with the Explanation and so read it means that a tenant can only be considered ''to be ready and willing to pay\" if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-s. (2), he makes an aPPlication to the court under subs. (3) of section 11 and hereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified by the court. The readiness and willingness to pay has to be judged in the light of the facts of the case.\n\nWhere as in the present case a suit is filed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears for a period of more than six months and although raising a dispute as to the standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under the Act, the t->nant makes no application in terms of s. 11(3) he cannot claim the protection of s. 12 (1) by merely offering to pay or even paying ail arrears due from him when the court is about to pass a decree against him. [351 H-352 BJ\n\nShah Bho; rai Kuver; i Oil Mills arrd Ginning Factory v. Subbash Cha11dra Yograi Sinha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 159, distinguished.\n\n\n(ii) The case did not come under s. 12(3)(b), To be within the protection of that provision, the tenant must not only pay alt the arrears due from him on the first day of the hearing of the suit, but he must , thereafter continue to pay or tender in court regularly the rent and the\n\npermitted increase till the suit is finally decided. There was a failure on the part of ti>, appellant to pay or tender in court all the amounts which fell due, and he could not therefore get the protection o~ s. I2(3)(b) of the Act. [353 B-El\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 455 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1962 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 150 of 1960.\n\nG. L. S.u1ghi, and B. R. Agarwala, (or the appellant.\n\n0. P. Malhotra and Ravi11der Narain, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, 1. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat passed in a Civil Revision Application arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-appellant to recover possession of certain premises situate in Surat.\n\nThe facts are as follows. The appellant became a tenant of the respondent under a rent note executed on February 27, 1947 whereby rent was fixed at Rs. 40 per month and the tenancy was to be for a period of one year from 22nd February, 1947.\n\nAfter the expiry of the said period, the appellant continued as a monthly tenant on the same terms and conditions as were to be found in the rent note. He fell into arrears of payment of rent and the respondent sued him for eviction some time in 1951.\n\nThe suit was eventually compromised by a petition put in court bearing date September 16, 1952, Under the terms of the compromise, the defendant continued as a tenant from September 1, l 952 .on the terms and conditions of the rent note dated February 27, 1947: the original conditions in respect of rent also continued excepting that the rate was lowered from Rs. 40/- -to quote the words of the compromise-to \"standard rent of Rs. 27\"\n\nand \"'in the matter of taxes and interest also the defendant was to act in accordance with the conditions of the aforesaid rent note.\" Paragraph 2 of the compromise petition contained an account of payments made by the defendant the final result thereof being that it was agreed between the parties that the defendant had paid Rs. 104-5-3 \"which amount was to be reimbursed by the plaintiff to the defendant when accounting the future payment of rent.\" It should be noted here that according to the rent note of 194 7 the tenant had agreed to pay the monthly rent of Rs. 40 together with interest at Rs. 0-12-0 per cent per annum in respect of any balance due for rent.\n\nEven after the compromise, the defendant fell in arrears again. The only payments made thereafter up to the institution of the second suit out of which the present proceedings ha\\'e arisen were a sum of Rs. 250 on July 19, 1954 and Rs. 200 on March 17. 1955.\n\nThe defendant did not make any payment to the plaintiff in respect of the permitted increases under the Bombay Rents, Hotel\n\nand Lodging House Rates Control Act, 194 7 from the I st cf April. 1954; neither did he pay the taxes agreed upon.\n\nThe plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant on April 18, 1955 demanding the arrears of rent and permitted increases in terms of the said Act and also terminating the tenancy of the defendant with effect from May 31, 1955 in terms of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice was received by the detendant on April 21, 1955.\n\nNo reply was sent thereto nor was any payment made to the plaintiff. The suit for ejectment was filed on March 15, 1956 the ground thereof as laid in the plaint being that the defendant was in arrears of payment of rent and permitted increases aitd as such not entitled to the pro.tection of the Act. In paragraph 6 of the plaint the dues under various heads were specified showing the arrears of rent, increases permitted thereon, interest in terms of the rent note and taxes for three years. It was pleaded by the defendant .in the written statement that rent at Rs. 27 had been fixed by the court without going into the merits of the case and that standard rent or reasonable rent of the property in suit had to be fixed first and a preliminary issue in that respect should be framed.\n\nThe defendant did not admit the claim to the arrears as laid in paragraph 6 of the plaint.\n\nHe also pleaded that the notice of ejectment was not a valid one as the tenancy was to be reckoned in terms of the Gujarati calendar and not the Gregorian calendar.\n\nThe date fixed for settlement'of issues was September 3, 1956 which can be taken to be the date of the first hearing of the suit for the purposes of the Act. On that day the defendant deposited in court a sum of Rs. 1,000.\n\nThereafter the defendant .made a deposit of asum of Rs. 150 on February 25, 1957. The suit was decreed by the trial Judge on March 25, 1957. The trial Judge after considering the evidence on record determined the standard rent of the premises at Rs. 27, exclusive of the permitted increasts and water tax and sanitary tax, payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.\n\nHolding that the defendant had not complied with section 12(3)(b) of the Act he passed a decree for eviction. The defendant went in appeal to the District Judge, Surat.\n\nHe raised no contention even at the hearing of the appeal either in regard to the standard rent of the premises or in regard to interest on arrears of rent or municipal taxes or permitted increases.\n\nThe finding 'of the trial Judge that the standard rent of the premises exclusive of permitted increases and water tax and sanitary tax was Rs. 27/- per month was not challenged by the defendant.\n\nNor was any question raised as to the finding that the defendant was liable to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 123-4-0 as and by way of interest on arrears of rent, a sum of Rs. 81 as and by way of water tax and sanitary tax for a period of three years prior to the date of the suit and a sum of R,. 2-1-9 per month as and by way of permitted increases from April 1, 1954.\n\nThe point regarding the validity of the notice of ejectment was however raised fa the appeal. According to the judgment of the High Court, \"the only contention urged\n\nA ,\n\nbefore the learned Assistant Judge was, whether the defendant had or had not complied with the requirements of section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act.\" The Assistant Judge concluded that there had been no compliance with that section and upheld the decree for eviction.\n\nIn revision three contentions were raised before the High Court, namely, (1) as to the validity of the notice of ejectment;\n\n(2) whether s. 12(3)(a) or 12(3)(b) of the Act applied; and ( 3) whether the defendant was entitled to protection under s. 12(1) of the Act. The High Court held that it was not open to the tenant to raise the question of the validity of the notice in a revision application. Moreover, there was no substance in it as the compromise petition expressly recorded that the tenancy in terms of it should commence on September 1, 1952. With regard to the second question the High Court held that \"it was ' common ground between the parties before the Assistant Judge that the case of the defendant fell within section 12(3) (b) of the Rent Act.\" The learned Judge of the High Court noted :\n\n(a) The trial Judge turned down the applicability of s. 12(3)(a) of .the Act holding that the defendant had disputed the municipal taxes and permitted increases;\n\n(b) The conditions under s. 12(3) (b) of the Act were not fulfilled;\n\n(c) No contention about the applicability of 12(3)(a) was raised before the Assistant Judge in appeal and he therefore did not go into the question at all; and\n\n( d) The conditions necessary for the applicability of s. 12(3 )(a) were not present, as besides the amount of Rs. 27 mentioned in the compromise petition, the tenant had to pay other sums not due from him every month.\n\nThe High Court further found that after the first date of hearing of the suit on September 3, 1956 rent of the premises which fell due on !st October 1956, !st November 1956, !st December 1956, !st January 1957, !st February 1957 and 1st March, 1957 remained unpaid on March 25, 1957 when the suit was disposed of. As the defendant did not pay or deposit .in court regularly the amount of standard rent which became due on the aforesaid dates barring the lst\"of March 1957 (taking into account the deposit of Rs. 150 on February 25, 1957) there was default on the part of the defendant attracting the operation of s. 12(3)(b) of the Act.\n\n350 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n\nThe High Coun turned down the contention based on A s. 12(1) of the Act.\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellant raised two points, namely :\n\n( 1) The provisions of s. 12( 1) of the Act were applicable throughout the hearing of the suit and down to B the date of the final hearing. If at that stage it was found that the defendant had paid up all arrears due from him he could not be ejected.\n\n(2) Even applying s. 12{3)(b) there was no default on the part of the defendant which would render him liable to eviction.\n\nIn order to appreciate the first contention it is necessary to set out section 12 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time :\n\n\"12( 1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so Jong as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of tliis Act.\n\n(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section I 06 of the Transfer of Property At, 1882.\n\n(3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession.\n\n(b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any suit, if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the court.\n\nt 4) Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit.\n\nExplanurwn.-ln any case where tnere is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under sub-section ( 3) of Section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court.\" Learned counsel drew our attention to a judgment of this Court in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Supbash Chandra Yograj Sinha('). There the landlord had filed a suit for possession of the premises on April 25, 1957, the period of tenancy fixed under the rent note having expired on March 14,\n\n1957. Under s. 6 of the Act a notification was issued applying Part II of the Act to the area where the property was situate.\n\nThe appellants claimed protection of s. 12 of the Act and the main question which engaged the attention of this Court was, whether by virtue of the fil'St proviso to s. 50 of the Act, all the provisions in Part II including s. 12 were made expressly applicable to all suits; and secondly, whether by virtue of s. 12(1) of the Act the suit was rendered incompetent. This Court turned down the contention of the respondent that the operation of s. 12( 1) was limited to suits filed after it came into force in a particular area and observed that under s. 12(1) the landlord was not to be entitled to recover possession and the point of time when the sub-section would operate was when the decree for recovery of possession would have to be passed.\n\nIt appears to us that there is no substance in the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant. Section 12(1) must be read with the Explanation and so read it means that a 1enant can only be considered \"to be ready and willing to pay\" if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the court under subs. (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of\n\n(l) [1962) 2 S.C.R. 159.\n\nrent or permitted increases speciljed by the court.\n\nWe have already noted that the tenant made no payment within the period of one month of the notice of ejectment and although in his written statementhe raised a dispute about the standard rent he made'no application in terms of s. 11(3) of the Act. The readiness and willingness to pay has therefore to Ile judged in the light of the facts of the case.\n\nWhere as here a suit is filed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears for a period of more than 6 months and although raising a dispute as to the standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under the Act, the tenant makes no application in terms of s. 11(3) he cannot claim the protection of s. 12(1) by merely offering to pay or even paying all arrears due from him when the court is about to pass a decree against him.\n\nIn Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai(') it was pointed out thats. 12(1) of the Act applied to a tenant who continued to remain in occupation even after the expiry ofthe contractual tenancy so long as he paid or was ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases. The. protection was howsoever available to a tenant subject . to the provisions of s. 13 .and to the limitations contained ins. 12(2) and s. 12(3)(a) of the Act.\n\nIn Mrs. Manorama Masurekar v. Mrs. Dhanlaxmi G. Shah and another(') rent was in arrears for a period of more than six months and the tenant neglected to make payment of the same within one month of the notice under s. 12(2). There the rent was payable by the month and there was no dispute regarding the amount of the rent. It was held that if the conditions of sub-s. (3)(a) of s. 12 were satisfied the tenant could not claim any protection from eviction by tendering the arrears of rent after the expiry of one month from the service of notice under sub-s. (2). It was observed :\n\n\"It is immaterial whether the tender was made before or after the institution of the suit.\n\nIn a case falling within sub-s. (3)(a), the tenant must be dealt with under the special provisions of sub-s. (3)(a), and he cannot claim any protection from eviction under the general provisions of sub-s. (l).\"\n\nAs already noted, if sub-s. (3)(a) is not attracted, the tenant, if he is in arrears, cannot sit quiet and offer to pay all the amount due from him at the time of the hearing of the suit so as to get the protection of ;;, 12(1). To be within the protection of subs. (1) where he raises a dispute about the standard rent payable, he must make an application to the court under sub-s. (3) of s. 11 and thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent and permitted\n\n\n(2) [1967] I S.C.R. 135.\n\nincreases, if any, specified in the order made by the Court. If he does not approach. the court under s. 11 (3), it is not open to him thereafter to claim the protection of s. 12(1).\n\nThe case clearly does not come within s. 12(3)(b).\n\nTo be within the protection of that provision, the tenant must not only pay all the arrears due from him on the first day of hearing of the suit, but he must thereafter continue to pay or tender in court regularly the rent and the permitted increases till the suit is finally decided. Before the date of the suit, the appellant was entitled to a credit of Rs. 104-5-3; the total payihents up to the date of the first hearing including the sum of Rs. 1,000 come to Rs. 1,554-5-3, The. amounts due from him. up to that 'date were:\n\n(a) rent at the rate of Rs. 27 per month for 48 months.\n\nRs. 1296-0-0\n\n(b) permitted increases from 1-4-54 to 1-9-56. 61-3-9\n\n(c) taxes. 81-0-0\n\n(d) Interest on arrears at 9% p.a. 123-3-0\n\nmaking a total of Rs. 1561-6-9\n\nMoreover, there was failure on the part of the appellant to pay or tender in court the amounts which fell due from the 1st of October 1956 to the 1st of March,\n\n1957. Thus, leaving out of consideration the question of costs awarded against him under the decree, the appellant cannot get the protection under s. 12(3)(b) of the Act. A faint attempt was made to raise the pdint about the invalidity or the notice of ejectment on the plea that the same had to comply with s. 12(2) of the Act. This is clearly fallacious as the said section merely lays down the manner in which a notice of demand of standard rent and permitted increases has to be made.\n\nThe contentions raised on behalf of the appellants are therefore without any merits and the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "SHAH DHANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAH DHANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAUCHAND VIRCHAND SHROFF AND OlllERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DALICHAND VIRCHAND SHROFF AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH DHANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL v.\n\nDAUCHAND VIRCHAND SHROFF AND OlllERS\n\nMarch 1, 1968\n\n(J.C. SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT ANDG."}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT ANDG. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lddging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 12(1) and 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lddging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lddging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035, "end_char": 1043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 11(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1951, "end_char": 1956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah Bho", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2096, "end_char": 2104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "351 H-352 BJ\n\nShah Bho; rai Kuver; i Oil Mills arrd Ginning Factory v. Subbash Cha11dra Yograi Sinha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 159, distinguished.", "canonical_name": "Shah Bho"}}, {"text": "rai Kuver", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "351 H-352 BJ\n\nShah Bho; rai Kuver; i Oil Mills arrd Ginning Factory v. Subbash Cha11dra Yograi Sinha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 159, distinguished."}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2184, "end_char": 2203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2255, "end_char": 2266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. L. S.u1ghi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2964, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. S.u1ghi, and B. R. Agarwala, (or the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2983, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. S.u1ghi, and B. R. Agarwala, (or the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3022, "end_char": 3033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and Ravi11der Narain, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Ravi11der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3038, "end_char": 3054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and Ravi11der Narain, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, 1."}}, {"text": "Surat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3404, "end_char": 3409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat passed in a Civil Revision Application arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-appellant to recover possession of certain premises situate in Surat."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40 per month and the tenancy was to be for a period of one year from 22nd February, 1947."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3984, "end_char": 4002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was eventually compromised by a petition put in court bearing date September 16, 1952, Under the terms of the compromise, the defendant continued as a tenant from September 1, l 952 .on the terms and conditions of the rent note dated February 27, 1947: the original conditions in respect of rent also continued excepting that the rate was lowered from Rs."}}, {"text": "September 1, l 952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4080, "end_char": 4098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was eventually compromised by a petition put in court bearing date September 16, 1952, Under the terms of the compromise, the defendant continued as a tenant from September 1, l 952 .on the terms and conditions of the rent note dated February 27, 1947: the original conditions in respect of rent also continued excepting that the rate was lowered from Rs."}}, {"text": "February 27, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4151, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was eventually compromised by a petition put in court bearing date September 16, 1952, Under the terms of the compromise, the defendant continued as a tenant from September 1, l 952 .on the terms and conditions of the rent note dated February 27, 1947: the original conditions in respect of rent also continued excepting that the rate was lowered from Rs."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250 on July 19, 1954 and Rs."}}, {"text": "March 17. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5260, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 on March 17."}}, {"text": "and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant on April 18, 1955 demanding the arrears of rent and permitted increases in terms of the said Act and also terminating the tenancy of the defendant with effect from May 31, 1955 in terms of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant on April 18, 1955 demanding the arrears of rent and permitted increases in terms of the said Act and also terminating the tenancy of the defendant with effect from May 31, 1955 in terms of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act."}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel\n\nand Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel\n\nand Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5836, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice was received by the detendant on April 21, 1955."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for ejectment was filed on March 15, 1956 the ground thereof as laid in the plaint being that the defendant was in arrears of payment of rent and permitted increases aitd as such not entitled to the pro.tection of the Act."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6944, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date fixed for settlement'of issues was September 3, 1956 which can be taken to be the date of the first hearing of the suit for the purposes of the Act."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "150 on February 25, 1957."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the trial Judge on March 25, 1957."}}, {"text": "section 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge, Surat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7637, "end_char": 7658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant went in appeal to the District Judge, Surat."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8414, "end_char": 8427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-1-9 per month as and by way of permitted increases from April 1, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9403, "end_char": 9420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, there was no substance in it as the compromise petition expressly recorded that the tenancy in terms of it should commence on September 1, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9596, "end_char": 9609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9730, "end_char": 9741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9865, "end_char": 9873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10905, "end_char": 10916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11407, "end_char": 11412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11584, "end_char": 11594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13850, "end_char": 13860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 25, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14200, "end_char": 14214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the landlord had filed a suit for possession of the premises on April 25, 1957, the period of tenancy fixed under the rent note having expired on March 14,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "March 14,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14282, "end_char": 14297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the landlord had filed a suit for possession of the premises on April 25, 1957, the period of tenancy fixed under the rent note having expired on March 14,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14305, "end_char": 14309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14457, "end_char": 14462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14644, "end_char": 14649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 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{"document_id": "1968_3_34_40_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MADAN LAL AAM CHANDRA DAGA ETC. v.\n\nSfATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 5, 1968\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S, BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.j B\n\nPractice and Procedure-Criminal appeti/-Offtnc• o' cheatlng--0/ftr by accused to return 1noney if sentence 'M'OS rtduct!d-Higlt Court willing to consider-Propriety.\n\nThe three appellants were a partner, munim and clerk of the R. R. firm and were closely related to one another. In the course of their deolings with. the J. R. firm, who were Bankers and CoinmisMon Ajents, the appellants were alleged to have, inlla!ed the invoices of goods drawn up exaggerated lmndies, and borrowed money from the J. R. finii on the security of such invoices and hundks. The J. R. firm came to know 1he fact! when the hundios were not honoured; but before the hundies were tendered to the R. R. firm, its partners were declared inlolvenL 'lbe\n\nppellants were charged with the offence of cheatinJI the J. R. firm. In the High Court, the partner offered to pay his sbaro of the losses of tbe J. R. firm if the sente11ee passed on him by the trial court was reduced. 1be High Court adjourned the appeal to enable him to deposit the money\n\nbut did not. reduce the sentence though it recovered the fine imposed from the money. deposited.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that : (I) there was no evidence against the clerk; (2) the High Court should have , reduced the smtence; and (3) the partner and munim would pay to the J. R. firm tbe amounts wrongly realised by them and this Court may reduce the aenteru:e.\n\nHELD : (I) As regards the clerk there was nothing to show that he took prut in the negotiations with the J. R. firm, or that any r-ntation was made by him to that firm, or thaJ he made the inflated invoices and hundies.\n\nThe only evidence against htm was (a) that he wrote some invoices which were not inflated, (b) that he took to the J. R. firm, and (c) that he drew up some pay-in-slips on behalf of the J. R. firm.\n\nIn the absence of a charge of conspiracy, the evidenal was not relevant and F the clerk could not be held guilty of the offence of cheating. [38 A-Fl\n\n(2) It is very wtong for courts to enter into a barpin with the accused by which money is recovered for the complainant through their agency.\n\nOffences should be tried and punished according to the guilt of the accused, and if any leniency is to be shown in the 'sentence it should be on the faots of the case.\n\nThe High Court should not have agn:ed to consider lhe question of sentence and the offer of the accused in this Court could ltot also be accep ed. [39 E--GJ\n\n( 3) The sentences were however reduced, because, but for the supuvening ilsolvency, the ac:Cused might have paid back the money as they had done in the past. [39 HJ\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 99 to 104 of 1964.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March l 0, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals\n\nMADAN LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Hidayatul/a/1, /.) 35\n\nNos. 1323 to 1325 of 1962 and 1073 to 1075 of 1962 respectively.\n\nNurudclin Ahmed, G. L. Sanghi and 0. C. Marhur, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for the complainants (in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. . This judgment shall govern the disposal of C Criminal Appeals Nos. 99-104 of 1964.\n\nThese appeals arise from a number of criminal prosecutions started against four persons for cheating. In the original court there were as many as nine cases filed against them which were tried simultaneously, three of the same kind being tried together, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result of the trial the lirst D and the fourth accused were acquitted. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were convicted.\n\nThey were sentenced in the aggregate to rigorous imprisonment for two years and were imposed fines lotalling Rs. 15,000 each.\n\nThe convicted accused appealed to the High Court.\n\nThe State Government also appealed against the acquittal of accused No. 4. The High Court maintained the E conviction and sentences qf accused Nos. 2 and 3 and further set aside the acquittal of accused No. 4 who on conviction was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years but no fine was imposed on him.\n\nThe convicted accused have now filed these appeals by special leave.\n\nThe case started on tlie complaint of one Bansilal who was a partner in a firm Jawarmal Ramkaran of Kalbadevi, Bombay.\n\nIt had five or six partners. This firm deals as Bankers and Commission Agepts.\n\nThe accused are connected with another .firm the name of which is Ramnarayan _Rajmal Rathi. The t\n\naccused ( Laxminarayan Ramchandra) and the second accused (Murlidhar Daga) were partners of this firm and were doing business at Jhaveri Bazar, Bombay. The third accused Motilal, who is the brother of accused No. 2 was working as a Muilim in the firm.\n\nAccused No. 4, Madan Lal, is a nephew of accused Nos. 2 and 3 and was working as a clerk.\n\nThe third firm which is involved in the narration of facts was called Satyanarayan Shymsunder Firm at Tejpur, Assam.\n\nAccused No. 4 is a partner of that firm. In the High Court the first firm is shortly described as J. R. Firm. the second as R. R. Firm and 'the , third as S. S. Firm.\n\nWe shall adhere to these abbreviations in this judgment.\n\nIt is an _admitted fact that the R. R. Firm had dealings with the J. R. Frrm for several years and had borrowed in the past large sums of money from the J. R. Firm. In September, 1959 accused No. 3 approached Bansilal representing that the R.R'.\n\nFirm had tci supply cloth to certain constituents in Assam and that the R.R. Firm needed money for this pu1pose.\n\nAccused No. 3 offered to the J .R. Firm a commission of 2 as. on every Rs. 100 and 6t per cent interest. It appears that Bansilal wanted that some security should be furnished and accused No. 3 promised that the railway receipts, invoices and .the hundies drawn upon the S.S. Firm would be handed over as security.\n\nFor a time things went on quite regularly and honestly.\n\nAs many as 110 hundies and railway receipts were .tendered and the liability was also met.\n\nThis involved a sum of no less than Rs. 1,20,000. .Later, however, the R.R. Firm began to inflate its invoices and to draw hundies for exaggerated amounts. When these hundies and the invoices reached the S.S. Firm they were returned. Thy hundies and the railway receipts were then returned and .the Bank got back the goods from the railway. authorities.\n\nThe parcels were opened and surveyed.\n\nT t was found that the goods represented by the invoices were not in the parcels and that cloth very much less in value was actually despatched. In other words, it was apparent that the RR. Firm was inflating the invoices and drawing up exaggeraed hundies although cloth which was being sent was very much less in value. In other words, the drawing of the money on the security of the invoice& and hundies from the J.R. Firm was an act of cheati\"ng pure and simple because if the J.R. Firm knew that the invoices and hundies were worthless or at any rate not of sufficient worth they would not have advanced such large sums of money to the R.R.\n\nFinn. It ffi\\lY be mentioned here that in this way 40 invoices and\n\nhundis were found to be inflated and they invofved a sum of Rs. 1, 10,000 or thereabouts.\n\nThe matter might not have come to a head but for an event which made the R.R. Firm incompetent even to pay the hundies if tendered .to them. A . petition in insolvency was filed against them and they were declared insolvent on December 30, 1959.\n\nThe first hundi and invoice which was rejected by the S.S. Firm was as far back as October 8, 1959. Although the R.R. Finn wrote to .the J.R. Firm that the hundies may be tendered to them for payment no action appears to have been taken. Jn this way\" the offence of cheating which really arose when the inflated if,. voices and hundier were tend.red representing not the full value in tenns of bales was made out.\n\nAccustd Nos. 2 and 3, 'vho were partner and Muni.m, respectively were held to be responsible for this cheating.\n\nAccused. No. 1 was acquitted because he was only a financing partner and had no knowledge about .these\n\nMADAN LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Hidayatul/ah, /.) 37\n\nhappenings.\n\nHis acquittal was allowed to remain because th~ State did not appeal against his acquittal. Accused No. 4, who\n\nwas only a clerk, was also acquitted by the court of trial on the ground that he had made no representation to the J. R. Firm and thus was not guilty of any offence. It may be stated here that no charge of conspiracy was made. If it had been, other considerations might have applied.\n\nSince accused No. 4 was directly charged with cheating some representation on his behalf had to be made out. It is on this point that the court o[ trial aiid the High Court have differed, .the court of trial having held that there was no such representation and the High Court, taking the view, on evidence, which we shall consider presently, that accused No. 4 must be held to be equally guilty.\n\nIn this appeal it is practically admitted that the offence was committed although Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed described it as rechnical because (a) Bansilal knew what was being done, (b) this ruse was adopted so that the other partners of the J. R .. firm may not object, and ( c) but for the intervention of inso!Vency the hundies if they had been presented for payment to the RR Firm would have been .met. He draws our attention to the fact tha'. as many as 110 invoices and hundies were regular and also met by the R.R. Firm. He pleads for a mitigation of the sentence on this ground.\n\nAs regards accused No. 4, Mr.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed submits .that his case has been wrongly viewed by the, High Court which has read too much into his actions and has. thus erroneously held that he was responsible for cheating the I.R. Firm.\n\nMr. Nuruddin Ahmed also draws our attention to what the High Court did during the hearing of the appeal. Jt appears that it was, represented to the High Court that accused No .. 2 was willing to bring the money in payment of his share of the losses caused to the J.R. Firm. The High Court adopted an unusual procedure by adjourning the appeal and affording accused No. 2 an opportunity of tendering his share of the amount.\n\nAccµsed No. 2 brought a sum of Rs. 35,000 and deposited it in Court. It appears from the High Court judgment that it had assured his counsel that the question of reduction of sentence would be heard after the amount was deposited.\n\nWhen the amouRt was deposited the matter was heard again.\n\nThe High.\n\nCourt found it difficult to reduce the sentence. It returned the balance of the amount after retaining the gross amount of fine . :mp<ised upcin accused No. 2 in the case. Mr. Nuruddin .Ahmed contends thai the High Court should have reduced the sentence . and taken over the money which had been deposited fo.r payment to ttie complaiiiant. He contends also that the High Court was. in error in deducting the amount of fine when no qurion of reduction of sentence was to be considered. We shall say something 'ab<iut the procedure adopted in the High-Court preserttly.\n\nWe may .begin first by considering the case of the fourth ac:cused. Evidence shows .that he was a mere cl.erk in the R.R. firm.\n\nNo doubt he is a nephew of accused Nos. 2 and 3 but there is nothing to show that he took any part in the negotiations or in .the making out of the inflated invoices and hundies. We have already said that no charge of conspiracy was made and his action as a mere clerk is capable of a different inteJ1lretation untess we can attribute to him an intention to cheat the J .R.\n\nFirm as did the other accused, On this part there is no evidence whatever. The only evidence is that being a clerk he wrote sl>me of the invoices and took to the J .R. Firm. There is also evidence that at the instance of the J.R. Firm he drew up some pay-inslips which were later submitted, not by him, but by the J.R: Firm to the Bank with the hundies. In our judgment this evidence falls short of the requirements of the law. No representation was made by the fourth accused to induce the J.R. Firm to part with the funds. If a charge of conspiracy had been made this evidence might have been relevant under s. 10 of the Evidence Act but as no charge of conspiracy was made the charge of cheating by the fourth accused had. to be made out on good and proper evidence. There is nothing to show that the fourth accused knew that the hundies were not going to be met or that the invoices were in fact inflated.\n\nIn the absence of any such proof it is diflicult to hold (as did thei High Court) that accused No. 4 was also guilty of the offence of cheating. None of the invoices which were written by the fourth accused was found to be inflated.\n\nThe bad invoices were apparently written by someone else and he was only instrumental in taking them to the J :R. Firm as the servant of the R.R. Firm. Even if he wrote some of the bad invoices or the pay-in-slips some more evidence was needed before it could be held that he was instrumental in cheating the J.R. Firm. On these grounds he was entitled to an acquittal and the High Court erred in setting it aside in the apr.al of the State Government.\n\nWe accordingly allow his appeal and order his acquittal. He need' not surrender his bail which was granted by this Court. The bail bond is cancelled.\n\nThis brings. us to the question of the sentence of the remain- G ing accused, viz,., accused Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nFrom what we have said above it is quite clear that these accused seem now to admit that they were guilty of cheating the J. R. Firm. Their case is that Bansilal knew that the invoices and the hundies were inflated, but that is no excuse because Bansilal was not the only person involved. There was the J. R. Firm who as Bankers H and Commission Agents would never have lent such large sums of money if they knew that the invoices and hundies did not. represent the proper villue of the goods. It is also to be noticed that\n\nMADAN LAL v. MAHARASHTRA (Hidaj'atul/ah, J.) 39\n\nBansilal denies alJ this and the suggestion of the second and the third accused that he knew everything is merely an assertion. It appears to us that having found a financier who was willing to lend money on the security of invoices and hundies, the second and the third accused engineered a plan under which a larger sum could be borrowed than what could be if the true facts were known.\n\nIn other words, they devised a method under which inflated invoices and false hundies would enable them to get at larger loarts than the actual value of the goods represented.\n\nThere was thus cheating and their conviction must be held to be proper. We do not think that the offence can be described as merely technical. It was quite clearly a bold attempt .to ge.t more money through false documents which were to form secu rity for the loans. It is true that in some way they might even have paid this money if the hundies had been tendered to them but there is nothing to show that they were in a position to meet the liability because the insolvency which supervened clearly indicates that they were not in possession of funds. It is their insolvency or lack of funds which must have induced them to adopt this method.\n\nHaving, therefore, held that the offence against them is prov ed we are now to consider the question of sentence in the case.\n\nWe pointed out that the High Court adopted an unusual .course in the case. In fact a similar course was suggested to us at the hearing by submitting that we should increase the fine and reduce the sentence to the period und.'!rgone.\n\nIn other words, the accused were adopting the same method which they did in the High Court, namely, that they will pay the amount which they have wrongly realised from the J.R. Firm and this may be taken in mitigation of the punishment imposed on them. In our opinion, it is very wrong for a court to enter into a bargain of this character Offences should be tried and punished according to the guilt of the accused. If the. Court thinks that leniency can be shown on the facts of the case it may impose a lighter sen tence.\n\nBut the court should never be a party to a bargain by which money is recovered for the complainant through their agency.\n\nWe do not approve of the action adopted by the High Court and for the same reason we would refrain from accepting the suggestion of Mr. Niµ11ddin Ahmed that we should inerease the fine with a view to reducing the sentence of imprisonment.\n\nWe, however, think that in this case, but for the supervening insolvency the accused might have paid back the money to the J .R. Finn. The fact that they were on this occasion and also in the High Court willing to pay shows that if the matter had not been concluded against them by .the insolvency they might even have attempted to satisfy the J.R. Firm. They were influenced\n\nby the ease with which they could borrow money and therefore tempted to depart from the strict path of honesty to meander into an offence of cheating. Taldng this into consideration we think that although we cannot condone such offences there is room for reduction of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon these two appellants. We reduce their sentence to one year's rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe sentence of fine imposed on them shall stand. With this modification the appeal of the second and the third accused will stand dismissed. Their bill is cancelled and they shall , urrender forthwith.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nSentence reduced and Appeal dismisseil..", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "MADAN LAL AAM CHANDRA DAGA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADAN LAL RAM CHANDRA DAGA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SfATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SfATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 5, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSfATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nFebruary 5, 1968\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S, BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.j B\n\nPractice and Procedure-Criminal appeti/-Offtnc• o' cheatlng--0/ftr by accused to return 1noney if sentence 'M'OS rtduct!d-Higlt Court willing to consider-Propriety."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "J. R. firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal to this Court it was contended that : (I) there was no evidence against the clerk; (2) the High Court should have , reduced the smtence; and (3) the partner and munim would pay to the J. R. firm tbe amounts wrongly realised by them and this Court may reduce the aenteru:e.\n\nHELD : (I) As regards the clerk there was nothing to show that he took prut in the negotiations with the J. R. firm, or that any r-ntation was made by him to that firm, or thaJ he made the inflated invoices and hundies."}}, {"text": "Nurudclin Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3058, "end_char": 3073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nurudclin Ahmed, G. L. Sanghi and 0.", "canonical_name": "Nurudclin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3075, "end_char": 3087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nurudclin Ahmed, G. L. Sanghi and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Marhur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3092, "end_char": 3104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nurudclin Ahmed, G. L. Sanghi and 0."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for the complainants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for the complainants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, J. .", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3726, "end_char": 3752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bansilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case started on tlie complaint of one Bansilal who was a partner in a firm Jawarmal Ramkaran of Kalbadevi, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Jawarmal Ramkaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case started on tlie complaint of one Bansilal who was a partner in a firm Jawarmal Ramkaran of Kalbadevi, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Kalbadevi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4529, "end_char": 4538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case started on tlie complaint of one Bansilal who was a partner in a firm Jawarmal Ramkaran of Kalbadevi, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4540, "end_char": 4546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case started on tlie complaint of one Bansilal who was a partner in a firm Jawarmal Ramkaran of Kalbadevi, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Ramnarayan _Rajmal Rathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused are connected with another .firm the name of which is Ramnarayan _Rajmal Rathi."}}, {"text": "Laxminarayan Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The t\n\naccused ( Laxminarayan Ramchandra) and the second accused (Murlidhar Daga) were partners of this firm and were doing business at Jhaveri Bazar, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar Daga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The t\n\naccused ( Laxminarayan Ramchandra) and the second accused (Murlidhar Daga) were partners of this firm and were doing business at Jhaveri Bazar, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Motilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third accused Motilal, who is the brother of accused No."}}, {"text": "Madan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, Madan Lal, is a nephew of accused Nos."}}, {"text": "J. R. Frrm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5482, "end_char": 5492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is an _admitted fact that the R. R. Firm had dealings with the J. R. Frrm for several years and had borrowed in the past large sums of money from the J. R. Firm."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5716, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firm had tci supply cloth to certain constituents in Assam and that the R.R. Firm needed money for this pu1pose."}}, {"text": "R.R.\n\nFinn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7276, "end_char": 7286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the drawing of the money on the security of the invoice& and hundies from the J.R. Firm was an act of cheati\"ng pure and simple because if the J.R. Firm knew that the invoices and hundies were worthless or at any rate not of sufficient worth they would not have advanced such large sums of money to the R.R.\n\nFinn."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petition in insolvency was filed against them and they were declared insolvent on December 30, 1959."}}, {"text": "S.S. Firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7742, "end_char": 7751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first hundi and invoice which was rejected by the S.S. Firm was as far back as October 8, 1959."}}, {"text": "October 8, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7771, "end_char": 7786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first hundi and invoice which was rejected by the S.S. Firm was as far back as October 8, 1959."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9262, "end_char": 9276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal it is practically admitted that the offence was committed although Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed described it as rechnical because (a) Bansilal knew what was being done, (b) this ruse was adopted so that the other partners of the J. R .. firm may not object, and ( c) but for the intervention of inso!Vency the hundies if they had been presented for payment to the RR Firm would have been .met.", "canonical_name": "Nurudclin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9787, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, Mr.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed submits .that his case has been wrongly viewed by the, High Court which has read too much into his actions and has.", "canonical_name": "Nurudclin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "Nuruddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10896, "end_char": 10904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nuruddin .Ahmed contends thai the High Court should have reduced the sentence .", "canonical_name": "Nurudclin Ahmed"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12404, "end_char": 12409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Niµ11ddin Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16584, "end_char": 16599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not approve of the action adopted by the High Court and for the same reason we would refrain from accepting the suggestion of Mr. Niµ11ddin Ahmed that we should inerease the fine with a view to reducing the sentence of imprisonment."}}, {"text": "J .R. Finn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16811, "end_char": 16821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, however, think that in this case, but for the supervening insolvency the accused might have paid back the money to the J .R. Finn."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_354_358_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "RAM CHARAN & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 1, 1968\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, J. M. SUELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure (Act S of 1898), s. 164-Smttment of wilness recorded under section-Evidence given by him in Court-Wtig/11 <Jf.\n\nThe statements of eye witnesses to a murder were recorded under s. 164, Criminar Procedure Code, and a certificate waa appended to each of the statements to the effect, that the deponent waa warned that he was making the statement before a Magistrate and that it might be used against him.\n\nOn the question as to the weight to be attached to the evidenC< given by the witnesses in court.\n\nHELD : It dld not follow from the endorsement that anv threat was given to the witnesses or that it necessarily made their evidence in court\n\nuspect or less believable. [357 Gl If a witness, in his evidence in court sticks to the .wsion given by him in the statement under s. 164, Cr. P.C. the mere fact that the statement was previously recorded under the section is not suftlcient to discard his <:vidence. The only inferenee that can be drawn is that there was a time\n\nwhen the police thought the witness may change his eviden<1>. The Court, however, ought to receive the evidence with caution. [358 DJ\n\nObservations in Parmanand v. Emperor, A.i.R. 1940 Naa. 340, 344 and In re: Gopisetti Chinna Venkatarubbiah .• I.L.R. [1955] A.P. 633, 639, approved.\n\nObservations contm in Emperor v. Manu Chik, A.I.R. 1938 Patna 290, 295, disapproved.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 17, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1967 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 9 of 1967.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowaja, for the appellants.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.-This appeal by special leave by Ram Charan, Dnlarey and Ram Bux is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, confirming the convictions under. s. 302, read with s. 34, I.P.C. Ram Charan and Dularey were sentenced to death while Ram Bux was sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another. Radhey Shyam had some business in Lucknow, including consulting Sri Pal Singh, Advocate,· P.W. 20, regarding the preparation of a reply to a notice received by him. After the work was finished the four left Lucknow. It appears that Radhey Shyam was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Shankar Singh, and Bachchu Lal was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Surat Singh: Raclhey Shyam carried a leather bag in which he had kept money which he had received as the sale proceeds of jau sold by him in Lucknow. For some reasons which need not be detailed, Shankar Singh and Radhey Shyam went ahead of Surat Singh and Bachchu.\n\nLal, and the distance between them when they came near about the scene of occurrence was, according to Surat Singh, between\n\n1t and 2 furlongs.\n\nWhen Shankar Singh and Radhey Shyam reached near the drain of Rastogi, they met Ram Charan, accused.\n\nRadhey Shyam got down from the cycle and started walking with Ram Charan, while Shankar Singh followed a little behind. Then the attack on Radhey Shyam took place and is described thus by Shankar Singh :\n\n\"When we reached the grove of Durga Maharaj then Ram Bux and Dularey accused were sitting at the well. Then Ram Charan by extending his hands (Kantiya Kar) caught hold of Radhey Shyam and threw him down on his face and after drawing his hands towards his back sat down catching him. Dularey and Ram Bux came up running .. Dularey had a Banka and Ram Bux had a lathi. Ram Charan told Dularey, 'Bring the Banka, why are you delaying it.' Thereupon I cried ou(. Then Dularey gave 5-6-7 Banka blows to Radhey Shyam on his neck. As I was crying so Ram Charan said 'Beat Thakurwa. He will go to the village and tell !hat such and such persons had hacked Radhey Shyam.' At this Ram Bux gave 5-6 Lathi blows to me.\n\nBy that time Surat Singh and Bachoo Mahraj also came there and Rupan also came.'' Surat Singh corroborates. this statement. He says that he saw all this from a distance of H furlongs. Bachchu La], P.W. 7, also corroborates this version. He says that on seeing the attack he and Surat Singh ran towards the scene of occurrence. He further adds that when they were at a distance of about 30-35 paces, the accused ran away. The First Information Report was lodged at the police station four miles from the scene of the occurrence at 17.30 hours by Shanker Singh.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants says that the First Information Report was written much later than the time mentioned above.\n\nHe relies first on the fact that the first page of the First Information Report was written verj closely and the second page written not so closely. . He suggests that the draft W!1$ prepared sometime later and then it was copied into the Register in ' which first information reports are written; the writer having left only two pages for the report to be transcribed wanted to be quite certain that the report would finish in two pages.\n\nThis suggestion is, however, denied by Liaqat Hussain, P.W. 6, who was posted as Head Moharrir at the police station Kakori in\n\n1965. He says that he wrote on the first page of the report closely1 because he wanted that the whole matter should be completed On that page and that there was no other reason; after finishing the first page when he started writing on the second page then he did not write closely as the report had come to an end. He denied the suggestion that two pages were left for writing this report. This explanation seems to be true. The special report of this case was sent, according to this witness, on December 24, 1965, at 7.55 p.m. through Abdul Rashid, Constable, who was called as Court Witness. He says that he delivered the special report at the place of S.S.P. 1 at 9.10 a.m. on December 25,\n\n1965. The special report was sent to S.S.P. D.M., Additional S.P.C.O., S.D.M., anq D.C.R.R.S. on Invoice Book at No. 54 which was exhibited in Court. The learned counsel criticizes his evidence. on the ground that there is .no reason why he should have slept' on the way.\n\nThe reason given by Abdul Rashid for breaking his journey on the way is that the ekka drivers and riksha drivers were charging too much.\n\nIn our view, there is no force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nThe second ground of attack against the First Iilforniation Report is that the report itself discloses that it could not have been dictated by Shanker Singh. He says that Shanker Singh was literate and yet the First Information Report bears his thumb mark.\n\nHe further says' that it mentions the names of the fathers of Radhey Shyam, Ram Charan; Mata Pershad, Dayal, Lallu and Ram Bux, but in cross-examination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the names of Ram Charan's father and Ram Daya)'s father, and also he did not know the name of Ram Bux's father. He,· however, further added in cross-examination that at the time he gave the First Information Report, the names of the fathers of Ram Charan and Ram Dayal were then in his memory.\n\nAnother fact relied on by the learned counsel is that the First Inform11tion Report contains the word \"sazish\" while in crossexamination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the . m, eaning of this word. He urges that looking at all . these circumstances it is clear that the First Information Report was either\n\nwritten at the scene of occurrence after the Investigating Officer had gone there or that a draft was first written on a piece of paper some people supplying the names of the fathers of the various persons and suggesting words.\n\nWe are, however, unable to accede to this contention. It may well be that the chowkidar who accompanied Shanker Singh supplied the name of the father of a pat1icular person and the Head Moharrir may have substituted a word or two of his own, without changing the meaning.\n\nThe Investigating Officer went straightaway to the scene of the occurrence and started investigation. None of these facts, in our opinion, cast doubt on the prosecution story. It may be that Shanker Singh is able to sign but he put his thumb impression not only on the First Information Report but on his statement under s. 164, Cr. P.C., and his statement before the Committing Magistrate. It may be that if was felt safer to have his thumb impression which he could not effectively deny later.\n\nBut the fact that the special report was sent on December 24, 1965, in the evening, dispels any doubt about the fact that the First Information Report was lodged at 5.30 p.m. on December 24, 1965.\n\nDealing with the eye-witnesses, the learned coun&el drew our attentionJo the endorsement which was made by the Magistrate who too down the statements under s. 164, Cr. P.C. Below the statement• is appended a certificate in the following form :\n\n\"Certified that the statement has been made voluntarily.\n\nThe deponent was warned that he is making the . sta1 ement before the 1st class Magistrate and can be used against him. Recorded in my presence. There is no police here.\n\nThe witness did not go out until all the witnesses had given the statement.\"\n\nThis certificate appears below the statements of Shanker Singh, Surat Singh and Bachchu Lal. The learned counsel rightly suggests that the endorsement is not proper. But we are unable to say that it follows from this endorsement that any threat was given to these witnesses or that it necessarily makes the evidence given by the witnesses in Court suspect or less believable,\n\nThe learned counser further relies on the following passage from the judgment of Dhavle J., in Emperor v. Manu Chlk(')\n\n\"There is yet another circumstance which calls for remark, and that is the examiliation of Ladhu and Rebi among other witnesses under s. 164, Criminal P.c.· It was pointed out by Prinsep, J., in the well-known case in Queen Empress v. Jadub Das(') that a statement of a\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1938 Pal 290-295.\n\n(2) 27 Cal. 295.\n\n358 SuPllBMB COUllT llBPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwitness obtained under this section always raises a suspicion that it has not been voluntarily made, and that the section was not intended to enable the police to obtain a statement from some person (in that case it was an incriminating statement) and as it were to put a seal on that statement by sending in that person to a Magistrate practicalJy under custody, to be examined before the judicial inquiry or trial, and therefore compromised in his evidence when judicial proceedings are regularly taken.\" These observations were dissented from by the Andhra Pra desh High Court in In re: Gopisett/ Chinna Venkata Subbiah('}, and Subba Rao, C.J., preferred the following observations of the Nagpur High Coun in Parmanand v. Emperor(\")\n\n\"We are of the opinion that if a statement of a witness is previously recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, it leads to an inference that there was a time when the police thought the witness may change but if the witness sticks to the statement made by him throughout, the mere fact that his statement was pre viously recorded under section 164 will Jiot be sufficient to discard it. The Court, however, ought to receive it with caution and if there are other circumstances on record which lend support to the truth of the evidence of such witness, it can be acted upon.\"\n\nWe agree with Subba Rao, C.J., that the observations of the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court lay down the law correctly.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(I) I.L.R. [19SS] A.P. 633-38. (2} A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 340.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n) • I", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "RAM CHARAN & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM CHARAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nMarch 1, 1968\n\n[S. M. SIKRI, J. M. SUELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminar Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminar Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminar Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1616, "end_char": 1651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 17, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1733, "end_char": 1744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowaja, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. I. Khowaja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowaja, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1785, "end_char": 1798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. 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Ram Charan and Dularey were sentenced to death while Ram Bux was sentenced to imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Dnlarey"}}, {"text": "December 24, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2246, "end_char": 2263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another."}}, {"text": "Shanker Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2329, "end_char": 2342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another.", "canonical_name": "Shanker Singh"}}, {"text": "Radhey Shyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another.", "canonical_name": "Raclhey Shyam"}}, {"text": "Surat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2383, "end_char": 2394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another."}}, {"text": "Bachchu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2399, "end_char": 2410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts in brief are as follows : On December 24, 1965, at about 8 a.m. four persons started fo( Lucknow on two cycles; Shanker Singh and Radhey Shyam were on one cycle and\n\nSurat Singh and Bachchu Lal on another.", "canonical_name": "Bachchu Lal"}}, {"text": "Pal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Radhey Shyam had some business in Lucknow, including consulting Sri Pal Singh, Advocate,· P.W. 20, regarding the preparation of a reply to a notice received by him."}}, {"text": "Shankar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2718, "end_char": 2731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Radhey Shyam was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Shankar Singh, and Bachchu Lal was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Surat Singh: Raclhey Shyam carried a leather bag in which he had kept money which he had received as the sale proceeds of jau sold by him in Lucknow.", "canonical_name": "Shanker Singh"}}, {"text": "Raclhey Shyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2812, "end_char": 2825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Radhey Shyam was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Shankar Singh, and Bachchu Lal was sitting on the carrier of the cycle driven by Surat Singh: Raclhey Shyam carried a leather bag in which he had kept money which he had received as the sale proceeds of jau sold by him in Lucknow.", "canonical_name": "Raclhey Shyam"}}, {"text": "Bachchu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For some reasons which need not be detailed, Shankar Singh and Radhey Shyam went ahead of Surat Singh and Bachchu.", "canonical_name": "Bachchu Lal"}}, {"text": "Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal, and the distance between them when they came near about the scene of occurrence was, according to Surat Singh, between\n\n1t and 2 furlongs.", "canonical_name": "Lallu"}}, {"text": "Rastogi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Shankar Singh and Radhey Shyam reached near the drain of Rastogi, they met Ram Charan, accused."}}, {"text": "Durga Maharaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the attack on Radhey Shyam took place and is described thus by Shankar Singh :\n\n\"When we reached the grove of Durga Maharaj then Ram Bux and Dularey accused were sitting at the well."}}, {"text": "Kantiya Kar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then Ram Charan by extending his hands (Kantiya Kar) caught hold of Radhey Shyam and threw him down on his face and after drawing his hands towards his back sat down catching him."}}, {"text": "Bachoo Mahraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that time Surat Singh and Bachoo Mahraj also came there and Rupan also came.''"}}, {"text": "Rupan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4288, "end_char": 4293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that time Surat Singh and Bachoo Mahraj also came there and Rupan also came.''"}}, {"text": "Bachchu La", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachchu La], P.W. 7, also corroborates this version."}}, {"text": "Liaqat Hussain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5437, "end_char": 5451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suggestion is, however, denied by Liaqat Hussain, P.W. 6, who was posted as Head Moharrir at the police station Kakori in\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "Kakori", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suggestion is, however, denied by Liaqat Hussain, P.W. 6, who was posted as Head Moharrir at the police station Kakori in\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "Abdul Rashid", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special report of this case was sent, according to this witness, on December 24, 1965, at 7.55 p.m. through Abdul Rashid, Constable, who was called as Court Witness."}}, {"text": "December 25,\n\n1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says that he delivered the special report at the place of S.S.P. 1 at 9.10 a.m. on December 25,\n\n1965."}}, {"text": "S.S.P. D.M.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6259, "end_char": 6270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special report was sent to S.S.P. D.M., Additional S.P.C.O., S.D.M., anq D.C.R.R.S. on Invoice Book at No."}}, {"text": "Abdul Rashid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6515, "end_char": 6527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason given by Abdul Rashid for breaking his journey on the way is that the ekka drivers and riksha drivers were charging too much."}}, {"text": "Mata Pershad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further says' that it mentions the names of the fathers of Radhey Shyam, Ram Charan; Mata Pershad, Dayal, Lallu and Ram Bux, but in cross-examination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the names of Ram Charan's father and Ram Daya)'s father, and also he did not know the name of Ram Bux's father."}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further says' that it mentions the names of the fathers of Radhey Shyam, Ram Charan; Mata Pershad, Dayal, Lallu and Ram Bux, but in cross-examination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the names of Ram Charan's father and Ram Daya)'s father, and also he did not know the name of Ram Bux's father."}}, {"text": "Lallu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further says' that it mentions the names of the fathers of Radhey Shyam, Ram Charan; Mata Pershad, Dayal, Lallu and Ram Bux, but in cross-examination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the names of Ram Charan's father and Ram Daya)'s father, and also he did not know the name of Ram Bux's father.", "canonical_name": "Lallu"}}, {"text": "Ram Daya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further says' that it mentions the names of the fathers of Radhey Shyam, Ram Charan; Mata Pershad, Dayal, Lallu and Ram Bux, but in cross-examination Shanker Singh admitted that he did not know the names of Ram Charan's father and Ram Daya)'s father, and also he did not know the name of Ram Bux's father.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dayal"}}, {"text": "Ram Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He,· however, further added in cross-examination that at the time he gave the First Information Report, the names of the fathers of Ram Charan and Ram Dayal were then in his memory.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dayal"}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8620, "end_char": 8626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9150, "end_char": 9156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhavle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10004, "end_char": 10010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we are unable to say that it follows from this endorsement that any threat was given to these witnesses or that it necessarily makes the evidence given by the witnesses in Court suspect or less believable,\n\nThe learned counser further relies on the following passage from the judgment of Dhavle J., in Emperor v. Manu Chlk(')\n\n\"There is yet another circumstance which calls for remark, and that is the examiliation of Ladhu and Rebi among other witnesses under s. 164, Criminal P.c.·"}}, {"text": "Ladhu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10134, "end_char": 10139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we are unable to say that it follows from this endorsement that any threat was given to these witnesses or that it necessarily makes the evidence given by the witnesses in Court suspect or less believable,\n\nThe learned counser further relies on the following passage from the judgment of Dhavle J., in Emperor v. Manu Chlk(')\n\n\"There is yet another circumstance which calls for remark, and that is the examiliation of Ladhu and Rebi among other witnesses under s. 164, Criminal P.c.·"}}, {"text": "Rebi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10144, "end_char": 10148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we are unable to say that it follows from this endorsement that any threat was given to these witnesses or that it necessarily makes the evidence given by the witnesses in Court suspect or less believable,\n\nThe learned counser further relies on the following passage from the judgment of Dhavle J., in Emperor v. Manu Chlk(')\n\n\"There is yet another circumstance which calls for remark, and that is the examiliation of Ladhu and Rebi among other witnesses under s. 164, Criminal P.c.·"}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10177, "end_char": 10183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prinsep", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Prinsep, J., in the well-known case in Queen Empress v. Jadub Das(') that a statement of a\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1938 Pal 290-295."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pra desh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10962, "end_char": 10988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations were dissented from by the Andhra Pra desh High Court in In re: Gopisett/ Chinna Venkata Subbiah('}, and Subba Rao, C.J., preferred the following observations of the Nagpur High Coun in Parmanand v. Emperor(\")\n\n\"We are of the opinion that if a statement of a witness is previously recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, it leads to an inference that there was a time when the police thought the witness may change but if the witness sticks to the statement made by him throughout, the mere fact that his statement was pre viously recorded under section 164 will Jiot be sufficient to discard it."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations were dissented from by the Andhra Pra desh High Court in In re: Gopisett/ Chinna Venkata Subbiah('}, and Subba Rao, C.J., preferred the following observations of the Nagpur High Coun in Parmanand v. Emperor(\")\n\n\"We are of the opinion that if a statement of a witness is previously recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, it leads to an inference that there was a time when the police thought the witness may change but if the witness sticks to the statement made by him throughout, the mere fact that his statement was pre viously recorded under section 164 will Jiot be sufficient to discard it."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11101, "end_char": 11117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations were dissented from by the Andhra Pra desh High Court in In re: Gopisett/ Chinna Venkata Subbiah('}, and Subba Rao, C.J., preferred the following observations of the Nagpur High Coun in Parmanand v. Emperor(\")\n\n\"We are of the opinion that if a statement of a witness is previously recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, it leads to an inference that there was a time when the police thought the witness may change but if the witness sticks to the statement made by him throughout, the mere fact that his statement was pre viously recorded under section 164 will Jiot be sufficient to discard it."}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11231, "end_char": 11242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11244, "end_char": 11267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11494, "end_char": 11505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11816, "end_char": 11833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with Subba Rao, C.J., that the observations of the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court lay down the law correctly."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_359_362_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI ANDO~.\n\nCHADHA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO.\n\nMarch 4, 1968 a\n\n[J, C. SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nMotor Vehicles Act, 1939, s. 68(2) (ww)-P.,.soru doing th• bwinoss of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carrl•d by public carri<rs required by notification under S<ction to takt out /lc<ne<g-Validity of notification and section.\n\n'The respondent was engaged in the busines.'I of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers in Delhi, The Chief CommiMioner, Delhi issued a notification under s. 68(2) (ww) of the Motor Yehic!Q Act, 1939 whereby the respondent and those en23l!ed in similar businas were required to take out licen=. The respondent filed a writ\n\npetition in the Punjab High Court challenging cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) and tho aforesaid notification on various grounds and askin~ for an order quashing the notification. The High Cowt allowed the wnt petition holding that as the rules frame undtt s. 68 can be made only for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV of tho Act, and in Chapter IV there was no substantive provision requiring agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers to take out licences, the lej!islature had no power to enact\n\ncl. (WW) of s. 68(2) authorising the framing of the rules f<t the licensing of sudl agents. The appellants came to this Court with certificate,\n\nHELD : The appeal must be allowed.\n\nSection 68(2) specifically enumerates the matter on which rulea under the ooelion can be made for the purpose of carrying into effect tbe provisions of Chapter IV. Clau5e (ww) of o. 68(2) is an expression of the will of the legislature that rules for the licensing of agents engaj!ed in\n\nthe business of collecting. forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers may be made for the purpose of carryin~ into effect the provisions of Chapter IV. The proposition that the legislature must in the first instance incorporate in the Act a oection requiring a class of persons to take out licences before it can enact a section authorising the mding of rules for such licensing is unsound and must be rejected. Within the limits of their legislative powers, parliament and the State legislatures have plenary powers of legislation and th!')' may. delegate to an executive authority the power to make rules for the licensing of any class of persons.\n\n[360 H-361 C]\n\n[Csse remanded to High Court for considering other contentions raised in the petition.]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil App\\llll No. 466 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1961 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent H Appeal No. 15-D of 1958.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants.\n\nMohan Behari Lal, for the respondent.\n\nL6 Sup, C.L/61!-10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBachawat, J. The respondt carries on the business of col-. lecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers in Delhi. On October 27, 1956,. the. Chief Commissioner, Delhi issued a notification under s. 68(2)(ww) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.\n\nUnder this notification, the respondent and other agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers are required to take out licences.\n\nThe respondent filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court challenging cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) and the aforesaid notification on various grounds and asking for an order quashing the notification. A single Judge of the High Court struck down cl. (ww) and allowed the writ petition. He held that the clause was ultra vires and invalid and therefore the notification issued under it was also invalid.\n\nHis decision was affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nThe appellants have preferred the present appeal from this order after obtaining a certificate from the High Court.\n\nChapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for control of transport vehicles. The chapter contains ss. 42 to\n\n68. Section 68(1) provides that a State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chap. N. Section 68(2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the, foregoing power, rules under the section may be made with respect to all or any of the matters enumerated in •.he various sub-clauses thereof. Clause (ww) of s. 68(2) provides that the State Government may make rules for ''the licensing of agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing of goods carried by public carriers.\" This clause was in8erted in s. 68(2) by Delhi Act No. 5 of 1954 and also later by Central .Act No. 100 Of 1956.\n\nThe High Court held that as the rules framed under s. 68 can made only for the .Purpose of carrying into effect the prov1S1ons of Chap. N, such rules must relate to a substantive provisionof law in the chapter.\n\nAs there was no substantive provision in Chap. N requiring agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers to take out licences, the legislature had no. power to enact cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) authorising the framing of rules for the licensing of such agents.\n\nThe legislature must, in the first #!stance, make a law requiring such agents to take out licences.\n\nAs the legislature did not make such a law, the clause is ultra vires its powers and is invalid.\n\nWe are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Section 68(2) specifically enumerates the matters on which rules under the\n\nCHIEF COMMR. DELHI v. CHADHA MOTOR (Bachawat, !.) 361\n\nsection can be made for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chap. IV. Clause (ww) of s. 68(2) is an expression of the will of the legislature that rules for the licensing of agents engaged in the business of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carr!e; s may be made for the purpo~. of carrying into effect the prov1s10ns of Chap. IV. The propos1t10n that the legislature must in the first instance incorporate in the Act a section requiring a class of persons to take out licences before it can enact a section authorising the making of rules for such licensing is unsound and must be rejected.. Within the limits of their legislative powers, Parliament and the State legislatures have plenary powers of legislation, and they may delegate to an executive authority the power to make rules for the licensing of any class of persons. This law may be open to attack on the ground that it is not on a matter on which the legislature is competent to legislate or on the ground that there is excessive delegation of legislative power.\n\nBut it cannot be struck down on the ground that . the fogislature has made no other provision for licensing in the body of the Act. There is no constitutional prOhibition against the making of a law authorising the making of rules onany topic without the support of another substantive provision of law in the body of the Act. Take Chap. VII of the Motor Vehicles Act dealing with motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India. That chapter contains one section, namely, s. 92. The section provides for the making of rules only. It authl>rises the Central Government to make rules inter a/ia for the grant and authentication of travelling passes, certificates or authorisations to persons temporarily taking motor vehicles out of India to any place outside India and prescribing the conditions subject to which motor vehicles brought temporarily into India from outside India by persons intending to make a temporary stay in India may be possessed and used in India. There is no other substalltive provision of law in Chap. VII or any other Chapter of the Act on the subject of motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India. But the absence of such a substantive provision does not render either s. 92 or the rules made under it invalid.\n\nIf the Central Government frame• rules under s. 92, such rules must be complied' with.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that cl. (ww) of s. 68(2) cannot be struck down on the ground that there is no other substantive provision of law in the body of the Act requiring the taking out of licences.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was suggested that the clause is invalid on the ground that it is a law on a subject on which the\n\nlegisl_ae is not competent to legislte. It was also suggested that 1t 1s bad o_n the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. The High Court has not struck down the clause on either of these grounds. . Nor has the High. Court considered the othct\n\n362 SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS [1968) 3 S.C.ll.\n\ngrounds raised in the petition challenging the validity of the noti A fication dated October 27, 1956. As the High Court has not dealt with the other contentions raised in the petition, the matter must be remanded to the High Court.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court, so that the High Court may deal with it in accordance with law.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this Court.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal 11llowed.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI ANDO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHADHA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHADHA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 4, 1968 a\n\n[J, C. SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 562, "end_char": 570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 747, "end_char": 764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'I of collecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers in Delhi, The Chief CommiMioner, Delhi issued a notification under s. 68(2) (ww) of the Motor Yehic!Q Act, 1939 whereby the respondent and those en23l!ed in similar businas were required to take out licen=. The respondent filed a writ\n\npetition in the Punjab High Court challenging cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of tho Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1057, "end_char": 1078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of tho Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of tho Act"}}, {"text": "Section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1493, "end_char": 1506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of tho Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of tho Act"}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2792, "end_char": 2803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L6 Sup, C.L/61!-10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBachawat, J. The respondt carries on the business of col-."}}, {"text": "October 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 27, 1956,."}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)(ww)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3515, "end_char": 3523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4036, "end_char": 4077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 42 to\n\n68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 68(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Chapter N of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The propos1t10n that the legislature must in the first instance incorporate in the Act a section requiring a class of persons to take out licences before it can enact a section authorising the making of rules for such licensing is unsound and must be rejected.. Within the limits of their legislative powers, Parliament and the State legislatures have plenary powers of legislation, and they may delegate to an executive authority the power to make rules for the licensing of any class of persons."}}, {"text": "VII of the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII of the Motor Vehicles Act dealing with motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VII of the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "VII of the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7361, "end_char": 7379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It authl>rises the Central Government to make rules inter a/ia for the grant and authentication of travelling passes, certificates or authorisations to persons temporarily taking motor vehicles out of India to any place outside India and prescribing the conditions subject to which motor vehicles brought temporarily into India from outside India by persons intending to make a temporary stay in India may be possessed and used in India."}}, {"text": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7837, "end_char": 7872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8016, "end_char": 8021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act", "statute": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act", "statute": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8184, "end_char": 8192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act", "statute": "VII or any other Chapter of the Act"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS [1968) 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court considered the othct\n\n362 SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS [1968) 3 S.C.ll."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_363_366_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF MYSORE AND ANR.\n\n11.\n\nSYED MAHMOOD AND ORS.\n\nMarch 4, 1968 [J. c. SHAH, R. s. BACHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nMysore State CivU Services General Recruitment Rules, 1951, r, 4(3) (b)-Promotion to next grade-P1Tsons eligible no/ considered and juniors in seniorit, v promoted-High Court directs their promotion-Vclldlty.\n\nRule 4(3)(b) of the Mys0re State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957 requires promotion to be made by selection on the basis of seniority.., um-merit, that is seniority subject to the fitness of the candidate to discharge the duties of the post from among persons eligible for pro. molioo.\n\nWhile making selections for promotions to the posts of .Uor statistical assistants from the cadre of junior statistical assistants, the State Governmen did not consider the case of the respondents' who were junior alatistical assistsnts, and published a list promoting persom ranking below them in point of seniority. The respondents filed writ petitions, in which the High Court refused to quash the seniority list but directed the appellant- State to promote the respondents as from the dates on which their juniors were promoted and treat their promotion as effective from that date.\n\nAllowing the appeal, this Court, HELD : While making sei..ctions for promotion to the posts of senior statistical assistants ftom the cadre of junior statistical assiatants in 1959, the State Government was under a duty to consider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness they should be promoted. The promotions were irregularly made and they were, therefore, entitled to ask tho State Government to reconsider their case, In the circumstanceo, tho High Court could issue a writ to the State Government compelling it to perform its duty and to t'ODSider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness they should have been promoted on the relevant dates when officers junior to them were promoted.\n\nInstead of issuin1: such a writ, the Hiah Court wrongly issued writs directing the State Govetnment to promote them with retrospective effect. The High Court ought not to have issued sucli writs without giving the State Government an opportunity in the first insfance to consider their fitness for promotion in 1959. [365 B-DJ\n\nPromotion to the post of senior statistical assistant was based on soniority.., um-merit. In spite of their seniority, offioers junior to them could he promoted if they were unfit to dischar!I\" the duties of th~ post; Promotion could not be claimed as a matter of right by virtue of seniority alone. [366 C-D) ·· State of Mysore v. H. M. Bal/ary, [1964) 7 S.C.R. 471, distinguished, CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1968.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 25, 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 774 and 2171 of 1965.\n\nR. H. Dhebar, Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the appella11ts (in both the appeals).\n\nS. S. Java/I and M. Veerappa for respondent No. - (in both the appeals).\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.CR.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J, On the reorganisation of States on November I, 1956, the services of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao were allotted to the State of Mysore and they wen~ employed there as junior statistical assistants. On January 16, 1958 the Head of the Department of Statistics under the directions of the Government of State of Mysore prepared a tentative seniority list of nongazetted staff of that department treating junior statistical assistants and senior statistical inspectors of the former State of Hyderabad, junior statistical assistants and senior compilers of the former State of Mysore, statistical assistants and statistical inspectors from Bombay and the head compiler of Coorg as holding the equivalent posts of junior statistical assistants in the State of Mysore. In 1959, before revising this tentative seniority list the State Government directed that all the statistical assistants and statistical inspectors of Bombay State and the head compiler of Coorg should be treated and promoted as senior statistical assistants.\n\nAs a result of this direction officers ranking below Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao in the seniority list published on January 16, 1958 were promoted to the higher posts. In making their promotions, the State Government did not consider the fitness of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao for promotion at all. At a much later date, they were promoted as senior statistical assistants.\n\nOn May 3, 1963, the State Government published a revised seniority list placing inspectors from Bombay and head compilers from Coorg in the category of senior statistical assistants. Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao filed separate writ petitions in the High Court of Mysore asking for appropriate writs quashing the seniority list published on May 3, 1963, and direct ing the State Government to consider their case for promotion as senior statistical assistants with retrospective effect.\n\nAs the Objections to the seniority list published on May 3, 1963 were still under consideration by the State Government the High Courl refused to quash this seniority list but it directed the State Government to promote Syed l14ahmood and Bhao Rao as from the respective dates on which respondents junior to them were promoted as senior statistical assistants and to treat such promotions as effective up to May 3, 1963. The State of Mysore has filed the present appeals from the orders directing the promotion of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao after obtaining special leave.\n\nPromotion to the posts of senior statistical assistants is made from the cadre of junior statistical assistants and progress assis tants.\n\nRule 4(3)(b) of tlie Mysore State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957 requires such promotions to be made by selection on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, that is seniority subject to the fitness of the candidate to discharge the duties of the post from among persons eligible for promotion. In 1959 .\n\nMYSORE v. SYED MAHMOOD (Bachawat, I.) 36&\n\nthe seniority of junior statistical assistants was governed by the seniority list published on January 16, 1958. Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao were junior statistical assistants.\n\nWhile making selections for promotion to the posts of senior statistical assistants from the cadre of junior statistical assistants in 1959, the State Government was under a duty to consider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness they should be promoted. But.without considering their case at all, the State Government promoted junior statistical assistants ranking below them in point of seniority.\n\nThe promotions were irregularly made and they were, therefore, entitled to ask the State Government to reconsider their case. In the circumstances, the High Court could issue a writ to the State Government compelling it to perform its duty and to consider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness they should have been promoted on the relevant dates when officers junior to them were promoted. Instead of issuing such a writ, the High Court wrongly issued writs directing the State Government to promote them with retrospective effect. The High Court ought not to have issued such writs without giving the State Government an opportunity in the first instance to consider their fitness for promotion in 1959.\n\nMr. Javali submitted that Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao by virtue of their seniority were entitled to promotion at the time when persons junior to tliem were promoted. The argument overlooks the fact that promotion to the post of senior statistical assistant was based on seniority-cum-merit. In spite of their seniority officers junior to them could be promoted if they were unfit to discharge the duties of the post. Promotion could not be. claimed as a matter of right by virtue of seniority alone.\n\nMr. Javali argued that even in the case of promotion based on seniority-cum-merit, an officer is entitled to promotion by virtue of seniority alone, and he relied on the decision in State of Mysore v. H. M. Be/lary('). In that cast, an officer of the Bombay Government was sent on deputation from his parent department to another department. After long and satisfactory service and a number of promotions in the new department, he was reverted to his parent department and was posted in a lower grade though in the meantime an officer next below him in the parent department had been promoted to a higher grade.\n\nThe promotion to the higher grade was based on seniority-cum-merit.\n\nThe Court held that under r. 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and the circular of the Government of Bombay dated October 31, 1950, an officer on deputation in another department on reversion to his parent department was entitled to be restored to the position he would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed. Rule SO(b) treated the service of an\n\n(1) (1964]7 S.C.R. 471.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOJ.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S, C.R.\n\nofficer on deputation in the new department as equivalent to service in the parent department.\n\nAs he rendered satisfactory service and was considered fit for obtiiining increments and promotions in the new department, he should be deemed to be fit for promotion in the parent department and was entitled to promotion in that department when an officer next below him there was getting promotion based on seniority-cum-merit. In official language, this is the ''next below rule\" under which aa officer on deputation is given a paper promotion and shown as holding a higher post in the parent department if the officer next below him there is being promoted. In our opinion, this case is entirely distinguishable. It decided that under the relevant service rules the fitness for promotion of an officer on deputation in the uew department was equivalent to fitness for promotion in the parent department and the officer was entitled to promotion in the parent department when the officer next below him there was obtaining promotion based on seniority-cum-merit. But it is not an authority for the proposition that the officer on deputation is entitled to promotion in either the new or the parent department as .a matter of right by virtue of his seniority alone, or that he should be deemed to be promoted whenever the officer next below him is being promoted. Where the promotion is based on senioritycummerit the officer cannot claim promotion as a matter of right by virtue of his seniority alone.\n\nH he is found unfit to discharge the duties of the higher post, he may be passed over and an officer junior to him may be promoted; We are of the opinion that the State Government should be directed at this stage to consider the fitness of Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao for promotion in 1959. If on such examination the State Government arbitrarily refuses to promote them, different considerations would arise.\n\nThe State Government would upon such consideration be under a duty to promote them as from 1959 if they were then fit to discharGe the duties of the higher post and if it fails to perform itS duty, the Court may direct it, to promote them as from 1959.\n\nIn the result, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders passed by the High Court. We direct the State Government to consider whether Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao should have been promoted to the posts of senior statistical assistants on the relevant dates when officers junior to them were promoted, and if so, what consequential monetary benefits should be allowed to them. While granting special leave, this Court directed that the appellants shall pay the costs of the respondents in any event.\n\nAccordingly, the appellants are directed to pay the costs of these appeals to the respondents.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MYSORE AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MYSORE AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SYED MAHMOOD AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED MAHMOOD AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 4, 1968 [J. c. SHAH, R. s. BACHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mysore State CivU Services General Recruitment Rules, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 7 S.C.R. 471", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the appella11ts (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2878, "end_char": 2892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the appella11ts (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, Shyamala Pappu and S. P. Nayar, for the appella11ts (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. S. Java", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Java/I and M. Veerappa for respondent No. - ("}}, {"text": "M. Veerappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2971, "end_char": 2982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Java/I and M. 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placing inspectors from Bombay and head compilers from Coorg in the category of senior statistical assistants."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao filed separate writ petitions in the High Court of Mysore asking for appropriate writs quashing the seniority list published on May 3, 1963, and direct ing the State Government to consider their case for promotion as senior statistical assistants with retrospective effect."}}, {"text": "Syed l14ahmood", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5220, "end_char": 5234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Objections to the seniority list published on May 3, 1963 were still under consideration by the State Government the High Courl refused to quash this seniority list but it directed the State Government to promote Syed l14ahmood and Bhao Rao as from the respective dates on which respondents junior to them were promoted as senior statistical assistants and to treat such promotions as effective up to May 3, 1963.", "canonical_name": "SYED MAHMOOD AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Mysore State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Javali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Javali submitted that Syed Mahmood and Bhao Rao by virtue of their seniority were entitled to promotion at the time when persons junior to tliem were promoted."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that cast, an officer of the Bombay Government was sent on deputation from his parent department to another department."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that under r. 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and the circular of the Government of Bombay dated October 31, 1950, an officer on deputation in another department on reversion to his parent department was entitled to be restored to the position he would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8684, "end_char": 8700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that under r. 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and the circular of the Government of Bombay dated October 31, 1950, an officer on deputation in another department on reversion to his parent department was entitled to be restored to the position he would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPOJ.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S, C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 9007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPOJ.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S, C.R.\n\nofficer on deputation in the new department as equivalent to service in the parent department."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_367_373_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "P. S. L. RAMANATHAN CHE'ITIAR & ORS.\n\nO. RM. P. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETl'IAR March 4, 19&8 B [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMAswAMI AND G. K. MrrTBI., JJ.]\n\nM.aaras Agriculturists R•U•f Act IV of 1938, ss. 3(iii) and 19(2); If relief by way of 8Caling down of deer .. avldlable In cas• of a d•PDllt-\n\nWMl/ur 'd•pollf a 'd•bf within the \"\"'aning of s. 3(iil)-D•poslt in court prnding appral-Wlutlur amounts to sallsfaction of d.cre, within\n\n1. 16(1U) of Modrm Act 23 of 1948-lf decr\"-holdtr can claim lntmst c after date of deposit In court.\n\nThe respondent's father made a deposit of Rs. 5,000 with the appellant's father ill 1926 which was repayable with interest. A demand was made fQr repayment in 1944 and a suit for recovery decreed in 1946 for RI. 11,459. The High Court cOnfumed the decree ill appeal in September\n\n1951 and thereafter tho appellant's father deposited Rs. 11,098 to obtain a stay of execution of the dec:ree.\n\nAlthough the judpnent-dcbtors had made no attempt in the trial court ' or before the appeal court to take any advantage of the provisions of the Madru Aaricuftillista Relief Act IV of 1938 on execution proceedings beiq commenced they filed an application under the Act for scaling down the deaee under s. 19(2). The Subordinate Judge who heard the applicaion rejected certain objections raised by the decree holder and modified the decree. The High Court in appeal, reversed the <tder of the Sub-Judge holding that the money entrusted to the plaintilfs' father being a d<posit with a banker was not payable until there was a demand for it : the money became payable only on 2nd October, 1944 I.e. after the coming into force of Act IV of 1938 and consequently the provisions of s. 19(2) of the Act were not applicable and the decree was not liable to be scaled down.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was also contended on behalf of the respondent that the. word \"debt\" implied a pre-existing loan and as such it p could not apply to a deposit; and furthermore that the decl-ee bad already hem satillled and as such s. 16(3) of Madras Act XXUI of 1948 was applicable.\n\nHELD : The appeal must be allowed and the order of the subordinale Judge aca1ing down the decree upheld.\n\n(i) The definition of \"debt\" in s. 3(iii) of the Act is of a very wide import and would include any liability of an agriculturist with the exceptiOllll specified Section 4 specifies and takes out of the ambit of the ddlnition various liabilities and impositions on the ag'riculurist. If therefore thue is a liability of an agriculturist not ill terms excepled by sec. 3(iil) '* sec. 4 of the Act, it would be a 'debt' within the meaning of the de&ition giwn in s. 3(iil). There can be no doubt that on a deposit being made, the depositee incurred a liability although the limo fer ropay- mont wnuld come only when a demand was made and the cause of action for the suit would arise on such a demand. (370 H; 371 D-Bl\n\nNarayanan Chettiar v. Anrwmalai Chettiar. (1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 237 and K11oram Industries v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1966] 2 S.C.R.\n\n688. refdrred to.\n\n368 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) The definition in s. 3(iii) clearly negatives the respondent's con tention that the word \"debt\" implied a pre-existing loan and could not apply to a deposit. If loans alone were meant to be covered by the uae of the word\n\n1debt', there was no rea$00 to exclude i'elit from the purview of the expression. In that case there would have been no need 'to IDc:onon expressly revenue, tax or cess or liability arising out of a breach of !rust or in respect of \"Maintenance under a decree of court or otherwise\" in s. 4. [371 EF]\n\n(iii) The fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree-holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree-ohlder. He can if he likes take the money\n\nollt in terms of the o<der; but so long as he does not do so, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking if out by furnishing other security, say, of immovable property, if the court allows it and on his losing 1he appeal putting the decretal amount in court in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. in satisfaction of the decree. [373 A, BJ\n\nThe real effect of the deposit of money in court as was done in thi! case was to put the money beyond the reach of the parties pending the disposal of the appeal. The decree-holder could only take it out on fur. nishing security which means that the payment W88 not in satisfaction of the dedree and such security could be proceeded against by the judgment debtor in case of his success in the appeal. Pending the determination ot the same, it was beyond the reach .of the judgment debtor. [373 C-D]\n\nChowthmull Maganmull v. The Calcutta Wheat and Seeds Association, I.LR. 51 Calcutta 1010, distingui&hed.\n\nKeshav/a/ v. <; handulal, 37 Bombay Law Reporter 200, referred to.\n\nHeld also : There was no force in the content on that the decree-holder cannot claim any amount by way of interest after the deposit of the money in court. There is no substance .in this point because the deposit in this case was not unconditional and the decree-.holder was not free to withdraw it whenever he liked even before the disposal of the appeal. In case he wanted to do so, he had to give security in terms of the order. The deposit was not in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. and a.s such, there is no question of the stoppage of interest after the deposit. [373 F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 462 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1959 of the Madras High Court in A.A.O. No. 171 of 1953.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants.\n\nR. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. No. 33 of 1945.\n\nThe facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows.\n\nThe respondent's father made a deposit of Rs. 5,000/·\n\nwith the appellants' father in 1926 repayable with. interest at Rangoon Nadappu rate.\n\nA demand was made for re-payment on 1944 and a suit for recovery of the amount was fixed on March 16, 1945. The trial court decreed the suit in the year 1946 for Rs. 11,459-14-0. The appellants' father preferred an appeal therefrom to the High Court and pending disposal of the same deposited Rs. 3,500/- in court on April 16, 1947.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the decree on September 14, 1951.\n\nThere is some dispute about the actual date but there is no contest that the appellants' father deposited Rs. 11,098-10-2 to obtain stay of execution of the decree.\n\nOn August 20, 1947 the court passed an order to the effect that the decree-holder would be allowed to draw out the amount on furnishing security.\n\nAlthough an Act styled The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 was passed on 22nd of March of that year wherein pro- Yision was made for giving relief to agriculturist debtors, inter <tlia, by scaling down decrees passed against them, no attempt was made by the defendants to take advantage thereof either in the trial court or before the court of appeal.\n\nOn execution proceedings being commenced, the judgment-debtors filed an application under the aforesaid Act for scaling down the decree under s. 19(2) thereof.\n\nThe decree-h.older raised various objections thereto.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge who heard the application in the first instance turned down the contentions of the decree-holder and modified the decree. An appeal therefrom was preferred by the decree-bolder to the Madras High Court. There being conflicting decisions in the High Court as to whether a judgmentdebtor who had not claimed relief under the Act before the passing of the decree, could do so subsequently thereto, the appeal was directed to be heard by a Full Bench. An appeal from another decision of the same High Court embracing the identical question\n\nwas disposed of by this Court in Narayanan Chelliar v. Annamalai Chettiar(').\n\nThere after referring to the Act of 1938 as also to s. 16 of Madras Act XXIII of 1948 amending the Act of 1938, it was held that \"the appellant was entitled to the benefit of s. 19(2) of the Act read with s. 16 cl.· (ii), of the Amending Act.\"\n\nThe Full Bench of the Madras High Court constituted for the purpose of hearing the appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge held that the lower court was competent to give relief under s. 19(2) of the Act by way of scaling down the decree passed by the High Court, and referred the matter back for decision by a bench.\n\nThe Bench decided inter alia that the application was properly presented bef0re the Subordinate Judge i.e., the court which passed the decree.\n\nIt refused to go into the question as to whether the plainitff was an agriculturist in\n\n(I) [19l9] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 237\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nview of the concession before the Full Bench. It further negatived the plea that the decree had become satisfied by payment of money into court on Iuly 24, 1947. It however reversed the order of the Subordinate' Judge by holding that the money en trusted to the plaintiff's father being a deposit with a banker was not payable until there was a demand for it : the money became payable only .on 2nd October, 1944 i.e. after the com ing into force of Act IV of 1938 and consequently the provisions of s. 19(2) of the Act were not applicable and that the decree was not liable to be scaled down. The present appeal is against this order.\n\nSection 19 of the Act which we have to consider is set fQl'th below:\n\n\"(l) Where before the commencement of this Act, a court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt, it shall, on the application of any judgmentdebtor who is an agriculturist or in respect of a Hindu joint family debt, on the application of any member <>f the family whether or not he is the judgment-debtor or on the application of the decree-holder, apply the provisions of this Act to such decree .and shall, not withstanding anything contained in the Ccide of Civil Procedure, 1908, amend the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction, as the case may be :\n\nProvided that all payments made or amounts recovered, whether before or after the commencement <>f this Act, in respect of any such decree shall first be applied in payment of all costs as originally decreed to the creditor.\n\n(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply to cases where, after the commencement of thia Act, a court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement.\" 'Debt: has been defined in s. 3(iii) of the Act as meaning \"any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise, but does not include rent as defined in clause (iv), or 'kanartham' as defined in section 3(1)(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929.\"\n\nIt will be noted that the definition is of a very wide import and would include any liability due from an agriculturist with the exceptions specified.\n\nSection 4 takes out of the ambit of the definition various liabilities and impositions on the agriculturist expressly specified therein. If therefore there is a liability\n\nof an agriculturist not in terms exctcd by sec. 3(iii) or sec. 4 of the Act it would be a 'debt' withm the meaning of the definition given in s. 3(iii).\n\nIn Kesoram Industries v. Commissioner . of Wealth Tax(1} this Court had to consider the meaning of the expression \"debts owed by the assessee\" which had to be taken into account in computing his net Wealth in terms of s. 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act. One of the questions there raised was, whether the amount of the provision for payment of income-tax and super-tax in respect of a particular year of account was a debt owed within the meaning of s. 2(m) and as such deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee. It was held by this Court that even though the Finance Act may be passed later \"the tax liability at the latest will arise on the last day of the accounting year\". 'The Court went elaborately into the question as to the meaning of the word 'debt' and held that it could be defined as a liability to pay in presenti or in futuro an ascertainable sum of money. As regards the meaning of the word 'owed' it was observed that \"it did not really add to the meaning of the word 'debt' \".\n\nIn the light of this decision there can be no doubt that on a deposit being made, the depositee incurred a liability although the time for repayment would come only when a demand was. made and the cause of action for the suit would arise on such a demand. ·\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, it was argued that the word 'debt' implied a pre-existing loan and as such it could not apply to a deposit. The definition in s. 3(fu) clearly negatives such a propositiou. If loans alone were meant to be covered by the use of the word 'debt', there was no reason to exclude rent from the purview of the expression. In that case there would have been no need to mention expressly revenue tax or cess or liability arising out of a breach of trust or in respect of ''maintenance under a decree of collrt or otherwise\" in s. 4.\n\nThe plea of the decree-bolder which succeeded before thct High Court cannot therefore be accepted.\n\nG It was however argued that the decree had been satisfied already and as such s. -16 cl. (iii) of Madras Act XXIII of 1948 was applicable. That section for our purpose runs as .follows : ·\n\n\"The amendments made by this Act shall apply to the following suits and proceedings, namely :-\n\n(i) •\n\n(ii)- •\n\n(l} [1966)'2 S.C.R. 688.\n\n372 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(iii) all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act :\n\nIt was argued that as the full amount of the decree had been put in court before 1948, the judgment-debtors could not apply for scaling. down thereafter. In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Coun in Chcrwthmull Maganmu// v. The Calcutta Wheat and Seeds Association('). There the defendant-appellant )lad appealed from a decree for Rs. 21,850/· with interest. and costs passed against it and on the respondents taking steps to execute the decree had obtained an order for stay of execution thereof on depositing the said sum in court as security to the credit of the suit.\n\nThereafter an order was made adjudicating the appellants as insolvents.\n\nThe Official Assignee did not proceed with the appeal and the respondent applied for the appeal being dismissed and the money being paid over to them.\n\nThe Official Assignee claimed the money as belonging to the insolvents' estate and for the benefit of the general body of creditors.\n\nIt was 'held that the effect of the order of August 29, . 1923 directing stay of execution on terms of a deposit being made was that \"the money was paid into Coun to give security to the plaintiff that in the event of their succeeding in the appeal they should obtain the fruits of their success,\" and the \"money which was paid into coun belonged to the party who might be eventually found entitled to the sum.\" On the other hand, there is a decision of the Bombay High Court in Keshav/al\n\nv. Chandulal(') where a judgment-debtor had obtained an order for stay of execution of the decree on his depositing the decretal amount in court.\n\nLater on the application of the judgmentdebtor the deposit was invested in Government promissory notes which. appreciated in value by the time the appeal was heard.\n\nThe appeal resulted in a small sum being disalloweQ. from the decree whereupon the judgment-debtor applied for i. return of the investment to him on his paying into court the amount due under the decree.\n\nBut the decree-holder claimed the securities which represented the decretal amount at the time the deposit was made.\n\nOn behalf of the decree-holder reference was made to the above judgmenf of the Calcutta High Court. There distinguishing the Calcutta judgment,_ Macklin, J. said that the amount in court \"was primarily a deposit of security rather than a deposit of the decretal debt, and the decree-holder cannot claim it as his own unless the judgment-debtor fails to satisfy the decree by the payment of the money due under the decree.\"\n\n(1) I.L.R. SI Cal. 1010.\n\n(2) 37 B.L.R. 20Q.\n\nP.S.L.R. CHETTIAR v. 0.R.M.P.R.M. CHETTIAR (Mitter, !.) 373\n\nOn principle, i.t appears to us that the .facts of a judgmentdebtor's depositing a sum in ourt to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree-holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree-holder. He can if he likes take the money out in terms of the order; but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment-debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security, say, of immovable property, if the court allows him to do so and on his losing the appeal putting the decretal amount in court in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. in satisfaction of the decree.\n\n. The real effect of deposit of money iu court as was done in this case is to put the money beyond the reach of the parties pending the disposal of the appeal. The decree-holder could only\n\ntake it out on furnishing security which means that the payment was not in satisfaction of the decree and the security could be proceeded against by the judgment-debtor in case of his success in the appeal. Pending the determination of the same, it was beyond the reach of the judgment-debtor.\n\nThe observations in Chowthmull's case(1) do not help the respondent. In that case, the appeal was not proceeded with by the Official Assignee. Consequently, the decree-holder could not be deprived of the money which had been put into court to obtain stay of execution of the decree as but for the order, the decree-holder could have levied execution and obtained satisfaction of the decree even before the disposal of the appeal.\n\nThe last contention . raised on behalf of the respondent was that at any rate the decree-holder cannot claim any amount by way of interest after the deposit of. the money in court. There is no substance in this point because the deposit in this case was not unconditional and the decree-holder was not free to withdraw it whenever he liked even before the disposal of the appeal. In case he wanted to do so, he had to give security in terms of the order. The deposit was not in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. and as such, there is no question of the stoppage of interest after the deposit. ·\n\nIn the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) I. L.R. SI Cal. 1010.", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "P. S. L. RAMANATHAN CHE'ITIAR & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. S. L. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "O. RM. P. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETl'IAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. RM. P. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 19&8 B [J.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 92, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMANATHAN CHETl'IAR March 4, 19&8 B [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMAswAMI AND G. K. MrrTBI.,"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMAswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.aaras Agriculturists", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.aaras Agriculturists R•U•f Act IV of 1938, ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 3(iii) and 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(iil)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1083, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1218, "end_char": 1226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Relief Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "2nd October, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1590, "end_char": 1607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in appeal, reversed the <tder of the Sub-Judge holding that the money entrusted to the plaintilfs' father being a d<posit with a banker was not payable until there was a demand for it : the money became payable only on 2nd October, 1944 I.e. after the coming into force of Act IV of 1938 and consequently the provisions of s. 19(2) of the Act were not applicable and the decree was not liable to be scaled down."}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1694, "end_char": 1702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Relief Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2030, "end_char": 2038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Relief Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 3(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3(iil)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2552, "end_char": 2563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2567, "end_char": 2573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(iil)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966] 2 S.C.R.\n\n688", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21 rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order 21 rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1959 of the Madras High Court in A.A.O. No."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5739, "end_char": 5755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5955, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Devakottai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "March 16, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6384, "end_char": 6398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A demand was made for re-payment on 1944 and a suit for recovery of the amount was fixed on March 16, 1945."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6609, "end_char": 6623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,500/- in court on April 16, 1947."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6665, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court confirmed the decree on September 14, 1951."}}, {"text": "August 20, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6855, "end_char": 6870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 20, 1947 the court passed an order to the effect that the decree-holder would be allowed to draw out the amount on furnishing security."}}, {"text": "Although an Act styled The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6999, "end_char": 7064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although an Act styled The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938", "statute": "Although an Act styled The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8265, "end_char": 8270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There being conflicting decisions in the High Court as to whether a judgmentdebtor who had not claimed relief under the Act", "statute": "There being conflicting decisions in the High Court as to whether a judgmentdebtor who had not claimed relief under the Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8274, "end_char": 8298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8418, "end_char": 8423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8649, "end_char": 8657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948"}}, {"text": "Iuly 24, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9234, "end_char": 9247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further negatived the plea that the decree had become satisfied by payment of money into court on Iuly 24, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9587, "end_char": 9595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10807, "end_char": 10816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11092, "end_char": 11107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11115, "end_char": 11140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11296, "end_char": 11305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "sec. 3(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11511, "end_char": 11522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "s. 3(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11610, "end_char": 11619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11840, "end_char": 11847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12067, "end_char": 12074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929", "statute": "the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "s. 3(fu)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13040, "end_char": 13048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13433, "end_char": 13437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXIII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14279, "end_char": 14297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Coun in Chcrwthmull Maganmu// v. The Calcutta Wheat and Seeds Association(')."}}, {"text": "August 29, . 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was 'held that the effect of the order of August 29, ."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15492, "end_char": 15509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, there is a decision of the Bombay High Court in Keshav/al\n\nv. Chandulal(') where a judgment-debtor had obtained an order for stay of execution of the decree on his depositing the decretal amount in court."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16239, "end_char": 16258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the decree-holder reference was made to the above judgmenf of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16285, "end_char": 16293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There distinguishing the Calcutta judgment,_ Macklin, J. said that the amount in court \"was primarily a deposit of security rather than a deposit of the decretal debt, and the decree-holder cannot claim it as his own unless the judgment-debtor fails to satisfy the decree by the payment of the money due under the decree.\""}}, {"text": "Macklin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16305, "end_char": 16312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There distinguishing the Calcutta judgment,_ Macklin, J. said that the amount in court \"was primarily a deposit of security rather than a deposit of the decretal debt, and the decree-holder cannot claim it as his own unless the judgment-debtor fails to satisfy the decree by the payment of the money due under the decree.\""}}, {"text": "Order 21 rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17304, "end_char": 17319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17320, "end_char": 17325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chowthmull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17864, "end_char": 17874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations in Chowthmull's case(1) do not help the respondent."}}, {"text": "Order 21 rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18762, "end_char": 18777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18778, "end_char": 18783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_374_386_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "NAGAR MAHAPALJKA VARANASI A v.\n\nDURGA DAS BHAITACHARYA I: ORS.\n\nMarch 4, 1968 [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMAswAMI AND G. K •. Mrm!1t, 11.] I\n\nU.P. Municipalities Act (II o/ 1916) Chapters V, VIII t:nd JXe fees from ownerr of rickshaws and rickshaw drivers-I/ in tlu 1ltlltlH of t@-Whether quid pro quo in tlu form of ttrVices by munic/palit; y _.,_ saey.\n\nUnder a. 294 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 a Municipal Boord may charae a fee, to be Hxed by byHaw. for any Ii~ and, s. 298 mables the Board to make the bye-laws. Purporting to act UDder s. 298(2) and List 1-H, of the Act, the appellant (Municipal Boord, Varanui) framed certain byaws relating to the plying of ricbbawa. Wlder which, the owner Of each rickshaws had to pay an annual licence fee of Ra. 30/- and each rickshaw driver an annual licence fee of Ra. SI-. The ricbbaw owners and drivers challenged the validity of the bye-laws ill a 111it on the groUDd that the licence fem were not comme111uh1te with the services and advantages rendered or provided by the appellant.\n\nThe trial court dismi'8ed the suit. The High Court, on -1. Jield that the Imposition of licence fees at the1rates of Ra. 30/· and Ra. SJ• was ultra vires and illegal, because, after excluding certain items of expenditme the balanoe did not constitute sullicient quid pro quo for the amount of licence fees charged.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, it was contended: (i) that the fee charaed was not for rendering any serviC<ll but waa in the nature Of a tax; (2) that s. 294 of the Act contemplates the charge of a fee not only in the reatricclld senae of a fee for which a quid pro quo is provided but also in the seme of a fee in which the taxation element is predominant, that such a licence fee could be imPo9ed by enacting a bye-law for that purpooo under a. 298, and that the licence fee in the present case was of that cateaory and (3) that even if it was held to be a fee in the restricted seMe for services renderd by the appellant, there was sufiici•nt quid pro quo.\n\nHELD : (I) The fees mentioned in Chapter VIII, which contains a. 294, are meant for the purpose of regulation of certain trades and professiOlll, for rendering services and for tho maintenance of public ufety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality, and, it ia not contemplated that they should be merged in the public revenues Of the municipality or should go for the upkeep of the roads and other matters of aeneral public utility. Therefore, the fees impooed under a. 294, are onlf fees in the restr; cted sense of a fee for which a quid pro quo is pl'OVlded and cannot be considered to be an impost in the nature of a tax. (384 E-GJ\n\nThe Co1nmissioner~ Hindu Religious Endowments. Madras\n\nv. Sri Lokshmindra Thirtha SIWJmiar of Sri Slrur Mutt, [19S4] S.C.R. 1005, 1042, followed.\n\n(2) The Act contemplates only two cateaories of impost, that is, taxes H enumerared in Chapter V and fees mentioned in as. 293, 293.A and 294 of Chapter VIII. If a levy is a tax the imposition could be lawfully made only after following the mandatory procedure prescribed under as. 131 to\n\n13S.\n\nUnder s. 128(1) (iii) and (Iv), which aro in Chapter V, it is\n\nMAffAPALIKA v. BHATTACHARYA (Ramaswami, J.) 375\n\ncompetent to a municipality to impose a tax on rickshaw drivers and rickshaw owners. If it is assumed that the tax element was predominant in the present ca\"Se and that therefore the licence fee was in the nature of a tax, the imposition would be u/Jra virer because the procedure under ss. 131 to 135 was not followed.\n\nThere is no third category of impost of licence fee which is in the nature of a tax for which the procedure prescribed by ss. 131 to 135 is not applicable, but the procedure contemplated by Chapter IX, which contains s. 298, is applicable. [383 G-H; 384 D-El\n\nI 3) The items disallowed by the High Coun could not be CGnsidered as ving been spent in rendering any servioos to rickshaw owners and\n\ndrivers. because they were spent over paving bye-lanes suitable for rickshaws and for the lighting of stteets and lanes; and, under s. 7(a) and (h) of the Act, it was the statutory duty of the municipal board to light public streets and places and to cdnstruct and maintain public streets, culverts etc. A licence fee cannot be imposed for re-imbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services perf<*med in the discharge of its statu:ory duty to provide for the aeneral public. Since the balance of expenditure constituted only 44% of the total income of the appellant from the licencees, the High Coun was right in holding that sufficient quid pro quo was not cstabli•hed\n\nin the circumstances of this case. (385 G-H; 386 A-CJ\n\nIndia Sugar and Refinerie1 Ltd. v, The Municipal Council, Ho1pet, J.L.R. (1943) Mad. 521, approved.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 23, 1961 of the Allahabad High Court. in First Appeal No. 315 of 1958. .\n\nC. B. Agarwa/a, Ravindra Rana and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Jai Shankar Lal, Yogeshwar Prasad and Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deJiyered by Ramaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated November 23, 1961 in First Appeal No. 315 of 1958 by which the appeal of the respondents was allowed and the suit was decreed with costs throughout.\n\nOn March 26, 1956, the plaintiff respondents who are rickshaw owners and rickshaw drivers filed a representative suit in the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi praying for a decree against the appellant to restrain it by means of a permanent injunction , from charging any license fee or preventing the respondents from plying rikshaws for hire without paying license fee within the municipal limits of Varanasi. Purporting to act Under s. 298(2), List I-H of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (Act No. II of 1916), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', the Municipal Board L6Sup.C.I/68-lt .\n\nof Varanasi framed certain bye-Jaws relating to the plydig of A rickshaws.\n\nThe bye-laws were first published by Government order No. 3471/XXIII-9994 dated March 10, 1941 and were subsequently amended by two notifications No. 4022/XXUI-445 dated February 2, 1950 and No. 5834-XXIII-745 dated September 6, 1951. Under these bye-Jaws, as they stood amended, the owner of each rickshaw had to pay an annual licence fee of Rs. 30/- and each driver of. a rickshaw had to pay an annual fee\n\n- of Rs. 5 /-. The respondents challenged the validity of these bye\n\nlaws mainly on the ground that considering the amount that was being levied what should have been only a fee was really a tax which the Municipal Board had no authority to levy.\n\nIt was contended on their behalf that a licence fee could be levied only for services rendered or advantages provided a, nd the imposition must be commensurate with the services and advantages so rendered or provided. It was urged that so far as . the rickshaws that were being plied within the municipal limits of Varanasi were concerned no advantages or services were provided which could justify the levy of a fee at such a rate. The suit was con\n\ntested by the appellant Municipal Board on the ground that services and advantages were, in fact, provided and their cost was much more than the total amount that was being realised from the rickshaw owners and drivers.\n\nBy his judgment dated March 26, 1958 the 1st Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi dismissed the suit of the respondents, holding that the bye-laws in question were not invalid. The respondents took the matter in appeal to the Allahabad High Court being First Appeal No. 315 of 1958. The appeal was first placed before Gurtu and Srivastava, JJ. who referred it for consideration by a larger Bench. The appeal was finally heard by the Chief Justice, J agdish Sahai and Bishambhar Dayal, JJ.\n\nBy a majority judgment dated November 23, 1961, the appeal of the respondents was allowed, the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the suit of the respondents decreed.\n\nIt was held by Sahai and Dayal, JJ. who delivered the majority\n\njudgment that the imposition of the license fee at the rate of Rs. 30 /- on each of the rickshaw owners and Rs. 5 / • on each of the rickshaw drivers was ultra vires and a permanent injunction was accordingly granted restraining the appellant from realising the license fees at this rate for the period in question. It was however, m.ade clear that it was open to the Municipal Board to reduce the fee to a reasonable figure and co-relate it to the services rendered by the Municipal Board.\n\nChapter V of the Act deals with Municipal Taxation. Section 128 falls within that Chapter and reads as follows : H\n\n\"(1 ) Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which\n\nA a board may impose in the whole or any part of a municipality are-\n\n..........................................\n\n(iii)\n\n(iv)\n\na tax on trades, caliings and vocations including all employments remunerated by salary or fees, a tax on vehicles and other conveyances plying for hire or kept within the municipality or on boats moored therein;\n\n\" ..........................................\n\nSection 131 deals with framing of preliminary proposals and reads as follows :\n\n\"131. ( 1 ) When a board desires to impose a tax, it shall by special resolution frame proposals specifying-\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\n(d)\n\nthe tax, being une of the taxes described in subsection (1) of section 128, which it desires to impose; the persons or class of persons to be made liable,\n\nand the description of property or other tax able thing or circumstances in respect of which they are to be made liable, except where and in so far as any such class or description is already sufficiently defined under clause (a) or by this Act,\n\nthe amount or rate leviable from each such per\n\nson or class of persons;\n\nany other matter referred to in section 153, which the State Government requires by rule to be specified.\n\n(2) The board shall also prepare a draft of the rules which it desires the State Government to make in respect of the matters referred to in section 153.\n\n(3) The board shall, thereupon, publish in )he man\n\nner prescribed in section 94 the proposals fram ed under sub-section (1) and the draft rules framed under sub-section (2) along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule rn.\"\n\nSection .132 provides for filing objections by inhabitants of the municipality and the procedure for dealing with such objections.\n\nIt reads :\n\n\"132. ( 1) Any inhabitant of the municipality may, within a fortnight from the publication of the said notice, submit to the board an objection in writing to all or any of the proposals framed under the preceding section, and the board shall take any objection so submitted into consideration and oass orders thereon by special resolution. ·\n\n( 2) If the board decides to modify its proposals or any of them, it shall publish modified proposals 11nd\n\n(if necessary) revised draft rules along with a notice\n\nindicatin~ that the proposals and rules (if any) are in modification of proposals and rules previously published for objections.\n\n(3) Any objections which may be received to the modified proposals shall be dealt with in the manner prescribed in sub-sectk>n (1 ) .\n\n( 4) When the board ha5 finally settled its proposals, it shall submit them along with the objections (if any) made in connection therewith to the (Prescribed Authority).\"\n\nSection 133 relates to the power of State Government to reject sanction or modify the proposals of the Municipal Board. Section 134 states :\n\n\"(I) When the proposals have been sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority or the State Government, the State Government, after .taking into consideration the draft rules submitted by the board, shall proceed forthwith to make under section 296, such rules in respect of the tax as for the time being it considers necessary.\n\n(2) When the rules have been made the order of sanction arid a copy of the rules shall be sent to the board, and thereupon the board shall by special resolution direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the. resolution.\"\n\nSection 135(1) & (2) provide as follows:\n\n\"( l ) A copy of the resolution passed under section 134 shall be submitted to the State Government, if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government and to the Prescribed Authority, in any other case.\n\n(2) Upon receipt of the copy of the resolution the State Government or Prescribed Authority as the case may be, shall notify in the Official Gazette, the imposilion of the tax from the appointed date, and the imposi• tion of a tax shall in all cases be subject . to the condi ti on that it has been so notified.\"\n\nChapter VII deals with powers. of the.Municipal Board in respect of buildings, public drains, streets, extinction of fires, scayenging and water supply. Chapter VIII deals with other powers in respect of markets, slaughter-houses, sale of food, public safety, sanitation and prevention of disease, inswction, entry, search, rent and charges etc.\n\nSections 293 and 294 fall within Ch.\n\nVIII.\n\nSection 293 of the Act reads as follows :\n\n\"( 1) The board may charge fees to be fixed by byelaw or by public auction or by agreement, for the use or occupation (otherwise than under a lease) of any im movable property vested in, or entrusted to the manage ment of the board, including any public street or place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise.\n\n(2) Such fees may either be levied along wl:h the fee charged under section 294 for the sanction, licence or permission or may be recovered in the manner provided by Chapter VI.\"\n\nSection 293-A of the Act is to the following effect :\n\n\"A board may with the previous sanction of the State Government impose and leVy fees for use of any place to which the public is allowed access . and at which the Board may provide sanitary and other facili lilies to the public.\"\n\nSection 294 of the. Act enacts as follows :\n\n\"The board may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under '.his Act.\"\n\nSection .298 relates to the power of the Board to make bye-laws and reads as follows :\n\n\"298. ( 1) A board by special resolution may, and where required by the State Government shall make bye-Jaws applicable to the whole or. any part of the municipality, consistent with this Act and with any rule, for the purpose of promotin~ or maintaining the, health, safety, and eonvenience of the inhabitants of the municipality and for the furtherance of municipal administration under this Act.\n\nq >. In particular, and ithout prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-secti.IJn ( 1),\n\nthe board of a municipality, wherever, situated, may, A. in the exercise of the said power, make any bye-Jaw, described in List I below and the board of a municipality-wholly or in part situated in a hilly tract may further make, in the exercise of the said power, any byel aw described in List II below.\n\nList I ............................................\n\nff-Public safety and convenience ............................................\n\n( c) Imposing the obligation of taking out licences on the proprietors or drivers of vehicles other than motor vehicles boa1s or animals kept or plying for hire, or on persons hiring themselves out for the purpose of carrying loads within the limits of the municipality, and fixing the fees payable for such licences and the conditions on which they are to be granted and may be revoked;\n\n( d) Limiting the rates which may be demanded for the hire of a carriage, cart, boat or other conveyance, or of animals hired to carry loads or for the services of persons hired to carry loads, and the loads to be carried by such conveyances, animals or persons when hired within the municipality for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours or for a service which would ordinarily be performed within twenty-four hours; \" ................ ·, ........................ .\n\nBv Government Notification No. 3471/XXIII-994 dated March IO, 1941 the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board under s. 298, List I-H (c) and (d) of the Act and confirmed by the Commissioner, were published.\n\nParagraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the bye-laws are to the following effect :\n\n\"12. For every licence granted under these byelaws to the proprietor of the rickshaw, a fee of Rs. 25 per annum shall be charged for cycle rickshaw and Rs. 3 per annum for hand-drawn rickshaws.\n\n13. The licences shall be annual and shall terminate on the 31st March, in each year.\n\n14. A fee of Re. 1 shall be charged from every person who desires to take out a licence for drivinp; a rickshaw and the licence shall be issued to the applicant\n\non receipt of the prescribed fee by the licensing officer, after ascertaining that he is strong, healthy and above the age of 18 years, provided that the Licensing Officer may refuse the license if. he is of opini'on that it would be inexpedient to grant it to the person applying.\" An amendment was made by the Municipal Board to the byelaws by Government Notification No. 4022/XXIJI-745 (45-49) dated February 2, 1950 and No. 5834/XXIII-745 dated September 6, 1951 which read thus :\n\n\"No. 4022/XXllI-745 (45-49) dated 2-2-1950:\n\nThe following amendment in the Rickshaw bye-laws for the Banaras Municipality published under notification No. 3471/XXIII-994 dated March Hl, 1941, which has been made by the Banaras Municipal Board under section 298-H(c) and (d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 and confirmed by the Commissioner, is hereby published as required under Section 301 (2) of the said Act.\n\nAMENDMENT\n\nIn the 2nd line of rule 12 of the Rickshaw bye-laws read 'Rs. 30' instead of 'Rs. 25' in between the words 'a fee of' and 'per annum'.\n\nNo. 5834/XXllI-745 dated September 6, 1951:\n\nThe fo!lowing amendment in the bye-laws for the regulation and control of Rickshaws plying for hire or kept for private use in the Banaras Municipali'ly sanctioned under G.O. No. 3471/XXIII-994 dated March\n\n10, 1941, which bas been made by the Municipal Board of Banaras, under Section 298-H ( c) and ( d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, as confirmed by the Commissioner is hereby published as required by Section\n\n301 (2) of the said Act.\n\nAmendment\n\nIn Rule 14 between the words 'A fee' and 'shall be charged' 'rupees five' be substituted in place of 'Re. !/-' occurring in the first line.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellant Mr. Agarwala argued, in !he first place, that the impugned bye-laws under which the appellant charged the license fee from the respondents were not ultra vires the powers of .the Board. It was maintained that the impost was not a fee in the sense lhat the Municipal Board had to give a quid\n\npro quo to the persons from whom the fee was charged.\n\nIn other words, . the contention of the appellant was that the fee charged was not under the bye-laws a fee taken for rendering any services but it was a license fee which was in the nature of a tax. l\"t was contended that it was not necessary to show that there was any co-relationship between the amount of license fee and the services rendered by the. Municipal Board to rickshaw owners and rickshaw drivers concerned. The question aboll't the distinction between a tax and a fee has been considered by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') in which the constitutional validity of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowmeffis Act 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) came to be examined.\n\nAmongst the sections challenged was s. 76(1).\n\nUnder this section every relig:ous institution hd to pay to the Government annual contribution not exceeding 5 per cen: of its income for the services rendered to it by the said Government; and the argument was that the contribution thus exacte:I was not a fee but a tax and as such outside the competence of the State Legislature.\n\nIn dealing with this argument Mukherjee, J., as he then was, cited the definition of tax given by Latham, C.J., in the case of Matthews(') and has elaborately considered the distinction between a tax and a fee. \"A tax\", said Latham. C.J., is a compulsory exaction of monev by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered''.\n\nJn brining out the essential features of a tax this definitit>n also assists in distinguishing a tax from a fee.\n\nJt is true that between a tax and a fee ther~ is no generie difference; both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorit.ies; but whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes and is not supported by any consideration of service rendered in return, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and ; is such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it.\n\nJn \"'i'he Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madril:'!\n\nv. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') Mukherjee, J. examined the scheme of the Act and observed as follows:\n\n\"If, as we hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be co-related to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services.\n\nAs indicated in Article 110 of the Constitution, ordinarily there are. two classes of cases where Government imposes 'fees' upon persons.\n\nIn the first class of cases,\n\n(1) (19S4].S.C.R. 1J05,1042.\n\n(2) 60 C.LR. 263, 276.\n\nGovernment simply grants a permission or privilege to a person to do something, which otherwise that person would not be competent to do and extracts fees either heavy or moderate from that person in return for the privilege that is conferred.\" After giving an illustration of licence fees for motor vehicles as coming under that class of cases, Mukherjee, J. proceeds to state :\n\n\"In such cases, according to all the writers on public finance, the tax element is pedominant, and if the money paid by licence holders goes for the upkeep of roads and other matters of general public utility, the licence fee cannot but be regarded as a tax.\n\nIn the other class of cases, the Government docs some positive work for the benefit of persons and the money is taken as the return for the work done or services rendered. If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public, it could be cuntcd as fees and not a tax. There is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may man:fest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments, fees and taxes.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellant learnecl Counsel relied upon this passage and said that licence fee fell within the first class of cases mentioned by Mukherjee, J. and it was not necessary for the appellant to show that there was any co-relationship be!Ween the levy of the fees and the expenses incurred by the Municipal Board in rendering the services.\n\nWe shall assume in favour of the appellant that the tax clement is predominant in the imposition of the fee upon the respondents under the impugned bye-laws and the license fee is therefore in the nature of tax.\n\nEven upon that assumption the imposition of the fee under the machinery contemplated by s. 294 of the Act is ultra vires t.he powers of the Municipal Board. The reason is that if the imposition is in the nature of a tax the procedure contemplated by ss. 131 to 135 of the Act should be followed by the Municipal Board and in the absence of such procedure being followed the imposition of this kind of fee would be ultra v:'res.\n\nIt is manifest from s. 128(1) (iii) & (iv) that it Is competent to the Municipality to impose a tax on vehicles plyin~ for hire or kept within the municipality and also on trades, callings and vocations including rickshaw drivers and rickshaw owners.\n\nBut the imposition of such a tax can only be lawfully made by the Municipal Board after following the procedure prescribed under ss. 131 to 135 of the Act.\n\nIt was, however, contended for the appellant that under s. 294 of the Act the Municipal Board has authority to impose a licence fee by enacting a bye-law for that purpose under s. 298 of the Act. It was said that s. 294 of the Act contemplates the charge of a fee not only in the restricted sense of a fee for which a quid pro quo is provided but a:so in the sense of a fee in which the taxation element is predominant.\n\nIt was hence argued that the procedural machinery for the imposition of tax contemplated under ss. 131 to 135 of the Act need not be followed in such a case.\n\nWe are unable to accept th'.s argument as correct.\n\nAccordin~ to the scheme of the Act there is a sharp and clear distinction between taxes properly so called and fees.\n\nThere i> a logical and clearcut division of the Act into several Chapters. and taxes, by whatever designation they may be called, are all comprehended and dealt with in Ch. V. and by that Chapter alone.\n\nAnd what is permitted to be imposed by s. 294 which occurs in Ch. VIII is only a fee in the restricted sense as distinguished from a tax. To put it differently, the Act contemplates only two categories of impost, i.e., taxes enumerated in Ch. V and fees mentioned in ss. 293, 293-1\\ and 294 of Ch. VIII. It is not contemplated in the scheme of the Act that there should be a third category of impost of licence fee which is in the nature of a tax . for which the procedure contemplated by Ch. IX is applicable. In our opinion, the scheme of Ch. VIII of the Act shows that the provisions contained therein are meant for the purpose of regulation of certain trades and professions and for maintenance of public safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality.\n\nThe fees mentioned in s. 294 are meant to be impoicd for the purpose of regulation of trade and professions and for rendering services. It is not contemplated by the Act that licence fees imposed by s. 294 should be merged in the public revenues of the municipality and should go for the upkeep of the roads and other matters of general public utility. It is therefore not permissible for the Municipal Board to impose a tax on the respondents under the guise of a license fee without following the mandatory procedure for imposition of the taxes prescribed by ss. 131 to 135 of the Act. Otherwise <here will be a circumvention of the provisions of ss. 131 to 135 of the Act. It is manifest that s. 294 of the Act must be interpreted in such a manner as to prevent the circumvention of the safeguards of the provisions of ss. 131 to 135 of the Act.\n\nIn this context it is important to notice that the power to tax is not included in the police power in the American Municipal\n\nLaw.-(Dillon on 'Municipal Corporations' Vol. IV, 5th E<ln., p. 2400). It has been held that the police and taxing powers of the legislature though co-existent, are distinct powers. Broadly speaking, the distinction is thatJhe taxing power is exercised for the purpose of raising revenue and is subject to certain designated constitutional limitations, while the police power is exercised for B . lhe promotion of the public welfare by means of the regulation of dangerous or potential!y dangerous businesses, occupations, or activities, and is not subject to the constitutional restrictions applicable to the taxing power. \"It may consequently be said that if\n\nth~ primary purpose of a statute or ordinance exacting an impoc\n\nsition of some kind is to raise revenue, it represents an exercise of the taxing power, while if the primary purpose of such an enactment is the regulation of some particular occupation, calling or activity, it is an exercise of the police power, even if it ind dentally produces revenue.\" (American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn.\n\nVol. 16, p. 519).\n\nWe pass on to consider the next question raised in this appeal, namely, whether there was a quid pro quo for the licence fees realised by the appellant and whether the impost was a fee in the strict sense as contemplated by s. 294 of the Act. A finding bas been recorded in 1he present case by the trial court that a sum of Rs. 1,43,741/7/0 was spent by the Municipal Board for providing facilities and amenities to owners and drivers of rick shaws.\n\nThis sum of Rs. 1,43,741/7 /0 is made up of the following items :\n\n\"Rs. 68,000/- spent over the paving of bye-lanes, in these the only conveyance that can operate is a rickshaw.\n\nRs. 20,000/ - spent as expenses for lighting of streets and lanes.\n\nRs. 47,741/7 /0 spent in making provision for parking grounds.\n\nRs. 8,000/ - spent on payment of salary to the staff maintained for issuing licences and inspecting rickshaws.\"\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that the amount cf Rs. 68,000/- spent for paving of bye-lanes and Rs. 20,000/ • for lighting of streets and lanes cannot be considered to have been spent in rendering services to the rickshaw owners and rickshaw drivers. The reason was that under s. 7 (a) of the Act .it was the statutory duty of the Municipal Board to light public streets and places and under cl. (h) of the same section to construct and maintain public streets, culverts etc.\n\nThe expenditure under\n\nthese two items was incurred by the Municjpal Boatll in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the licence fee canno< be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services which the Municipal Board was bound under the statu:e to provide to the general public (See the decision of the Madras High Court in India Sugar and Refineries Ltd. v. The Municipal Council Hospet('). If these two items are excluded from consideration the balance of. expenditure incurred by the Municipal Board for the benefit of the licensees is Rs. 55,741/7/0. In other words, the expenditure constitit.ed about 44% of the total income of the. Municipal Board from the licensees. In our op - nion, there is no sufficient quid pro quo established in the circumstances of this case and the High Court was therefore rigl:rt in holding that the imposition of the licence fees at the rate of Rs. 30/- on each rickshaw owner and Rs. 5/- on eaclt rickshaw driver was ultra vires and illegal.\n\nFor the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment an:I decree of the Allahabad High Court dated November 23, 1961 in First Appeal No. 315 of 1958 is correct and this appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n( 1)1.L.R. [194)] Mad. S21.\n\nI \\.\n\nI•) {", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "NAGAR MAHAPALJKA VARANASI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGAR MAHAPALIKA VARANASI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DURGA DAS BHAITACHARYA I: ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DURGA DAS BHATTACHARYA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 4, 1968 [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMAswAMI AND G. K •. Mrm!1t, 11.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMAswAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. 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Gupte, Jai Shankar Lal, Yogeshwar Prasad and Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5039, "end_char": 5055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Jai Shankar Lal, Yogeshwar Prasad and Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Jai Shankar Lal, Yogeshwar Prasad and Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deJiyered by Ramaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated November 23, 1961 in First Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMAswAMI"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Varanasi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 26, 1956, the plaintiff respondents who are rickshaw owners and rickshaw drivers filed a representative suit in the court of Civil Judge, Varanasi praying for a decree against the appellant to restrain it by means of a permanent injunction , from charging any license fee or preventing the respondents from plying rikshaws for hire without paying license fee within the municipal limits of Varanasi."}}, {"text": "s. 298(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5832, "end_char": 5841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5864, "end_char": 5888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 26, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated March 26, 1958 the 1st 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No."}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Banaras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18213, "end_char": 18239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3471/XXIII-994 dated March\n\n10, 1941, which bas been made by the Municipal Board of Banaras, under Section 298-H ( c) and ( d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, as confirmed by the Commissioner is hereby published as required by Section\n\n301 (2) of the said Act."}}, {"text": "Section 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18247, "end_char": 18258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act 1916"}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18287, "end_char": 18311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18381, "end_char": 18393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Amendment\n\nIn Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18416, "end_char": 18434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18600, "end_char": 18608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant Mr. Agarwala argued, in !"}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowmeffis Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19616, "end_char": 19674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act XIX of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19676, "end_char": 19698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 76(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19758, "end_char": 19766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XIX of 1951", "statute": "Madras Act XIX of 1951"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20132, "end_char": 20141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this argument Mukherjee, J., as he then was, cited the definition of tax given by Latham, C.J., in the case of Matthews(') and has elaborately considered the distinction between a tax and a fee. \""}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this argument Mukherjee, J., as he then was, cited the definition of tax given by Latham, C.J., in the case of Matthews(') and has elaborately considered the distinction between a tax and a fee. \"", "canonical_name": "Latham"}}, {"text": "Matthews", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20229, "end_char": 20237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this argument Mukherjee, J., as he then was, cited the definition of tax given by Latham, C.J., in the case of Matthews(') and has elaborately considered the distinction between a tax and a fee. \""}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A tax\", said Latham.", "canonical_name": "Latham"}}, {"text": "Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madril", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21040, "end_char": 21088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn \"'i'he Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madril:'!"}}, {"text": "Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21100, "end_char": 21126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') Mukherjee, J. examined the scheme of the Act and observed as follows:\n\n\"If, as we hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be co-related to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services."}}, {"text": "Article 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21511, "end_char": 21522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seligman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22830, "end_char": 22838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the taxing power of a State may man:fest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments, fees and taxes.\""}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23626, "end_char": 23632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23788, "end_char": 23802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 128(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23987, "end_char": 23996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24348, "end_char": 24362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24432, "end_char": 24438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24553, "end_char": 24559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24589, "end_char": 24595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24892, "end_char": 24906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25369, "end_char": 25375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 293, 293", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25597, "end_char": 25609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26125, "end_char": 26131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26302, "end_char": 26308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26664, "end_char": 26678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26752, "end_char": 26766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26799, "end_char": 26805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 131 to 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26925, "end_char": 26939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28375, "end_char": 28381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29307, "end_char": 29311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municjpal Boatll", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29566, "end_char": 29582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expenditure under\n\nthese two items was incurred by the Municjpal Boatll in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the licence fee canno< be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services which the Municipal Board was bound under the statu:e to provide to the general public (See the decision of the Madras High Court in India Sugar and Refineries Ltd. v. The Municipal Council Hospet(')."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29848, "end_char": 29865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expenditure under\n\nthese two items was incurred by the Municjpal Boatll in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the licence fee canno< be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services which the Municipal Board was bound under the statu:e to provide to the general public (See the decision of the Madras High Court in India Sugar and Refineries Ltd. v. The Municipal Council Hospet(')."}}, {"text": "S21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30788, "end_char": 30791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_387_395_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KOLIJPARA SRIRAMULU\n\nT. ASWATHANARAYANA & ORS.\n\nMarch 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nContruct--Oral c.gree111ent to sell /and-Fornwl docuntent to be' executed later but not actually executed-Mode of paynrent of price not seuled-Contract whether binding,\n\nPartition Act 4 of 1893, s. 2-No application 1nac/e 11nder section- Higli Court whether empowered to give direction as to allollnent of pcrti cu/ar area 011 _narlition.\n\nOn April IS, 1940 respondent No. I took on ten years' lease a site for the purpose of building a cinema theatre, from a partnership firm.\n\nHe thoreafter built a cinema theatre on the land.\n\nAppellant No. I in 1948\n\ninstiuted a suit for dissolution of the firm and for accounts. Respondent No. I who was impleaded as a defendant resisted the suit. In I 9SO the firm filed a suit to evict the first respondent from the leased land. In this suit appellant No. I was also impleaded as a defendant and he claim•d that in addition to his original 23 shares in the firm. he had acquired 39 shares by purchase. In 1953 respondent No. I also filed a suit alleging that all. the partners of the firm except the appellant had entered into an oral agreement. with him on July 6, 1952 to sell 137 shares in the site except the 23 shares belonging to appellant No. 1; that 98 shares had actually boon sold to him; that 39 shares had not been sold to him and had been instead sold to appellant No. I. Respondent No. I thereaftor claimed spet':Jic performance of the agreement to sell the aforesaid 39 shares by iheir owners and contended that the sale of those shares in fa\\'Our of appellant No. 1 was not binding upon him. The trial court decided against respondent No. 1 but the High Court decid-:d in his favour.\n\nIn appeal before lhe Court the following questions came up for consideration : (i) whether there was an oral agreement between 'r-!!spondent No. l and all partners of the firm other than appellant No.: I for sale of their shares on July 6, 1952; (ii) whether the oral agreement was in-:tfective because the parties con:emplated the execution of a formal document or because the mode of payment of the purchase money was not actually agred upon;\n\n(iii) whether in respect of the 39 shares purchased by him appellant No. I \\Vas a purchaser wihout notice; (iv) whether in the absence of an application under s. 2 of the Partition Act 1893 the High Court was right in giving a direction that as far as possible the site upon which the cinema building stood should be allotted to tho. share of respondent No. I if it was comprised within the 137 shares to wh~.ch he was entitled.\n\nHELD : (i) On the facts of the case the High Court was rioht in holding that there \\vas an agreement to sell 137 shares in the site iO respondent No. I.\n\n(ii) A mere reference to a future formal contract does not prevent the existence of a binding ag'reement between the partios unless the reference to a future contract is made in such te'rms as to show that the parties did rrot intend to be bound until a formal contract is sic.nd. The question depends upon the intention of the. parties and the speCial circumstances of each particular case. In the present case the evidence Jid not show that tho drawing up of a written agreement was a prc-rcquisi:e to the coming into effect of the oral agreement. [393 CD]\n\nN<>r did the absence <>f a specific agt\"'...ement as to the mode of payment A necessarily make the agreement ineffective.\n\nSince the vi.tal terms of the contract like the price and area of the land and the time for completion of the sale were all fixed. [394 El\n\n(iii) The appellant had been unable to establish that in respect of the 39 shares purchased by him he was a purchaser without notice. [395 A-Bl\n\n(iv) Jn the absence of an applicati<>n by the respondent under s. 2 <if B tho Partition Act the High Court bad no power to make a direction as to the particula'r portion of the site to be allotted to respondent No. I on partition. [395 D-El\n\nRama Prasada Rao v. Subbaramaiah, (1951) II An. W.R. 488, Ridgway v.JVharton, 6 H.L.C. 238, Von Hatzfe/dt-Wildenburg v. Alexander, (1912) I Ch. 284, Rossiter v. Miller; 3 A.C. 1124 and Currimbhoy and Compan, v Ltd. v. Creel, 60 I.A. 297, referred to. c\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeals Nos. 427 and 428 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1960 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.S. Nos. 380 and 331 of 1956. ·\n\nH. R. Gokha/e and K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in both the appeals) .\n\nS. T. Desai, P. Parameshwara Rao and R. V. Pillai, for. the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswami, J. The appellant in both the appeals was one of the partners in a firm consisting of about thirty partners which was running a mill named 'Vasavamba Oil and Rice Mill' at Vijayawada.\n\nThe partnership firm owned not only a factory but also a site of the extent of about 3845 sq. yards.\n\nThe total number of shares in the partnership was 160 out of which the appellant owned 23 shares.\n\nBy a document dated April 15, 1940, the firm executed a lease in favour of the 1st respondent and another person of the area of the site for a period of 10 years.\n\nThe Jessee was permitted to construct a building for the use of a Cinema Theatre. The annual rent was Rs. 750/-. In the year 1948, the appellant filed 0.S. No. 196 of 1948 in the Subordinate\n\nJudge'~ Court, Vijayawada for dissolution of the partnership and for accounts. On December 20, 1951 a preliminary decree was granted in that suit. The first respondent was added as 17th defendant in that suit. He contended in that suit that the manag- . ing partner of the firm had covenanted to sell to him the site leased out and that in any event he was not liable to eviction in view of the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In 1950, before the passing of the preliminary decree, a suit was filed in the District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada\n\n, i\n\nf ) {\n\n-0.S. No. 440 of 1950 by the firm and its managing partner against the 1st respondent and others seeking to evict •the 1st respondent.\n\nOn December 20, 1951 a p:eliminary decree was passed in 0.S. No. 196 of 1948 but it was made subject to the rights of the 1st respondent and without prejudice to his contentions. There was a direction in the preliminary decree to sell the properties of the partnership firm and a receiver was appointed for that purpose.\n\nOn February 17, 1952 the appellant was transposed as the 3rd plaintiff in 0.S. No .. 440 of 1950 in the District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada. As the appellant had by then purchased 39 shares from some of the partners in addition to the 23 share> already owned by hini, he claimed partition and separate possession of 62 sh.ares belonging to him in the said suit.\n\nTo obtain this relief he applied for an amendment of the plaint which was allowed. By reason of the said amendmnt the District Munsiff ceased to have jurisdiction over the suit and herefore he directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the Subordinate Judge's Court. The plaint was therefore filed in the Subordinate Judge's court, Vijayawada and numbered as O.S. 203 of D 1954.\n\nWhile this litigation was going on the 1st respondent who had built a Cinema theatre on the site was active:y trying to purchase the site from the co-sharers.\n\nHe filed 0.S. No. 124 of 1953 in the Subordinate Judge's court alleging that all the partners of the firm except the appellant had entered into an oral\n\nagreement with him on July 6, 1952 to sell 137 shares in the site and that in pursuance of the agreement partners who owned 98 shares had executed sale deeds in his favour and the other partners owning 39 shares did not do so.\n\nThe 1st respondent therefore claimed specific performl!nce of the agreement to sell 3 9 shares owned by the said partners and contended that sa!e of those shares in favour of the appeJlant was not binding upoa him.\n\nThe suit was transferred to the District Court of Masulipatam and was numbered as O.S. No. 1 of 1956. The suit referred to earlier in-which the appellant claimed partition and recovery of possession of his 62 shares was also finally transferred to the District Court of Masulipatam and numbered as O.S. No. 2 of 1956. As the main dispute in both the suits was common, namely whether the appellant was entitled to the 39 shares purchased by him from the partners owning theni or whether by reason of the prior oral agreement the 1st respondent was entitled to a conyeyance in respect of the shares. It was agreed between the parties . that evidence should be taken in both the suits together and what was evidence in the one suit should be treated as evidence in tlie other suit. By his judgment dated February 28, 1956, the District H Judge held that the 1st respondent had not proved the oral agreement of sale in his favour alleged to have taken place on July 6,\n\n1952. He therefore dismissed the suit for specific performance,\n\n0.S. No. 1 of 1956. For the same reasons he held that in the suit for partition namely, 0.S. No. 2 of 1956 the appellant was entitled to 62 shares and he granted a decree for partition and . possession thereof as also damages at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per annum from May 1, 1950 to the dale of the delivery of possession of his sha:es.\n\nThe 1st respondent took the matter in appeal before the. High Court of A. P.-. A.S. No. 380 of 1956 against O.S. No. 1 of 1956 and A.S. No. 381 of 1956 against 0.S. No. 2 of 1956.\n\nBy a common judgment dated March 25, 1960 the High Court allowed both the appeals.\n\nIt was held by the High Court that the oral agreement pleaded by the 1st respondent was true and that the appell811'1 was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The High Court accordingly decreed the suit for specific performance. The decree in the partition suit O.S. No. 2 of 1956 was therefore varied. The appellant's share was fixed at\n\n23/160th. A direction was also given by the High Court that in the actual partition, as far as possible, the lower court should allow to respondent No. I that portion of the site on which the cinema theatre building cons'lr•cled by him stood and if that was not possible, the trial court may follow the procedure indicated in Rama Prasada Rao v. Subbaramaiah(').\n\nThe first question to be considered in these appeals is whether there was an oral agreement between the 1st respondent and all the partners of the firm except the appellant for sal.e of their shares on July 6, 1952 and whether respondent No. 1 was entitled to\n\nspecific performance of that oral agreement. It was the. case of respondent No. I that on July 6, 1952 there was a meeting of all the male partners at the house of Desu Yirabhadrayya and at that meeting the:e was an agreement reached between all of them\n\n(except the appellant) and himself that they should sell to him their shares (and the shares of those whom they represented) at the rate of Rs. 3,375/- for eight shares.\n\nA written agreement was to be drawn in 2 or 3 days and the mode of payment of the purchase money was also to be settled later. It was further . agreed that the sale deeds were to be executed in three months.\n\nIn pursuance of the agreement all the co-sharers except de'.endants 1 to 9 executed sale deeds and the plaintiff therefore became the owner of 98 shares.\n\nThe first witness in proof of the oral agreement was respondent No. I himself. He deposed that P.Ws. 5, 6 and 8, Sri Oevata Rama Mohana Rao, Sri Addepalli Nageswara Rao and si Thoomu Srimannarayana respectively were present at the meeting of the shareholders.\n\nHe also said that the first defendant, the son of the 2nd defendant, was there to represent the latter, and that Gopala Krishnaiah, son of the 3rd defendant, and the 7th defendant (who represents the 5th and 6th def en-\n\n(I) (1957) II An. W.R. 488.\n\n\" \\\n\nSRlllAMULU v. ASWATHANARAYANA (Ramaswami, J.) 391\n\ndants) and Alavala Subbayya (husband of the 8th defendant and father of the 9th defendant) were present when the agreement was settled.\n\nHe added lhat the sate deed was to be executed in three months and that draft agreement, Ex. A-6 was also prepared 2 or 3 days later.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reference was made to Ex. B-1, the deposition of the first respondent in the previous suit, where he said that the agreement was on July l, 1952 and that he did not remembCr the names of the other persons present at the meeting except P.W. 8, Sri Subba Rao Nayudu, Vice President of Andhra Bank. In our opinion, the discrepancy is immaterial and the High Court was right in accepting the evidence of this witness as true. The evidence of respondent No. 1 is corroborated by P.W. 7 who said that eXcept the women. shareholders all other shareholders were present at the meeting of July 6, 1952 and the subject for consideration was the sale of the site of the cinema theatre to respondent No. 1.\n\nHe added that the price of the whole site was fixed at Rs. 67,500/- and that all the partners except the appellant agreed to seJI away their shares. On behalf of the appellant reference was made to the counter-affidavit, B-4 dated January 5, 1953 filed in interlocutory proceedings on behalf of P.W. 7, but there is no serious cqntradiction between the evidence of that witness in Ex. B-4 and the evidence of P.W. 7 in the present suit. The High Court was highly impressed with the evidence of P .W. 7 and we see no reason for talring a different view in regard to the credibility of this witness. P.W. 8 was also present at the meeting on July 6, 1952. His evidence corroborates that of respondent No. 1.\n\nHe said that the son of the appellant was present at the meeting and the women shareholders were represented by some men on their behalf.\n\nIt is true that P.W. 8 is the cousin brother of respondent No. 1, but this can be no ground in itself for rejecting his testimony. P.Ws 2 and 3 have also given important corroborative evidBnee.\n\nP.W. 2, Sri D. Subba Rao is the Subordinate Judge of Bapatla. He deposed that the first respondent told him that there was an oral agreement for the purchase of the shares concluded in the first week of July, 1952. Exhibit A-22 dated July 9. 1952, a letter written by P.W. 2. to respondent No. I supports the evidence of P.W. 2 G P.W. 3, Sn S. Narayana Rao, a District Judge and a family friend .of re~ndent No. 1 also testified that he was informed of the\n\nnegotiations by the first respondent for purchasing the shares and he was also told by the first respondent about the conclusion of the agrei; mcnt.\n\nExhibit A-26 dated July 14, 1952, a letter written by him to .the first respondent. supports this evidence.\n\nP.Ws. and. 3 ar~ highly respectable witnesses and the Hfah Court was right m takmg the view that th.eir evidence strongly corroborates !he case of respondent No. 1 with regard to the conclusion of the H\n\noral agreement for sale on July 6, l 952. The evidence of re1pon-\n\n6Sup.C.l/6R-12\n\ndent No. 1 is also corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6\n\nSri Devata Rama Mohana Rao and Sri Addepaili Nageswara Rao which has been believed by the High Court On behalf of the appellant it was said that respondent No. 1 has not given any reason in the plaint or in the evidence as to why a written agreement was not entered into.\n\nThere may be some force in this argument.\n\nBut no such question was put to P.W. 1 in cross. examination, nor was he asked to give any explanation.\n\nOn the other hand, there are important circumstances indicating that the case of the first respondent with regard to the oral agreement is highly probable.\n\nJn the first place, respondent No. 1 had built a valuable cinema theatre building on the disputed site and he had very strong reasons to make an outright purchase of the site otherwise he would be placed in a precarious legal position.\n\nNegotiations for purchase were going on for several years past and considering this background, the case of the first respondent with regard to the .oral agreement appears highly probable. P.W. 2, a Subordinate Judge and P.W. 3, a District Judge have both given evidence which corroborates the case of respondent No. 1 with regard to the conclusion of the oral agreement on July 6, 1952 and there is no reason suggested on behalf of the appellant for piscarding their evidence. It is also important to notice that 20 out of 30 shareholders executed sale deeds in favour of the first respondent after the date of the alleged oral agreement on July 6, 1952. The fact that the shareholders sold their shares at th: identical price to the first respondent and the others sold at the same price to the appellant is only explicable on the hypothesis that the price was fixed by agreement between all the shareholders willing to sell i.e., all those other than the appellant. The last of . the sale deeds executed in favour of the appellant or the first respondent are Exs. A-11 and A-12 dated February 28, 1953. There is evidence that prices were rising meanwhile and therefore the circumstance that . the vendors chose to sell at the same price renders it highly probable that there was an earlier binding agree ment. It is also an important circumstance against the appellam that none of. the women shareholders has appeared in the witnes< box to rebut the evidence tendered un behalf of respondent No. 1.\n\nThere was evidence given on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the women partners had authorised the men partners to represent them at the meeting but none of the women partners entered the witness box to deny such authorisation.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reliance was placed upon the circular letter. Ex. A-15 purported to be written by one Gopi Setti Venkata Subba Rao, one of the shareholders. The document is not signed by respondent No. I.\n\nIt appears to be a notice prepared by one of the shareholders to be circulated .inter se among them and refers to the mode of pay. men! of the purchase money agreed to between respondent No. I\n\nand the persons selling the shares.\n\nThe High Court has observed tive. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does no! case of respandent No. 1 and we see no reason to take a dffierent view as regards the effect of Ex. A-15.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next question raised in these appeals, namely whether the oral agreement was ineffective be cause the parties contemplated the execution of a formal document or because the ruode of payment of the purchase money was not actually agreed upon. It was submitted on behalf of the appelant that there was no contract because the sale was conditional upon a regular agreement being executed and no such agreement . was executed.\n\nWe do not accept this argument as correct. It is well-established that a mere reference to a future formal contract will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties.\n\nThe fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement. by which the terms agreed upon are to be put in a more formal shape does not prevent the existence of a binding contract. There are. however, cases where the reference to a future contract is made in such terms as to show that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal contract is signed. The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of each particular case. -As observed by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth) in Ridgway v. Wharton(') the fact of a subsequent agreement being prepared may be evidence that the previous nego. tiations did not amount to a concluded agreement, but the mere fact that persons wish to have a formal agreement drawn up does not establish the proposition that they cannot be bound by a pre vious agreement In Von Hatzfeldt-Wi/denburg v. Alexander(') it was stated by Parker, J. as follows :\n\n\"It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further conract is a\n\nconditin or term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through ... In the former case there is no enforceable contract either becailse the condition is unfulfilled or !>ecause the law does not recognize a contract to enter\n\nmto a. contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored.\"\n\nIn other words, thre may be a cs7 where the signing of a further formal agreement 1s made a cond1t1on or term of the bargain, and\n\n(I) 6 H.L.C. 238, 263.\n\n(2) 119121 I Ch. 284, 288.\n\n394 SUPREMB OOU1T llBPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nif the formal agreement is not approved and signed there is no concluded contract. In Rossier v. Mil/er(1) Lord Cairns said :\n\n\"If you find not an unqualified. acceptance subject to the condition that an agreement is to be prepared and agreed upon. between. the parties, and until that condition. is fulfilled no contract is to arise then you cannot find a concluded contract.\"\n\nIn Currimbhoy and Company Ltd. v. Cree1( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed the view that the principle of the English law which is summarised in the judgment of Parker, J. in Von Hatz feldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander(3 ) was be applicable in India. Tho question in the present appeals is whether the execution of a formal agreement was intended to be a condition of the bargain dated July 6, 1952 or whether it was a mere expression of the desire oi the parties for a formal agreement which can be ignored. The evidence adduced on behalf of respondent No. 1 does not show that the drawing up of a written agreement was a pre-requisite to the coming into effect of the oral agreement It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that the oral agreement was ineffective in law because there is no execution of any formal written document.\n\nAs regards the -other point, it is true that there is no specific agreement with regard to the mode of payment but this does not necessarily make the agreement ineffec tive. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does not affect the completeness of the contract because the vital terms of the contract like the price and area of the land and the time for completion of the sale were all fixed.\n\nWe accordingly hold that Mr. Gokhale is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.\n\nWe shall next deal with the question whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior oral agreement.\n\nThe first sale deed obtained by the appellant was on July 29, 1952. P.W. 2 stated in his evidence that the\n\nappelfant told him that he had been aware of the agreement in favour of respondent No. I at the time of the purchases under Exs. B6 to B-.10.\n\nIt is true that P.W. 2 added that the aPPCllant did not say distinctly that he was aware of the agreement belWeen the respondent and defendants 1 to 9.\n\nUpon this point the appel !ant himself was unable to remember whether he had told P.W. 2 to that effect.\n\nIn any case, P.Ws. 5 and 6 deposed that they went to the appellant on July 7, 1952 and asked him to part with his shares in favour of respondent No. 1. It is not denied by the appellant that he met P.Ws. 5 and 6 on July 7, 1952. It is also\n\n(I} 3 A.C. 1124.\n\n(2) 60 I.A. '1!11.\n\n(3) [1912) l Ch. 2114.\n\nlllllAMULU v. AswATHANAllAYANA (Ramaswami, J.) 391\n\nA significant that the purchase money paid by the appellant was very nearly the same 8s that payable under the agreement in respondent No. l's favour. On the basis of his evidence the High Conrt reached the conclnsion .that the appellant had notice of the prior oral agreement. We see no reason to dilfer from the finding of the High Court on this point B It was finally contended that_ the High Court ought not to have given any direction that as far as possible the site upon which the cinema building stands should be allotted to the share of res pondent No. 1 if it is comprised within the 137 shares to which he was enthled. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that there was no equity in favour of respondent No, 1 as he was a C lessee for 10 years and all the constructions were made with the full knowledge that he was a lessee for a limited period. In any case, h was said that the appellant should have been given permission under s. 3 of the Partition Act (Partition Act No. IV of\n\n1893) when respondent No. l him.<elf invoked the provisiOns of s. 2 of that Act It was also argued that the High Court had D no jurisdiction to modify any portion of the judgment dated Mar.ch 25, 1960 by a subsequent order dated June 21, 1960 without an application for review. In our opinion, the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is well-founded and since no application was made on behalf of the first respondent under s. 2 of the PartitiOn Act we are of opinion that the following direction E of the High Court in the preliminary decree should be deleted :\n\n\" ( 7) That the lower Court shall as for as possible allot to the appellant the site upon which the appellants' buildings stand and further direct that if that procedure cannot be adopted conveniently or equitably the procedure laid down in the judgment reported in 1957 ( 2) A.W.R. page 488 be followed.\" It will, of course, be open to the parties to make representations and for the High Court lo give equitable directions in the allot ment of shares to be made in. the final partition decree.\n\nSubject to this modification; we affinn the judgment and decree of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.S. Nos. 380 and 381of1956 dated March 25, 1960 and dismiss these appeals with costs-there will be one hearing fee.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nL6Sup, C.l/68-13", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "KOLIJPARA SRIRAMULU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KOLLIPARA SRIRAMULU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. ASWATHANARAYANA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. ASWATHANARAYANA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Partition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 6, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1212, "end_char": 1224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with him on July 6, 1952 to sell 137 shares in the site except the 23 shares belonging to appellant No."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2360, "end_char": 2364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Partition Act 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Partition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e and K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4467, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokha/e and K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. Parameshwara Rao and R. V. Pillai, for."}}, {"text": "P. Parameshwara Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. Parameshwara Rao and R. V. Pillai, for."}}, {"text": "R. V. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4559, "end_char": 4571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. Parameshwara Rao and R. V. Pillai, for."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswami, J. The appellant in both the appeals was one of the partners in a firm consisting of about thirty partners which was running a mill named 'Vasavamba Oil and Rice Mill' at Vijayawada.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Vasavamba Oil and Rice Mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswami, J. The appellant in both the appeals was one of the partners in a firm consisting of about thirty partners which was running a mill named 'Vasavamba Oil and Rice Mill' at Vijayawada."}}, {"text": "Vijayawada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4840, "end_char": 4850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswami, J. The appellant in both the appeals was one of the partners in a firm consisting of about thirty partners which was running a mill named 'Vasavamba Oil and Rice Mill' at Vijayawada."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a document dated April 15, 1940, the firm executed a lease in favour of the 1st respondent and another person of the area of the site for a period of 10 years."}}, {"text": "Subordinate\n\nJudge'~ Court, Vijayawada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196 of 1948 in the Subordinate\n\nJudge'~ Court, Vijayawada for dissolution of the partnership and for accounts."}}, {"text": "20, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5501, "end_char": 5509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 20, 1951 a preliminary decree was granted in that suit."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6138, "end_char": 6155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 20, 1951 a p:eliminary decree was passed in 0.S. No."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 17, 1952 the appellant was transposed as the 3rd plaintiff in 0.S. No .. 440 of 1950 in the District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada."}}, {"text": "District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 17, 1952 the appellant was transposed as the 3rd plaintiff in 0.S. No .. 440 of 1950 in the District Munsiff's Court, Vijayawada."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge's court, Vijayawada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7137, "end_char": 7174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaint was therefore filed in the Subordinate Judge's court, Vijayawada and numbered as O.S. 203 of D 1954."}}, {"text": "S. 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7193, "end_char": 7199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8770, "end_char": 8787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated February 28, 1956, the District H Judge held that the 1st respondent had not proved the oral agreement of sale in his favour alleged to have taken place on July 6,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "July 6,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8926, "end_char": 8939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated February 28, 1956, the District H Judge held that the 1st respondent had not proved the oral agreement of sale in his favour alleged to have taken place on July 6,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "High Court of A. P.-. A.S. No. 380 of 1956", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9395, "end_char": 9437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court of A. P.-."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9546, "end_char": 9560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a common judgment dated March 25, 1960 the High Court allowed both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Desu Yirabhadrayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10746, "end_char": 10764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I that on July 6, 1952 there was a meeting of all the male partners at the house of Desu Yirabhadrayya and at that meeting the:e was an agreement reached between all of them\n\n(except the appellant) and himself that they should sell to him their shares (and the shares of those whom they represented) at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Oevata Rama Mohana Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, 6 and 8, Sri Oevata Rama Mohana Rao, Sri Addepalli Nageswara Rao and si Thoomu Srimannarayana respectively were present at the meeting of the shareholders."}}, {"text": "Addepalli Nageswara Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11517, "end_char": 11540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, 6 and 8, Sri Oevata Rama Mohana Rao, Sri Addepalli Nageswara Rao and si Thoomu Srimannarayana respectively were present at the meeting of the shareholders."}}, {"text": "Thoomu Srimannarayana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11548, "end_char": 11569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, 6 and 8, Sri Oevata Rama Mohana Rao, Sri Addepalli Nageswara Rao and si Thoomu Srimannarayana respectively were present at the meeting of the shareholders."}}, {"text": "Gopala Krishnaiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also said that the first defendant, the son of the 2nd defendant, was there to represent the latter, and that Gopala Krishnaiah, son of the 3rd defendant, and the 7th defendant (who represents the 5th and 6th def en-\n\n(I) (1957) II An."}}, {"text": "Alavala Subbayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" \\\n\nSRlllAMULU v. ASWATHANARAYANA (Ramaswami, J.) 391\n\ndants) and Alavala Subbayya (husband of the 8th defendant and father of the 9th defendant) were present when the agreement was settled."}}, {"text": "July l, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12370, "end_char": 12382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-1, the deposition of the first respondent in the previous suit, where he said that the agreement was on July l, 1952 and that he did not remembCr the names of the other persons present at the meeting except P.W. 8, Sri Subba Rao Nayudu, Vice President of Andhra Bank."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao Nayudu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12485, "end_char": 12501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-1, the deposition of the first respondent in the previous suit, where he said that the agreement was on July l, 1952 and that he did not remembCr the names of the other persons present at the meeting except P.W. 8, Sri Subba Rao Nayudu, Vice President of Andhra Bank."}}, {"text": "Andhra Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12521, "end_char": 12532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-1, the deposition of the first respondent in the previous suit, where he said that the agreement was on July l, 1952 and that he did not remembCr the names of the other persons present at the meeting except P.W. 8, Sri Subba Rao Nayudu, Vice President of Andhra Bank."}}, {"text": "January 5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13165, "end_char": 13180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant reference was made to the counter-affidavit, B-4 dated January 5, 1953 filed in interlocutory proceedings on behalf of P.W. 7, but there is no serious cqntradiction between the evidence of that witness in Ex."}}, {"text": "D. Subba Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13987, "end_char": 13999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2, Sri D. Subba Rao is the Subordinate Judge of Bapatla."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14007, "end_char": 14035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 2, Sri D. Subba Rao is the Subordinate Judge of Bapatla."}}, {"text": "July 9. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14209, "end_char": 14221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit A-22 dated July 9."}}, {"text": "S. Narayana Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I supports the evidence of P.W. 2 G P.W. 3, Sn S. Narayana Rao, a District Judge and a family friend .of re~ndent No."}}, {"text": "Devata Rama Mohana Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15049, "end_char": 15071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 and 6\n\nSri Devata Rama Mohana Rao and Sri Addepaili Nageswara Rao which has been believed by the High Court On behalf of the appellant it was said that respondent No."}}, {"text": "Addepaili Nageswara Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15080, "end_char": 15103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 and 6\n\nSri Devata Rama Mohana Rao and Sri Addepaili Nageswara Rao which has been believed by the High Court On behalf of the appellant it was said that respondent No."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16947, "end_char": 16964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-11 and A-12 dated February 28, 1953."}}, {"text": "Gopi Setti Venkata Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17704, "end_char": 17732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-15 purported to be written by one Gopi Setti Venkata Subba Rao, one of the shareholders."}}, {"text": "Cranworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19382, "end_char": 19391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-As observed by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth) in Ridgway v. Wharton(') the fact of a subsequent agreement being prepared may be evidence that the previous nego."}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19777, "end_char": 19783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tiations did not amount to a concluded agreement, but the mere fact that persons wish to have a formal agreement drawn up does not establish the proposition that they cannot be bound by a pre vious agreement In Von Hatzfeldt-Wi/denburg v. Alexander(') it was stated by Parker, J. as follows :\n\n\"It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further conract is a\n\nconditin or term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through ... In the former case there is no enforceable contract either becailse the condition is unfulfilled or !", "canonical_name": "Parker"}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21316, "end_char": 21322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Currimbhoy and Company Ltd. v. Cree1( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed the view that the principle of the English law which is summarised in the judgment of Parker, J. in Von Hatz feldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander(3 ) was be applicable in India.", "canonical_name": "Parker"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21394, "end_char": 21399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Currimbhoy and Company Ltd. v. Cree1( 2 ) the Judicial Committee expressed the view that the principle of the English law which is summarised in the judgment of Parker, J. in Von Hatz feldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander(3 ) was be applicable in India."}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22449, "end_char": 22456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly hold that Mr. Gokhale is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22715, "end_char": 22728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first sale deed obtained by the appellant was on July 29, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24473, "end_char": 24477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Partition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24485, "end_char": 24498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Partition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24500, "end_char": 24513, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24588, "end_char": 24592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mar.ch 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24710, "end_char": 24725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l him.<elf invoked the provisiOns of s. 2 of that Act It was also argued that the High Court had D no jurisdiction to modify any portion of the judgment dated Mar.ch 25, 1960 by a subsequent order dated June 21, 1960 without an application for review."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24754, "end_char": 24767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l him.<elf invoked the provisiOns of s. 2 of that Act It was also argued that the High Court had D no jurisdiction to modify any portion of the judgment dated Mar.ch 25, 1960 by a subsequent order dated June 21, 1960 without an application for review."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24963, "end_char": 24967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PartitiOn Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24975, "end_char": 24988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25671, "end_char": 25699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subject to this modification; we affinn the judgment and decree of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.S. Nos."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_396_403_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "UN11ED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. v.\n\nOKARA GRAIN BUYERS SYNDICATE LTD. & ANR.\n\nMarcil 4, 1968\n\n(J. C. SiIAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ,]\n\nBanking-Deposit Rectif!t-Syndicate openinl/ account in Bank-De posit rteeipt in the name of Syndicate account DiJtrict Mqistrate If constitutes him owner of deposit-Condition of deposit that on due date deposit receipt should be discharged by depositor-Non production of deposit receipt-Equitable jurisdiction of High Court.\n\nThe respondent-a syndicate with its registered office in Montgo= in undivided Punjab, had depOl!ited certain amount with the appellant-Bank and obtained a Fixed Deposit Receipt. The deposit was required to be made for due performance of the conditiona of a scheme for procurement devised by the Government of Punjab in 1946. The receipt was made out in the name of the Syndicate Account District Magistrate, Montgomery. No account was opened in the bank's books in the name of the District Magistrate and under the conditions of deposit it was repayable to the respondent on demand on due date. The respondent served a notice of withdrawal upon the Bank. An endorsement in that behalf was made on the receipt which was handed over to the District Magistrate, Montgomery. Following the communal riots in 1947 the staff of the respondent migrated to India and the respondent aet up a new business at Amritsar.\n\nThe respondent demanded the money to which the appellant replied that the amount could not be returned until the respondent obtains a discharge from the District Magistrate, MontgOmery (in Pakistan) of his lien on the fixed deposit reccipt. The respondent filed a petition before the Debt Adjustment Tribunal, Amritsar, for an order directing the appellant to pay the amount with interest, and impleaded the District Magistrate, Montgomery as a respondent.\n\nThe District Magistrate filed no claim before the Tribunal. The Tribunal 'dismissed the petition holding that the amount stood forfeited by' order of the Disliict Magistrate, Montgomery.\n\nJn appeal, the High Court made an order in terms of the prayers in the petition, subject to the condition that the respondent shall give an indemnity for restitution of the amount in case the bank had to pay the amount to the District Magistrate, Montgomery.\n\nIn appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD : The deposit receipt gave rise to no contractual obligation in favour of the Disliict Magistrate, Montgomery nor was the bank a trustee for that officer. By an express condition the receipt was not tranlferable.\n\nThe name in which the receipt was made out was by itself not sufficient to create an interest in the amount in favour of the District Magistrate.\n\nThe District Magistrate was not in Jaw constituted owner of the money deposited by the respondent with the appellant by virtne of the delivery of the, receipt. Jn the books of the appellant the fund stood to the credit of the resp0ndent : the respondent was the owner thereof and it was the respo.ndent alone which was entitk:d to d .. m.uid payn1ent of the fund. Jn the absenre of any obligalion--cuntractual or fiducia.ry-un:dertuken by the appellant. in favour of the District ~1agistrate, the appellant could not withhold payment of money deposited after-the expiry of the period of notice. [399 D-HJ\n\ntl. CO. BANK V. tJ. G. B. SYNDICAtE (Shah, J.) 397\n\nEven if the condition in the terms of deposit that on due date the deposit n!ceipt should be discharged by the depositors was to be considered a condition pn!eedent to the enforcement of the obligation of the Bank in favour of the respondent, the High Court was right in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to direct that the money be paid to the respondent without production of the receipt. It might =nably be inferred that the receipt was lost or was destroyed and in such cases the court's equitable jurisdiction could appropriately be exercised. fhe . direction of the Hill!' Court that an indemnity be given by the n!spondent to the Bank for restitution if the Bank was to pay the amount to the District Magistrate, Montgomery has fully protected the Bank against any possible Joss and this eminently reasonable direction was not liable to be set side. 1400 F-Hl CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 449 of\n\n1965~\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated August 29, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in F.A.0. No. 14 of 1954.\n\nBishan Narain and Hans Raj Dhawan, for 'the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, B. K. Maheshwari and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. This appeal is filed with certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab.\n\nThe Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Syndicate'-was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with its registered office at Okara, District Montgomery .in the undivided Punjab. In 1946 the Government of undivided Punjab devised a scheme for procurement of foodgrains and appointed the Syndicate to buy foodgrains on its behalf. For due performance of the conditions of the scheme, the Syndicate was required to make a deposit with a recognized Bank. The Syndicate deposited an amount of Rs. 40,000/- on March 29, 1947, with the United Commercial Bank Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Bank' -and obtained a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated March 29, 1947. The terms of the receipt were these:\n\n\"The United Commercial Bank Limited.\n\nNo. Misc. 9872-4/18 Okara(Punjab) 29th March, 1947.\n\nReceived from the Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Limited, Okara A/ c District Magistrate, Montgomery Rs. Forty thousand only as a depllsit at the rate of 2 per cent per annum to remain till notice of twelve months for its withdrawal by either side expires.\n\nFor the United Commercial Bank Ltd.\n\n(Sd.) ............... .\n\nAccountant.\n\nRs. 40,000/- Manager.\n\n396 SUPUMB coua.t B.BPO&tS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nTerms for the Deposit Receipt\n\nThis deposit receipt is issued subject to the following terms and conditions.\n\n1. This receipt is not transferable.\n\n2. This deposit cannot be withdrawa before due date.\n\n3. Interest on this deposit ceases on the due date.\n\n4. The amount of this deposit cannot be withdrawn in part or by cheque or draft.\n\n5. On due date this deposit receipt should be discharged by the depositors on one anna stamp if it is required to be repaid, otherwise an endorsement as to its renewal should be made in the space provided thereof.\n\n6. Receipts will when so required, be issued in the names of two or more persons and will be made payable to any one or more of them or to the survivors.\"\n\nThe Syndicate served a notice of withdrawal on March 29, 194 7 upon the Bank and an endorsement in that behalf was made on the receipt. The rc!ceipt was then handed over to the District Magistrate, Montgomery. On account of widespread communal riots in the month of August 1947, non-muslim residents of the area found it unsafe to continue to reside at Okara, and the staff and Managing Director of the Syndicate migrated to India leaving all the property, goods etc. of the Syndicate at Okara. The\n\nSyndicate set up a new place of business at Amritsar and registered itself in the State of Punjab.\n\nIn reply to a demand made on October 26, 1951, by the Syndicate the Bank replied that the amount deposited will not be returned until the Syndicate obtains a discharge from the District Magistrate, Montgomery, of his lien on the fixed deposit receipt and an intimation in that behalf was given by the District Magistrate relinquishing his lien on the fixed deposit receipt.\n\nThe Syndicate then filed a petition before the Debt Adjustment Tribunal, Amritsar, .under s. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act 70 of 1951, for an order against the Bank for payment of Rs. 40,000/- as principal and Rs. 3,200/- as interest @ 2% per annum upto March 3, 1952, and future interest at 6% per . annum till realization.\n\nTo this petition, the District Magistrate, Montgomery, was also impleaded as party-respondent.\n\nThe Tribunal dismissed the petition holding that the amount of Rs. 40,000/- deposited by the Syndicate stood forfeited by order of the District Magistrate, Montgomery, and the petition was\n\non that account not maintainable. In appeal, the High Court of Punjab made an order in terms of the prayer in the petition, subject to the condition that the respondent shall give an indemnity for restitution of thP. amount in the event of the Bank having to pay the amount to the District Magistrate, Montgomery. The High Court held that the deposit was sl4bject to conditions x pressly mentioned in the receipt and no others and that the District Magistrate was not given any dominion over the amount of Rs. 40,000/- dep'Osited by the Syndicate.\n\nIn this appeal, counsel for the Bank urged that the terms of the receipt created no obligation enforceable against the Bank at the instance of the syndicate, and that in any event the liability could be enforced only if the District Magistrate discharged the receipt and handed it over to the Bank acknowledging that he had no claim against the Syndicate.\n\nThe deposit receipt is made out in the name of the Syndicate.\n\nIt is acknowledged by the receipt that an amount of Rs. 40,000/- was received from the Syndicate and the amount was to remain with the Bank till notice of twelve months for its withdrawal by either side expired. The deposit receipt gave rise to no contractual obligation in favour of the District Magistrate, Montgomery, nor was the Bank a trustee for that officer. It is common ground that no account was opened in the Bank's books in the name of the District Magistrate, Montgomery.\n\nCondition No. 5 of the Conditions of Deposit also clearly indicates that payment of the amount on the due date was to be made to the Syndicate, for it expressly provides that on due date the deposit receipt shall be discharged by the depositors if it is required to be repaid, otherwise an endorsement as to its renewal shall be made in the space provided in that behalf. It is not the case of the Bank that the receipt was transferred to the District Magistrate, Montgomery.\n\nBy an express condition the receipt is not transferable. The name in which the receipt was made out is by itself not sufficient to create an interest in the amount in favour of the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate was not in law constituted an owner of the money deposited by the Syndicate with the Bank by virtue of the delivery of the receipt. In the books of the Bank the fund stood to the credit of the Syndicate : the Syndicate was the owner thereof and it was the Syndicate alone which was entitled to demand payment of the fund. In the absence of any obligationcontratu~J or fiuciary-undertaken by the Bank in favour of the D1str1ct Ma_gIStrate, the Bank could not withhold payment of money deposited after the expiry of the period of notice.\n\nIt was urged by counsel for the Bank that unless the receipt wa~ poduced duly discharged, the Bank was not under an obhgat10n to repay the money.\n\nRelince was placed upon the\n\n400 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfollowing observations in Sheldon's Practice and Law of Banking, A 8th Edn., at p. 163 :\n\n\"If the deposit receipt merely acknowledges the deposit of the money, the banker cannot demand its production before paying over the money. But if the form of the receipt is such that the signing of the receipt is a condition precedent to the withdrawal of the money, then the deposit receipt must be returned when the money is handed over. But the banker is not entitled to withhold payment of the money should the receipt be lost or destroyed. All that he can .do is to ask the depositor for an indemnify. Whether he is legally entitled to de- . 'mand such an indemnity, the receipt not being a negotiable instrument, is another question.\",\n\nand upon the statement at p. 174, Art. 327 Vo]; 2 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. :\n\n\"The receipt of money on deposit account constitutes the banker a debtor to the depositor, but not a trustee thereof for him.\n\nThe debt is repayable either on demand or on condition agreed with the depositor. Specified notice may be stipulated for, and the return of the deposit book (or receipt) made a condition of repayment, or the deposit may be for a fixed period. If the return of the deposit book is a condition precedent, no actual debt arises until its return. In case of the loss of the book, however, a court would exercise its equit- \"able jurisdiction, and not allow the absence of the receipt to stand in the way of the depositor reclaiming his money.\"\n\nIn the proceeding before the Tribunal, the District Magistrate, Montgomery filed no claim. We are of the view, even if Condition No. 5 of the terms of deposit receipt is a condition precedent to the enforcement of the obligation of the Bank in favour of the Syndicate, that the High Court was right in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to direct that the money be paid to the Syndicate without production of the receipt. It may reasonably be inferred that the receipt is lost or destroyed and the Court's equitable jurisdiction may appropriately be exercised in this case.\n\nWhether the District Magistrate has the receipt is on the evidence problematic. Again the High Court has fully protected the Bank against any possible loss by directing that an indemnity be given by the Syndicate to the Bank for restitution if the Bank is to pay the amount to the District Magistrate, Montgomery, and this eminently reasonable direction is not liable to be set aside.\n\nIt was urged that the Government of Pakistan have forfeited the amount standing to the credit of the Syndicate in the Bank's books of account at Okara, and the validity of that act cannot be questioned in the Indian Courts. But there is no evidence on the record that any order was passed by the Pakistan Government forfeiting, in exercise of any authority-statutory or sovereign-, the amount deposited by the Syndicate with the Bank. The only document on the record on which reliance is placed is a sheet of paper entitled \"A list of securities of rion-muslims forfeited to Government of Pakistan deposited in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.\" tendered in evidence by Shamim Yazdani an employee of the Bank in Pakistan. The witness was examined on interrogatories and he identified the list of securities of non-muslims which, it was claimed, were forfeited by the Government of Pakistan and in the list produced by him, Item No. 14 is the amount of Rs. 40,000/- deposited by the Syndicate on March 29, 1947 at Okara. The list does not purport to bear the signature of any officer of the Government of Pakistan, nor does it purport to specify the authority in exercise in which it is claimed that the amount was forfeited. A copy of a letter dated March 4, 1949, from N. A. Haroon, Officer on Special Duty, West Pakistan Government, Finance Department, Laltore, addressed to the Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. was also produced by Shamim Yazdani. It is recited in the Jetter that he was directed to enclose a list of securities of non-muslims deposited with the Branch Office and forfeited at Lyallpur, Okara and the Bank was requested to make arrangements for early realization of the amount for payment to .the District Food Controllers concerned. Neither the original letter nor its authenticated copy has been produced.\n\nThere .is no reference to the source of the authority of the officer who purported to forfeit the amount. The letter even does not recite that the order of forfeiture was made by him acting on behalf of the Government of Pakistan.\n\nIt is common ground that the money deposited had not been paid by the Bank to the Government of Pakistan till the High Court decided the appeal. Counsel for the Bank urged that once an order was passed forfeiting the amount, the Bank held the amount on behalf of the Government of Pakistan. But underlies that argument the assumption that such an order was in fact passed by the Government of Pakistan. In the absence of any evidence .to that effect, we are unable to hold that any such order of forfe1un:e was passed.\n\nWe do not feel called upon in this case to ons1der whether. n order passed by the Government of a foreign country forfe1tmg the property of an Indian national must be recognized by the Courts in this country as a complete discharge of the obligation in circumstances similar to those in this case, when the question is raised in . the Courts here.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nIt was faintly suggested that the amount of Rs. 40,000/- had vested in the Custodian, Evacuee Property in Pakistan.\n\nBut the question was never mooted at any stage of this litigation, and we cannot permit counsel for the Bank to make out that case for the first time in this Coun.\n\nFinally it was contended, relying upon the judgment of this Court in The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Hamam Singh and Others(') that the dispute must be determined by the law of Pakistan and not by the law in India. In that case, the plaintiffs were residents of Lyallpur and were appointed by the Government of undivided Punjab to administer a scheme for rationing of cloth.\n\nThe Cloth Mills through its branch office at Lyallpur supplied those persons with cloth from time to time and maintained a running account of the transactions. On partition in 1947, Lyallpur was allotted to Pakistan and the plaintiffs migrated to India as refugees. The Pakistan Government isued an Ordinance vesting all evacuee property in Pakistan in the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Pakistan, and prohibited payment of money to evacuees in Pakistan and ordered that all moneys payable to, or claimable by evcuees, be paid to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property iu Pakistan. Payments so made were to operate as a discharge from further liability to the extent of the payment. Breach of this Jaw was punishable as an offence.\n\nThe Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property demandetl of the Mills the money payable to the plaintiffs and in sath; faction of the payment the Mills paid the amount. In defence to a suit filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, the Mills pleaded that they had discharged their liability by payment made to the Deputy Custodian of Evucuee Property in Pakistan. The Court held that Lyallpur was the place of primary obligation, that the elements out of which the contract to pay arose were most densely grouped at Lyallpur, and Lyallpur was the natural seat of the contract and the place with which i• had its closest and most real connection. Accordingly the proper law of the contract was the Jaw of Pakistan, and that even under the English doctrine 1he situs of the debt was Lyallpur and therefore either way the Jaw of Pakistan applied.\n\nAssuming that it was the Jaw of Pakistan which applied to the repayment of the debt due under the receipt, the Bank has failed to prove its defence that they are not liable to pay the money due under the deposit receipt.\n\nTo recapitulate the facts, the amount was deposited by the Syndicate; it was repayable to the Syndicate when demanded; the notice of repayment of the amount was served at the date when the deposit was made. The District Magistrate, Montgomery had no contractual relationship with\n\n(I) [19SS] 2 $.C.R. 4a2.\n\nA the Bank, nor was the Bank constituted a trustee for the District Magistrate.\n\nThe Bank has failed to prove that in exercise of any statutory or sovereign authority the Government of Pakistan have forfeited the amount. Nothing has been placed which may support the plea that under the law of Pakistan the Bank is not liable to repay the amount due under a deposit feceipt on the B. due date, because an officer of the State is said to have the custody of the receipt evidencing the deposit.\n\nThe order for payment -0f interest at a rate exceeding 2 % per annum was also chaJlenged by the Bank.\n\nBut the rate of interest was stipulated only for the period of the deposit receipt.\n\nThe Syndicate claimed interest at rate of 6% per annum from the date on which the petition was filed before the Tribunal under the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act 70 of 1951. Interest from the date of the petition was within the discretion of the High Court, and the High Court has awarded interest at the rate claimed. We do not see any reason to interfere with the rate of interest awarded by the High Court.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "UN11ED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OKARA GRAIN BUYERS SYNDICATE LTD. & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.-hereinafter", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deposit was required to be made for due performance of the conditiona of a scheme for procurement devised by the Government of Punjab in 1946."}}, {"text": "Syndicate Account District Magistrate, Montgomery", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 838, "end_char": 887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The receipt was made out in the name of the Syndicate Account District Magistrate, Montgomery."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Montgomery", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1207, "end_char": 1238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An endorsement in that behalf was made on the receipt which was handed over to the District Magistrate, Montgomery."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1317, "end_char": 1322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the communal riots in 1947 the staff of the respondent migrated to India and the respondent aet up a new business at Amritsar."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1367, "end_char": 1375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the communal riots in 1947 the staff of the respondent migrated to India and the respondent aet up a new business at Amritsar."}}, {"text": "Debt Adjustment Tribunal, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed a petition before the Debt Adjustment Tribunal, Amritsar, for an order directing the appellant to pay the amount with interest, and impleaded the District Magistrate, Montgomery as a respondent."}}, {"text": "Disliict Magistrate, Montgomery", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1990, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal 'dismissed the petition holding that the amount stood forfeited by' order of the Disliict Magistrate, Montgomery."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3319, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BANK V. tJ. G. B. SYNDICAtE (Shah, J.) 397\n\nEven if the condition in the terms of deposit that on due date the deposit n!ceipt should be discharged by the depositors was to be considered a condition pn!eedent to the enforcement of the obligation of the Bank in favour of the respondent, the High Court was right in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to direct that the money be paid to the respondent without production of the receipt."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and Hans Raj Dhawan, for 'the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hans Raj Dhawan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4400, "end_char": 4415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and Hans Raj Dhawan, for 'the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4438, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, B. K. Maheshwari and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. K. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, B. K. Maheshwari and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B. K. Maheshwari"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, B. K. Maheshwari and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B. K. Maheshwari"}}, {"text": "Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.-hereinafter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Syndicate'-was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with its registered office at Okara, District Montgomery .in the undivided Punjab.", "canonical_name": "Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.-hereinafter"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of undivided Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946 the Government of undivided Punjab devised a scheme for procurement of foodgrains and appointed the Syndicate to buy foodgrains on its behalf."}}, {"text": "29, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000/- on March 29, 1947, with the United Commercial Bank Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Bank' -and obtained a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated March 29, 1947."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Ltd.-hereinafter", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5203, "end_char": 5242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000/- on March 29, 1947, with the United Commercial Bank Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Bank' -and obtained a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated March 29, 1947."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5305, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000/- on March 29, 1947, with the United Commercial Bank Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Bank' -and obtained a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated March 29, 1947."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The terms of the receipt were these:\n\n\"The United Commercial Bank Limited."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9872-4/18 Okara(Punjab) 29th March, 1947."}}, {"text": "Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Limited, Okara A/ c District Magistrate, Montgomery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Received from the Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Limited, Okara A/ c District Magistrate, Montgomery Rs."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the United Commercial Bank Ltd.\n\n(Sd.) ............... ."}}, {"text": "March 29, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Syndicate served a notice of withdrawal on March 29, 194 7 upon the Bank and an endorsement in that behalf was made on the receipt."}}, {"text": "Okara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6910, "end_char": 6915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of widespread communal riots in the month of August 1947, non-muslim residents of the area found it unsafe to continue to reside at Okara, and the staff and Managing Director of the Syndicate migrated to India leaving all the property, goods etc."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSyndicate set up a new place of business at Amritsar and registered itself in the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7186, "end_char": 7202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to a demand made on October 26, 1951, by the Syndicate the Bank replied that the amount deposited will not be returned until the Syndicate obtains a discharge from the District Magistrate, Montgomery, of his lien on the fixed deposit receipt and an intimation in that behalf was given by the District Magistrate relinquishing his lien on the fixed deposit receipt."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 3, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,200/- as interest @ 2% per annum upto March 3, 1952, and future interest at 6% per ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, the High Court of Punjab made an order in terms of the prayer in the petition, subject to the condition that the respondent shall give an indemnity for restitution of thP. amount in the event of the Bank having to pay the amount to the District Magistrate, Montgomery."}}, {"text": "Sheldon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11107, "end_char": 11114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relince was placed upon the\n\n400 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfollowing observations in Sheldon's Practice and Law of Banking, A 8th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11849, "end_char": 11857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11887, "end_char": 11894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "327 Vo]; 2 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. :"}}, {"text": "Government of Pakistan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13563, "end_char": 13585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the Government of Pakistan have forfeited the amount standing to the credit of the Syndicate in the Bank's books of account at Okara, and the validity of that act cannot be questioned in the Indian Courts."}}, {"text": "Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13837, "end_char": 13856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But there is no evidence on the record that any order was passed by the Pakistan Government forfeiting, in exercise of any authority-statutory or sovereign-, the amount deposited by the Syndicate with the Bank."}}, {"text": "Shamim Yazdani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14209, "end_char": 14223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only document on the record on which reliance is placed is a sheet of paper entitled \"A list of securities of rion-muslims forfeited to Government of Pakistan deposited in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.\" tendered in evidence by Shamim Yazdani an employee of the Bank in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14251, "end_char": 14259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only document on the record on which reliance is placed is a sheet of paper entitled \"A list of securities of rion-muslims forfeited to Government of Pakistan deposited in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.\" tendered in evidence by Shamim Yazdani an employee of the Bank in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "March 4, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14789, "end_char": 14802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of a letter dated March 4, 1949, from N. A. Haroon, Officer on Special Duty, West Pakistan Government, Finance Department, Laltore, addressed to the Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. was also produced by Shamim Yazdani."}}, {"text": "N. A. Haroon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of a letter dated March 4, 1949, from N. A. Haroon, Officer on Special Duty, West Pakistan Government, Finance Department, Laltore, addressed to the Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. was also produced by Shamim Yazdani."}}, {"text": "West Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of a letter dated March 4, 1949, from N. A. Haroon, Officer on Special Duty, West Pakistan Government, Finance Department, Laltore, addressed to the Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. was also produced by Shamim Yazdani."}}, {"text": "Laltore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14894, "end_char": 14901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of a letter dated March 4, 1949, from N. A. Haroon, Officer on Special Duty, West Pakistan Government, Finance Department, Laltore, addressed to the Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. was also produced by Shamim Yazdani."}}, {"text": "Lyallpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15140, "end_char": 15148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is recited in the Jetter that he was directed to enclose a list of securities of non-muslims deposited with the Branch Office and forfeited at Lyallpur, Okara and the Bank was requested to make arrangements for early realization of the amount for payment to .the District Food Controllers concerned."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18136, "end_char": 18173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In defence to a suit filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, the Mills pleaded that they had discharged their liability by payment made to the Deputy Custodian of Evucuee Property in Pakistan."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_404_414_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "BHUPENDRA SINGH\n\nTHE STA~ OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 5, 1968\n\n(S. M. SllQU, J.M. S!mLAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] B\n\nCode of Criminal Proctdure, 1898, ss. 375, 376 and 423-Duty of 'J{Jpellate Court to examine entire record in proceedlll//S for con{irmatron of dtath se11te11L:e--if court can acctpt dtf•nct admission of Its CflSt! luzv. inJl no substance or should exG111lnt rec!ird for itself.\n\nStnttnce-<Jpptal against-when Supreme Court may interfere.\n\nThe appellant lived with his father A in a house adjoining that of the deceased G who lived there with his two sons and a daughter. An argument developed one evening between the appellant and one of the sons of G.\n\nWhen G intervened, the appellant's father A raised a 'lalkara' asking the appellant to finish him off. Thereupon the appellant shot and killed G.\n\nBy this time G's two sons, his daughter and one M who lived neaf-by had arrived and witnessed the occurrence. At the trial the appellant's defence was a pica of alibi but the Trial Coun rejected the defence and convicted the appellant of G's murder and sentenced him to death.\n\nIn appeal, the High Court did not go into the defence evidence because the counsel appearin~ for the appellant admitted that there was no substance in it.\n\nThe High Court accordingly dismilled the•appeal and con' finned the sentence of death.\n\nIn appeal to this Court against the conviction and the sentence it was contended that the High Court in not examining the defence evidence for itself, committed an er'ror and did not properly discharge its duties.\n\nHBLD : (i) Although ordinarily, in a criminal appeal against conviction, the appellate Court, under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\ncan d; smiss the appeal if the Court is of the opinion that theM is no sufficient ground for interference and it is not necessary for the appellate Court to examin<0 the entire record for the purpose of arriving at an in\n\ndependent decision, the position i• different where the appeal is by an F accused who is sentenced to death, so that the High Court dealing with the appeal has before it. simultaneously witb the appeal. a reference for continnation of the capital sentence under s. 374 of the Code. On a reference for confirmation of sen!ence of death, the High Court is requirctl to proceed in occordance witb sections 375 and 376 of the Code Of Cri minal Procedure and the provisions of these sections make it clear that the duty of the High Court, in dealing with the reference, is not only to G see whether the order passed by the Sessions Judge Is correct but to examine the case for itself and even direct a further enauirv or the taking of additional evidence if the Court considers it desirable in order to as certain the guilt or the innocence of the convicted penon. (407 D-0)\n\n. Jummcn and Others v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1957, S.C. 469; . Ram ShGnker Singh & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,\n\n(1962) Supp. 1 . S.C.R. 49 at p. 59; applied.\n\n(ii) (UPon an exarilination of the entiro evidence by tho Court) : No grconds had been made out for intcm.rence with the appellant's con viotion. [409 D-B)\n\nBHUPBNDRA v. PUNJAB (Bhargava, /.)\n\nA Masalti v. State of U.P., [1964] 8 S.C.R, 133 at p. 144; referred to.\n\n(iii) The sentence of death must be set aside and instead the appellant s.entenced to imprisonment for life Although ordinarily this Coiirt, in exercise of its power under Art.. 136 does not interfere with a sentence, in the present case there were som'e special features which had to be taken into account : even according to the proSccution, the murder of G by the appellant was not pn:- meditated; the act Of firing at him appeared to be that of a hot-beaded person who was incited to do so by his father; the murder was not in any way cruel cir brutal. In all these circumstances, tho ends of justice would.\n\nbe met if the lesser penalty prescribed by law was awarded to the appellant [413 G•Hl\n\nCRIMINAL AIIPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 185of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 18, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 24 7 of 1967 and Murder Reference No. 23 of\n\n19~. .\n\nD A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant.\n\nHans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J. Bhupendra Singh has come up to this Court irr appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming the sentence of death awarded to him by the Sessions . Judge of Jullundur for an offence under section 302 of the Indian. Penal Code and dismissing his appeal against the conviction and sentence. The conviction of the appellant was recorded for committing the murder of one Gurdarshan Singh who was living in the same village Birpind as the appellant in the house adjoining the appellant's house.\n\nThe appellant's father, Ajit Singh, also lived with the appellant, while, with Gurdarshan Singh, were living his sons, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, and his daughter Gian Kaur. According to the prosecution, on the 6th November, 1965, at about 7.45 p.m., the two brothers, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, happened to be standing in front of their house talking to each other, when the appellant came out of his house and asked them what they were talking about. Gurdial Singh replied that he and Sarvjit Singh were brothers apd were talking between themselves and it was no business of th~ appellant to interfere. The appellant, thereupon, abused the two brothers and also slapped Sarvjit Singh on the face.\n\nGurdial Singh asked the appellant why he had beaten his brother and used abusive language against the appellant. The appellant got e.nraged, ran into his house abusing the two boys, and returned with a double-barrel 12 bore gun. When he came out of his house this time, he was accompanied by his father, Ajit Singh.\n\nGurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh then ran into the 'deorhi' of their house. In the meantime, their father, Gurdarshan Singh, and their sister, Gian Kaur, returned to the house from their fields.\n\nWhen Gurdarshan Singh saw the appellant carrying the gun, he enquired what the matter was. Thereupon, Ajit Singh raised a 'lalkara' asking his son, the appellant, to finish off Gurdarshan Singh. The appellant then fired two shots in quick succession from his gun hitting Gurdarshan Singh on vital parts of his body.\n\nGurdarshan Singh fell down dead on the ground. One Malkiat Singh, who lived in a house nearby, had arrived and saw this occur. rence, so that the four persons, who witnessed the occurrence, were Malkiat Singh, Gurdial Singh, Sarvjit Singh and Gian Kaur.\n\nGurdial Singh, leaving others to look after the dead body of his father, went with Lal Singh, Lambardar, to the Police Station which was situated at a distance of about three miles and lodge the }'irst Information Report at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day. The case was then investigated. A post mortem examination on the corpse of Gurdarshan Singh was performed and articles like pellets, blood-stained cardboard pieces lying near the scene of occurrence were taken into their possession by the. Police. Both the appellant and his father, Ajit Singh, were thereafter prosecuted for this murder. The appellant was charged with being the principal offender in committing the murder, while his father, Ajit Singh, was prosecuted for having participated in the murder with the common intention that Gurdarshan Singh should be killed.\n\nHowever, before the trial could take place in the Court of Sessions, Ajit Singh was murdered and, for that murder, Gurdial Singh was prosecuted.\n\nIn the case, at the first stage before the Court of the Commit ting Magistrate, both Ajit Singh and the appellant took the plea that neither of them was responsible for committing the murder of Gurdarshan Singh and contented themselves with denying the correctness of the prosecution case. In the Court of Sessions. when the appellant was examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he came forward with the plea that it was his father, Ajit Singh, who actually fired and killed Gurdarshan Singh. He pleaded that he himself was not present in this village at all and was, in fact, that day staying at Phillaur. He, thus, put forward the plea of alibi.\n\nThe Sessions Judge believed the evidence of the four prosecution witnesses mentioned above, and, after discussing the defence evidence given on behalf of the appellant in support of his pleas. rejected that evidence. He did not accept the defence evidence that Gurdarshan Singh was fired at by Ajit Singh and he also held that the evidence given on behalf of the appellant to prove\n\nbis alibi could not be relied upon. On these findings, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death for committing the murder of Gurdarshan Singh.\n\nWhen the case came up before the High Court, the High Court briefly examined the evidence of tbe prosecution witnesses and held that their evidence was reliable. The High Court did not, however, go into the defence evidence, because the counsel appearing for the appellant, according to the High Court, frankly admitted that there was no substance in it. On this view, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant and confirnied his sentence of death.\n\nIn this appeal, the principal question that was canvassed before us on behalf of the appellant was that the High Court, in not examining the defence evidence for itself on the simple ground that counsel for the appellant admitted that there was no substance in it, committed an error and did not properly discharge its duty.\n\nIt appears that there is substance in the submission made on behalf of the appellant. Ordinarily, in a criminal appeal against conviction, .the appellate Court, under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can dismiss the appeal, if the Court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for interference, after examining all the grounds urged before it for challenging the correctness of the decision given by the trial Court. It is not necessary for the appellate Court to examine the entire record for the purpose of arriving at an independent decision of its own whether the conviction of the appellant is fully justified.\n\nThe position is, however, different where the appeal is by an accused who is sentenced to death, so that the High Court dealing with the appeal has before it, simultaneously with the appeal, a reference for confirmation of the capital sentence under s. 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On a reference for confirmation of sentence of death, the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with sections 375 and 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of these sections make it clear that the duty of the High Court, in dealing with the reference, is not only to see whether the order passed by the Sessions Judge is correct. but to examine the case for itself and even direct a further enquiry or the taking of additional evidence if the Court considers it desirable in order to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the convicted person. It is true that, under the proviso to s. 376, no order of confirmation is to be made until the period allowed for preferring the appeal has expired, or, if an appeal'is presented within such period, until such appeal is disposed of, so that, if an appeal is filed by a condemned prisoner that. appeal has to be disp<ised of_ before any order is made in the reference confirming the sentence of death. In disposing of such an appeal, however, it is necessary that the High Court should keep in view its dutv under s. 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, consequently, the Couri must examine the appeal record for itself,\n\n40~ SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\n.arrive at a view whether a further enquiry-or taking of additional .evidence is desirable or not, and then come to its own conclusion on the entire material on record whether conviction of the condemned prisoner is justified and the sentence of death should be confirmed. In Jumman and Others v. The State of Punjab(1 ), 1his Court explained this position in the following words :-\n\n\" . . . . . ..... but there is a difference when a reference is made under s. 374, Criminal Procedure Code, and when, disposing of an appeal under s. 423, Criminal Procedure Code, and that is t:pat the High Court has to satisfy itself as to whether a case beyoRd reasonable doubt has been made out against the accused persons for the infliction of the penalty of death. In fact the proceedings before the High Court are a reappraisal and the reassessment of the entire facts and law in order that th,~ High Court should be satisfied on the materials about the guilt or innocence of the accused persons. Such being the case, it is the duty of the High Court to consider the proceedings in all their aspects and come to an independent conclusion on the materials, apart from the view expressed by the Sessions fodge. In so doing, the High Court will be assisted by the opinion expressed by the Sessions Judge, but under the provisions of the Jaw above-men!ioned it is for the High Court to come to an independent conclusion of its\n\nown\"\"\n\nThe same principle was recognised in Ram Shankar Singh and -Others v. State of We.s<t Bengal(2) :-\n\n\" ... .. .. . . . The High Court had also to consider what order should be passed on the reference under s. 374, and to decide on an appraisal of the evidence whether the order of conviction for the offences for which the accused were convicted was justified and whether, having regard to the circumstances. the sentence of death was the appropriate sentence.\"\n\nJn Masalti v. State of U.P.(3) this Court was dealing with an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and, in that appeal, on behaJf of the persons who were under sentence of death, a point was sought to be urged which was taken before the trial Court and was rejected by it, but was not repeated before the High Court. This Court held :-\n\n\" .... . ...... . . .it may, in a proper case, be permissible to the appellants to ask this Court to consider\n\n(l) A.J.R. 1957 S.C. 469.\n\n(2) (1962) Supp. 1S.C.R. 49 at p. S9.\n\n(3) (196418 S.C.R. 133 at p. 144.\n\nthat point in an appeal under Artice 136 of _the Constitution; after all in criminal proceedings of this character where sentences of death are imposed on the appellants, it may not be appropriate to refuse to consider relevant and material plas of fact and law only on the ground that they were not urged before the High Court. If it is shown that the pleas were actually urged before the High Court and had not been considered by it, then, of course the party is entitled as a matter of right to\n\nobtain a decision on those pleas from this Court. But zven otherwise no hard and fast rule can be laid down prohibiting such pleas being raised in appeals under Art. 136.\"\n\nIn view of these principles indicated by us above, and in view of the fact that, in this case, the High Court did not properly examine the defence evidence on the ground that the counsel for the appellant in that Court admitted that there was no substance in it, we permitted learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal to take us through the entire evidence on the record given by the prosecution and the defence so as to enable us to form our own judgment about the correctness of the conviction and sentence of the appellant.\n\nWe, however, find that, after examining the entire cv'idence, we are unable to hold that any grounds are made out for interference with the conviction.\n\nThe prosecution case, as already mentioned by us above, is supported by the evidence of four eye-witnesses, Gurdial Singh,\n\nSarvjit Singh, Gian Kaur and Malkiat Singh.\n\nThree of these witnesses, Gurdial Singh, Sarvjit Singh and Gian Kaur are the\n\nsons and daughter of the deceased Gurdarshan Singh, but this circumstance, in our opinion, does not detract from the value to be attached to their evidence, because, naturally enough, , they\n\nare interested in seeing that the real murderer of their father is convicted of te offence. and they cannot be expected to adopt a course by which some mnocent person would be substituted for the person really guilty of the murder. None of these witnesses hd any such enmity with the appellant as could induce him to give false evidence and to substitute him as the murderer in place of the perso!1 really guilty. n fact, their feelings would be strongest agamst. the real culprit and, consequently, their evid~\n\nmce cannot be discarded on the mere ground of their close interest m the deceaed. \"fyf alkiat Singh has been held both by the Sessions Judge and the High Court to be an independent witness and we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the two Courts O.n behalf of the appellant.' it w~~ so.ught to be urged that Malkiat\n\nSingh. bore a grudge agamst AJtt Smgh, because Ajit Singh had been instrumental in the adoption of a son by Malkiat Singh's real uncJe, Veer ingh, with the result that Malkiat Singh was\n\ndeprived of the succession to the property of his uncle. Malkiat Singh denied that he had any grievance against Ajit Singh on such a ground. In support of the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant, one defence witness, Niranjan Singh was examined who claimed to be the son of another' real uncle of Malkiat Singh.\n\nNiranjan Singh came to depose that his son, Sadha Singh, had been adopted by Veer Singh and this adoption took place because Ajit Singh had asked Veer Singh to take Sadhu Singh in adoption.\n\nNiranjan Singh had, however, to admit that, in the deed of adoption, the person adopted is described as Mukhtiar Singh and not Sadhu Singh. To explain this discrepancy, Niranjan Singh came forward with the assertion that his son, Sadhu Singh, bore an alias Mukhtiar Singh. If Sadhu Singh was the real and principal name of the boy adopted by Veer Singh, there is no reason why that name was not mentioned in the deed of adoption and why the person adopted was described only as Mukhtiar Singh.\n\nThere is further the circumstance that, even according to Niran jan Singh, Malkiat Singh, witness, did not try to challenge the adoption, even though the adoption had taken place in April 1965, seven months before this incident. Malkiat Singh had stated that he had no grievance against Ajit Singh and was in fact not interest cd in challenging the adoption.\n\nIn these circumstances, we do not think that Malkiat Singh can be said to be an interested wit ness and must hold that his evidence has been rightly relied upon.\n\nThe time of the murder was not only J?roved by the evidence E of these four witnesses, but is also borne out by the circumstance that the First lnfonnation Report was lodged at the Police 9tation three miles away at about 9.30 p.m. without any undue delay.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, it was urged that the First Wormation Report was in fact recorded much later and not at 9.30 p.m. the same day, on the basis that the copy of that report sent to F the Ilaqa Magistrate was received by him at 10.30 a.m. on 8th November, 1965. The argument was that, if the report had been lodged at 9.30 p.m. on 6th No:vember 1965, the copy should have reached the Magistrate the same night or early on the 7th November and not as late as 8th November. We are unable to accept this submission. The evidence of Gurdial Singh was perfectly clear that he reached the police station and lodged the G report that very night at 9.30 p.m. and there is no reason to disbelieve him. It appears that in this case, the investigating officer, Sub-Inspector Ram Saran Dass was, to some extent, negligent.\n\nIn the report lodged by Gurdial Singh, the facts given clearly made out an offence of murder, and yet the Sub-Inspector chose to register .the case wrongly as for an offence under section 304 H read with section 34. of the Indian Penal C<><te. It may be that, having wrongly put down the offenc.e as under .304 .J.P.C. instead of section 302, the Sub-Inspector did not consider 1t 1lecesarv to\n\nsend the report to the Ilaqa Magistrate the same night and delay eJ sending it, so that it was received at 10-30 a.m. on 8th November, 1965 by the Magistrate. It is also not clear from the evidence whether, apart from the copy of the First Information Reporl sent to the Ilaqa Magistrate, any special report was also\n\nent to the Magistrate by the Sub-Inspector. In any case, we do not think that this late receipt of the copy of t.lte First Information Report by the Magistrate can lead to the infere1ice that Gurdial Singh is not right in saying that he had the report recorded the s:une night at 9 .30 p.m.\n\nThe evidence of the doctor who performed the post mortem examination and of the ballistic expert clearly estabfish that Gurdarshan Singh had died as a result of gun shot injury received by him from a gun. The guri which the appellant passesscd under a licence issued to him was examined by the ballistic expert and his evidence proved that the shots, which killed the deceased, were tired from that very gun. In these circumstances, the Sessions Judge and the High Court were right in recording the conviction of the appellant for the murder of Gurdarshan Singh on the basis of this prosecution evidence.\n\nSo far as the defence put forward on behalf of the appellant is concerned, the first point to be noticed is that the plea that the shots. which killed Gurdarshan Singh, were fired by Ajit Singh, was not taken by the appellant until his father, Ajit Singh, had already died. It seems to be clear that this plea, which was put forward for the first time in the Court of Sessions, was an afterthought which could be taken safely by the appellant after Ajit Singh had died and he could not be convicted for the murder.\n\nWhen the appellant was examined in the court of the Committing Magistrate while Ajit Singh was alive, he did not make any such statement. This is an important circumstance that militates against the plea put forward in defence.\n\nThe appellant relied upon the evidence of two witnesses in support of the p~a hat the shots '.-\"hich killed Gurdarshan Singh were fired by A11t Smgh and not by the appeltant. The first of these witnesses is Uggar Singh who stated that he was in his house situated opposite to the house of the appellant and, when he c?mc out on earing the noise, he saw Ajit Singh quarelling with\n\n(1rdashan Singh deceased and exchanging abuses. Thereafter,\n\n~.11t .Smgh fired the gun shots towards Gurdarshan Singh killing\n\nh.1111 instantaneously. Acco\\ding to him, neither MaJkiat Singh nor tnc sons of Gurdarshan Singh were present at that time. Even Shrimati Giano. according to him, was not there. TI1e evidence of this witness cannot be relied upon for several reasons. According to this witness, his statement was recorded by the Police at about 10 a.m. the next day, i.e., the 7th November, 1965; but L7Sup.C.1:61!- -:?\n\nthe investigating officer's statement is clear that no person residing ih the neighbourhood had been examined by him or had come forward to give any statement to him. Uggar Singh, thus, made a wrong statement that he was examined by the Police the next day.\n\nIt also appears that he was prosecuted in a murder case in which he was acquitted and Ajit Singh had assisted him in that trial. The answers given by him in the cross-examination also show that, in fact, his house is not in front of the house of the appellant but is situated in the same line as the house of the appellant and the deceased and at some distance. He tried to get over this difficulty by stating that he has another house which is opposite to the house of the appellant, but it appears that that house belongs to his cousin, Ujagar Singh, and that is how the house is described in the site plan also. In all these circumstances, the evidence of Uggar Singh cannot be accepted.\n\nThe second witness is Niranjan Singh, whose evidence we have noticed above, and he also partially supported this part of th'! defence case by saying that he came rus!ling to the spot after the incident and found Gurdarshan Singh lying dead, while Ajit Singh . D was standing outside his house with something which appeared to be a gun. It is clear that this is an, another attempt by Niran jan Singh to help the appellant and on this point also reliance cannot be placed on his evidence.\n\n. There remains to be considered the evidence given ori behalf of the appellant to establish his plea of alibi. One defence wit- E ness Kirpal Singh was examined to prove that the accused was on deputation in the Seed Corporation at Phillaur and was attached to the Tehsildar, Phillaur and that he was not suspended until\n\n11th November, 1965. His evidence is of no help, because it is obvious that the appellant could be suspended only after he surrendered in connectlon with this charge which happened on F 11th November 1965. The fact that be was in service on 6th November, 1965, does not necessarily prove that he could not have been present at the place of occurrence.\n\nThe-_witness, on whose evidence relince is primarily placed is Bunta Ram, Patwari. Bunta Ram stated that on 6th November, 1965 he had come to the office of the Corporation at Phillaur G in order to collect his pay and he also brought some files from Nakodar in order to consign those files. In that connection, he remained in the office of the Corporation throughout the day. He .saw the appellant also working in the said office throughout the day. According to him, at about 6.30 p.m., he and the appellant went to the house of Inderjit Singh, Patwari and spent the H night at his house.\n\nIt, however, appears that this witness is a direct subordinate of the appellant and that is the reason why he has come forward to support the appellant's case. In this connection, Jagdish Rai Batta, Tehsildar in the Seed Corporation, was examined as a court witness by the Sessions Judge and his evidence shows that Bunta Ram was one of the Patwaris working as a subordinate of the appellant who was a kanoongo in the Corporation.\n\nBunta Ram had stated that on that day he had himself appeared before the Tehsildar in connection with the consignment of the files and the Tehsildar had given him some directions in that behalf.\n\nJagdish Rai Batta stated that on that day Bunta Ram, Patwari did not appear before him nor did he produce any files.\n\nHe went further and stated that' he did not point out any defects to Bunta Ram Patwari either orally or in writing. Thus, Bunta Ram is proved to be an untruthful witness by the evidence of Jagdish Rai Batta, Tehsildar. Bunta Ram, in his cross-examination, purported to state that the appellant was living in a part of the house of Inderjit Singh at.Phillaur.\n\nOn the face of it, it cannot be correct because the appellant did not belong to Phillaur and was not even posted there in connection with his employment.\n\nHis headquarters, according to Jagdish Rai Batta, was Nakodar and not Phillaur. The evidence of Jagdish Rai Batta only shows that he saw the appellant working in his office at Phillaur on that day until about 5 p.m. Phillaur is connected with Nakodar by a metalled road along with which there is a bus service, and village Birpind, where the murder took place, is only three miles from Nakodar; It is quite clear that the appellant could easily reach Birpind well before 7.45 p.m. even if he worked at Phillaur till 5 p.m. on that day.\n\nIt is also significant that the murder was committed with the gun belonging to the appellant.\n\nIf the appellant himself had not been at Birpind and had been at Phillaur or Nakodar, the gun should have been with. him at one of these places and not at Birpind.\n\nThe gun could not, therefore, have been available for use by Ajit Singh, his father, in his absence. Considering all these circumstances and the nature of the evidence, we are unable to accept that there is any force in the defence plea of alibi put forward by the appellant, so that the conviction based on the prosecution evidence must be upheld .\n\n. A plea was put in for reduction of sentence. Ordinarily, this Court, in exercise of its powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution, does not interfere with a sentence . awarded by a Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court; but, in this case, there are some special features which we cannot ignore. Even according to the prosecution, the murder of Gurdarshan Singh by the appellant was not pre-meditated. The act of firing at him appears to be that of a hot-headed person who was incited to do .so by his father. The murder was not in any way cruel or brutal. In all these circumstances, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the lesser penalty prescribed by law is awarded to the appellant.\n\nConsequently, while upholding the conviction, we allow the ap- '- peal to the extent that the sentence of death is set aside, and, instead, the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "BHUPENDRA SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUPENDRA SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STA~ OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Proctdure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 375, 376 and 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Proctdure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Proctdure, 1898"}}, {"text": "G.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellant shot and killed G.\n\nBy this time G's two sons, his daughter and one M who lived neaf-by had arrived and witnessed the occurrence."}}, {"text": "s. 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 375 and 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4163, "end_char": 4174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. A. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4189, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shiva Pujan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Virendra Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. S. R. Chari, B. A. Desai, S. C. Agarwal, A. K. Gupta,\n\nShiva Pujan Singh and Virendra Verma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hans Raj Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4276, "end_char": 4291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bbargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J. Bhupendra Singh has come up to this Court irr appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming the sentence of death awarded to him by the Sessions ."}}, {"text": "Bhupendra Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4390, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J. Bhupendra Singh has come up to this Court irr appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming the sentence of death awarded to him by the Sessions .", "canonical_name": "BHUPENDRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBbargava, J. Bhupendra Singh has come up to this Court irr appeal by special leave against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirming the sentence of death awarded to him by the Sessions ."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4652, "end_char": 4662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gurdarshan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conviction of the appellant was recorded for committing the murder of one Gurdarshan Singh who was living in the same village Birpind as the appellant in the house adjoining the appellant's house.", "canonical_name": "Gurdarshan Singh"}}, {"text": "Birpind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conviction of the appellant was recorded for committing the murder of one Gurdarshan Singh who was living in the same village Birpind as the appellant in the house adjoining the appellant's house."}}, {"text": "Ajit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father, Ajit Singh, also lived with the appellant, while, with Gurdarshan Singh, were living his sons, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, and his daughter Gian Kaur.", "canonical_name": "Malkiat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father, Ajit Singh, also lived with the appellant, while, with Gurdarshan Singh, were living his sons, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, and his daughter Gian Kaur."}}, {"text": "Sarvjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father, Ajit Singh, also lived with the appellant, while, with Gurdarshan Singh, were living his sons, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, and his daughter Gian Kaur."}}, {"text": "Gian Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father, Ajit Singh, also lived with the appellant, while, with Gurdarshan Singh, were living his sons, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, and his daughter Gian Kaur."}}, {"text": "6th November, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5145, "end_char": 5163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution, on the 6th November, 1965, at about 7.45 p.m., the two brothers, Gurdial Singh and Sarvjit Singh, happened to be standing in front of their house talking to each other, when the appellant came out of his house and asked them what they were talking about."}}, {"text": "Malkiat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Malkiat Singh, who lived in a house nearby, had arrived and saw this occur.", "canonical_name": "Malkiat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Lal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6807, "end_char": 6816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdial Singh, leaving others to look after the dead body of his father, went with Lal Singh, Lambardar, to the Police Station which was situated at a distance of about three miles and lodge the }'irst Information Report at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day."}}, {"text": "Lambardar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdial Singh, leaving others to look after the dead body of his father, went with Lal Singh, Lambardar, to the Police Station which was situated at a distance of about three miles and lodge the }'irst Information Report at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8056, "end_char": 8067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8075, "end_char": 8101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Phillaur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8321, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He pleaded that he himself was not present in this village at all and was, in fact, that day staying at Phillaur."}}, {"text": "s. 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9883, "end_char": 9889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9897, "end_char": 9923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10605, "end_char": 10611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10619, "end_char": 10645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 375 and 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10758, "end_char": 10778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10786, "end_char": 10812, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11260, "end_char": 11266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 375", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11735, "end_char": 11741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11749, "end_char": 11775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12356, "end_char": 12362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12364, "end_char": 12387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12428, "end_char": 12434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13523, "end_char": 13529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13855, "end_char": 13866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14297, "end_char": 14299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14997, "end_char": 15005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15805, "end_char": 15818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case, as already mentioned by us above, is supported by the evidence of four eye-witnesses, Gurdial Singh,\n\nSarvjit Singh, Gian Kaur and Malkiat Singh."}}, {"text": "Sarvjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case, as already mentioned by us above, is supported by the evidence of four eye-witnesses, Gurdial Singh,\n\nSarvjit Singh, Gian Kaur and Malkiat Singh."}}, {"text": "Gian Kaur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15836, "end_char": 15845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case, as already mentioned by us above, is supported by the evidence of four eye-witnesses, Gurdial Singh,\n\nSarvjit Singh, Gian Kaur and Malkiat Singh."}}, {"text": "Malkiat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15850, "end_char": 15863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case, as already mentioned by us above, is supported by the evidence of four eye-witnesses, Gurdial Singh,\n\nSarvjit Singh, Gian Kaur and Malkiat Singh."}}, {"text": "fyf alkiat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16732, "end_char": 16748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fyf alkiat Singh has been held both by the Sessions Judge and the High Court to be an independent witness and we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the two Courts O.n behalf of the appellant.'"}}, {"text": "Malkiat\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16970, "end_char": 16984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it w~~ so.ught to be urged that Malkiat\n\nSingh.", "canonical_name": "Malkiat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Veer ingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17115, "end_char": 17124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bore a grudge agamst AJtt Smgh, because Ajit Singh had been instrumental in the adoption of a son by Malkiat Singh's real uncJe, Veer ingh, with the result that Malkiat Singh was\n\ndeprived of the succession to the property of his uncle.", "canonical_name": "Veer Singh"}}, {"text": "Niranjan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17391, "end_char": 17405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant, one defence witness, Niranjan Singh was examined who claimed to be the son of another' real uncle of Malkiat Singh."}}, {"text": "Niranjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17487, "end_char": 17501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niranjan Singh came to depose that his son, Sadha Singh, had been adopted by Veer Singh and this adoption took place because Ajit Singh had asked Veer Singh to take Sadhu Singh in adoption.", "canonical_name": "Niran jan Singh"}}, {"text": "Sadha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17531, "end_char": 17542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niranjan Singh came to depose that his son, Sadha Singh, had been adopted by Veer Singh and this adoption took place because Ajit Singh had asked Veer Singh to take Sadhu Singh in adoption.", "canonical_name": "Sadha Singh"}}, {"text": "Veer Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niranjan Singh came to depose that his son, Sadha Singh, had been adopted by Veer Singh and this adoption took place because Ajit Singh had asked Veer Singh to take Sadhu Singh in adoption.", "canonical_name": "Veer Singh"}}, {"text": "Sadhu Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17652, "end_char": 17663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niranjan Singh came to depose that his son, Sadha Singh, had been adopted by Veer Singh and this adoption took place because Ajit Singh had asked Veer Singh to take Sadhu Singh in adoption.", "canonical_name": "Sadha Singh"}}, {"text": "Mukhtiar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17782, "end_char": 17796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niranjan Singh had, however, to admit that, in the deed of adoption, the person adopted is described as Mukhtiar Singh and not Sadhu Singh."}}, {"text": "Niran jan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18231, "end_char": 18246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is further the circumstance that, even according to Niran jan Singh, Malkiat Singh, witness, did not try to challenge the adoption, even though the adoption had taken place in April 1965, seven months before this incident.", "canonical_name": "Niran jan Singh"}}, {"text": "8th November, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19204, "end_char": 19222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant, it was urged that the First Wormation Report was in fact recorded much later and not at 9.30 p.m. the same day, on the basis that the copy of that report sent to F the Ilaqa Magistrate was received by him at 10.30 a.m. on 8th November, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in this case, the investigating officer, Sub-Inspector Ram Saran Dass was, to some extent, negligent."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19954, "end_char": 19965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19978, "end_char": 19988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20104, "end_char": 20115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uggar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22337, "end_char": 22348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these witnesses is Uggar Singh who stated that he was in his house situated opposite to the house of the appellant and, when he c?mc out on earing the noise, he saw Ajit Singh quarelling with\n\n(1rdashan Singh deceased and exchanging abuses."}}, {"text": "1rdashan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22512, "end_char": 22526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these witnesses is Uggar Singh who stated that he was in his house situated opposite to the house of the appellant and, when he c?mc out on earing the noise, he saw Ajit Singh quarelling with\n\n(1rdashan Singh deceased and exchanging abuses.", "canonical_name": "Gurdarshan Singh"}}, {"text": "MaJkiat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22688, "end_char": 22701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acco\\ding to him, neither MaJkiat Singh nor tnc sons of Gurdarshan Singh were present at that time.", "canonical_name": "Malkiat\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Shrimati Giano", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22767, "end_char": 22781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even Shrimati Giano."}}, {"text": "7th November, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22998, "end_char": 23016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to this witness, his statement was recorded by the Police at about 10 a.m. the next day, i.e., the 7th November, 1965; but L7Sup."}}, {"text": "Uggar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23209, "end_char": 23220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uggar Singh, thus, made a wrong statement that he was examined by the Police the next day."}}, {"text": "Ujagar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23840, "end_char": 23852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He tried to get over this difficulty by stating that he has another house which is opposite to the house of the appellant, but it appears that that house belongs to his cousin, Ujagar Singh, and that is how the house is described in the site plan also."}}, {"text": "E ness Kirpal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24611, "end_char": 24630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One defence wit- E ness Kirpal Singh was examined to prove that the accused was on deputation in the Seed Corporation at Phillaur and was attached to the Tehsildar, Phillaur and that he was not suspended until\n\n11th November, 1965."}}, {"text": "Bunta Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25221, "end_char": 25230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The-_witness, on whose evidence relince is primarily placed is Bunta Ram, Patwari."}}, {"text": "Patwari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25232, "end_char": 25239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The-_witness, on whose evidence relince is primarily placed is Bunta Ram, Patwari."}}, {"text": "Phillaur G", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25333, "end_char": 25343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bunta Ram stated that on 6th November, 1965 he had come to the office of the Corporation at Phillaur G in order to collect his pay and he also brought some files from Nakodar in order to consign those files."}}, {"text": "Nakodar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25408, "end_char": 25415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bunta Ram stated that on 6th November, 1965 he had come to the office of the Corporation at Phillaur G in order to collect his pay and he also brought some files from Nakodar in order to consign those files."}}, {"text": "Inderjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25688, "end_char": 25702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to him, at about 6.30 p.m., he and the appellant went to the house of Inderjit Singh, Patwari and spent the H night at his house."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Rai Batta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25929, "end_char": 25946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Jagdish Rai Batta, Tehsildar in the Seed Corporation, was examined as a court witness by the Sessions Judge and his evidence shows that Bunta Ram was one of the Patwaris working as a subordinate of the appellant who was a kanoongo in the Corporation."}}, {"text": "Bunta Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26181, "end_char": 26190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bunta Ram had stated that on that day he had himself appeared before the Tehsildar in connection with the consignment of the files and the Tehsildar had given him some directions in that behalf.", "canonical_name": "Bunta Ram Patwari"}}, {"text": "Bunta Ram Patwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26564, "end_char": 26581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went further and stated that' he did not point out any defects to Bunta Ram Patwari either orally or in writing.", "canonical_name": "Bunta Ram Patwari"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Rai Batta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27041, "end_char": 27058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His headquarters, according to Jagdish Rai Batta, was Nakodar and not Phillaur."}}, {"text": "Nakodar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27064, "end_char": 27071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His headquarters, according to Jagdish Rai Batta, was Nakodar and not Phillaur."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28261, "end_char": 28269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_415_421_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "NIRANJANLALL AGARWALLA\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nMarch 7, 1968 B\n\n[J.C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nIndian Rai11rays Act (9 o/ 1890), ss. 3(6), 77 and 14Q (before a111e1il-\n\n111t•111 by Act 39 of 1961)-StatC-olvned Railway-Service of s. 77 notice\n\n<'111 Cilil'f Co1111nercial Managt•r (Claiin.v aud Refunds)-!/ sufficient co111p/iauce.\n\nIndian Li111italio11 Act (9 of l 908), s. 14-Appliccbility.\n\nThe appellant booke<l goods at Scaldah, which is on the border of the 1crritoria1 limits of the Original Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, to be tr:tnsported by the Bengal and Assam Railway, owned by the State\n\nand having its head office at Calcutta. There was short de1ivcry of the goo<ls and ti1c n1ihvay authorities issued the ncccssarv c..:rt:fk:atcs uf hort agc.\n\nThe appellant \\Vrote a letter to the Chief Commercial tanager (Clain1s and Rcfun<ls) of the R.aihvay within six months from th.? <late of delivery of goods fOr carriage as required by s. 77 of the Act before ils amendment by Act 39 of 1961, claiming the value of the goods short deliv-cred.\n\nFailing to get any rcdrcs.~. lie filed a suit on the Original Side of the High Court at Cnlcutta in 1946. within the period of limitation.\n\nIn 1954. the sui1 \\Vas disn1issed on the ground that the Court had no iu'risdiction to try the suit. lbcn the appellant filed a second suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court havinl! jurisdiction, and prayed for exclusion of the time tnkcn between the i.latcs of institution and dismissal of th\"c earlier suit. under s. J 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908.\n\nThe trial Court dismissed the suit.\n\nThe High Court in appeal, held against the appellant on the ground that the appc11ant's letter addresed\n\nto the Chief Commercial Man:.tgcr (Claims and Refunds) could not he t'ri:atcd as th-.:: notice required under s. 77 of the Railways Act, 1890. as that officer \\vas not the authority to receive the notice -un<lcr the si:ction.\n\nln appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: (1) The rcquircn1ent of compliance \\\\-'ith the tcrn1s of s. 77 should be liberally construed as the object of the notice , vas only to enable the railway n<lministration to n1ak~ an enquiry and investigate into lhc cause of the loss of the goods consigned to it. S:ction 140, bcfor\\! its\n\n.imendment by Act 39 of 1961 provided that a notice required to he served on a State-owned Raily.ay Adn1inistration may he served on the Mannger.\n\nThe Bc11gal and Assam Railway Administration did not have an authority known as the Mnnagcr. It hall a General M'anagcr in •JVer all charge hut its Chief Commercial ~Ianagcr (Claims and Kefunds) \\l.1as a high ranking officer specially engaged in enquiring into claims hY consignors and consignees against the Rnilway administration . .He was therefore an officer con1pctcnt to deal \\\\•ith such claims and the requirements of s. 77 arc satisfied hy serving a notice on him: and it docs not behove the S!nte to contest a good claim on unsubstantial technical picas. [418 D-\n\nE; 419 C-D, FH; 421 DJ\n\nGol'ernor-.General i11 Council v . .lf11satldi Lal. [_1961] 3 S.C.R. 647, 651 an<l Je11111tl/ Bhojraj v. The Darjt•c/ing Hi111ala~'<111 Railnay Co. LttT. 11963] 2 S.C.R. 83~. 845, followed.\n\nGovernor-General in Co1111cil v. G .. S. Mills Ltd, 1.L.R. 28 Pat. 178 A (F.B.) approved,\n\n(2) On the facts, tho appellant was entitled to the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act, because, he was prosecuting the earlier suit v.ith due diligence and the mistake in choosing the Original Side of tl>o High Court for filing the first suit was made bona fide. [421 Al\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 577 of B 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated June 9, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 133 of 1956.\n\nB. C. Misra and S. S. Shukla for the appellant.\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad, K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by certificate under Art. 133(l)(c)\n\n0f the Constitution of India from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta confirming a decree of dismissal of the I> suit of the appellant herein instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge, 8th Court at Alipore, District 24 Parganas, West Bengal.\n\nThe only two points .canvassed in the appeal to this Court are: (I) whether notices under section 77 of the Indian Railways Act were properly served on the Railway Administration in this case, and (2) whether the suit was barred by limitation ?\n\nThe relevant facts are as follows. The appellant was entitled to delivery of two lots of goods booked at Sealdah, Calcutta on June 9, 1945 and September 24, 1945 respectively. The goods were for delivery at Cooch Behar. They were to be transported by Bengal and Assam Railway owned by the State and having its Head Office at the relevant time at No. 3 Koilaghat Street, Calcutta. In respect of the first lot, there was a short delivery of 104 umbrellas and a certificate of shortage was issued to the plaintiff on July 20, 1945.\n\nThe appellant wrote a letter to the Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) of the Bengal and Assam Railway at No. 3 Koilaghat Street on August 11, 1945 claiming the value _of the goods short delivered i.e. Rs. 1,284/- as per bill enclosed and the short delivery certificate issued to him.\n\nOn November 12, 1945 the plaintiff sent a letter to the Governor- General in Council representing the Bengal and Assam Railway through the Secretary, Govrnment of India, New Delhi giving full particulars of the claim and stating that the Chief Commercial Manager had already been approached for payment.\n\nThis letter was replied to by the Secretary, Railway Board on November 27, 1945 to the effect that the plaintiff's Jetter had been forwarded for disposal to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway. In respect of the second lot of goods, the plaintiff made a similar claim to the Chief Commercial Manager of Rs. 12,742'7-4 as per the short delivery certificate of October 10,\n\n1945. The plaintiff also wrote a letter to the Governor-General in Council on February 14, 1946 giving full particulars about the two invoices and the railway receipts covering the consignments despatched on September 24, 1945 and mentioning further that a claim had been preferred on October 24, 1945 enclosing the plaintiff's bill. It was stated expressly in this letter that notice to the Chief Commercial Man!lger had been given under s. 77 of the Railways Act. It does nQt appear that this particular claim of the plaintiff was referred to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway by the Secretary to the Railway Board .as in the previous case . ....\n\nFailing to get any redress the plaintiff served a notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure onFebruary 14, 1946 on the Governor-General .in Council through the Secretary to the Railway Board and on the 14th August 1946 filed a suit on the Original Side of the High Court at Calcutta for recovery of the two sums of money for non-delivery of the goods and alternatively for damages for wrongful conversion or detention of the said goods. It was defended by the Governor-General in Council and one of the pleas taken was that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as no -part of the cause of action for the suit had arisen within the said jurisdiction. On July 16, 1954, the suit was dismissed on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the same.\n\nThereupon the appellant filed a suit out of which the present appeal arises on August 5, 1954. In the plaint of the second suit, it was stated that the earlier suit had been filed on the Original Side of the High Court on a bona fide mistake on the part of the plaintiff's solicitor and prosecuted with due diligence by the plaintiff till it was dismissed on July 16, 1954. The plaintiff prayed for exclusion of the time taken between the date of the institution of the earlier suit and the dismissal thereof under s. 14 of the Limitation Act.\n\nA defence similar to that taken in the High Court suit was put up by the Union of India, the defendant in the later suit.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge who tried the suit dismissed it on various grounds, inter alia that the notice served upon the Chief Commercial Manager was not in terms of the Railways Act and that the first suit had not been pursued bona fide and with diligence on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.\n\nIn appe~I to the High Court, it was argued that (a) no notice under s. 77 was necessary in the case of non-delivery of goods (b) alternatively, notice in terms of the said section had been served by the appellant and ( c) the plaintiff was entitled to\n\nthe benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act. The greater part of the judgment of the High Court was devoted to the first question which was answered against the appellant.\n\nThe second contention was summarily turned down by the observation that there was nothing on the record to show that the Chief Commercial Manager had been held out as the authority comtent to receive notice under s. 77 of the Act. The question of lunitation was not decided in view of the above although the learned Judges felt inclined to allow the appellant the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act. ·\n\nThe relevant portion of s. 77 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) provided that\n\n\"a person shall not be entitled to ... .'compensation for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to be .... carried unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date. of the delivery of the animals or goods for carrige by railway.\"\n\nSection 140 of the Act provided that \"any notice or other document required or authorised by the Act to be served on a railway administraiion may be served, in the case of a railway administered by Government .... on the Manager ..... by delivering the notice or olher documents to the Manager ... or by leaving it at his office or by forwarding it by post in a pre-paid Jetter addressed to the Manager .... at his office.\" Under s. 3\n\ncl. (6) of the Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context \"railway administration\" or \"administration\" in the case of a railway administered by the Government means \"the manager of the railway and includes the Government. .... \"\n\nIn this case, there can be no dispute that if notices to the Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) complied with the terms of section 77 of. the Act 'the most serious obstacle to the appellant's success in this appeal would be overcome.\n\nIt therefore becomes necessary to consider the ambit and effect of the said section.\n\nThe scope of section 77 has come up for consideration bv various High Courts at different times.\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to the same; put we may refer to a decision of this Court in Gol'emor General i11 Co1111cil v. Musaddi Lal('). It was there observed that :\n\n\"Section 77 of the Railways Act is enacted with a view to enable the railway administration to make en-\n\n(1) (1951) 3 S.C.R. 647, 651.\n\n!<IRANJAN LALL I'. UNION (Mitter,.].)\n\nquiries and if possible to recover the goods and to deliver them to the consignee and to prevent stale claims.\n\nIt imposes a restriction on the enforcement of liability declared by s. 72. The liability declared by s. 72 is for loss, destruction or deterioration.\n\nFailure to deliver is the consequence of loss or destruction of goods; it does not furnish a cause of action on which a suit may lie against the railway administration, distinct from a cause of action for loss or destruction.\"\n\nThis aspect of s. 77 was again referred to in Jetmull Bhojraj v.\n\nThe Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co. Ltd.('). There it was observed that the object of service of notice under s. 77 being essentially to enable the railway administration to make an enquiry and investigation as to whether the ls. destruction etc. was due to the consignor's ]aches or to the wilful neglect of the railway administration and its servants, the notice under s. 77 should be liberally construed. To quote the words of the judg ment of the majority Judges :\n\n\"In enacting the section the intention of the legislature must have been, to afford only a protection to the railway administration against fraud and not to provide a means for depriving the consignors of their legitilnate claims for compensation for the loss or damage caused to their consignments during the course of transit on the railways.\" Jn the light of section 3(6) there would be sufficient compliance with section 77 if the notice was served on the Manager of the\n\nState owned railway.\n\nSection 140 only provides for the man ncr of service of notice. The Bengal and Assm Railway administration did not have an authority known as the Manager. It had a General Manager as also another high ranking officer i.e. the Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) working in the head office of the company at Calcutta. As the said statu tory Qrovisions do not make it obligatory to serve a notice under s. 77. on the General Manager of a State-owned Railway, it is difficult to see why a notice served on the Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) would not be a proper notice under the said section. The General Manager is in overall charge of many departments of the railway administration and is not particularly or immediately concerned with dealing with claims against the ranway administration. The Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) is the authority specially engaged in the _ enquiry into such claims and would therefore prlma facfe appe_ar to be competent to deal with the claims by consignors or consignees against the railway administration envisaged by s. 77\n\nro [196312 s.c.R. sn, R4~.\n\nSUPRBME COURT RBPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Act.\n\nHe is not a person of such inferior status that it can be said that a claim preferred as regards non-delivery would not be properly investigated or looked into for finding out the truth or falsity of the claim preferred. Apart from any authority it seems to us that a notice on the Chief Commercial Manager (Claims and Refunds) of a State-owned railway administration would be in terms of s. 77.\n\nThe question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Governor-General in Council v.\n\nG. S. MilLf Ltd.('). There are learned Judges of the Patna High Court examined the various aut.horities of the High. Courts of Madras, Lahore, Bombay, Allahabad and Calcutta.\n\nOn a conspectus of all the authorities referred to, the answer to the question posed before the Full Bench was as follows :\n\n\"The requirements of section 77 read with s. 140, Railways Act, 1890 are satisfied by serving a notice within the prescribed time on the Chief Commercial Manager or any other subordinate officer of a Railway owned by the Government of India, provided it is established as a fact that the Railway Company by its course of business or the terms of the contract between the parties has hel.d out a particular official as competent to deal with the claims on receipt of a notice to him.\"\n\nThere is a current of authority in the Calcutta High Court which is in line with the above Patna decision. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court. In our opinion, it is only in the case of an authority subordinate or inferior in rank to the Chief Commercial Manager that proof of competence to deal with the claims would be called for.\n\nThe question has now become academic in view of the recent amendment of the Railways Act.\n\nThe second point about limitation is not of any substance.\n\nThe appellant had filed a suit in the Calcutta High Court on its Original Side for recovery of compensation within time. The despatch of the goods had taken place from Sealdah which is on the border of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.\n\nIt would appear from the plaint that the plaintiff was under the impression that the head office of the Bengal and Assam Railway administration being situated within the said limits. his suit could properly be instituted in the High Court. The Subordinate Judge was not right in holding that the suit had not been proceeded with bona fide. The learned Judes of the Division Bench of the High Court were disposed to give\n\n(I) 1.L.R. 28 Patna 17S.\n\n' j\n\nthe plaintiff the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act and nothing has been shown to induce us to take a different view.\n\nThe judgment and decree of the High Court are therefore reversed.\n\nThe appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the plaintiff's suit decreed for the amount claimed and interest pendellle lite at 6% per annum.\n\nBefore parting with the case, we however wish to make a remark against the conduct of the authorities of the railway administration concerned in the disposal of claims like the one in the present appeal. There is no suggestion anywhere that the plaintiff's claim was not genuine.\n\nThe railway authorities had promptly issued certificates of shortage in respect of the consignments.\n\nThere is nothing to show that the Chief Commercial Manager found any defect in the plaintiff's claim. If the claim had been settled in good time, the public exchequer would have been spared not only of its own costs of litigation which will be considerable but the costs which will have to be paid to the appellant. It does not behove the State to contest a good claim on the off-chance of success on some unsubstantial technical plea.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed;.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "NIRANJANLALL AGARWALLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIRANJANLALL AGARWALLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 7, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NIRANJANLALL AGARWALLA\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nMarch 7, 1968 B\n\n[J.C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 3(6), 77 and 14Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant booke<l goods at Scaldah, which is on the border of the 1crritoria1 limits of the Original Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, to be tr:tnsported by the Bengal and Assam Railway, owned by the State\n\nand having its head office at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 964, "end_char": 969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1541, "end_char": 1561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2022, "end_char": 2027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Bc11gal and Assam Railway Administration", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2405, "end_char": 2445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bc11gal and Assam Railway Administration did not have an authority known as the Mnnagcr."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "1961] 3 S.C.R. 647", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3052, "end_char": 3070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1963] 2 S.C.R. 83", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3153, "end_char": 3170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3356, "end_char": 3370, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3683, "end_char": 3702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated June 9, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra and S. S. Shukla for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra and S. S. Shukla for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad, K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad, K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad, K. L. Hathi and R. N. 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This is an appeal by certificate under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3969, "end_char": 3983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 4013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(l)(c)\n\n0f the Constitution of India from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta confirming a decree of dismissal of the I> suit of the appellant herein instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge, 8th Court at Alipore, District 24 Parganas, West Bengal."}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4341, "end_char": 4351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of 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{"text": "Cooch Behar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The goods were for delivery at Cooch Behar."}}, {"text": "Bengal and Assam Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were to be transported by Bengal and Assam Railway owned by the State and having its Head Office at the relevant time at No."}}, {"text": "July 20, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the first lot, there was a short delivery of 104 umbrellas and a certificate of shortage was issued to the plaintiff on July 20, 1945."}}, {"text": "August 11, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 Koilaghat Street on August 11, 1945 claiming the value _of the goods short delivered i.e. Rs."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5327, "end_char": 5344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1945 the plaintiff sent a letter to the Governor- General in Council representing the Bengal and Assam Railway through the Secretary, Govrnment of India, New Delhi giving full particulars of the claim and stating that the Chief Commercial Manager had already been approached for payment."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1945 the plaintiff sent a letter to the Governor- General in Council representing the Bengal and Assam Railway through the Secretary, Govrnment of India, New Delhi giving full particulars of the claim and stating that the Chief Commercial Manager had already been approached for payment."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was replied to by the Secretary, Railway Board on November 27, 1945 to the effect that the plaintiff's Jetter had been forwarded for disposal to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was replied to by the Secretary, Railway Board on November 27, 1945 to the effect that the plaintiff's Jetter had been forwarded for disposal to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway."}}, {"text": "Assam Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was replied to by the Secretary, Railway Board on November 27, 1945 to the effect that the plaintiff's Jetter had been forwarded for disposal to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway."}}, {"text": "October 10,\n\n1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,742'7-4 as per the short delivery certificate of October 10,\n\n1945."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6089, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff also wrote a letter to the Governor-General in Council on February 14, 1946 giving full particulars about the two invoices and the railway receipts covering the consignments despatched on September 24, 1945 and mentioning further that a claim had been preferred on October 24, 1945 enclosing the plaintiff's bill."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6296, "end_char": 6312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff also wrote a letter to the Governor-General in Council on February 14, 1946 giving full particulars about the two invoices and the railway receipts covering the consignments despatched on September 24, 1945 and mentioning further that a claim had been preferred on October 24, 1945 enclosing the plaintiff's bill."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6736, "end_char": 6741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6745, "end_char": 6772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "14, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Failing to get any redress the plaintiff served a notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure onFebruary 14, 1946 on the Governor-General .in Council through the Secretary to the Railway Board and on the 14th August 1946 filed a suit on the Original Side of the High Court at Calcutta for recovery of the two sums of money for non-delivery of the goods and alternatively for damages for wrongful conversion or detention of the said goods."}}, {"text": "14th August 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6883, "end_char": 6899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Failing to get any redress the plaintiff served a notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure onFebruary 14, 1946 on the Governor-General .in Council through the Secretary to the Railway Board and on the 14th August 1946 filed a suit on the Original Side of the High Court at Calcutta for recovery of the two sums of money for non-delivery of the goods and alternatively for damages for wrongful conversion or detention of the said goods."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7349, "end_char": 7362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 16, 1954, the suit was dismissed on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the same."}}, {"text": "August 5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellant filed a suit out of which the present appeal arises on August 5, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7969, "end_char": 7974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7982, "end_char": 7996, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A defence similar to that taken in the High Court suit was put up by the Union of India, the defendant in the later suit."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8288, "end_char": 8300, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8693, "end_char": 8698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8706, "end_char": 8720, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9063, "end_char": 9068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9238, "end_char": 9252, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9281, "end_char": 9286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9301, "end_char": 9313, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10148, "end_char": 10152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10542, "end_char": 10552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10753, "end_char": 10763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11009, "end_char": 11019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11039, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1951) 3 S.C.R. 647", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11117, "end_char": 11136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11364, "end_char": 11369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11397, "end_char": 11402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11690, "end_char": 11695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11852, "end_char": 11857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12113, "end_char": 12118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12574, "end_char": 12586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12629, "end_char": 12639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12710, "end_char": 12721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal and Assm Railway administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12778, "end_char": 12816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal and Assm Railway administration did not have an authority known as the Manager."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13801, "end_char": 13806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBME COURT RBPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13836, "end_char": 13874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. sn, R4~.\n\nSUPRBME COURT RBPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14278, "end_char": 14283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14352, "end_char": 14368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Governor-General in Council v.\n\nG. S. MilLf Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "High. Courts of Madras, Lahore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14515, "end_char": 14545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are learned Judges of the Patna High Court examined the various aut.horities of the High."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14547, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Courts of Madras, Lahore, Bombay, Allahabad and Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14555, "end_char": 14564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Courts of Madras, Lahore, Bombay, Allahabad and Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14726, "end_char": 14736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14926, "end_char": 14945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a conspectus of all the authorities referred to, the answer to the question posed before the Full Bench was as follows :\n\n\"The requirements of section 77 read with s. 140, Railways Act, 1890 are satisfied by serving a notice within the prescribed time on the Chief Commercial Manager or any other subordinate officer of a Railway owned by the Government of India, provided it is established as a fact that the Railway Company by its course of business or the terms of the contract between the parties has hel.d out a particular official as competent to deal with the claims on receipt of a notice to him.\""}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15281, "end_char": 15286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a current of authority in the Calcutta High Court which is in line with the above Patna decision."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15659, "end_char": 15671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16489, "end_char": 16494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16502, "end_char": 16516, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_41_90_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "UDAI RAM SHARMA ANI) OTHERS ETC. v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA &\"ID OTHERS\n\nFebruary 1, 1968\n\n(K. N. WANCHOO, CJ., R. S. BACRAWAT, G. K. MITTER\n\nAND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J .\n\nLand Acquisition (Amendment and Vclidation) Act, 13 of 19~7, ss. 2, 3, 4, 5-Validity of Act-Validation of past invalid reports under s. 5-A of Lafrd Acquisition Act 1894 and declarations under s. 6 without removal of lacuna in substantive law wheth£r an encroachntent on judicial power\n\nby the legislature-Amendment whether violates Arts. 14 and 31 (2) of Constitution of India 1950.\n\nIn the Stal;, of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma, [1966) 3 S.C.R. 557 is Court held that once a declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was made the notification under s. 4(1) of the Act was exhausted and there could be no 'Successive notifications under s. 6 with resocct to land in a locality specified in one notification under s. 4(1). Relying on the above judgment the present writ petitions were filed in order to challenie successive notifications under s. 6 following a single notification under s. 4(1) in respect of land belonging to them. Meanwhile in order to meet the situation created by the judgment in V, P. Sharma' s case the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance (I of 1967). The Ordinance .was later followed by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 1967. Section 2 of this Act purported to amend s. 5-A of the principal Act by allowing the making of more than one report in .respect of land which had been notified under s. 4(1). Section 3 purported to amends. 6 of the principal Act' .hY emPQ__wering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the samei notification under s. 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been made under s. 5-A sub-s. (2). Section 4 of the Act purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the ordinance namely January\n\n20, 1967, notwithstanding that more than one declaration under s. 6 had been made in pursuance of the same notification under s. 4(1), and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary.\n\nThe Amending Act also laid down time limits for declarations under s. 6 of the principal Act after the notification under s. 4( 1) had been issued in respect of notifications made after January 20, 1967 the time limit was three years; in respect' of notification made before that date the time limit was to be two years after that date.\n\nProvision was also made for pay ment of interest on compensation due to persons in respect of whose land declarations under s. 6 had been delayed beyond a specified period; no interest was however, to be paid to those to whom compensation hd already been paid.\n\nThe petitioners by leave of Co'urt amended their petitions to attack the validity of te aforesai~ Validating Act pn the folloing m.ain grounds : ( 1) By seeking to validate past transactions of a kind which had been H declared invalid by this Court without retrospectively changing the subs-. tantive law. under which the past tr.:nsactions had been effected the legislature Was encroaching over the domain of the judicial power vested by tho Constitution in the judiciary exclu.sively; (ii) The Validating Act did not L4Sup. C.1./68-4\n\n42 SUPREME COURT lll!POllTS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nrevive the notification under s. 4 which had become exhausted after the A first declaration under s. 6 and no acquisition following thereafter could be made without a fresh notification under s. 4; (iii) The Validating Act violated Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acqµisitions without fresh notifications under 5. 4 thereby allow ing compensation to be paid on the basis of the said notification uruler s. 4 without allowing for increase in the value of land thereafter; (iv) The Validating Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways.\n\nHELD: Per Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter, JJ.-(i) The American doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powen has no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute , which seeks to validate invalid actions' is bad if the invalidify has already been pronounced upon by a court of law.\n\nA. K. Gopala11 v. Sir.le, [1950) S.C.R. 88, referred to.\n\n(Ii) The absence of a provision in the amending Act to give retrospec tive operation to s. 3 of the Act does not affect the validity of s. 4. It was open to Parliament to adopt either course e.g. (a) to provide expressly for the retrospective operation of s. 3, or, (b) to Jay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be deemed\n\nro be invalid or even to have become invalid because, intn alia, of the lllllking of more than one declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, notwithstanding any judgment decree or order to the contrary. Parliament was competent to validate such actions and transactions. its power in that behalf being only circumscribed by appropriate entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights set.(<ith in Part Ill of the Constitution. Section 4 of the Amending Act being within the legislative competence of Parliament, the provisions thereof are binding on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments, orders or decrees to the contrary rendered or made in tbe past. [67 C-F]\n\nCase-1aw referred to.\n\n(iii) The impugned Act does not violate Art. 31(2).\n\n\"fhe Act does not in express terms enact any law which directly affects compensation payable in respect. of property acqvired nor does it lay down r any principles different from those which were already in the Land AC'!Uisition Act of 1894. After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the quest.ion of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the law pro-- vides that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his property or lays down the principks therefor. [67 G-H]\n\nThe Legislature might well have provided in the Act of 1894 that it would be open to the appropriate Government afte'r issuing a notification G under s. 4 to consider objections raised under s. 5 with regard to the different localities from time to time enabling different reports to be made under s. 5-A with consequent adjustments in s. 6 providing for declarations to be made as and when each report under •· SA was conside<ed. By the validation of action taken under s. 6 more than once in respect of a single notification under s. 4, the original scheme of acquisition is not altered.\n\nThe public purpose behind the notification remains the same. It is not as if a different public purpose and acquisition of land for such purpose ff\n\nwer~ beg interploated by means of t~~ Validating Act.\n\nOnly the short conungs 1n th.e Act as to want to prov1Sion to enable more than one declaration under s. 6 are being '.removed. [68 D-F]\n\nlJDAI RAM SHARMA v. tJ!oo'ION 43\n\n'Ibo date of valuation under the Validation Act is that of the iue of notification Wlder s. 4(1), a principle which has held the field since 1923.\n\nLegislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be c:llallenged because of constant appreciation of laud values all over the country dUe to the prevalent abnormal inflation.\n\nThere must be some time Jag between the commencement and conclusion of land acquisition proceedings and in principle there is nothing wrong in accepting the said commencement as the date of valuation. Sections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by Art. 31(5)(a) of the Constitution. Only ss. S-A and 6 of the Act have been amended.\n\nThe amendment does not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act nor contlcavene Art 31 of the Constitution ill aoy way. [69 G-70 BJ\n\nIt cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary date for the valuation of the property which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings. The population in Indian cities especialJy in the capital is ever-increasing. 'Ibe State has to plan the development of cities and it is not , possible to take up all schemes in all directions at the same time. 'Ibe \"'80tl?ces of the State may not be sufficient to acquire all the area required by a scheme at the same time.\n\nOf necessity the area under the proposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and the develoPment of one or more blocks at a time could only be taken up in consonance with the reoources available. Even contiguous blocks could be developed gradually and systematically. In view of such factors it cannot be said that the principle of fixing compenaation on the basis of the price prevailing on the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was not a relevant principle which satisfied the requirements of Art, 31(2).\n\n[70 C-71 HJ\n\nThe State of Wut Bengal v. MTS. Bela BlW!riee. [1954J , S.C.R. 558, State of Madras v. D. Namasivuya Muda/iar, ~1964J 6 , S.C.R. 936 and P. V. Mudalior v. Deputy Collector, [1965J 1 S.C.R. 614, considered.\n\n(iv) The validating Act was not violative of Art. 14.\n\nWhenever an Amending Act is passed there is bound to be some difference in matment between transactions which have already taken place and those which are to take place in the future. That by itself will not attract the operarion of Art. 14. Again, even with respect to transac'ions which may be completed in the future, a reasonable classification will not be struck down. [72 CJ\n\nlalan Trading Co. v. Mavloor Union, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 15, relied on.\n\nIt is not p<JSSiblc to say that because the Legislature thought of improv- , ing upon the Act of 1894, by prescribing certain limits of lime as from 20th January 1967 the difference in treatment in cases covered by the notification before the said date and after the said date denies equal protection of laws because the transactions ate not similarly circumstanced. Some of the notifications issued under s. 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before 20th Janua'ry, 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as notifications issued after that date. Art. 14 does not strike at. differentiation caused by the enactment of a law between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so governed. [73 H-74 Bl Hatisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of Indid, [1960J 3 S.C.R. 528.\n\nNo grievance can be made because interest is denied to persons who have already taken the compensation.\n\nEven here the classification is not unreasonable and cannot be said to be unrelated to the object of the Act.\n\n[74 E-FJ\n\n44 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nPer Shela! and. Vaidialingam, JJ. (dissenting)- By validating .the acquisition orders and declarations made on the basis of an exhausted notification under s. 4 the impugned Act saves government from having to i .. ue a fresh notification and having to pay compensation calculated on the market value as on the date of such fresh notification and depriving the expropriated owner of the benefit of the appreciated value in the meantime. 1be real object of s. 4 of the impugn ed Act is thus to save the State from havmg to compensate for such appreciation under the de.vice of validating all that is done under an exhausted s. 4 notification and thus in reality fixing an an!e!rior date i.e. the date of such a dead s. 4 notification for fixing the compensation. The impugned Act thus suffers from a two fold vice : (i) that it purports to validate acquisitions orders and notifications without resuscicating the notification under i. 4 by any legisla.tive provision on the basls of which alone the validated acquisitions, orders and declarations .can properly be sustained and (ii) that its provisions are in derOgation of Art. 31(2) as interpreted by this Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value on the date of notifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and for keeping them/ alive no legislative provision is to be found in the impugned Act. It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the pUJ'P(lSe of s. 4 is to fill the lacuna pointed out in Shamuis case nor with the vieJIV that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation. The section under the guise of validating the acquisitions, otders and notifications camouftages the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of values frozen by notifications under s. 4 which by Part acquisitions thereunder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the rest of the land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such fresh notificatiollJl.\n\nThe fact that neither s. 4 nor s. 23 of the principal Act are altered does not make any difference. (89 D-H, 85 HJ\n\nSection 4 of the Anlending Act must therefore be struck .down as invalid. [90 Al\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 114, 216, 223 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupca, for the petitioners' (in W.P.s Nos. 114, 216 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.)\n\nR. V. S. Mani and K. P. Gupta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo. 223 of 1966).\n\nNiren De, Solicitor-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 114 and 216 of 1966).\n\nG Niren De, Solicitor-General, R. H. Dhebar lll)d R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in W.P. No. 223 of 1966 and the respondents (in W. P. No. 85 of 1967).\n\nR. N. Sachfhey, for respondent No. 9 (in W. P. No. 223 of 1966).\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar and Shyamala Pappu for respondents Nos. 12(a) to 12(d) (in W.P. No. 223 of 1966).\n\nUDAI RAM SHAlWA V. UNION (Mitter,/.) 45\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad and R.H. Dhebar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in w. P. No. 252 of 1966).\n\nP. C. Bhartari, for the intervener (in W.P. No. 114 of 1966).\n\nThe Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., BACHAWAT and MITTER, JJ. was delivered by MITTER, J. The dissenting opinion of B SHELAT and VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by Sm!LAT, ].\n\nMitter, J. This is a group of five Writ Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging in four cases the validity of land acquisition proceedings started by a notification dated November 13, 1959 under s. 4 ofl the Land Acquisition Act and declarations contained in other notifications dated March 18, 1966 onwards under s. 6 of the said Act and for other incidental reliefs including the issue of appropriate writs for the purpose. Various persons have joined as petitioners in three of the applications.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 114 of 1966 the petitioners number 61. They all own lands in village Mandawali Fazilpur, on Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi, the notification of the declaration under s. 6 having been made on March 18, 1966. In Writ Petition No. 216 of 1966 there are 71 petitioners who also own lands in the same village. Their complaint is based on the same notification under s. 4 and a notification dated July 12, 1966 under s. 6 of the Act. In Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively withi.n the union E territory of Delhi. His complaint is based on a s. 4 notification dated September 3, 1957, a notification dated April 15, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act and several awards of Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi made in 1961. In Writ Petition No. 252 of 1966, there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village Kotla at\n\nPatparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi. Their grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 and a notification dated June 14, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act. In Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi. His grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, a notification dated July 27. 1961 under s. 6 of the Act and an award dated February 16, 1962.\n\nAlthough there are some distinctive features in some of the petitions to be mentioned later, the common attack is based on the judgment of this Coun delivered on February 9, 1966 in State of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma('). That case arose out of proceedings for acquisition of land in eleven villages in Madhya Pradesh for the steel plant at Rourkela. There a notification had been issued under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on May 16.\n\n\n46 SUP&l!MB COUl.T UPOl.TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\n1949 declaring that lands in eleven named viages were .likely to be needed for a.. public_ purpose i.e., the erect.ion of an uon and steel plant. Thereafter, notifications were issue<;! under s. fr<>!11 time to time and some lands in village Chhawam were acquued Ill the year 1956. In August 1960 a fresh notification under s: 6 of the Act was issued proposing to acquire Ac. 486-~ 7 of land Ill the said village.\n\nSome owners of the land in the village who were affected by the notification filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the notification under s. 6. The High Court accepted their contention whereuJ>On the State of Madhya Pradesh came up to this Court in appeal. It was held by this Court that ss. 4, 5~A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were integrally connected and that acquisition always began with a notification under s. 4(1) followed by consideration of all objections thereto under s. 5-A and a declaration under s. 6, According to this Court, once a declaration under s. 6 was made the notification under s. 4(1) was exhausted and the latter section was not a reservoir from which the Government might from time to time draw out land and make declaration with respect to it successively. The ultimate conclusion was that there could be no successive notifications under s. 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under s. 4(1) and in the result, the appeal of the State was dismissed.\n\nThe present Writ Petitions were all filed after the said judgment of this Court.\n\nThe omnibus notification under s. 4 in four of these cases dated November 13, 1959 covered an area of Ac. 34,070-00 marked as blocks Nos. A to T and X in a map enclosed with the notification excepting therefrom certain classes of lands, namely, (a) Government land and evacuee land, (b) land already notifi~ either under s. 4 or under s. 6 of the Act for any Government scheme, (c) land already notified either under s. 4 or under s. 6 for house building co-operative societies mentioned in annexure (iii) to the notification and the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and those attached to religious institutions and wakf property. The notification stated that land was required by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of Delhi.\n\nAs already noted, there were sevetl!l notifications under s. 6 made from time to time, the earliest one in this series of petitions being dated June 14, 1961. It is clear that on the basis of the judgment of this Court the validity of the notifications under s. 6 of the Act after, the first of the series could not be upheld in a court of law.\n\nOn January 20, 1967 an Ordinance was promulgated by the President of India styled The Land Acquisition (Amendment and H Validation) Ordinance (1 of 1967). The scheme of the Ordinance was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was to have effect, subject to the amendments specified in ss. 3 and 4 of the Ordin-\n\nUDAl :&AK SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 47\n\nance. Section 3 purported to amend s. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter-referred to as the principal Act) by enabling different reports to be made in respect of different parcels of land under s. 5-A of the Act. Similarly, s. 4 of the Ordinance purported to amend s. 6 of the principal Act by enabling different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under s. 4. Section 5 of the Ordinance purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the Ordinance, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary.\n\nOn April 12, 1967 Parliament passed an Act (Act 13 of 1967) styled The Land Acquisition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act, 1967. Section 2 of this Act purported to amends. 5-A of the principal Act to allow the making of more than one report in respect of land which had been notified under s. 4(1). Section '3 similarly purported to amends. 6 of the principal Act by empowering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under s. 4(1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been made under s. 5-A sub-s. (2). Clause (ii) of s. 3 inserted a new proviso to s. 6(1) reading:\n\n\"Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, subsection (1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication.\" As a good deal of argument turns on the interpretation of s. 4 of the Amending Act, it is necessary to set the same out in extenso :\n\n\"4. (1) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary,-\n\n(a) no acquisition of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment aaa Validation) Ordinance, 1967, and no action taken or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into, or notification published) in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid merely on the ground-\n\n(i) that one or more Colleciors have performed the functions of Collector under the principal Act in respect of the land covered by the same notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;\n\n(ii) that one or more reports have heen made under sub-se9tion (2) of section 5-A of the principal Act, whe-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nther in respect of the entire land, or different parcels thereof, covered by th6 same notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;\n\n(iii) that one or more declarations have been made under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;\n\n(b) any acquisition in pursuance of any notification published under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment artd Validation) Ordinance 1967. may be made after such commencement and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered into or notification published), whether before or after such commencement, in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the rounds referred to in clause\n\n(a) or any of them.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause\n\n(b) of sub-section (1), no declaration under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of any land which has been notified before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the principal Act, shall be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the said Ordinance.\n\n'(3) Where acquisition of any particular land covered by a notification under sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the principal Act, published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, is or has been made in pursuance of any declaration under section 6 of the principal Act, whether made before or after such commencement, and such declaration is or has been made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of such notification, there shall be paid simple interest, calculated at the rate of six per cent per ; mnum on the market value of such land, as determined under section 23 of the principal Act, from the date of expiry of the said period of three years to the date of tender of payment of compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquisition of such land : Provided that no such interest shall be payable for any period during which the proceedings for the acquisition of any land were held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a court :\n\nH''\n\n, i\n\nUDAJ llAK SHARMA .v. UNION (Mitter, J.)\n\nProvided further that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the acquisition of any land where the amount of compensation has been paid to the persons interested before the commencement of this Act.\"\n\nSection 5 of the Amending Act repealed the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 and further provided that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act as amended by. this Ace as if this Act had come into force on the 20th January, 1967.\n\nThe petitions before us were amended by leave of the Court so that the Validation Act of 1967 could. be challenged. Mr. C. B.\n\nAgarwala who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 114, 216, 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967 raised the following points in support of the petitions : (1) The Validation Act does not revive the notification under s. 4 which had become exhausted after the first declaration under s. 6 and no acquisition could be made without a fresh notification under s. 4. (2) The Validation Act violated Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under s. 4 thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of the dead notification under s. 4. It was argued that once a notification under s. 4 was exhausted Government had. to make a fresh one under the said section; as a result thereof; compensation had to be assessed on a different basis altogether. (3) The Validation Act vioiated Art. 14 of the Constitution in various ways :-\n\n(a) It made discrimination inasmuch as a notification under s. 4 made before the commencement of the Ordinance had to be followed by a declaration under s. 6 within two years of the said date, whereas if a notification um!er s. 4 was made after 20th January 1967 i.e. the date of the Ordinance, the declaration under s. 6 could be made within a period of three years from th~ date of the notification under s. 4. The discrimination lay in the fact that whereas a declaration under s. 6 had to be inade in respect of a notification under s. 4 bearing date subsequent to 20th January 1967 within three years, a much longer period of time might elapse between a date of declaration under s. 6 and a notification under s. 4 issued prior to the date of the Ordinance.\n\n(b) If a notification under s. 4 was made after the date of the Ordinance, compensation had to be paid on the basis of such notification but if a notification had been made under s. 4 of the Act before the date of the Ordinance, compensation would be awarded on the basi~ of the exhausted notification under s. 4 however much time might have elapsed since the date of the dead notification.\n\n50 SUPREME COUllT .REPORTS\n\n\n(c) H coi:p.yensati()n ha. d not been paid before the Ordinance, interest at 6% had to be paid to the owner of the land on the .amount of compensatjon fixed, but if the owner had received.compensation before the date of the Ordinance, he had no clalDl to interest although the acquisiti!Jn in both cases flowed from the same notification under s. 4. ( d) It was open to Government to make a fresh notification under s. 4 after the lapse of threo:> years from the date of the Ordinance and such notification might be issued after every period of thro:>e years in any case where acquistion was not completed. In such cases, owners of land would be substantially benefited by the new notification under s. 4. But if a notification had been made before the date of the Ordinance, the owner of the land would receive compensation based on the old notification although a period much longer than three years might elapse between the date of the notification under s. 4 and a declaration under. s. 6, his only solatium being interest at 63 p.a. on the amount of the compensation. This would result in discrimination inasmuch as a person affected by a s. 4 notification prior to the date of the Ordin- :ance would be treated very differently from another person whose land was acquired in terms of a notification made after the commencement of the Ordinance.\n\nOn the first point, it was argued by Mr.· Agarwala that ss. 2 and 3 of the Amending Act had no retrospective operation, that there was no law which purported to validate retrospectively any but the first report mae under s. 5-A of the principal Act or\n\naey but the first declaration issued under s. 6 of the Act and consequently there was no legal basis for the validation of such past acts. by the operation of s. 4 of the Amending Act. It was therefore argued that the defect in the principal Act as pointed out by this Court in V. P. Sharmcts case(') was not removed by s. 4 of the Amending ct. It was urged that Acts so:>eking to validate past transactions .an only be effective if the amendment introduced had retrospective operatio11 so as to cure the lacuna in the enactment from a date anterior .to that of the impugned transactions.\n\nIf the Amenc,!jng Act had no retrospective operation, it could not protect past traµsactions which would still have to be declared invalid inasmuch as the notification under s. 4\n\nmade on November 13, 1959 having exhausted itself after the first declaration under s. 6 was not resusciated by any provision of the Amending Act.\n\nOn the second point, the broad contention urged was that the amendment was hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as its whole purpose was to avoid payment of enhanced compensation which would be necessitated if a fresh notification had to be issued under s. 4. The notification dated November 13, 1959\n\n(1) [19661 3 S.C-R. 557.\n\nuDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, I.) 51\n\nA having spent itself, a fresh one in the normal course would have to be issued and compensation be paid not on the basis of valuation on November 13, 1959 but on that prevailing at least 8 or 9 years afterwards which would be substantially higher. . It was argued that acquisition on the basis of any declaration under s. 6 of the Act after the first one would in effect be providing for 8 compensation on the basis of a notification under s. 4 which had no relation to the acquisition.\n\nIn other words, the date of the earlier notification under s. 4 must be treated to be an arbitrary date divorced from and completely alien to the acquisition sought to be made by a subsequent declaration under s. 6.\n\nIn such circumstances, the ratio of a number of decisions of this Court c starting from that of The State of West Bengal v. Mrs •. Bela Banerjee(') to .a recent judgment in Union of India v. , Kamalabai Harjivandas Parekh and others(') would apply. It is not necessary to examine all these decisions in detail. The notable deci sions to which reference was made at some length are P. V. Mudaliar v. Dy. Collector('), Jeejeebhoy .v. Asstt. Collector(') and\n\nD State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Muda/iar( 6 ). It was argued that though the Land Acquisition Acfwas saved by Art. 31(5)(a) of the Constitution, any amendment thereto after the coming into force of the Constitution had to pass the test of Art. 13 and Art. 31(2) would apply with full force to any amendment of the Land Acquisition Act if as a result thereof a person expropriated was being deprived of compensation, i.e., the just equivalent of the E property acquired.\n\nTI\\e point sought to be made was that the notification of November 13, 1959 having exhausted itself, the value of the property at or about that date would be illusory compensation in violation of Art. 31 (2) in respect of a declaration under s. 6 made after the first one of the series. Reference was\n\nmade to proceedings for compulsory acquisition of land in England under the Lands Clauses Acts under which \"once the undertakers or authority .are authorised to purchase, the next step in the normal course 1s to serve a notice to treat\"-see Halsbury's Laws of England, third edition, Vol. 10, page 60, Art. 97. - It is pointed out in Art. 102 of the said book that\n\n\"The effect of serving a notice to treat is to establish a relation analogous in some respects to that of a purchaser and vendor, a relation which binds the undertakers to take the land and binds the land-owner to give up the land subject to his being paid compensation, but until the price is ascertained the land remains the property of the landowner. Both parties have the\n\n(!) [1954) S.C.R. 558.\n\n(2) C.A. 1564/1966 decided on 7+1967,\n\n(3) (1965] 1 S.C.R. 614,\n\n(4) [i965] 1 s.c.R. 636.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.CR.\n\nright to have the price ascertained and the purchase completed in manner provided by the Lands- Clauses Acts.\"\n\nIt was said that the English procedure ensured the payment of just equivalent of the property to the person who was deprived of it and that issue of a declaration under s. 6 made years after the notification under s. 4 the date of which alone was to be considered for fixing the value of the property, ignored the rights of the person to the lawful compensation aimed at by Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. Reference was made to the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India(') where ori a reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act as they then stood,< it was observed :\n\n\"that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing a value shouldl>e possessed of all the information in the hands of the department, and should at the same tiine avail himself of all that is offered at the enquiry, his ultimate duty being not to conclude the owner by his so-called award, but to fix the sum, which in his best judgment is the value and should be offered.\"\n\nOn the question of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, besides the general argument already referred to, it was urged that in Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 there was a further point as to discrimination.\n\nThe facts laid in this petition are as follows. The petitioner was the owner of land measuring. Ac.\n\n10--62 in village Kilokri.\n\nHe wanted to develop the land by establishing a residential colony and selling the same out in plots.\n\nFor this purpose; he had spent a good deal of money and taken enormous trouble and divided the area after development into 78 residential plots. In 1956 he had submitted a lay out plan of the land in question for necessary sanction to the Delhi Development Provisional Authority.\n\nOn June 18, 1956 he was informed by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority that the final lay out plan had becen approved by the said authority. In September 1957 the said authority demanded from the petitioner a security for Rs. 12,850-25 , as a guarantee for carrying out the development of the colony in accordance with the approved standards and this sum was duly deposited by the petitioner.. On\n\nSeptember 15, 1958 the petitioner submitted service plans in respect df his colony and these were dllly checked and found to be in order : the case was ordered. to be placed before the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation for approval. By December 24, 1958 the Standing Committee referred the case\n\nR. 32 Calcutta 605 at 629,\n\nUDAI RAM .SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 53\n\nA back to the Town Planner for a scrutiny Qf the ownership documents. . The question relating to the proof of ownership was settled on March 19, 1961. In the meantime, the notification dated November 13, 1959 had been issued under s. 4(1) of the Act. The petitioner duly filed his objections under s. 5-A of the Act. By a notification dated July 1, 1960 published by the Delhi B Administration the Chief . Commissioner, Delhi, withdrew the land of 16 .. colonies from the acquisition out of the area covered by the notification of November 13, 1959 on the ground that their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and as per general decision of the Standing Com• mittee, Delhi Municipal Corporation, the petitioner was asked by c the Town Planner by letter dated April 16, 1960 to submit a denotification certificate. to the effect that the land comprising the. proposed lay out of his colony was excluded from the purview of the notification issued under s. 4 of the Act. On June 14, 1961 the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, issued the first notification under s. 6 of the Act in respect of D 97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in village Kilokri as required by the Governmenf for a public purpose at the public expense, namely, the planned development of Delhi. The petitioner's land was not covered by this notification. The Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, purported to. issue another notification dated 26/27th July, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act declaring that land specified therein in village Kilokri was reqajred to be E taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose.\n\nThis notification coveredthe. petitioner's land in question in village Kilokri. On January 9, 1962 the petitioner was informed by a letter issued by the office of the Town Planner, Municipal Corporation, Delhi,, that the. Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation by its resolution No. 1190 dated December 18, 1961 F had rejected the lay out plan of the petitioner's colony. According to the petitioner, this resolution went to show that his land was sought to be acquired because it had not been de-notified along with the land of the other colonies on the ground that the Standing Committee. had rejected the lay out plan of his colony.\n\nThereafter the Land Acquisition Collector, De]hi, made an award G No. 1276 dated February 16, 1962 with respect to the petitioner's said land. In March 1965 the petitioner learnt about the notification issued by the Delhi Administration 0n July 1, 1960 under s. 48(1) of the Act withdrawing the land of the 16 colonies men- . tioned therein from the acquisition out of the area covered by\n\nthe notification dated November 13, 1959 on the ground that H their lay. out plan had bee.n sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. By letter dated March 10, 1965 the petitioner asked the Deputy Husing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, for restoration of his land on the same basis because liis lay out plan\n\n54 SUPREME COURT lU!POllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nhad been sanctioned before the s. 4 notification. This request was however turned down by letter dated May 14, 1965 on the ground that the petitioner's land had already been acquired and could not be released. According to the petitioner, there was no basis for treating his land in a manner different from that of the 16 colonies. This differential treatment has resulted in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the petitioner's colony is concerned.\n\nMr. Agarwala also tried to make a subsidiary point in this connection and urged that acquisition of petitioner's land was a colourable exercise of the power under the Act inasmuch as the petitioner was out to do the same thing as was sought to be achieved by proceedings under Land Acquisition 'Act,_ the only difference being that whereas the sales effected by him were at reasonable rates, those fetched at auction of lands acquired under the Act were for much higher figures and the State was really making revenue out of such acquisitions.\n\nMr. R. V. S. Mani who appeared for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966 adopted the arguments of Mr. Agarwala in general but sought to make a special point of his own. In substance the additional_ ground urged by him was that by the Validating Act the Legislature had sought to encroach into the domain of the Judiciary. Mr. Mani contended that although there was no clear sep_3!ation of legislative and judicial powers in our Constitution, nevertheless the Constitution did not confer unlimited powers on the fogislature and it was for the Judiciary to declare the limits of the legislative powers enshrined in the Constitution. To quote Mr. Mani's words : ·\n\n\"The Legislature exercises judicial power if its legislative action retroacts1 on past controversies and overrides or reverses the decisions of the Judiciary.\"\n\nSuch an act, argued Mr. Mani, had to be struck down in courts of Jaw.\n\nMr. Mani's main argument was that inasmuch as ss. 2 and 3 G of the Amending Act l!ad not been given retrospective effect, the validation sought to be effected by s. 4 with respect to the past transactions was of no avail as the impugned actions, i.e., the subsequent declarations under s. 6 of the Act, had no legal basis.\n\nIn our opinion no useful purpose will be served by referring to the clear demarcation between the judicial powers and Jegisfative powers in America and attempt to engraft the said principle in the working of our Constitution. This development of the\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, 1.) 55\n\nlaw, as pointed out in A. K. Gopalan v. State(1) was due to histori i; al reasons. In that case it was pointed out by Das, J. (see at p. 286) that\n\n\"the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law,'' . . . It is thus th11t the Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the executive and the Congress. In India the position of the Judiciary is somewhere in between the Courts ill England and the United States. While in the main leaving our Parliament and the_ State Legislatures supreme in .their respective legislative fields, our Constitution has, by some of the articles, put upon the Legislature certain specified limitations . . . . . Our Constitution, unlike the English Constitution, recognises the Court's supremacy over the legislative authority, but such supremacy is a very limited one, for it is confined to the field where the legislative power is circumscribed by limitations put upoh it by the Constitution itself. Within this restricted field the Court niay, on a scrutiny of the law made by the Legislature, declare it void if it is found to have transgressed the constitutional limitations.\"\n\nIt will not serve any useful purpose to note the decisions of this Court where reference has been made to the distinction between the Indian Constitutional law and the American Constitutional law on this subject. Mr. Mani sought to rely on a statement of the law made by Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 137, as quoted in Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, second edition, Vol. 3, at page 1651 that:\n\n\"If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it not according to the judicial, but acording to the legislative judgment . . . . . If he legislature cannot thus indirectly control e action of the courts, by requiring. of them a construction of the law according to its own views it is ':ery plain it cannot. do so directly, by setting aside' their\n\n1udgment~, compelhng them to grant new trials, ordermg the discharge of offenders, or directing what partiula'. steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial mquiry.\".\n\n(l) [1950] $.C.R. 88 at 198.\n\n.5~\n\n\nAccording to Willoughby,\n\n\"Retroactive legislation which does not impair vested rights, or violate express constitutional prohibi ti ons, is valid, and therefore, particular legru remedies, and, to a certain extent, rules of evidence may be changed and, as changed, made applicable to past transactions, . . . . . But substantial rights may not thµs be interfered with.\"\n\nWilloughby seeks to fortify his statement quoting from Cooley again:\n\n\"The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so it may dispense with any of those formalities which are not essentiaf to the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the court has. failed to observe any of those formalities.\n\nBut it would not be competent for 1he legislature to authorize a court to-proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it and, for the same reason it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties.\"\n\nRelying on the above Mr. Mani proceeded to argue that the wording of s. 4 of the Amending Act was not a question of mere form and that it was a decree purporting to operate as such.\n\nAccording to him unless s. 3 was retrospective, s. 4 would be meaningless and should be struck down.\n\nMr. Mani relied par . ticularly on the decision of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. King Emperor(') where it was held by this Court that Ordinance No. III of 1944 did not take away the power of the court to investigate and interfere with orders of detention or deprive the court of its power to pass orders under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the court was still at liberty to investigate whether an order purporting to have been made under r. 26 of 1he Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance was in fact validly made, in exactly the same way as immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance; and if on a consideration the Courf came to the conclusion that it was not\n\n(!} (1944] F.C.R. 295.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 57\n\nvalidly made on any ground other than the ground that r. 26 of the Defence of India Rules was ultra vfres, , s. 10 of the Ordinance would no more prevent it from so finding than s. 16 of the Defence of India Act did. We shall deal with the argument based on this cas\" later on.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General first dealt with the question as to whether Parliament was competent to pass the Validating Act and whether s. 4 of the Amending Act could be given effect to unless the legislature gave retrospective operation to section 3.\n\nAccording to the Solicitor General-and that is undoubtedly the position in law-the legislative competence of Parliament is only circumscribed by the scope of the entries in the appropriate Li11ts under the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitutio1.1. The power of Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India is dealt with by the Constitution in Arts. 245 to 250, 252 and 253. Acquiition and requisitioning of property is an entry in List III and Parliament is competent to make laws enumerated in that List under Art. 246(2) of the Constitution. As early as in the year 1878 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah(') that the Indian Legislature when acting within the limiis prescribed (by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it) had plenary powers of legislation as much, and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself and\n\n\"If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.\"\n\nIn that case the question 'oefore tlie Judicial Committee was whether Act XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court within certain specified districts was not inconsistent wiih the Indian High Courts Act or with the Charter of the High Court and so in its general scope within the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council.\n\nUnder _s. 4 of that Act the territory known as Garo Hills was removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature and from the control .of the officers of revenue, constituted by the regulations of the Bengal Code and the Acts passed by any Legislature established in British India as well ns\n\n(ll L.R. SI.A. 178 at 194.\n\nL4Sup. C.1./68-5 6\n\n58 SUPREMB COURT llBPOll.TS\n\n\nfrom the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Acts aforesaid. This section further provided that no Act thereafter passed by the Council of the Governor-General for making laws and regulations shall be deemed to etend to any part of th_!: said territory unless the se was specially named therein. Under s. 9 of the Act the Lieutenant-Governor was authorised by notification in the Calc:U!ta Gazett~ to. xtend mutatis mutandis all or any of the prov1S1ons contained 1n the other sections of the Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and such portion of the Khasi. Hills as might for the lime being form part of British India. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, acting under powers conferred by s. 9, extended the provisions of Act XXII of 1869 to the territory of Khasi and Jaintia Hiils and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the courts of civil and criminal judicature. The High_ Court of Calcutta held that the 9th section was not legislation but was a delegation of legislative power. This was not accepted by the Judicial Committee and it was observed (at p. 195) :\n\n\". . . . . it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor .(large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor~ General in Council. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself.\"\n\nReference was made by counsel to the case of Abeyesekra v.\n\nJayatilake('). The question there arose as to whether .m Order in Council of 1928 amending another of 1923 making provision that the action of a common informer brought to rccllver penal- :ics under the Order in Council of 1923 be dismissed a11d further amending the 1923 Order so as to except the office held by the respondent from its operation was valid and c.onstitutcd an effective defence to the action although it was retrospective in operation. In upholding the validity of 1928 Order, it wa~ observed\n\ny the Judicial Committee that legislators \"have certainly the nght to prevent, alter or reverse the consequences of their own decrees.''\n\nThe effect and validity of retrospective legislation has had to be considered by the Federal Court of India and this Court on a number of occasions. In the case of The United Provinces\n\nv. Atlqa Begum(') a question arose as to whether the Regularisa- H ti on of Remissions Act, 193 8 of the United Provinces Legislature\n\n(l) [1932] A.C. 26J.\n\n(2) 11943! F.C.R. 110.\n\n.., __\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, I.) 59\n\nwas within its competence. There was an Act in force, namely, the Agra Tenancy A, ct, 1926 the purpose whereof was to consolidate and amend the Jaw relating to agricultural tenancy and certain other matters. Section 73 of that Act provided that \"when for any cause the Local Government or any authority empowered by it, remitted or suspended for any period the whole or any part of the revenue payable in respect of any land, a Collector might order that the rents of the tenants should be remitted or suspended to an amount which shall bear the same proportion tc the whole\n\nof the amount payable in respect of the land as the revenue of which the payment has been so remitted or suspended bears to the whole of the revenue payable in respect of such land.\" In 1931 there was a catastrophic fall in agricultural prices followed by threats on the part of tenants to withhold rent on a large scale.\n\nThe Government of the United Provinces devised a scheme for the systematic reduction of rents, varying with the circumstances of the different districts, followed later by consequential adjustments in land revenue. The Allahabad High Court had held iri Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum v. Secretary of State for India(') that remissions made in pursuance of the orders of Government had no legal effect. In 1938 the Provincial Legislature passed the Regularisation of Remissions Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in the courts of Jaw.\n\nThe Allahabad liigh Court took the view that the Act was contrary to the provisions of s. 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 because it amounted to an attempt to legislate retrospectively. Section 2 of the Act of 1938 provided that\n\n\"notwithstanding anything in the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, . . . . . or in any other Jaw for the time being in force where rent has been remitted on account of any fall in the price of agricultural produce which took place before the commencement of this Act, under the order of the Provincial Government or any authority empowered by it in that behalf, s1tch order, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue court.\" Referring to the case of Queen v. Burah(') Gwyer, C.J., said that there was nothing in s. 292 which suggested any intention on the part of Parliament to impose a fetter against retrospective legislation. According to the learned Chief Justice, the impugned Act was an Act with respect to \"remission of rents\" although it might also be an act with respect to something else, that is to say, the validation of doubtful executive orders.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice said : (I) I.L.R. 19:J8 Allahabad, 114.\n\n(2) L.R.I.A. 178,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\n\"It is true that \"Validation of execntive orders\" or any entry even remotely analogous to it is not to e found in any of the three Lists; but I am clear that legislation for that purpose must necessarily be regardd as subsidiary or ancillary to the power of legislating on the particular subjects in respect of which the executive orders may have been issued.\" His Lordship further opined that powers of the court were not affected merely because certain executive orders were not allowed to be questioned in any court.\n\nIn Piare Dusadh & others v.IT!ze King Emperor(') one of the questions raised was whether it was competent for the Legislature by retrospective legislation to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts but which were void for want of. jurisdiction over the parties. In this case the facts were as follows.\n\nThe appellants had been convicted by courts functioning under\n\nthe~ \"Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (Ordinance No. II of 1942).\n\nOn 4L'1 June, 1943, the Federal Court hela that the courts constituted under that Ordinance had not been duly invested with jurisdiction, in view of the nature of the provisions contained in ss. 5, IO and 16 of that Ordinance. The next day, the Governor-General made and promulgated another Ordinance (Ordinance No XIX of 1943) whereby Ordinance No. II of 1942 was repealed and certain provisions were made in respect of sentences which had been passed by. the special courts and in respect of cases which were pending before them on that date.\n\nBy sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the new Ordinance, a right of appeal against sentences which had already been passed by the special courts was . given and appeals were accordingly preferred to the High Court in some cases.\n\nIn certain other cases applications for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus were made.\n\nIn both sets of cases, it was contended on behalf of the accused that the new Ordinance did not, and in any event could not, give validity o the sentences which had been passed by the special courts, and it was claimed that the sentences should be treated as void or set aside. Section 4 of the new Ordinance provided that :\n\n\"Where the trial of any case pening before a court constituted under the said Ordinance has not concluded before the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, the proceedings of such court in the case shall be void and the case shall be deemed to be transferred\" to the ordinary criminal courts for enquiry or trial in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 3 of the Ordinance provided as follows :\n\n(I) [1944] F.C.R. 61.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)\n\n\"(a) Any $entence passed by a Special Judge, a Special Magistrate or a Summary Court in exercise of jurisdiction conferred or purporting to have been conferred by or under the said Ordirianpe shall have effect, and subject to the succeeding provisions of this section shall continue to have effect, as if the trial at which it was passed had been held in accordance with the Code of Crimi.nal Procedure, 1898 by a Sessions Judge, an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magistrate of the first class respectively, exercising competent jurisdiction under the said Code.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, any such sentence as is referred to in subsection (I) shall, whether or. not the proceedings in which the sentence was passed were submitted for review under section 8, and whether or not the sentence was the subject of an appeal under Section 13 or Section 19, of the said Ordinance, be subject to such rights of appeal as would have accrued, .and to such powers of revision as would have been exercisable under the said Code if the sentence had at a trial so held been passed on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance.\n\n( 3) Where any such sentence as aforesaid has . been altered in the course of review or on appeal under the said Ordinance, the sentence as so altered shall for the purpose of this section be deemed to have been passed by the Court which passed the original sentence.\"\n\nLearned counsel for .the accused conceded that the principle of validation by subsequent legislation was quite applicable to judicial as to ministerial proceedings but relying on Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 205 and also pp. 773-776, they contended-\n\n. . (_a) that w!J!le such legilation might seek to aid and support 1ud1cial proceedmgs, the legislature could not under the guise of legislation be permitted to exercise judicial power, and\n\n(b) that it was not competent to the legislature by retrospective legislation to make valid any proceedings which had been held in the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties.\n\nSpens, C. J., observed (see at p. 100):\n\n\"As a general proposition, it may be true enough to say that the legislative function bek>ngs to the legisla-\n\n62 • SUPREME COURT RilPORTS\n\n\nture and the judicial function to the judiciary.\n\nSuch differentiation of functions and distribution of powers are in a sense part ofrthe Indian law as of the American law. But an examination of the American authorities will show that the development of the results of this distribution in America has been influenced not merely by the simple fact of distributioll of functions, but by the assumption that the Constitution was intended to reproduce the provision that bad already existed in many of the State Constitutions positively forbidding the legislature from exercising judicial powers . . . .\n\nOne result of the application of this rule in the United States has been to bold that \"legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past controversies • and to reverse decisions whfoh the courts in the exercise of their undoubted authority have made.'' The reason given is that \"this would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the ruling of the courts. . . . .\n\nIn India, however, the legislature has more than once enacted laws providing that suits which bad been dismissed on a particular view of the law must be restored and retried.''\n\nThe learned Chief Justice referred to the Australian case, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro(') where a Board of Appeal constituted under an Act of 1922 bad given certain decisions in appeals in income-tax matters. The law cpurts declared\" that the Australian Parliament had no power to invest this Board of Appeal with judicial power.\n\nA later Act established what was described as a Board of Review and assigned to it functions which were held to be different in character from those assigned to the former Board of Appeal.\n\nThis Act however went on to provide that decisions which bad already been pronounced by the Board of Appeal \"should be deemed to be and at all times to have been decisions of a . Board of 'Review given in pursuance of the provisions of the later Act.\" This later Act was challenged as vesting judicial power in the Board of Review, but this contention was overruled. Reference may be made to the judgment of Starke, J. quoted by Spens; ·c.J. that\n\n\"Parliament simply takes up certain determinations which exist in fact, though made without authority, and prescribes not that they shall be acts done by a Board\n\n(I} 38 Com. L.R. 153.\n\nUDAl RAM SHAltMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) •\n\nof Review, but that they shall be treated as they would be treated if they were such acts.\n\nThe sections, no doubt, apply reltospectively, but they do not constitute an exercise of the judicial power on the part of the Parliament.\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice observed that this apt!)' described what had happened in the case before the Federal Court and answered the argument that it was an impossible feat to convert what was not a trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure into a trial under the Code;\n\nAccording to the learned Chief Justice, the real question was, C whether the Ordinance was covered by any of the entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act. \"It was not contended said the Chief Justice \"that the mere absence of a specific provision about validating laws\" was by its.elf of much significance.\" As observed by this Court in Atiqa Begum's case('), \"the power of validation must be taken to be ancillary or subsidiary to the D power to deal with the particular subjects specified in the Lists.\"\n\nThere is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose's case(') which deltacts from the propositions of law laid down in Atiqa Begum's case(') or Ffiare Dusadh's case('). In Basant Chandra Ghose'< case(') cl. (2) of s. 10 provided :\n\n\"If at the commencement of this Ordinance ther\" is pending in any Court any proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by virtue of section 6 as if it had been made un<ier this Ordinance is called in question, that proceeding is hereby dischorP.erl\"\n\nSpens, C.J. said with regard to this clause that :\n\n\"here there has been no jnvestigatioii or decision by any Tribunal which the legislating authority can be deemed to have given effect to. . It is a direct disposal of cases by the legislature itself.\" (see at p. 309).\n\nG h was pointed out that tile nature of the provision considered in Piare Dusadh's case(') was essentially different from cl. (2) of s. 10 of the impugned Ordinance.\n\nThe question has engaged the attention of this Court in a number of cases and we .may refer to tlie case of West Ramnad H Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras(') by way of\n\n(1} (1940] F.C.R. 110.\n\n. (3) [1944] F.C.R. 61\n\n(2) (1944] F.C.R. 295\n\n\nillustration. In that case, the Madras Legislature had passed an Act ( 43 of 1949) on January 24, 1950 for the acquisition of undertakings supplying electricity in the Province of Madras. In pursuance of s. 4 ( 1) of the Act the State of Madras passed an order on Mav 17, 1951 declaring that the appellant undertaking shall vest iii' the respondent from September. 21, 1951.\n\nThe Chief Electrical Inspector took over possession of the appellant and all its records etc. The State paid to the appellant Rs. 8,34,000 and odd as compensation. According to the appellant, about Rs. 1,00,000 still remained to be paid.\n\nSome of the electrical undertakings in Madras which had' been taken over filed writ petitions in the High Court which upheld the validity of the impugned Act in so far as it related to the licencees other than municipaji\\ies. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.\n\nv. The State of Madras(') this Court had held that the impugned Act of 1949 was ultra vires on the ground that it went beyond the legislative competence of the Madras Legislature inasmuch as there was no entry in any of the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, l 935 relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking.\n\nAfter the decision in this case, the Madras Legislature passed Act XXIX of 1954 which received the assent of the President on 9th October,\n\n1954. This Act incorporated the main provisions of the earlier Act and purported to validate action taken under the earlier Act.\n\nThe appellant then filed a writ petition alleging that to the extent to which the Act purported to validate acts done under the earlier Act of 1949 it was ultra vires. It was further urged . that the three bases of compensation as laid down by the Act were inconsistent with the requirement of Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 24 of the Act ran as follows :\n\n. \"Orders made, decisions or directions given, notifications issued, proceedings taken and acts or things done, in relation to any undertaking taken over, if they would have been validly made, given, issued, taken or done, had the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949 (Madras Act XLIII of 1949), and the rules made thereunder been in force on the date on which the said orders, decisions or directions, notifications, proceedings, acts or things, were made, given, issued, taken or done are hereby declared to have been validly made, given, issued, taken or done, as the case may be, except to the extent to Which the said orders, decisions, directions, notifications, proceedings, acts or things are repugnant to the provisions of this Act.\"\n\n(I) [1954] S.C.R. 779.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)\n\nIt was held by this Court that this was\n\n\"a saving and validating provision and it clearly intends to validate actions taken under the relevant provisions of the earlier Act which was invalid from the start. The fact that s. 24 does not use the usual phraseology that the notifications issued under the earlier Act shall be deemed to have been issued under the Act, does not alter the position that the second part of the section has and is intended to have/ the same effect.\"\n\nThe contention that the impugned notification contravened Art. 31 ( 1) because of want of existence of an antecedent law depriving the citizen of his Jl_roperty was turned down with the observation:\n\n\"In our opinion, this argument is not well-founded.\n\nIf the Act is retrospective in operation and s. 24 has been enacted for the purpose of retrospectively validating actions taken under the provisions of the earlier Act, it must follow by the v_ery retrospective operation of the relevant provisions that at the time when the impugned notification was issued, these provisions were in existence. That is the plain and obvious effect of the retrospective operation of the sfatute. \"·\n\nReference was made to the case of the United Provinces v. Mst.\n\nAtiqa Begum('), Piare Dusadh v. The King Emperor(') and also to the decision in Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra( 8 ) and it was finally said (at p. 766) :\n\n\" .... there is no doubt about the competence of the Legislature to enact a law and make it retrospective in operation in regard to topics included within the relevant Schedules of the Constitution.\"\n\nReference may also be made to the case of Rai Ramkrishna\n\nv. The State of Bihar(').\n\nAll these decisions lay down that the power to legislate for validating actions taken under statute which were not sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose is only anciliary or subsidiary to legislate on any subject within the competence of the legislature and such Validating Acts cannot be struck down merely because courts of law have declared actions taken earlier to be invalid for want of jurisdiction.\n\nNor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validating Act must enact provisions to cure the defect for the future\n\n(1) [19401 F.C.R. 110.\n\n(2) [19441 F.C.R. 61. (J) [1954] S.C.R. 541 at 544.\n\n(4) [!9641 l S.C.R. 897.\n\n66 SUPREME COURT REPOl!.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nand also provide that all actions taken or notifications issued must be deemed to have been taken or issued under the new provisions so as to give them full retrospective effect _ !\"o doubt legislatures often resort to such practice but it is not absolutely necessary that they should do so so as to give full scope .and effect to the Validating Acts. By way of illustration reference may be made to the following Acts. ( 1) The Professions Tax Limitation (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1949 where s. 3(i) provided that\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force,-\n\n(i) no tax on circumstances and property imposed before the commencement of this Act under clause (Ix) C of sub-section (1) of section 128 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, or clause (b) of section 108 of the United Provinces District Boards Act, 1922, shall be deemed to be, or ever to have been invalid merely on the ground that the tax imposed exceeded the limit of Rs. 50/ • per annum prescribed by the said Act, and D the validity of the imposition of any such tax shall not be called in question in any Court;\"\n\n(2) The Hindu Marriages (Validation of Proceedings) Act, 1960 (Act 19 of 1960) was passed to obviate the shortcomings in the Hindu Marriage Act pointed out by the Punjab Court in Janak Dulari v. Narain Das (A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 50). There the E High Court held that the court of an additional Judge cannot be regarded as a principal court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act and that a District Judge to whom a petition under the Act. is presented cannot transfer it to an additional Judge for trial. The object of the Validation Act was to validate all proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed by F any of the Courts specified in cl. (2) exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 2( 1) ran as follows :-\n\n\"All proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed before the commencement. of this Act by any of the Courts referred to in sub-section (2) exercising or pur- G porting to exercise jurisdiction under the Hindu Mar - riage Act, 1955 shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, be deemed to be as good and valid in law as if the court exercising or purporting ·.to exercise such jurisdiction had been a district court within the meaning of the said Act.\" H\n\nThe courts referred to in sub-section (1) are: the court of an additional Judge, additional district Judge, etc. ·\n\n• ;\n\n,,_\n\nUDAI RAM SHA1WA v. UNION (Mitter, J,) 67\n\nIn our opinion the contentions raised about the invalidity of the Amending Act on the ground that s. 3 thereof was not ade expressly retrospective or that it encroached upon the domam of the judiciary by seeking to nullify judicial decisions caot be sustained. The American doctrine of well-defined separation of legislative and judicial powers has no alication to Indi.a and. it cannot be said that an Indian Statute which seeks to validate invalid actions is bad if the invalidity has already been pronounced upon by a court of law.\n\nIn view of the decisions of the Judicial Committee, the Federal Court and this Court referred to above, it must be held that the absence of a provision in the Amending Act to give retrospective operation to s. 3 of the Act does not affect the validity of s. 4 as contended for. It was open to Parliament to adopt either course, e.g. (a) to provide expressly for the retrospective opera\n\ntion of s. 3, or, (b) to lay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be deem ed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid because inter <!Ila\n\nof the making of more than one report under s. 5-A or more than one declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order to the contrary.\n\nParliament was competent to validate such actions and transactions, its power in that behalf being only circumscribed by the appropriate entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights setforth in Pan ill of the Constitution. As\n\nshown above, there have been instances where the latter course had been adopted by the Indian Parliament in the past.\n\nSection 4 of the Amending Act being within the legislative competence of Parliainent, the provisions thereof are binding on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments, orders or decrees to the conrtary rendered or made in the past.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept the contention about the violation of Art. 31 (2) of the Amending Act. It is not suggested that the Validating Act in express words enacts any law which\n\ndiry affects compensation payable in respect of the property acqmred or lays down any principles different from those which were already in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the question of adequacy of C?mpensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the Jaw,,\n\nprovies that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his property or Jays down the principles for the determination\n\nthf._ There is not word about \"compensation\" in s. 4 of the Validating Act. , lndtrectly however, it would affect a person's right to compensation, inasmuch as but fot the Validating Act the notification under s. 4 issued on 13th November 1959 could\n\n;; s\n\n\n[ 1968] 3 S.C. R.\n\nnot be resorted to for the purpose of making more than one declaration under s. 6 of the Act.\n\nSchemes of the magnitude of the plan for the development of Delhi or for the establishment of an iron and steel plant did not have to be considered in pre- Constitution days. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 contained sufficient measures to allow acquisition of small parcels of property for the different schemes of the extent and magnitude which had to be considered in the past. Even then, the law with regard to compensation did not remain static from the days of the Act of\n\n1870 to 1923. In the Act of 1894 the date of declaration under s. 6 w.as made to take the place of the date in s. 24 of the Act of 1870. Under the Act of 1870 the market value of the land at the time of awarding compensation was the criterion.\n\nThe date for the assessment of compensation was further shifted to the date of the notification under s. 4 only in 1923.\n\nThe Legilature might well ha','.e provided in the Act of 1894 that it wouldbe open to the appropriate government after issuing a notification under s. 4 to consider objections raised under s. 5 with regard to different localities from time to time enabling different reports to be made under s. 5-A with consequent adjustments in s. 6 providing for declarations to be made as and when each report under s. 5-A was considered. By the validation of actions taken under s. 6 more than once in respect of a single notification under s. 4, the original scheme of acquisition is not altered.\n\nThe public purpose behind the notification under s. 4 remains the same. It is not as if a different public purpose and acquisition of land for such purpose were being interpolated by means of the Validating Act. The principle of compensation remains the same under the Validatmg Act as it did under the principal Act of 1894. Only the shortcomings in the Act as to want of provision to enable more than one declaration under s. 6 are being removed. In our opinion, the Validating Act does not fall within the mischief pointed out by this Court in various decisions starting from the State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Bancr- ; ee(') :\n\nEntry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule before its amendment read:\n\n\"Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the forms and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\"\n\nIn Mrs. Bela Banerjee's case(') s. 8 of the impugned West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 provided that the com-\n\nJll [i954] S.C.R. 558.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)\n\npensation to be awarded for acquisition of land was not to exceed the market value thereof on December 31, 1946. This provision was held to be arbitrary by this Court .inasmuch as it fixed the ceiling on compensation by reference to the market value of the land on the above-mentioned date no matter when and how long afterwards the acquisition took place. Similarly in dismissing the appeal of the State in State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar (1) where the Madras Act XI of 1953 provided that compensation was payable on the basis of the valuation of the land on Apnl 28, 194 7 together with some improvements made thereon up to the date of notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act because of the discovery of the presence of lignite in certain taluks in 194 7 and the announcement by Government by a press note that it proposed to undertake legislation to compel persons purchasing such lands after a date to be prescribed in 1947, it was held that \"a law which authorises acquisition of land not for its true value, but for value frozen on some date anterior to the acquisition, on the assumption that all appreciation in its value since that date is attributable to purposes for which the State may use the land at some time in future, must be regarded as infringing the fundamental right\" and \"there was no true relation between the acquisition of the land .... and the fixation of compensation based on their value on the market rate prevailing o.n April 28, 1947.\" Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act for assessment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land not on the date on which the interest of the owner was extinguislied under section 16 but to the date of the notification under S; 4(1) it was observed that \"any principle for determination of compensation denying to the owner all increments in value between a fixed date and the date of issue of the notifications under s. 4(1) must prima facie be regarded as denying to him the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated.\n\nIn our opinion, the Amending Act cannot be said to lay down any principle which suffers from the vice of the Act struck down in the. above decisions. The date of valuation is that of the issue of notification under s. 4(1 )-a principle which has held the field since 1923. It is tru~ that the underlying principle of the Act of 1894 was that all mcrements due to the settina on foot of the acquisition proceedings were to be ignored whreas due to the ever spiralling of all prices all over India land values are 11'.o.1mting up all the time i.n all the States, specially round about big c1t1es-an occurrence qmte unconnected with th~ issue of a notification under s. 4(1)-but it cannot be said that because owners of land are to be deprived of all the increments due to the latter\n\nphei:omnon it must be held that. there is a violation of Art. 31 (2).\n\nLegislative competence to acquire land under the provisions of\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthe Land Acquisition Act cannot be challenged because of constant appreciation of land values all over the country due to the prevalent abnormal inflation. There must be some time lag between the start and conclusion of land acquisition proceedings and in principle there is nothing wrong in accepting the said start as the date for valuation. Sections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by Art. 31(5)(a) of the Constitution.\n\nOnly sections 5-A and 6 of the Act have been amended. The amendments do not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act nor contravene Art. 31 of the Constitution in any way.\n\nThe Amending Act does not really derogate from the principle that the valuation on the date of issne of notification affords the criterion for determining compensation of all lands to be acquired.\n\nIt only keeps alive the said notification for sustaining more than one declaration under s. 6 to meet the exigencies of the situation where it was not possible to make one comprehensive declaration under s. 6 and where the State has been obliged to validate actions which could not be supported under the principal Act.\n\nIt cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary date for the .valuation of the i>roperty which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings.\n\nAt the same time when the notification under s. 4 was issued on 13th November 1959, the State had cqnsidered that a very huge area round about Delhi would have to be acquired so that the development of the city could proceed in an orderly manner step by step not only to meet the immediate needs of the then population of the city but with an eye to the ever-increasing demands of the exploding population in all cities in India and specially in iis capital. It was before November 1959 that the State had to consider the acquisition of a large tract of land for the purposes of development of Delhi but it was not possible to take up simultaneously all schemes for the future development of the city. It was also not practically possible to take up all schemes in all directions at the same time. The resources of the State were not adequate to take up the schemes for improvement of the city by the acquisition of an area like Ac. 34,000,00, at the same time keeping in mind not only the need of land for housing purposes but also for other purposes like education, industry and manufacture not to speak of amenities for recreation, entertainment etc. Of necessity, the area under the proposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and the development of one or more blocks at a time could only be taken up in consonance with the resources available.\n\nEven contiguous blocks could be developed gradually and systematically.\n\nIf a particular area, say block 'A' was meant to provide lands for building houses for residential purposes onlv a block contiguous thereto, say block 'B' might be set apart for industrial purooses. There may be nothing common between\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, !.) 71\n\nBlock A and Block B to require their simultaneous development although both the Blocks would form part of a composite whol(}- to serve the needs of a growing city. Can it be said that acquisition of lands for Block A and Block B must be made simultaneously and is the law to be struck down because it enables a declaration under s. 6 with respect to Block B to be made some time after a similar declaration in respect of Block A 7 In such a case, it would be inc<ingruous to award compensation for lands acquired in Block B on a basis different from that in respect of lands in Block A covered by an earlier declaration under s. 6. The scope of Art. 31 (2) as amended was considered by this .coun in P. V •. Mudaliar v. Deputy Collector('). It was there pomted out that after the amendment \"what is excluded from the courts' jurisdiction is that the said law cannot be questioned on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate;\" and \"if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the properly acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acquired, it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.\" In that case it was also observed by this Court that \"in the context of continuous rise in land prices from year to year depending upon abnormal circumstances it cannot be said that fixation of average price of over five years is not a principle for ascertaining the price of the land in or about the date of acquisition.\" The decision is also an authority for the proposition that the omission of one of the elements that should properly be taken into account in fixing the compensation might result in the inadequacy of compensation but such omission in itself did not constitute fraud on power.\n\nIt is also to be noted that in this case this Court upheld the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961 although the said Act substituted a new clause for the first clause in s. 23 ( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The substituted clause provided for payment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4( 1) or an amount equal to the average market value of the land during the five years immediately preceding such date, whichever was less. It is significant that the Act which was a post-\n\nourth Constitution Amendment Act,· was upheld although by its own terms and independently of the Land Acquisition Act it provided for payment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4(1). It may therefore be inferred that in upholdinll the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961, this Court was. of the vie~ that th~ yrinciple of fixing com pei; isation on the\n\nbasis of the pnce prevailmg on the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was a relevant principle. Jn\n\n(0 [19651 l S.C.R. 614.\n\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe result the court turned down the contention about the violation of Art. 31(2) because of the modification of some of the principles for assessing compensation laid down in s. 23 of the Act.\n\nIn the present case, there has been no variation of the law formulated in s. 23 of the Act. As such, in our opinion, there has been no violation of Art. 31 ( 2) merely because the actions already taken have been sought' to be validated.\n\nNor are we satisfied that there has l>een any colourable or fraudulent exercise of legislative power.\n\nWith regard to the question as to discrimination violative of Art. 14, it goes without saying that whenever an Amending Act is passed, there is bound to be some difference in treatment between transactions which have alread:wtaken place and those which are to take place in the future. That by itself will not attract the operation of .Art. 14. Again, even with respect to transactions which may be completed in the future, a reasonable classification will not be, struck down as was held b)' this Court in Jalan Trading Co. v. Mazdoor Un{on(').\n\n\"If the classification is not patently arbitrary, the Court will not rule it discriminatory. merely because it involves hardship or inequality of burden. With a view to secure a particular object a scheme may be selected by the Legislature wisdom whereof may be open to debate; it may even be demonstrated that the scheme is not the best in the circumstances and the choice of the Legislature may be shown to be erroneous, but unless the enactment fails to satisfy the dual test of intelligible classification and rationality of the relation with the object of the law, it will not be subject to judicial interference under Art. 14. Invalidity of legislation is not established by merely finding faults with the scheme adopted by the Legislature to achieve the purpose it has in view.\" Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act, we must examine the objects of the Act.\n\nThey may be summed up as follows:-\n\n(a) To amend the Act for the future by empowering the making of more than one declaration under s. 6.\n\n(b) To validate completed acquisitions on the basis of more than one declaration under that section.\n\n(c) To authorise more than one declaration under the said section in cases where there is already in existence a notification tinder s. 4.\n\n(I} [1%71 l S.C.R. 15 at 36.\n\n..• D\n\nU11AI 11AM SBADL\\ v. UNION (Mitter, I.) 7 3\n\n(d) To prescribe a time limit for future acquisitions as also pending proceeAingo> not yet completed; and\n\n. (e) To provide additional compensation by way of interest in all cases where acquisition has not yet been completed and where a declaration under s. 6 is issued more than three years after the notification under s. 4.\n\nThere is nothing arbitrary or irrational about the said objects.\n\nIt is well known that in some cases there has been unusual delay in the issue of declaration under s. 6 after a notification under s. 4. The Amending Act puts an end to this harsh treatment by providing that in respect of notifications under s. 4 made before the date of the Ordinance i.e. 20th January 1967, a declaration under s. 6 must be made within two years after that date. If such a declaration is not m~, then it will not. be open to Government to make use of the old s. 4 notification and the State\n\nwould be obliged to issue a fresh notification under s. 4. The Act also limits the time within which a declaration under s. 6 may be made when a notification under s. 4 is issued after 20th January, 1967. This period is limited to three years there having been no time limit in tho past. We are not impressed by the argument that a person whose land may be covered by a notification under s. 4 issued more than one year lieforc 20th January 1967 would seemingly be treat.eel differently from a person wliose land comes under the notification under s. '4 after that date. The Legislature has sought to improve upon the existing provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and there is no discriminatory treatment which should be struck down as violative of Art. 14. The Legislature in its wisdom thought that some time limit should be fixed in respect of s. 4 notificalions :SSued before 20th January, 1967 and that a time limit should also be fixed for acquisition where such a notification is issued after that date. No fault can be found with the Legislature because it has provided tor a period of two years in one case and three years in the other. As was pointed out in la[an Trading Co. v. Mal.doors Union('). ''Equal protection of the laws is denied if in achieving a certain object persons, objects or transactions similarly circumstanced are differently treated by law and the principle underlying that different treatment has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law.\" It is not possible to say that because the legislature thought of . improving upon the Act of 1894 by prescribing certain limits o( time as from 20th January 1967 the difference in treatnient in cases covered by notification before the said date and after the said date denies equal protection of laws because the transactions are not similarly circumstanced. Some of the notifications\n\n(I) (1967] I S.C.R. IS.\n\nIA Sup. C.1./68-lj\n\n74 SUPJlEMB COUllT JlEPOl.TS [1968] 3 S.CJl.\n\nissued under s. 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before 20th January 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as .notifications issued after that date.\n\nArt. 14 does not strike at a differentiation caused by the enactment of a law between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so governed. As was pointed out by this Court in Hatisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India(').\n\n\"When Parliament enacts a law imposing a liability as flowing from certain transactions prospectively, it evidently makes a distinction between those transactions which are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act, because they were completed before the date on which the Act was enacted.\" With respect, the dictum can also be applied as between cases where the transaction was in the course of completion and those which had to be started after a particular date.\n\nOn the whole the Amending Act seeks ta improve the legislation wruch covered the field of acquisition of land. The Legislature might have made more liberal provisions for improvement but it is not fQr thiS court to strike down a piece of legislation because the improvement falls short of the expectation of the litigants.\n\nWitl, rpgard to the provision for payment of interest, in addition to compensation or by way of additional compensation no grievance can be made in that interest is not 'allowed in respect of transactions which have been already completed and compensation taken. The Legislature felt that because there has been unreasonable delay in the payment of compensation, interest should be allowable where the period of three years has already expired or may expire between the date of s. 4 notification and\n\nthe date of declaration under s. 6. No grievance can be made because interest is denied to persons who have already taken the F compensation. Even here the classification is not unreasonable and cannot be said to be unrelated to the object of the Act.\n\nAs regards violation of Art.14, in the case of Sohan Lal who filed Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 the learned Solicitor General drew our attention to a few facts which are not clearly brought out in the affidavit in opposition and will be referred to presently.\n\nHere the attack is on an executive act, namely, the differential treatment meted out to 16 colonies whose lands were covered by\n\nthe notification dated 13th November, 1959 but in respect of which de-notification orders were issued subsequently. It would appear that some of the letters which were received by Sohan L3I did not bring out the full facts and the policy underlying the apparent discrimination in this case. It is pointed out in paragraph II 3 6 of the affidavit in opposition :\n\n(I) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 528 at 543.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, 1.)\n\n\"After the issue of the notification No.F.15(Ill)/59- LSG dated 13-11-1959, it was decided by the Government that the colonies in respect of . which the layout and. service plans had been sanction before the d11te of notification viz., 13-11-1959, may be released from the purview ot acquisition. . .................. .\n\nThe petitioner's colony known as Kanwal Park could not be released from the purview of acquisition because in i~ case only the. layout plans had been sanctioned and not the service plans.\"\n\nThis policy is corroborated by the records of the Land and Housing Department, Delhi Administration which were made available to us at the hearing. It appears from that record that after the notification of 13th November 1959 private owners of land who wanted to lay out colonies and had taken steps in respect thereof by making some arrangement and, spent money-threon had approached the Administration for' release of their lands from the notification and a proposal for de'notification of the colonies was considered' at a high level. It appears that a meeting was held on 29th June 1960 at which were present a nlimber of per-· sons including the Chief Secretary, Vice Chairman, Delhi Dewlop.\n\nment Authority, Engineer-Member,. Architect, Town Planning Organisation, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi Municipal Corporation, Architects of Delhi Municipal Corporation, Secretary, Local Self Government and Under Secretary to the State Government.\n\nThe records show that the case of each notified colony was considered separately and it was felt tl\\at cases in which the layout and service plans had been finltlly approved in all respects before 13th November, 1959 should be recommended for de-notification.\n\nOn 1st of July, 1960, the Commission, Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter ; md recommended that :\n\n\"All those colonies in respect of which both lay-ont plans and service plans had been approved by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority the Delhi Development Authority or the Delhi Municipal Corporation may be de-notified irrespective of whether security was demanded or not and whether the time limit for completion of development .was imposed or not and irrespective of whether security has been paid or not and whether development bas been completed or not.\"\n\nAccording to this recommendation, 16 colonies named tberem\n\nf~IJ in this category.\n\nSoban Lal's colony was not one of those sui:teen.\n\n It is unfortunate that the petitioner who submitted the Jay out plan of the colony as early as June 18, 1956 had not the service plan approved before 13th November, 1959.\n\nIt is clear from\n\n76 SUPllEME COUltT lll!POllTS\n\n\nthe annexures to the petition that the details of the lay-out of the colony were submitted on 30th August, 1956. The petitioner submitted service plans on 15th September, 1959. There was nothing wrong with the plans intrinsically except that there were more than one small pocket of land within the colony to which the petitioner ci>uld not prt>ve his ownership statisfactorily.\n\nMr.\n\nAgarwala appearing for the petitioner submitted that the only difficulty was that in respect of the small pockets they were owned not by the petitioner alone but in c0:0wnership with others and the pe_titioner subsequently excluded these pockets from the purview of his lay-out plan: but this was done only on March 19, 1961, The petitioner's subsequent efforts to have his colony denotified were of no avail even though he had excluded these pockets on\n\n20th January, 1960. On these facts, we cannot hold that the petitioner was subjected to any discrimination.\n\nThere was a policy behind the de-notification and it has not been suggested that the policy was vitiated by any mil!3fides on the part of the authorities.\n\nAll the points urged by the petitioners, therefore, fail and the petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nShelat J.-The facts .in these five writ petitions have been sufficiently set out by our learned brother Mitter J. in his judgment and therefore need not be repeated here. Though they differ in some particulars, the contentions raised by Counsel for the petitioners are common except the additional contentions raised by Mr. Mani in Writ Petition 223 of 1966 and by Mr. Agarwala in Writ Petition 85 of 1967.\n\nThese writ petition arise as a result of and challenge inter a/ia the villidity of the following notifications. No November 13, 1959 the Chief Commissioner, Delhi,· issued a notification under sec. 4-of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 (hereafter referred to as the Pr'incipal Act) notifying that land meiisuring 34070 acres marked in blocks A to T and X in the map enclosed there with was required by the Delhi Administration for the planned development of Delhi. In pursuance of that notification, the Delhi Administration issued sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 in respect of the land situate in village .Ki!kori measuring 97 bighas 14 biswas only from out of the said notified area.\n\nThe notification directed the Collector to take order for its acquisition under s. 7 of the Act. The Collector thereafter made his award on August 31, 1961 in respect . of the said 97 bighas of land at Rs. 2500 a bigha, the total amount including the solatium awarded being Rs. 2,80,887.50. Nothing thereafter was done till March 18, 1966 when another notification under sec. 6 was issued in\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Shelat, I.) 77\n\nrespect of lJ52.2 bighas of land situated in Mandawali Fazilpur, Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas. .\n\nOn Febrary 9, 1966 this Court delivered its judgment in M. P. State v. V. P. Sharma (') where facts were similar to the facts in the present cases and where the land was required for the erection of a steel plant in public sector. In that case the notification under sec. 4 covering land in eleven villages was issued in May 1949. This was followed by several notifications under sec. 6, the last of them being in 1960.\n\nAfter examining the provisions of secs. 4, 5A and 6 oCthe Act, thi~ Court declared as follows :- \"At the stage of sec. 4, the land is not particularised but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the locality. is particularised and thereafter the notification under s. 4( 1) having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a notification of the intention to acquire under s. 4. to the declaration under sec. 6, leads to the conclusion that once a declaration under s. 6 particularising the area is issued, the remaining non-particularised area in the notification under s. 4 ( 1 ) stands automatically released.\n\nThe intention of the legislature was that one notification under s. 4( 1) should be followed by survey under s. 4(2), objections under s. 5A heard, and thereafter, one declaration under sec. 6 issued. If the Government requires more land in that locality, there is nothing ti> prevent it from issuing another notification under s..4(1) making a further survey if necessary, hearing objections and then making another declaration under s. 6, whereas there is likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if there is great delay between the notifications under s. 4(1) and s. 6.\" One of the ontentions urged in that case was that where the land is required for a small project and the area is not large the government may be able to make up its mind once for all what land it needs but where, land is required for a large project requiring a large area of land, government may not be able to make up its mind at once. This contention was rejected on the ground that even if it. be so there is nothing to prevent the government from issuing another notification under sec. 4 followed by a notification unde.r sec. 6, that the government's power to acquire land in a particular locality is not eXhausted by issuing one notification under sec. 4 (1) followed by a notification under s. .6 nd that it . can proceed to do so by a fresh not1ficatton under Sectton 4 ( 1) and a fresh declaration under sec. 6 and that such a procedure would be fair to all concerned.\n\n\n78 SUPREME COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n\nSark:ar J. who delivered a separate judgment also repelled the contention by observing that he could not\n\n\"imagine a government which has V3J!t resorces not being able to make a complete plan of its. pro1ect at a time. Indeed, I think, when a plan is made it is a complete~ plan. I should supp()se that before the governmnt\n\nstats acquisition pr_oceedings b:( the issue of a n?tiJ!- cation under sec. 4 1t has made its plan for otherwise 1t cannot state in the notification, as it has to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan it would have enough time before the making of a declaratio.n under section 6 to do so. I think therefore that the difficulty of the government, even if there is one, does not lead to the conclusion that the Act contemplates the making of a number of declarations under sec. 6.\" -\n\nIn the view taken Shanna's case(') sec. 6 notification dated March 18, 1966 was invalid as sec. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 on which it was founded ceased to be efficacious and became exhausted after sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 was issued and tire rest of the land not covered by it became. as a result released from acquisition. Depending on the declaration of law made in this decision the petitioners filed these writ petition in April 1966 and thereafter.\n\nRealising that if the view taken in Shanna's case(') were to stand the government would have to issue a fresh sec. 4 notification and would have to pay compensation on the basis of the market value of the land on the date of such new notification instead of on November 13, 1959, the government promulgated an Ordinance dated January 20, 1967 called the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1 of 1967. It is not necessary to set out the provisions of the Ordinance as it has been substituted by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 13 of 1967 (hereafter referred to as the Amendment Act) passed on April 12, 1967. There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act were enacted with the object of setting at naught the decision in Sharma's case(').\n\nSection 2 of the Amendment Act substituted the. following words in sec. SA (2), viz.,\n\n\"Submit the case for the decision of an appropriate government together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections.\" by the following words viz.,\n\n\nUDAI ltAM SHARMA v. UNION (Shelat, I.) 79\n\n\"either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land.\"\n\nSection 3 added the following words in sec. 6( 1) after the words 'certify its orders', viz.,\n\n\"and different declaration may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under sec. SA sub-section (2).\" Section 3 also substituted the existing proviso to sec. 6 ( 1) by the following :-\n\n\"provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under sec. 4(1) published after the commencement of the said ordinance (after 20-1-1967) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication.\" Sec. 4(1) of the Amendment Act is a validating provision.\n\nBy clause (a) it provides that no acquisition purporting to have been made before the commencement of the said Ordinance (i.e., before 20-1-67) and no action taken or thing done including any notification published in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid on the ground that\n\n(i) one or more collectors have performed the functions of collector in respect of the entire land covered by s. 4 notification.\n\n(ii) one or more reports have been made under s. 5A(2) whether in respect of the entire land or different parcels thereof covered by the same notification, and\n\n(iii) that more than one declaration are made under sec. 6 in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under sec. 4(1).\n\nClause (b) of sec. 4(1) provides that any acquisition in pursuance of a sec. 4 notification published before 20-1-67 may be made after that date and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done including any order, agreement or notification made or published whether before or after 20-1-67 in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the said grounds mentioneii in clause (a).\n\nSub-sec. (2) .of sec. 4 provides that no declaration under sec. 6 shall be made in respect of land covered by sec. 4 notification published before 20-1-67 after the expiry of two years from that\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\ndate, that is, 20-1-69. Sec. 4(3) provides for payment of interest in the circumstances set out therein.\n\nThe result of the Amendment Act clearly is that an area of land notified tinder sec. 4(1) can be acquired piecemeal at any time, the only restriction being that under sec. 3 in the case of land covered by a sec. 4 notification published after 20-1-67, sec. 6 notification can be issued withiu 3 years from the date of such notification and in respect of land notified under sec. 4(1) before 20-1-67 within two years after 20-1-67. The direct consequence of the Amendment Act is that the unitary character of acquisition by a single inql!iry, a single report, a single declaration and a single award under the Pr111cipal Act is done away with. The government can freeu an area by issuing a sec. 4 notification and can, subject to the lirilitations in sec. 3 and sec. 4(2) of the Amendment Act, go on acquiring parcels of such area at its convenience irrespective of the time when it makes up its mind to acquire and pay compensation on the basis of the value at the date of sec. 4 notification. In the case of land notified under sec. 4(1) after 20-1-6 7 the owner is deprived of appreciation in the value of his land during. three years by reason of limitation_ prescribed in sec . .3 but in the case of land notified before 20-1-67 such deprivation can be for an uncertain period from the date of sec. 4 notification up to two years from 20-1-67 i.e., up to 20-1-69\n\ndepending upon when its acquisition is made. As has happened\n\nin the instant cases the entire area of 34070 acres was frozen for the purpose of computation of compensation as from Nov. 13, 1959 E portons of that area were acquired as late as 1966 and the remaining. area can still be acquired until 20-1-69, each owner being thus deprived of the appreciation in value of his land depending upon when during all this long period the government decides to acquire it. Thus, if the land is notified in 1959 and is acquired in 1960, the loss of appreciation in value is only of one year.\n\nBut the owner of another plot even. if it is contiguous to it, if the government decides to acquire it in 1969, would be deprived of the appreciation in va!ue which has taken place right from\n\n1959 to 1969. The entire area is in the meantime frozen both for the purpose of compensati<m and as poinred out in Shanna's Case(') from its full beneficial enjoyment, the owner not knowing until government chooses to make sec. 6 declaration whether it will ultimately be acquired or not. Under the Principal Act as construed in ShMma', r Case(') once a sec. 6 nOtification is issued sec. 4 notification would become exhausred\n\nana the land not declared as needed thereunder would be relieved from acquisition. If government then desires to acqujre any land in addition to the one so declared it would have to be notified ari.h and the government would be obliged to pay compen-\n\n(1)]1966] 3 S.C.R. 5'7.\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA V. UNION (Shela!, J.) 81\n\nsation at the market rate prevailing on such date. The practical effect of the Amendment Act is that by keeping alive sec. 4 notification and by declaring the declarations made after the first declaration valid, the legislature. dated back the basis of compensation which would have been, put for this validation, tke rate prevailing at the date of sec. 4 notification howsoever belatedcessary. The real purpose of enacting sec. 4 is thus to enable government to freeze an unlimited area by. first notifying it under sec. 4 w1d then to acquire bit by bit and pay compensation at the rate pre1niling at the date of sec. 4 notification howsoever belatedly it ma:3 choose to acquire such bits provided it does so before 20-1-69 where the land is notified before 20-1-67 and before the expiry of t~ years where s. 4 notification is issued after 20-1-67 and thus avoid compensating the appreciation in value in the meantime to which the owner would have been entitled to. Though in form ti\\e Amendment Act purports to valida, te acquisitions including orders and declarations made therfor, the real purpose of enacting the Amendment Act is to avoid having otherwise to compensate for the appreciation in the land vallle during the intervening period. It is a well-settled principle that in determining the constitutionality of a provision impugned on the ground of its being an invasion on a fundamental right the court must weigh not its form which may apparently look innocuous but its real effect and impact on such fundamental right. (cf. Re Kera/a Education Bill('); Gajapati Dea. v. State of Orissa( 2 ).\n\nIt will be seen that secs. 2 and 3 which enable piecemeal and multiple inquiries and reports of a Collector or Collectors under s. 5A, diverse declarations, and awards in respect of different parcels of land covered by sec. 4 notification are prospective. It is only sec. 4 which is made retrospective. But it merely seeks to nullify the decision in Sharmds Case(') and purports to keep alive sec. 4 notifications which would have otherwise lost their efficacy and validates acquisitions including orders and sec. 6 declarations purported to have been made on the ba'sis of such sec. 4 notifications.\n\nSection 4, however, does not contain :\\DY provision retrospectively amending sec. 4 or sec. 5A or sec. 6 and merely seeks to .revitalise sec. 4 notifications already exhausted.\n\nThe section does not also provide that an acquisition or an order or declaration under sec. 6 •made on the basis of such exhausted notification will be deemed to have been made or issued under secs. 2 and 3 of the Amendment' Act and as if the Amendment Act was in force at that date as is usually done in such validating Acts. A notification under sec. 4 having exhausted itself after a declaration under sec. 6 in respect of a part of the land covered . by it and the r8lit of the land being relieved from acquisition,\n\n(I) [1959] s.c.R. 995. .\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 357.\n\n(3) iJ966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n\n82 SUPIU!MB COURT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthere would be prima facie no basis for a sec. 6 declaration or acquisition unless such notification is retrospectively validated by a supporting amendment of sec. 4 of the Principal Act or by malting secs. 2 and 3 of the Amendment Act retrospective and by a fiction deeming it to have been made under such amending provision.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners raised the following conte!l tions :-\n\n(1) that Act 13 of 1967 does not revive sec. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 which became exhausted after the first sec. 6 declaration in 1961 was made and therefore no acquisition in respect of the rest of the land could be made without a fresh sec. 4 notification. Tue contention was that secs. 2 and 3 being prospective they did not resuscitate the sec.' 4 notification though subsequent acquisitions including orders and declarations under sec. 6 -are validated and that such validation has no efficacy as there would be no basis by \"way of a sec. 4 notification for such acquisition or order or declaration.\n\n(2) that Act13 of 1967 is in derogation of the requirements of Art. 31(2) as it purports to authorise acquisition without a fresh sec. 4 notification thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of an exhausted sec. 4 notification and on the value of the laud prevailing on the date of such exhausted notification.\n\n(3) that the Amendment Act is in violation of Art. 14 in that\n\n(a) where a sec. 4 notification is made before 20-1-1967, sec. 6 declaration can be made within 2 years from the said date, I.e.,\n\non or before 20-1-69. But where the land is notified after 20-1-67 sec. 6 declaration would have to be made within 3 years from the date of such notification. In the former case a much longer period is provided for a sec. 6 declaration than in the latter\n\ncas~;\n\n(b) where a sec. 4 notification is made after 20-1-67 compensation would be fixed on the basis of the value on that date but where a sec. 4 notification is made before 20-1-67 compensation would be on the basis of the value on the date of the exhausted notification howsoever long a period has elapsed since such notification;\n\n(c) if compensation has not been paid before 20-1-67 interest has to be paid on the compensation amount, but if compensation _h~ ben paid before 20-1-~7 no interest is payable though acqumt10n m both the cases springs from the same sec. 4 notification;\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA V. UNION (She/at, J.) 83\n\n(d) in the case of sec. 4 notification issued after 20-1-67 if Sec. 6 declaration is not made within three years a fresh sec. 4 notification is necessary and compensation would be on the basis of the value on the date of such fresh notification but where a s. 4 notification is' issued before 20-1-67 there is no defined period and sec. 6 declaration can be made until 20-1-69. Therefore the owner gets compensation on the value at the date of s. 4 notification howsoever long the intervening period may be. A person affected by sec. 4 notification issued after 20-1-67 is thus dilferentlY. treated than the one who is affected by such a notification issued before 20-1-67.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967 an additional point was raised, viz., that though 16 colonies in village Kilkori were denotified under s. 48, the land of the petitioner though situate witnin the same notified area was not denotified thus wrongly discriminating him. In Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966, Mr. Mani contended that the Amendment Act merely seeks to reverse the decision of this Court, that the Act is not a legislative but a judicial act and that though the Constitution has not brought about separation of powers nonetheless it does not confer unlimited powers on the legislature to encroach upon the judicial power. In other words, the legislature seeks to control the courts' function by requiring of them a construction of law according to its views. The legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon 'past transactions and controversies and reverse decisions which the courts in exercise of their undoubted authority have made,. for, that would mean not only exercise of a judicial function but in effect to sit as a court of review to which the past transactions and controversies are referred to. The question as formulated by him is whether a statute which simply validates acts and orders pronounced upon by a court as invalid is sustainable without a retrospective law providing that such acts and orders are deemed to have been made under the validating Act and as if such validating Act was in existence at the date of such acts and orders.\n\nOn the question whether the Amendment Act is in derogation of the requirements of Art. 31(2), the contention of the Solicitor-General was that it is not the law contemplated by Art. 3 I (2) as it merely amends ss. SA and 6 of the Principal Act and does not touch either s. 4 or s. 23 which deal with compensation, that it amends only the procedural provisions and that sec. 4 thereof merely validates acquisitions including orders and notifications purported to have been. made or passed to get over the difficulty create by Sharma' s Case(').\n\nThe impugned Act does not frankly deal with compensation.\n\nBut as already stated it is not the form of a statute under\n\n\\ 1) [l966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nchallenge which matters but its substance and the direct impact it A has on the constitutional requirements.\n\nThough secs. 2 and 3 amend ss. SA and 6 of the Principal Act enabling multiple inqµiries, reports and declarations in respect of different parcels of land notified under s. 4, the validating provisions of s. 4 have a direct impact on the question of compensation payable under the Act.\n\nWhere a sec. 4 notification has been issued at any time before 20-1-67, as has happened ill the instant cases,. a large area can be notified under sec. 4, say, in 1959, and yet sec. 6 declarations can be made by reason of s. 4 of the impugned Act at different times and as late as 1969. Yet, the compensation would be on the value in 1959 irrespective of the fact that such value has appreciated in the meantime due to the general spiralling of prices and not as a consequence of its having been notified under sec. 4. It is manifest that but for the validating provisions of s. 4 of the Amendment Act government would have had either\n\nto proceed with the acquisition of the whole bf the notified land or to proceed with part of it and thus exhaust the sec. 4 notification and release the rest of the land from acquisition. If further land is subsequently needed a fresh notification under s. 4 would have been necessary and compensation would have to be paid on the basis of the value on that date. The impugned Act enables government to acquire the land once it is notified under sec. 4 in different parcels and if the notification is of a date prior to\n\n20, 1-67 pay the same compensation depriving the owner of the appreciation of value during the intervening period. Such appreciation would have had to be compensated for but for sec. 4 of' the impugned Act.\n\nEach parcel of land in an area notified under sec. 4 would thus be deal~ with differently depending on at what point of time it is acquired. A piece of land would fetch compensation at X amount even though its market value has doubled by the time sec. 6 declaration in respect of it is made.\n\nAnother piece of the very same land would be awarded the same compensation even if the appreciation in its value is four-fold only because government can now acquire it at a subsequent date.\n\nThe deprivation of the appreciated value to different owners or to the same owner if both the parcels of land belong to the same would vary depending upon when government chooses to acquire each of such parcels. Therefore, from the mere fact that the impugned Act does .not amend sec. 4 or sec. 23 it is not possible to say that it is not an Act dealing with or affecting compensation.\n\nBesides, by amending secs. SA and 6 and validating acquisitions, orders and declarations the Amendment Act brings about changes of a fundamental character in the Act by converting the unitary character of an acquisition into a diversified one, in that instead of one inquiry and one report )>y the same officer, one declaration under sec. 6 and one award, it pemtits several inquiries and several reports by different officers, several declarations and even\n\nUDAI RAM SIWlMA v .. UNION (Shelat, J,) 85\n\nseveral awards thus altering the very structure of the Principal Act. It is thus impossible to say that the impugned Act is not the law of acquisition contemplated by Art. 31(2).\n\nIt was, however, contended that even so, (1) the impugned Act does not alter the principle in s. 23 of the Act that compensation is to be fixed on the basis of market value at the date of s. 4 notification and that. such mode of compensation is based on a long standing principle that the owner is not entitled to any increase in value as a result of the land having been notified; and\n\n(2) that the basis of compensation emerging from the Amendment Act has a bearing on the adequacy of compensation and hence the court is barred under the amended Art. 31 (2) from making any scrutiny.\n\nThe principle on which compensation is to be ascertained has undergone changes from time to time. In the Act of 1870, s. 24 provided that it should be fixed on the basis of the value at the time of paying compensation. That was changed in the Act of 1894 under which the date of s. 6 notification was made the crucial date for ascertaining compensation.\n\nThis was changed in 1923 when the market value on the date of s. 4 notification was made the measure of compensation. This was done as s. SA was then introduced for the first time in the Act.\n\nIt was felt that the insertion of s. SA would create a time gap between the notification under s. 4 and the actual acquisition. The date .of s. 4. notification was accepted as the crucial date on the principle that in calculating compensation it was fair to exclude appreciation due to the land having been notified for a scheme for . which it was sought to be acquired.\n\nThe principle on which appreciation in value after the issuance of s. 4 notification was excluded is no longer valid or in accord with the present day realities for it is a notorious fact that prices of properties have been continuously rising for reaons into which it is neither necessary nor relevant to go into. The principle excluding appreciation as a result of s. 4 notification has been there for a long time. But the argument that s. 23 is not altered by the. Amendment Act does not lead us any further, for, the inquiry is what is the impact of the impugned Act on the question of compensation payable to the expropriated owner. If the impugned Act had not nullified the decision in Sharma's Case(') and had not ruled that s. 4 notification would not become exhausted, fresh notification under s. 4 would have become necessary and higher • compensation would have become payable than now. The fact that neither s. 4 nor s. 23 is altered therefore does not make any difference.\n\n(I} [1966] 3 s.c.R. ss1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [196S] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe impugned Act being a legislation after the 4th Constitution amendment of 1955 the question as to the adequacy of compensation is no longer amenable to judicial scrutiny but the amendment of Art. 31(2) in 1955 has not affected the constitutional requirement that no property can be compulsorily acquired except under a law providing for compensation or which provides principles fixing such compensation. As to what the term \"compensation\" in Art. 31 means has been the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court and the term has as a result acquired a well settled interpretation. In Bela Banerjee's Case(')\n\nPatanjalj Sastri C.J. in repelling the contention that compensation in Entry 42 of List III could not mean full cash equivalent laid stress on the distinction between the word \"compensation\" in Art. 31 and the said Entry and the words \"the acquisition of property on just terms\" in s. 51 (XXXI) of the Australian Constitution Act and held that compensation meant just equivalent and the principles which should govern the determination of compensation amount to be given to the expropriated owner must ensure that what is determined must be such compensation, i.e., just equivalent.\n\nIn striking down the proviso to s. 8 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, XXI of 1948 he observed that the fixing of ad anterior date which has no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary.\n\nSimilarly in Namasiwz:; a Mudaliar's Case(') this Court held, following Bela Banerjee's Case('), that any principle for determination of compensation denying the owner all increments in value between a fixed date and the date of s. 4 notification must be regarded as denying to the owner the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated and that it is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on the market value on an anterior date does not constitute violation of the constitutional guarantee.\n\nThis decision was in respect of a law before the 1955 amendment and the court expressed no opinion on the question whether it was possible by enactg legislation after the 1955 amendment to provide that compensat10n may be fixed on the basis of value prevailing on a certain anterior date. (cf. Jeejeebhai v. Assist. Co1/ector($)\n\nIt was thus well settled before the amendment of .j\\.rt. 31(2)\n\nin 1955 that there could not be a valid acquisition unleSs the law authorising it provided compenstion, i.e.; just equivalent or principles fixing such compensation, i.e., just equivale~ of what the owner is deprived of. The question as to the impact of the 1955 amendment of Art. 31 (2) on this principle arose in H\n\n(I) [1954) s.C.R. 558. at p. 563-64.\n\n(2) [1964] 6 SiC.R. 936.\n\n(3) [1965] l S.C.R. 636.\n\nUDAJ 1tAM SHARMA v. UNION (Shelat, J.) 87\n\nP. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Deputy Collector('). This decision laid down the following propositions :-\n\n(i) whether the principles laid down in an impugned Act take into account all the elements to make up the true value of the property and exclude matters which are to be included is a justiciable issue;\n\n'(ii) that the law fixing compensation or laying down principles governing its fixation cannot be questioned on the ground of inadequacy;\n\n(iii) that the connotation of \"compensation\" and the question of justiciability are distinct concepts and should be. ept apart while considering the validity of the impugned provision;\n\n(iv) that the fact that the amended Article uses the same words, viz., \"compensation\" and \"principles\"-shows that Parliament used them in the sense in which they were construed by this Court, and\n\n(v) that the legislature must provide for a just equivalent or lay down principles fixing such just equivalent and if that is done, such a law cannot be questioned on the ground of inadequacy of compensation.\n\nAs to how and in what manner the question of . adequacy would a, rise was illustrated by giving various examples. Article 31(2) as amended means therefore that if the impugned Act either fixes just equivalent as compensation or lays _down principles for fixing such just equivalent it cannot be impeached on the ground that such compensation is inadequate or that when working out those principles the resultant compensation is inadequate.\n\nBut this does not mean that the amendment permitted the legislature to fix inadequate compensation or to lay down principles fixing compensation which is not just equivalent. Such a theory attributes an intention to the legislature to enact a law in terms of contradiction, for, compensation which is not just equivalent is no compensation as interpreted by this Court and understood when Art: 31 (2) was amended and giving any such meaning to that Article would be contrary to the well settled principle of construction that where the legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has. received judicial interpretation it must be assumed that it is used in the si; nse i~ which it has been judicially interpreted unless a contrary mtentton appears. At p. 629 of the report if has clearly been laid down that ·\n\n. \"If the legislature though ex facie purports to provide for compensation or indicates the principles for as: certaining the same but in effect and substance takes\n\n(I) il96Sl I S.C.R. 614.\n\n88 SUPREME COURT lU!PORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\naway a property without paying compensation for it, it 'will be exercising , power which it does not pos. If the legislature makes a law for acquiring a proiiertY by providing fqr an illusory compensation . or by indicating the principles for ascertaing the compensation which do riot relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within a reasonable proximity of the date of ' acquisition or , the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide for compensation at all one can easily hold that the legislature made .the Jaw in fraud of its powers.\"\n\nFollowing this decision this Court held in the Union of India v.\n\nMetal Corporation of India(') that the principles Jaid down in the impugned ct were not in accord with Art. 3!(2) and that an acquisition Jaw \"to justify itself has to provide for the payment of a just equivalent to the property acquired qr lay down principles which are not arbitrary: but which are relevant ro the fixation of compensation. It is only when the principles stand this test that the adequacy of the resultant compensation falls outside the judicial scrutiny under the second limb of Art. 31(2).\"\n\nIt is true that in Va; ravelu's Case(') it was held that in the context of the continuous rise in land prices, fixation of an average price over 5 years amounted to ascertaining 1 the price of the land in or about the date of acquisition and that omission of one of the elements which should properly be taken into ac~ count for fixing compensation though resulting in inadequacy of compensation . would . not constitute fraud on power.. But there is no analogy between the provisions of the impugned Act in that case and the instant cases.\n\nThough that Act varied the method of ascertainment of compensation provided by s. 23 of the Principal Act it provided for taking the average of prices prevailing during the 5 years in or about the date of acquisition.\n\nBy striking the. average of prices during those 5 year8 the Act actually. took into account the appreciation in value during the S years preceding the acquisition for fixing the compensation. The position in the instant cases is quite different. The impugned Act does. not provide for any such average price as was done in Vairavelu's Case.(') Though s. 4 apparently validates , acquisiticins, orders and notifications made on the basis of s; 4 notifi\" cation issued before 20-1-67, in effect and substance it seeks to treat such a notification under s. 4 which had Jost its efficacy and' had become exhausted where s. 6 declaration has been made\n\n(1) (1967] 1 S.C.R. 2SS\n\n(2) (1965] I S.C.R. 614.\n\nUDAI RAM SHA1lMA v. UNION (Shelat, J.) 89\n\nfor a part of the land covered by such s. 4 notification as still outstanding. This is sought to be done without any legislative provision in the impugned Act revitalising the notification .which had become dead and inefficacious. Such a thing could not be done by merely validating acquisitions, orders and declarations without revitalising by some provision the notifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and on which such acquisitions including orders and declarations are founded.\n\nNor could it validate inquiries and reports under s. 5A and declarations under s. 6, all of which are made on the basis of a notification which was no longer alive except by retrospectively amending s. 4 and declaring such s. 4 notification as having been made under such amended s. 4. Not having so done, the direct result of the validating provisions of s. 4 of the impugned Act is to fix compensation on the basis of the market value existing on the date of s. 4 notification which had exhausted itself.\n\nBy validating the acquisitions, orders and declarations made on the basis of such an . exhausted notification the impugned Act saves government from having to issue a fresh s. 4 notification and having to pay compensation calculated on the market value as on the date of such fresh notification and depriving the expropriated owner the benefit of the appreciated value in the meantime. The real object of s. 4 of the impugned Act is thus to save the State from having to compensate for such appreciation under the device of validating all that is done under an exhausted s. 4 notification and thus in reality fixing an anterior date, i.e., the date of such a dead s. 4 notification for fixing the compensation. We apprehend that s. 4 of the impugned Act suffers from a two-fold vice : (i) that it purports to validate acquisitions, orders and notifications without resuscitating the notification tinder s. 4 by any legislative provision on the basis of which alone the validated acquisitions, orders and declarations can properly be sustained and (2) that its provisions ate in derogation of Art. 31 (2) as interpreted by this Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value on the date of notifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and for keeping them alive no 1egislative provision is to be.found in the impugned Act It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the purpose of s. 4 is to fill in the lacuna pointed out in Shanna's Case(') nor with the view that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation. The section under the guise of validating the acquisitions, orders and notifications camouflages the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of \".alues frozen by notification~ u.nder s; 4 which by part acquisi- Uons thereder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the rest of the land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such fresh notifications.\n\n(I} (19661 3 S.C.R. 557.\n\nL4Sup.C. 1/68-7\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nIn this view, it is not necessary to go into the other questions raised by the petitioners and we refrain from expressing any opinion on them. We would declare s. 4 as invalid and allow the petitions with costs.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority the petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.\n\nG.C.", "total_entities": 676, "entities": [{"text": "UDAI RAM SHARMA ANI) OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UDAI RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA &\"ID OTHERS\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 81, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA &\"ID OTHERS\n\nFebruary 1, 1968\n\n(K. N. WANCHOO, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, CJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. 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"end_char": 4100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: Per Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter, JJ.-(i) The American doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powen has no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute , which seeks to validate invalid actions' is bad if the invalidify has already been pronounced upon by a court of law.", "canonical_name": "Mitter"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4215, "end_char": 4220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: Per Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter, JJ.-(i) The American doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powen has no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute , which seeks to validate invalid actions' is bad if the invalidify has already been pronounced upon by a court of law."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was open to Parliament to adopt either course e.g. (a) to provide expressly for the retrospective operation of s. 3, or, (b) to Jay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be deemed\n\nro be invalid or even to have become invalid because, intn alia, of the lllllking of more than one declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, notwithstanding any judgment decree or order to the contrary."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5345, "end_char": 5354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6458, "end_char": 6462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6631, "end_char": 6635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7056, "end_char": 7060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ibo date of valuation under the Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ibo date of valuation under the Validation Act", "statute": "Ibo date of valuation under the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7274, "end_char": 7361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7697, "end_char": 7714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(5)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7760, "end_char": 7773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Art 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Legislative competence to acquire laud under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "cannot be said of the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7993, "end_char": 8029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8921, "end_char": 8928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BJ\n\nIt cannot be said of the Validating Act", "statute": "BJ\n\nIt cannot be said of the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9300, "end_char": 9307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Whenever an Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9543, "end_char": 9550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whenever an Amending Act", "statute": "Whenever an Amending Act"}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 S.C.R. 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9728, "end_char": 9746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10166, "end_char": 10170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whenever an Amending Act", "statute": "Whenever an Amending Act"}}, {"text": "20th Janua'ry, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the notifications issued under s. 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before 20th Janua'ry, 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as notifications issued after that date."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10347, "end_char": 10354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10859, "end_char": 10864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[74 E-FJ\n\n44 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 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(", "canonical_name": "Vaidialingam"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11311, "end_char": 11315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11570, "end_char": 11574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11978, "end_char": 11988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12098, "end_char": 12102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12293, "end_char": 12297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamuis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12335, "end_char": 12342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the pUJ'P(lSe of s. 4 is to fill the lacuna pointed out in Shamuis case nor with the vieJIV that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12637, "end_char": 12641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12860, "end_char": 12864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12869, "end_char": 12874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13142, "end_char": 13152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13160, "end_char": 13181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupca, for the petitioners' (in W.P.s Nos.", "canonical_name": "C. B.\n\nAgarwala"}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupca", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13245, "end_char": 13256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupca, for the petitioners' (in W.P.s Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Gupca"}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13337, "end_char": 13350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and K. P. Gupta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13355, "end_char": 13366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and K. P. Gupta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "K. P. 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"end_char": 14588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution challenging in four cases the validity of land acquisition proceedings started by a notification dated November 13, 1959 under s. 4 ofl the Land Acquisition Act and declarations contained in other notifications dated March 18, 1966 onwards under s. 6 of the said Act and for other incidental reliefs including the issue of appropriate writs for the purpose."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14603, "end_char": 14607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mandawali Fazilpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14879, "end_char": 14897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They all own lands in village Mandawali Fazilpur, on Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi, the notification of the declaration under s. 6 having been made on March 18, 1966."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14997, "end_char": 15001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 12, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their complaint is based on the same notification under s. 4 and a notification dated July 12, 1966 under s. 6 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandit Lila Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15317, "end_char": 15332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively withi.n the union E territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Raipur Khurd", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15374, "end_char": 15386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively withi.n the union E territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Shahpur Jat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15391, "end_char": 15402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth, Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively withi.n the union E territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15484, "end_char": 15488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15569, "end_char": 15573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kotla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15744, "end_char": 15749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "252 of 1966, there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village Kotla at\n\nPatparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15834, "end_char": 15838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15921, "end_char": 15925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15997, "end_char": 16018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Kilokri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16045, "end_char": 16052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16060, "end_char": 16065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 13, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16165, "end_char": 16182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, a notification dated July 27."}}, {"text": "July 27. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16205, "end_char": 16218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His grievance is against s. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, a notification dated July 27."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 16, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16260, "end_char": 16277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": 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On\n\nSeptember 15, 1958 the petitioner submitted service plans in respect df his colony and these were dllly checked and found to be in order : the case was ordered."}}, {"text": "December 24, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35968, "end_char": 35985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By December 24, 1958 the Standing Committee referred the case\n\nR. 32 Calcutta 605 at 629,\n\nUDAI RAM .SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 53\n\nA back to the Town Planner for a scrutiny Qf the ownership documents. ."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36234, "end_char": 36248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question relating to the proof of ownership was settled on March 19, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36330, "end_char": 36337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36397, "end_char": 36401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36440, "end_char": 36452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated July 1, 1960 published by the Delhi B Administration the Chief ."}}, {"text": "Delhi B Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36470, "end_char": 36492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated July 1, 1960 published by the Delhi B Administration the Chief ."}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36713, "end_char": 36740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner, Delhi, withdrew the land of 16 .. colonies from the acquisition out of the area covered by the notification of November 13, 1959 on the ground that their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and as per general decision of the Standing Com• mittee, Delhi Municipal Corporation, the petitioner was asked by c the Town Planner by letter dated April 16, 1960 to submit a denotification certificate."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36890, "end_char": 36904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner, Delhi, withdrew the land of 16 .. colonies from the acquisition out of the area covered by the notification of November 13, 1959 on the ground that their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and as per general decision of the Standing Com• mittee, Delhi Municipal Corporation, the petitioner was asked by c the Town Planner by letter dated April 16, 1960 to submit a denotification certificate."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37083, "end_char": 37087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37150, "end_char": 37170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1961 the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, issued the first notification under s. 6 of the Act in respect of D 97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in village Kilokri as required by the Governmenf for a public purpose at the public expense, namely, the planned development of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37208, "end_char": 37212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26/27th July, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37568, "end_char": 37586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issue another notification dated 26/27th July, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act declaring that land specified therein in village Kilokri was reqajred to be E taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37593, "end_char": 37597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 9, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37835, "end_char": 37850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1962 the petitioner was informed by a letter issued by the office of the Town Planner, Municipal Corporation, Delhi,, that the."}}, {"text": "December 18, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38055, "end_char": 38072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1190 dated December 18, 1961 F had rejected the lay out plan of the petitioner's colony."}}, {"text": "De]hi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38441, "end_char": 38446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Land Acquisition Collector, De]hi, made an award G No."}}, {"text": "s. 48(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38657, "end_char": 38665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT lU!POllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39109, "end_char": 39148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By letter dated March 10, 1965 the petitioner asked the Deputy Husing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, for restoration of his land on the same basis because liis lay out plan\n\n54 SUPREME COURT lU!POllTS [1968] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39181, "end_char": 39185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39539, "end_char": 39546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40165, "end_char": 40178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. V. S. Mani who appeared for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40497, "end_char": 40501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mani contended that although there was no clear sep3!ation of legislative and judicial powers in our Constitution, nevertheless the Constitution did not confer unlimited powers on the fogislature and it was for the Judiciary to declare the limits of the legislative powers enshrined in the Constitution."}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41111, "end_char": 41122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41227, "end_char": 41231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41351, "end_char": 41355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41529, "end_char": 41536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion no useful purpose will be served by referring to the clear demarcation between the judicial powers and Jegisfative powers in America and attempt to engraft the said principle in the working of our Constitution."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41800, "end_char": 41803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case it was pointed out by Das, J. (see at p. 286) that\n\n\"the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law,'' . . ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41835, "end_char": 41869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case it was pointed out by Das, J. (see at p. 286) that\n\n\"the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law,'' . . ."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41909, "end_char": 41917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case it was pointed out by Das, J. (see at p. 286) that\n\n\"the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in \"due process of law,'' . . ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42057, "end_char": 42070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus th11t the Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the executive and the Congress."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42232, "end_char": 42245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India the position of the Judiciary is somewhere in between the Courts ill England and the United States."}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43219, "end_char": 43225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mani sought to rely on a statement of the law made by Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,"}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43291, "end_char": 43301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 137, as quoted in Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, second edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45522, "end_char": 45526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45660, "end_char": 45664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45684, "end_char": 45688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46064, "end_char": 46070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1944] F.C.R. 295", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 46527, "end_char": 46544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46698, "end_char": 46703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance", "statute": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46767, "end_char": 46772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance", "statute": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47006, "end_char": 47010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance", "statute": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47111, "end_char": 47120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance", "statute": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47329, "end_char": 47345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance", "statute": "Defence of India Rules and deemcil to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Arts. 245 to 250, 252 and 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47544, "end_char": 47573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47712, "end_char": 47723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47953, "end_char": 47972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As early as in the year 1878 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah(') that the Indian Legislature when acting within the limiis prescribed (by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it) had plenary powers of legislation as much, and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself and\n\n\"If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.\""}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee was whether Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48555, "end_char": 48589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49269, "end_char": 49282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.1./68-5 6\n\n58 SUPREMB COURT llBPOll."}}, {"text": "from the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49296, "end_char": 49375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49629, "end_char": 49633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "TS\n\n\nfrom the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Act", "statute": "TS\n\n\nfrom the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49982, "end_char": 49988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, acting under powers conferred by s. 9, extended the provisions of Act XXII of 1869 to the territory of Khasi and Jaintia Hiils and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the courts of civil and criminal judicature."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50023, "end_char": 50027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "TS\n\n\nfrom the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Act", "statute": "TS\n\n\nfrom the Jaw prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regu Jations and Act"}}, {"text": "Jaintia Hiils", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50103, "end_char": 50116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, acting under powers conferred by s. 9, extended the provisions of Act XXII of 1869 to the territory of Khasi and Jaintia Hiils and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the courts of civil and criminal judicature."}}, {"text": "Federal Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51604, "end_char": 51626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect and validity of retrospective legislation has had to be considered by the Federal Court of India and this Court on a number of occasions."}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52144, "end_char": 52154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the United Provinces", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52839, "end_char": 52873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the United Provinces devised a scheme for the systematic reduction of rents, varying with the circumstances of the different districts, followed later by consequential adjustments in land revenue."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 53054, "end_char": 53074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Allahabad High Court had held iri Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum v. Secretary of State for India(') that remissions made in pursuance of the orders of Government had no legal effect."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53422, "end_char": 53431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Allahabad liigh Court took the view that the Act was contrary to the provisions of s. 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 because it amounted to an attempt to legislate retrospectively."}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53505, "end_char": 53511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53519, "end_char": 53548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53613, "end_char": 53622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Agra Tenancy Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53690, "end_char": 53712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54009, "end_char": 54011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926", "statute": "the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54190, "end_char": 54195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to the case of Queen v. Burah(') Gwyer, C.J., said that there was nothing in s. 292 which suggested any intention on the part of Parliament to impose a fetter against retrospective legislation."}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54234, "end_char": 54240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926", "statute": "the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Special Criminal Courts Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55621, "end_char": 55654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4L'1 June, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55687, "end_char": 55702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4L'1 June, 1943, the Federal Court hela that the courts constituted under that Ordinance had not been duly invested with jurisdiction, in view of the nature of the provisions contained in ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55875, "end_char": 55880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Criminal Courts Ordinance", "statute": "Special Criminal Courts Ordinance"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56247, "end_char": 56251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Criminal Courts Ordinance", "statute": "Special Criminal Courts Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56815, "end_char": 56824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57204, "end_char": 57230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57232, "end_char": 57241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 61", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 57286, "end_char": 57302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58122, "end_char": 58131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58200, "end_char": 58210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58214, "end_char": 58224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Spens", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59433, "end_char": 59438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Spens, C. J., observed (see at p. 100):\n\n\"As a general proposition, it may be true enough to say that the legislative function bek>ngs to the legisla-\n\n62 • SUPREME COURT RilPORTS\n\nture and the judicial function to the judiciary."}}, {"text": "Board of Appeal constituted under an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61073, "end_char": 61113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Australian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61218, "end_char": 61239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law cpurts declared\" that the Australian Parliament had no power to invest this Board of Appeal with judicial power."}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61904, "end_char": 61910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may be made to the judgment of Starke, J. quoted by Spens; ·c.J. that\n\n\"Parliament simply takes up certain determinations which exist in fact, though made without authority, and prescribes not that they shall be acts done by a Board\n\n(I} 38 Com."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62621, "end_char": 62647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62806, "end_char": 62822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atiqa Begum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63030, "end_char": 63041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by this Court in Atiqa Begum's case('), \"the power of validation must be taken to be ancillary or subsidiary to the D power to deal with the particular subjects specified in the Lists.\""}}, {"text": "Basanta Chandra Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63220, "end_char": 63241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose's case(') which deltacts from the propositions of law laid down in Atiqa Begum's case(') or Ffiare Dusadh's case(').", "canonical_name": "Basanta Chandra Ghose"}}, {"text": "Ffiare Dusadh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63334, "end_char": 63347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose's case(') which deltacts from the propositions of law laid down in Atiqa Begum's case(') or Ffiare Dusadh's case(').", "canonical_name": "Ffiare Dusadh"}}, {"text": "Basant Chandra Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63362, "end_char": 63382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Basant Chandra Ghose'< case(') cl. (", "canonical_name": "Basanta Chandra Ghose"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63404, "end_char": 63409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63570, "end_char": 63579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Piare Dusadh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64028, "end_char": 64040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G h was pointed out that tile nature of the provision considered in Piare Dusadh's case(') was essentially different from cl. (", "canonical_name": "Ffiare Dusadh"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64093, "end_char": 64098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1940] F.C.R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 64317, "end_char": 64334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 61", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 64343, "end_char": 64359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1944] F.C.R. 295", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 64365, "end_char": 64382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64417, "end_char": 64435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the Madras Legislature had passed an Act ( 43 of 1949) on January 24, 1950 for the acquisition of undertakings supplying electricity in the Province of Madras."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64589, "end_char": 64593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64614, "end_char": 64629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of s. 4 ( 1) of the Act the State of Madras passed an order on Mav 17, 1951 declaring that the appellant undertaking shall vest iii' the respondent from September."}}, {"text": "Mav 17, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64649, "end_char": 64661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of s. 4 ( 1) of the Act the State of Madras passed an order on Mav 17, 1951 declaring that the appellant undertaking shall vest iii' the respondent from September."}}, {"text": "September. 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64739, "end_char": 64758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of s. 4 ( 1) of the Act the State of Madras passed an order on Mav 17, 1951 declaring that the appellant undertaking shall vest iii' the respondent from September."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65518, "end_char": 65534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October,\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65784, "end_char": 65798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the decision in this case, the Madras Legislature passed Act XXIX of 1954 which received the assent of the President on 9th October,\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66218, "end_char": 66225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66248, "end_char": 66258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66583, "end_char": 66607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67343, "end_char": 67348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949", "statute": "Madras Act XLIII of 1949"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67657, "end_char": 67664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67897, "end_char": 67902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70021, "end_char": 70028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validating Act", "statute": "Nor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70261, "end_char": 70272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validating Act", "statute": "Nor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70280, "end_char": 70321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70340, "end_char": 70351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "United Provinces District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70359, "end_char": 70401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70793, "end_char": 70811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 70831, "end_char": 70843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50/ • per annum prescribed by the said Act, and D the validity of the imposition of any such tax shall not be called in question in any Court;\"\n\n(2) The Hindu Marriages (Validation of Proceedings) Act, 1960 (Act 19 of 1960) was passed to obviate the shortcomings in the Hindu Marriage Act pointed out by the Punjab Court in Janak Dulari v. Narain Das (A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 50)."}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71053, "end_char": 71071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71403, "end_char": 71421, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71423, "end_char": 71436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Mar - riage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71662, "end_char": 71689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72203, "end_char": 72207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Mar - riage Act, 1955", "statute": "the Hindu Mar - riage Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72848, "end_char": 72852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72896, "end_char": 72900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73036, "end_char": 73040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73329, "end_char": 73333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73371, "end_char": 73375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73634, "end_char": 73650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73810, "end_char": 73827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As\n\nshown above, there have been instances where the latter course had been adopted by the Indian Parliament in the past."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73842, "end_char": 73851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74149, "end_char": 74156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74756, "end_char": 74760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74918, "end_char": 74922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75062, "end_char": 75066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75623, "end_char": 75627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75671, "end_char": 75676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75907, "end_char": 75911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76075, "end_char": 76079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76116, "end_char": 76120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76219, "end_char": 76223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76257, "end_char": 76261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76330, "end_char": 76334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76394, "end_char": 76398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76456, "end_char": 76460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76563, "end_char": 76567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76939, "end_char": 76943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77177, "end_char": 77193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bela Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77474, "end_char": 77487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mrs. Bela Banerjee's case(') s. 8 of the impugned West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 provided that the com-\n\nJll [i954] S.C.R. 558."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77498, "end_char": 77502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77519, "end_char": 77569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77751, "end_char": 77768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)\n\npensation to be awarded for acquisition of land was not to exceed the market value thereof on December 31, 1946."}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78121, "end_char": 78142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78324, "end_char": 78331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "April 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79132, "end_char": 79146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in dismissing the appeal of the State in State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar (1) where the Madras Act XI of 1953 provided that compensation was payable on the basis of the valuation of the land on Apnl 28, 194 7 together with some improvements made thereon up to the date of notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act because of the discovery of the presence of lignite in certain taluks in 194 7 and the announcement by Government by a press note that it proposed to undertake legislation to compel persons purchasing such lands after a date to be prescribed in 1947, it was held that \"a law which authorises acquisition of land not for its true value, but for value frozen on some date anterior to the acquisition, on the assumption that all appreciation in its value since that date is attributable to purposes for which the State may use the land at some time in future, must be regarded as infringing the fundamental right\" and \"there was no true relation between the acquisition of the land .... and the fixation of compensation based on their value on the market rate prevailing o.n April 28, 1947.\""}}, {"text": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79149, "end_char": 79203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79355, "end_char": 79365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79601, "end_char": 79608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79927, "end_char": 79935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80376, "end_char": 80383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80551, "end_char": 80558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81013, "end_char": 81030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(5)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81076, "end_char": 81089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81117, "end_char": 81127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81256, "end_char": 81263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81584, "end_char": 81588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81699, "end_char": 81703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82030, "end_char": 82034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th November 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82049, "end_char": 82067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time when the notification under s. 4 was issued on 13th November 1959, the State had cqnsidered that a very huge area round about Delhi would have to be acquired so that the development of the city could proceed in an orderly manner step by step not only to meet the immediate needs of the then population of the city but with an eye to the ever-increasing demands of the exploding population in all cities in India and specially in iis capital."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84029, "end_char": 84033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84326, "end_char": 84330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84345, "end_char": 84352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84867, "end_char": 84877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85679, "end_char": 85684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85881, "end_char": 85889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86334, "end_char": 86341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86590, "end_char": 86597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86770, "end_char": 86780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86875, "end_char": 86880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86968, "end_char": 86973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87042, "end_char": 87049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87297, "end_char": 87304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87571, "end_char": 87578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88406, "end_char": 88413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88568, "end_char": 88621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88796, "end_char": 88800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89038, "end_char": 89042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89382, "end_char": 89386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89448, "end_char": 89452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89620, "end_char": 89624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Before scrutinising the provhions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89652, "end_char": 89656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89763, "end_char": 89767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89850, "end_char": 89854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89998, "end_char": 90002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90084, "end_char": 90088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90152, "end_char": 90156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90195, "end_char": 90199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90420, "end_char": 90424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90782, "end_char": 90789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90880, "end_char": 90884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92023, "end_char": 92027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92204, "end_char": 92211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "On the whole the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92936, "end_char": 92965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93738, "end_char": 93742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the whole the Amending Act", "statute": "On the whole the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93791, "end_char": 93795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the whole the Amending Act", "statute": "On the whole the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94038, "end_char": 94044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sohan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94061, "end_char": 94070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards violation of Art.14, in the case of Sohan Lal who filed Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "13th November, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94427, "end_char": 94446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here the attack is on an executive act, namely, the differential treatment meted out to 16 colonies whose lands were covered by\n\nthe notification dated 13th November, 1959 but in respect of which de-notification orders were issued subsequently."}}, {"text": "Sohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94584, "end_char": 94589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would appear that some of the letters which were received by Sohan L3I did not bring out the full facts and the policy underlying the apparent discrimination in this case.", "canonical_name": "Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "(1960) 3 S.C.R. 528", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 94771, "end_char": 94790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land and Housing Department, Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 95400, "end_char": 95449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This policy is corroborated by the records of the Land and Housing Department, Delhi Administration which were made available to us at the hearing."}}, {"text": "29th June 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95926, "end_char": 95940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a meeting was held on 29th June 1960 at which were present a nlimber of per-· sons including the Chief Secretary, Vice Chairman, Delhi Dewlop."}}, {"text": "Delhi Dewlop", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96033, "end_char": 96045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a meeting was held on 29th June 1960 at which were present a nlimber of per-· sons including the Chief Secretary, Vice Chairman, Delhi Dewlop."}}, {"text": "1st of July, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96557, "end_char": 96574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of July, 1960, the Commission, Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter ; md recommended that :\n\n\"All those colonies in respect of which both lay-ont plans and service plans had been approved by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority the Delhi Development Authority or the Delhi Municipal Corporation may be de-notified irrespective of whether security was demanded or not and whether the time limit for completion of development .was imposed or not and irrespective of whether security has been paid or not and whether development bas been completed or not.\""}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96812, "end_char": 96839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of July, 1960, the Commission, Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter ; md recommended that :\n\n\"All those colonies in respect of which both lay-ont plans and service plans had been approved by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority the Delhi Development Authority or the Delhi Municipal Corporation may be de-notified irrespective of whether security was demanded or not and whether the time limit for completion of development .was imposed or not and irrespective of whether security has been paid or not and whether development bas been completed or not.\""}}, {"text": "Soban Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97219, "end_char": 97228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soban Lal's colony was not one of those sui:teen.", "canonical_name": "Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "15th September, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 97648, "end_char": 97668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner submitted service plans on 15th September, 1959."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 98333, "end_char": 98351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nAgarwala appearing for the petitioner submitted that the only difficulty was that in respect of the small pockets they were owned not by the petitioner alone but in c0:0wnership with others and the pe_titioner subsequently excluded these pockets from the purview of his lay-out plan: but this was done only on March 19, 1961, The petitioner's subsequent efforts to have his colony denotified were of no avail even though he had excluded these pockets on\n\n20th January, 1960."}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98732, "end_char": 98738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shelat J.-The facts .in these five writ petitions have been sufficiently set out by our learned brother Mitter J. in his judgment and therefore need not be repeated here.", "canonical_name": "B SHELAT"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99333, "end_char": 99339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99352, "end_char": 99377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99674, "end_char": 99680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99917, "end_char": 99921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "August 31, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99977, "end_char": 99992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector thereafter made his award on August 31, 1961 in respect ."}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100208, "end_char": 100214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "Khuraj Khas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 100337, "end_char": 100348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 was issued in\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Shelat, I.) 77\n\nrespect of lJ52.2 bighas of land situated in Mandawali Fazilpur, Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas. ."}}, {"text": "Shakarpur Khas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100353, "end_char": 100367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 was issued in\n\nUDAI RAM SHARMA v. UNION (Shelat, I.) 77\n\nrespect of lJ52.2 bighas of land situated in Mandawali Fazilpur, Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas. ."}}, {"text": "Febrary 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100375, "end_char": 100390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Febrary 9, 1966 this Court delivered its judgment in M. P. State v. V. P. Sharma (') where facts were similar to the facts in the present cases and where the land was required for the erection of a steel plant in public sector."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100639, "end_char": 100645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100752, "end_char": 100758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100907, "end_char": 100913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100998, "end_char": 101002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101085, "end_char": 101093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101214, "end_char": 101218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101245, "end_char": 101251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101307, "end_char": 101311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101412, "end_char": 101416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101520, "end_char": 101528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101564, "end_char": 101571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101590, "end_char": 101595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101641, "end_char": 101647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101890, "end_char": 101894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102017, "end_char": 102024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102029, "end_char": 102033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102523, "end_char": 102529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102564, "end_char": 102570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102692, "end_char": 102698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102851, "end_char": 102857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102949, "end_char": 102951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 SUPREME COUllT llBPOllTS\n\nSark:ar J. who delivered a separate judgment also repelled the contention by observing that he could not\n\n\"imagine a government which has V3J!t resorces not being able to make a complete plan of its."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103344, "end_char": 103350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103589, "end_char": 103598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103791, "end_char": 103797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103821, "end_char": 103827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view taken Shanna's case(') sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103838, "end_char": 103844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103894, "end_char": 103900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104014, "end_char": 104020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104397, "end_char": 104403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104936, "end_char": 105002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105069, "end_char": 105075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act were enacted with the object of setting at naught the decision in Sharma's case(')."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105088, "end_char": 105097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105507, "end_char": 105513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105601, "end_char": 105610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 6( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105640, "end_char": 105650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105836, "end_char": 105842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105986, "end_char": 105995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act", "statute": "There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106037, "end_char": 106043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106166, "end_char": 106175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 106241, "end_char": 106247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4(1) published after the commencement of the said ordinance (after 20-1-1967) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication.\""}}, {"text": "Sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106331, "end_char": 106340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-1-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 106525, "end_char": 106532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By clause (a) it provides that no acquisition purporting to have been made before the commencement of the said Ordinance (i.e., before 20-1-67) and no action taken or thing done including any notification published in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid on the ground that\n\n(i) one or more collectors have performed the functions of collector in respect of the entire land covered by s. 4 notification."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106832, "end_char": 106836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106898, "end_char": 106906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107065, "end_char": 107071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107151, "end_char": 107160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107177, "end_char": 107186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107235, "end_char": 107241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107600, "end_char": 107606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107642, "end_char": 107648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1967] 1 S.C.R. 2", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 132956, "end_char": 132973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133085, "end_char": 133089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133430, "end_char": 133434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133591, "end_char": 133596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133620, "end_char": 133624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133740, "end_char": 133744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133764, "end_char": 133768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133821, "end_char": 133825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133897, "end_char": 133901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134002, "end_char": 134006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134222, "end_char": 134226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134454, "end_char": 134458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134620, "end_char": 134624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134713, "end_char": 134717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134778, "end_char": 134782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134952, "end_char": 134956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135141, "end_char": 135148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135262, "end_char": 135266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135453, "end_char": 135457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136244, "end_char": 136248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_422_427_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "TUKARAM G. GAOKAR\n\nR. N. SHUKLA & ORS.\n\nMarch 8, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K, S. HEGDE\n\nAND A. N. GR.OVER, JJ.)\n\nThe Sea Customs A.ct, 1962, ... Ill, 112, 135-PrDHCutlon Hfo11 Magistrate for smuggling gold under •· 135-Colkctor of Custonv also iJsuing notice under ss. 111and112 to sholv cause why contrdband gn/d should not he confiscated and penlllly iniposed-Jssue of notice whether constitutes co11te11ipt of cri111inal court-1vhe1her contravenes Art, 20(3) Constitution of India, 1950.\n\nJn Septcml>r 1966 the Customs authorities seized certain contrabanJ gol<l from the possession of the appellant. Thereafter the appellant along with certain other persons was charged befor~ a Magistrate for oJfcnccs\n\nin cQnncction with the smuggling of gold under s. 120 B of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 135 of the Sea Customs Act, r. 131-11 of the Defence of India Ruros and s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.\n\nBefore the commencement of the trial the Assistant Collector of Customs issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the gold should not he confiscated under s. J 11 of the Sea Customs Act and why a penahv .,.hould not be imposed on him under s. 112 of the same Act. Thereupon\n\ntbe appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution a<ked the High Court for a writ of prohibition restraining proceedings for imposition of P'naJty .on him in pursuance of the aforesaid notice.\n\nThe contention as tht 1hc thrcatenc<l proceedings (i) amounled to contempt ot the MagistnH..:\n\nhcforc whom the trial was imminent and (ii) were in violation of Ar:.\n\n20(3) inasmuch as he \\•louJd be compelled to go into the witness ho\\: to rebut the evidence of an accomplice witness. The High Court rejccll!<l 1hcsc contentions, but granted a certificate to appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD: (i) Identical issues arise in proceedin~ for impMition of penalty under s. I 12(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1962 and in a !, rial for an offence punishable under s. 135(b) of the sam~ Act.\n\nJf a pCrson incurs liability under s. 111 he may be proceeded against under s. 112lhl and also under s. 135(b). Similar issues arise in the trial for contraven\n\ntion of r. 131 B of the Defence of India Rules and s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The customs officers will have to enquire inlo these issues though the same issues will later be tried by the criminal court.\n\nSeclion 127 expressly provides that the award of a penalty under s. J 12 is not bar to th-~ infliction of punishment under s. 135.\n\nTh~ offender may be punished under s. 135 without prejudice to any othr action that may he taken under the Act, [424 E--HJ\n\nThe Customs Officers were acting hona fide and discharging thir statutory duties under ss. 111and112:. The power of adjudicating penahr and confiscation under those sections is vested in them alone. The criminal court cannot make this adjudication. The issue of the show..cal1s~\n\nnotice and proceedings theundcr were authorised by the Act and v; cre 110t calculated to obstruct the cou'rsc of justice in any Court. There \"'as\n\nno justification for holding that the proceedings amounted lo contempt of Court. 1425 Cl\n\nReg v. Gmy, [19j)O] 2 Q.B. 36, Arthur Reginald Perera v. 7\"/ie King, [1951) A.C. 482, Saihnl K11m.ar Gupta v. B. K. Sen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 460 :mJ S. S. Rny v. Stcl, le of Omsa, A.l.R. 1960 S.C. 190, referred to.\n\n' (ii) The customs officers have a discretion to stay the ptocecdio~ under ss. 111 and 112 during the pendency of the trial in the criminal court.\n\nIn 1he exercise of their disc'rction they had refused to stay the proceedings, It was not shown that thir action Was 111ala fide or arbitrary.\n\nThe Court would not issue a 11uiudanuu to control this' exercise of their di, crction, [425 Hl ~\n\ndii) The proceedings unde'r ss. 111 and 112 could not be said to be in violation of Art. 20(3) 06' he Constitution, The possibility of h:.aving to en1cr tho witness-box to rebut the evidence of an accomplice y; as no! such a compulsion as would attract the, provisions of proceeding_, from another person or authority. If an accused voluntarily gives evidence. in his defence he is not being compelled to be a witness against himself. [The Court however obs~-ed that~ different considerations might arise if the 01ppellant was summoned by the clistoms authorities under s. 108 to give evidence in tile proceedinK-'! under ss. 111 and 112.) [4,26 D-F)\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTIO!'f : Civil Appeal No. (591 of 1967. •\n\nAppeal from' the judgment and order dated March 31,-1967 - of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 11 of 1967.\n\nJethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacha\"fl'.at, J. This is an appeal by certificate against an order of the Bombay High Court on Letters Patent appeal confinning an order of dismissal of a writ petition by which the appellant Tukaram G. Gaol}; lr asked for a wi:it of prohibition restraining proceedings for imposition of a penalty on him for alleged complicity in the smuggling of gold in pursuance of a notice dated November 16, 1966 issued under s. 112 of the sea Customs Ac\\,\n\nl 962.\n\nThe appellant's contention is that the threatened proceedings amount fo contempt of the magistriite before whom his trial for offences in connection with the smuggling 9f gold is imininent are and in vioJation of the constitutional protection of Ari.'20(3) of the Constitution. The High Court rejected these\n\ncOntentions~ The main facts may be stated briefly. On septembef 14 and 17, 1966, \"the customs officers tii1ded a number of premises in the cit}i of Bombay\" and seized 65,860\" tofas of foreign gold and some gold bangles worth aboilt Rs. 1, 14,20,270. On September\n\n14, 1966, \"the appellant was arrested on charges of complicity in the .. smuggling of gold and other articles. After several remands,\n\n'\"$,)\n\nhe was released on bail. On October 6, 1966, the customs officers lodged a first information report charging the appellant, .one John D'Sa and other persons with offences in connection with the smuggling of gold under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with s. J 35 of the Sea Customs Act, r. 131-B of the Defence of India Rules and s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.\n\nThe trial of the appellant on these charges before a magistrate is imminent. On November 16, 1966, the Assistant Collector of Customs, Preventive Department, Bombay issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the gold should not be confiscated under s. 111 of the1Sea Customs Act and why a penalty should not be imposed on him under s. 112 of. the same Act. The notice alleged that he acquired possession of an<fwas concerned in carrying, removing, depesiting, harbouring, keeping, concealing and dealing With gold which he knew or had reason to believe was liable to confiscation under s. 111 and that in relation to such gold he was knowingly concerned in fraudulent evasion of customs duties and of the prohibitions imposed under the laws in force.\n\nThe notice relied on several. documents and the statenu:nt of John D'Sa.\n\nThe appellant disclaims any interes! in the gold seized by the customs officers. He resisis the imposition of penalty on him for alleged complicity in the smuggling.\n\nIt is quite clear that iden'.ical issues arise in proceedings for imposition of penalty under s. 112(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1962 and in a trial for an offj'nce punishab1e under s. 135 (b) of the same Act. If any person acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing, or in any other manner dealing wih any goods which he knows or. has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under s. 111, he may be proceeded against under s. 1 l2(b) and also under s. 135(b). On the same set of facts, a penalty may be imposed on the offender under s. 112(b) and he may be punished with imprisonment and fine under s. 135 (b). Similar issues arise in !he trial of offences for contravention of r. 131-B of the Defence of India Rules ands. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.\n\nThe customs officers will have to enquire :into these issue-, though the same issues will\n\nlater be tried by the criminal court. The Sea Customs Act contemplates parallel proceedings of.- thi& kind. Section 127 expressly provides that the award of a penalty under s. 112 is not a bar to the infliction of punishment under s. 135. The offender may be punished under s. 135 without prejudice to any other action that may be taken under the Act. The customs officers are empowered to confiscate smuggled goods and to levy penalties on persons concerned with the smuggling. They may initiate proceedings for confiscation of the goods and for imposition of the\n\npenalty though the trial of those persons in a criminal. court for connected offences is imminent. The initiation and continuance of those proceedings in good faith cannot amount to contempt of the criminal court. To constitute contempt of court, there must be involved some \"act done or writing published calculated to bring\n\na court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority\" or something \"cakulated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful' process of the courts\", see Reg v. Gray('), Arthur Reginald Perera v. The King( 2 ). The customs officers dld nothing of this kind. They are acting bona fide and di; charging lheir statutory duties under ss. 111 and 112.\n\nThe power of adjudicating penalty and confiscation under those sections is vested in them alone. The criminal court cannot make this adjudicatiop. The issue or the show-cause notice and proceedings thereunder are authorised by the Act and are not calculated to obs'.ruct the course of justice in any court. We see no justiftcation for holding that the proceedings amount to contempt of court.\n\nThe decided cases do not support -the appellant's contention.\n\nIn Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B. K. Sen('), it was held that an enquiry by a special committee .. appointed by the Corpora ii on of Calcutta to enquire in'.o the conduct of the Commissioner in the matter of appointment of municipal officers pending_ criminal proceedings against him in respect of certain offences did not amount to contempt of court. The special committee could not be said to hold a parallel enquiry on matters pending before the court, though the enquiry might extend to those matters incidentally. It may be noted tha'. there was no express provision in the Calcutta Municipal Act authoris:ng a special committee to hold an enquiry into\n\nany matter in issue before a CQurt. In S. S. Roy v. Statt of Orissa('), a magistrate issued an order restraining the execution of a warrant of arrest issued by a civil court. The order was in excess of his jurisdiction and was not warranted by s. 144 of the Code of Crim 'nal Procedure. The court held that he could not be punished for contempt of court in the absence of wilful error proceeding from improper or corrupt motives. In the present case also, 1the customs officers are not actuated by any oblique motive.\n\nMoreover, their action is authorised by ss. 111 and 112 and is not in excess of their jurisdiction.\n\nThe customs officers have a discre'.ion to stay the proceedings under ss. 111 and 112 during the pendency of the trial in the\n\n(I) (1900j2 Q.B. 36.\n\n(3) [1%1) 3 S.C.R. 460.\n\n(2) (19511A.C.482, 488.\n\n(4) A.T.R.1960S.C. 190.\n\ncriminal court. In the .exercise of their discretion they have refused to stay the proceedings. It is not shown that their action is ma/a fide or arbitrary. The court will not issue a mandan11t.1 to control this exercise of their discretion.\n\nThe appellant then claims that the proceedings under ss. 111 and 112 are in violation of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. He says that unless the proceedings are stayed he will he compelled to enter the witness-box to rebut the evidence of John D'Sa and will be forced in cross-examination to give answers incriminatinn himself.\n\nArticle 20(3) affirms that \"no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.\" The first information report has been lodged and formal accusation has been made in it against the appellant charging him with offences in connection with the smuggling of gold. The appellani is, therefore a person accused of an offence. But it is not possible at this stage to say that he is compelled to be a witness against himself. There is no compulsion on him to enter ther witness-box.\n\nHe may, if he chooses, not appear a$ a witness in the proceeding.< under ss. 111 and 112. The necessity to enter the witness-box fl?r\n\nsubstantiating his defence is not such a compulsion as would attract the protection of Art. 20(3). Even in a criminal trial. any person accused of an offence is a competent wifuess for the defence under s. 342-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and mav give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him.\n\nIt may be very necessary for the accused person to enter the witness-box for substantiating his defence. But this is no reason for saying that the criminal trial compels him to be a witness against himself and is in violation of Art. 20(3). Compulsion in the coniext of Art. 20(3) must proceed from another person or :rnthority. The appellant is not compelled to be a witness if he voluntarily gives evidence in his defence. Different considerations may arise if he is summoned by the customs authoriti~~ unde1 s. 108 fo give evidence in the proceedings under ss. 111 and 112.\n\nBut he has not yet been summoned to give evidence in those proceedings.\n\nWe express no opinion on the question whether in the event of fiis being summoned he can claim the protection under Art. 20(3) and whether in the event of his being then com pelled to give incriminating answers he can invoke the protection of the proviso to s .. 132 of the Indian Evidence Ai:t against the use of those answers in the criminal oroceedings. It may be noted that counsel for the customs authorities gave an undertaking in the High Court that they would not use h1 any criminal proceed ings the statement, if any, that might be made by the ap1>ellant during the course of the adjudication proceedings.\n\nBefore the High Court, , the appellant took the further point that the proceeding-; under ss. 111 and 112 were in violation of\n\nA Art. 14 of the Consiitution. The High Court repelled this contention. That point has now been abandoned by the appellant and does not survive.\n\nln the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nL7 Sup.C.I/68~3", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "TUKARAM G. GAOKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TUKARAM G. GAOKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. N. SHUKLA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. N. SHUKLA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 8, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K, S. HEGDE\n\nAND A. N. GR.OVER, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 796, "end_char": 802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 829, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 915, "end_char": 919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1144, "end_char": 1155, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1210, "end_char": 1216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1265, "end_char": 1273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1986, "end_char": 1995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2049, "end_char": 2055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2115, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2226, "end_char": 2230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2565, "end_char": 2571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "ss. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 460", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3292, "end_char": 3311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3857, "end_char": 3867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "APPELLATE JURISDICTIO!'f", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,26 D-F)\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTIO!'f : Civil Appeal No. ("}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4603, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingora11i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. Hingora'ni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. G. Khandalawa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4672, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jethmalani, N. H. Hingora11i and K. Hingora'ni, for the appellant ·\n\nK. G. Khandalawa/a, H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Tukaram G. Gaol", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bacha\"fl'.at, J. This is an appeal by certificate against an order of the Bombay High Court on Letters Patent appeal confinning an order of dismissal of a writ petition by which the appellant Tukaram G. Gaol}; lr asked for a wi:it of prohibition restraining proceedings for imposition of a penalty on him for alleged complicity in the smuggling of gold in pursuance of a notice dated November 16, 1966 issued under s. 112 of the sea Customs Ac\\,\n\nl 962.", "canonical_name": "TUKARAM G. GAOKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "septembef 14 and 17, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5605, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On septembef 14 and 17, 1966, \"the customs officers tii1ded a number of premises in the cit}i of Bombay\" and seized 65,860\" tofas of foreign gold and some gold bangles worth aboilt Rs."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On septembef 14 and 17, 1966, \"the customs officers tii1ded a number of premises in the cit}i of Bombay\" and seized 65,860\" tofas of foreign gold and some gold bangles worth aboilt Rs."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1966, the customs officers lodged a first information report charging the appellant, .one John D'Sa and other persons with offences in connection with the smuggling of gold under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with s. J 35 of the Sea Customs Act, r. 131-B of the Defence of India Rules and s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act."}}, {"text": "John D'Sa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1966, the customs officers lodged a first information report charging the appellant, .one John D'Sa and other persons with offences in connection with the smuggling of gold under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with s. J 35 of the Sea Customs Act, r. 131-B of the Defence of India Rules and s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.", "canonical_name": "John D'Sa"}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6175, "end_char": 6182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6190, "end_char": 6207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6237, "end_char": 6248, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6293, "end_char": 6297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 16, 1966, the Assistant Collector of Customs, Preventive Department, Bombay issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the gold should not be confiscated under s. 111 of the1Sea Customs Act and why a penalty should not be imposed on him under s. 112 of."}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6610, "end_char": 6625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6679, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "John D'Sa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7161, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "documents and the statenu:nt of John D'Sa.", "canonical_name": "John D'Sa"}}, {"text": "s. 112(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7434, "end_char": 7443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7521, "end_char": 7527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7823, "end_char": 7829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 112(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7975, "end_char": 7984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8356, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8407, "end_char": 8418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8573, "end_char": 8579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9564, "end_char": 9579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10166, "end_char": 10174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B. K. Sen('), it was held that an enquiry by a special committee .. appointed by the Corpora ii on of Calcutta to enquire in'.o the conduct of the Commissioner in the matter of appointment of municipal officers pending_ criminal proceedings against him in respect of certain offences did not amount to contempt of court."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11382, "end_char": 11397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11832, "end_char": 11847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11868, "end_char": 11878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12108, "end_char": 12121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12689, "end_char": 12704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13299, "end_char": 13309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13340, "end_char": 13350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13581, "end_char": 13587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13630, "end_char": 13645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13837, "end_char": 13847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 111 and 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14428, "end_char": 14443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14468, "end_char": 14475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_428_432_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MOHD, USMAN\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 12, 1968\n\n(S. M. S!KRI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] B\n\nl11dia11 Explosives Act, 1884 (4 of 1884), s. 5(3)-Minors permitted to enter licensed pre.niises-Punish1nent under \"tt•hich cl. of s. 5(3).\n\nExplosive Rules, 1940, r. 16-Ji.tinors pernzitted to inter licensed pre mises-Punislunent under which cl. of s. 5(3).\n\nThe appellant, a manufacturer of fireworks was convicted under s. 5 ( 3) of the Indian Explosives Act as he. had allowed minors to work in the manufacture of fireworks thus contravening r. 16 of the Explosives Rules.\n\nHELD: Clause (a) of s. 5(3) deals with a person who imports or manufactures in .contravention of tho Rules; cl. (b) deals with a person who 'possesses; uses, sells or transports any explosive in contravention of the Rules; and cl. (c) deals with the contravention of the Rules in other ca5es. If there is a breach of a rule, it has to be ascertained in each case whether the rule or part of it relates to activities mentioned in cl. (a) of s. 5(3) or cl. (b) of s. 5(3). If it does not relate to any of the activities mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 5(3) the breach of the rule would fall under cl. (c), of s. 5(3). [430 A-B; 431 HJ\n\nJn this case, though it. was established that the minors were employed 1n or allowed to enter the premises, it was not proved that the minors were employed in any of the activities mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 5(3). Nor it has been proved that any manufacture of fireworks was <lone on that day.\n\nSo the contravention of r. 16 on the facts found, could only be punishable under cl. (c) of s. 5(3). [432 BJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 14, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Government Appeal No. 25 of 1962.\n\nN11r-ud-dit1 Ahmed and A. K. Nag, for the appellant.\n\nD. P. Singh, Anil Kumar and S/rivpujan Singh, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by sial leave is directed against the judgment of the fatna High Court allowing the appeal filed by the State Govemmept and convicting the appellant, Mohd.\n\nUsman, under s. 5(3)(a) of the Indian Explosives Act. 1884 (IV of 1884 )-hereinafter referred to as the Act-and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default to undergo rigorous\n\nMOHD. USMAN. v,. BIHAR (Sikri, J.) 429\n\nA imprisonment for a further period of six months. The High Court, however, agreed with the Magistrate that the appellant could not be held guilty under s. 304A, IPC. The High Court did not find the two other accused persons, Abdul Rahman and Abdul Aziz, guilty, and State appeals against them were dismiss.. ed.\n\nB The prosecution c; ise, in brief, is that an explosion occurred in appellant's factory at Matkuria, PS Dhanbad, on April 28,\n\n1960. As a result of the explosion Kashi Bhakta, Gobardhan Bhokta and Mohan Bour died. On that day, the appellant, who manufactures fireworks, had allowed minors (under 16 years of age), viz., Kashi Bhokta, Guhi Bhokta Gobardhan .and Subhas Chamar to work in the man11facture of fireworks, thus oOiltravening r. 16 of the Explosives Rules, 194hereinafter referred to as the Rules-made under the Act, and had thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 5 ( 3 )(a) of the Act. The High Court, disagreein~ with the Magistrate .who tried the case, held that \"the three mlnor boys, Kashi, Guhi and Subhas, were employed and Gobardhan, in any event, was allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules for manufacture of explosives\" in contravention of r. 16, anu convicted the appellant as already stated.\n\nSection 5 ( 3) of the Act reads thus: \"Any person contravening the rules made under this section shall lbe punishable-\n\n(a) if he imports or manufactures any explosive in such contraventibn, with . imp$nment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;\n\n( b) if he possesses, uses, sells or transports any explosive in such contravention with imprisonment .for a term w.hich may extend tc two years, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or with both; and.\n\n(c) in any other case, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.\"\n\nRule 16 of the Explosives Rules provides:\n\n\"16. Children and intoxicied persons-No child under 16 years of age and no person who is in a state of intoxication shall be employed on the loading, unloading or •transport of explosives, or be employed in or allowed to enter any premises licensed under these rules.\"\n\nSUPRBMB ~T llBPO&TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.CR.\n\nThe first question which arises is whether every breach of r. 16 falls under s. 5(3)(a) of the A<:t. In our opinion, the answer is in the negative. It will be. noticed thai cl. (a) of s. 5\n\n(3) deals with a n who imports or manufactures in contravention of the; Rules; cl. (b) deals with a person who possesses, uses, sells or transports any explosive in contravention of the Rules; and cl. (c) deals wtth contraventions of the Rules in other cases. It seems to us that the scheme of this sul>section is to divide the contravention of the Rules into three categOries. In the first category fall rules which a person must observe while he imports or manufactures. In other words, rules relatable to\n\nthe import or manufacture of exp!OsiVes would fall in the first category. For example, clause 11 of the licence issued to the c appcllant provides: ·\n\n\"Not more than four persons shall be allowed at any one time in any one building or tent in which the explosive is being manufactured and only persons actually employed in manufacturing or superintending manufacture shall be allowed iDsiile the place of D manufacture.\"\n\nClause 12 of the Licence provides:\n\n\"No iron or steel implements shall be used in the manufacture. OnJ.y copper gun-methl or wooden tools are permissible.\"\n\nN<>W, if the appellant had infringed the provisions of these clauses it could be said that the contravenuon would fall under\n\ncl. (a) of s. 5(3). We may mention that r. 81 provides that\n\n\"no explosive shall be manufactured, possessed, used or sold except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted under these rules\", and a breach of the conditions would F be contravention of r. 81. Bui su~ the appellant had contravened clause 2 of the licence-his licence is for the manufacture, possession and sal~ . of 25 pounds of fireworks-which prescribes the modes in which the explosives shall be kept in the premises, i.e. \"(a) in a building substantially constructed of brick-stone or concrete or in a securely constructed fire-proof safe; or (b) in an excavation formed in solid rock or earth .... \", G he would be g_uilty under cl. (b) of s. 5(3) and not cl. (a) of s. 5(3). Similarly, a contravention of clau•e 18. which provides ihat \"all sales of explosives under this licence must be effected on the premises described on the face of the licence. and an explosive shall not be sold to any person under the age of 16 years\" would fall under cl. (b) of s. 5(3).\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant contends that on the facts found by the High Court the conviction of the appellant\n\nMOHD. USMAN \\', B!HAR (Sikri, J.) 431\n\nunder cl. (a) of s. 5(3) cannot be sustained. He says that there is no finding or evidence that the four minors were engaged to manufacture or were taking part in the manufacture of fireworks.\n\nWe have gone through the evidence and we find that no witness states that these minor boys were employed by the al'pellant to manufacture fireworks.\n\nSubhas Chamar, P.W. 1, says that he \"was working in' the workshop of explosives at Matkuria owned by Usmap .... We were working in the normal manner and in the same place at the time of occurrence.\" Puran Bhokta, P .W. 2, father of Kashi and Gobardhan, says that all his sons \"worked in the explosive workshop of Matkuria owned by Usman.\" He does not enlighten us about the nature of work done by his sons. Guhl Bhokta, P.W. 8, only states that \"about\n\n18 months ago, on a Thursday, I was working in the explosive shop in village Matkuria under the supervision of Rahman accused ...• \" There is no other evidence bearing on this point.\n\nFrom this evidence it cannot be definitely inferred that the four minors were actually employed in the manufacture of explosives on April 28, 1960. In fact, there is no evidence at all that any fireworks were being manufactured that day. It was for the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offence, and. s. 106 of the Evidence Act does not, as contended by the learned counsel for the State, absolve the prosecution from proving its case.\n\nThere is no doubt that tlif, te has been a contravention of r. 16, inasmuch as the four minors were employed in or allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules. But r. 16 is a comprehensive rule and applies to employment of minors in\n\nthe premises for various purposes--manufacture and sale of explosives it would also apply to employment of a minor to sweep floors and keep the premises clean.\n\nIf a minor is employed to keep clean the premises, would this contravention fall under cl. (a), cl. (b) or cl. (c) of s. 5(3)?\n\nIt seems to us that if cl. (a) and cl. (b) are read widely so as to cover every activity which might take place on the premfaes,\n\ncl. (c) would be rendered redundant. This is not a permissible way of reading statutes. Ii will be noticed that the legislature regards an offence under cl. (a) of s. 5 ( 3) to be more serious than one under cl. (b) and an offence under cl. (b) to be more serious than one under cl. (c). Further, the rules are many; some regulate minor matters, and it would be absurd to treat the breach of every rule to be a breach of cl. (a) or cl. (b).\n\nIn our opinion, if there is a breach of a rule, it has to be ascertained in each case whether the rule or part of it relates to\n\nacivities mentioned in cl. (a) of s. 5(3) or cl. (b) of s. 5(3).\n\nIt JI does not relate to any of the activities mentioned in cl. \\ u)\n\n432 SUPREME COUP.T REPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nor cl. ( b) of s. 5 ( 3), the breach of the rule would fall under A\n\ncl. (c) of s. 5(3).\n\nIn this case the prosecution has not proved that the four minors were employed in any of the activities mentioned in cl\n\n(a) or cl. (b) of s. 5(3). Nor has it proved that any manufacture of fireworks was done on April 28, 1960. It follows that the contravention of r. 16, on the facts found, can only come B under cL (c) of s. 5(3).\n\nWe may mention that the learned counsel for the appellant challenged the findings of fact made by the High Court, but, in our opinion, they are not vitiated in any manner.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is partly allowed.\n\nThe conviction is altered to one under cl. ( c) of s. 5 (3) of the Act,. and the\n\naJ>pellant is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Fine, if paid in excess, shall be refunded.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "MOHD, USMAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nUsman", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 43, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHD, USMAN\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nMarch 12, 1968\n\n(S. M. S!KRI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Explosives Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosives Act, 1884", "statute": "Explosives Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228, "end_char": 235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosives Act, 1884", "statute": "Explosives Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 458, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1037, "end_char": 1044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1128, "end_char": 1135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Rules, 1940", "statute": "Explosive Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1431, "end_char": 1438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N11r-ud-dit1 Ahmed and A. K. Nag, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1855, "end_char": 1864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N11r-ud-dit1 Ahmed and A. K. Nag, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1886, "end_char": 1897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, Anil Kumar and S/rivpujan Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, Anil Kumar and S/rivpujan Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "rivpujan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, Anil Kumar and S/rivpujan Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by sial leave is directed against the judgment of the fatna High Court allowing the appeal filed by the State Govemmept and convicting the appellant, Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nUsman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by sial leave is directed against the judgment of the fatna High Court allowing the appeal filed by the State Govemmept and convicting the appellant, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nUsman"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2188, "end_char": 2198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2213, "end_char": 2227, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2611, "end_char": 2618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2620, "end_char": 2623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Abdul Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2684, "end_char": 2696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not find the two other accused persons, Abdul Rahman and Abdul Aziz, guilty, and State appeals against them were dismiss.. ed."}}, {"text": "Abdul Aziz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not find the two other accused persons, Abdul Rahman and Abdul Aziz, guilty, and State appeals against them were dismiss.. ed."}}, {"text": "PS Dhanbad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2874, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B The prosecution c; ise, in brief, is that an explosion occurred in appellant's factory at Matkuria, PS Dhanbad, on April 28,\n\n1960."}}, {"text": "April 28,\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B The prosecution c; ise, in brief, is that an explosion occurred in appellant's factory at Matkuria, PS Dhanbad, on April 28,\n\n1960."}}, {"text": "Kashi Bhakta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the explosion Kashi Bhakta, Gobardhan Bhokta and Mohan Bour died.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Bhakta"}}, {"text": "Gobardhan Bhokta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2949, "end_char": 2965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the explosion Kashi Bhakta, Gobardhan Bhokta and Mohan Bour died.", "canonical_name": "Gobardhan Bhokta"}}, {"text": "Mohan Bour", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the explosion Kashi Bhakta, Gobardhan Bhokta and Mohan Bour died."}}, {"text": "Kashi Bhokta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kashi Bhokta, Guhi Bhokta Gobardhan .and Subhas Chamar to work in the man11facture of fireworks, thus oOiltravening r. 16 of the Explosives Rules, 194hereinafter referred to as the Rules-made under the Act, and had thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 5 ( 3 )(a) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Bhakta"}}, {"text": "Guhi Bhokta Gobardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kashi Bhokta, Guhi Bhokta Gobardhan .and Subhas Chamar to work in the man11facture of fireworks, thus oOiltravening r. 16 of the Explosives Rules, 194hereinafter referred to as the Rules-made under the Act, and had thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 5 ( 3 )(a) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Subhas Chamar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kashi Bhokta, Guhi Bhokta Gobardhan .and Subhas Chamar to work in the man11facture of fireworks, thus oOiltravening r. 16 of the Explosives Rules, 194hereinafter referred to as the Rules-made under the Act, and had thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 5 ( 3 )(a) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Kashi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3482, "end_char": 3487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, disagreein~ with the Magistrate .who tried the case, held that \"the three mlnor boys, Kashi, Guhi and Subhas, were employed and Gobardhan, in any event, was allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules for manufacture of explosives\" in contravention of r. 16, anu convicted the appellant as already stated.", "canonical_name": "Kashi"}}, {"text": "Guhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, disagreein~ with the Magistrate .who tried the case, held that \"the three mlnor boys, Kashi, Guhi and Subhas, were employed and Gobardhan, in any event, was allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules for manufacture of explosives\" in contravention of r. 16, anu convicted the appellant as already stated."}}, {"text": "Subhas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, disagreein~ with the Magistrate .who tried the case, held that \"the three mlnor boys, Kashi, Guhi and Subhas, were employed and Gobardhan, in any event, was allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules for manufacture of explosives\" in contravention of r. 16, anu convicted the appellant as already stated."}}, {"text": "Gobardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, disagreein~ with the Magistrate .who tried the case, held that \"the three mlnor boys, Kashi, Guhi and Subhas, were employed and Gobardhan, in any event, was allowed to enter the premises licensed under the Rules for manufacture of explosives\" in contravention of r. 16, anu convicted the appellant as already stated.", "canonical_name": "Gobardhan Bhokta"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB ~T llBPO&TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.CR."}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4761, "end_char": 4771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5805, "end_char": 5814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6820, "end_char": 6827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MOHD. USMAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7268, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellant contends that on the facts found by the High Court the conviction of the appellant\n\nMOHD.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nUsman"}}, {"text": "B!HAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "USMAN \\', B!HAR (Sikri, J.) 431\n\nunder cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subhas Chamar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7651, "end_char": 7664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhas Chamar, P.W. 1, says that he \"was working in' the workshop of explosives at Matkuria owned by Usmap .... We were working in the normal manner and in the same place at the time of occurrence.\""}}, {"text": "Matkuria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7734, "end_char": 7742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhas Chamar, P.W. 1, says that he \"was working in' the workshop of explosives at Matkuria owned by Usmap .... We were working in the normal manner and in the same place at the time of occurrence.\""}}, {"text": "Usmap", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7752, "end_char": 7757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhas Chamar, P.W. 1, says that he \"was working in' the workshop of explosives at Matkuria owned by Usmap .... We were working in the normal manner and in the same place at the time of occurrence.\"", "canonical_name": "Usmap"}}, {"text": "Puran Bhokta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran Bhokta, P .W. 2, father of Kashi and Gobardhan, says that all his sons \"worked in the explosive workshop of Matkuria owned by Usman.\""}}, {"text": "Kashi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran Bhokta, P .W. 2, father of Kashi and Gobardhan, says that all his sons \"worked in the explosive workshop of Matkuria owned by Usman.\"", "canonical_name": "Kashi"}}, {"text": "Usman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7982, "end_char": 7987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puran Bhokta, P .W. 2, father of Kashi and Gobardhan, says that all his sons \"worked in the explosive workshop of Matkuria owned by Usman.\"", "canonical_name": "Usmap"}}, {"text": "Guhl Bhokta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8058, "end_char": 8069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Guhl Bhokta, P.W. 8, only states that \"about\n\n18 months ago, on a Thursday, I was working in the explosive shop in village Matkuria under the supervision of Rahman accused ...• \" There is no other evidence bearing on this point."}}, {"text": "Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Guhl Bhokta, P.W. 8, only states that \"about\n\n18 months ago, on a Thursday, I was working in the explosive shop in village Matkuria under the supervision of Rahman accused ...• \" There is no other evidence bearing on this point."}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9263, "end_char": 9270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9567, "end_char": 9571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10008, "end_char": 10015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10171, "end_char": 10175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10236, "end_char": 10243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10385, "end_char": 10392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor has it proved that any manufacture of fireworks was done on April 28, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10570, "end_char": 10577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10850, "end_char": 10854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_433_440_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "AYODHYA PRASAD VAJPAI\n\nSTATE OF U.P. & March 13, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAII, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.)\n\n, U.P. Kshettra Samities and Zita Pa,.islrads Adhiniyam, 1961 (33 of 1963), ss. 3, 4, 8 a11d 8A-Abolitio11 of Khands and tenninc.1io11 of Saniities-lf Executive Governnient has power-Power to ter1nitU1tc-.lf\n\netcessive delecation-lf violative of Art .. 14 o/ tl1c Constitution.\n\nThe appellant was elected Pramukh of a Kshcttra Samiti and his term of office which was co-terminus with that Of the Sarniti, was for five years.\n\nfhe Government of Uttar Pradesh issued two notification's t\\ndcr ss. 3 and 8 of the Ulla\\- Pradesh Kshcttra Samities and Zila Parishads Adhini yam, 1961, by \\Vhich the rural areas in the district Ylerc redivided into i1ew Khands, the Khand relating to the appellant's Samiti was abolished and the term of the Samiti was brought to a close. As a consequence, the appellant lost the office of Pramukh of the Samiti. His writ petition in the High Court challenging the notifications was dismissed.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it wps contended that: (I) The two notifica tions arc repugnant to th~ scheme of the Act; (2) Sections 3 and 8 are i:ontrary to the other provisions of the Act under \\vhich a San1iti once constituted had a corporate existence v+'ith perpetual succession owning prope'rty and a fund, and \\\\'hose existence for 5 years v; as contemplated under the Act with the possibility of further continuance; (3) Sections 3 .ind 8 \\Vere invalid because they involved excessive delegation of Jcgisl~· tive functions to the State Government, and (4) Th~ sections violate :\\rt.\n\n14 of the Constitution because they furnish an indirect tncthod of re moving the Pramukh, Uppramukh and members of a K!:ihcttra Samlti without resorting to the app'ropriate pro\\'isions in the Act.\n\nHELD: (1) The notifications fiO\\V fron1 an express grant of po'~'er to the Executive by the Legislature. [438 BJ\n\nThe Act \\\\'as -jntcndcd to make dcn1ocracy broa<l-h:tct.l and to ;.ve training, in the art of administration and running dcn1ocracy, to the rur11.I -t:)()J>ulation.\n\nIts scheme indicates that the a'rea of the district is required io be divided into many Khands with a Kshettra Samiti in each Khand. 'fhe po\\\\--cr to create Khands nn1st he read with the: po\\\\er to abolish Kbands and create new Khands in their place.\n\nSections 3, 4, 8 and SA confer po\\\\er upon the Sh1te Governn1cnt to alter the area of th~ Khand,\n\nabolish old Khands, constitute nc\\v Khands nnd re-establish old one<;; and this po., vcr is given by the Legislature advisedly, so that the \\Vorking of dcmoc'racy in the rural areas in Kshcttra Samitics and Zila Parishds reav be smooth and without difficulty, [435 D-E; 437 G-H; 538 GJ -\n\n(2) The provisions of ss. 3 and 8 cannot be said to negative the other provisions of the Act, vYhich merely indicate \\\\'hat a Kshettra San1iti is required to do as Jong as it cxisls. Perpetual succession only means succession of one S.arniti to another, hut docs not entail perpetual existence of any Samiti or any Khand not\\\\ithstanding the inadvisability of conti nuing it for administrative or other valid reason<;.\n\nSimila'rly, tho fct lhat thl.! San1ities arc rcquird to function \\\\\"ith right to hold property, to\n\n434 SUPIU!MB COURT lll'OltTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R •\n\nposselis fund and to carry on administration, does not show that the power given. by the Act to reconstitute Khands is in any way impail:ed or frustrated. The lint power exists whon the Samities are established and continue; and the se<:Olld come& into play when the need for the re coastitution of a .K:band emerges. [438 B-FJ\n\n(3) The Act has not erred by conceding unfettered or uncanalized power to the State GOVWIDlent. [439 DE]\n\n1be underlying policy and the objective of the legislation is set out in the preamble and o!her provisions of the Act and the Act gives ample indication of what the puipose of making a Khand is and the duties wb1cb the Samlti must p\"form. The del3ils of how big a Khand should be, what territory it should involve and. how many Samities should be con stituted in each diStrict, etc. cannot be the subject of detailed legislation and th.ey are eminently matters which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the local e, the political exigency of the situation and the i\"equirements of administrative control.\n\nOn this subject the legislative will has been expressed in sufficient detail giving guidance to the State Government in mating its notifications to implement it. [438 G-H; 439 C-EJ\n\nState .of Bhopal cit Ors. v. Champa/al cit Ors., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 35, followed.\n\n( 4) Sections 3 and 8 do not .violate Art. 14. The provision in ihe Act on the •ubject of nmoval of members of a Samiti and that dealing with the subject of re\"pnisation of Khands deal with dilferent powers\n\nand cannot be c~~ at all. One is concem..i dlrectlY with the re moval of Pramukb, Up-Pramukh and other members, while the other is concerned diroctly with tlie abolition and reconstitution of Kbands. It may be that by abolishina: al Kband and its Kshettra Samiti. the members, including the Pramutb, must also go; but, that is the comequence of the E exercise of a dilferent power. If, however the actiOn in abolishing the Khand is for the direct purpoae of the removal of a Pramukh, Up- Pramukh or member of a Samiti, the action of the Executive Government can be struck down as ma/4 fide. In the present case, there is no evidence of any ma/4 {ides. [439 0-H; 440 A-CJ\n\nRam Dial and Ors. v. State of Pun; ab, [19651 2 S.C.R. 858. distin guished.\n\nF CIVIL APPELLATE JUJtlSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1805 of 1967.\n\nApJJ.elll by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th October 1967 o~ the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 864 ot 1967.\n\nR; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and 0. P. Rana, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah C.J. This is an appeal against the judgment of a division Bench, October 20, 1967, in a Special Appeal (No. 864 of 1967) of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the dis-\n\nA. P. VAJPAI V. u:P. STATE (Hidtiyatullah, C.J.) 435\n\nA missal of 61 writ petitions by a learned single Judge of the High Court. This appeal arises from one such petition. The appellant was elected Pramukh of Sarwan Khera Kshettra Samiti and his term of office which was co-terminus with the term of the Samifi, extended to five years. He challenges in this appeal, (as he did in the High Court), two Government notifications issued B by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under the Uttar Pradesh\n\nKshettra Samities and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 (Act 33 of 1963). By these notifications the Government of Uttar Pradesh has redivided the rural area in the district to which the matter relates into neVI' Khands specifying the limits and constituents of their areas and as a consequence has abolished a few khands and created new Khands in their place. The Khand C relating to the appellant's Samiti has been abolished by the first notification and by the second notification the term of the Samiti has also been brought to a close. Both the notifications are of July I, 1966. 'The appellant challenges these notifications as also ss. 3 and 8 of the Act on various grounds. To understand his contentions we may begin by setting -out how the Act is D constructed. ·\n\nThe Act was passed in 1961 for the establishment of Kshettra Samities and Zila Parishads in Uttar Pradesh. h was intended to make democracy broad-based and to give training in the art of administration and running democracy to the rural population.\n\nE It is a long Act of 27.4 sections and 8 schedules. It is not possible tof\"ve more than a brief idea of the constitution of the Samitis an their functions and organisation. The preamble of the Act states as follows :\n\n\"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the establishment of Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads in the F districts of Uttar Pradesh to undertake certain governmental functions at Kshettra and district levels respectively in furtherance of the principle of democratic decentralisation of governmental fupctions and for ensuring proper municipal government in rural areas, and to correlate the powers and functions of Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, with Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads;\"\n\nThe Act goes on to define a Kshettra Samiti as a Kshettra Samiti established under s. 5 of the Act and a Khand as an area of the district specified as such by the State Government under s. 3 Chapter II of the Act deals inter alia with the establish- H ment of Kshettra Samitis and s. 3 provides as follows :-\n\n\"The State Government shall by notification in the Gazette divide the rural area of each district into khands\n\n436 SUPllBMB COURT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nspecifying each Khand by a name and the limits or constituents of its area and may likewise change the names or make modifications in the areas and limits of the Khands by including therein or excluding therefrom areas or create new Khands.\"\n\nThis section allows the State Government to divide the rural area of each district into Khands. It also enables the Government to change the name of a Kshettra Samiti and to make modifications in the areas and limits of the Khands and to create new Khands. Section 4 specifies the effect of change in Khands\n\nand the temporary and permanent consequences thereof are provided for.\n\nSection 5 then deals with the establishment and C incorporation of Kshettra Samitis for each Khand bearing the name of the Khand for which it .is established. It says inter alia that every Kshettra Samiti is a body corporate having peqietual succession ap.d common seal and subject to any restrictions or\n\nqualificatio~ imposed by any other enacfuumi.s, possesses , the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to enter into contracts and may by its corporate name sue and be sued.\n\nD Section 6 details the composition of Kshettra Samitis providing for elections and cooptions. Section 7 lays down the procedure for the election of the Pramukhs. and the Up-Pramukhs of the Kshettra Samitis and its members and s. 9 in the same way deals with the term of the Pramukhs and the Up-Pramukhs.\n\nSection 10 then enables the Government to ararnge for the constitution of the first Kshettra Samiti for every Khand and for the\n\nrec:onstitution thereof on the expiry of the first and each subsequent term or when otherwise required under the Act having regard io the provisions of s. 6.\n\nSections 11-16 deal with the resigilatio11 of Pramukhs, Up-Pramukhs and members, filling of casual vacancies, disqualifications for being chosen or co-opted as members,, disputes as to membership or disqualification and motion of non-confidence in Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and removal of Pramukh or Up-Pramukh. Jn this way complete local self-government is established. ·\n\nIn 19.65 by a Sanshodan Adhiniyam, 1965 certain changes were introduced in the parent Act. In s. 8 a second proviso was inserted which read: ''Provided further that where the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do with a view. to re-organisation of Khands, it may by notification in the Gazette determine the term of all or any Kshettra Samitis.'' The Amending Ac.t also added section SA of which the second sub-section is material for our purpose and may be read here.\n\nA. P. VAJPAI v. U.P. STATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 437\n\nA \"Where on account of changes in the areas of the .Kharids under section 4, a Khand ceases to exist, or where under the second proviso to sub-section ( 1 ) of Section 8 the term of the .Kshettra Sarniti of any Khand is determined, the Pramukh and the memlier of the .Kshettra Samiti of such Khand who are members of B the Zila Parishad under clauses (i) and (ii) respectively of sub-section (1 ) of Section 18 shall, notwithsthanding anything contained in Sections 18 and 20, continue to be members of the Parishad for the residue of the term of the Parishad.\"\n\nWhen the .Kshettra Samitis were formed Khands were estab- 1.isb.ed and the appellant was the Pramukh of .Kshettra Samiti relating io a .Khand called Sarwan Khera.\n\nBy the impugned notifications, the Khand and its Kshettra Sarniti have been abolished and the appellant loses the office of Pramukh of the Kshettra Samiti concemeil. He challenged in the High Court the two notifications as ultra vires and repugnant to the scheme and the purpose of the Act. He challenged also ss. 3 and 8 as suffering from excessive delegation of legislative functions and involving a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThese arguments were repelled concurrently in the High Court and his further allegation that the action was ma/a. fide was also discountenanced. He urged the same arguments.before us.\n\nMr. R. K. Garg on behalf of the appellant took us through the provisions of the Act pointing out that the Sarniti once constituted had a corporate existence with perpetual succession and it was not possible for the State Government to destroy a corpor3.tion so set up and which. owned property and a fund and whose\n\nexiatence for five years was contemplated under the Act . with F possibility of further continuance. It is noi necessary to refer to these sections because they are to be found .in all legislation\n\ndeiiling with the establishment of corporate local self-Govern ment bodies. The question is not whether Kshettra Samitis enjoy peipetua1 succe8sion. The question is whether the Kshettra Samitis once established enjoy perpetual existence. The schenie G of the Act clearly indicates thai the area of the district is required to 9c divided into many .Khands with a Kshettra Sainiti in each Khand. Sections 3, 4, 8 and SA confer power upon the State Government to alter the . area of the Khand, constitute new Kh:inds and n;-establish old ones. This power is . given by the legislature advisedly so that the working of democracy in the\n\nrural areas in the Kshettra Sarnitis and Zila Parishads may be smooth and without difficulty. The reorganisation of the .Khands B\n\nmay e necessary because of circumlltances too numerous to mention here. Power has, therefore, been reserved to Govern-\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nment to make the alterations as stated above.\n\nIt will be seen that the latter part of s. 3 gives specific power to .create new Khands in addition to the change of areas of the existing Khands wllich means that new Khands may be brought into existeoce and old Khands abolished. In fact, ss. 4 and SA and the newly added provisO to section 8 bear upon the abolition of existing Khands.\n\nIn other words, what the State Government did was by an express grant from the legislature. The other provisions o[ the Act to which our attention was drawn merely indicate what Kshettra Samiti is required to do as long as the Kshettra Samiti exists.\n\nSimilarly the term of the Kshettra Samitis is to apply to a Kshettra Samiti which is not abolished but continues. The perpetual succession in this context means successions of one Kshettra Samiti to another but in fact it does not entail perpetual existence of any Samiti or any Khand notwithstanding the inadvisability of continuing it for administrative or other valid reason.\n\nThe power exercised by the Government in issuing the two notifications flow clearly from the provisions of the law under which Government was acting.\n\nIt is for this reason that the attack of Mr. Garg was next directed against ss. 3 arid 8 of the Act. He compared .the power to make new Khands and to reorganise the old ones with the other scheme of the Act under which the Kshettra Samitis are required to function with right to hold property, to possess fund and to carry on administration. All this does not show that the power given by the act to reconstitute Khands is in any way impaired or frustrated. The two pgwers are quite distinct. The first power exists when the Samitis are established and Continue.\n\nThe second power comes into play when the need for reconstitution of the Khand emerges. The provisions of ss. 3 and 8 cannot thus 'be said to negative the other J>rDVisions to which our atiention was drawn. ·\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Garg that ss. 3 and 8 were invalid because they involved excessive delegation of legislative functions to the State Government and being_ not supported by adequate safeguards or guides, 1nust be struck down. This argument is not valid. The Act speaks for itself and is self-contained. Its policy is .stated in clear terms and the power to create Khands must be read with the power to abolish Khands and create new Khands in their place. The details of how big a Khand should be, .wat territory it should involve and so on and so forth cannot be the subject of detailed legislation.\n\nThe Act gives ample indication of what the pui:pose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform.\n\nOn t11is subject the legislative will has been sufficiently expressed and must, therefore, guide the State Government in making its notifi-\n\nA. P. VAJPAI v. U.P. STATE (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 439\n\nA cations. This case is analogous to the one reported in State o.f Bhopal and others v. Champa/al and other~('). In that case 11 was observed that the pteamble and long utle of ll Act made it clear that the enactment was ''.for the reclamation and the development of the land by the eradication of Kans weed in certain areas in the State.\" The purpose being specified as the a eradication of kans in area infested with it, the Act was said to\n\nbe valid although the selection of the land was left to the cutive. The legislative policy behind the provisions of Jaw were held to be writ large on it, and what remained or was left to the\n\nExecutive was to carry out the mandate and give effect to the Jaw to achieve the purpose of the Act. c\n\nIn present case also the underlying policy and the obtive of the legislation is cleilrly set out and the details of the duues ot the Kshettra Samitis are indicated. It has, however, been left to the State Government to determine what the Khands should be and how many Kshettra Samitis sho_uld be constituted in each district. This is not a subjt for detailed legislation because it is eminently a .matter which can be left to the determination of the Executive which is to act in conformity with the wishes of the 1oca1 people, the political exigency of the situation and the requirements of administrative control. In our opinion, the Act has not erred by conceding unfetrered or uncanalised power to the State Government as is contended. On the other hand, it has itself spoken on the relevant subject in full detail so as to outline its own will which alone the Executive is supposed to implement.\n\nIt was next contended that ss. 3 and 8 violate Art. 14 because they furnish an indirect method of removal of the Pramukh, the\n\nUp-Pramukh and the Members of a Kshettra Samiti without hav- F 1ng to take recourse to the provisions for their removal as laid down. i.n the A7t. . Reliance in this connection is placed upon\n\n~ deem on of this Court in Ram Dial and others v. StatP of Punjab (1). That case iseasily distinguishable.\n\nere the Punjab Municipalities Act contained two provis10ns for the i:e!Doval of a mem})er in the public G mterest. By one prov1s100 he was entitled to a hearing and by the other not. This Court held .that as it was open to choose one: method . rather than the other and that there was room for arbitrary action. Here the provision on the subject of removal of embers of th~ K;9hettra Samitis are not congruous with the\n\nllbJec! of fC?rgan1Sat1on of Khands. The two provisions operate H m entirely different fields.\n\nOne is concerned directly with the remov~ o! the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and the members.\n\nThe other is directly concerned with the abolition of the Khands and\n\n\n(2) [19551 2 S.C.R. 858.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nrec:Onstiution of different Khands.\n\nThese are two different If. powers and cannot be compared at all. It may be that by\n\nabolishing a Khand and its Kshettra Samiti !he members also must go, but that is a consequence of the exercise of quite a different power. Of course, if the action in abolishing the Khand could be shown to be directly connected with the removal of the Pramukh, Up-Pramukh or a member of the Kshettra Samiti the B action of the Executive Government can be struck down as mala fide.\n\nIt was for this purpose that 1lhe appellant pleaded in the High Court ma/a {ides on the part of the Government. The two judgments now under appeal negative the existence of any ma1a fide intention. No material was placed before us io establish ma/a {ides nor could the findings be. attacked since tl)ey were concurrently reached. In this view of the matter we must hold that the State Government in exercising its powers acted honestly and within the four corners of its jurisdiction.\n\n[n the result the appeal must be !J.eld to be without substance.\n\nIt will be dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "AYODHYA PRASAD VAJPAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AYODHYA PRASAD VAJPAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. & March", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. 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Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5885, "end_char": 5892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt."}}, {"text": "Shiv Punjan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5922, "end_char": 5933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt."}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5942, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R; K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar, Shiv Punjan Si11g/1 N. M. Ghatate, for the appell\\lnt."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 5992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and 0.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and 0."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6074, "end_char": 6091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah C.J. This is an appeal against the judgment of a division Bench, October 20, 1967, in a Special Appeal (No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "864 of 1967) of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the dis-\n\nA. P. VAJPAI V. u:P. STATE (Hidtiyatullah, C.J.) 435\n\nA missal of 61 writ petitions by a learned single Judge of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Hidtiyatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "864 of 1967) of the High Court of Allahabad affirming the dis-\n\nA. P. VAJPAI V. u:P. STATE (Hidtiyatullah, C.J.) 435\n\nA missal of 61 writ petitions by a learned single Judge of the High Court."}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7390, "end_char": 7401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7617, "end_char": 7630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was passed in 1961 for the establishment of Kshettra Samities and Zila Parishads in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8411, "end_char": 8475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8707, "end_char": 8711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947", "statute": "Gaon G Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8712, "end_char": 8733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9488, "end_char": 9497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10200, "end_char": 10209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10332, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10411, "end_char": 10421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10692, "end_char": 10696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10699, "end_char": 10710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanshodan Adhiniyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11083, "end_char": 11102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 19.65 by a Sanshodan Adhiniyam, 1965 certain changes were introduced in the parent Act."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11163, "end_char": 11167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11694, "end_char": 11703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11788, "end_char": 11797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12028, "end_char": 12038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 18 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12085, "end_char": 12103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12665, "end_char": 12676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He challenged in the High Court the two notifications as ultra vires and repugnant to the scheme and the purpose of the Act", "statute": "He challenged in the High Court the two notifications as ultra vires and repugnant to the scheme and the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12770, "end_char": 12777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He challenged in the High Court the two notifications as ultra vires and repugnant to the scheme and the purpose of the Act", "statute": "He challenged in the High Court the two notifications as ultra vires and repugnant to the scheme and the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12989, "end_char": 12999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. K. Garg on behalf of the appellant took us through the provisions of the Act pointing out that the Sarniti once constituted had a corporate existence with perpetual succession and it was not possible for the State Government to destroy a corpor3.tion so set up and which."}}, {"text": "Sections 3, 4, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13893, "end_char": 13909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14510, "end_char": 14514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14710, "end_char": 14715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15637, "end_char": 15641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is for this reason that the attack of Mr. Garg was next directed against ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15668, "end_char": 15673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16262, "end_char": 16273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kshettra Samitis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17076, "end_char": 17092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act gives ample indication of what the pui:pose of making a Khand is and the duties which the Kshettra Samitis must perform."}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18991, "end_char": 18998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20072, "end_char": 20109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.ll."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_441_446_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "ISHWARDAS v.\n\nMAHARASHTRA REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.\n\nMarch 13, 1?68 [M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] .\n\nBombay 1 c1ra11c, v <n<I Agricu//ura/ Land~ (Vldarbha Region) Act, 1958 ss. 2(12), 36(1)-Bombay Public Trusts Act s. 2(18)-1/ manag. ing trustee of a trust is (landlord) and tan •cultivdte personally' wi1hb1 s. 2(12) to be able to claim possession of 1/and under s. 36(1).\n\nThe appellant was the Managing Trustee of a public charitable trust\n\nmaitaining a Dharamshala.\n\nHe filed ,.an application under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy ana Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, XClX of 1958 before the Naib Tehsildar, the third respondent to direct the fourth rc.'\\pondent. the tenant, to. surrender foUr acres of land, on the ground that the lands were required for personal cultivation; According to the appellant, ihe necessary notices, te.rminating the tenancy of the fourth respondent, had been given and he was entitled to get pas session of the lands!\n\nThe tenant raised a legal CQDtention th.at inas much as the lands belonged to the Trust, the appellant could not be con 'idered .the landlord; the trust itself could not 'cultivate personally' the lands within the meaning Of the Act and therefore the appellant's application was not mairitainable. This contention was overruled and the tenant ordered to surrender poSBCssion of the land to the appellant. How ever, the ant's appeal to the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Akola, the second respondent, was allowed and this decision was confirmed in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur. A writ petition filed by the appellant was summarily rejected by the High Court.\n\nOn appeal to this Cou<t,\n\nHELD : The appeol must be allowed and the order of the Naib Tchsildar restored. ·\n\nUnder s. 2(18), of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, a Trustee has been Jefined as mCanina a person, in whom either alone or in aociation wUh other per.1ons. the trust property is vested and includes a manager In view of this definition, it is clear that in the present case the properties ?f the Trust ve$t in the Managing Trustee the appellani; and he is the landlord •. '!nder cl. (32). of s, 2. As trustee, he would have to administer the properties for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Trust but, as the properties vest in him and he is a 'landlord\\ be can 3sk fo; a surrender from the tenant of the lands of the Trust 'to cultivate per sonally'.\n\nHe ciln cultivate the lands, either by his own labour or under •he per.1onal supervision of himself, by hired labour or by ,;, rvants as contemplated under sub-els; (i) or (iii), of cl. (12) of s. 2. As the properties vest in him, in law, cultivation by him. is to be considered 'on one's own account..' [444 H-445 CJ ·\n\nSliri Kala11ka Del'i samtha11, .Pat11r v. Pandu Maroti [1963) Mh L J. 249, referred 11>. ' •\n\n. B11rasaheb v . . Yes11 Krishna, (1960) N.L.J. 219 and Keslieoraj Deo Sanst/ir.n, Karanja v. Bap11rao, ( 1964) Mh. L.J. 589, distinguished.\n\n442 SUPREME t:OUllT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 641 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by speciiil leave from the judgment and orded dated July 27, 1964 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Application No. 32 of 1964.\n\nR. V. S. Mani, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. In this appeal, by special leave, the appel !ant attacks the judgment and order, dated July 27, 1964, of the Nagpur Bench, of the Bombay High Couri, dismissing Special C Civll Application No. 322 of 1964.\n\nBadridatta Ishwardas Trust is a publi9 charitable trust, maintaining a Dharamshala.\n\nThe appellant, the Maoaginjl Trustee of the said Trust, filed an appficaiion, under the provt sioos of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural LaD!ls (Vidar- 0 bha Region) Act, 1958 (Bombay Act XCIX of 1958) (hereinafter called the Act), before tbii Naib Tehsildar, Balapur (the third respondent, herein), io direct the fourth respondent,. the tenant, to surrender four acres of land, on the .ground that the lands were required for being cultivated personally. According io the appellant, the necessary notices, terminating the tenancy of the fourth respondent, had been given, under the Act, and E that he was entitled to get possession of the lands, in question.\n\nThe fourth respondent raised various objections, on merits; but all those objections were over-ruled, )>y the third respondent.\n\nThe fourth respondent raised a legal contention that, i.nasmuch as the lands, in question, belonged to the Trust, the appellant- F Managing Trustee could not be considered to be the landlord.\n\nHe further contended that the Trust itself could not 'cultivate personally' the lands and, therefore, the application, filed by the appellant, was not maintainable. The third respondent o\\rerruled these objections, on the ground that the Managing Trustee was a person in whom the properties of the Trustee vested in law and, therefore, it was open io him to make a claim for posses- G sion of the lands from a tenant, on the ground that they were required for 'personal cultivation'.\n\nIn this view, the third respondent further held that the Managing Trustee was a Jandlord, under the Act, entitled to get possession of the lands. Finally, the third respondent ordered the tenant to surrender possession -of the land, as required by the. appellant. B\n\nThe order of the third respondent was challenged, by the tenant, in appeal, before the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy\n\nH l\n\nAppeals Akola (the second respondent).\n\nThe latter, by order dated October 30, 1963, reversed the decision of the Naib Tehsildar. The. second respondent accepted the appellant's plea that he was the Managing Trustee of the Trust, in question, but took the view that a claim, on behalf of a Trust, for personal cultivation, under the Act, could not be made, as a Trust was incapable of cultivatin!l lands personally.\n\nThe second rC3pondent followed, in this regard, the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in Shri Kalanka Devi Sansthan, Patur v.\n\nPandu Maroti(1), which had held that a Deity or Sansthan, which is a juristic person, could hold property, but could not act, except through a Wabiwatdar or Manager, and, as such, was incapable of cultivating lands personally. In this view the second respondent held that the appellant was not a person capable of cultivating land personally and, as such, was not entitled io ask for surrender of the lands, from the tenant.\n\nThe appellant went up, in revision, against this order, .before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur (the first respondent). That Tribunal took the view that the case was goveme by' the decision of the Bombay High Court, in Buvasaheb ' Yesu Krishna('), and dismissed the revision.\n\nThe High Com summarily rejected 1he writ petition, filed by the appellant, against this order.\n\nMr. R. V. S. Mani learned counsel, appearing for the appel !ant, raised two contentions before us: (i) that the appellant, being a Managing Trnstee of the Public Charitable Trnst, the properties of the Trust vested in law in him and so he was the landlord, under the Act, entitled to ask for possession of the lands for personal cultivation; and (ii) if the Manaing Trustee was not so entitled, under the Act, such of the provisions of the Act, which were to be construed, as denying the fundamental rights of the appellant, would have to be struck down, as violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(f), of the Constitution. There has been no appearance, before us, on behalf of the_ respondents.\n\nA.t the. outset; it has to be stated tha~ i~ the grounds of appeal, filed m this Court, there has been a nuxmg up of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948), and the Act; but, on a careful perusal of the proceedings, before the Revenue Tribunals it is seen that the proceedings were initiated, by the appellant, 'under the Act and, therefore, we shall refer to the material provisions of that Act. We may further add that, in the view that we take garding the contruction to be placed, on the material provi: s1ons of the At, 1t mes unnecessary for us to consider the second contention, ratsed by Mr. Mani, for the appellant.\n\n(I) (1963) Mh, L.l. 249.\n\n(2) (1960) N.L.J. 219' L 7Sup.C. L/68-4\n\n4:44 SUPRBMB OOUllT lUIPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nSection 2, of the Act, contains the definitions, of the various\n\nexpions, occurring in the Act.\n\nClause ( 12), omitting the Explanations, reads.:\n\n\"(12) 'to cultivate personally' means to cultivate on one's own account-\n\n(i) by one's own labour, 01\n\n(ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or\n\n(iii) under the personal supervision of one-self or of any member of onc's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not jn crop share;\"\n\nClause ( 31) defines 'tenancy' as meaning that relationship of landlord and tenant. Under clause (32), 'tenant' means a person who holds land on lease and includes (a) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under sections 6, 7 or 8; (b) a person who is a protected lessee or occupancy tenant, and the word 'landlord' shall be constructed, accordingly. It must be noted that there is no separate definition of the word 'landlord', but, as provided in\n\ncl. (32), the word 'landlord' has to be construed accordingly.\n\nThere is no controversy, in this case, that the fourth res~ dent is a 'tenant', as defined in cl. (32) of s. 2. The appellant gave the necessary notice, as required bysub-s. (1) of s. 38, claiming that he bona fide required the land, for cultivating it personally. It was, after complying with the provisions of this section, that he applied for possession of the land, under s. 36 (1) of the Act.\n\nThe claim, of the Managing Trustee, in this case, is that he intends to 'cultivate personally', the lands in question.\n\nThe objection, raised by the fourth respondent, to the appellant's claim, was that the properties belonged to the Trust, and a Trust could not 'cultivate personally' lands. It was further urged that if the Managing Trustee cultivated the lands of the Trust, he could not be considered to 'cultivate on one's own account,' as any cultivation, by the Managing Trustee, of Trust lands, must necessarily be on account of the Trust, therefore, s. 2(12) will not be satisfied. 'Ibis objection found favour with respondents 1 and 2. The High Court also appears to agree whh their views, as is evident from the fact, that it dismissed the writ petition of the appellant, summarily.\n\nTo. consider the si>undness of the objection, raised by the tenant, it is necessary to refer, in law, to the position of a Trustee vis-a-vis Trust properties. Under s. 2(18), of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, a Trustee has been defined, as meaning a persOn, in\n\nA whom, either alone or in association with other persons, the trust propeny is vested, and includes a Manager. In view of tltls definition, it is clear that, in this case, the properties of the Trust vest in the Managing Trustee, Pandit Ishwardas, and he is the 'landlord', under cl. ( 32) of s. 2. No doubt, as Trustee, he will have to administer the properties, for the purpose of carrying O!lt the B objects of the Trust; but, as the properties vest in him and he is a 'landlord', he can ask for a surrender, from the tenant, of the lands of the Trust 'to cultivate personally'. He can cultivate the lands, either by his own labour, or under the personal supervision of himself, by hired labour, or by servants, on wages payable in cash or kind, a<; contemplated under sub-els. (i) or (iii); of cl. (12), c of s. 2. As the propertfos vest in him, in law, cultivation, by him, as indicated above, is. to be considered 'on one's own account.' Thus the requirements of s. 38(1), read \\Vith s. 2(12), are amply satisfied, in this case. It follows that the applicatjon, filed by the appellant, was maintainable, and the order of the third respondcn'., accepting the appellant's claim, is correct.\n\nI!'\n\nIn our opinion, the decision of the Bombay High Court. in Buvasaheb's case('),. relied on by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, for disallowing the claim of the appellant, has no application, to the case on hand. The question, that arose for consideration, in that decision, was as io whether a Wahiwatdar, or Manager, of lands belonging to a Deity, was entitled to apply, under s. 34, read with s. 2(6), of Bombay Act LXVII of 1948, for surrender of lands, from the tenant, for personal cultivation.\n\nThe High Court held that there was a distinction, between a Tru!ltee, in whom the properties of ihe trust vest in law, and a Manager or a Shebait of the properties, which vest in an idol, which is the legal owner. On this basis, the learned Judges have held that, inasmuch aey the 1egal ownership of the properiy, in. the case before them, vested in the idol, and as the Manager or Wahiwatdar of such property, was no more than an administrator of the properiy, managing that property, for and on behalf of the idol, he was not a 'landlord' and hence could not apply, for surrender of lands from a tenant, on the ground of personal cultivation. It is their further view that it is only the person in whom the legal. ownership of the lands vest, who can be rega; ded as the\n\nJadlord, and who alone can apply, on the ground that he reqmres the land, bona fide, for personal cultivation. The expressions 'to cultivate personally', 'tenant' and 'landlord', which the learned Judges had to consider, in Bombay Act LXVII of 1948 are substantially similar to the definitions, contained in the Act. '\n\nWe .may also reer, to a later decision, of the Bombay High Court, 111 Kesheora1 Deo Sansthan, Karanja v .. Bapurao( 2 ). In\n\n(I) (1960)N.L.J. 219.\n\n(2) (1964) Mh.L.J. 589.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nthat decision, the learned Judges bad to consider the identical provisions of the Act. . The claim, for personal cultivation, in that\n\ncase, was made by the Manager of a private Sansthan. The learned Judges held that Sansthan is a juristic person, in whom the properties vest.\n\nThey further held that cultivation, through an agency, like a Manager, on behalf of a juristic person, did not come within the ambit of the definition 'to cultivate personally,' ins. 2(12) of the Act. They also held that an idol, or a juridical person, like the Sanstban, was not capable of cultivating personally. and hence the tenancy of a tenant of land, owned by a Deity or Sansthan, could not be terminated, under s. 38 of the Act.\n\nWe do not propose to express any opinion, as to whether a .Manager or Shebait, of the properties of an idol, or the Manager of a Sansthan, can or cannot apply, for surrender, by a tenant, of lands for personal cultivation. It is enough to point out that the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, in both the decisions, cited above, have indicated that a Trus:ee, in whom the properties vest in law, stands 011 a different footing, from a Shebait or a Wahiwatdar, or Manager. This distinction, pointed out by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, has not been properly appreciated, by the Revenue Tribunal, in the present c::is-e.\n\nTo conclude, the appellant, the Managing Trustee, is a person, in whom .the legal ownership of the property is vested and, as such, he was entitled to apply for surrender, by the tenant, of the lands in question, 'to cultivate personally', under s. 38, read with s. 2(12), of the Act.\n\nInasmuch as all the other points, on facts, have been held in the appellant's favour, it follows that this appeal will have to be allowed. In consequence, the order of the third respondent, dated June 29, 1963, will stand restored. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "ISHWARDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ISHWARDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARASHTRA REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 13, 1?68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 13, 1?68 [M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] ."}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. 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GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(12), 36(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 279, "end_char": 287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act", "statute": "Bombay Public Trusts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 373, "end_char": 381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act", "statute": "Bombay Public Trusts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 36(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act", "statute": "Bombay Public Trusts Act"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How ever, the ant's appeal to the Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Akola, the second respondent, was allowed and this decision was confirmed in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Naib Tchsildar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1808, "end_char": 1822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to this Cou<t,\n\nHELD : The appeol must be allowed and the order of the Naib Tchsildar restored. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1842, "end_char": 1850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2693, "end_char": 2697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3320, "end_char": 3333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3431, "end_char": 3443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. In this appeal, by special leave, the appel !"}}, {"text": "Badridatta Ishwardas Trust", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3654, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badridatta Ishwardas Trust is a publi9 charitable trust, maintaining a Dharamshala."}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XCIX of 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5670, "end_char": 5686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter, by order dated October 30, 1963, reversed the decision of the Naib Tehsildar."}}, {"text": "Naib Tehsildar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter, by order dated October 30, 1963, reversed the decision of the Naib Tehsildar."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second rC3pondent followed, in this regard, the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in Shri Kalanka Devi Sansthan, Patur v.\n\nPandu Maroti(1), which had held that a Deity or Sansthan, which is a juristic person, could hold property, but could not act, except through a Wabiwatdar or Manager, and, as such, was incapable of cultivating lands personally."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Tribunal took the view that the case was goveme by' the decision of the Bombay High Court, in Buvasaheb ' Yesu Krishna('), and dismissed the revision."}}, {"text": "Buvasaheb ' Yesu Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6813, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Tribunal took the view that the case was goveme by' the decision of the Bombay High Court, in Buvasaheb ' Yesu Krishna('), and dismissed the revision."}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. V. S. Mani learned counsel, appearing for the appel !", "canonical_name": "R. V. S. Mani"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7538, "end_char": 7559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7794, "end_char": 7841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "statute": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948"}}, {"text": "Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8313, "end_char": 8317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may further add that, in the view that we take garding the contruction to be placed, on the material provi: s1ons of the At, 1t mes unnecessary for us to consider the second contention, ratsed by Mr. Mani, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8454, "end_char": 8463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "statute": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948"}}, {"text": "sections 6, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9141, "end_char": 9154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9624, "end_char": 9629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9819, "end_char": 9824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10401, "end_char": 10409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10802, "end_char": 10810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandit Ishwardas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of tltls definition, it is clear that, in this case, the properties of the Trust vest in the Managing Trustee, Pandit Ishwardas, and he is the 'landlord', under cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11192, "end_char": 11196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11868, "end_char": 11876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11889, "end_char": 11897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Buvasaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Buvasaheb's case('),."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12478, "end_char": 12483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12495, "end_char": 12502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12507, "end_char": 12531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13599, "end_char": 13623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14589, "end_char": 14594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948", "statute": "Bombay Act LXVII of 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15495, "end_char": 15500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15512, "end_char": 15520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_447_449_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nCHJNUBHAI GOPALDAS\n\nMarch 13, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND\n\nA. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nBombay Prohibition Act, ss. 66(b) and 98-Acquittal of person charged with offence under s. 66( b )-Properly in respect of which offeirce committed may still be confisccted under s. 98.\n\nA stock of bottles apparently containin~ cosmetic preparations was iound from the possession of the respondent On analysis the bottles which were taken as samples were found to eo'htain alcohol and as the respondent did not have any licence for possessiitg alcohol he was prollOCUled under s. 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The trying Magistrate acquitted him on the ground that he did not hold the bottles on his own but only as the agent of a wholesale dealer who acknowledged his ownership.\n\nWhile acquitting the respondent the Magistrate ordered the confiscation of the remaining bottles under s. 98 of the Prohibition Act.\n\nThe respondent went to the High Court against the order of confiscation.\n\nThe learned Single Judge ordered return of the bottles because according to him it was not proved that the 1500 and odd other bottles also contained intoxicants. and therefore the order under s. 98 of the Act y:as illegal.\n\nThe State appealed,\n\nHELD : U oder s. 98 what has to be seen is whether an offence under the Prohibition Act in respect of the property in que5tion has been com milted or no~ An offence may be demonstrated to be committed although the accused who committed it may not be successfully prosecuted.\n\nOn proof that there is a contraband artic1e in respect of which an offence has been committed the obvious course is to confiscate it to tbc State.\n\nTherefore in the prcsont case if the court was satisfied that lhe bottles contained contraband article the bottles could be confiscated.\n\n[449 C-EJ .\n\n[Order of the High Court set aside \\\\ith the direction that a few bottles at random should be analysed and if contraband stuff against the prohibition act was found the whole stock should be confiscated.]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1965.\n\nG Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 8, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 345 of 1964,\n\nUrmi/a Kapur and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\nThe .respondent did not appear.\n\nH The Judgment of the. Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatwllah C.J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nCourt of Gujarat, January 8, 1965, by which an order confiscat: ing 1500 and odd bottles said to contain intoxicating liquor by the City Magistrate, 8th Court, Ahmedabad, has been set aside.\n\nThe facts of the case are as follows.\n\nOn January 9, 1963, Sub-Inspector, Benot of Ahmedabad City raided a godown consisting of two rooms in Serial No. 1510/0 and Survey No. 324/0.\n\nHe found several deal boxes which were opened and each box was found to contain 144 bottles packed with grass, each bottle containing 4 oz. of some liquid. Bottles were of two kinds, one containing yellow liquid and the other a red liquid. The bottles co11ng ye)liOw liA, uJd were labelled 'U. D. Colbn Solvek Cosmetics Bombay, 28.', and the bottles containing red liquid were labelled 'Jasmine Batch No.\n\n3. Solvek Cosmetics Bombay.' From these bottles, two bottles, one of each kind, were selected and were sent to the Chemical Examiner. Baroda for test. Before sending them, the Panchas were allowed to .. seal the bottles with paper slips containing the\n\nsinatre 'of panchas pasted on them for identification. On anuiysi.s;.they were found to contain alcohol and the respondent Chinubhai Gopaldas was prosecuted under s. 66(b) of the Boinbay P, rohibition Act.\n\nThe other bottles numbering 1584 containing 6336 oz. of alleged alcohol were kepi intact.\n\nGopal Das's prosution failed.\n\nHe was acquitted by the City Magistrate, because according to him, it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was in possession of these bottles on his own. It was found that he possessed them as\n\nagent~ of a wholesale merchant. It is in evidence however that he did not poscss a permit or licence for possessing alcohol.\n\nThe Magistrate while acquitting him ordered the confiscation of the remaining bottles under s. 98 of the Prohibition Act.\n\nThe State Government did not appeal against the acquitt; tl.\n\nGopaldas went to the High Court 'in appeal against the order of confiscation.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court ordered return of the bottles, because according to him it was not proved that the 1500 and odd other bottles also contained intoxicants.\n\nHe therefore held that the confiscation of the bottles was illegal as no order under s. 98 of the Bombay Prohibitim~ Act could be passed.\n\nIn this appeal by the State of Gujarat it is contended that s. 98 applies to the case.\n\nThat section reads as follows :\n\n\"Whenever any offence punishable under this Act has been ·, committed, ff\n\n(a) any intoxicant, hemp, shora, flowers, molasses, materials, still, ntensil, implement or\n\nGUJARAT v. C!IlNUBHAI GOPAL DAS (Hidayatullah, C./.) 449\n\napparatus in respect of which the offence has been committed,\n\nshall be confiscated by the order of the Court.\"\n\nThe short question therefore is whether it can be said that in respect of the 1500 and odd bottles, an offence punishable under the Prohibition Act had been committed. It is no doubt true that the person who was charged with committing an offence was found not guilty, but the question is not whether the accused has been successfully brought to book, but whether the offence in respect of the property has been committed or not.\n\nThere is distinction between the two. An offence may be demonstrated to be committed although the accused who committed it may not be sucoessfuly prosecuted. We may give an example.\n\nSuppose in a house a vast quantity of contraband opium is found.\n\nThe householder may get off because the opium was found from a place which was open and had access to strangers. He may get the benefit of doubt and be acquitted, but it is clear that in so far as the opium is concerned, an offence must be deemed to have been committed, and if it is proved that the contraband article was opium, it would be remarkable that the order should be that the opium be returned to the householder.\n\nIn these circumstances, on proof that the contraband article in respect of which an offence has been committed is proved to exist, the obvious course would be to confiscate it to the State.\n\nIn the present case, the two bottles which were sent to the Chemical Examiner were said to contain alcohol although there was some doubt in the mind of the Magistrate as to whether ther(l was no chance of any malpractice. Be that as it may, there are the other 'bottles intact. There is some evidence to show that they were in the original packing and were a proprietary product. The manufacturer came as a witness and deposed that the liquids were bottled by him as a proprietary manufacture. In these circumstances, it would be fair to assume that all of them were of the same kind as the ones which were sent for chemical examination.\n\nHowever an examination of random samples can be made and if they satisfy the court that the bottles contain contraband articles the bottles can be confiscated. The order of the High Cort is thus set aside, but instead of restoring the order of confiscation we order that a few bottles at random should be analysed and if contraband stuff against the Prohibition Act is found the whole stock shall be confiscated.\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the case is remanded as ordered.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHJNUBHAI GOPALDAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHJNUBHAI GOPALDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 13, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nCHJNUBHAI GOPALDAS\n\nMarch 13, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND\n\nA. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 66(b) and 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "statute": "Bombay Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 66( b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "statute": "Bombay Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "statute": "Bombay Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 66(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "statute": "Bombay Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 912, "end_char": 917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Prohibition Act", "statute": "Bombay Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1209, "end_char": 1214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1276, "end_char": 1281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "345 of 1964,\n\nUrmi/a Kapur and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hidayatwllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2380, "end_char": 2392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatwllah C.J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nCourt of Gujarat, January 8, 1965, by which an order confiscat: ing 1500 and odd bottles said to contain intoxicating liquor by the City Magistrate, 8th Court, Ahmedabad, has been set aside."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2777, "end_char": 2792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1963, Sub-Inspector, Benot of Ahmedabad City raided a godown consisting of two rooms in Serial No."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2818, "end_char": 2832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1963, Sub-Inspector, Benot of Ahmedabad City raided a godown consisting of two rooms in Serial No."}}, {"text": "U. D. Colbn Solvek Cosmetics Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3208, "end_char": 3243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bottles co11ng ye)liOw liA, uJd were labelled 'U. D. Colbn Solvek Cosmetics Bombay, 28.',"}}, {"text": "Solvek Cosmetics Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solvek Cosmetics Bombay.'"}}, {"text": "Chinubhai Gopaldas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3699, "end_char": 3717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On anuiysi.s;.they were found to contain alcohol and the respondent Chinubhai Gopaldas was prosecuted under s. 66(b) of the Boinbay P, rohibition Act.", "canonical_name": "CHJNUBHAI GOPALDAS"}}, {"text": "s. 66(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Das's prosution failed.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Das"}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopaldas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopaldas went to the High Court 'in appeal against the order of confiscation.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Das"}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal by the State of Gujarat it is contended that s. 98 applies to the case."}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4880, "end_char": 4885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_450_458_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "FORT GLOSTER INDUS'IRIES LTD.\n\nSEDllA MERCANTILE (P) LTD.\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\n[1. C. SHAH, V; RAf.usWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, 11.] B\n\nForward Contract-Discrepancy behveen bought and sold 11otes- Contrac1 whether binding-Other evidence whether may be looked inJD- Forward Controcts (Regulation) Act 14 of 1952, s. 11-Bye-/aws framed under-Effect of bye-laws 1(c) and 8(b) on construction of contract.\n\nThe appellant and the respondent were both members of the East lrulia Jute aod Hessian Exchange Ltd., aod were bound by its rules and regulations framed under s. 11 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act 74 of 1952 for regulating aod conl!Olliog forward cootraets in the jute trade.\n\nThe appellant in August 1960 agreed to purchase aod the respondent to sell 750 bales of Pakistan raw jute for delivery during October and/orNovember, 1960. According to the custom of the trade which was recognised by the bye-laws. the brokers sent a sold note on behalf of the respondent to the appellant, and issued a• bought oote oo behalf of the appellant which was sent to the respondent.\n\nDifferences arose between the parties in respect of the execution of the contract and the appellant referred a claim against the respondent to the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce aod Industry.\n\nThe respondent thereupon moved oo the original side of the Calcutta High Court, a petition under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 challenging the existence and validity of the alleged arbitration agreement between the parties.\n\nThe principal ground in support of the petition was that the terms of the bought and sold notes in respect of payment and otherwiso\n\ndid not tally, and on that account there was no concluded contract. lo the affidavit filed by the appellant the genuineness of the sold note set up hr the respondent was questioned. The High Court decided in favour of the resporulent and the appellant by special leave came to this Court.\n\nHELD : (i) The term as to payment is an important term of a written conll\"act. The bought and the sold notes have the bye-laws to be in writing and in the prescribed form and if. there be any discrepancy between the two i.e. the tenns as to payment are specified in one note and not in the other, prima facie, there is no concluded contract. [455 B-CJ\n\n(ii) In view. of the bye-laws of the Association which make it obligatory on the parties that the terms of the contract shall be in writing and that they shall be in the fo'rm prescribed, it could not be held tha~ apart from the terms of the bought and the sold notes which by custom of the market are issued, evidence may be Jed to prove that the parties had aifeed to certain terms not set out in the bought and sold notes. [456 El\n\n(iii) The bought note did not comply with bye-law 7(c) in so far as the latter required a letter of authority to import Pakistan jute.\n\nIn bye-law 8(b) two alternative methods of payment were provided; the bouaht note mentioned one of them, while the sold note mentioned neither.\n\nIn these circumstances, even if bye.Jaws 7(c) and 8(b) were read into the contract it. could not be said that there was no discrepancy between the houltht and the sold notes. The bought and sold notes as produced in Court could not be regarded as creating a binding contract.\n\n(457 F-458 CJ\n\n(iv) The question whether the sold note produ\"\"d in Court was genuine must be decided by the trial court after taking fresh evidene<:.\n\n(Case remanded to trial court for this purpose.) [458 DJ\n\nCowie & Ors. v. Wil/iani Remjry and others, 3 M.I.A. 448.\n\nDurga Prosad Sureka & Ors. v. Bhajan Lall & Ors. L.R. 31\n\nI.A, 122 and Rodhakrislma Sil'adutta Rai & Ors. v. Tayebol/i Dawoodbhal, [1962) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 81, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 573 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 26, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Awaid No. 181 of 1961.\n\nS. T. Desai, S. Tibriwala, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.\n\nS. V. Gupte, C. M. Kohli and G. R. Chopra, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. The East India Jute & Hessain Exchange Ltd.- hereinafter called \"the Association\"-is recognized for the purpose of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act 74 of 1952 as an association concerned with the regulation and control of forwaid contracts in jute and jute g$0ds. The Association has, under s. 11 of the Forwaid Contracts (Regulation) Act, with the previous approval of the Central Government, made bye-laws to regulate and control forwaid contracts in jute and jute goods, and for trading in Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts in raw jute and jute goods. Clause 1 (a) in Ch. V of the bye-laws provides that no trading in Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts in any delivery or deliveries in raw jute and/or jute goods shall be effected otherwise than between members or through or with any member, or where the servi\\:e5 of a broker, who is not a member, are employed by a member, otherwise than through a licensed broker.\n\nClause l(b) provides that all Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts shall be in writing in the prescribed forms.\n\nThe appellant and the respondent are members of the Association. On August 11, 1960, the appellant agreed to purchase and the respondent agreed to sell 750 bales of Pakistan raw jute. at the rate of Rs. 103 per bale of 400 lbs. net ex-NaiayanganJ and/or Daulatpur and/or Khulna for delivery during October and/or NoVember 1960. In the transaction W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd. acted as brokers for both the paities. According to the CU$!Om of the trade which is recognized by the bye-laws, the brokers sent a sold note on behalf of the respondent to the appellant, and issued a bought note on behalf of the appellant which\n\nwas sent to the respondent.\n\nThe goods contracted to be pur chased by the appellant were to be imported from Pakistan. The appellant was in terms of the sold note to furnish to the respon dent import licence and a letter of authority issued by the proper officer authorising the respondent or his nominee to import the requisite quantity of jute from Pakistan for delivery to the appel !ant. For importing jute from Pakistan, a letter of credit had, under the terms of the contract, to be opened by the respon dent.\n\nDifferences arose between the parties in respect of the execution of the contract and on January 11, 1961, the appellant referred its claim for Rs. 1, 17,7 50/ • against the respondent to the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, on the plea that the respondent had failed to open a letter of credit for importing the stipulated 750 bales of \"jute cuttings\" from Pakistan according to the terms of the contract.\n\nOn June 26, 1961, the respondent moved, before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on its original side, a petition under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, inter alia, for the following orders :\n\n(a) that the existence or validity or otherwise of the alleged arbitration agreement dated August 11, 1960, between the appellant and the respondent be adjudicat\n\ned upon and determined by the High Court; and\n\n(b) that it be declared that the alleged arbitration agreement is void, illegal and ineffective and of no effect and such arbitration agreement to be set aside.\n\nThe principal ground in support of the petition was that the terms of the bought and sold notes did not tally, and on that account there was no concluded contract.\n\nIn support of the petition one Sobania! Sethia a director of the respondent affirmed an affidavit. The appellant filed its affidavit in reply contending, inter alia, that the sold note set up by the respondent in support of its petition under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act was not the sold note issued by the brokers at the time when the contract was entered into. An order was passed by the High Court under the proviso to s. 33 of the Arbitration Act directing that the petition be set down for hearing on evidence on the following iss11es :\n\n\"1. (a) Do the Bought and Sold Notes vary in mate rial particulars as alleged in paragraph 2 of the petition ?\n\n(b) If so, what is the effect thereof ?\n\n2. (a) Is the Sold Note which has been produced in\n\nF. G, INDUSTRIES V, S. l\\AllCANTILE LTD. (Shah, J.) 4U\n\nCourt by the seller. the original Sold Note?\n\n(b) If so, what is the effect thereof ?\n\n3. Is there a subsisting arbitration agreement between the parties ?\" One Jitendra Nath Basu, Manager of the respondent, and one Sudhir Kumar De, Head Clerk of W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd .. were examined in support of the case of the respondent.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant Shib Narayan Mundhra, an employee of the appellant, was examined. A. N. Ray, J ., declared that there was no concluded arbitration agreement dated August 11, 1960, between the parties. Against that order, this appeal has been preferred with special leave.\n\nTwo questions arise in this appeal : (1 ) Whether there was a lawful contract for sale and purchase of jute cuttings between the appellant and the respondent; and ( 2) Whether the sold note set up by the respondent was a fabricated document set up in collusion with W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd.\n\nThe Hir, h Court has answered both the questions in the negative.\n\nThe form of contract prescribed by the Bye-laws of the Transferable Specific Delivery reads as follows :\n\n\"The East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta\n\nAPPENDIX IV\n\nTransferable Specific Delivery Contract for Raw Jute.\n\nCalcutta .......... 19 .. ..\n\nF No ................ .\n\nTo Messrs ................. .\n\nDear Sirs,\n\nWe have, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter referred to, this day, bought from/sold to .... . . . . . . . . by/your order and on your account, the following goods which are *Pakistan Jute/Jute:- ---------------·-------- Crop 19 .... 19. . . . maunds/kilograms, bales of jute/mesta/Bimli/ cuttings, of the inark, assortment and quality as per margin and in sound, dry storing condition at the rate of :- H Rupees Rupees Rupees\n\n•Score out if not applicab~\n\nfree to buyers' mill, siding and/ or ghat.\n\nWeight guaranteed at buyers' mill.\n\nDelivery to :- Shipment or despatch during :- Payment:- Arbitration :- Re-weighment :-\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe foregoing terms and conditions as well as other terms and conditions applicable to this contract are as per the terms and conditions of the Transferable Specific Delivery Contract for raw jute of the East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta, and are subject to the bye-laws of that Exchange for trading in Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts for raw jute in force for the time being.\n\nBrokerage at . . . . per cent.\n\nYours faithfully, Member/Licensed Broker.\n\nThe East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd. --------------------------\n\n(CONFIRMATION SLIP) Received from Shri/Messrs . . . . . . . . . . . . his/their Contract No. , ....... dt. .......... and I/we confirm having bought from/sold to ............ through him/them .............. \"\n\nThe respondent claimed that the terms of the bought and lhe sold notes issued by the brokers did not tally and there was on that account .no contract between the parties. They claimed 'that whereas in the bought note under the heading \"payment\" it was recited : \"Cash on presentation in Calcutta a full set ot shipping documents and insurance cover\", in the sold note tendered in evidence by the respondent no entry was n1ade under that heading.\n\nIn both the notes there was a note to the following .effect:-\n\n\"Buyers to provide import licence, during the shipment period serially to their purchase of Pakistan cuttings.\n\nIn case of non-availability of licence in full or part thereof, the quantity thus remained will be treated as cancelled without any difference to either parties.\" At the foot of the bought note it was .recorded-\"Sellers to open Letter of Credit\", but no such recital was found in the sold note.\n\nAgain at the foot of the bought note the rate of brokerage was\n\nnot incorporated, whereas in the sold note it was stated that the rate of brokerage was 1 per cent. Ray, J., observed that the bought and the sold notes differed and on that account there was no contract between the parties. The learned Judge did not set out in detail what in his opinion were the differences between the two notes.\n\nBut it is clear that he relied upon the discrepancy in the recital under the heading \"payment''. The term as to payment is an important term of a written contract.. The bought and the sold notes have by the bye-laws to be in writing and in the prescribed form, and if there be any discrepancy bet - ween the two, i.e., the terms as to payment are specified _in one note and not in the other, prima facie, there is no concluded contract. In Cowie and others v. William Remfry and others(') the bought and the sold notes in respect of a contract for -the purchase and sale of indigo differed in certain material terms. In an action brought by the sellers against the purchaser for nonperformance of the contract contained in the sold note, the Judicial Committee held that the transaction was one by bought and the sold notes, and that the circumstances attending the purchaser's alteration of the_ sold note and affixing his initials, were not sufficient to make that note, alone, a binding contract, and that there being a material variation in the terms of the bought note with the sold note, they together did not constitute a binding contract.\n\nCounsel for the appellant urged that a discrepancy between the terms of the bought and the sold notes may be explained bv extraneous evidence, and'that Cowie's case (1) merely lays down a presumption and not an absolute rule. Counsel relied upon the observations in Remfry's Sale of Goods in British fndia-Tagore Law Lectures 1910 at p. 69, and upon the opinion expressed in Woodroffe & Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 11th Edn., at p. 1533, that the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee raises merely a presumption which may be rebutted by evidence. Counsel also relied upon the observations of the Judicial Committee in Durga Prosad Sureka and others v. Bhafan Lall and others ('} that:\n\n\"In India a contract of sale can be proved by parol : and the bought and sold notes having in this instance been falsified, the aggrieved purchaser was entitled to disregard them and prove his contract by other and antecedent material. This he has done conclusively by the evidence of the broker and by the telegram.\" But in Durga Prosad's case(') it was established that the notes had been falsified; there was also evidence to show that' the real contract was, and effect was given to that contract. In Cowie's\n\n(I) 3M.I.A. 448.\n\n(~J L.R. 31 I.A. 122.\n\ncase('): apart from the bought and sold notes there was no evidence of the tenns of the contract, and sinee the terms of the bought and sold notes differed, the parties were not ad idem.\n\nIn Durga Prosad's case(') there was evidence of a parol contract and the bought and sold notes did not, because of fraud, correctly record the tenns of that contract.\n\nAgain in neither of these cases, the contract was required by Jaw to be in writing and in a fonn statutory prescribed. But the l!'ansaction between the parties in the case in hand is governed by special rules of the Association which make it obligatory that the contract shall be in a particular form and in writing. Durga Prosad's case {') can, therefore, have no application in the present case.\n\nIn Radhakrishna Sivadutta Rai and others v. Tayeballi Dawoodbhai(8) this Court cited Cowie's case(') with apparent approval. In that case the contract was by the bought and sold notes. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the Court proceeded to consider the effect of the bought and sold notes according to the established custom of the mercantile world and accepted the contention for counsel for the respondent that according to the established commercial usage if there is any variation or disparity between the bought and sold notes, the consequence follows, from aff legal principles, that no binding contract has resulted.\n\nIn view of the bye-laws of the Association which make it obligatory on the parties that the terms of the contract shall be in writing and that they shall be in the fonn prescribed, we are unable to hold that, apart from the tenns of the bought and sold notes which by cus(om of the market are issued, evidence may be led to prove that the parties had agreed to certain terms not set out in the bought and sold notes.\n\nIn the bought note the price was made payable in \"Cash on presentation in Calcutta a full set of shipping documents and insurance cover\". There was no term in the sold note about the payment of price. Counsel for the appellant, however, contended that under the prescribed fonn the contract is made subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter referred to and it is expressly recited that \"the foregoing tenns and conditions as well as other terms and conditions applicable to this contract are as per the terms and conditions of the Transferable Specific Delivery Contract for raw jute of the East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta, and are subject to the bye-laws of that Exchange for trading in Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts for raw jute in force for the time being\". He submits that bye-laws 7 ( c) and 8(b) framed by the Association being made part of the contract, there is in truth no discrepancy between the bought anc'\n\n(I) 3M.I.A. 448.\n\n(2) L.R. 311.A. 122.\n\n(3) [1962] S\"pp, I S.C.R. 81.\n\nF. O. ISDUSTRIES V. S. MERCANTILE LTD. (Shah, J.) 457\n\nsold notes.\n\nJn Ch. IX, bye-law 7 ( c) insofar as it is material, reads:-\n\n\"In the case of Pakistan Jute, buyers to deliver to sellers, or sellers' nominee, letter of authority to import the Pakistan Jute or open confirmed, irrevocable Letter of Credit in terms of paragraph S(b)(ii) within 14 working days from the commencement of the delivery period of the contract failing which there shall be free extension for delivery equal to the period of. delay occurring ter\n\nthe 14 working days, . . . ., If buyers do not dehver Jetter of authority or open confirmed irrevocable Letter of Credit within one month from the commencement of the delivery period of the contract, the sellers shall be entitled to exercise any one of the following options\n\n\" Bye-law S(b) which relates to payment or what is called \"reimbursement\" states, insofar as it is material :\n\n\"In the case of Pakistan jute reimbursement shall be either:-\n\n(i) Cash, on presentation in Calcutta of a full set of shipping documents and insurance cover. . . . .\n\n(ii) By confirmed irrevocable Letter of Credit for 100% of the value of goods, less transit insurance, Bengal Raw Jute Tax (as applicable to West Bengal) and freig4t \"to pay\", if any, to be opened by buyers with a scheduled Bank in Pakistan within 14 working days from the commencement of the delivery period of the contract . . . . \"\n\nBye-law 7 ( c) contemplates two alternatives.\n\nWhere there is a contract for the sale and purchase of Pakistan Jute, the buyer has to deliver to the seller, or seller's nominee, a letter of authority to import Pakistan Jute or to open confirmed, irrevocable Letter of Credit in terms of paragraph S(b)(ii).\n\nBye-law 8(b) also contemplates two alternatives : in the case of a contract for sale and purchase of Pakistan Jute payment has to be made in cash on presentation in Calcutta of a full set of shipping documents and insurance cover or by confirmed irrevocable Letter of Credit for 100% of the value of goods. In the bought note in question it was recited that the buyer had to provide the import licence during the shipping period. Nothing was stated about the Letter of authority to import Pakistan Jute and the stipulation relating to the application to provide the import licence cannot be equated with the issue of. a letter of authority to import Pakistan Jute. It is true that under bye-law 7(c) the buyer has to do one of the two things-he has to issue a letter of authority to\n\nimpon Pakistan Jute or to open a Letter of Credit in terms of .t paragraph 8(b) (ii) and under bye-law 8(b) payment maybe either in cash on presentation of a full set of shipping documents and insurance cover or by confirmed irrevocable Letter of Credit.\n\nWhen nothing was written in the sold note, under the head \"Payment\", either of the two alternatives could be adopted. In the endorsement at the foot of the note, it was recorded that the B seller had to open Letter of Credit, but thJs is not found in the sold note.\n\nThis further emphasizes that the two parties could not be said to have agreed on how the payment wasto be made.\n\nIf the sold note produced in Coun is genuine, we are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant that the terms of the contract were agreed upon between the parties. The bought and sold notes as produced in Coun cannot be regarded as constituting a C binding contract.\n\nBut the question whether the sold note \"was fabricated\" still remains to be considered. Ray, J., observed, after briefly summarising the evidence, that. he was unable to act on the \"suggestion of suspicion\" and he did not believe that there was any foun- D dation in the plea of fabrication of the document.\n\n[Their Lordships remanded the case to the High Court with ap!propriate directions].\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal remanded.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "FORT GLOSTER INDUS'IRIES LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FORT GLOSTER INDUSTRIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEDllA MERCANTILE (P) LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SETHlA MERCANTILE (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 19, 1968\n\n[1."}}, {"text": "1. C. 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T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, S. Tibriwala, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Tibriwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3935, "end_char": 3947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, S. Tibriwala, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, S. Tibriwala, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3969, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, S. Tibriwala, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, C. M. Kohli and G. R. Chopra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. M. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, C. M. Kohli and G. R. Chopra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. R. Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4037, "end_char": 4049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, C. M. Kohli and G. R. Chopra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. The East India Jute & Hessain Exchange Ltd.- hereinafter called \"the Association\"-is recognized for the purpose of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act 74 of 1952 as an association concerned with the regulation and control of forwaid contracts in jute and jute g$0ds."}}, {"text": "East India Jute & Hessain Exchange Ltd.-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4129, "end_char": 4169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. 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Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5530, "end_char": 5555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the transaction W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd. acted as brokers for both the paities."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Differences arose between the parties in respect of the execution of the contract and on January 11, 1961, the appellant referred its claim for Rs."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6770, "end_char": 6783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 26, 1961, the respondent moved, before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on its original side, a petition under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, inter alia, for the following orders :\n\n(a) that the existence or validity or otherwise of the alleged arbitration agreement dated August 11, 1960, between the appellant and the respondent be adjudicat\n\ned upon and determined by the High Court; and\n\n(b) that it be declared that the alleged arbitration agreement is void, illegal and ineffective and of no effect and such arbitration agreement to be set aside."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 26, 1961, the respondent moved, before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on its original side, a petition under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, inter alia, for the following orders :\n\n(a) that the existence or validity or otherwise of the alleged arbitration agreement dated August 11, 1960, between the appellant and the respondent be adjudicat\n\ned upon and determined by the High Court; and\n\n(b) that it be declared that the alleged arbitration agreement is void, illegal and ineffective and of no effect and such arbitration agreement to be set aside."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6907, "end_char": 6928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sobania! Sethia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7538, "end_char": 7553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the petition one Sobania!"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7750, "end_char": 7755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7930, "end_char": 7935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jitendra Nath Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8473, "end_char": 8491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Jitendra Nath Basu, Manager of the respondent, and one Sudhir Kumar De, Head Clerk of W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd .. were examined in support of the case of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Kumar De", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8528, "end_char": 8543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Jitendra Nath Basu, Manager of the respondent, and one Sudhir Kumar De, Head Clerk of W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd .. were examined in support of the case of the respondent."}}, {"text": "W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Jitendra Nath Basu, Manager of the respondent, and one Sudhir Kumar De, Head Clerk of W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd .. were examined in support of the case of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shib Narayan Mundhra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8671, "end_char": 8691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant Shib Narayan Mundhra, an employee of the appellant, was examined."}}, {"text": "A. N. Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Ray, J .,"}}, {"text": "W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9194, "end_char": 9219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two questions arise in this appeal : (1 ) Whether there was a lawful contract for sale and purchase of jute cuttings between the appellant and the respondent; and ( 2) Whether the sold note set up by the respondent was a fabricated document set up in collusion with W. Haworth & Co. (P) Ltd.\n\nThe Hir, h Court has answered both the questions in the negative."}}, {"text": "East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9399, "end_char": 9448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The form of contract prescribed by the Bye-laws of the Transferable Specific Delivery reads as follows :\n\n\"The East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta\n\nAPPENDIX IV\n\nTransferable Specific Delivery Contract for Raw Jute.", "canonical_name": "East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta"}}, {"text": "East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10752, "end_char": 10791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd. --------------------------\n\n(CONFIRMATION SLIP) Received from Shri/Messrs . . . . . . . . . . . .", "canonical_name": "East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11317, "end_char": 11325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They claimed 'that whereas in the bought note under the heading \"payment\" it was recited : \"Cash on presentation in Calcutta a full set ot shipping documents and insurance cover\", in the sold note tendered in evidence by the respondent no entry was n1ade under that heading."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12112, "end_char": 12115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, J., observed that the bought and the sold notes differed and on that account there was no contract between the parties."}}, {"text": "and'that Cowie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13637, "end_char": 13651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the appellant urged that a discrepancy between the terms of the bought and the sold notes may be explained bv extraneous evidence, and'that Cowie's case (1) merely lays down a presumption and not an absolute rule."}}, {"text": "Remfry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13760, "end_char": 13766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relied upon the observations in Remfry's Sale of Goods in British fndia-Tagore Law Lectures 1910 at p. 69, and upon the opinion expressed in Woodroffe & Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Woodroffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13869, "end_char": 13878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relied upon the observations in Remfry's Sale of Goods in British fndia-Tagore Law Lectures 1910 at p. 69, and upon the opinion expressed in Woodroffe & Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Ameer Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13881, "end_char": 13890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel relied upon the observations in Remfry's Sale of Goods in British fndia-Tagore Law Lectures 1910 at p. 69, and upon the opinion expressed in Woodroffe & Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14189, "end_char": 14194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel also relied upon the observations of the Judicial Committee in Durga Prosad Sureka and others v. Bhafan Lall and others ('} that:\n\n\"In India a contract of sale can be proved by parol : and the bought and sold notes having in this instance been falsified, the aggrieved purchaser was entitled to disregard them and prove his contract by other and antecedent material."}}, {"text": "Durga Prosad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14510, "end_char": 14522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in Durga Prosad's case(') it was established that the notes had been falsified; there was also evidence to show that' the real contract was, and effect was given to that contract."}}, {"text": "Cowie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14690, "end_char": 14695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Cowie's\n\n(I) 3M.I.A. 448."}}, {"text": "L.R. 31 I.A. 122", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14721, "end_char": 14737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15680, "end_char": 15694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the Court proceeded to consider the effect of the bought and sold notes according to the established custom of the mercantile world and accepted the contention for counsel for the respondent that according to the established commercial usage if there is any variation or disparity between the bought and sold notes, the consequence follows, from aff legal principles, that no binding contract has resulted."}}, {"text": "East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the appellant, however, contended that under the prescribed fonn the contract is made subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter referred to and it is expressly recited that \"the foregoing tenns and conditions as well as other terms and conditions applicable to this contract are as per the terms and conditions of the Transferable Specific Delivery Contract for raw jute of the East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Ltd., Calcutta, and are subject to the bye-laws of that Exchange for trading in Transferable Specific Delivery Contracts for raw jute in force for the time being\"."}}, {"text": "F. O. ISDUSTRIES V. S. MERCANTILE LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. O. ISDUSTRIES V. S. MERCANTILE LTD. ("}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_459_463_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF KERALA\n\nP. P. HASSAN KOYA\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\nfJ. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-Compensation-Jenmi holder not objecting to qucntunt of con1Pensation-Principle1 of dtermination.\n\nOn the acquisition of several units of land with buildino. the Land Acquisition Officer detmnined the compensation payable to - tho persons interested at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per acre for the land, and for houses standing thereon \"at their break up value\".\n\nThe respondent, who held Kanam rights in one of tho units of the land and te> whom the building standing thereon belonged, raised objections to the quantum of the oom pensation. The Receiver of the Estate holding Jenmi rights in the land did not object. The trial co.urt disapproved the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining the compensation and held that each unit had to be valued as a com!\"\"ite property. He determined the market value by capitalising the net rent received from the unit and taking into consideration tho return fcom gilt-<ldged securities at 3!% awarded compensation fdr the respondent's unit at 35 times the net annual rental. The High Court upheld the order of the trial court but reduced the multiple to 33-1/3. Dismissing the appeal, this Court:\n\nHELD : By the compulsory acquisition of land. all outstanding inter~ ests not vested in the Government are extinguished. It is. therefore. the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to determine in the first instance compensation v.rhich is to be paid for extinction of those interests, and then to apportion the compensation among the persons known or bc1ieved to be interested in the land. The rule could not be departed from merely because the Receiver in whom the Je111ni rights \\ve'rc vested failed to raise an objection to the quantum of compensation awarded to him. The respondent being a Kane<mdar has an interest in the land and was entitled to appaintment of compensation even in respect of the land. f461 H-462 Bl\n\nThe method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining compensation payable for extinction of the interest of the holder of the land and of the buildings separately was unwananted. In determining compensation payable in respect of land with buildings compensation c.an not be determined by ascertaining the value of the land and the \"break up value• of the building separately. The land and the building constitute one unit, and the value of the entire unit must be determined with all its advantages and its potentialities. When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale. of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the noti fication under s. 4.\n\nTherefore the method which is generally resorted to in dcto:rmining the value of the land 'vith buildings especially thOCie used for business purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the land and the buildings. [462 C; 462 H-463 CJ\n\nRr.ja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatira}11 v, The Revenue Di1isior:al Officer, Vitagapatnam, L.R, 66 I.A. 104, referred to.\n\nL7 Sup.C.J/68-5\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S CR.\n\nIt cannot be laid down as a general hlle applicable to all situations and circumstances that a multiple approximately equal to the return fro1n gilt-edged securities prevail, ng at the relevant time forms an adequate basis for finding out the market value of the land.\n\nBut in this case the trial court and the High Court were of the view that a multiple based on a return from the gilt-edged securities was the appropriate multiple for determining the V<tlue of the property under acquisition. and no ground has been suggesNd fdr not accepting the basis and the rate of capitalization adopted by them. [463 E-F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 588 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated June 21, 1962 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 602 of 1958.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant.\n\n5. V. Gupte, Vishnu 8. Saharya, Yougindra Khushala11i, Sardar Baizadur Saharya and T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On December 8, 1954, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying for acquisition for a public purpose, viz. widening the Madras-Calicut Road at Palyam, seven units of land with buildings. One of the units was T.S. No. 298/2 admeasuring 3911 sq. ft. together with a building standing thereon used for business purposes. No!ification under s. 6 of the Act was issued on December 12, 1954, and possession of the land was taken soon thereafter.\n\nThe Receiver of Patinhare Kovilakam Estate held T.S. No. 298/2 in Jenmi right.\n\nThe respondent in this appeal held in that land the rights of a Kanamdar under a deed dated March 27, 1954.\n\nThe buildings constructed on the land belonged to the respondent and were let out to tenants at an aggregate monthly rent of Rs. 332.50.\n\nThe Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation payable to the persons interested at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per acre for the land, and for the houses standing thereon \"at their break-up value\". In a reference at the instance of the respondent under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (in which the Receiver of Patinhare Kovilakam Estate did not join) the Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode, was of the view that the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining compensation by separately valuing the lands as garden lands and the break-up value of the houses was \"manifestly unjust and improper\". In his view, each unit had tt be valued as a composite property. He then procee.:!ed to adopt the method of determining the market value by capitalizing the net rent received from the unit, and taking into consideration the retnrn from gilt-edged\n\nsecurities at 3-112 per cent. at the relevant date, the learned Judge awarded compensation for the unit in which the respondent was interested at 35 times the net annual rental.\n\nAgainst the award of the Subordinate Judge, the State of Kerala appealed to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The High Court determined compensation by multiplying e net ent\n\n33-1/3 times that being in their view the true multiple denved from the return based on the current return from gilt-edged securities. Against the award made by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred by the State of Kerala with certificate under Art. 133(l)(a) of the Constitution.\n\nTwo questions were urged in support of the appeal :\n\n(1) that the Receiver having accepted the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, the respondent could Claim compensation only for the right which he had in the land and the buildings and the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer was in the circumstances the only appropriate method; and\n\n(2) that the rate of capitalization was unduly high.\n\nIn our judgment, there is no force in either of the contentions.\n\nWhen land-which expression includes by s. 3(a) of the Act benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or fastened to anything attached to the earth-is notified for acquisition, it is notified as a single unit whatever may be the .interests which the owners thereof may have therein. The purpose of acquisition is to acquire all interests which clog the right of the Government to fuU ownership of the land, i.e. when land is notified for acquisition, the Government expresses its desire to acquire all outstanding interest collectively.\n\nThat is clear from the scheme of the und Acquisition Act. Under s. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector is required to enquire into the objections raised by the persons interested in the land anp into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4, subs. (1), and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation, and then to make an award determining-(i) The true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the compensation among all the persons known or believed t? be interested in the .land, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. By the compulsory acquisition of land, all outstanding interests not vested in the Government are extinguished. It is therefore the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer . to determine in the first instance compensation which is to be paid for extinction of those interests, and then to apportion the compensation among the persons known or believed to be interest-\n\n462 StJPUJOI. cooaT uroan\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\neel in the land. The Subordioate Judge had also, when a refer- A encc was made to him, to assess the value of the unit and then to apportion the compensation amoag pcnons entitled tba'eeo.\n\nThe rule could not be departed from merely because the ReceiYer in whom the lenmi rights in T.S. No. 298/2 were veatcd failed to. raise an objection to the quantum of compcnsatioll awarded\n\nto him. Again the respondent was the holder of kanam rights in B the land, and the bui!dingi; on the land belonged to him. The respondent being Kanamdar, ho had an interest in T.S. No. 298/ 2, and as Kanamdar the respondent was .entitled to apportionment of compensation even in respect of the land.\n\nWe agree with the trial coun and the High Court that the method adopted by the- Land Acquisition Officer for determining C compensation payable for extinction of the interest of the holder of 'the land and the buildings •rate wu unwarranted. In determining compensation payable m respect of land with buildings, compensation cannot be determined by ascertaining the value of the land and the \"break-up value\" of the building separately.\n\nThe land and the building constitute one unit, .and the value of D the entire unit must be determined with all its advantages and its potentialities. Under s. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act compensation has to be determined by taking into consideration the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notifi• cation under s. 4(1) and the damage, if any, sustained by the persons interested under any of the heads mentioned in secondly to sixthly in s. 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nAs observed by the Judicial Committee in Raia Yyriclier/a Narayana GujapatirajtJ, v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatnam(') at p. 114:\n\n\"There is not in general any market for land in the sense in which one speaks of a market for shares or a market for sugar or any like commodity. The value of any such article at any particular time can readily be ascertained by the prices being obtained for similar articles in the market. In the case of land, its value in general can also be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for land of similar quality and in similar position, and this is what must .be meant in general by \"the market Vall, IC\" in s. 23.\"\n\nAn instance of a sale which is proximate in time to the date of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in res- H peel of land similarly situate and with similar advantages and which is proved to be a transaction between a willing vendor and\n\n(!) L.R. 66 I.A. 1~.\n\nA a willing purchaser would . form a reliable guide for determining the market value. The value which a willing vendor might reasoaably expect to receive from a willing purchaser in respect of a house generally depends upon a yariety of circumstances including the nature of the consll'llction; 'its age, situation, .the amenities available, its special advantages and a tiost of other circumstances. When the property sold is land with building, it is tiften difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of B\n\nsiniilar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under s. 4. Therefore the method which is generally resorted to in detenniliing the value of the lan<, i with buildings especially those used for biisiness purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might rea5onably be received from the land and the buildings.\n\nThat method was rightly adopted by the trial court and the High Court. The unit under acquisition is used for business purposes and has a prominent situation in the town of Calicut.\n\n~ There was clear evidence about the rental of the building, . and D the trial court proceeded to capitalize the net annual rental, having regard to the rate of return of 3t per cent from gilt-edged securities, by multiplying it by 35 timCll. The High Court has slightly reduced the multiple.\n\nIt cannot be laid down as a general rule applicable to all situations and circumstances that a multiple approximately equal E to the return from gilt-edged securities prevailing at the relevant time forms an adequate basis for finding out the market value of the land.\n\nBut in this case the trial court and the High Court were of the view that a multiple based on a return from the giltedged securities was the aJipropriate multiple for determining the value of the property under acquisition, and no ground has been F suggested for not accepting the basis and the rate of capitalization adopted by them. It is relevant to note that the same multiple which has been adopted in other cases relating to lands and buildings acquired under the same notification under which the\n\nland of the respondent was acquired has not been challenged by the State.\n\nG The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dJsmiS#tl.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. P. HASSAN KOYA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. P. HASSAN KOYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF KERALA\n\nP. P. HASSAN KOYA\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\nfJ. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "fJ. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "463 E-F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No, 588 of 1965."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated June 21, 1962 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4045, "end_char": 4060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Gupte, Vishnu 8."}}, {"text": "Saharya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharya, Yougindra Khushala11i, Sardar Baizadur Saharya and T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Yougindra Khushala11i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharya, Yougindra Khushala11i, Sardar Baizadur Saharya and T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sardar Baizadur Saharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharya, Yougindra Khushala11i, Sardar Baizadur Saharya and T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. L. Viswanatha Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharya, Yougindra Khushala11i, Sardar Baizadur Saharya and T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On December 8, 1954, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying for acquisition for a public purpose, viz."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. On December 8, 1954, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying for acquisition for a public purpose, viz."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 12, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No!ification under s. 6 of the Act was issued on December 12, 1954, and possession of the land was taken soon thereafter."}}, {"text": "Patinhare Kovilakam Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Receiver of Patinhare Kovilakam Estate held T.S. No."}}, {"text": "Jenmi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4821, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "298/2 in Jenmi right."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4927, "end_char": 4941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent in this appeal held in that land the rights of a Kanamdar under a deed dated March 27, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a reference at the instance of the respondent under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (in which the Receiver of Patinhare Kovilakam Estate did not join) the Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode, was of the view that the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining compensation by separately valuing the lands as garden lands and the break-up value of the houses was \"manifestly unjust and improper\"."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6185, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the award of the Subordinate Judge, the State of Kerala appealed to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam."}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the award of the Subordinate Judge, the State of Kerala appealed to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam."}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the award made by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred by the State of Kerala with certificate under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7108, "end_char": 7115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7915, "end_char": 7919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10015, "end_char": 10020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10200, "end_char": 10207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10327, "end_char": 10335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11154, "end_char": 11161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 66 I.A. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11962, "end_char": 11966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calicut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12427, "end_char": 12434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unit under acquisition is used for business purposes and has a prominent situation in the town of Calicut."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_464_472_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "G. NARAYANA RAJU\n\nG. CHAMARAJU & OTHERS\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. !lAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)\n\nHindu joint fami/y-Hotch Potch-Self acquisition when acquires characteristics of joint family property-concurrent finding that business is separate--SnprenJe Court lvill not interfere under Art. 133.\n\nThere is no presumption under Hindu lw that a business standing in the name of any member of the joint family is a joint family business everi if that member is the manager of the joint family.\n\nUnless it could be shown that the business in the hands of the coparcener grew up with the assistance of the joint family property or joint family funds or that the earnings of the business were blended with the joint family estate, the business remains free and separate. [466 F-Hl\n\nBhuru Mal v. Jagannath. A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 40, Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand, A.I.R. 19'48 P.C. 108, Chattanatha Karayalar v. Ramachandra Iyer, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 799, referred to.\n\nThe separate property of a Hindu coparcener ceases to be his separate property and acquires the characteristics of his joint family or ancestral property, not by mere act of physical mixing with . his joint family or ancestral property but by his own volition and intention, by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as separat•e property, Mei-e recitals in deeds dealing w:th self acquisitions as ancestral joint family property is not by itself u.rfficient; but it must be established that there \\Vas a clear intention on the part of the coparcener to waive his separate property.\n\n[470 B-CJ\n\nlfurourshad v. S!ieo Dyal, 3 I.A. 259. Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaiya Lal, 34 l:A. 65. Leh Mddun Go, al v. Khikhinda Kaer, 18 I.A. 9, Naina Pillai v. Daiyanai Ammal, A.J.R. 1936 Mad. 177, referred to.\n\n\\\\ihete there is a concurrnt find'ng of both the lower courts that the bur, iness is a scp:irate business and it is neithr a ?oint family business nor\n\nreated as joint family business, it is not open to further scrutiny by ths F Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution. [467 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 155 of 1953.\n\nV. Krishnamurthy and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, B. Subbiah and R. Thiagarajan, for respondents Nos. 2 and 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J\". The plaintiff G. Narayana Raju filed O.S. 34 of 1951-52 in the Court of District Judge, Mysore for partition and separate possession of suit properties mentioned in the various schedules of the plaint.\n\nThe first defendant is the brother\n\nNARAYANA RA.TU v. CHAMARA.ru' (Ramaswami, J.) 465,,\n\nA: of the plaintiff. The second defendant is the widow of Mami Raju, tho eldest brother of the plaintiff. The third defc; ndant. is the legal representative of the plaintiff's mother: She is now. the a_Ppellant having been brought bn record as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. The case of the original plaintiff was that he, the first defendant and Muniswamj Raju (husband of the second defendant) were the sons. of oneGopala Raju.and were all members of the joint faniily.\n\nGopalaraju died in May B\n\n1931 and after. his death the plaintiff and his brothers continued to be mel!lbers of the joint faniily. The joint status of the faniily was severed by the issue of a registered notice by the first defendant to the' pJ.aintiff in July 1951. An ancestral house in Nazarbad belonging to the family was acquired 'by the , City Improvement Trust Board in or about the year 1909 .. Out of the compensation paid for that house and supplemented by the earnings of the\n\nmembers of the joint family, the house item , No. 1 of Schedule 'A' to th, e plaint was pµrchase!l by Gopalaraju in or about the year 1910. Subsequently item No. 2 of Schedule 'A'. was also purchased by Go11alaraju from the income of item No. 1 suppl1>- mented by the earr1ings_ of the. members of the family. All the other items of properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' and other Schedules attached to the plaint were acquired out of the income from items 1 and 2 of Schedule 'A'. It was further , alleged that the business'known as \"Arnbika Stores~ was also the joint family business and all the properties mentioned in the Schedules except items 1 and 2 of Schedule 'A' were acquired out of the incorneof the members of the family including the iricome fn;)m the b:.loine:s of Ambika Stores. The plaintiff accordingly claimed that he and the first defendant woul:I each be entitled to get 5/14ts share and the second and third defendants would 'each be ent'tl<Y.! to get 2/14tl1s share. In the alternative the plaintiff pleaded that if for any reason the Court held\" that the properties stand in the name o~ Muniswami Raju and were 'not acquired with the aid of the joint family nucleus, he and the second 4efendant were entitled to equal shares as co-owners of the joint family business.\n\nThe suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who asserted that the properties mentioned in all the Schedules of the plaint were self-acquisitions of Mnniswami Raju and constituted his •eparate propertis, It was alleged that Muniswami Raju was the only earning member of the family at the time of the acquisition of items 1and 2 of Schedule 'A' properties and the plaintiff and the fi'8t defendant were employed in petty jobs in Wesley Press.\n\nMunisami Raju later on employed the plaintiff in his shop as a salaried servant and the latter had no proprietary right in the business of Ambika Stores. After consideration of the oral and documentary evidence the District Judge held that the plaintiff, first defendant and Muniswami Raju were not divided and that the only property which was divisible, was item No. 1 of Schedule\n\n466 SUPIU!MB cOVlT llllPO&Ts\n\n(1968) 3.s.c.R.\n\n'A' and there was not sufficient ancestral nucleus for acquisition A of the. other properties and that all properties eJtcept item No. 1 of Schedule 'A' were the self acquisitions of Muniswami Raju, that Muniswlimi Raju never blended his properties with that of the joint family' that the plaintiff was only an employee under . Muniswami Raju and thetefore he was not entitled to the alternative relief claimed by him. Accordingly, the District Judge grant- B ed a preliminary decree holding that the plaintiff was entitled to 2/7ths share in item No. 1 of Schedule 'A'. 'Th: plaintiff took the matter in appeal to the Mysore High Court. By its judgment dated March 25, 1960 the High Court affirmed the decree of the trial court with the modification that besides item No. 1 of Schedule 'A' item No. 2 also should be held to be joint family property c and the plaintiff was entitled to partition of his share in this item also. The High Court cancelled the direction of the District. Judge that the plaintiff should account for the moneys and properties of Muniswami Raju in his hands before he is given possession of his share.\n\nThis appeal is brought by certificate on behalf of the plaintiff D from the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated March 25, 1960 in R.A. No. 155 of 1953.\n\nThe first question to be considered in this appeal if whether the business of Atnbika Stores was really the business of the joint family and whether the plaintiff was entitled to a partition of his share in the assets of that . business. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the business of Atnbika Stores grew out of a nucleus of the joint family funds or at least by the efforts of the members of the joint family including the appellant. The contention of the appellant has been negatived by both the lower courts\n\nand there is a concurrent finding that the Atnbika Stores was the separate business of Muniswami Raju and it was neither the joint J family business nor treated as joint family business. It is wellesta]>lished that there is no presumption under Hindu law that a business standing in the name of any member of the joint family is a joirit family business even if that member is the manager of the joint \\family. Unless it could be shown that the business in the hands of the coparcener grew up with the assistance of the G. joint family property or joint family funds or that the earnings of the business were blended with the joint family estate, the business remains free and separate. The question therefore whether the business was begun or carried on with the assistance of joint family property or joint family funds or as a family business is a question of fact.-{See the decisions of the Judicial Committee in\n\nBhuru Mal V; Jagannath( 1 ) and in Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand(') lllld of .this Court in Chattanatha Karayalar v. Ramachandra\n\n(I) A.I.R. 19431\".C. 40. (ll A.J.R. 19481\".C. 108.\n\nIyer}('). In the present cas(I there is a concurrent finding of both the lower courts that the business of Ambika Stores was a separate business of Muniswami Raju and it was neither a joint family business nor treated as joint family business. The concurrent finding ot the lower courts on this issue is upon a finding of fact and following the usual practice of this Court, it is not now open to further scrutiny by thi~ Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was, however, contended on behalf of the appellant that the find, ing of the lower .. courts is vitiated in law because of the circumstance that they have not taken into accoUJit three important documents, Ex. D, Ex. E and Ex. DDD. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is manifest on a pcr.:sal of tile judgment of the High Court that all the documents have been examined regarding the issue whether the business of Ambika Stores was a joint family business or whether it was a separate business of Muniswami Raju. As regards Ex. D, th\" High Court has, after e11:amining the evidence adduced, remarked that the mere fact that item No. 2 of Schedule 'A' was given as a security by Muniswami Raju did not result in any detriment to the joint family property and it cannot therefore be held that the business of Ambika Stores grew out of the joint family funds or with the aid of the joint family funds. . On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on the recitals in Ex. E, a deed of mortgage dated July 26, 1928 executed by Gopalaraju, Muniswamiraju and the appellant in favour of the Mysore Bank. The property that had been mortgaged under this document is item No. 2 of Schedule 'A'. The recital is that the borrowing from the Bank was for the business and trade of the executants and for the benefit and use of their family. There is also a recital in an earlier portion of thedocument that the business was being carried on for the benefit of the family, but it is not quite clear as to whether this related to the business carried on by Narayana Raju or whether it was intended to relate to some business carried on by all the three executants. It is possible that the appellant had other business of his own carried on on his own account at that time and it cannot be assumed that the borrowing under Ex. E must have been for the purpose of Ambika Stores. It should be noticed that Muniswami Raju has been described in the document as the proprietor of Ambika Stores which description is not consistent with the contention of the appellant that the business was a joint family business. The High Court has, in this connection, referred to Ex. I an application dated February 14, 1929 by the appellant to the City Co-operative Bank, Mysore wherein the appellant has said that he was getting a decent earning by doing out-of-door commercial bu.~'ness with Ambika Stores. There is also the recital in Ex. I that Muniswami Raju was the proprietor of Ambika Stores. Having regard to this recital in Ex. I i• is not\n\nen A.I.R.1953 !f.C. 799.\n\ni •\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n.unlikely that the appellant had some business of his own at the material time and it cannot be assumed that borrowing under Ex.\n\nE, was for the purpose of Ambika Stores business only. The High Court has also dealt with the effect of Ex. DDD, mortgage d~ produced .on behalf of the appellant. It is true that in this document the appellant and Muniswami Raju have been described as proprietors of Ambika Stores. The finding of the High Court is that this recital was made in the document for the purposes of borrowing from the Bank. Reference was made in this context to a J.etter dated May 5, 1931, Ex. 75 written by-Muniswami Raju as proprietor of Ambika Stores to the Bank of Mysore. In this lett:Gr, he has requested the Bank to take note of the fact that he has! authorised the appellant to accept drafts, and sign letters etc. on behalf of the firm. There is another J.etter, Ex. 76, dated April 14, 1934 written by Muniswami Raju to the Bank of Mysore wherein Muniswami Raju has been described as the proprietor of Ambika Stores and there ls an intimation to the Bank that .the appellant Narayana Raju was authorised to sign for the firm.\n\nIn the context and background of these circumstances it is evident that though both the appellant and Muniswami Raju were described as proprietors of Ambika Stores the description was only for the purpose of borrowing money from the Bank, as contended for by the respondents. In this connection the High Court has also taken into account Ex. 7 5 (b), a Jetter written by Muniswami Raju. In this letter Muniswami Raju has described himself as the proprietor of Ambika sores and has instructed the Bank that he. has cancelled the authority given to the appellant to operate on his Current Account. with the Bank.\n\nIt is therefore not possible for us to accept the contention of the appellant that the finding -0f •he High Court' that the bus'ness of Ambilca Stores was the exclusive business of Muniswaml Raju is vitiated in law.\n\nOn the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the finding of the High Court is supported by proper evidence. The business of Ambika Stores was started by Muniswamiraju as the proprietor thereof at a time when Muniswamiraju himself was comparatively well-off as a result of bis partnership with Krishnaswamy Chetty & Co. In the year 1925 the partnership of Krishnaswailly Chetty & Co. was dissolved by a document Ex. D.\n\nThe enire business with all the assets ad liabilities was taken over by Muniswami Raju while the widow and son of Krishnaswari1y Chetty were given a house estimated by the appellant himself at Rs. 3,000/- and furniture worth Rs. 400/-. Mliniswami Raju changed the name of the shop after taking it over into Ambika Stores and continued the business as is apparent from Bxs.\n\nXVTII, XXVI and XXVI(A). There is also evidence that at the, time when Ambika Stores was started other members of the family were not in a financia:I llosition to make any oontributioµ to purchase such a business. The appellant joined Wesley Press in 1912 on a salary of Rs. 8 or Rs. 9 p.m. and he was drawing Rs. 27 p.m. in 1927 when he resigned from the Press. The first defendant joined Wesle Press in 1910 on a salary of Rs. 10 p.m. and he was continuing to work there till the institution of the present suit. The income of the property item No. 2 of Schedule 'A' was Rs. 15 p.m. and the income from pounding rice for which there is no satisfactory evidi:nce as also negligible. Therefore, the earnings of the members of the family other than Muniswami Raju were hardly sufficiently to maintain the family at the time when the business of Ambika Stores was started. The High Court has found that the family did not have sufficient nucleus and that Muniswami Raju was not a partner of Krishnaswamy Chetty & Co. on behalf of the family but that he was a partner in his own right. The High Court has observed that there is no evidence to show that the family supplied the money or that the family had enough means or that Muniswami Raju was representing the family when he started the business of Ambika Stores. As we have already said, the finding of the High Court and of the District Judge is a concurrent finding on a question of fact and Counsel on behalf of the appellant ha~ been unable to make good his argument that the finding is vitiated in law on any account.\n\nWe pass on to consider the alternative argument put forward on behalf of the appellant, namely, that even if the business of Ambika Stores was started. as a separate business of Muniswami Raju, it became converted at a subsequent stage into joint family business. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the business of Ambika Stores was thrown by Muniswami Raju into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate cla'ms to it and therefore the business of Ambika Stores lost its character of a separate property and was impressed with the character of joint family property. It is a well-established doctrine of Hindu law that property which was originally self-acquired may become joint property if it has been voluntarily thrown by the coparcener into the joint stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. The doctrine has been repeatedly recognized by the Judicial Committee [See Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal(') and Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaiya Lall (2). But the question whether the coparcener has done so or not is entirely a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case. It must be established that there was a clear intention on the part of the coparcener to waive his separate rights and such an intention will not be inferred merely from acts which may have been done from kindness or affection [See the decision in Lala Muddun Gopa/ v.\n\nKltikhinda Koer]( 3 ). For instance, in Naina Pillai v. Daiyanai\n\nfl) 3 I.A. 259.\n\n(2) 34 I.A. 65. <3l 18 l.A. 9.\n\n470 SUPREMB COURT UJOllTS\n\n(19611] 3 S.CJL\n\nmmal,{ 1 J where in a series of documents, self-ae<Juired property Wl!S _described and dealt with as ancestral joint family property, it Wl!S held by the Madras High Court that the mere dealing with self acquisitions as joint family property was not sufficient but an intention .of the coparcener must be shown to waive liis claims with full knowledge of his right to it as his separate property. .The ini; portant. point to keep in mind is that the separate property of a Hindu coparcener ceases to be his separate property and acqu~\n\nthe characteristics of his .joint family or ancestral property, not by mere act of physical mixing with his joint family or aricestral property, but by his own volition and intention, by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as separate property. A man's intention can be discovered only from his words or from his .acts and conduct. When his intention with regard to his sepa• rate property is not expressed in words, we must seek for it in his acts and conduct. But it is the intention that we must .seek in every case, the acts and conduct being no more than evidence of the intention. In the present case, the High Court has examined the evidence adduced by the parties and has reached the conclu sion that there was no intention on the part of Muniswami Raju to throw the separate business of Ambika Stores into the common stock, nor was it his intention to treat it as a joint family business. Counsel on behalf of the appellant referred to the recital in Ex. E describing the properties being those of the executants and that the borrowings was for trade and benefit of the family\n\nand it was argued that there was a clear intention on the part of J: Muniswami Raju to treat the business as joint family business.\n\nWe have already referred to this document and indicated that the recitals were probably made for the purpose of securing a loan and cannot be construed as consent on the part of the members of the joint family to treat the business as the joint family business. Further, there is ample evidence to show that in all succeeding yean before his death Muniswami Raju had always described himself and conducted himself as the sole proprietor of Ambika Stores.\n\nSuch an attitude on the part of Muniswami Raju was not consistent with any intention on his part either to abandon his exclusive right to the business or to allow the business to be treated as joint family business. Exhibits XXXV to XL VT are all documents ex&- cuted by third parties in favour of Muniswami Raju in which Muniswami Raju has been. described as the oroprietor of Amblka Stores. Exhi1Jits ill, XXill, XXJV, 51, 52, 56, 58, ZZ. AAA series and BBB are all communications addressed by institutions likeBanks etc., in which Muniswami Raju has been described as the proprietor of Ambika Stores. It may be stated that the appellant himself has admitted in his evidence that he was not drawing any moneys from the business of Ambika Stores and that whenever he wanted any_money, he would ask Mun1•·dllll Raj11 and obtain\n\n(I) A.l.R.1936 Mad. 177.\n\nNARAYANA RA.JU v. CllAMARAJU (Ramaswaml, /.) 471\n\nA it from him. If really the appellant had considered himself to be a co-oWner equally with Muniswami Raju, such conduct on his part ill not explicable. It was urged on behalf of. the appellant that there was no documentary evidence to show that the appel Jant WIS being paid any saJanr by Muniswami Raju, and that prior to Mlllliswaml Raju's death, it was the appellant who was in the B entire management of Amblka Stores when Muniswami Raju was ill and after the death of Muniswami Raju also it was the appeJ.. !ant who had been in mt. AJl the books C?f account and other documents pertaining to the business of Amblka Stores had been admittedly entrusted to the appellant. But it is not explained Oil behalf of the appellant as to why the documents were not C produced on his behalf tp disprove the case of the respondenb that he was a salaried servant. It is therefore not unreasonable to draw an inference from the conduct of the appellant that th!l Account Books0 .if produced in court, would not have supported his case.\n\nWe accordingly reject the argument of the appellant that the busi ness of Ambika Stores became converted into joint family business at any subsequent stage by the conduct of M uniswami Raju in D throwing the business into the common stock or in blendinl! theearnings of the business with the joint family income.\n\nIt was finally contended on behalf of the appellant that, in any event, the appellant became a c<>-owner of the business along with Muniswami Raju by reason of contribution of his own labour towards the development of the business. In our opinion, there is I: no substance in this argument. It is evident that the appellant gave up his job in Wesley Press and joined An)bika Stores about 9 or 10 months after it was started by Muniswami Raju. The appellant does not state in his evidence that he was a co-owner when he. joined Amblka Stores. On the other hand, in Ex. 68 which is an application dated March 20, 1928 by the appellant r to the City Co-operative Bank, the appellant has described him self as a clerk in Amblka Stores and Muniswami Raju has been described as his proprietor. There is no satisfactory evidence on behalf of the appellant to show as to when and under which cir cumstances his status of a clerk changed to that of a c<>-owner. In another application, Ex. 'I.which is of the year 1929 the appellant has dc.9cribed Muniswami Raju as the proprietor of Ambika Stores C and he has. described himself as doing out-door commercial busi with bika Stores. Again, in Ex. C which is a loan appli catiOll made m 1932 by both the brothers, Muniswami Raju has been dcacn'bed as the proprietor of Amblka Stores while the appellut ha,, been dc.9cribed . as a General Merchant of Mysore.\n\nReference was made on behalf of the appellant io recitals in. Ex. l1I Dl>:P, a mortgage deed dated June 20, 1934 in which Muniswami Raju ll!ld the appellant have been descn'bed as proprietors of Ambit& Stores. We have already dealt with this document and for .the reasons already mentioned we hold that the description of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968 J 3 S.C.ll.\n\nexecutants was only given for the purpose of borrowing from the Bank and it had not the legal effect of making the appellant a co-owner of the partnership business .. The.re is no vidence of any assenion by the appellant during Muniswami Raju's life-time of his being a co-owner of the partnership business, nor is there any evidence of recognition by Muniswami Raju of any such right of the appellant. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that whatever the appellant did in connection with the business was only done with the au¢.ority conferred by Muniswami Raju. In our opinion the High Court has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant that he was a co-owner of the pannership business; For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal has no merit and it must be dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "G. NARAYANA RAJU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. NARAYANA RAJU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. CHAMARAJU & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. CHAMARAJU & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. NARAYANA RAJU\n\nG. CHAMARAJU & OTHERS\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. !"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 298, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2173, "end_char": 2190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No."}}, {"text": "V. Krishnamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Krishnamurthy and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2248, "end_char": 2265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Krishnamurthy and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2287, "end_char": 2300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, B. Subbiah and R. Thiagarajan, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. Subbiah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, B. Subbiah and R. Thiagarajan, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, B. Subbiah and R. Thiagarajan, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2407, "end_char": 2416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J\".", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "G. Narayana Raju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff G. Narayana Raju filed O.S. 34 of 1951-52 in the Court of District Judge, Mysore for partition and separate possession of suit properties mentioned in the various schedules of the plaint.", "canonical_name": "G. NARAYANA RAJU"}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2461, "end_char": 2466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of District Judge, Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff G. Narayana Raju filed O.S. 34 of 1951-52 in the Court of District Judge, Mysore for partition and separate possession of suit properties mentioned in the various schedules of the plaint."}}, {"text": "Mami Raju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2772, "end_char": 2781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second defendant is the widow of Mami Raju, tho eldest brother of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Muniswamj Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the original plaintiff was that he, the first defendant and Muniswamj Raju (husband of the second defendant) were the sons.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "oneGopala Raju.and", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3149, "end_char": 3167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of oneGopala Raju.and were all members of the joint faniily."}}, {"text": "Gopalaraju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3208, "end_char": 3218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalaraju died in May B\n\n1931 and after.", "canonical_name": "Go11alaraju"}}, {"text": "Nazarbad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An ancestral house in Nazarbad belonging to the family was acquired 'by the , City Improvement Trust Board in or about the year 1909 .. Out of the compensation paid for that house and supplemented by the earnings of the\n\nmembers of the joint family, the house item , No."}}, {"text": "Go11alaraju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3899, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was also purchased by Go11alaraju from the income of item No.", "canonical_name": "Go11alaraju"}}, {"text": "Ambika Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further , alleged that the business'known as \"Arnbika Stores~ was also the joint family business and all the properties mentioned in the Schedules except items 1 and 2 of Schedule 'A' were acquired out of the incorneof the members of the family including the iricome fn;)m the b:.loine:s of Ambika Stores."}}, {"text": "Mnniswami Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who asserted that the properties mentioned in all the Schedules of the plaint were self-acquisitions of Mnniswami Raju and constituted his •eparate propertis, It was alleged that Muniswami Raju was the only earning member of the family at the time of the acquisition of items 1and 2 of Schedule 'A' properties and the plaintiff and the fi'8t defendant were employed in petty jobs in Wesley Press.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Muniswami Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5221, "end_char": 5235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who asserted that the properties mentioned in all the Schedules of the plaint were self-acquisitions of Mnniswami Raju and constituted his •eparate propertis, It was alleged that Muniswami Raju was the only earning member of the family at the time of the acquisition of items 1and 2 of Schedule 'A' properties and the plaintiff and the fi'8t defendant were employed in petty jobs in Wesley Press.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Wesley Press", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5425, "end_char": 5437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was mainly contested by the second defendant who asserted that the properties mentioned in all the Schedules of the plaint were self-acquisitions of Mnniswami Raju and constituted his •eparate propertis, It was alleged that Muniswami Raju was the only earning member of the family at the time of the acquisition of items 1and 2 of Schedule 'A' properties and the plaintiff and the fi'8t defendant were employed in petty jobs in Wesley Press."}}, {"text": "Munisami Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munisami Raju later on employed the plaintiff in his shop as a salaried servant and the latter had no proprietary right in the business of Ambika Stores.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Muniswami Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After consideration of the oral and documentary evidence the District Judge held that the plaintiff, first defendant and Muniswami Raju were not divided and that the only property which was divisible, was item No.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Schedule\n\n466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Muniswlimi Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6074, "end_char": 6089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of Schedule 'A' were the self acquisitions of Muniswami Raju, that Muniswlimi Raju never blended his properties with that of the joint family' that the plaintiff was only an employee under .", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "March 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated March 25, 1960 the High Court affirmed the decree of the trial court with the modification that besides item No."}}, {"text": "Atnbika Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7235, "end_char": 7249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question to be considered in this appeal if whether the business of Atnbika Stores was really the business of the joint family and whether the plaintiff was entitled to a partition of his share in the assets of that ."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 26, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10268, "end_char": 10281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E, a deed of mortgage dated July 26, 1928 executed by Gopalaraju, Muniswamiraju and the appellant in favour of the Mysore Bank."}}, {"text": "Muniswamiraju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10306, "end_char": 10319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E, a deed of mortgage dated July 26, 1928 executed by Gopalaraju, Muniswamiraju and the appellant in favour of the Mysore Bank.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Mysore Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10355, "end_char": 10366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E, a deed of mortgage dated July 26, 1928 executed by Gopalaraju, Muniswamiraju and the appellant in favour of the Mysore Bank."}}, {"text": "Narayana Raju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also a recital in an earlier portion of thedocument that the business was being carried on for the benefit of the family, but it is not quite clear as to whether this related to the business carried on by Narayana Raju or whether it was intended to relate to some business carried on by all the three executants.", "canonical_name": "NARAYANA RA.JU"}}, {"text": "February 14, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11442, "end_char": 11459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I an application dated February 14, 1929 by the appellant to the City Co-operative Bank, Mysore wherein the appellant has said that he was getting a decent earning by doing out-of-door commercial bu.~'ness with Ambika Stores."}}, {"text": "City Co-operative Bank, Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11484, "end_char": 11514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I an application dated February 14, 1929 by the appellant to the City Co-operative Bank, Mysore wherein the appellant has said that he was getting a decent earning by doing out-of-door commercial bu.~'ness with Ambika Stores."}}, {"text": "May 5, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12446, "end_char": 12457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in this context to a J.etter dated May 5, 1931, Ex."}}, {"text": "Bank of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12530, "end_char": 12544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 written by-Muniswami Raju as proprietor of Ambika Stores to the Bank of Mysore."}}, {"text": "April 14, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12755, "end_char": 12769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "76, dated April 14, 1934 written by Muniswami Raju to the Bank of Mysore wherein Muniswami Raju has been described as the proprietor of Ambika Stores and there ls an intimation to the Bank that .the appellant Narayana Raju was authorised to sign for the firm."}}, {"text": "Narayana Raju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "76, dated April 14, 1934 written by Muniswami Raju to the Bank of Mysore wherein Muniswami Raju has been described as the proprietor of Ambika Stores and there ls an intimation to the Bank that .the appellant Narayana Raju was authorised to sign for the firm.", "canonical_name": "NARAYANA RA.JU"}}, {"text": "Muniswami Raju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the context and background of these circumstances it is evident that though both the appellant and Muniswami Raju were described as proprietors of Ambika Stores the description was only for the purpose of borrowing money from the Bank, as contended for by the respondents.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Ambilca Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13754, "end_char": 13768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore not possible for us to accept the contention of the appellant that the finding -0f •he High Court' that the bus'ness of Ambilca Stores was the exclusive business of Muniswaml Raju is vitiated in law."}}, {"text": "Muniswaml Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13799, "end_char": 13813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore not possible for us to accept the contention of the appellant that the finding -0f •he High Court' that the bus'ness of Ambilca Stores was the exclusive business of Muniswaml Raju is vitiated in law.", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "Krishnaswamy Chetty & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14153, "end_char": 14178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The business of Ambika Stores was started by Muniswamiraju as the proprietor thereof at a time when Muniswamiraju himself was comparatively well-off as a result of bis partnership with Krishnaswamy Chetty & Co. In the year 1925 the partnership of Krishnaswailly Chetty & Co. was dissolved by a document Ex."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswailly Chetty & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14215, "end_char": 14242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The business of Ambika Stores was started by Muniswamiraju as the proprietor thereof at a time when Muniswamiraju himself was comparatively well-off as a result of bis partnership with Krishnaswamy Chetty & Co. In the year 1925 the partnership of Krishnaswailly Chetty & Co. was dissolved by a document Ex."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswari1y Chetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14393, "end_char": 14414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.\n\nThe enire business with all the assets ad liabilities was taken over by Muniswami Raju while the widow and son of Krishnaswari1y Chetty were given a house estimated by the appellant himself at Rs."}}, {"text": "Mliniswami Raju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14515, "end_char": 14530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mliniswami Raju changed the name of the shop after taking it over into Ambika Stores and continued the business as is apparent from Bxs."}}, {"text": "Wesle Press", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first defendant joined Wesle Press in 1910 on a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17962, "end_char": 17979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "470 SUPREMB COURT UJOllTS\n\n(19611] 3 S.CJL\n\nmmal,{ 1 J where in a series of documents, self-ae<Juired property Wl!S _described and dealt with as ancestral joint family property, it Wl!S held by the Madras High Court that the mere dealing with self acquisitions as joint family property was not sufficient but an intention .of the coparcener must be shown to waive liis claims with full knowledge of his right to it as his separate property."}}, {"text": "NARAYANA RA.JU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20891, "end_char": 20905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NARAYANA RA.JU v. CllAMARAJU (Ramaswaml, /.) 471\n\nA it from him.", "canonical_name": "NARAYANA RA.JU"}}, {"text": "Mlllliswaml Raju", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21265, "end_char": 21281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant that there was no documentary evidence to show that the appel Jant WIS being paid any saJanr by Muniswami Raju, and that prior to Mlllliswaml Raju's death, it was the appellant who was in the B entire management of Amblka Stores when Muniswami Raju was ill and after the death of Muniswami Raju also it was the appeJ.. !"}}, {"text": "Amblka Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AJl the books C?f account and other documents pertaining to the business of Amblka Stores had been admittedly entrusted to the appellant."}}, {"text": "M uniswami Raju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22144, "end_char": 22159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant that the busi ness of Ambika Stores became converted into joint family business at any subsequent stage by the conduct of M uniswami Raju in D throwing the business into the common stock or in blendinl!", "canonical_name": "Muniswlimi Raju"}}, {"text": "An)bika Stores", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22651, "end_char": 22665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is evident that the appellant gave up his job in Wesley Press and joined An)bika Stores about 9 or 10 months after it was started by Muniswami Raju."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22885, "end_char": 22899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 which is an application dated March 20, 1928 by the appellant r to the City Co-operative Bank, the appellant has described him self as a clerk in Amblka Stores and Muniswami Raju has been described as his proprietor."}}, {"text": "City Co-operative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22926, "end_char": 22948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 which is an application dated March 20, 1928 by the appellant r to the City Co-operative Bank, the appellant has described him self as a clerk in Amblka Stores and Muniswami Raju has been described as his proprietor."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23781, "end_char": 23794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l1I Dl>:P, a mortgage deed dated June 20, 1934 in which Muniswami Raju ll!ld the appellant have been descn'bed as proprietors of Ambit& Stores."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968 J 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24009, "end_char": 24047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already dealt with this document and for .the reasons already mentioned we hold that the description of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968 J 3 S.C.ll."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_473_480_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "GORANTLA THATAIAH v.\n\nTHOTAKURA VENKATA SUBBAJAH & ORS.\n\nMarch 19, 1968\n\n[1. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, 1J.]\n\nWill-Propounder taking prominent part in xecutlon of and receiving benefif under-Principles regarding scrutiny of evidence of execution .and sound disposing state of mind of testator.\n\nOne V lost his father when he was only 10 years old and thereafter lived al<!ng with his mother; i• the hous., of the first defendant who was his maternal uncle.\n\nThe first defendant had considerable influence over V as he was slow witted and below the average level of intelligence and understanding. V died when he was 24 years old. A few days before his death he executed a will by which he bequeathed his entire property\n\nto the first defendant absolutely with a direction that his mother should be maintained, and that, even if his mother lived separately from the first defendant, she was to have only a life. interest in certain items which were also to be taken absolutely by the first defendant after her death. At the time of the execution of the will V was physically in a weak condition.\n\nThe first defendant took a prominent part in summonin~ the attesting witnesses and the scribe and in procuring writing materials for the execution Of the will. Evidence was given on behalf the first defendant tliat though V was delirious on Ibo day previous to the execution of the will and also subsequent to that date, V was in a pormal condition on the date> of the execution of the will.\n\nOn the question of the validity of ihe will,\n\nHELD : The will was not executed in a sound disposing state of mind and was therefore not legally valid. (480 A-BJ In a case in which a will is prepared. under circum'Stano-..s which raise the suspicion of the court that it does not express the mind of the .testatOr it is for those who propound the will -to remove that suspicion. What are suspicious circumstances mint be judged on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If, however, the propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the wjll which eonfcrs substantial benefits on him that itself is a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and in appreciating the evidence in such a case the coun should prooeed in a vigilant and cautious manner. (477 H; 478 A-BJ\n\nBa\"Y v. But/in, (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, 482, Fulton v. Andrew, (187S) L.R. 7 H.L. 448, Ty\"ell v. Painton, (1894) P. 151, 157, 159 and Surat Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand & Ors., 56 I.A. 62, applied.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 43'1 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August 22, J 963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 554 of 1959.\n\nff H. R. Gokhale and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nD. Narsa Raju, S. T. Desai, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangan for the respondents.\n\n.474 $UPlll!MB OOtlaT UPOl.TS\n\n(1968) 3 S.c.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on be- .half of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Andhra .Pradesh in Appeal Suit No. 554 of 1959 dated August 22, 1963.\n\nOne Gorantla Tathiah, as the sole plaintiff, filed O.S. No. 2 of 1957 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Bapatla for pos- B session of certain properties which had been left by Gorantla Veeriah when he died issueless on June 24, 1939. Originall)I. there were ten defendants in the suit. Defendant no. 1 is the maternal uncle of V eeriah and Defendant no. 2 and Defendant .no. 3 arc the sons of Defendant no. 1. Defendants nos. 4 to 8 were the alienees froin Defendant no. l's family. Defendants nos. 7, 9 and 10 did not contest the suit. Defendant no. 8 died in the course of the suit and his legal representatives were added as De fendants 11 to 14. Defendants l to 3 contested the suit on the , ground that Defendant no. 1 became entitled to the properties of\n\nVeeriah under the will, Ex. B-4 dated June 17, 1939 which Veeriah executed in his favour. It was contended in the alternative 1hat at the time when the reversion opened on the death of Veeriah's mother, Rattamma on October l, 1956, Defendant no. 1 was the nearest heir and not the plaintiff, under the Hi:ld'.: Succession Act (XXX of 1956) which had come into force Oil October 17, 1956. The Additional Subordinate Judge, Bapatla held that the will was tru~ and genuine but it was not legally valid as it was executed by V eeriah at a time when he had no testamentary capacity. It was also held that the Hindu Succession Act did not apply to the facts of the case. The Additional Subordinate Judge accordingly granted a decree for possession of properties except item no. 4 in favour of the plaintiff as against Defendants nos. t to 3, 6, 7 and 11 to 14. Defendants 1 to 3, 7, 11 and 13 took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The plaintiff also preferred a Memorandum of Cross Objections to the extent the trial Court's decree was against him. By its judgment <lated August 22, 1963, the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the will, Ex. B4 was executed by Veeriah in a sound and disposing state of mind and that the will was not only true but was valid and t>inding upon the plaintiff. The High Court accordingly diSll)issed the suit. 'The Memorandum of Cross Objections was also dismissed.\n\nThe first question to be considered in this appeal is whether 1he will, Ex. B4 was true and genuine and was executed by Veeriah in a sound and disposing state of mind.\n\nIt is not disputed that one Gangiah died leaving bis widow H Rattamma and his only son through her called Veeriah and a young daughter. The girl died 'without leaving any issue in the year 1932. Veeriah was a little boy and it is not disputed that\n\no. TILl, TAIAH v. T. v. SUBBAIAH (Ramaswami, J.) 475\n\nbe was below average in intelligence and understanding. Rattanuna alongwith her son took up residence with her brother, Defendant no. I who was a man of great wealth and influence in the village, owning fifty acres of land and outstanding' credits to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-. Rattamma's husband had left properties to the extent of 13 acres of land. In spite of owning so much property Veeriah was engaged as a cow-boy in tending cattle. In June 1939, he had an attack of typhoid, became bed-ridden and ultimately died of the disease on June 24, 1939. The case of tire contesting defendants was that Veeriah executed the will, Ex. B-4 on June 17, 1939, that D.W. 4 wrote it and nine witnesses attested it but the will was not registered in Veeriah's life-time. On October 15, 1939, defendant no. I and Rattamma presented the will, Ex. B-4 before the Sub-Registrar, Chirala for registration. The Sub-Registrar, however, refused to register the will by his order, Ex. A-45 in W.C. 4 of 1939. Defendant no. 1 preferred an appeal before the District Registrar, Guntur but the appeal-was dismissed. Defendant no. 1 then filed O.S. no. 111 of 1940 in the court of District Munsif, Bapatla against Ramayya (father of defendants 9 and 10), the plaintiff and jlattamma for a direction for registration of the will. The District Munsif returned the will .to defendant no. 1 for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. Defendant no. 1 presented it to the Subordinate Judge, Bapatla and got it numbered as O.S. no. 6 of 1941. The suit was ultimately dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation. Defendant no. 1 and Rattamma filed O.S. no. 13 of 1942 in the Subordinate Judge's court, Bapatla for a declaration that the will was genuine and valid. Ramayya filed a written statement and the suit was ultimately decreed in favour of Defendant no. 1. and Rattamma. The present plaintiff, Gorantla Tatbaiah was, however, not a party to that suit.\n\nIn the will, Ex. B-4 it is stated by the testator as follows :\n\n\" .... Typhoid condition has set in.\n\nAs no treatment has been effective in curing this condition I have lost confidence that I will survive. Therefore I have wholeheartedly made the following disposition regarding my movable and immovable properties in order that there may be no obstruction in future from any source whatsoever.\n\nThat my mother Rattamma should be maintained comfortably for her life-time and that in case there is disagreement between her and my material uncle.\n\nVenkatasubbayya and they decide to live separately, my mother, Rattamma. should enjoy the income of the property mentioned in 'B' Schedule for her life-time '-\".ithout exercising any powers of disposition by way of gift, sale etc., over the property and that after her life.\n\nL7 Sup. C.1.168-6\n\n476 SUPRl!Mll COURT UPOJl.TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\ntime the entire property mentioned in 'B' schedule A should devolve in my maternal uncle, V enkatasubbayya.\n\nMy maternal uncle, Venkatasubbayya shall enjoy the entire properties mentioned in 'A' and 'B' Schedules with absolute powers of disposition by way of gift, sale etc.\" In the will it is mentioned that V eeriah had sold his land on May\n\n30, 1939 to defendant no. 4 and received an advance of Rs. 165/- with the stipulation that the balance of sale price should be paid at the time of registration. Veeriah also said that in case he did not live long enough, defendant no. 1 should complete the sale transaction and receive 'the balance of price fro.!ll defendant no. 4.\n\nThe will was wri)ten by one Ammanamanchi Sambiah, D.W. 4 the karnam of tl'ie village. 'There are 9 attesting witnesses of whom three are dead. On behalf of the plaintiff two of the attestors P.Ws. 8 and 9 were examined and two attesting witnesses were examine<! as Court witnesses 1 and 2. On behalf of defendants two attesting witnesses D.Ws. l and 6 besides the scribe D.W. 4 gave evidence. P.W. 8 deposed that the testator did not give any instructions or particulars for drafting the will. The testator was very weak and in a delirious state and he was not in a position to put his thumb impression to the will. P.W. 9 is stonedeaf and he could not give proper evidence. He did not remember if Veeriah was raving and was tearing his clothes. D.Ws. 1, 4, 6 and 14 and C.Ws. 1 and 2 say that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind. It was the testator who gave instructions regarding the disposition of the properties. D.W. 4 wrote the will and read it over to V eeriah who approved of it and put his thumb impression thereon. The evidence of P.Ws. 8 and 9 is therefore clearly in conflict with the evidence of C.Ws. 1 and 2 and D.Ws. 1, 4, 6 and 14. The evidence of C.Ws. 1 and 2 is interested. It is admitted that C. W. 1 is related to defendant no. 1 and C.W. 2 is indebted to the first defendant to the extent of Rs. 1,400/-. As regards D.Ws. 1, 4 and 6, the trial court bas remarked that their testimony is not impartial and we see no reason to take a different view as regards the effect of their testimony.\n\nSo far as D.W. 1 is concerned, be appears to have kbatha dealings with the first defendant. D.W. 4 admitted that be and Venkataswamy were good friends and worked as karnam and Village Munsif for 30 years.\n\nThere was . a case of misappropriation against Venkataswamy and D.W. 4 deposed in his favour in that case. It is in evidence that D.W. 6 is related to Ambati Veeriah who is married to the first defendant's niece. With regard to P.Ws. 8 and 9 the High Court has remarked that they bad attested the will without any protest or adding any note of protest though the testator, Veeriah was not in a sound state of mind at the time of the execution of the will. In our opinion, this circumstance is of no consequence nnd the High Court was noi justified in reject-\n\n....\n\nG, THATAIAH v. T. v. SUBBAIAH (Rattulswami, J.) 477\n\nA ing the evidence of P. Ws. 8 and 9 on this ground alone. On the other hand, there are two important features in the present case which throw a great deal of doubt as to whether the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind at the time of the execution of the will. It is the admitted position that the first defendant took a prominent role at the time of the execution of the will by sumnioning the scribe and the attesting witnesses. It is stated by D.W. 1 that the first defendant also procured the writing materials B\n\nand the black ink for affixing the thum~ impressions of the witnesses. It is also admitted that the will preferred the first defendant to the mother. Normally, the testator would have bequeathed all his property to the mother and would have also given her power to adopt a boy to perpetuate the lineage of the family.\n\nInstead the mother was given, in the will, a life interest in items 1 and 6 and the rest of the properties were given absolutely to <!efendant no. 1. It is undisputed that the testator was 24 years of age at the time of the execution of the will and that he was far below the average level of intelligence and understanding and nobody was prepared to oiler a girl in marriage to him. There is evidence D that Veeriah was \"laC1dng in wits\" and that he was employed for tending cattle.\n\nFurther more, the testator was suffering from typhoid fever at the time of the execution of the will and he died a week thereafter i.e., on June 24, 1939. In Ex. B-4 it is recited that the testator was ailing for about 15 days and had become delirious.\n\nAccording to D.W. 4 when he arrived Veeriah was\n\nlying on a cot and he was not in a position to sit up by himself.\n\nBoth D.Ws. 1 and 4 admit that the attesting witnesses and the scribe had all assembled and waited for nearly an hour.\n\nBoth P.Ws. 8 and 9 say that at the time of the execution of the will Veeriah was in a delirious state. D.Ws. 1, 4, 6, 14 and C.W. 1 all admit that the. testator was delirious on the day previous to the execution of the will and also subsequent to the day of the exei:ution of the will.\n\nThese witnesses, however, state that the testator was quite all right and in normal condition on the date of the execuon of the wm.\n\nIt is difficult to accept this part of the defence evidence.\n\nConsidering that the condition of the testator became worse and he died a week thereafter it is difficult to accept the vidence of defence w!tnesses and of C.W. 1 that the testator was m a sound state of mind on , the date of the exeeution of the will but he s in a delirious state the day before and the day after the e:io:ecuon ?f the will: In our opinion, the Subordinate Judge was !1ght in .1!is conclusion that the testator was physically weak\n\nRl!d m a deli_nous men.ta! state at the time of the execution of. the will. , We think the High Curt had no justification for reversing the view taken by the Subordmate Judge.on this point.\n\nIt is :-veil-established that in a case in which a will is prepared der circumstances whch raise the suspicion of the court that It does not express the mmd of the testator it is for those who pro-\n\nSUP~ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\npound the will to remove that suspicion.\n\nWhat are suspicious circumstances must be judged in the facts and circumstances of each particular case.. If, however, the propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers substantial benefits on him that itself is a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and in appreciating the evidence in such a case, the court should proceed ill. a vigilant and cautious manner.\n\nIt is observed in Williams on \"Executors and Administrators\", Vol. I, 13th Ed., p. 92 :\n\n\"Although the rule of Roman Law that 'Qui se scripsit haeredem' could take no benefit under a will does not prevail in the Jaw of England, yet, where the person who prepares the instrument, or conducts its execution, is himself benefited by its dispositions, that is a circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and calls on it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument in favour of which it ought not to pronounce, unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper does express the true wUI of the deceased.\"\n\nAccording to the decision in Fulton v. Andrew('), \"those who take a benefit under a will, and have been instrumental in preparing or obtaining it, have thrown upon them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction\". \"There is however no unyielding rule of law (especially where the ingredient of fraud en ters into the case) that, when it has been proved that a testator, competent in mind, has had a Will read over to him, and hail thereupon executed it, all further enquiry is shut out\". In this case, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, has cited with approval the well-known observations of Baron Parke in the case of Barry v.\n\nBut/in(').\n\nThe two rules of law set out by Baron Parke are: \"first, that the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator\"; \"the second is, that, if a party writes or prepares a will under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court and calls upon it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is .iudicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true will of the deceased.\" In Sarat Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand & Ors.,('} the Judicial Committee made it clear that \"the principle which requires the propounder to remove suspicions from the mind of the Court is not confined only to cases where the propounder takes part in the\n\n(I) (1875) LR, 7 H.L 448.\n\n(2) (183R) 2 Moo. P.C. 4RO, 482.\n\nI)) 561.A. 62.\n\nG. THATAIAH v. T. v. SUBBAJAH (Ramaswami, J.) 479\n\nexecution of the will and receives benefit under it. There may be other suspicious circumstances attending on the eXecution of. the will and even in such cases it is the duty of the propounder to remove all clouds and satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument propounded is the last will of the testator.\" This view is supported by the following observations made by Lindley and Davey, L. JJ., in Tyrrell v. Painton('):\n\n\"The ru1e in Barry v. But/in (2 Moo. P.C. 480); Fulton v. Andrew [(1375) L.R. 7 H.L. 448]; and Brown\n\nv. Fisher [ (1890) 63 L.T. 465] is not, in my opinion, confined to the single case in which a will is prepared by or on the instructions of the person taking large benefits under it, but extends to all cases in which circumstances exist which excite the. suspicion of the Court; and wherever such circumstances exist, and whatever their nature mai be, it is for those who propound the will to remove such suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the document, and it is only where this is done that the onus is thrown on those who oppose the will to prove fraud or undue influence, or whatever else they rely on to displace the case made for proving the wilt\"\n\n(Lindley, L.J.).\n\n\"it must not be supposed the principle in Barry v.\n\nBut/in (2 Moo. P.C. 480) is confined to cases where the person who prepares the will is the person who takes the benefit under it-that is one state of things which raises a suspicion; but the principle is that wherever a will is prepared under circumstances which raise a wellgrounded suspicion that it does not express the mind of the testator the Court ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless that suspicion is removed.\" (Davey, L.J.).\n\nIt is in the light of these principles that the evidence adduced in this case will have to be considered. As we have already pointed out, there is abundant testimony in this case which proves beyond doubt that the testator was physically in a weak condition and that he was in a delirious State of mind at the time of the execution of the will.\n\nIt is admitted that the first defendant took a prominent part in summoning the attesting witnesses and the scribe and in procuring the writing materials for the execution of the will.\n\nThere is also evidence that Veeriah Jost his father, Gangiah when he was hardly 10 years of age and after Gangiah's death the first defendant brought Rattamma and Veeriah to his house and was looking after them.\n\nThe first defendant had therefore considerable }nfluence over Veeriah and his mother Rattamma.\n\n(I) (1894) P. 151, 157, 159.\n\nr{ --\n\n480 SUPIU!M'.B COURT IU!POllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThere is also the circumstance that V eeriah was only 24 years of age at the time of the execution of the will and he was slow witted and below the average level of intelligence and understanding.\n\nHaving regard to the cumulative effect of all the circumstances we are of opinion that the will, Ex. B-4 was not executed by V eeriah in a sound and disposing state of mind, and was not legally valid and binding upon the plaintiff. We accordingly set aside the finding of the High Court on this issue.\n\nIt is, however, not possible for us to finally dispose of this a, Ppeal because the High Court has not examined the second question arising in this case, namely, whether the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) is applicable to the case and whether defendant no. 1 was the nearest heir to succeed to the estate of the deceased V eeriah in preference to all others including the appellant, defendants 9 and 10. We therefore consider it necessary that the case should go back to the High Court for hearing the parties afresh and recording a finding on this question and to submit it to this Court within three months from the . date of receipt of the record by the High Court. The parties will not be allowed to give additional evidence in the case and the High Ci>urt will submit a finding on the evidence already adduced by the parties.\n\nThe appeal will be placed for further hearing before this Ci>urt after the finding is submitted by the High Court in accordance with. the directions we have given.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal remanded.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "GORANTLA THATAIAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GORANTLA THATAIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THOTAKURA VENKATA SUBBAJAH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THOTAKURA VENKATA SUBBAIAH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 19, 1968\n\n[1."}}, {"text": "1. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ff H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2687, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff H. R. Gokhale and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2708, "end_char": 2723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff H. R. Gokhale and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Narsa Raju", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2745, "end_char": 2758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, S. T. Desai, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangan for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, S. T. Desai, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangan for the respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Vedavalli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2773, "end_char": 2785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, S. T. Desai, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangan for the respondents."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, S. T. Desai, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangan for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by certificate on be- .half of the plaintiff from the judgment of the High Court of Andhra .Pradesh in Appeal Suit No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Gorantla Tathiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3112, "end_char": 3128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Gorantla Tathiah, as the sole plaintiff, filed O.S. No.", "canonical_name": "GORANTLA THATAIAH"}}, {"text": "V eeriah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 is the maternal uncle of V eeriah and Defendant no.", "canonical_name": "Veeriah Jost"}}, {"text": "Veeriah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 became entitled to the properties of\n\nVeeriah under the will, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Veeriah Jost"}}, {"text": "June 17, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-4 dated June 17, 1939 which Veeriah executed in his favour."}}, {"text": "Rattamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended in the alternative 1hat at the time when the reversion opened on the death of Veeriah's mother, Rattamma on October l, 1956, Defendant no.", "canonical_name": "H Rattamma"}}, {"text": "October l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4090, "end_char": 4105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended in the alternative 1hat at the time when the reversion opened on the death of Veeriah's mother, Rattamma on October l, 1956, Defendant no."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4245, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Succession Act (XXX of 1956) which had come into force Oil October 17, 1956."}}, {"text": "Additional Subordinate Judge, Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional Subordinate Judge, Bapatla held that the will was tru~ and genuine but it was not legally valid as it was executed by V eeriah at a time when he had no testamentary capacity."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Defendants 1 to 3, 7, 11 and 13 took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "August 22, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment <lated August 22, 1963, the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the will, Ex."}}, {"text": "Gangiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5497, "end_char": 5504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that one Gangiah died leaving bis widow H Rattamma and his only son through her called Veeriah and a young daughter."}}, {"text": "H Rattamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that one Gangiah died leaving bis widow H Rattamma and his only son through her called Veeriah and a young daughter.", "canonical_name": "H Rattamma"}}, {"text": "be", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veeriah was a little boy and it is not disputed that\n\no. TILl, TAIAH v. T. v. SUBBAIAH (Ramaswami, J.) 475\n\nbe was below average in intelligence and understanding."}}, {"text": "Rattanuna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattanuna alongwith her son took up residence with her brother, Defendant no."}}, {"text": "June 24, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6312, "end_char": 6325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In June 1939, he had an attack of typhoid, became bed-ridden and ultimately died of the disease on June 24, 1939."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6539, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 15, 1939, defendant no."}}, {"text": "Chirala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-4 before the Sub-Registrar, Chirala for registration."}}, {"text": "District Registrar, Guntur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6812, "end_char": 6838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 preferred an appeal before the District Registrar, Guntur but the appeal-was dismissed."}}, {"text": "District Munsif, Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111 of 1940 in the court of District Munsif, Bapatla against Ramayya (father of defendants 9 and 10), the plaintiff and jlattamma for a direction for registration of the will."}}, {"text": "Ramayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6966, "end_char": 6973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111 of 1940 in the court of District Munsif, Bapatla against Ramayya (father of defendants 9 and 10), the plaintiff and jlattamma for a direction for registration of the will."}}, {"text": "jlattamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111 of 1940 in the court of District Munsif, Bapatla against Ramayya (father of defendants 9 and 10), the plaintiff and jlattamma for a direction for registration of the will."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7211, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 presented it to the Subordinate Judge, Bapatla and got it numbered as O.S. no."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge's court, Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7433, "end_char": 7467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1942 in the Subordinate Judge's court, Bapatla for a declaration that the will was genuine and valid."}}, {"text": "Gorantla Tatbaiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7660, "end_char": 7677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present plaintiff, Gorantla Tatbaiah was, however, not a party to that suit.", "canonical_name": "GORANTLA THATAIAH"}}, {"text": "Venkatasubbayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8265, "end_char": 8280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatasubbayya and they decide to live separately, my mother, Rattamma.", "canonical_name": "Venkatasubbayya"}}, {"text": "May\n\n30, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8945, "end_char": 8958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the will it is mentioned that V eeriah had sold his land on May\n\n30, 1939 to defendant no."}}, {"text": "Ammanamanchi Sambiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9312, "end_char": 9332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will was wri)ten by one Ammanamanchi Sambiah, D.W. 4 the karnam of tl'ie village. '"}}, {"text": "Venkataswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 4 admitted that be and Venkataswamy were good friends and worked as karnam and Village Munsif for 30 years.", "canonical_name": "Venkatasubbayya"}}, {"text": "Munsif", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11002, "end_char": 11008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 4 admitted that be and Venkataswamy were good friends and worked as karnam and Village Munsif for 30 years."}}, {"text": "Ambati Veeriah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11175, "end_char": 11189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in evidence that D.W. 6 is related to Ambati Veeriah who is married to the first defendant's niece."}}, {"text": "Veeriah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13271, "end_char": 13278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to D.W. 4 when he arrived Veeriah was\n\nlying on a cot and he was not in a position to sit up by himself."}}, {"text": "Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15308, "end_char": 15316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is observed in Williams on \"Executors and Administrators\", Vol."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15509, "end_char": 15516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 92 :\n\n\"Although the rule of Roman Law that 'Qui se scripsit haeredem' could take no benefit under a will does not prevail in the Jaw of England, yet, where the person who prepares the instrument, or conducts its execution, is himself benefited by its dispositions, that is a circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and calls on it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument in favour of which it ought not to pronounce, unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper does express the true wUI of the deceased.\""}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16531, "end_char": 16537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, has cited with approval the well-known observations of Baron Parke in the case of Barry v.\n\nBut/in(')."}}, {"text": "Parke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16600, "end_char": 16605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, has cited with approval the well-known observations of Baron Parke in the case of Barry v.\n\nBut/in(')."}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18123, "end_char": 18130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is supported by the following observations made by Lindley and Davey, L. JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18135, "end_char": 18140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is supported by the following observations made by Lindley and Davey, L. JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Veeriah Jost", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20065, "end_char": 20077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also evidence that Veeriah Jost his father, Gangiah when he was hardly 10 years of age and after Gangiah's death the first defendant brought Rattamma and Veeriah to his house and was looking after them.", "canonical_name": "Veeriah Jost"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21106, "end_char": 21126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_481_488_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "GODHRA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY v.\n\nGODHRA ELECTRICITY CO. LTD.\n\nMarch 20, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nThe Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, s. 13-Rules 4 and 5- 'Rate' /eviable 11nder s. 13 on lands and buildings-Certain lands and buildings to be taxed under r. 4(1) on capital basis-Method of evaJUQo tion of capital value-E'nglish. laW relating to 'rates'. relevance . of-Con tractors' method of evaluation recommended-Data in company's balance sheet whether 'reliable data' for purpose of r, S.\n\nUnde'r s. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 read with rr. 4( 1) and 5 made thereunder a rate on non-residential buildings belonging to factories and mills was leviable on a capital basis, and the capital value for this purpose was to be work<!d out, if 'reliable data' were furnished by the assessee, on the basis of such data. The respondent company owned certain buildings on which rate was leviable under r. 4(1) on the basis of capital value. The respondent company claimed that the actual cost of construction of the buildings in 1920 ought to be taken as the capital value. The Municipality of Godhra however made its own estimate of the capital value. Thereafter the Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge made va1uaions taking into account the rise in the cost of building materials since 1920. The High Court In revision upheld the view that the actual cost minus depreciation thereon should be tho capital value; it observed that the English law and practice as to levy of rates was not relevant in the Indian context. The Municipality appealed.\n\nHELD : (i) When legislaturea in this country enact statutes which clooely resemble statutes in England and have the same purpose and object in view, then unless tho expressions used in the Indian Statutes are defined courts of law cannot go wrong in interpreting them in the way English judges have done.\n\nFurther, the words which have acquired a particular shade of meaning in England may be given the same meaning unless there is anything in the statute itself which would be contraindicative. [486-F-OJ\n\n(ii) Section 73 empowered the municipality to impose a rate on buildings or lands. The word 'rate' had not been defined in the Act but . it has a well known meaning. In Patti Gordhandar's case this . Court examined various statutes bearing on the English rating law and held that the word 'rate' was used .with respect to a tax whichwas levied on the net annual value or rateable value of lands and buildings and not on their capital value, but capital value could be adopted as the basis for working out the annual value. [4850486E]\n\n(iii) Rule 4 of the Godhra Municipal Rules shows what properties are to be valued on capital basis. What the capital. basis is not defined.\n\nThe capital value however can be determined in the way laid down in Patel Gordhandas'• case by adopting the contractor'& method. (487B].\n\n(iv) The figures given in the balance sheet of the company could not be regarded as 'reliable data' for the purpose of r. 5. The figures given in tho balance sheet are merely statements in .terms of the form given in\n\nSchedule VI. They have no relevance in determining tbe capital value of A property for the purpose of B&'eSsment to a rate. [488 B.q\n\n[Case remanded to District Judge for determining capital value by adopting contractors' method in the light of the observations made by this Court.]\n\nPatel Gordhandas Haraovindas v. hfunicipal Cornn11\"ssioner1 Ah1nedav bad, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 608, relied on.\n\nR. v. School Board for London, (1885) SS L.J.M.C, 33, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 631 and 632 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 7, 8, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision C Applicntions Nos. 116, 117, 173 and 174 of 1961.\n\nPurshottam Trikamadas and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nS. S. Shukla, for the respondent (in both the appeals),\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThese are two appeals by special leave against the judgment and order dated January 8, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court dismissing Civil Revision Applications 116 and 117 of 1961 filed by the appe!Jant and allowing similar applications Nos.\n\n173. and 174 of l 961 filed by the respondent against the com mon judgment dated December 1, 1960 passed by the District and Sessions Judge of Panchmahals.\n\nThe. matter arises out of assessments made by the appellant constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 on the respondent under section 73 of the Act. The respondents are an electricity company ownini inter alia properties bearing several numbers in the municipal borough of Godhra.\n\nFor the years 1956-57 and 1957-58 the appellan_t had fixed the Yaluation of the properties belonging to the respondent at Rs. 3,25,000/ -.\n\nOn appeal by t])e respoµdent, the Judicial Magistrate fixed the valuation of the properties at Rs. 90,000/-. On the appellant going in revision, the Sessions Judge fixed the valuation at Rs. 1.25,000/-.\n\nAs a result of the High Court's decision the valuation stood reduced to Rs. 90,000/-. The present appeals are by the Municipality.\n\nUnder s. 73(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') :\n\n\"Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf and to the provisions of sections 75 and 76, a municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act any of the following taxes, namely-\n\nGODHP.t. MUNIC. v. GODHRA ELEC. co. (Mitter, J.) 483\n\n(i) a rate on buildings or lands or both situate with- . in the municipal borough.\"\n\nThe procedure preliminary to imposing tax is laid down in s . . 15\n\nB and s. 78 deals with the preparation of an assessment list. Section 5 8 empowers the municipality to make rules prescribing the taxes to be levied in a municipal borough for municipal purposes etc.\n\nRules 4, 5 and 7 relevant for our purpose read as follows :\n\n \"4. Modes of valuation : (1) For the purpose of determining tax the following properties shall be valued c on the capital basis :-\n\n(a) All open lands, buildings and yards belonging to the Railway Administration.\n\n(b) All buildings and lands other than those which are actually used for residential purposes belonging to Mills and Factories to which the Indian Factories Act, D is applied.\n\n(Z) All properties other than those mentioned above shall be valuesJ on the basis of the annual letting value as defined in section 3(1) of the Act.\n\n5. Mode of determining capital value : The capi- E tal value of properties mentioned in rule 4(1) shall, in each case, be determined on such reliable data as the Railway Authorities and the Agents of the mills and the factories may furnish when called upon from thne io time to do so and in the absence of any such trustworthy reliable data, it shall be determined by the Chief\n\nF Officer or by expert valuers employed by the municipality for that purpose.\n\n7. Amount of tax: (1) in case of properties which as stated above, are valued on the .capital basis the tax G to be levied shall be assessed at Rs. 0-8-0 per cent of the capital value and it shall be a direct tax thereon provided however that any fraction of hundred in excess of fifty rupees shall be taken as the next higher hundred and any fraction of fifty rupees or less be taken as the lower hundred.\n\n(2) In case of properties which, as stated above, 1 are. valued on the annual letting value the tax to be levied shall be assessed as shown in the appendix an- .i nexed hereto.\"\n\nUnder rule 4(1) (b) above, the buildings of the respondent had to be valued on the capital basis. Under r. 5 the capital value of\n\npropt:rti~• had tc be determined on such reliable data as the respondent might furnish and in the absence thereof, it would be the duty of the Chief Officer to determine the same.\n\nBefore the Judicial Magistrate, one R. R._ Tewari, an Assistant Secretary of the respondent who had affirmed an affidavit showing that the approximate value of the seven items of property on which tax was sought to be imposed as per the books of the company was Rs. 41,541-12-9.\n\nHe sought to rely on the balance sheets and accounts of the company audited under the Companies Act for the purpose. The Judicial Magistrate observed that the properties were 40 years old and according to Tewari the life of the office buildings was 50 years while that of others was only 30 _years. Acting on the admission of Tewari that the price of building materials had increased three times the original figures in 1956- 57 and taking into consideration the properties were over 40 years old, the Magistrate assessed the capital value at Rs. 90,000/-.\n\nThe Sessions Judge dealt with the matter in greater detail and noted that neither party had given him real assistance in determining what should be the proper assessment. According to him the assessment papers preceding the bills had not been produced and neither party had led any evidence as to how the capital value was to be arrived at. He however felt that the capital value could not mean merely the book value shown in the books of account oi the assesste. He noted that according to the balance sheet for 1955-56 the property and assets under the head \"buildings\" was shown as below :\n\nBuildings.\n\nCost up to 31st March 1955\n\nAdditions during the year\n\nRs. 1,72,866-5-11\n\n12,398-10- 3\n\nTotal Rs. 1,85,265-0-2\n\nThe said figure included the value of all the buildings of the company but those which were to be assessed were only seven out of which two residential bungalows and servants quarters were to be assessed on the rental value. . The Sessions Judge therefore inferred from the above figures that Rs. 1,85,265/- inch1ded at !east Rs. l,00.000/- as the cost up to 31st March, 1955 of the factory buildiitgi in question. The Sessions 1 udge found himself unable to accept the contention that the depreciated selling value of the property was the capital value for the purpose of assessment of house tax. He also did nof accept the municipality's contention that the cost of construction of buildings had gone up\n\nH r\n\nGODHRA MUNIC. v. GODHRA ELEC. co. (Mitter, 1.) 485\n\nfive times since 1920. Considering the rival contentions he fixed the capital value at three times the figure shown by the company, viz., Rs. 41,541/· and rounded the same off to Rs. 1,25,000/·.\n\nTaking the view that it was not open to \"a Judge in India to base his judgment as a whole or in part or his conclusion upon either Halsbury's Laws of England or Bean and Lockwood's book on Rating Valuation Practice\" on the ground that these books were irrelevant under the Indian Evidence Act, the learned Judge of the High Court held that \"capital value\" might possibly bear four different meanings but the meaning given to the expression in Halsbury's Laws of England was '.'not appropriate in the context of the Indian enactment and the Indian Rules\". Referring to the rules made by Godhra Municipality he observed that it could not be said that the municipality had adopted the capital value as one of the methods of ascertaining the rental value or that the municipality had adopted the rental value as one of the methods of ascertaining the capital value.\n\nAccording to the learned Judge,\n\n\" 'capital value' has to be treated as meaning the value of the building treated as capital at the time of the assessment; in other words, the original cost of construction minus the depreciation or at the most the original cost of construction without depreciation.\" Accepting the figure of Rs. 41,541-12-9 as the cost of construction of the building in 1920 as found by the courts below, he observed that the capital value should be \"either Rs. 41,541-12-9 or something less after deducting depreciation.\" According to him \"the assessee has not c. ome in revision against the order of the Magistrate fixing the value at Rs. 90,000/-. Both the courts have erred in considering the probable cost of construction of a new building.\" He therefore held that the courts below had committed a material mistake in the exercise of jurisdiction in relying upon the probable cost of constructing a new building of a similar type in order to estimate the capital value as contemplated by Godhra Municipality and accordingly reduced the capital value fixed by the Sessions Judge to Rs. 90,000/-.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept the views expressed or the reasoning given in the judgment of the High Court. Section 73 empowered the municipality to impose a rate on buildings or lands.\n\nNow the word 'rate' had not been defined in the Act but it has a. well known meaning:-As observed in Patel Gordhandas Har.' govindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad(') the word \"has come to our country for the purpose of local taxation from England.\" In that case this Court examined various statutes bearing on the English Rating Law and held that the word \" 'rate' was\n\n(I) (196412 S.C.R. 608 at 616 ..\n\n,. .\n\n486 SUPllEMB COUllT llEPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nused with respect . to a tax which was levied on the net annual value or rateable value of lands and buildings and not on !hair capital value; It would therefore not be wrong to say that in the legislative history and practice in England up to 1925, 'rate' for the purpose of local taxation meant a tax on the . annual value of lands and buildings liable to such taxation.\"\n\nThe Court werit on to examine the methods in use for the purpose of ascertaining the rateable value which were generally three. It was said :\n\n\"Where the land or building was actually let, the valuation was based on the rent at which it was let.\n\nWhere, however, the .land or building was not let, two methods were evolved for the purpose of finding out the rateable value. The first was to assume a hypothetical tenancy (such as where the same person is the owner and occupier) and find out the rent at which the premises would be let. The second was based on the capital value of the premises. But the tax was not levied on the capital value itself; the capital value was determined on the structural value of the building to bci assessed by what was known to be contractor's method or contractor's .test in addition to the market value of the land.\n\nSometimes the words \"effective capital value\" were also used since in. most cases the actual capital cost of the building plus the market value of land might for some reason or the other be ineffective IA., it might not be rent producing. Having arrived at the effective capital value it was necessary to apply percentages thereto in order to arrive at the annual value.\" When legislatures in this country enact statutes which closely resemble statutes in England and have the same purpose and object in view, then unless .the expressions used in the Indian Statutes are defined, courts of law cannot go \\\\TOng in interpreting them in the way English Judges have done. Further, the words which have acquired a particular shade of meaning in England may be given the same meaning unless there is anything in the statute itself which would be contra indicative.\n\nIn Patel Gordhandas' s case(') the statute which this Court had to interpret was the same Act which is before us in this case. Consequently, that decision affords us a good guide in forming our own conclustons in this case. Section 7 5 of the Act has an Explanation introduced in 1966 which reads as follows :\n\n\"Explanation-For the purposes of a rate on buildings .or lands, the basis of valuafion may be-\n\n(i) the annual letting value;\n\n(I) [196412 S.C.Jl. 608.\n\n30DHRA MUNIC. v. GODHRA ELEC. co. (Mitter, J.) 487\n\n(ii) the annual value;\n\n(iii) the floor area, in the case of Mills, Factories and buildings and lands connected therewith;\n\n(iv) the capital value, in the case of vacant lands.\"\n\n9 The Explanation is deei, ned always to have been substituted for the original by Maharashtra Act 3 of 1966, s. 3(b).\n\nRule 4 of Godhra Municipal Rules shows what properties are to be valued on the capital basis. What the capital basis is is not defined.\n\nThe capital value however can be determined in the way laid down iri Patel Gordhandas's case(') by adopting the c contractor's method. What that method is has been explained in Ryde on Rating (Eleventh Edition) Chapter 20. In R. v. School Board for London(') Cave, J. applied the contractors test to schools. Ryde points out that it was tacitly rognised as applicable in various other cases. The principle on which the contractor's basis rests lire given by the author at page 439 and the method of its application •is given at page 442. The learned author notes D that in. \"applying the contractor's basis it is possible to discern five stages.\n\nThe first stage is the estimation of the cost. of construction of the building.\" There is a difference of view as to whether it is better to take the cost of replacing the actual building as it is, or the cost of a substitute building on the same plan as the actual building but otherwise in ari up-to-date form. The second stage is IE \"to make deductions from the cost of construction to allow for age, obsolescence and any other factors necessary to. arrive at the 'effective capital value'. ''The third stage is to estimate the cost of the ll)lld. The fourth stage is to apply the market rate or rates at which money can be 1l9rrowed or invested to the effective capi• tal value of the building and the land. The fifth stage is to. con- F shider whether the result of the fourth stage really reprsents what t e hypothetical tenant would pay for the annual tenancy on the statutory terms, and to make any adjustments necessary to ensure that no higher rent is fixed as the basis of assessments than that which it is believed the owner would really be willing to pay for the occupation of the premises.\n\nG Rule S of the Godhra Municipal Rules lays down that the capital value is to be determined in each case on reliable data furnished by the Mills and the Factories when called upon to do so and in the absence thereof js to be determined by the Chief Officer or expert valuer.. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that here there were reliable data in that the balance sheet of the H company showing the value of these properties for the purpose of the Companies Act and there was no reason why the same figures should not be adopted as the capital value of the lands\n\n11)(1964) 2 S.C.R. lioll. (2) {18~S) 55 L.J.M.C. 33; 17 Q.ll.D. 738 C.A.\n\n488 SUPJU!llB COURT lU!POllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nand buildings within the jurisdiction of Godhra municipality. This clearly is fallacious as under section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 the balance sheet of a company has to be drawn up in the form prescribed by Schedule VI.\n\nUnder the said SChedule, Part\n\nI, the value of fixed assets has to be shown \"distinguishing as far as possible between expenditure upon (a) go<id-will, (b) land, (c) buildings, (d) leaseholds, (e) railway sidings, (f) plant and machi- B nery, (g) furniture and fittings, (h) development of property etc. The fourth column of the form which gives the instructions in accordance with which assets should be made out shows under each head \"the original cost and the additions thereto and deductions therefrom during the year, and the total depreciation written off or provided up to the eQd of the year is to be stated.\" It will therefore be noticed that the. figures given in the balance sheet are merely statements in terms of the form given in SChedule\n\nVI.\n\nThey have no relevance in determining the capital value of property for the purpose of assessment to a rate.\n\nIt appears to us therefore that the true method of determination of the capital value was not adopted in the courts below. We D therefore set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and remand the matter back to the District Judge for him to determine the capital value in the light of the observations made by us after giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the subject. The costs will abide by the decision of the Disrtict Judge.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed and case remanded.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "GODHRA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GODHRA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GODHRA ELECTRICITY CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GODHRA ELECTRICITY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 20, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 20, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 520, "end_char": 525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 533, "end_char": 568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipality of Godhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipality of Godhra however made its own estimate of the capital value."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1681, "end_char": 1688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : (i) When legislaturea in this country enact statutes which clooely resemble statutes in England and have the same purpose and object in view, then unless tho expressions used in the Indian Statutes are defined courts of law cannot go wrong in interpreting them in the way English judges have done."}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098, "end_char": 2108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patti Gordhandar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Patti Gordhandar's case this .", "canonical_name": "Patel Gordhandas'•"}}, {"text": "Patel Gordhandas'•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The capital value however can be determined in the way laid down in Patel Gordhandas'• case by adopting the contractor'& method. (", "canonical_name": "Patel Gordhandas'•"}}, {"text": "Schedule VI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 S.C.R. 608", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3483, "end_char": 3502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamadas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamadas and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamadas and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3911, "end_char": 3923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Shukla, for the respondent (in both the appeals),\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThese are two appeals by special leave against the judgment and order dated January 8, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court dismissing Civil Revision Applications 116 and 117 of 1961 filed by the appe!Jant and allowing similar applications Nos."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4012, "end_char": 4018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Shukla, for the respondent (in both the appeals),\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMitter, J.\n\nThese are two appeals by special leave against the judgment and order dated January 8, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court dismissing Civil Revision Applications 116 and 117 of 1961 filed by the appe!Jant and allowing similar applications Nos."}}, {"text": "District and Sessions Judge of Panchmahals", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4376, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 174 of l 961 filed by the respondent against the com mon judgment dated December 1, 1960 passed by the District and Sessions Judge of Panchmahals."}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4503, "end_char": 4538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Godhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are an electricity company ownini inter alia properties bearing several numbers in the municipal borough of Godhra."}}, {"text": "s. 73(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5201, "end_char": 5209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 75 and 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5738, "end_char": 5743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6356, "end_char": 6369, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. R._ Tewari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Judicial Magistrate, one R. R._ Tewari, an Assistant Secretary of the respondent who had affirmed an affidavit showing that the approximate value of the seven items of property on which tax was sought to be imposed as per the books of the company was Rs."}}, {"text": "sought to rely on the balance sheets and accounts of the company audited under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Magistrate observed that the properties were 40 years old and according to Tewari the life of the office buildings was 50 years while that of others was only 30 _years."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking the view that it was not open to \"a Judge in India to base his judgment as a whole or in part or his conclusion upon either Halsbury's Laws of England or Bean and Lockwood's book on Rating Valuation Practice\" on the ground that these books were irrelevant under the Indian Evidence Act, the learned Judge of the High Court held that \"capital value\" might possibly bear four different meanings but the meaning given to the expression in Halsbury's Laws of England was '.'not appropriate in the context of the Indian enactment and the Indian Rules\"."}}, {"text": "Bean", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10570, "end_char": 10574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking the view that it was not open to \"a Judge in India to base his judgment as a whole or in part or his conclusion upon either Halsbury's Laws of England or Bean and Lockwood's book on Rating Valuation Practice\" on the ground that these books were irrelevant under the Indian Evidence Act, the learned Judge of the High Court held that \"capital value\" might possibly bear four different meanings but the meaning given to the expression in Halsbury's Laws of England was '.'not appropriate in the context of the Indian enactment and the Indian Rules\"."}}, {"text": "Lockwood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking the view that it was not open to \"a Judge in India to base his judgment as a whole or in part or his conclusion upon either Halsbury's Laws of England or Bean and Lockwood's book on Rating Valuation Practice\" on the ground that these books were irrelevant under the Indian Evidence Act, the learned Judge of the High Court held that \"capital value\" might possibly bear four different meanings but the meaning given to the expression in Halsbury's Laws of England was '.'not appropriate in the context of the Indian enactment and the Indian Rules\"."}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10682, "end_char": 10701, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Godhra Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10995, "end_char": 11014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to the rules made by Godhra Municipality he observed that it could not be said that the municipality had adopted the capital value as one of the methods of ascertaining the rental value or that the municipality had adopted the rental value as one of the methods of ascertaining the capital value."}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patel Gordhandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Patel Gordhandas' s case(') the statute which this Court had to interpret was the same Act which is before us in this case.", "canonical_name": "Patel Gordhandas'•"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15360, "end_char": 15369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15941, "end_char": 15948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Godhra Municipal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15961, "end_char": 15983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ryde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16265, "end_char": 16269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What that method is has been explained in Ryde on Rating (Eleventh Edition) Chapter 20."}}, {"text": "Cave", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16347, "end_char": 16351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In R. v. School Board for London(') Cave, J. applied the contractors test to schools."}}, {"text": "Rule S of the Godhra Municipal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18304, "end_char": 18317, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Godhra municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18583, "end_char": 18602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. 738 C.A.\n\n488 SUPJU!llB COURT lU!POllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nand buildings within the jurisdiction of Godhra municipality."}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18640, "end_char": 18651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rule S of the Godhra Municipal Rules", "statute": "Rule S of the Godhra Municipal Rules"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18659, "end_char": 18678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule VI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18755, "end_char": 18766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_489_497_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v.\n\nRANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR.\n\nMarch 21, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts, 19(1)(/), (5) and 31-Enactment abolishing cc.oh grant-If violative of Art. 19(1)(/) and 31(2)-Choses in action and money, i/ could be acquired under Art. 31(2).\n\nMadhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act (M.P. 16 of 1963)- lf violates Art. 19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\n'The appellant.State abolished by an executive order cash grants payable by it. This order was quashed by this Court. Thereupon the State passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963 to abolish the cb grants, but provided for the payment of certain comjlensation to the grantees-;-respondents. Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act to be ultra vires of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and not saved by sub-Art.\n\n(5) thereof. In appeals by certificate, this Court,\n\nHELD : The Act is either violative of Art. 31 (2) or, in the !lltemative, Art. 19(1)1f) of the Constitution. (490 F]\n\nChoses in action and money could not be acquired under Art. 31(2}.\n\nIf it is held that State by the exercise of its pOwer of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging to its . citizens, by paying a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right gnaranteed under Art. 19(1 )(f) would be deprived of all its contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose.\n\nArticle 31(2) must be construed harmoniously with .Art. 19(1)(1). If so constr'Jed, it is obvious that the public purpose contemplated by the Article does not include enrichment of the colfe'rs of the State. Further the compensation• referred to in Art. 3112) is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken. (495 E-H]\n\nA law which authorises the State to deprive a persOn of bis property must be a valid law. It must not violate Art. 19(1)(f) which means that it must satisfy the ruirements of Art. 19(5). The word \"law\" used in Art. 31(1) 'indicates its limitations and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31( I) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes,\n\nare reasonable and in the interest of general public. The Act which empowers the State to approp'riate some one else's property for itself solely with a view to augment the resources of the State cannot be considered as .a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. If Art. 19(5) is inteqireted to mean that the State can take by authority of law anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the g\\Jarantee gjveli by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory [496 D-497 _El\n\nMadhorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat [1961) I S.C.R. 957, Kamuhwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C, 1166, Stale of Bihar v. Kcmeshwar Singh, [1952) S.C.R. 889, Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunl v. State of Madril$, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887, followed.\n\nBombav Dyein11 and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.\n\nState of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, referred to.\n\n-490\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1730 .and 1731of1966.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated August 18, 1964 .of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition Nos. 21 .and 22 of 1963 (G.).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nB. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by certificates the ques non that arises for decision is whether the Madhya Pradesh Abo\n\nlition of Cash Grants Act of 1963 {Act No. XVI of 1963) is .ultra vires the provisions of tbe Constitution. The respondents in these appeals were entitled to receive cash grants from tbe Government of Madhya Pradesh. The impugned Act abolished such grants but provided for the payment of certain compensation to tbe :grantees. The respondents <; hallenged the vires of the Act before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 21 and 22 of 1963, on various grounds. The High Court rejected ;111 the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents excepting one namely that the Act is ultra v/res of Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub-Art. (5) thereof. After -Obtaining from the High Court certificates under Art. 133(1)(c), the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these appeals. The State is challenging the correctness of the decision of the High Court to the extent it went against it.\n\nThe respondents on their part, in addition to supporting the findings of the High Court which are in their favour, relied also on the other pleas taken by them before the High Court.\n\nAs we are of the opinion that the impugned Act is either violative of Art. 31 (2) or, in the alternative, Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, we have not !bought it necessary to go into the other contentions ta_ken on behalf of the respondents.\n\nBefore the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, purported to abolish the cash grants payable by it by ineans of an executive order. That order was unsuccessfully challenged by Madhorao Phalke and others before the High Court.\n\nBut in appeal this Court in Madhorao Plialke v. State of Madhya Bharat(') quashed the order in question. holding that the grants in question were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Rulers of Gwalior and those knlambandis are existing laws within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution and consequently the same could not be abrogated by means of an executive order. Jt may be noted that in that appeal, the appellant challeng-\n\n(1) [1961] I S.C.R. 957.\n\ned the order in question on two grounds, namel>:-(1) tha~ as his right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by the State of Gwalior, it was not open to the Government of Madhya Bharat to extinguish that right merely by an executive ordr, and\n\n(2) that that right being property the same could not be dives_ted without payment of compensation under Art. 31 of the Constitution. This Coun allowed the appeal on the first ground ~~ consequently it did not <jeal with the second. After the dec1s1on of this Court in that case, the impugned Act was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh legislature on April 5, 1963. It received the assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary on August 2, 1963.\n\nThe Act comes into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint. Even before that notification was issued, the petitions from which these appeals arise were instituted in the High Coun. We are given to understand that in view of those. petitions, the Act has not yet been brought into force.\n\nThe long title of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for D the discontinuance of cash grants in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith. It contains twelve sections. Section 11 sets out the short title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 defines some of the expressions found in the Act.\n\nSection 3 is the most important section. It purports to abolish certain cash grants. Section 4 provides for E statement of claims by the grantees. Section 5 provides the manner of determining the compensation payable. Section 6 prescribes that appeal, revfsion and review under the Actto be in. accordance v.ith Madhya Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1959. Section 7 provides for the determination of disputes as regards the title of any grantee. Section 8 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to . issue F an ijunction against any person in respect of any proceedings pendmg before the competent authority under s. 5 which shall have the effect of staying the proceedings.\n\nSection 9 prescribes the quantum of compensation payable. Section 10 deals with the mode of payment of compensation.\n\nSection 11 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act.\n\nSection 12 says that if any difficulty G arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, the State Government may by order make such provisions not inconsistent v.ith the purposes of this Act as appears to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.\n\nH In these appeals we are mainly concerned with the vires of s 3 read \"\"!tit the defin_ition of \"cash grant\" in s. 2(1 ).\n\nIf sectio~ 3 read with s. 2(1) 1s held to be ultra vi1'11s of the Constitution,. then the who!~ Act falls t? .the groll~ as the rell!aining sections of the Act are merely subsidiary or mc1dental provisions. Section L7Sup.C.J/68-7\n\n492 SUPREMB COURT JUlPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3 ( •) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a court or other authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act.\n\nBut the proviso thereto makes certain exceptions with which we are not concerned in this case.\n\nThe case of the respondents falls within the main part. They do not have the benefit of the proviso. A cash grant as defined in s. 2 (1 )( ••) includes a grant of\n\n(*) '\n\n13. Abolition of certain cash grtin1s-(_t) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custcm, usage. sanad or a decree or order of a ccurt or other authority whatscever, all cash grants shall be disc_ontinued and cease-to have effect from th~ commencement of this Act ;\n\nProvided that where the grantee is a person specified in column (1) of the Table belowhecashgrantmay, at the option ofthe grantee exercised in such rnal}ner, within such period and in such fonn as may be prescribed, be continued sub1ect to the contlitions and during the Period mentioned in the corresponding entry in column (2) of the said Table~\n\nTABLE (!)\n\n(i) A widow {ii) A minor\n\n(a) in the case of a male\n\n{b) in the case of a female\n\n(iii) A person above the age of 60\n\nyears.\n\n(2)\n\nSo long as she remains a widow.\n\nTill the date he attain& 21 years Qf age.\n\nTill the date of her marriage or till she attains 21 years of age, which ever is earlier.\n\nDUl'iDg his life time.\n\n(iv) A person subject to physical During his life time.\n\n\"disability or mental . infirmity\n\nowin'g to which he is incapable of earning his Uvelihood.\n\n (2) Upcn th~ disc.>ntinu1nc~ of a cash grant under suection (1), it shall not bJ obligatory on the grantee to perform the function or discharge the duty, if\n\nan\"y attached to such grant\".\n\nc••) \"2(1)-'Cash grant' means a grant of money which is enforcea,, le by th'e grantee against the State Government on the c:Iate of the coming into force -0f this Act but does not include-\n\n(i) a grant of money for-\n\n(a) services of public temPles, mosque or .church; .or (b) W'?rship r\n\npublic temples, mosque or.church; or (c) readingpuran in pubhc temples; or (d) pcrformirig Kirlan in public temples;\n\n(ii) a grant of money to charitable or religious institutions; (111') a grant of. money or pension or annuity or special or perpetual annuity sanctio.ned under-\n\n(i:i) s. S .of the Central Provine<.& and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 (XXXVII of 1948);\n\n(b) s. 77 or s. 81-A of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estate~ Mahals Alienated Lands) Act, 19SO (1 of 1951);\n\n(c) s. 41 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms\n\n Act, 1952 {XI of 1952);\n\n(d) the orders relating to Jagirs in Bhopal 'lhekam Khosravi, 1949,\n\npara 30' read with s. 45-A of the Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (No. X of 1953); and\n\n(e) sub-s. (2) of s. 160 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,\n\n1959, (20 of 1959);\"\n\nA money which is enforceable by the grantee against the State Goverliment on the date of the coming into force of the Act but does not include those granis which are specifically excluded.\n\nThis definition takes in all the cash grants whatever may be the nature or origin of those grants. The definition of a cash grant is wide enough to include cash grants sanctioned by ex-Rulers in lieu of B J agirs or other properties resumed or even payments agreed to be made in lieu of loans given to the Rulers.\n\nDifferent considerations may arise if the grants abolished are gratuitous payments, grants in lieu of services to be rendered or other resumable grants.\n\nBut as mentioned earlier, the definition of cash grants in s. 2(1) does not make any distinction between the various types of cash C grants.\n\nHence, the said definition will have to stand or fall as a whole, there being no basis for severing some out of the several grants included therein. It is impennissible for this Court to rewrite that clause and confine the definition only to such of the cash grants which the legislature might be competent to abolish.\n\nThe doctrine of severability is applicable only if it is possible D to separate the legal from the unconstitutional portion of the provision. If it is not possible to do so, the entire provision has to be struck down as unconstitutional. see Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar(').\n\nThe High Court has come to the conclusion that a \"cash grant\" is property within the meaning of that expression in Arti- 1: cles 19(l)(f) and 31. This conclusion was not challenged before us. It is obvious that a right to a sum of money is property.\n\nThere was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act . can be considered as acquisition under Art. 31 (2). It was urged before that Court on behalf of the State that that abolition of cash grant amounted I' to compulsory acquisition of property f<JI'. public purpose and as the Act has prescribed the compensation payable to grantees the acquisition in question is completely protected by Art. 31(2). The High Court replied this contention opining that as the law in question cannot be considered as having transferred the rights of the grantees as proyided in Art. 31 (2A) the State cannot seek D the protection of Art. 31 (2). This conclusion is debatable. It is possible to view the discontinuance of the payment of cash grants under s. 3 as a statutory transfer of rights of the grantees to the State. But there is no need to pursue this line of reasoning for reasons to be stated presently. Though the language of Art. 31 (2) prima facie comprehends movable properties including choses in action and money there are valid grounds to hold that H choses in action and money are outside the reach of Art 31 (2).\n\nIn the United States of America, opinion is divided among the\n\n(I) A.!.R.1962 S.C. 1166.\n\n494 SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\njurists whether money and choses in action can be acquired in the exercise of the power of eminent domain though the prepondel:'llllce of opinion appears to be that it is impermissible.\n\nBut so far as we are concerned; this question is concluded by the decisions of this Court. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(1) this Coun held that under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, money and choses in action could not be acquired. Mahajan, J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority, after quoting with approval certain passages from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, observed (at pp. 943-44 of the Report) :\n\n\"It was not necessary to decide in this case whether under the comp_ulsory acquisition power the State has the power to acquire choses in action or money, but it cannot be seriously disputed that such an acquisition amounts to a forced loan and that the desired result can be more appositely obtained in exercise of the police power of the State than of the power of eminent domain or compulsory acquisition of property and that compensation in such a case is the same amount of money that is being taken and in the case Of a chose in action the amount of money that it would produce.\n\nIn this situation it cannot be. held that fifty per cent of the outstanding arrears was compensation in any sense of that expression for this acquisition. The true position is that the State took over all the arrears and decided to refund fifty per cent of them and forfeit the rest. The validity of this acquisition has to be decided independently of the acquisition of the estates. It has no connection with land reform or with any public purpose. It stands on the same footing as other debts due to zamindars or their other movable properties, which it was not the object of the Act to acquire. As already stated, the only j)urpose to support this acquisition is to raise revenue t6 pay compensation to some of the zamindars whose e5tates are being taken.\n\nThis piirp0se does not fall within any definition, however wide, of the phrase 'public purpose' and the law therefore to this extent is unconstitutional.\"\n\nIn the same case, Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) observed:\n\n\"Taking money under the right of emineni domain when it must be compensated by money afterwards, could be nothing more. or less than a forced loan and it is difficult to say that it comes under the head of acquisi-\n\n(1) (!952) S.C.R. 889.\n\nA lion or requisitioning of property •.•• and is embraced within its ordinary connotation.\"\n\nChandrasekhar Aiyar 1., in that very case held that though money and choses in action are movable property and would prima facie come under the power of compulsory acquisition the power under Art 31 (2) could not be used to support such acquisition \"on B the ground that generally speaking there would be no public purpose in their acquisition\"'.\n\nThe majority view in that case was followed by this Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Cb Ltd. v. The State of Bombay(1 ). That case considered the validity of s. 3 (1) of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act which provided that there should be constituted a fund called the Bouie bay Labour Welfare Fund and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the same specified in sub-s. (2) ihereof shall be paid into the fund. Section 3\n\n(2) provided inter alia :\n\n\"The Fund shall consist of :-\n\n(a) all fines realised from the employees;\n\n(b) all unpaid accumulation.\" / The Court held following the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') that the provision in question is, c _ invalid and is not protected by Art 31 (2). ;.\n\nFrom the above decisions it follows that choses in action anif': ' E money could not be acquired under Art. 31 (2). If it is held that\n\nState by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging to its citizens, by paying a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1 )(f) would be deprived of all ilS' _ contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful p111-f F pose.\n\nThe power conferred under Art. 31 (2) is not a taxing-< power.\n\nThat power cannot be _utilised for enriching the coffers( of the State. _ It is true that the abolition of tbe cash grants would' augment the resources of the State but that cannot be considered •as a public purpose under Art. 31 (2). If it is otherwise it would be permissible for the legislatures to enact laws acquiring the public debts due from the State, the annuity deposits returnable by G it and provident fund payable by it by providing for the payment of some nominal compensation to the persons whose rights are acquired as the acquisitions in question would augment the resources of the State. But nothing so bad can be said to be within contemplation of Art. 31 (2).\n\nThat Article must be construed harmoniously with Art. 19(1)(f).\n\nIf so construed, it is obvious\n\nH that the public purpose contemplated by that Article does not include enrichment of the coffers of the State. Further the compensation referred to in Art. 31 ( 2) is, as held by this Court in various\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1122.\n\n(2) !1952] S.C.R. 889.\n\n..,,_._- ·· ., r ,. I\n\n496 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS\n\n\ndecisions, is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken.\n\nA If for every rupee acquired fifty paisas or less is made payable as compensation the vi()lation of Art. 31 (2) would be patent and in tliose circumstances the exercise of the powers by the legislature would be considered as a fraud on its powers and consequently the legislation will be struck down as a colourable piece of legisla- B\n\nIt is true that in State of Bihar v. K.ameshwar Singh(') and in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co Limited v. Stat8 of Bom bay('), this Court was considering the question of taking of monoy by the State that was in the hands of others, but in this case we are. concerned with the abrogation of the liability of the Government. But we fail to see any difference in principle in these two sets: of cases. In the former case the Government was compulsorily taking others' property and in the latter it seeks to appropriate to itself the property of others which is in its hands.\n\nIt was next urged that the impugned Act, even if it is held not to be protected by Art. 31(2) is still valid under Art. 31(1). The said Article says that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.\n\nA law which authorises the State to deprive a person of his property must be a valid law.\n\nIt must not violate Art. 19(1 )(f) which means that it must satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5). In Kava/appara Kottarathi Kochuni v.\n\nState of Madras(•) this Court laid down that the word \"law\" used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitations and refers back to E Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31 (1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public, . The Act which empowers the State to appropriate some one else's property for itself solely with a view to augment the resources of the State, cannot be considered as a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. That conclusion of ours receives support from the ratio of the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') and in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. Stale of Bombay(') wherein Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking for the Court, observed :\n\n\"Assuming that the correct position is what the respondents contend it is that the case falls within Art. 19(l){f), the question that has still to be determined is whether the impugned Act could be supported under Art. l 9(S). There was some discussion before us as to the scope of this provision, the point of the debate being whether the words _'imposing reasonable restriction'\n\n(I) [1952) S.C.R. 889.\n\n(2) (1958) S.C.R. 1122.\n\n\nwould cover a legislation, which not merely regulated the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(f) but totally extinguished them, and whether a law like the present one which deprived the owner of his properties could be held to fall within that provision. It was argued that a law authorising the State to seize and destroy diseased cattle, noxious drugs and the like, could not be brought within Art. 19 ( 5) if the word 'restriction' was to be narrowly construed, and that accordingly . the power to restrict must be held to include, in appropriate\n\ncase&, the power to prohibit the exercise of the right.\n\nThat view does find support in the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australki v. Bank of New South Wales(') : but the present legislation cannot be sustained even on the above interpretation of the word \"restriction\", as s. 3 ( 1) of the Act. deals with moneys and money cannot be likened to diseased cattle or noxious drugs so as to attract the exercise of police power under Art. 19 ( 5). It appears to us that whether we apply Art. 31(2) or Art, 19(5), the impugned Act cannot be upheld and it must be struck down.\" If Article 19(5) is interpreted to mean that State can take by authority of law anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the guarantee given by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory, a proposition to which this Court cannot subscribe.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above we are unable to uphold the validity of Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act. .\n\nThese appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs with one set ol hearing fee.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeals disriwed.\n\n(I} (1950] A.C. 235.", "total_entities": 124, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 21, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(/) and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act"}}, {"text": "Thereupon the State passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 792, "end_char": 889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 911, "end_char": 921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1562, "end_char": 1575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 3112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1811, "end_char": 1820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act", "statute": "Tho respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2067, "end_char": 2077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2159, "end_char": 2166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2190, "end_char": 2201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2545, "end_char": 2555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2720, "end_char": 2733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 887", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. W. Sahasrabuddhe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. K: Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3473, "end_char": 3487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by certificates the ques non that arises for decision is whether the Madhya Pradesh Abo\n\nlition of Cash Grants Act of 1963 {Act No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents <; hallenged the vires of the Act before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4499, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(1)(c), the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these appeals."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5129, "end_char": 5151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, purported to abolish the cash grants payable by it by ineans of an executive order."}}, {"text": "Madhorao Phalke", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That order was unsuccessfully challenged by Madhorao Phalke and others before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5601, "end_char": 5608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "holding that the grants in question were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Rulers of Gwalior and those knlambandis are existing laws within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Gwalior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed the order in question on two grounds, namel>:-(1) tha~ as his right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by the State of Gwalior, it was not open to the Government of Madhya Bharat to extinguish that right merely by an executive ordr, and\n\n(2) that that right being property the same could not be dives_ted without payment of compensation under Art."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed the order in question on two grounds, namel>:-(1) tha~ as his right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by the State of Gwalior, it was not open to the Government of Madhya Bharat to extinguish that right merely by an executive ordr, and\n\n(2) that that right being property the same could not be dives_ted without payment of compensation under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6238, "end_char": 6245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dec1s1on of this Court in that case, the impugned Act was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh legislature on April 5, 1963."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received the assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary on August 2, 1963."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received the assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary on August 2, 1963."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7049, "end_char": 7063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The long title of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for D the discontinuance of cash grants in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7155, "end_char": 7165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7289, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7436, "end_char": 7445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7601, "end_char": 7619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7636, "end_char": 7645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7726, "end_char": 7735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7893, "end_char": 7897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8073, "end_char": 8083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8185, "end_char": 8195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "s 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8514, "end_char": 8517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8836, "end_char": 8854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9328, "end_char": 9332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11365, "end_char": 11370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11488, "end_char": 11493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": " Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11669, "end_char": 11674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms\n\n Act, 1952", "statute": "the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms\n\n Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11684, "end_char": 11737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11778, "end_char": 11784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1953", "statute": "the Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11792, "end_char": 11824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12567, "end_char": 12574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,\n\n1959", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,\n\n1959"}}, {"text": "was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13509, "end_char": 13597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13934, "end_char": 13944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14161, "end_char": 14168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14282, "end_char": 14286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14464, "end_char": 14471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act", "statute": "There was controversy before the High Court whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14647, "end_char": 14653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14667, "end_char": 14691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America, opinion is divided among the\n\n(I) A.!.R.1962 S.C. 1166."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J. 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(as he then was) observed:\n\n\"Taking money under the right of emineni domain when it must be compensated by money afterwards, could be nothing more."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhar Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17303, "end_char": 17322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhar Aiyar 1.,"}}, {"text": "Art 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17495, "end_char": 17501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17817, "end_char": 17821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18115, "end_char": 18124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18423, "end_char": 18429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18542, "end_char": 18549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18790, "end_char": 18804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18939, "end_char": 18946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19199, "end_char": 19206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19644, "end_char": 19651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19707, "end_char": 19720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19907, "end_char": 19914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20232, "end_char": 20239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21129, "end_char": 21139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21161, "end_char": 21171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21382, "end_char": 21396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21450, "end_char": 21460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21568, "end_char": 21578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21626, "end_char": 21633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21657, "end_char": 21664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22220, "end_char": 22237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That conclusion of ours receives support from the ratio of the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') and in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. Stale of Bombay(') wherein Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking for the Court, observed :\n\n\"Assuming that the correct position is what the respondents contend it is that the case falls within Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22379, "end_char": 22389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22805, "end_char": 22819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23119, "end_char": 23126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Porter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23387, "end_char": 23393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That view does find support in the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of Australki v. Bank of New South Wales(') : but the present legislation cannot be sustained even on the above interpretation of the word \"restriction\", as s. 3 ( 1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23722, "end_char": 23729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23775, "end_char": 23785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23867, "end_char": 23880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24039, "end_char": 24052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_498_505_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "NAm SINGH AND OTHERS v.\n\nTHE BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS March 21, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND G. K. ~ITTER, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952 s. 20(b)(i)-resp0ndents shown in record of rights for l356F c..r sub-tenants-if to be regarded as occupants entitled to 'Adhivasi~ rights-er whether inquiry to be about pr.opriezy of entry.\n\nIn 1945 one R who was the thekadat of the proprietary rights of a village, sued the appellants and the respondents, other than tho first res• pondent Board of Revenue, far their ejectment under section 171 Of the U.P. Tenancy Act. alleging that the appellants bad illegally sub-let the lands tp the respondents. The appellants and tbe respondents made a common case denying the alleged sub-letting and stating that the entries in the villa8'e records about the respondents being sub-tenants were erroneous.\n\nThe suit was dismissed in March, 1946, I.e., towards the end of 1353 F on the ground that there was no sub-letting and the entries were not correct No attempt was made by anyone to bring the village records in harmony with this decision and the respondents continued to figure as\n\nsuf>..tenants in these records.\n\nOn his attention being drawn to this, the Lekbpal, on his own authority. removed the entries in favour of the respondents from the records for the year ending 1358 F, but the entries for the year 1356 F were left undisturbed as it was not within the Lekhpal's jurisdiction to alter these.\n\nAfter the .U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force in 1952 i.e .. at the beginning of 1360 F, on the strength of the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 F, the respondents claimed•.Afiiivasl rights under section. 20(b) (i) of the Act and filed six suits praying for the recovery of possession of. the lands under s. 232 of the Act. They lost the. suits before the sub Divisional Officer and Additional Commissioner . of Varanasi but succeeded in appeals to the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe appellants thereafter filed writ petitions for quashing the Of\\(ers of the Boatd; 1111d the High Court although of the view that the impugned\n\norders of the Board of Revenue were wrong, held that the Board had jurisdiction to interpret section 20(b) as it thought proper; and as the orders passed by it were final without being subject to any appeal. they could not be quashed by certiorari as being mere errors of law.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, it was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the appellants that (i) the correctness of the entry in the record of rights of 1356 F could be one into and was capable of challenge in a court of law exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226; (ii) in the present case there\n\nwas an adjudication in March 1946 that the respondents were not subtenants; consequently, unless they showed that they bad thereafter become sub-tenants, the benefit of the entry in their favou'r in 1356 F could not be availed of by them; (iii) in the Khasra of 1356 F the respondents were only recorded as sub-tenants but not as occupants and could not therefore get the benefit of s. 20(b)(i) of the Act.\n\nHELD : Dismissing the appeals.\n\nThe record of rights for the year 1356 F had not been corrected afte'rwards. The court had to go by the entry in the record of rights and\n\nno enquiry need be made as to when the respondents became sub-tenants after the decision in the suit filed by R. As between the tenant and the slJ!>.tenant, the entry in the record of rights in favour of the sub-tenant made him the occupant entitled to the adhivcsi rights under s. 20 of the Act. !504 G-Hl\n\nThe Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rahman and others, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 564; Amba Prasad v. Abdul Noor Khan & Ors. [1964] 7 S.C.R. 800; Ram Dular Singh & Anr. v. Babu Sukh Ram & Ors., (1963] A.L.J. 667; and Nanakchand v. Board of Revenue U,.P. [1955] A.L.J. 408;\n\napplied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 621 to 626 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writs Nos. 1428 to 1433 of 1961.\n\n1. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. I. Khuwaja, for respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (In all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. These six appeals by special !.:ave arise from a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court rejecting six writ petitions fifed by the appellants in that court for quashing the orders of the Board of Revenue arising out of cases filed under section 232 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform> Act.\n\nThe relevant facts are as follows.\n\nIn 1945 one Ram Dhari Singh who was the thekadar of the proprietary rights of a village sued the appellants and the respondents other than the Board of Revenue for their ejectment under section 171 of the U.P. Tenancy Act alleging that the appellants had illegally sublet the lands to the said respondents. Tire appellants and the respondents made a common cause denying the alleged subletting and stating that the entries in the village records about the respondents being subc tenants were erroneous.\n\nOn 3rd March 1946 i.e., towards the end of 1353 F. the suit was dismissed on the ground that there had been no subletting and that the entries regarding the subletting in. the village records were not correct. No attempt was,. however made by anyone tobring the village records in harmony with the said decision with the result that the said respondents continued to figure therein as sub-tenants as before. On his attention being drawn to this fact, the Lekhpal on his own authority removed the entries in favour of the said respondents showing them as sub-tenants from the records of the year ending 1358 F.\n\n500 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.CR.\n\nThe entries in the year 1356 F. were left undisturbed and it was A not within the jurisdiction of the Lekhpal to make any alterations therein.\n\nThe U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') came into force with the commencement of 1360 F. i.e. 1st July, 1952. Under s. 20(b)(i) B every person who . was recorded as occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 F. prepared under sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act was to be called an \"adhivasi\" and was subject to the provisions of the Act, to be entitled to take or retain possession of the land (unless he would become a bhumidar or an asami). The second Explanation to the section provided that where any entry in the records referred C to in clause (b) of section 20 had been corrected before the date of vesting under or in accordance with the provisions of the U.P.\n\nLand Revenue Act, 1901, the entry so corrected was to prevail for the purposes of the said clause. The third Explanation provided that for the purposes of the second Explanation an entry shall be deemed to have been corrected before the date of vestfitg D if an order or decree of a competent court requiring any correction in the records had been made before the said date and had become final even though the correction may not have been incorporated in the records.\n\nOn the strength of the Khasra and Khatauni of 1356 F. the respondents claimed adhivasi rights under s. 20(b)(i) of the Act E They filed six suits praying for recovery of possession under s. 232 of the Act.\n\nAccording to their case, the appellants were never in possession of the lands in dispute at any time. They lost the suits before the Sub Divisional Officer and the Additional Commissioner of Varanasi but they ultimately succeeded in appeals to the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe appellants filed the writ petitions for quashing the orders of the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe High Court went elaborately into the procedure for making entries in the records of rights and examined the question as to whether an entry recording a person as a sub-tenant was equivalent to an entry recording him as occil- G pant for the purpose of the Act. The High Court concluded that the impugned orders of the Board of J!.evenue were wrong but held that the Board had jurisdiction to interpret s. 20 (b) as it thought proper . and as the orders passed by it were final without being subject to any appeal, they could not be quashed by certiorari as being mere errors of law.\n\nIt is from this judgment that the present appeals have been launched.\n\nH Learned counsel for the appellants. raised the following points in his address :\n\n( 1) The correctness of the entry in the record of rights of 1356 F. can be gone into and is capable of challenge in a court of law exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226.\n\n(2) In the present case there was an adjudication in March 1946 and the respondents were not sub-tenants : consequently, unless they showed that they had hereafter become sub-tenants the benefit of the entry in their favour in 1356 F. could not be -availed of by them.\n\n(3) Under rule 183 of the rules framed under the Act it was incumbent on the respondents to state in their applications the dates of their dispossession and the failure to do so rendered their petitions defective.\n\n( 4) In the Khasra of 1356 F. the respondents were only recorded as sub-tenants but not as occupants and hence they cannot get the benefit of s. 20(b )(i) of the Act.\n\nBefore entering into a discussion as to the merits of the points raised, it is worthy of note that before the Board of Revenue i, e. the ultimate fact-finding authority the contention on behalf of the respondents who were the appellants before the Board, was that they had been recorded as occupants in the revenue papers of 1356 F. and hence they were entitled to be reinstated to pos session, it being unneeessary for them to prove that they were in actual possession in 1356 F.\n\nThe arguments before the Board of Revenue on behalf of thepresent appeliants were : ( 1) as the appellants were not in possession, they were not sub-tenants either in 1356 F. or before and hence they _could not be regarded as occupants in 1356 F : in support of this proposition reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in The Upper Ganges Suirar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul- Rahman and others(') which will be discussed later : (2) as both the courts below and the Board of Revenue had concurrently found that there was no contract of sub-tenancy, the respondents could not be regarded as sub-tenants and could not rely on an entry in the year 1356 F. in their favour, and (3) a sub-tenant was not an occupant and as such not entitled to maintain an application under s. 232 of the Act.\n\nAll these contentions were turned down by the Board of Revenue.\n\nAs regards the first point the Board took the view that the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills'(') case did not lay down that a person had to be in actual possession before be could get the benefit of the entry in the record of rights of 1356 F. With regard to the second point, the Board held that even if the respondents had failed to prove that they were sub-tenants they could\n\n(!) [1961] I S.C.R. 504.\n\n.502\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nstill be treated as trespassers.\n\nThe third point was disposed of by ae Board placing reliance on an earlier deci.sion of its own to the effect that the entry of sub-tenancy should be held to be an entry of a recorded occupant.\n\nThere are two decisions of this Court which negative the points <:anvassed before us. In the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills'(') case, the appellant company, a thekadar up to 1355 F. (June 1948) had retained possession of the lands in dispute by virtue of stay orders granted although the landlord had succeecled in the ejectment suit under the U.P. Tenancy Act in all the courts up to the Board of Revenue.\n\nDuring the pendency of the company's appeal to this Court, the Act came into force.\n\nThe company started proceedings to recover actual possession under s. 232 of the Act read with sections 12 and 20. The trial court decided in favour of the company and ordered delivery of possession under both the sections. The landlords lost in appeal. Thereupon there was a Se<:ond Appeal to the Board of Revenue which was dismissed in January 1956. The landlords came to this Court on special leave, The appeals were remanded by this Court for a finding whether the company had acquired any rights under s. 20 of the Act. The Board held that the company was entitled to such benefit and had acquired Adhivasi rights thereunder.\n\nBefore this Court. at the final hearing, there was a good deal of discussion as to the meaning of the expression \"a person in occupation\". It was held that in order that the company could take the benefit of s. 20 it should have been recorded as in occupation of the land in dispute in the year 1356 F. and the only limitation placed by judicial decisions on the meaning of the word \"occupant\" was that a person should be in occupation \\n his own right and not on behalf of some one else. On behalf of the landlords it was argued that the company was not in possession in its own right firstly because there was an order for ejectment in November 1948 and thereafter it remained in possession only on account of the stay orders; and secondly, as L thekadar the possession of the company was on behalf of the landlords.\n\nThis Court held that on the landlords' own showing the company was not in possession as a thekadar as the theka had expired before 1356 F. and consequently the nature of occupation of the company was on its own behalf and not on behalf of the court or of the landlords. In the result, the company was held entitled to Adhivasi rights. - This case establishes that a person recorded as an occupant on the relevant date although found by courts of Jaw to have no -ri!lht to possession even prior thereto, is not to be denied <Odhivasi rights.\n\n\nThe case of Amba Prasad v. Abdul Noor Khan and others(1) is more in point.\n\nAmba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act. The opposite parties were persons whose names had been recorded in column 23 (miscellaneous) in the Khasra for the year 1356 F. as persons in possession . and they claimed to be recorded as occupants of the B fields in dispute and to have obtained Adhivasi rights under s. 20.\n\nThe case of the respondents was that they were in occupation of the land and had been dispossessed after June 30, 1948 by the appellant and as they were recorded occupants i11 1356 F. they were not required to prove actual possession.\n\nThe appellant's stand was that the entry was fraudulently made after July 1, 1949.\n\nThe suits were dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer but in appeal the Additional Commissioner held that the respondents had acquired Adhivasi rights.\n\nThis was upheld by the Board of Revenue. The appellant then filed appeals to this Court.\n\nThe real dispute as noted by this Court was, whether a person who was recorded as 'Qabiz' but not as a tenant or subtenant would get the advantage of s. 20 of the Act and claim D Adhivasi rights. Examining the scheme of s. 20 along with its Explanations, it was observed :\n\n\"The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons \"recorded\" as \"occupants\" of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952. . . . . . . Su.ch persons must be recorded as occupants in the Khasra or Khatauni for 1356 F. (1-7-48 to 30-6-49).\n\nIf such a: person is in possession he continues in possession.\n\nU he is evicted after June 30, 1948 he is to be put back in possession notwithstanding anything in any order or decree. By fiction such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain possession (Explanation I). The emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. and June 30 1948 is the datum line. The importance of an entry' in these two documents is further apparent from Expl!!nations Il and III. Under the former if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52) the corrected entry is to prevail and under the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected) if an order or decree of a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final.\n\nThere are thus two date lines. They are June 30,.\n\n(I) [1964] 7S.C.R. 800.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\n1948 and July 1, 1952, and the title to possession as A adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356 F.\"\n\nThe Court went on to add that the word 'occupant' had not been defined in the Act and said ;\n\n\"Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word 'occupant' must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the subtenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a propri_etor and a tenant, the tenant, and between a tenant and the subtenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as \"Dawedar qabiz\" the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. . . . . . . . . The section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. or its correction before July 1, 1952. It was perhaps thought that all such disputes would have solved them- selves in the four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952.\" With regard to the question as to whether a mere entry in 1356 F. without possession in that year was sufficient, reference was made by this Court to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Dular Singh and another v. Babu Sukh Ram & others( 1) which had endorsed the earlier view in N anakchand v.\n\nBoard of Revenue, U.P.( 2 )~ In the last mentioned case the Allahabad High Court had observed that the words in the section were not \"every person who was an occupant in 1356 F.\" nor were the words \"every person who was recorded as an occupant in the year 1356F. and who was in possession in that year.\" According to the Allahabad High Court there was no warrant for introducing words in the section which were not there. This Court felt that in view of the Jong established line of cases, there was no justification for reopening this question and the decision of the Board of Revenue was right.\n\nThese decisions negative the first, second and the fourth points sought to be raised on behalf of the appellants. The record of rights for the year 1356 F. had not been corrected afterwards. We have to go by the entry in the record of rights and no enquiry need be made as to when the respondents became sub-tenants after the decision in favour of the landlord, Ram Dhani Singh. The last decision of this Court also shows that as between the tenant and the sub-tenant the entry in the record of rights in favour of the\n\n.(!) i1963J A.L.J. 667.\n\n(2) [195S] A.L.J. 408.\n\nsub-tenant makes him the occupant entitled to the adhivasi rights under s. 20 of the Act.\n\nWith regard to the point as to the violation of rule 183 it is enough to say that the point was not canvassed before the Board of Revenue and as such we need not look into it.\n\nB In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "NAm SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATH SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Lekbpal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1206, "end_char": 1213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his attention being drawn to this, the Lekbpal, on his own authority."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "section 20(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2188, "end_char": 2201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623, "end_char": 2631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3048, "end_char": 3059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R. 564", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C.R. 800", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3836, "end_char": 3864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3986, "end_char": 4006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "P. Goyal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Sobhag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khuwaja, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "M. I. Khuwaja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khuwaja, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4256, "end_char": 4262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. These six appeals by special !"}}, {"text": "section 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Dhari Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1945 one Ram Dhari Singh who was the thekadar of the proprietary rights of a village sued the appellants and the respondents other than the Board of Revenue for their ejectment under section 171 of the U.P. Tenancy Act alleging that the appellants had illegally sublet the lands to the said respondents.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dhari Singh"}}, {"text": "section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4797, "end_char": 4808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd March 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd March 1946 i.e., towards the end of 1353 F. the suit was dismissed on the ground that there had been no subletting and that the entries regarding the subletting in."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6079, "end_char": 6090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "sections 28 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7229, "end_char": 7240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act, 1901", "statute": "Land Revenue Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7316, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act, 1901", "statute": "Land Revenue Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Varanasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They lost the suits before the Sub Divisional Officer and the Additional Commissioner of Varanasi but they ultimately succeeded in appeals to the Board of Revenue."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8099, "end_char": 8104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(b )(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9236, "end_char": 9248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10516, "end_char": 10522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Upper Ganges Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10661, "end_char": 10685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the first point the Board took the view that the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills'(') case did not lay down that a person had to be in actual possession before be could get the benefit of the entry in the record of rights of 1356 F. With regard to the second point, the Board held that even if the respondents had failed to prove that they were sub-tenants they could\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11828, "end_char": 11834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11856, "end_char": 11874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12268, "end_char": 12273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12601, "end_char": 12606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13832, "end_char": 13915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14187, "end_char": 14192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act", "statute": "Amba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the respondents was that they were in occupation of the land and had been dispossessed after June 30, 1948 by the appellant and as they were recorded occupants i11 1356 F. they were not required to prove actual possession."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14500, "end_char": 14512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's stand was that the entry was fraudulently made after July 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14909, "end_char": 14914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act", "statute": "Amba Prasad was a zamindar of a village before the coming into operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14979, "end_char": 14984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15170, "end_char": 15180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15318, "end_char": 15330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Examining the scheme of s. 20 along with its Explanations, it was observed :\n\n\"The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons \"recorded\" as \"occupants\" of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952. . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "30-6-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su.ch persons must be recorded as occupants in the Khasra or Khatauni for 1356 F. (1-7-48 to 30-6-49)."}}, {"text": "June 30 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. and June 30 1948 is the datum line."}}, {"text": "1-7-52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16003, "end_char": 16009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the former if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52) the corrected entry is to prevail and under the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected) if an order or decree of a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17475, "end_char": 17488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was perhaps thought that all such disputes would have solved them- selves in the four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952.\""}}, {"text": "Ram Dhani Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18769, "end_char": 18784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to go by the entry in the record of rights and no enquiry need be made as to when the respondents became sub-tenants after the decision in favour of the landlord, Ram Dhani Singh.", "canonical_name": "Ram Dhari Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19048, "end_char": 19053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_506_511_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "LAJWANTI v.\n\nLAL CHAND AND ORS.\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nEast Punjab Factories (Control of DisnwntUng) Act 19411, s. 3- Whether bars execution of delivecy of possession.\n\nExecution of Decree-No appeal from earlier execution application- Fresh application, if barred by res judicata-S. 3 of East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act, if bars.\n\nThe eviction of the respondent from the appellant's premises, which \\\\'38 used as a factory, was decreed and application for execution of an order for pssession was made.\n\nThe respondents resisted the execution on the plea that the machinery installed in the factory could not be removed without the prior permission of Chief Inspector Of Factories as provided by the East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act. The execution of the decree in so far as it involved the dismantling or removal of the machinery was stayed, but the p0ssession of the other part of the premises was allowed. Both parties appealed. The appellate Court took the view that the machinery and spare parts were lying practically in all the rooms, and the locking and sealing of the factclry would result in its closure which would be against the provisions of the Act, and therefore directed the appellant to pursue the matter with the State Government.\n\nThfa order dated April 22, 1953 was not challenged by any appeal. But the appellant restarted th\" execution proceedings in which it was held that the State Government had refused permission for demolition of the factory, so the file was ordered to be consigned to the record room. The appOUant filed n appeal, which was dismissed, but in further revision the High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955 observed that on the record it wa:s not possible to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, so it set aside the order and directed the executing court to give decision on points that arose under s. 3 of the Act, The executing court found that the provisions of the Act did not prohibit the execution and as such the respondents were liable to ejectment but since the application had become over a year Old it would be struck off the file with liberty to make a fresh application. The respondents appealed.\n\nThe District Judge held that the Act did not apply to involuntary dismant1ing of factories and that the issue raised by the ex-ecuting court did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the appOUant by the High Court in revision. The appellant's appeal to High Court was dismissed by a Single Judge, and in the Letters Patent Appeal, it \\Vas held that the delivery of possession was not barred in execution of decree by the Act, but the matter had become res judicala in conse~ quenee of the decisions in the first execution application and the decision of the High Court dated July 13, 1955 in the second execution application. Allowing the appeal, HELD : The Act does not bar the deJivery of possession in execution of a decree. It makes no re1ference to any decree for possession against the owner of a factory.\n\nBy ordering delivery of possession of the premises. the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a factdry and a bailiff charged with execution of a warrant for possession does not infringe the provision of law by rendering possession of the proper!• to the decreeholder. [510 C-DJ\n\nThere was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the first application for execution. Further the High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955, did not .decide the question as to whether the decree for J>OSSCSSion would be inexecutable in. \\iew of the Act. It stated expressly\n\nthat it \\\\oas not possible for it t~ dcdde whether the execution of the decree 1,1, ould defeat the provisions of the Act, and being unable to come to a decision on the record it rmanded the matter to the court of execu tion.\n\nIt found itself unable to interpret the section on the evidence hefore it.\n\nThe proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal a'rose.\n\nThe order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a eat on the proceedinp, [510 F-H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 687 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 3, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 405 of 1958.\n\nC. B. Agarwa/a and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nS. N. Anand, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 405 of 1956.\n\nThe matter arises out of an application for execution of an order for possession passed on a compromise between the parties.\n\nThe Division Bench of the Punjab High Court felt itself unable. to help the decree-holder because of an earlier decision in the execu tion proceedings which was held to constitute res judicata against her. The main question for consideration is, whether it was right in doing so.\n\nThe relevant facts are as follows. As far back as April 1950.\n\nHarbans Lal, the late husband of the appeJlant before us, obtained an order for eviction from the Rent Controller against Lal Chand and Ram Rattan Dass Jain in respec't of certain premises which were being used as a factory.\n\nThis decree was upheld in appeal and in July 1951 the decree-holder applied for execution. The court bailiff made a report dated the 14th July 1951 that on his going to give delivery of possession resistance was offered by a number of persons and being apprehensive of breach of peace he could not effect delivery of possession.\n\nThe judgment debto1.s appear to have approached the Department of Industries and informed them of the attempt at their eviction by the decree-holder.\n\nThe copy of a letter from the Extra Assistant Director of Industries to the Chief Inspector of Factories dated July 18, 1951 exhibited at the instance of the judgment-debtors goes to show that the machinery installed in the factory could not be removed without 7 Sup. C.J./68-8\n\nk:=--\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe prior permission of the Chief Inspector of Factories.\n\nObviously the judgment-debtors wanted to thwart the decree-holder from getting possession through court by invoking the aid of the East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act XX of 1948. hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nThe judgment-debtors applied for stay of execution of the decree on August 23, 1951. The Subordinate Judge issued notices but did not grant stay. On appeal the District Judge accepted the appeal noting th.at the Subordinate Judge had not given any finding about the applicability of the Act.\n\nHe had before him the report of the bailiff that possession of the premises could not be given over as there were machinery stored therein .. By order dated October 11, 1951 he directed the Subordinate Judge to decide the objections under the Act.\n\nThe , Subordinat~ Judge framed a number of issues including one which read : 'whether the judgment-debtors could not be dispossessed of the factory and machinery could not be dismantled without permission of the Government ?\" Taking evidence of the parties and noting the contents of the letter of the Industries Department, he observed that the judgment-debtors had not secured permission but the decree-holder might follow up the matter through court. He stayed execution of 'the decree in so far as it involved the dismantling or removal of the machinery but allowed the same for securing possession of the part of the premises where no machinery was stored. This was on 7th February, 1953.\n\nBoth parties filed appeals from this order which were dismissed. The appellate court was of the view that machinery and spare parts were lying practically in all the rooms of the building and the locking and sealing of the factory would res11lt in its closure which would go against the provisions of the above-mentioned Act.\n\nThe decree-holder was therefore directed to pursue the matter with the State Government.\n\nIncidentally, the court noted that the decree-holder bad not challenged the proposition that the court could not order delivery of possession without the requisite sanction for the dimantling of the factory.\n\nThis order dated 22nd April 1953 was not challenged by any appeal to the Higb Court.\n\nIt appears that the court consigned the execution proceedings to the record room on July 25, 1953.\n\nOn Augut 18, 1953 the decree-holder applied for execution proceedings being re-started. On November 7, 1953 the executing court observed that a reply from the State Government had been received to the effect that permissi<m for demolition of the factory could not be given. The execution fi!ewas therefore ordered to be consigned to the record room once more. From this order. an appeal was preferred by the decree, holder.\n\nThe Additional District Judge held that in view of the imperative provisions of section 3 of the Act the decree-holder could not be granted posses-\n\nA sion in execution of the decree and dismissed the appeal by order dated January 8, 1954. On further appeal, a learned Judge of the High Court by order dated July 13, 1955 observed that in the &ecution proceedings BO evidence had been adduced on e points arising under Punjab Act XX of 1948. He therefore said as follows : B\n\n\"On the present record it is not possible for me to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat the provisions of section 3 of the Punjab Act XX of\n\n1948. That being the position of matters, I set aside the order passed by the Subordinate courts and direct the. court of execution to give fresh decision on the points that arise under section 3 of Punjab Act XX of 1948. ln proceedings pursuant to this order parties will be given opportunity to examine bearing on the points that arise under section 3 of Punjab Act XX of 1948.\" On remand the Subordinate Judge by order dated 30th December, 1955 held that the Act was not intended to cover involuntary dismantling in execution of orders of competent courts : further the Rent Restriction Act, 1949 passed after Act XX of 1948 did not take any notice of the prohibition contained in the said Act.\n\nIn the result he found that the respondent was liable to be ejected in e\"x.ecution of the decree for eviction but as the application had become over a year old it would be struck off the file and the decree-holder be at liberty to take out execution of the decree by a fresh application. ·\n\nThe judgment-debtors went up in appeal to the court of the District Judge.\n\nThe District Judge by order dated December 31, 1956 held that the Act did not apply to involuntary dismantling F of factories and that the issue raised by the Subordinate Judge in this connection did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the landlord by the High Court in Revision. According to him, the order of the High Court went to show that s. 3 of Act XX of 1948 covered delivery of possession even in execution of the order of the Rent Controller for otherwise the revision G application would have been accepted by him straightaway. In the result he dismissed the execution petition.\n\nThe appellant went up in Second Appeal to the High Court at Chandigarh. A single Judge of that Court dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe decree-holder filed a Letters Patent Appeal.\n\nAlthough of the view that delivery of possession was not barred in ff execution of the decree by Act XX of 1948, the Division Bench concluded that so far as the parties before it were concerned, the matter had become res judicata in consequence of the decisions of the executing court and the first appellate court on the\n\n510 SUPREME COURT RiPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfirs! .execution appli.cation th~ decision of a sinJ!!e Judge in A on on the preV1ous occas10n m 'the second execution application.\n\nSection 3 sul>-s. (1) of East Punjab Act XX of 1948 pro vides as follows :\n\n\"No person shall, without the written permission of the State Government or of an officer. authorised in this behalf by the State Government, dismantle any factory or remove from a factory any spare parts kept for maintaining the machinery of the factory in order.\" The Act which oontains only eight sections makes no ref~ to any decree for possession against the owner of a factory. By ordering delivery of possession of the premises the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a factory and a baililf charged with execution of a wammt for possesswn docs not infringe the above provision of law by rendering possession of the property to the decree-holder. So far as the judgment-del>- tor, the owner of the tactory, concerned, it wQuld be his look out to take the matter up with the State Government, if necessary and we have no doubt at in a case like this where there is no oo, llusion between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtors the State Government would not prosecute the judgmellt-debtors or refuse to accord sanction to the judgment-debtors for removal of the machinery from the premises of which they could not lawfully c<intinue in possession.\n\nIt appears that the Subordinate Judge; the District Judge and. the Judges of the Punjab High Court were all of the view that the. Act did not bar the delivery of possession in execution of a decree.\n\nIii our opinion there was no final order about the inexeclltability of the decree on the first application for execution which was consigned to the record room by order dated July 25, 1953. Further, the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court dated July 13, 1955 did not decide the question as to whether the decree for possession would be inexecutable in view of Act XX of 1948. He stated expressly that it was ndt possible for him to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat .the provisions of s. 3 of Punjab Act XX of 1948 and being unable to come to a decision on the record he remanded the matter to the court of execution. He found himself unable to interpret the section on the evidence before him. The proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal arises. The order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a seal on the proceedings.\n\nThe course of litigation subsequent to the order for eviction in 1950 is truly amazing.\n\nFor 17 years the decree-holder has\n\nbeen unable to reap the fruits of the decree although practically all the courts felt that the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid by the judgment-debtors to resist execution by delivery of possession.\n\nWe cannot but condemn in very strong terms the attitude of the judgment-debtors who, to say the least, are persons who have little regard for sanctity of their own solemn promise made before a court of law. On June 29, 1950 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1950 they stated on oath that they had reached an agreement with the landlord that they would \"remain on the premises only up till 31st March 1951 when they would of their own accord vacate the premises\" and on their failure to do so the landlord would be entitled to take out execution against them.\n\nEven before the time to vacate the premises came, one of the judgment-debtors filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restmin the decree-holder from obtaining possession in terms of the consent order of 29th June 1950. The suit was dismissed on July 11, 1951. The judgment-debtors also lost the appeal filed against that dismissal.\n\nAt every step and turn for nearly twe decades they have successfully resisted delivery of possession by raising an illusory plea.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents argued that even now his clients can urge the plea that the decree was not executable because of the provisions of Act XX of 1948. According to him, the agreement was in contravention of a statute and the respondents could not be estopped from pleading or proving facts which would render the agreement void.\n\nHis case was that Act XX of 1948 being in force on June 29, 1950 any agreement arrived at between the parties in contravention of its provisions would not be binding on the parties. No exception can be taken to the broad proposition of Jaw but no question of estoppel ever arose in this case because Act XX of 1948 did not operate as a bar to the delivery of possession of premises in execution of a decree.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is a!lowed with costs throughout from the 18th August 1953 irrespective of any order in that behalf made at any time thereafter.\n\nIt is. unfortunate that the decreeholder has been kept out of possession so long; but she is partly responsible for it herself. If she had preferred an appeal from order of the District Judge passed on 22nd April, 1953 to the High Court, probably her troubles would have ended Jong ago.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "LAJWANTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAJWANTI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAL CHAND AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAL CHAND AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 47, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 22, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nEast Punjab Factories (Control of DisnwntUng) Act 19411, s. 3- Whether bars execution of delivecy of possession."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 22, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1347, "end_char": 1361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thfa order dated April 22, 1953 was not challenged by any appeal."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appOUant filed n appeal, which was dismissed, but in further revision the High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955 observed that on the record it wa:s not possible to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, so it set aside the order and directed the executing court to give decision on points that arose under s. 3 of the Act, The executing court found that the provisions of the Act did not prohibit the execution and as such the respondents were liable to ejectment but since the application had become over a year Old it would be struck off the file with liberty to make a fresh application."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1859, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 3, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwa/a and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4466, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwa/a and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4499, "end_char": 4510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Anand, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Harbans Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5188, "end_char": 5199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, the late husband of the appeJlant before us, obtained an order for eviction from the Rent Controller against Lal Chand and Ram Rattan Dass Jain in respec't of certain premises which were being used as a factory."}}, {"text": "Lal Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, the late husband of the appeJlant before us, obtained an order for eviction from the Rent Controller against Lal Chand and Ram Rattan Dass Jain in respec't of certain premises which were being used as a factory.", "canonical_name": "LAL CHAND AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Ram Rattan Dass Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5324, "end_char": 5344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, the late husband of the appeJlant before us, obtained an order for eviction from the Rent Controller against Lal Chand and Ram Rattan Dass Jain in respec't of certain premises which were being used as a factory."}}, {"text": "14th July 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5547, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court bailiff made a report dated the 14th July 1951 that on his going to give delivery of possession resistance was offered by a number of persons and being apprehensive of breach of peace he could not effect delivery of possession."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment-debtors applied for stay of execution of the decree on August 23, 1951."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had before him the report of the bailiff that possession of the premises could not be given over as there were machinery stored therein .. By order dated October 11, 1951 he directed the Subordinate Judge to decide the objections under the Act."}}, {"text": "7th February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7727, "end_char": 7745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on 7th February, 1953."}}, {"text": "22nd April 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8391, "end_char": 8406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order dated 22nd April 1953 was not challenged by any appeal to the Higb Court."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8544, "end_char": 8557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the court consigned the execution proceedings to the record room on July 25, 1953."}}, {"text": "Augut 18, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Augut 18, 1953 the decree-holder applied for execution proceedings being re-started."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 7, 1953 the executing court observed that a reply from the State Government had been received to the effect that permissi<m for demolition of the factory could not be given."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9065, "end_char": 9074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 8, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional District Judge held that in view of the imperative provisions of section 3 of the Act the decree-holder could not be granted posses-\n\nA sion in execution of the decree and dismissed the appeal by order dated January 8, 1954."}}, {"text": "BO evidence had been adduced on e points arising under Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9349, "end_char": 9414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9587, "end_char": 9596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "BO evidence had been adduced on e points arising under Punjab Act", "statute": "BO evidence had been adduced on e points arising under Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XX of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9604, "end_char": 9620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XX of\n\n1948", "statute": "Punjab Act XX of\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XX of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9821, "end_char": 9842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XX of 1948", "statute": "Punjab Act XX of 1948"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XX of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9979, "end_char": 10000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10050, "end_char": 10069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On remand the Subordinate Judge by order dated 30th December, 1955 held that the Act was not intended to cover involuntary dismantling in execution of orders of competent courts : further the Rent Restriction Act, 1949 passed after Act XX of 1948 did not take any notice of the prohibition contained in the said Act."}}, {"text": "Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10195, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10722, "end_char": 10739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge by order dated December 31, 1956 held that the Act did not apply to involuntary dismantling F of factories and that the issue raised by the Subordinate Judge in this connection did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the landlord by the High Court in Revision."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11046, "end_char": 11050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "High Court at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11339, "end_char": 11363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant went up in Second Appeal to the High Court at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11993, "end_char": 12008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13955, "end_char": 13959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XX of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13963, "end_char": 13984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 29, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14927, "end_char": 14940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1950 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "29th June 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15489, "end_char": 15503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before the time to vacate the premises came, one of the judgment-debtors filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restmin the decree-holder from obtaining possession in terms of the consent order of 29th June 1950."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15531, "end_char": 15544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed on July 11, 1951."}}, {"text": "18th August 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16573, "end_char": 16589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, the appeal is a!lowed with costs throughout from the 18th August 1953 irrespective of any order in that behalf made at any time thereafter."}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16863, "end_char": 16879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If she had preferred an appeal from order of the District Judge passed on 22nd April, 1953 to the High Court, probably her troubles would have ended Jong ago."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_512_524_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "TIKA RAM & SONS LTD •. ETC.\n\n11IE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[I. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JI.)\n\nU.P. Stiles Tax Act (15 of 1948) ar amended by Act 8 of 1954, ss 2(h), Explanction II (ii) and II-Scope of Explanation-If ultra.\"'-\n\nWhen Commiss/Qner has right to ask for reference to High Co11rt-Jwildiction of Revisin11 Authorit, v to refer and of High Court to ec/de conltitutional validity of provisions of Act.\n\nFor the period !st April 1948 to 25th January 1950, goods (oil) were manufactured o'r produced in the Stat<> of Uttar Pradesh by the appelllllla who were carrying on business in the . State in those goods.\n\nPart of the good< were sent to their depols outside the State before any contract of. sale in respect of them was made, and thereafter, sold to various parti ...\n\n'Those outside sales were also assessed to sales tax under the U.P. s.leo 'tax Act, 1948. The matter was taken to the Appellate Authority ud thereafter to the Revising Authority constituted UDder the Act. Though the revision was filed before !st April 1954 when the Amending Act of 1954 came into force, it was disposed of in 1957, in favour of the appellants. On the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax two questiODS of law were referred to the High Court one of which related to the oonstitutional validity of Explanation II (ii) to s, 2(h) of the Act, according to which, the sale of any goods 'which are produced or manufactured in U.P. by the producer or manufacture thereof, shall, wherever the c!eli...Y or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the pul'poses of this Act to\n\nliave taken place in U.P.' The High Court decided both questions in favour of the Commissioner.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that : (I) For attractin& tu liability the Explanation requires that the goods should have been mannfactured or produced in U.P. after the contract of sale was entered inlD;\n\n(2) the Explanation was ultra vires as being outside legislative competence, because, sales tax legislation was concerned with tax on the transaction of a completed sale, and a Stare could not impoae sales tax on tbe baois that one of the component parts of sale constitutes sufficient nexJU between the taxing stale and the sale; (3) the Revising Authority could\n\nnot rdfer to the High Court and the High Court could not decide on such ref\"ence, any question regarding the constitutional validity of the Explanation; and ( 4) the Revising Authority could not make a reference to tho High Court under s. 11, at the instance of the Commissioner, as the Commissioner had no power to apply when the revision was filed before the Revising Authority but was empowered to do so only by the amending ACt of 1954 which had no retrospective operation.\n\nHELD : (I) For the application of the Explanation and attracting tax liability, it is only necessary that the goods must have been sold by the person who produced or manufactured them, but there is no requirement that he must have manufactured or produced them after the contract of sale and not before. (518 CJ ·\n\n(2) To ccinfer jurisdiction upon the State Legislature to impose sales tax, it is sufficient if there is a proper territorial nexus or connection\n\nSl2\n\nbetween the taxing authority and the transaction sought to be taxed. and,\n\nthe fact that goods were manufactured in the State constitutes a real and pertinent nexus. [519 CJ\n\nThe Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bi/Jar, [1958] S.C.R. 1355 and Bharat Sugar Mill.< v. The Staie of Bi/Jar, 11 S.T.C, 793, followed.\n\n(3) The appellants did not challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the constitutional validity of the Explanation; nor was any such challenge made in the special leave petition to this Coun OI' in the statement of case. On the contrary, the appellants contended in the revision before the Revising Authority that the Explanation was ultra vires. Therefore. having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Revising Authority it is not open to the appellants to challenge the jurisdiction of the Revising Authority to refer the question of the constitutional validity of the Explanation to the High Coun, or of the High Court to decide it [522 E-0]\n\n( 4) The Commissioner had the power to apply for a referenoe on the date he applied for a reference, as the amending Act had by )hen come into force.. There is nothing in the language o'r in thecontext of s. 11 to suggest that he could exercise the right only if it existed on the date on which the revision ws filed before the Revising Authority. The rule that a statute should he interpreted, as far as possible, so as to respeCt vested rights has no appliction because, the amendment does not affect any vested right of the appellants. but only deals with a procedural matter. [523 E-Hl\n\nGardner v; Lucar, (1878] 3 A.C. 582, 603, applied.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1682 to 1691 of 1967.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 30, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court in Misc. Sales Tax Reference Nos. 144, 134, 143, 148, 124, 104, 105, 112 and 113 of 1958 respectively.\n\nM. C. Chagla and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nC. B .. Agarwala and 0. P. Rana, for the respondents (in all appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J, These appeals are brought, by special leave from the judgment of the Ailahabad High Court dated November 30, 1962 in.Miscellaneous Sales Tax Reference No. 144 of 1958 and other connected references.\n\ne appellants are manufacturers and dealers of oil in the Provmce. of Uttar Pradesh and they have their own depots outside the Province. For the financial year 1948-49 and the subse<jueot period from April 1, 1949 to January 25, 1950 the appellants had sent their goods to their depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, for example, to Calcutta in the State of West Bengal before any contract of sale in respect of the goods was made.\n\n514 SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAfter the goods had reached the depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, they were sold to various parties. The Sales Tax Officers of Uttar Pradesh assessed the outside sales of all the appellants to sales tax under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act 15 of 1948, hereinafter called the 'Act'. It appears that this category of sales roughly amounted to more than one crore of rupees in the case of the appellants and the sales tax was levied at the rate of 3 pies per rupee subject to a rebate under s. 5 .of the Act and certain other adjustments.\n\nAggrieved by the assessments, the appellants took the matter in appeal under s. 9 of the Act.\n\nThe appeals were heard by various Appellate Officers called Judge, Appeals.\n\nSome of the Appellate Officers held that the assessment was properly made, while some others took the view that the assessments made for outside sales were improper and the assessment order should be quashed.\n\nThe parties aggrieved by the appellate orders filed revisions before the revising authority called Judge, Revisions under s. 10 of the Act. By his judgment dated July 10, 1957 the Judge, Revisions held that the out of State sales would be taxable ( I ) if the goods were in existence in the Province of Uttar Pradesh at the time when the contracts for sale were made; and (2) if the goods were manufactured after the contracts for sale were made in respect of them and were subsequently appropriated towards those contracts. He further held that sales of goods which were not only manufactured but also exported before any contracts for sale were made would not be taxable. Under s. 11 of the Act, the Commissioner of Sales Tax applied to the Revising Authority for making a reference of the case to the High Court. By its order dated .January 23, 1958 the Revising Authority drew up a statement of the case and referred to the Allahabad High Court tbe following two questions of Jaw for determination :\n\n\"(1) Whether clause (ii) of the Explanation II to Section 2 ( h) U.P. Sales Tax Act provides for taxing sales in which goods were manufactured or produced in U.P. but for which the contract for sale was made after the goods had left the State ? ( 2) If the reply to the above is in affirmative, whether this provision is ultra vires ?\"\n\nBy its judgment dated November 30, 1962, the High Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to refer to the relevant statutory provisions which were in force during the material period.\n\nSection 99 of the Government of India Act, 1935 authorised a Provincial Legislature, subject to the provisions of that Act, to make laws for the Province or for any part thereof.\n\nSection\n\n100 ( 3) of that Act provided that, subject to tbe two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature had, and tbe Federal Legislature had not, power to make laws for any Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act. The matter enumerated in Entry 48 in List II was ''Taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements.\" It was in exercise of this legislative power that the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature enacted Act 15 of i948 which came into force on Anril 1, 1948. Section 3 of the Act provides as follows :\n\n\"3. Liability to tax under the Act-Subject to the provisions of this Act, every dealer shall pay on turnover in each assessment -year a tax at the rate of 3 pies a rupee:\n\nProvided that-\n\n(i) the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, reduce the rate of tax on the turnover of any dealer or class of dealers or on the turnover in respect of any goods or class of goods;\n\n(ii) a dealer whose turnover in the previous year is less than Rs. 12,000/- or such larger amount as may be prescribed shall not be liable to pay the tax under this Act for the assessment year; \" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"dealer\" to mean \"any person or association of persons carrying on the business of buying or selling and supplying goods in the United Provinces, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and includes any firm or Hindu joint family and any society, club or association which sells or supplies goods to its members but does not include any department of the Provincial Government or of the Indian Union (hereinafter called the 'Dominion Government')''. Section 2 (h) is to the following effect :\n\n\" 'sale' means, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration and includes forward contracts but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge :\n\n\" ....................................\n\nExplanation 11-'-Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, or any other Jaw for the time being in force, the sale of any goods-\n\n(i) which are actually in the United Provinces at A the time when in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made,\n\n(ii) or which are produced or manufactured in the United Provinces by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have B taken place in the United Provinces.\n\n\" ......................................\n\nSection 10 states :\n\n\"Power of revision-(1) The Provincial Government shall appoint as Revising Authority a person quali1ied under sub-section (3) of section 220 of the Government of India Act, 1935, for appointment as Judge of a High Court.\n\n(2) The appellate authority appointed under section 9 shall be under the superintendence and control of the Revising Authority.\n\n(3) The Revising Authority may in its discretion at any time mo motu or on being moved by the Commissioner of Sales Tax or on the application of any person aggrieved, call for and examine the record of any order made or proceedings recorded by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceedings and may pass such order as he thinks fit. ( 4) The Revising Authority shall not pass any order under sub-section (3) adversely affecting any person unless an opportunity has been given to such person to be hear~.\n\n( 5) If the amount of assessment is reduced by the Revising Authority under sub-section ( 3) it shall order the excess amount of tax if already realized to be refunded.\"\n\nSection 11 is to the following effect :\n\n\"Statement of case to High Court-( 1) Within sixty days !rem tha passing by the Revising Authority of any order under sub-section (3) of section 9 or subsection (I) of section 10 affecting any liability of any dealer. to pay tax under this Act, such dealer may, by application in writing accompanied by a fee of one hundred rupees, require the Revising Authority\n\nTIKA ilAM & SONS v. C.S.T. (Ramaswami, J.) 517\n\nto refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order. ( 2) If, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Revising Authority refuses to make such reference, the applicant may, within thirty days of such refusal, either- ( a) withdraw his application (and if he does so, the fee shall be refunded), or\n\n(b) apply to the High Court against such refusal. ( 3) If upon the receipt of an application under claUSe (b) of sub-section (2), the High Court is not satisfied that such refusal was justified, it may require the Revising Authority to state a case and refer it to the High Court and on receipt of such requisition the Revising Authority shall state and refer the case accordingly.\n\n( 4) If the High Court is not satisfied that the statement in a case referred under this section is sufficient to enable it to determine the question raised thereby, it may refer the case back to the Revising Authority to make such additions thereto or alterations therein as the High Court may direct in that behalf.\n\n\" ........................................\n\nBy the Amending Act of 1954 (U.P. Act VIII of 1954) which came into force on April 1, i 954 the following provisions were substituted in place of sub-sections ( 1), ( 3) and ( 4) :-\n\n\" (1 ) Within one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of the order under sub-secti.on ( 3) of section 10, the person aggrieved, may, by application in writing .......... require the Revising Authority to refer to the High Court any question of Jaw arising out of such order ...........•\n\n(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also be applicable to the Commissioner of Sales Tax with the modification that it shall not be necessary for hint to deposit any fee .\n\n• < 4) If on any application being made under subsection ( 1 ) or ( 3) the Revising Authority refuses to state the case. , .......• the person aggrieved or the Commissioner of. Sales Tax as the case m11y be, may\n\n• • . . ..... apply to the High Coart .......... \" It wa; i argued by Mr. Chagla in the first place that cl. (ii) of Explanation II to s. 2(h) of the Act means that the goods should have been manufactured and produced in Uttar Pradesh for sale\n\n1\"··\n\nto the person who had contracted to buy them. In other words, there must be a contract for the sale before manufacture or produce. It was pointed out that in the present case the contract was entered into after the goods were manufactured and exported out of Uttar Pradesh. It was contended that as a matter of construction Explanation II does not cover these sales and the deeming provision will not make the appellants liable to pay sales-tax in regard to such sales.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nThere is nothing in the language or context of Explanation II to suggest that the goods should be produced or manufactured in Uttar Pradesh after the contracts for sale had been entered into. There is hence no warrant for the argument that for attracting the tax liability the goods must have been manufactured or produced after and not before the agreement for sale.\n\nIn other words, it is only necessary for the application of Explanation II that the goods must have been sold by the person who produced or manufactured them but there is no requirement that he must have manufactured or produced them after the agreement for sale. . It is the admitted position in these appeals that the goods were manufactured or produced in Urtar Pradesh by the appellants carrying on business in Uttar Pradesh in those good~ and therefore the appellants are liable to pay the tax on their sales irrespective of where and when the contracts for sale were entered into and also irrespective of the fact that the contracts were entered. into after the goods had lieen exported out of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nWe accordingly hold that the first question was rightly answered by the High Court.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next, and more important, question arising in these appeals, namely, whether the deeming provision contained in s. 2(h) Explanation II(ii') of the Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935. It was argued by Mr. Chagla that the doctrine of nexus was not applicable to sales-tax legislation, because such legislation was concerned with the tax on the transaction of sale, that is to say, a completed sale and to break up a sale into its component parts and to take one or more such parts and to apply the theory to it would mean that the State would be entitled to impose tax on one or more of the ingredients or constituent elements of the transaction of sale which by itself will not amount to a sale. An identical question has been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court in The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. The State of Bihar(1). It was held in that case that the provisions of s. 4 ( 1 ) read with s. 2 ( g) second provi8o, of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by the Bihar Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1949 were within the legislame competency of the Provincial Legislature of Bihar. The second proviso added by the amending Act did not extend the meaning\n\n(I) [19511 S.C.R. ll55.\n\nof the expression \"sale\" so as to include a contract of sale ; what it actually did was to lay down certain circumstances in which a sale, although completed elsewhere, was to be deemed to have taken place in Bihar. The circumstances mentioned in th!l Pro viso to s. 2 ( g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, namely, the presence of the goods in Bihar at the date of the agreement of sale or their production or manufacture there must be held to constitute a sufficient nexus between the taxing Province and the sale wherever that might lake place. It is manifest that a transaction of sale is a composite transaction and consists of legal ingredients like agreement of sale, passing of title and delivery of goods bµt it is not necessary for the purpose of legislative jurisdiction that all legal ingredients of sale or even the transfer of title should have taken place inside the Province. It is sufficient if there is a proper territorial nexus or connection between the taxing authority and the transaction sought to be taxed. . The fact that the goods are manufactured in the Province constitutes a real and pertinent nexus or connection which confers jurisdiction upon the Provincial Legislature to impose the tax.\n\nIn dealing with the question whether the production or manufacture of goods constituted a sufficient nexus to the subject-matter of taxation, S. R.\n\nDas, C.J., observed as follows :\n\n\"For the purpose of the present case it is sufficient to state that in a sale of goods the goods must of necessity play an important part, for it is the goods in which, as a result of the sale, the property will pass.\n\nIn our view the presence of the goods at the date of the agreement for sale in the taxing State or the production or manufacture in that State of goods the property wherein eventually passed as a result of the sale wherever that might have taken place, constituted a sufficient nexus betweep. the taxing State and the sale. In the first case the goods are actually within the State at the date of the agreement for sale .and the property in those goods will generally pass within the State when they are ascertained by appropriation by the seller with the assent of the purchaser and delivered to the purchaser or his agent. Even if the property in those goods passes outside the State the ultimate sale relates to those very goods. In the second case the goods, wherein the title passes eventually 011tside the State, are produced or manufactured in Bihar and the sale wherever that takes place is by the same person who produced or manufactured the same in Bihar. The producer or manufacturer gets his sale price in respect of goods which were in Bihar at the date when the imporc . tant event of agreement for sale was made or which were\n\nproduced or manufactured in Bihar. These are relevant facts on which the State could well fasten its tax.\"\n\nThe principle of this decision was reiterated by this Court in a subsequent case-Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar('). Jn The Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. The State of Blhar('), the course of dealing between the manufacturers and the purchasers was described as follows :\n\n\"The intending purchaser has to apply for a permit to the Iron and Steel Controller at Calcutta, who forwards the requisition to the Chief Sales Officer of the assessec working in Calcutta. The Chief Sales Officer thereafter makes a 'works order and forwards it to Jamshedpur.\n\nThe 'works order' mentions the complete spec.llication of the goods required. After the receipt of the 'works order' the J amshedpur factory initiates a 'rolling' or 'manufacturing' programme. After the goods are manufactured, the J amshedpur factory sends the invoice to the Controller of Accounts who prepares the forwarding notes, and on the basis of these forwarding notes, railway receipts are prepared. The goods are loaded in the wagons at Jamshedpur and despatched to various stations, but the consignee in the railway receipt is the assessee itself and the freight also is paid by the assessee.\n\nThe railway receipts are sent either to the branch offices of the assessee or to its bankers, and after the purchaser pays the amount of consideration, the railway receipt is delivered to him. These facts are admitted and the correctness of these facts are not disputed by the State of Bihar.\" In our opinion, the ratio of this decision applies to the present case and it must be accordingly held that Explanation II to s. 2(h) of the Act is not ultra vires as being outside the legislative competence of the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nReference was made in he course of argument to the recent decision of this Court in K. S. Venkataraman & Co. v. State of Madras(\") in which it was held by' the majority judgment that an authority created by a statute cannot question the vlres of. the statute or any of the provisions thereof under which it functions.\n\nThe authority must act under the Act and not outside it and if it acts on the basis of a provision of that statute which is ultra vires, to that extent it would be acting outside the Act. In that event, a suit to question the validity of such an order made outside the Act would lie in a civil court. In this context it was pointed out by the majority judgment that the reasoning of the Judicial Committee in Raleigh l11vestment Co.(') case was based upon the 1!5sumption that the question of ultra vires can be canvassed and finally decided through the machinery provided under the Income-\n\n(!)\n\n11 S.T.C. 793.\n\n0) [195'] S.C.R. 1355,\n\n(3) [!'l66] 2 S.C.R. 229.\n\n(4) 74 I.A. SO.\n\ntax Act.\n\nThe Judicial Committee 'held' that s. 67 of. the Incometax Act, 1922' was'a bar to the maintainability of tlie suit.·, T)ie argument on behalf of 'the assessee in that ce 'was that an asse5sment was not an assessment \"made under the Act\" if the assessment gave effect to a provision which was ultra vi res the Indian Legislature; that in law such a proyision, being a nullity, was nonexistent; and that an assessm!)nt justifiable in who)e or in part by reference to, or by suc)l a provision was more ap.tly described as an assessment not made under the Act than as an llSSessment made under the Act.\n\nThe argument was negatived by the Judicial Committee for the reason that the circumstance that the assessing officer had taken into account an ultra vires provision of the Act was immaterial in detennining whether the assess111ent'was \"made under the Act\". The main reason that persuaded the Judicial Committee to accept the construction.they placed on s. 67 of the 1ncome-tax Act may be stated in theii' own words as follows:\n\n\"'The absence of such machinery would greatly assist, the appellant on the question •of construction and, indeed, it may be added that; if-there were no such machinery and if the ection affected fo preclude the High Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction from considering a point of 11/tra vires, there would be a serious question whether the opening part of the section, s0 far , as jt debarred the question of ultra vires , being debated fell \\vithin the competence of the legislature.\" -....\n\nIt was held by this Court in K. S. Venkataraman & Co. v. State of Madras(') that the assumption underlying the reasoning of the Judicial Committee was not correct and it was µot open to the Income-tax; Oflicer the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal to decide any question Jls io the ulfra vires character of any provision of the Income-tax Act. In otherwords, the question' of 11/tra vil'es could not be deemed to arise' out of the Tribunal's order and if an assessee raises such. a question, the Tribunal.can ouly reject it on the grounc; l that lt •has no jurisdiction to entertain the objection _or to decide upon it.\n\nThe High Court also cannot possibly' give any decision on the question of ultra vires, because it~ jurisdiction , under s. 66 is a special advisory jurisdiction and its scope -is strictly limited. 0.n behalf of the appellants it was suggested that in the present ca8e- 'the Revising Authority under the Act cannot. on a simjlat line of reasoning; refer to the HiglrCoutt any question regarding tlie eonstitutional validity of Explanation Yr of s. 2(h) of the Act. It was, h, owever. pointed out on behalf of the respondents that in a number of c'ases in which proceedings relating to taxation have reached the High Courts by way of a reference. appeal or revision, the question of constitu- ~~~~~~~~~~·- ' (ll [l'J6~] 2 S.C.R. 2~'>. q\n\ntionaI validity of the statute under which the authority functioned was raised, entertained and decided.\n\nFor instance, in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar(') a reference was made by the Board of Revenue raising questions as to the. validity of certain provisions of the Bihar Sales-tax Att and decided by the High Court, and ultimately by this Court. Similarly, in Sardar Baldev Singh v. C.I.T., Delhi & Ajmer(2 ) in an appeal from ilie order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal with special leave, the constitutional validity of s. 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was permitted to be challenged. Again, in Navinchandra Ma/at/a/ v.\n\nThe C.I.T., Bombay City(') in l!- referenee under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 a question as to the vires of s. 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act was raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and was referred to the Bombay High Court.\n\nThis Court in appeal from the opinion expressed by the Higli Court on the reference also considered that question. Also, in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Madras('), the proceeding reached the High Court of Madras in a revision petition under s. 12-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and the High Court entertained the plea of ultra vires and decided it in favour of the tax-payer.\n\nIt is, however, not necessary in the present case for us to decide the question as to whether the principle laid down in K. S. Venkataraman's case(') is applicable. The reason is that the appellants did not challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the question of law regarding the constitutional validity of Explanation II to s. 2(h) of the Act. Nor was any such challenge made in the Special Leave Petition to this Court _or in the statement of the case.\n\nOn the contrary, the appellant has itself applied to the Judge, Revisions under s. 10 of the Act contending the Explanation II to s. 2(h) was ultra vires. It is not therefore open to the appellants to deny the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority to decide the question or to challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the question of law referred to it under s. 11 of the Act and to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of the impugned section. In. other words. it must be taken that the appellants had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority and of the High Court on the matter in issue and having submitted to the jurisdiction and having taken the chance of judgment in its favour, it is not right that the appellants should take exception to the jurisdiction of the High Court when the judgment has gone against it. We cannot therefore permit the appellants to canvass in this Court for the first time the question whether it was comiJetent for the\n\n(J) (1958] S.C.R.1355.\n\n(2) (1961] t S.C.R. 482.\n\n(3) [1955] I S.C.R. 829.\n\n(4) T.L.R. (1955] Mad. 832.\n\n(5) (1966] 2 S.C.R. 229.\n\ni ..\n\nHigh Court to decide the question of law referred to it under s. 11 of the Act. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellants on this aspect of the cillie.\n\nIt was lastly submitted by Mr. Chagla that a reference to the High Court under s. 11 of the Act at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales-tax was incompetent as the Commissioner was neither a 'dealer' n~'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of the section as it originally stood, and the. amendment effected in sub-s. (3) of s. 11 by U.P. Sales-tax Act 8 of 1954 .which came into force on April 1, 1954 was not retrospective in character and could not apply to proceedings which had been initiated earlier before Sales-tax authorities as well as before the Revising Authority.\n\nIt was pointed out that the appellate order was made on January 4, 1952 and the revision application was filed before the amending Act of 1954 came into force. It further appears that the revision application was disposed of on July 8, 1957 by the Revising Authority.\n\nThe contention put forward on behalf of the appellants was that the Commissioner had no power to apply for a reference at the time the appellants had made the application for revision. It was conceded by Mr. Chagla that at the time the Commissioner applied for a reference under s. 11 of the Act the amending Act 1954 had already come into force and under the amended section the Commissioner was empowered to ask for a reference.\n\nThe point taken was that the material date was the date on which the appellants made the application for revision and not the date on which the application was actually decided by the Revising Authority.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nThe right to apply for a referenee is conferred upon a person aggrieved by an order passed under s. 10 and this right exists regardless of when the application for revision was made. Only the existence of ail order undet s. 10 is required for the accrual of the right to make an application for a reference. It was suggested by Mr. Chagla that the Commissioner did not have the right to apply for a refe•ence because the right did not exist when the appellants had made the application for revision.\n\nBut the right did exist on the date O? which the Commissioner applied for a reference and there 1s no thin~ in the language o~ context. of s. 11 . to. sugest that the Commissioner could exercise the right only 1f 1t existed on the date on which the application for revision had been made. On behalf of the appellants Mr. Chagla referred to the well-reog nised rule that a statute should be interpreted, as far as possible, so as to respect vested rights. But this rule has no application to the present case for we do not think that amendment of s. 11 of the Act by enabling the Commissioner also to ask for a reference of a question to the High Court alters any vest~ or substantive right of the assessee.\n\nOn the contrary, we consider that the L7Sup.C.l/68-9\n\n\"Ii\n\namendment is merely a procedural matter and the present case falls within the general principle that the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of courts. For \"it is perfectly settled that if the legislature forms a new procedure, that, instead of proceeding in this form or that, you should proceed in another and a different way, clearly there bygone transactions are to be sued for and enforced according to tl)e new form of procedure.\n\nAlterations .in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be.\" (Gardner v. Lucas)('). We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Chagla is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that there is no merit in these appeals which are . accordingly dismissed with costs--there will be one hearin~ fee.\n\nV.P.S Appeals dismissed.\n\n(I)\n\n[1878) 3 A.C, 582, 603.", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "TIKA RAM & SONS LTD •. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TIKA RAM & SONS LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "11IE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX U.P., LUCKNOW", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX U.P., LUCKNOW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11IE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[I. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JI.)"}}, {"text": "I. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Stiles Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stiles Tax Act", "statute": "Stiles Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st April 1948 to 25th January 1950, goods (oil) were manufactured o'r produced in the Stat<> of Uttar Pradesh by the appelllllla who were carrying on business in the ."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax two questiODS of law were referred to the High Court one of which related to the oonstitutional validity of Explanation II (ii) to s, 2(h) of the Act, according to which, the sale of any goods 'which are produced or manufactured in U.P. by the producer or manufacture thereof, shall, wherever the c!eli...Y or contract of sale is made, be deemed for the pul'poses of this Act to\n\nliave taken place in U.P.' The High Court decided both questions in favour of the Commissioner."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 30, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court in Misc."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5178, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "C. B .. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B .. Agarwala and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5255, "end_char": 5265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B .. Agarwala and 0."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J, These appeals are brought, by special leave from the judgment of the Ailahabad High Court dated November 30, 1962 in.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Ailahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J, These appeals are brought, by special leave from the judgment of the Ailahabad High Court dated November 30, 1962 in."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the financial year 1948-49 and the subse<jueot period from April 1, 1949 to January 25, 1950 the appellants had sent their goods to their depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, for example, to Calcutta in the State of West Bengal before any contract of sale in respect of the goods was made."}}, {"text": "January 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the financial year 1948-49 and the subse<jueot period from April 1, 1949 to January 25, 1950 the appellants had sent their goods to their depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, for example, to Calcutta in the State of West Bengal before any contract of sale in respect of the goods was made."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5903, "end_char": 5911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the financial year 1948-49 and the subse<jueot period from April 1, 1949 to January 25, 1950 the appellants had sent their goods to their depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, for example, to Calcutta in the State of West Bengal before any contract of sale in respect of the goods was made."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the financial year 1948-49 and the subse<jueot period from April 1, 1949 to January 25, 1950 the appellants had sent their goods to their depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, for example, to Calcutta in the State of West Bengal before any contract of sale in respect of the goods was made."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6007, "end_char": 6046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "514 SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAfter the goods had reached the depots outside the Province of Uttar Pradesh, they were sold to various parties."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6549, "end_char": 6553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 10, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated July 10, 1957 the Judge, Revisions held that the out of State sales would be taxable ( I ) if the goods were in existence in the Province of Uttar Pradesh at the time when the contracts for sale were made; and (2) if the goods were manufactured after the contracts for sale were made in respect of them and were subsequently appropriated towards those contracts."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7660, "end_char": 7665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".January 23, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7815, "end_char": 7832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order dated .January 23, 1958 the Revising Authority drew up a statement of the case and referred to the Allahabad High Court tbe following two questions of Jaw for determination :\n\n\"(1) Whether clause (ii) of the Explanation II to Section 2 ( h) U.P. Sales Tax Act provides for taxing sales in which goods were manufactured or produced in U.P. but for which the contract for sale was made after the goods had left the State ? ("}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8035, "end_char": 8044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8055, "end_char": 8068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 30, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated November 30, 1962, the High Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative."}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8592, "end_char": 8602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9235, "end_char": 9266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in exercise of this legislative power that the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature enacted Act 15 of i948 which came into force on Anril 1, 1948."}}, {"text": "Anril 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9315, "end_char": 9328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in exercise of this legislative power that the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature enacted Act 15 of i948 which came into force on Anril 1, 1948."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "statute": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act"}}, {"text": "Liability to tax under the Act-Subject to the provisions of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9378, "end_char": 9446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9970, "end_char": 9979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Liability to tax under the Act-Subject to the provisions of this Act", "statute": "Liability to tax under the Act-Subject to the provisions of this Act"}}, {"text": "United Provinces", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,000/- or such larger amount as may be prescribed shall not be liable to pay the tax under this Act for the assessment year; \" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"dealer\" to mean \"any person or association of persons carrying on the business of buying or selling and supplying goods in the United Provinces, whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and includes any firm or Hindu joint family and any society, club or association which sells or supplies goods to its members but does not include any department of the Provincial Government or of the Indian Union (hereinafter called the 'Dominion Government')''."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10455, "end_char": 10464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10823, "end_char": 10885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11078, "end_char": 11087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "section 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11574, "end_char": 11603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11692, "end_char": 11701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12585, "end_char": 12595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12763, "end_char": 12772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12794, "end_char": 12804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, i 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" ........................................\n\nBy the Amending Act of 1954 (U.P. Act VIII of 1954) which came into force on April 1, i 954 the following provisions were substituted in place of sub-sections ( 1), ( 3) and ( 4) :-\n\n\" (1 ) Within one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of the order under sub-secti.on ( 3) of section 10, the person aggrieved, may, by application in writing .......... require the Revising Authority to refer to the High Court any question of Jaw arising out of such order ...........•\n\n(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also be applicable to the Commissioner of Sales Tax with the modification that it shall not be necessary for hint to deposit any fee ."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14396, "end_char": 14406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15057, "end_char": 15063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "apply to the High Coart .......... \" It wa; i argued by Mr. Chagla in the first place that cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15118, "end_char": 15125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Urtar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16484, "end_char": 16497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the admitted position in these appeals that the goods were manufactured or produced in Urtar Pradesh by the appellants carrying on business in Uttar Pradesh in those good~ and therefore the appellants are liable to pay the tax on their sales irrespective of where and when the contracts for sale were entered into and also irrespective of the fact that the contracts were entered."}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17065, "end_char": 17072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17100, "end_char": 17153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17857, "end_char": 17861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17878, "end_char": 17882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Act was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17911, "end_char": 17936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17955, "end_char": 17990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18375, "end_char": 18380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the expression \"sale\" so as to include a contract of sale ; what it actually did was to lay down certain circumstances in which a sale, although completed elsewhere, was to be deemed to have taken place in Bihar."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18430, "end_char": 18434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1949", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "S. R.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19524, "end_char": 19534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with the question whether the production or manufacture of goods constituted a sufficient nexus to the subject-matter of taxation, S. R.\n\nDas, C.J., observed as follows :\n\n\"For the purpose of the present case it is sufficient to state that in a sale of goods the goods must of necessity play an important part, for it is the goods in which, as a result of the sale, the property will pass."}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21586, "end_char": 21596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Sales Officer thereafter makes a 'works order and forwards it to Jamshedpur."}}, {"text": "J amshedpur factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21720, "end_char": 21739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the receipt of the 'works order' the J amshedpur factory initiates a 'rolling' or 'manufacturing' programme."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22481, "end_char": 22495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These facts are admitted and the correctness of these facts are not disputed by the State of Bihar.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22624, "end_char": 22631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22713, "end_char": 22735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the ratio of this decision applies to the present case and it must be accordingly held that Explanation II to s. 2(h) of the Act is not ultra vires as being outside the legislative competence of the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Raleigh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23466, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this context it was pointed out by the majority judgment that the reasoning of the Judicial Committee in Raleigh l11vestment Co.(') case was based upon the 1!5sumption that the question of ultra vires can be canvassed and finally decided through the machinery provided under the Income-\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23783, "end_char": 23788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23797, "end_char": 23816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24702, "end_char": 24707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25151, "end_char": 25153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25629, "end_char": 25643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26042, "end_char": 26047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26366, "end_char": 26373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27121, "end_char": 27150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in Sardar Baldev Singh v. C.I.T., Delhi & Ajmer(2 ) in an appeal from ilie order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal with special leave, the constitutional validity of s. 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was permitted to be challenged."}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27202, "end_char": 27208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27216, "end_char": 27243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Navinchandra Ma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27286, "end_char": 27301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, in Navinchandra Ma/at/a/ v.\n\nThe C.I.T., Bombay City(') in l!- referenee under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 a question as to the vires of s. 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act was raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and was referred to the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "C.I.T., Bombay City", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27316, "end_char": 27335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, in Navinchandra Ma/at/a/ v.\n\nThe C.I.T., Bombay City(') in l!- referenee under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 a question as to the vires of s. 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act was raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and was referred to the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27362, "end_char": 27370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27378, "end_char": 27405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27436, "end_char": 27441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27458, "end_char": 27472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27549, "end_char": 27566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, in Navinchandra Ma/at/a/ v.\n\nThe C.I.T., Bombay City(') in l!- referenee under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 a question as to the vires of s. 12-B of the Indian Income-tax Act was raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and was referred to the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Higli Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27624, "end_char": 27635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in appeal from the opinion expressed by the Higli Court on the reference also considered that question."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27766, "end_char": 27786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Also, in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Madras('), the proceeding reached the High Court of Madras in a revision petition under s. 12-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and the High Court entertained the plea of ultra vires and decided it in favour of the tax-payer."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27816, "end_char": 27821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27831, "end_char": 27865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. Venkataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28089, "end_char": 28104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, however, not necessary in the present case for us to decide the question as to whether the principle laid down in K. S. Venkataraman's case(') is applicable."}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28307, "end_char": 28314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28518, "end_char": 28523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28568, "end_char": 28575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28815, "end_char": 28820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "(1966] 2 S.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29554, "end_char": 29573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29644, "end_char": 29649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29825, "end_char": 29830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30076, "end_char": 30081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30140, "end_char": 30153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "amendment effected in sub-s. (3) of s. 11 by U.P. Sales-tax Act 8 of 1954 .which came into force on April 1, 1954 was not retrospective in character and could not apply to proceedings which had been initiated earlier before Sales-tax authorities as well as before the Revising Authority."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30385, "end_char": 30400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out that the appellate order was made on January 4, 1952 and the revision application was filed before the amending Act of 1954 came into force."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30557, "end_char": 30569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears that the revision application was disposed of on July 8, 1957 by the Revising Authority."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30877, "end_char": 30882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act the amending Act 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30890, "end_char": 30915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31383, "end_char": 31388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act the amending Act 1954", "statute": "the Act the amending Act 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31507, "end_char": 31512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act the amending Act 1954", "statute": "the Act the amending Act 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31926, "end_char": 31931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32333, "end_char": 32338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_525_533_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MOHAR RAI & BHARATH RAI\n\nTHE STATE OF BIBAR\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. ffEGDE, JJ.]\n\nCri11linal Trial-Trial Court and High Court refusing to exan1int• accused's defence- 01i ground. their 1:ersion had already been rejected in anot!1er case filed on a complaint by accused-if permissible.\n\nCode of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898, ss, 145, 154, 157 & 168-docu- 111e11t containing staten1ent of accus<td in investigation--accused no1 exa- 111i11ed as witness-whether document c.dniissible evidence.\n\nThe first appellant was convicted under s. 324 JPC for shooting and injuring PW I, at the instigation of the second appellant, who was himself convicted of an offence under s. 324 read with s, 109 lPC. The existence of enmity between the appellants and most of the prosecution witnesses who spoke to the occurrence was satisfactorily established. The plea of the appellants in their defence was that on the date of the incident when they were returning home in the evening, they were way-laid by PWI and several others and were assaulted; thereafter with a view to foist 8 false case against them, a revolver was forcibly thrust into the hands of the first appellant.\n\nIn connection with this incident, the State came to initiate three prosecutions : One case was instituted on the basis of a complaint by the first appellant; a second case was commenced against the first appellant under s, 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act for being armed with a revolver; and the third was the present case.\n\nThe case instituted on the first appellant's complaint as well as the case against him under the Arnts Act were both dismissed.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court refused to examine the defence of the appellants solely on the ground that the case pleaded by them had been rejected by the Magistrate in the prosecution commenced on the basis of the complaint by the first appellant.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that they did not have a fair trial; the High Coµrt as well as the trial court on an erroneous view of the law refused to take their defence into consideration; they ignored important circumstances appearing in favour of the appellants; and furthermore, some of the conclusions reached by them were unsupP.orted by any evidence on record. It was also contended that itn inadmissible document, namely a statement made by the second appellant in the course of the investigation was wrongly admitted; this admission was hit by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which had also greatly prejudiced the ca&a of the appellants.\n\nHELD : The appeals must be allowed and the appellants acquitted.\n\n(i) The trial .court as well as the High Court erred in summarily re jccting the defence of the appellants on the sole ground that the version put forward by them having been rejected by the Magistrate in the case filed on the complaint of the first appellant, it could not be considered again.\n\nThe defence of the appellants was highly probabilised by three important circumtances, namely. ( l) it was put forward immediately\n\nafter the occurrence, (2) it satisfactorily explained the injuries found on the persons of the appellants while the prosecution evidence failed to\n\n526 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nexplain those injuries; and (3) the prose<:ution evidence itself showed that the first appellant couW not have used the revolver exhibited and therefor his version that that weapon was thrust on him was probabilised.\n\n[531 H-532 BJ In both the prosecutic'!s-in the complaint made by the first appellant as well as m the complaint made by P.W.1-the pl-oeecutor before the court was the State. Therefore, the decision in the former case could not operate as an issue-estoppel against the appellants in the present case, because they were not parties in the former case. In other words, the plea taken by the appellants in this case was never before litigated bewteen them and the State, the opposite party in the present case. All that can be said is that the case put forward by the State in the one case was in consistent with that put forward by it in the other, In those circumstances it was wrong to hold that the appellants were estopped from putting forward their defence. [531 B-D]\n\nPrilam Singh v. The State of Punjab, A.l.R. 1956 S.C. 415; Manipur Adniinirtration v. Thokchoni, Bira Singh, (1964] S.C.R. 123; Sa112baSivan1\n\nv. Public Prosecutor, [1950] A.C. 458; and King v. Wilkes; 77 C.L.R. 511 at pp. 518-519, referred to.\n\n(ii) The trial court and the High Court relied on the second appellant's statement in the document admitted in evidence to the effect that it was a particular person who fired a pistol to contradict the statement of the first appellant in his complaint that a pistol was fired bv some other\n\npeon. No portion of this statement could have been used 'for that purpose either s. 157 or s. 145 of the Evidence Act. As the cond appellant was not examined as a witness in the present case, his previous statement could not have been used either to contradict bis evidence of corroborate it even if it were to be held that it was a statement falling under s.154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [532 H-533 BJ\n\nNazir Ali, v. State of U.P. A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 366; distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 159 and 160 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 28, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos . . 533 and 534 of 1963.\n\nR. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nB. P. Iha, for the respondent (in both the appeals.)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by special leave the legality of the convictions of the appellants-appellant Mohar Rai under s. 324 of the lndi.n Penal Code and appellant Bharath Rai under s. 324/109 of the Indian Penal Code-is challenged.\n\nIn the trial court the former was convicted under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code and the latter under s. 307/109 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court of Patna, in appeal, altered their convictions as set out above.\n\nIn order to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants, it is n_ecessary to state briefly the prosecution as\n\nwell as the defence version. The case made out by the prosecution is that because of previous enmity Mohar Rai shot and injured P.W. 1 Balli Ahir, at the instigation of Bharath Rai,. on the evening of October 8, 1961, in Natwar Bazar. The existence of enmity between the &ppellants and most of the prosecution witnesses who speak to the occurrence, is satisfactorily established. Many of the prosecution witnesses appear to have been proceed~ against under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of the appellants. The plea of the appellants was that on the day of incident when they were returning to their house in the evening they were way-laid by P.W.l and several others; one of those persons fired shots at Mohar Rai, but it missed him; to save himself he (Mohar Rai) ran away from the scene, subsequently two more shots were fired; meanwhile he got into the house of Lal Bahadur Mistri (P.W.9), but his assailants pursued him, forced their entry into the house of .P. W. 9 and there assaulted him; thereafter with a view to foist a false case against him forcibly thrust into his hands the revolver (Ex.III) and then handed him over with Ex.III to Janardan Singh (P.W. 15), the palice constable. The plea of Bharath Rai was that during the incident mentioned by Mohar Rai, he was caught hold of and assaulted by some of the prosecution witnesses. The. High Court and the trial court have rejected the plea of the appellants and relying on tqe prosecution evidence convicted the appellants as mentioned earlier. This Court being a Court of special jurisdiction does not re-assess the evidence in a case except under .exceptional circumstances.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the appellants that they did not have a fair trial, the High Court as well as the trial court on an erroneous view of the Jaw refused to take into consideration their defence, they ignored important circumstances appearing in their favour and further some of the conclusions reached by them are unsupported by any evidence on record. We have to see how far these submissions are well-founded.\n\nOut of the incident mentioned above, the State came to initiate as many as three prosecutions. G. R. Case 1370/TR-20 of 61/63 in the Court of the Munsif-Magistrate I Class, Sasaram was instituted on the basis of the coi; nplaint loifged by Mohar Rai.\n\nG.R. 506 of 1962 on the file of the Munsif-Magistrate I Class, Sasaram was a case under s. l 9(f) of the Indian Arms Act against Mohar Rai for being arn1ed with a revolver at the time of the incident mentioned earlier. The third case is the one with which we are concerned in these appeals.\n\nThe case instituted on the basis of the complaint made by Mohar Rai was acquitted on February 1, 1963. The Arms-Act case ended in acquittal on May 13, .1964. The appeal against that order was dismissed by the High Court of Patna on September 5, 1966. A copy of the judgment in that appeal was pr?<1uced at the hearing of these\n\nappeals and received as additional evidence with our permission.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court refused to examme the defence of the appellants solely on the ground that the case pleaded by them had been rejected by_the learned Munsif-Magistrate I Class, Sasaram in the prosecution commenced at the insta11ce of Mohar Rai.\n\nThe prosecution case was that immediately after the occurrence, Mohar Rai was chased and caught and at that time he had in his hands the revolver (Ex.III). Very soon thereafter he was produced before Audeshwar Prasad Singh (P. W.19) with the revolver in question. The further case of the prosecution was that P.W. 19 seized that revolver; later during investigation he seized the three cartridges said to have been fired by Mohar Rai as well as a misfired cartridge; the revolver as well as the seized cartridges were sent to the ballistic expert for examination. These facts were spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, in particular by P.W. Janardhan Singh, the constable to whom Mohar Rai was handed over immediately after the occurrence and P.W. 19 the investigating officer. P.W. 19 deposed that the number of the revolver seized is 545465. He is positive that the revolver seizea from Mohar Rai is Ex. III, though in his report to the ballistic expert he had given the number of the revolver sent for examination as 545466, but in that report itself he had added a note to say that the last two digits were not clear. The prosecution proceeded on the basis-there is no ambiguity about it-that Ex: III was the weapon that was used in the commission of the offence. The ballistic expert who was examined as D.W. 1 was positive that the seized empties as well as the l)lisfired cartridge could not have been fired from Ex.III. The evidence of this witness has been accepted both by the trial court as well as by the High Court. From that it follows that the prosecution case that Mohar Rai fired three shots from Ex.III cannot be accepted as true. If this part of the prosecution case fails then very little remains in the prosecution case.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court have brushed aside this important aspect on a wholly untenable basis: They opined that by some mistake a revolver different from that seized from Mohar Rai might have been sent to the ballistic expert. The conclusion has no basis on the material on record.\n\nIt is just a speculation-a process not open to\" courts. E_yidently overwhelmed by the evidence of the large number of witnesses who deposed in favour of the prosecution case, forgetting the fact that most of them belong to tl1e faction opposed to the appellants. the trial court and the High Court ignored the probabilities and lost sight of the evidence afforded by the circumstances appearing in the case. Both those courts failed to realise that the fact that Ex. III was not the revolver that was used during the\n\n• E\n\nincident went .to probablise the plea taken by Mohar Rai. At this stage we may recall the fact that both the trial Magistrate as well as the High Court rejected the prosecution case and acquitted Mohar Rai in the case against him under s. 19 (f) of the Anns Act.\n\nIt is true that the decision of the trial court in that .case was rendered after the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sasaram, convicted the appellants in the present case and therefore it may be that the appellants cannot take the benefit of the rule laid down by this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab(') and affirmed in Manipur Administration v. Thokchom, Bira Singh( 2 ).\n\nBut even without the assistance of that rule, on the basis of the prosecution evidence itself the prosecution version stands discredited. Once it is proved that the empties recovered from the scene could not have been fired from Ex.ill the prosecution case that those empties were fired from Ex.III by Mohar Rai stands falsified.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court wholly ignored the significance of the injuries found on the appellants.\n\nMohar Rai had sustained as many as 13 injuries and Bharath Rai 14.\n\nWe get it from the evidence of P.W. 15 that he noticed injuries on the perscin of Mohar Rai when he was produced before him immediately after the occurrence. Therefore the version of the appellants that they sustained injuries at the time of the occurrence is highly probabilised.\n\nUnder these circumstances the prosecution had a duty to explain those injuries. The evidence of Dr. Bishun Prasad Sinha (p.W. 18) clearly shows that those injuries could not have been self-inflicted and further, accord- 'ing to him, it was most unlikely that they would have been caused at the instance of the appellants themselves. -Under these circumstances we are unable to agree with the High Court that the prosecution had no duty to offer any explanation as regards those injuries. In our judgment the failure of the prosec11tion to offer any explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true. Further those injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants.\n\nBoth the trial court as well as the High Court refused to talce into consideration the plea of the appellants on the ground that that plea did not commend itself to the trial Magistrate in the case instituted on the complaint of Mohar Rai. They were erroneously of the view that the plea in question was barred by the rule )aid down by this Court in Pritam Singh' s case ( 1). In that case, this Court accepted as cotTect the following statement of\n\n(I) A.LR.1956S.C.415.\n\n(2) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 123\n\n530 SUPREME COUllT llEPOR.TS\n\n(1968] 3 S, C, R.\n\nthe law made by the Judicial Committee in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya('); ·\n\n\"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication.\n\nThe maxim 'res judicata pit> vetitate accipitur' is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the charge of having ammunition in his possession, the prosecution was bound to accept the correctness of that verdict and was precluded from taking any step to challenge it at the second trial.\"\n\nDixon J., of the Australian High Court in the King v. Wiikes(') explained the legal position in these words ;\n\n\"Whilst there is not a great deal of authority upon the subject, it appears to me that there is nothing wrong in the view that there js an issue-estoppel, if it appears by record .of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the .same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner. That seems to be implied in the language used by Wright, J. in R. v. Ollis [1960] II Q.B. 758, at p. 769) which in effect I have adapted in the foregoing statement. . . . . . There mqst be a prior proceeding determined against the Crown necessarily involving an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding by the Crown agai_nst the same prisoner. The allegation of the Crown in the subsequent proceeding must itself be inconsistent with the acquittal of the prisoner in the previous proceeding. But if such a condition of affairs arises I see no reason why the ordinary rules of issue-estoppel should not apply. Such rules are not to be confused with thOse of res judicata, which in criminal proceedings are expressed in the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. They are pleas which are concerned with the judicial determination of an alleged criminal liability and in the case of conviction with the substitution of a new liability. Issue-estoppel is concerned with the judicial es!ablishment of a :iro- \"(i) [1950] A.C. 458,\n\n(2) (77) C .. L.R. 511, at pp. 518·519.\n\nH {\n\nMOHAR RA! V.-BIHAR (Hegde, /.)\n\nposition of a law or fact between parties. It depends upon well-known. doctrines which cotrol. !he. reli,?gation of issues which are settled by prior htigatton.\n\nThis Court endorsed that statement in Manipur Administration's case('). But the law laid down in those cases bas no application to the facts of the present case. In both the prosecution-in the complaint made by Mohar Rai as well as in the complaint made by P.W. 1-the prosecutor before the court was the State.\n\nTherefore, the decision in the former case cannot operate as an issue-estoppei against the appelfar.ts in the pr~-; ent\n\ncase, because they were not parties in the former case. In other words the plea taken by the appellants in this case was never before litigated between them and the State, the -opposite party in the present case. All that can be said is that the case put forward by the State in the one case is inconsistent with that put forward by it in the other. In those circumstances it was wrong to hold that the appellants were estopped from putting forward their defence.\n\nThat apart, it is doubtful-though for the purpose of this case it is unnecessary to express any final opinion on this point-whether the rule in question could be pressed against an accused, the reason being that while a prosecution cannot succeed unless it proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the nature of the proof required of an accused in ' substantiating the plea taken by him is different-it is sufficient if he proves that plea taken by him is reasonable and probable.\n\nIn tftat event he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. This aspect was noticed by this Court in Manipur Administration's(') case, where it was observed :\n\n\"Before parting, we think it proper to make one observation. The question has sometimes been mooted as to whether the same principle of issue-estoppel could be raised against an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proved to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence led before it that he is guilty of the offence charged. We prefer to express no opinion on this question since it does not arise for examination.\"\n\nFor the , reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that the trial court as well as the High Court erred in summarily rejecting the defence of the appellants on the sole ground that the version put forward b)> them having been rejected by the court in G .R. case 1376ITRi20 of 61/63 in the court of the Munsif-Magistrate I ctass, Sasaram the same cannot Nii. onoi... ...-.. :..t---~ U:e ~--- - ..,.., '4C••Ull '-'Vll.>JU\"'!~U. .,..,. thil'.k that the aeience of the appellants is highly probabilised by\n\n(I) [1964! 7 S.C.R. 123.\n\nthree important circumstances, namely-(i) the same was put forward immediately after the occurrence, (ii) it satisfactorily explains the injuries found on the persons of the appellants while the prosecution evidence fails to explain those injuries, and (iii) the prosecution evidence itself shows that Mohar Rai could not have used Ex. III and therefore his version that that weapon was thrust on him is probab!ised.\n\nThe last contention taken by Mr. Garg is that admission of Ex. 4, an inadmissible document, has greatly prejudiced the cnse of the appeiianis. According to him, the admission of that document is hit by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIn the alternative, he contended that that document could not have been used to discredit the plea taken by Mohar Rai. We have earlier noted the two divergent versions given by P.W.1 and Mohar Rai in respect of the incident that took place on the evening of October 8, 1961. Quite naturally, both these complaints were investigated simultaneously. The statement given by P.W.1 was recorded as first information in one case and the statement given by Mohar R.ai as first information in the other. Appellant Bharath Rai was questioned during the investigation. His statement is Ex. 4. The trial court came to the conclusion that it was not hit by s. I 61 as the same was not recorded in the course of investigation in the case against Bharath Rai.\n\nThe High Court justified the admission of that document on the basis of the rule laid down by this Court in Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh('). namely-where the person who lodged the first information report regarding one offence is himself subsequently accused of that offence and tried and the report lodged by him is not a confessional first information report but is an admission by him of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how aud by whom the offence was committed or whether the statement of the accused in the court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not, the first information report is admissible to prove against him, his admissions which are relevant under s. 21 of the Evidence Act It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whether that statement is held to have been taken during the investigation of the complaint made by P.W. 1 or during the investigation of the complaint made by Mohar Rai, in either case it is hit by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also urged that the rule laid down in Faddfs case(') has no application to the facts.-of the present case.\n\nIn the instant case no p6rtion of Ex. 4 was relied on as an admission of Bharath Rai.\n\nHence the rule laid down in Faddi's ca8e('} could not have been caiieci iniu aid. The tria1 curt ~\"ld th!:! JU.gh_ Court relied on Bharath Rai's statement that it was Naulakh Rai who fired a pistol\n\n\\I) A.1.P.1964S.C.1850.\n\nto contradict the statement of Mohar Rai in his complaint that a pistol was fired by Dudhnath. No portion of Ex. 4 could have been used for that purpose either under s. 157 or s. 145 of the Evidence Act. As Bharath Rai was not examined as a witi!ess in the present case his previous statement .could not have been used either to contradict his evidence or corroborate it even if it is to be held that it is a statement coming under s. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: see Nazir Ali v. State of U.P.(1).\n\nThe circumstances noticed above, in our opinion, not merely affect the value and weight to be attached to the prosecution evidence, but they pursuade us to doubt the prosecution version. In the circumstances, we are unable to resist the conclusion that there has been a miscarriage of justice.\n\nWe accordingly allow these appeals and acquit the appellants.\n\nTheir bail bonds do stand cancelled.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 366.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "MOHAR RAI & BHARATH RAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAR RAI & BHARATH RAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIBAR", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 43, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHAR RAI & BHARATH RAI\n\nTHE STATE OF BIBAR\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. ffEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "March 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHAR RAI & BHARATH RAI\n\nTHE STATE OF BIBAR\n\nMarch 22, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. ffEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 547, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Crimirwl Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1419, "end_char": 1427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2496, "end_char": 2522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5157, "end_char": 5162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5437, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 28, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos . ."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5503, "end_char": 5513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals).", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals).", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala, S. P. Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. P. Iha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Iha, for the respondent (in both the appeals.)"}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by special leave the legality of the convictions of the appellants-appellant Mohar Rai under s. 324 of the lndi.n Penal Code and appellant Bharath Rai under s. 324/109 of the Indian Penal Code-is challenged."}}, {"text": "Mohar Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by special leave the legality of the convictions of the appellants-appellant Mohar Rai under s. 324 of the lndi.n Penal Code and appellant Bharath Rai under s. 324/109 of the Indian Penal Code-is challenged.", "canonical_name": "Mohar R.ai"}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5876, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bharath Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5891, "end_char": 5902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by special leave the legality of the convictions of the appellants-appellant Mohar Rai under s. 324 of the lndi.n Penal Code and appellant Bharath Rai under s. 324/109 of the Indian Penal Code-is challenged.", "canonical_name": "Bharath Rai"}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5944, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6025, "end_char": 6042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6099, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Patna, in appeal, altered their convictions as set out above."}}, {"text": "Mohar Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case made out by the prosecution is that because of previous enmity Mohar Rai shot and injured P.W. 1 Balli Ahir, at the instigation of Bharath Rai,.", "canonical_name": "Mohar R.ai"}}, {"text": "Balli Ahir", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case made out by the prosecution is that because of previous enmity Mohar Rai shot and injured P.W. 1 Balli Ahir, at the instigation of Bharath Rai,."}}, {"text": "Bharath Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6482, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case made out by the prosecution is that because of previous enmity Mohar Rai shot and injured P.W. 1 Balli Ahir, at the instigation of Bharath Rai,.", "canonical_name": "Bharath Rai"}}, {"text": "October 8, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the evening of October 8, 1961, in Natwar Bazar."}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6770, "end_char": 6776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6810, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohar Rai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plea of the appellants was that on the day of incident when they were returning to their house in the evening they were way-laid by P.W.l and several others; one of those persons fired shots at Mohar Rai, but it missed him; to save himself he (Mohar Rai) ran away from the scene, subsequently two more shots were fired; meanwhile he got into the house of Lal Bahadur Mistri (P.W.9), but his assailants pursued him, forced their entry into the house of .P. W. 9 and there assaulted him; thereafter with a view to foist a false case against him forcibly thrust into his hands the revolver (Ex."}}, {"text": "Lal Bahadur Mistri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plea of the appellants was that on the day of incident when they were returning to their house in the evening they were way-laid by P.W.l and several others; one of those persons fired shots at Mohar Rai, but it missed him; to save himself he (Mohar Rai) ran away from the scene, subsequently two more shots were fired; meanwhile he got into the house of Lal Bahadur Mistri (P.W.9), but his assailants pursued him, forced their entry into the house of .P. W. 9 and there assaulted him; thereafter with a view to foist a false case against him forcibly thrust into his hands the revolver (Ex."}}, {"text": "Janardan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7486, "end_char": 7500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "III to Janardan Singh (P.W. 15), the palice constable."}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8766, "end_char": 8774, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case instituted on the basis of the complaint made by Mohar Rai was acquitted on February 1, 1963."}}, {"text": "May 13, .1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Arms-Act case ended in acquittal on May 13, .1964."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal against that order was dismissed by the High Court of Patna on September 5, 1966."}}, {"text": "Audeshwar Prasad Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9810, "end_char": 9832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Very soon thereafter he was produced before Audeshwar Prasad Singh (P. W.19) with the revolver in question."}}, {"text": "Janardhan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10253, "end_char": 10268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These facts were spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, in particular by P.W. Janardhan Singh, the constable to whom Mohar Rai was handed over immediately after the occurrence and P.W. 19 the investigating officer."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12407, "end_char": 12412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assistant Sessions Judge, Sasaram", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12520, "end_char": 12553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the decision of the trial court in that .case was rendered after the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sasaram, convicted the appellants in the present case and therefore it may be that the appellants cannot take the benefit of the rule laid down by this Court in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab(') and affirmed in Manipur Administration v. Thokchom, Bira Singh( 2 )."}}, {"text": "Bharath Rai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13314, "end_char": 13325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohar Rai had sustained as many as 13 injuries and Bharath Rai 14."}}, {"text": "Bishun Prasad Sinha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13713, "end_char": 13732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Dr. Bishun Prasad Sinha (p.W. 18) clearly shows that those injuries could not have been self-inflicted and further, accord- 'ing to him, it was most unlikely that they would have been caused at the instance of the appellants themselves."}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14727, "end_char": 14739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were erroneously of the view that the plea in question was barred by the rule )aid down by this Court in Pritam Singh' s case ( 1)."}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C.R. 123", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14854, "end_char": 14873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15757, "end_char": 15762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixon J., of the Australian High Court in the King v. Wiikes(') explained the legal position in these words ;\n\n\"Whilst there is not a great deal of authority upon the subject, it appears to me that there is nothing wrong in the view that there js an issue-estoppel, if it appears by record .of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the .same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner."}}, {"text": "Australian High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15774, "end_char": 15795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixon J., of the Australian High Court in the King v. Wiikes(') explained the legal position in these words ;\n\n\"Whilst there is not a great deal of authority upon the subject, it appears to me that there is nothing wrong in the view that there js an issue-estoppel, if it appears by record .of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the .same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16307, "end_char": 16313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That seems to be implied in the language used by Wright, J. in R. v. Ollis [1960] II Q.B. 758, at p. 769) which in effect I have adapted in the foregoing statement. . . . . ."}}, {"text": "MOHAR RA! V.-BIHAR (Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17352, "end_char": 17377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H {\n\nMOHAR RA!"}}, {"text": "Manipur Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17584, "end_char": 17606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court endorsed that statement in Manipur Administration's case(')."}}, {"text": "Munsif-Magistrate I ctass, Sasaram", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19879, "end_char": 19913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the , reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that the trial court as well as the High Court erred in summarily rejecting the defence of the appellants on the sole ground that the version put forward b)> them having been rejected by the court in G .R. case 1376ITRi20 of 61/63 in the court of the Munsif-Magistrate I ctass, Sasaram the same cannot Nii."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20557, "end_char": 20561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last contention taken by Mr. Garg is that admission of Ex."}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20726, "end_char": 20732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20740, "end_char": 20766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohar R.ai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21219, "end_char": 21229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement given by P.W.1 was recorded as first information in one case and the statement given by Mohar R.ai as first information in the other.", "canonical_name": "Mohar R.ai"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22293, "end_char": 22298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22568, "end_char": 22574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22582, "end_char": 22608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Faddfs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22655, "end_char": 22661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged that the rule laid down in Faddfs case(') has no application to the facts.-of the present case."}}, {"text": "Faddi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22840, "end_char": 22845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the rule laid down in Faddi's ca8e('} could not have been caiieci iniu aid."}}, {"text": "Naulakh Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22979, "end_char": 22990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JU.gh_ Court relied on Bharath Rai's statement that it was Naulakh Rai who fired a pistol\n\n\\I) A.1.P.1964S.C.1850."}}, {"text": "Dudhnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23121, "end_char": 23129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to contradict the statement of Mohar Rai in his complaint that a pistol was fired by Dudhnath."}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23202, "end_char": 23208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23212, "end_char": 23218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23468, "end_char": 23474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23482, "end_char": 23508, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_534_541_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "LAKHAN LAL AND OTIIERS ETC. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BffiAR AND OTHERS ETC.\n\nMarch 26, 1968\n\n{M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S._ HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nBihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act (16 of 1960), ss. 2(h), 4(1), 5(2), IS(i/) and Bihar Agricultural Market Produce Rules, 1962 r. 59- Power of declaring market crea under s. 4( I )-Scope of-:..:/Jarktt, if should have well defined site,- niarket equip1nent and facilitie1-Licence\n\nfees-If in nature of tax-Settinz up 1narket in one area of SttJte-tf ofjerrds Art. 14 of Constitution.\n\nThe State Government of Bihar followed the procedure prescribed by :the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, and the Bihar Agricul\n\ntural Produce Market Rules, 1962, before issuing the necessary notifica tions for regula, in~ the purchase and sale of certain items of agricultural\n\nproduce and for establishing a market for them in the Gaya area of the State.\n\nUnder s. IB(ii) of the Act no person can do business as a trader or other operator in the notified agricultural produce in a market except :uhder a licence granted by the market committee on payment of the prescribed licence fees.\n\nThe validity of the notifications declaring the market area and •establishing the market for the notified agricultural produce and the lega lity of the levy of market fees and licence fees were questioned on the following grounds. ( 1) the area declared lo be the market area was too wide; (2) the market committee had not established any market Y.ithin .a well-defined site with market equipment and facilities; (3) the fees levied by the market cmmittee were in the nature of taxes as the committee did not render any services to the users of the market and therefore the levy was illegal; ( 4) the setting up of a market in Gaya was discriminatory .and violative of Art. 14 as the Act and Rules had not been implemented in all parts of Bihar.\n\nHELD: (I) The power of the State Government under s. 4(1) of declaring an area or. part of it to be a market area in respect of a notified agricultural produce, after considering any objections and suggestions :received by it, should no doubt be exel'cised reasonably; But, there is nothing to show that the Government acted unreasonably or that the market was so wide that the sale and purchase of agricultu'ral produce within it eould not be effectively controlled by the market committee or that the growers within the area could not conveniently bring their pro- duce lo the market yards. [539 D-EJ\n\n(2) For establishing a market it is sufficient to issue a notification 11nder s. 5(2) fixing the boundaries of the 'market proper• and tho 'market yards' on the recommendation of the market committee made under r. 59(2).\n\nThe definition of 'market' does not require a well-defined site with market equipment and facilities.\n\nUnder s. 18(1). the market !'Om mittee must provide such facilities as the State Government may direct, 'but it was not shown that the market committee refused to ca\\Ty out any such direction.\n\nUnder ss. 28(2) and 30(i) the market committee may acquire and own lands and buildings for the market, but it is not obliged\n\no do so. [539 F-H)\n\n(3) The fees collected by the market committee were not excessive and formed part of the market committee fund which was set apart and. ear-marked f<ir the purposes of the Act such as elimination of unhealthy market practices, ensuring correct weighment and grading, quick settlement of disputes, dissemination of information Ngarding prices of agricultural produce etc.\n\nThere is tbefefore, sufficient quid pro quo for the levies and they satisfy the test of 'fees'. (540 A-El B Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954] S.C.R. 1005, referred to.\n\n(4) The State Government is not bouhd .to implement the .Act and the Rules in all parts of Bihar at the same time. It may establish markets regulating the sale and purchase of agricultural produce in different parts of Bihar gradually and from time to time. (540 F-0] C OluGINAL/CI, VIL/CRIM\\NAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTlON:\n\nWrit Petition Nos. 103 and 199 of 1967.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution' of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1971 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 2, 1965: of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. 442 of 1965.\n\nAND\n\nE Criminal Appeals Nos. 164 to 168 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 22, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Misc ..\n\nNos. 649, 666, 667, 668 and 669 of 1965.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and A. K. Nag, for the petitioners (in .W.P ..\n\nNos. 103 and 199 of 1967).\n\n. M. C. Chagla and A. K. Nag, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 1971 of 1966).\n\nA, K. Nag, for the appellants (in Cr. A. Nos. 164 to 168 of\n\n1966) . . c. K: Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, K. M. K ..\n\nNair, Ami Kumar Gupta for respondents (in W.P. Nos. 103 and. 199 of 1967).\n\nB. P. Iha, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 1871 of 1966). and the respondents (in Cr. A. Nos. 164 to 168 of 19~6);\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by 8acbawat, J, W.P. No. 199 of 1967, C.A. No. 1971of196& and Cr. As. Nos. 164-168 of 1966 raise common questions as t<> the validity of the notifications declaring a market area and establishing a market for agricultural produce in Gaya and the legality of the levy of market fees and licence fees therein under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (Bihar Act 16 of 1960)\n\nand the Bjhar Agricultural Produce Markets Rules 1962. The contentions are that (1) the notification declaring the market area is void as the notified market area is too wide, (2) the market committee has not established any market and in the absence of a market and a lawful market area, the provisions of the Act and the Rules are not enforceable in the area, (3) the fees are in the\n\nnature of taxes and are illegally levied as no services are being rendered by the market committee and ( 4) the enforcement of the Act and the Rules in Gaya without implementing them in the whole of Bihar is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. W.P. No. 199 of 1967 is a writ petition filed in this Court. C.A. No. 1971 of 1966 is an appeal from iln order of the Patna High Court dismissing a writ petition filed in that Court. Cr. As. Nos. 164-168 of 1966 are appeals filed against the orders of the Patna High Court refusing to quash criminal prosecutions under s. 48 for refusal to take out licences in contravention of Rule 71.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules and the relevant notifications may be noticed briefly.\n\nAs stated in the preamble, the object of the Act is to provide for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for it in the State of Bihar and for matters connected therewith. \"Agricultural produce\" as defined in s. 2(1)(a) includes all produce mentioned in the schedule ta the Act.\n\nSections 2, 3, 4 and 5 define and deal with market area, market, market proper and market yards. \"Market area\" is the entire area within which purchase and sale of agricultural produce is regulated. \"Market\" for the area consists of a market proper, a principal market yard and sub-market yard or yards, if any. \"Market proper\" is an area inside the market area and within a certain distance from a market yard. \"Principal market yard\" and \"sub-market yard\" are enclosures, buildings or localities within the market proper.\n\n'J'.he State Government may issue a notification under s. 3 declaring its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of specified agricultural produce in any area. After considering the objections and suggestions received by it and after holding necessary enquiries, if any, the State Government may issue a notification under s. 4(1) declaring the area or any part of it to be the market area in respect of any notified agricultural produce. Section 4(2) provides that on the issue of such a notification no place can be set up, established or continued except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-laws for the purchase or sale of the agricultural produce other than sales by the growers and\n\nretail sales to consumers. The State Government is required by s. 6 to establish a market committee for every market area. Under Rule 61 read with s. 27 the market committee is required to levy and collect mark.et fees on the agricultural produce bought in the market area at the rate of 25 naye paise for Rs. 100/- worth of the produce.\n\nThe relevant provisions relating to the establishment of market may now be read :\n\n\"2 (h) market means a market established under this Act for the market area and includes a market proper, a principal market yard and sub-market yard or yards, if any.\n\nS. 5. Declaration of market yards-( 1) For each market there sitall be one principal market y'l!d and there may also be one or more sub-market yard or yards as may be necessary.\n\n(2) The State Government may, by notification, declare--\n\n(i) any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be the principal market yard and other enclosures, buildings or localities in such area to be one or more sub-market yard or yards for the said market area; and\n\n(ii) any area, including all lands, with buildings therein, within such distance of the market yard or yards as it thinks fit, to be market proper.\n\n18. Objects and duties of the Market Committee Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the following shall be the objects and duties of the Market Committee:-\n\n(i) when so required by the State Government, to\n\nest~~'!sh a market for the market area providing for such fac1lit1es as the State Government may, from time to time, direct in connection with the purchase and sale of the agricultural produce concerned; ....\n\nRule 59. Establishment of markets ( 1): After the issue of the notification under section 4 and establishment of the market committee under section 6, the State Government shall direct the market committee to establish a market.\n\n(2) when directed to do so under subcrule (1), the market committee shall establish a market for the market area for which it is established.\n\n(3) After the establishment of a market by the market committee, the State Government shall issue a notification under section 5.\" ·\n\nA market as defined in s. 2(h) is established for a market area by following the procedure laid down in secs. 5, 18(i) and Rule 59.\n\nThe State Government issues a direction under s. l 8(i) read with r. 59(1) to the market committee to establish a market for the market area. On receipt of this direction the market committee decides under r .. 59(2) to establish a market by fixing the boundaries of the market proper and the principal market yard and sub-market yard, if any.\n\nThereafter the government issues the necessary notification under s. 5(2) declaring the market proper and the market yards. These three steps form one integrated process and on the issue of the notification under s. 5(2) the market is finally established.\n\nThe market so established consists of the market proper and the market yard or yards. There is no other separate market place.\n\nThe expression \"market\" is used in the Act 3i meaning either the market proper or the market yards or both. Under section 15 read with r. 67 as soon as a market i' established a)] notified agricultural produce brought into, produced or processed in the market proper save a prescribed quantity for retail sale or consumption must pass through a market yard and shall not be sold at any other place within the market proper and the price shall be settled by open auction and not otbel'\\'\\'lSe.\n\nThus the business of sale and purchase of the agricultural produce is concentrated in the market yards and takes place at fair prices under regulated conditions in the presence of a large number of buyers and sellers. Under sec. 18(ii) and Rule 71 and 73, as amended by notification No. 4575 issued by the State Government on March 25, 1965 no person can do business as a trader or other operator in the notified agricultural produce in a market except under a licence granted by the market committee on payment of the prescribed licence fees.\n\nThe procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules was followed for regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce and for establishing a market for it in the Gaya area. On December 13, 1962 the State Government issued the necessary notification under s. 3. On September 19, 1963 it issued a notification under s. 4(1) declaring Gaya town, Gaya Mulfasil, Bodh Gaya and Paraiya Police Station within the Sadar sub-division of Gaya District as the market area for the sale and purchase of paddy, rice, masur, linseed, gur and potato. On the same date it established a market committee for the market area. On October 22, 1963 the Government acting under s. 18(i) and r. 59(1) directed th.e market committee to establish a market. On January\n\n2;3, 1964 tl\\e market committee decided to establish a market under\n\nr. 59(2) and made its recommendations regarding market proper and the principal market yard. On February 12, 1964 the market committee made its recommendation regarding the sub-market yard. The resolution of the committee dated January 23, 1964 stated that as directed by the State Government ''this committee appoints Gaya bazar to be area of this bazar.\" This clumsy phrase really means that as directed by the Government the committee was establishing a market for the Gaya market area. The market consisted of the market proper and the market yards. There was no other separate market known as the Gaya bazar. On April 6, 1964 the Government issued a notification under s. 5(2)(ii) declaring the entire area under the jurisdiction of the Gaya municipality and several villages as the market proper. On April 7, 1964 the Government issued a notification under s. 5(2)(i) declaring the locality of Mahallah Parani Godown within Gaya Police Station to be the principal market yard and the locality known as Kedamath Market within Gaya Police Station to be the sub-market yard.\n\nMr. M. C. Chagla submitted that the area declared to be the market area by the notification on September 19, 1963 is too wide. This objection is not well-founded. It may be conceded that the power under s. 4(1) should be exercised reasonably. But there is no material on the record to show that the Government acted unreasonably or that the market is so wide that the sale and purchase of agricultural produce within it cannot be effectively controlled by the market committee or that the growers within the area cannot conveniently bring their produce to the market yards. The market area was duly declared under s. 4(1) after considering all objections and suggestions made in that behalf.\n\nCounsel next submitted that the market committee has not established any market. According to Counsel, a market must be a well defined site with market equipment and facilities. The argument overlooks the definition of market in s. 2(h). The market consists of market proper, and the market yards . The market yards are well defined enclosures, buildings or localities but the market proper is under s. 2(k) read with s. 5(2)(ii) a.larger area.\n\nFor establishing a market it is sufficient to make a declaration under s. 5(2) fixing the boundaries of the market proper and the market yards on the recommendation of the market committee made under r. 59(2). Under s. 18(i) the market committee must provide for such facilities in the market as the . State Government may from time to time direct. It is not shown that the market committee refused to carry .out any direction of the Government.\n\nThe market comtnittee. my in view of ss. 28(2) an~ 30(i) acquire an~ own lands and buildings for the market, but 1t is not always obliged to do so.\n\nThe market is established on the issue of a L7 Sup. C.T./68-10\n\n540 SUPRBMB COUP.T RBPOllTS (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nnotification under s. 5(2) declaring the market proper and the mar- A ket yards.\n\nThe next contention is that the fees levied by the market committee are in the nature of taxes as the committee does not render any services to the users of the market and the levY of fees is therefore illegal. This contention is not tenable. The market committee has taken steps for the establisbment of a market where buyers and sellers meet and sales and purchases of agricultural produce take place at fair prices.\n\nUnhealthy market practices are eliminated, market charges are defined and improper ones are prohibited. Correct weighment is ensured by employment of licensed weighmen and by inspection of scales, weights and measures and weighing and measuring instruments. The market committee has appointed a dispute sub-committee for quick settlement of disputes. It has set up a market intelligence unit for collecting and publishing the daily prices and information regarding the stock, arrivals and despatches of agricultural produce.\n\nIt has provided a grading unit where the technique of grading agricultural produce is taught. The contract form for purchase D and sale is standardised.\n\nThe provisions of the Act and the Rules are enforced through inspectors and other staff appointed by the market committee. The fees charged by the market committee lire correlated to the expenses incurred by it for rendering these services. The n:i.arket fee of 25 naye paise per Rs. 100/ • worth of agricultural produce and the licence fees prescribed by E Rules 71 and 73 are not excessive. The fees collected by the market committee form part of the market committee fund which is set apart and ear-marked for the purposes of the Act. There is sufficient quid pro quo for the levies and they satisfy the test of \"fee\" as laid down in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamlar of Sri Shirur Mutt.(') F\n\nIt is then said that the setting up of a market in Gaya is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of . the Constitution as the Act. and the Rules have not been implemented in all parts of Bihar. There is no force in this contention. The State Government is not bound to implement the Act and the Rules in all G parts of Bihar at the same time. It may establish markets regulating the sale and purcha8e of agricultural produce in different parts of Bihar gradually and from time to time.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 103 of 1967 the relevant notification relating to Barb and the levy of fees by the market committee are challenged on the same grounds. The notification under s. 4(1) declaring the area within Barh police station to be a market area\n\n(I) [1954) S.C.R. 1005.\n\nH 1\n\nin respect of the agricultural produce mentioned therein was issued by the State Government on May 26, 1965. Thereafter the market for the area was established and notifications declaring the market proper and the market yards were issued after following the procedure laid down in secs. 5, 18 (i) and r. 59. For the reasons already given we find no substance in any of the contentions raised in this petition.\n\nIn Thakur Prasad Gupta v. The State of Bihar(1 ) the High Court of Patna upheld the constitutionality of the A.ct and Rule 61 but it struck down Rule 71 then in force as the rule imposed the liability to take out licences for operating in the entire market area and was ultra vires s. 18(ii). This judgment was pronounced on November 20, 1964. Theriafter Rules 71 and 73 were amended by notification No. 4575 dated March 25, 1965 and the word \"market\" was substituted for the words \"market area\" therein.\n\nThe amendment cures the objection that these rules were ultra vires s. 18 (ii). In all the matters before us the constitutionality of the Act and the Rules were again challenged. But when the hearing of these cases commenced, counsel expressly gave up all contentions regarding the invalidity of the Act and the Rules.\n\nIn the result, C.A. No. 1971 of 1966, W.P. Nos. 199 and 103 of 1967 are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. Cr. As. Nos. 164-168 of 1966 are dismissed.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetitions and appeals dismissed.\n\n{l) Al.R. 196S Pai. 267", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "LAKHAN LAL AND OTIIERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAKHAN LAL AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BffiAR AND OTHERS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 26, 1968\n\n{M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,\n\nK. S._ HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4628, "end_char": 4644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and A. K. Nag, for the petitioners (in .W.P ..\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and A. K. Nag, for the petitioners (in .W.P ..\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and A. K. Nag, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Chagla"}}, {"text": "A, K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A, K. Nag, for the appellants (in Cr."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4904, "end_char": 4915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. K: Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, K. M. 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The State of Bihar(1 ) the High Court of Patna upheld the constitutionality of the A.ct and Rule 61 but it struck down Rule 71 then in force as the rule imposed the liability to take out licences for operating in the entire market area and was ultra vires s. 18(ii)."}}, {"text": "s. 18(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19458, "end_char": 19467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 20, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19501, "end_char": 19518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This judgment was pronounced on November 20, 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19750, "end_char": 19755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_542_550_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "T. K. LAKSHMANA IYER & ORS. v.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS & ORS.\n\nMari:h 26, 1968\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A.\n\nVAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE AND A.. N.\n\nGROVER, 11.] .\n\nModras _Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (2 of 1927)-S. 44B inserted by Act 11 of 1934-/noms granted by Hindu King for performae of services at temple-Whether included me/waram rights only or\n\nkf!d1waram als~Whether granted in respect of personal services or here d1tary ofjices-S. 44-B whether retrospective-Whether applicable to iflall!S alienated before 1934-Alienees whether could claim adverse possession.\n\nInams were granted by Hindu kings fo'r performance of certain services (e-11. watchmen, music playen etc.) in the ancient temple of Thirumoolanathaswami. The iJllllllS were confirmed by the British Ooverrunent.\n\nFor over 80 years the inams were enjoyed by alienees -from the jnamdan.\n\nBy an order passed on ApHI 10, 1947 under s. 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, the Revenue Divisional Officer resumed the inam lands and regranted them to the temple.\n\nHis order was confirmed on appeal by the District Collector.\n\nBoth these authorities held that the inams comprised both melwaram and kudiwaram rights.\n\nTb.e alienees instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge under the proviso to s. 44-B(2)(d)(ii) asking for a decree declaring that the inam\n\ngtants consisted of the melwaram onlv. Thev filed another suit asking for a declaration that the aforesaid order passed by the Collector was a nullity.\n\nIn appeals against the order of the trial judge the High Court decided against the plaintiffs except as regards Dasi inams.\n\nAgainst the High Court's order the plaintiff.appellants came to this Court. It was contended on their behalf that : (i) the inam grants did not oomprise the Kudiwaram; (ii) the inams were personal inams burdened with services and were not resumable under s. 44-B; (iii) Section 44-B(2) was not retrospective in operation and did not authorise resumption of the inams on the ground of any alienation thereof made before 1934 when it came into effect; (iv) there was no alienation of the inams as contemplated by s. 44-B(2l(a)(i); and (v) the ight of resumption of the inarn lands-WU extinguished by adverse possession of the lands by the alienees fnr 60 years.\n\nHELD : ( i) The documents in evidence showed that the lands were being enjoyed by the inamdars and were granted as inams. _ The amount of the assessment or melwaram was very low and could not be an adequate remuneration for the services to be rendered. The plaintiffs claimed title to the lands under a grant from the inamdars on the footing that the lnamdars were entitled to the kudiwaram and the melwaram. The con- . clusion is irresistible that the inam comprised both the warams.[S47 F.01\n\n(ii) There is a well-recognised distinction between the grant of the land burdened with a condition of service and the grant of land as remuneration for an office. Section 44-B does not apply to a personal lnam burdened with a . condition of service. It alles to an inam granted to an offioe bolder as :remuneration for Im servtces corutected with a math or temple as also to an inam granted to the institution directly. The inams in the present cases were not personal in\\Ulls. They were inams granted\n\nT. K. L. IYER V. MADRAS 543\n\nto office.holders as remuneration for services to be rendered by them and\n\nwere within the purview of s. 44-B. [548 JI.CJ.\n\n(iii) The words 'has made' in s. 44-B(2)(a)(i) take in all alienations past and future and not only future alienatioos or alienation made after the section came into force.\n\nSection 4'h!l(2) is in its direct opetation prospective as it authorises only future resumption after it came into ferce. It is not properly called retrospective \"because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn, from a time antecedent to its passing.'• The inams in the present case were resumable under s. 44-B(2)(a)(i) though the alienations were made before 1934, [548 0-5498].\n\nMaxwell on interpretation on Statutes 11th Ed., p. 211, relied on\n\n(iv) The appellants admitted. that they held the land from the inam- . dars under a cowle lease and at no earlier stage did the appellan15 contend that the lease was not within the purview of s. 44-B(:)(a)(i).\n\nThe plea that the lease was from year to year and hence outside the purview of the section could not be allowed to he raised for the first time in this Court. [849 Jl..H]. .\n\n(v) The appellants being lessees their possession was not adverse to the inamdars. A fortiori, their possession was not adverse to the Government under whom the inamdars held the inam lands. They did not acquire any prescriptive title to the kudiwatam rights either against the inamdars or against the Government.\n\nThe Government could therefore resume the inam lands under s. 44-B(2). and dispossess the inamdars and the plaintiffs claiming as lessees under them. (550 B.c).\n\n[The question whether an alienee from the inamdar can acquire a 1n-riptive title to the kudiwaram rights in the inam lands and thereby defeat the latter's right to resume the inam did not on the ab< ve vie'I'( arise for decision and the court therefore expressed no opinion on it.)\n\nRoman Caiholic Mission v. State of MadrQ!J, (1966) 3 S.C.R. 283, referred to. . Forbes v. Noor Mohamed Tuquee, [1870] 13 M.l.A. 438, 464 and P, V, B/ieemsena Rao v .. Sir/girl Pedda Yella Reddi, [1962 I S.C.ll. 33!>, .relied on.\n\nF CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 484 and 485 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 14, 1959 of the Madras High Court in Appeals Nos. 808 and 7 46 of 1.954.\n\nS. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nA. V. Rangam, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 484 of 1965). . R. Gopalakri.s*nan,. for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (In C.A. No. 485 of 1965).\n\nB. Dutta, for resp0ndents Nos. 4, 9. and. 11 (in C.A. No. 484 of 1965) and respondents Nos. 13 to 17 and 20 (in C.A. No. 485 of 1965). ·\n\n544 SUPRBMB OOUJ.T llBPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.\n\nIn the village of Thenkarai in the Madurai District there is an ancient temple of Sri Thirumoolanathaswami.\n\nInams were granted by Hindu kings for performance of services of watchman, palanquin-bearer, background music player, dancing girl, musical instrument player, mason, blacksmith-carpenter, potter, washerman connected with the temple.\n\nThe inarns were confirmed by the British Government. For over 80 years, the inams were in the enjoyment of alienees from inamdars. By an order passed on April 10, 1947 under s. 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti resumed the inam lands and regranted them to the temple. On October 17, 194 7, his order was confirmed on appeal by the District Collector.\n\nThe Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Collector held that the inams comprised both melwaram and kudiwaram rights in the land. The orders were passed on notice to the alienees.\n\nThe alienees instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Madurai under the proviso to s. 44-B(2)( d)(ii) asking for a decree declaring that the in am grants consisted of the melwaram only. The suit was withdrawn to the Court of the District Judge, Madurai and registered as O.S. No. 3 of 1954. They instituted another suit in the Court of the Suboidinate Judge, Madurai, asking for a decree declaring that the order of the Collector dated October 17, 1947 was a nullity. This suit was transferred to the Court of the District Judge and registered as O.S. No. 4 of 1954. The District Judge dismissed O.S.\n\nNo. 3 of 1954. He decreed 0.S. No. 4 of 1954 and declared that the order resuming the inam lands was illegal and a nullity. The plaintiffs filed an appeal registered as A.S. No. 746 of 1954 in the High Court of Madras from the decree in O.S. No. 3 of 1954.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal. The State of Madras filed an appeal registered as A.S. No. 808 of 1954 from the decree in 0.S. No. 4 of 1954. The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit with respect to all the inams except the Dasi inam.\n\nRegarding the Dasi inam, the High Court dismissed the appeal as the inam was enfranchised and could not be resumed. It is from the decree of the High Court dismissing the suits in respect of the other inams that the plaintiffs have filed these appeals after obtaining special leaYe.\n\nThe two courts concurrently held that the inams comprised both the kudiwaram and the melwaram. The District Judge held\n\nthat the right to resume an inam could not be extinguished by adverse possession, and that, in any event, the claim of adverse possession was not established. The High Court held that assuming H the right of resumption could be so extinguished, it was not established that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the inam lands adversely to the inamdars or the CloV-\n\n•.\".\n\nernment. The District Judge held that the inams were personal inams burdened with services and the order of resumption was therefore illegal and a nullity. The High Court reversed this find ing and held that the inams were for performance of services connected with the temple and were resumable under s. 44-B. The District Judge held that s. 44-B was retrospective in operation.\n\nOn this last point, the High Court did not express any opinion.\n\nIt may be noted that O.S. Nos. 3 and 4 of 1954 were tried along with O.S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954 and disposed of by the District Judge by a common judgment. O.S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954 related to inams granted for performance of puja in another temple. From the decrees passed in 0.S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954, there were appeals to the High Court and subsequently appeals to this Court. The judgment in those appeals is reported in Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras('). One o{ the points in all the four suits was whether s. 44-B was ultra vire1 the powers of the legislature.\n\nThis Court held that the Provincial Legislature was competent to enacts. 44-B and the amendment to it.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants, Mr. S. T. Desai submitted that\n\n(1) the inam grants did not comprise the kudiwaram; (2) the inams were personal inams burdened with services and were not resumable under s. 44-B; (3) Section 44-B (2) was not retrospective in operation and did not authorise resumption of the inams on the ground of \\lDY alienation thereof made before 1934; ( 4) there was no alienation of the inams as contemplated by s. 44-B\n\n( 2) (a) (i) and ( 5) the right of resumption of the inam lands was extinguished by adverse possession of the lands by the alienees for over 60 years.\n\nThe Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927) was passed on January 19, 1927. Section 44-B F was inserted in the present Act by Madras Act XI of 1934 and was later amended by Madras Act V of 1944 and Madras Act X of 1946.\n\nThis section corresponds to s. 35 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of I 9 51) which repealed Act II of 1927. The material provisions of s. 44-B are in these terms :\n\n\"44-B. (!) Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage, and any lease for a tenn exceeding five years, of the whole r any portion of any inam granted for the support or mamtenance of a math or temple or for the performance of a charity or service connected therewith and made, confinned or recognised by the British Government, shall be null and void.\n\nExplanation. Nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or derogate from the rights and obligations\n\nOl ft966J J s.c, R. 2sJ.\n\nof the landholder and tenant in respect of any land as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.\n\n(2)(a) The Collector, may on his own motion, or on the application of the trustee of the math or temple or of the Assistant Commissioner or of the Board or of any person having interest in the math or temple who has obtained the consent of such trustee, Assistant Com missioner or Board, by order, resume the whole or any part of any such inam, on one or more of the following grounds, namely :-\n\n(i) that the holder of such inam or part has made , an exchange, gift, sale or mortgage of the same or any portion thereof or has granted a lease of the same or any portion thereof for term exceeding Jive years, or\n\n(ii) that the holder of such inmn or part has failed to perform or make the necessary arrangements for performing, in accordance with the custom or usage of such math or temple, the charity or service for performing which the inam had been made, confim1ed or recognised by the British Government, or any part of the said charity or service, as the case may be, or\n\n{iii) that the math or temple has ceased to exist or the charity or service in question has in any way become impossible of performance.\n\nWhen passing an order under this clause, the Col lector shall determine whether such inam or the inam comprising such part, as the case may be, is a grant of both the melwaram and the kudiwaram or only of the melwaram.\n\n(f) Where any inam or part of un inam is resumed wider this section, the Collector or the District Collector, as the case may be, shall, by order, regrant such inam or part-\n\n{i) as on endowment to the math or temple concerned, or\n\n(ii) in case of reswnption on the ground that the math or temple has ceased to exist or that the charity or service in question has in any way become impossible of performance. as an endowment to the Board, for appropriation to such religious, educational or charitable purposes not inconsistent with the objects of such math or temple, as the Board may direct.\"\n\nThe inam title deeds, the entries in the inam fair register prepared at the time of the confirmation of the inams by the Inams Commissioner in 1863 and the contemporaneous statement made by the inamdars are of the same pattern in respect of all the inams.\n\nIt is sufficient to refer to Exs. B-4, B-5 and B-6 relating to the inam for the service of Sree Padam Thangi (palanquin-bearers).\n\nThe statement, Ex. B-4, shows that in fasli 1272 corresponding to 1862-63, Veerabadra Mudali, Periasami Mudali, Andiappa Mudali were in enjoyinent of the inam and rendering the service under the direction of the Paisaldars or the trustees of the temple.\n\nThey made the following statement : \"For talcing the deities in procession round the village during the festival in the temple of Tirumulanathaswami and Akilandeswari Amman in the village of Kovil Thenkarai the aforesaid land has been granted as inarn.\n\nThe paisaldars appointed our ancestors and got service from them.\n\nThe aforesaid manyam was in their enjoyment. Afterwards the manyam was divided and during fasli 36, it was\" registered in the name of myself individual No. 1 and in the names of the fathers of individuals Nos. 2 and 3. They were rendering the service and enjoying manyam and in the same manner. We have been rendering the aforesaid service and enjoying the manyam.\" The entries in the inam fair register, Ex. B-5 show that the inam belonged to the category of Devadayam and was for the service of Sree Padam Thangi which was being then rendered, that the original gant was made to the temple before fasli 1212 corresponding to 1802- 3, and that in 1863 the inam was being enjoyed by Verrabadra Mudali, Periasami Mudali and Andiappa Mudali. The title deed acknowledged their title to Devadayan or pagoda service inam to 11.47 acres of land held for the service of Sree Padam Thang/ and confirmed the inam to them and their successors tax-free to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant were duly fulfilled.\n\nThose documents show that the lands were being enjoyed by the inamdars and were granted as inams. The amount of the assessment or melwaram was very low and could not be an adequate remuneration for the services to be rendered. The plaintiffs claimed title to the lands under a grant from .the inamdars on the footing that the inamdars were entitled to the kudiwaram and the melwaram. The conclusion is irresistible that the inam com•· prised both the warams.\n\nThe inams were originally granted to the temple for the per• formance of services connected therewith.\n\nThe trustees of the temple appointed persons to perform those services and placed the inams in their possession to be enjoyed by them as remuneration for the services to be rendered by them. The Inam Commis•ion confirmed the grants of the inams in favour of the hereditary officeholders then rendering the services.\n\nWhere there were seVP•• t\n\nholders of the office, the inams were shown to be in their enjoy- A ment in equal shares. It is quite clear that the inams were granted to the holders of hereditary offices as remuneration for services to be rendered by them in connection with the temple.\n\nThere is a well-recognised distinction between the grant of the land burdened with a condition of service and the grant of land B as remuneration for an office, see Forbes v. Noor Mohomed Tuquee(' ). Section 44-B does not apply to a personal inam burdened with a condition of service. See P. V. Bheemsena Rao v.\n\nSirigiri Pedda Yella Reddi('). It applies to an inam granted to an office-holder as remuneration for his services connected with a math or temple as also to an inam granted to the institution directly.\n\nThe inams in the present case were not personal inams.\n\nC They were inams granted to office-holders as remuneratio~ for services to be rendered by them and were within the purview of s. 44-B.\n\nThe next question is whether s. 44-B allows resumption of an inam falling within the purview of the section where the inam was alienated before the section came into force in 1934. Subsection (I) of s. 44-B renders null and void certain alienations of the inam. Sub-section (2) authorises resumption of the inam on certain grounds.\n\nSub-section (2) is not dependent upon sub-sec. {l) and allows resumption even in cases where there has been no alienation of the inam. In the present case, we are not concerned with th.e retrospective <>peration of sub-sec. (1) of s. 44-B, and we express no opinion on it. But there can be no doubt that s. 44-B (2)(a)(i) allows a resumption of the inam where there has been an alienation of the inam either before or after 1934. Even .apart from s. 44-B, any inam whatever its.nature could be resumed for failure to perform the conditions of the grant. Subject to certain restrictions and safeguards, paragraph 2 of the Board's Standing Order No. 54 permitted resumption of religious and charitable inams on the ground that the land was alienated or otherwise lost to the institution or service to which it once belonged or on the ground that the terms of the grant were not observed. The object of s. 44-B was to define and enlarge the grounds on which the inams could be resumed and to devise a proper procedure for the resumption. On general grounds of public policy, the legislature has declared that the inam may be resumed on any of the three grounds mentioned therein. The first ground is that the holder of the inam has made an alienation. The words \"has made\" in sub. - s. (2)(a)(i) takes in all alienations pat and future and not only future alienations or alienations made after the section came into force. If there has been any alienation at any time the first ground exists and the inam may be resumed. under s. 44-B. The words \"has failed\" in sub.-s. (2)(a)(ii} and the words \"has ceased\" and - .\n\n(I) (1870) 13 H.1.A.438,464.\n\n(2) (1962) 1S.C.R.339.\n\n\"has become\" in sub.-s. (2)(a)(iii) similarly authorise resumption of the inarn if the other grounds exist though they may hav~ ari~ earlier. Section 44-B(2) is in its direct operation prospective as 1t authorises only future resumption after it came into force. It is not properly called retrospective \"because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.\" See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed, p. 211. The inams in the present case are resumable under s. 44-B(2)(a)(i) though the alienations were made before 1934.\n\nSection 44-B(2)(a)(i) is attracted if the holder of the inam has made an exchange, gift, sale or mortgage of the inam or has granted a lease of it for a term exceeding five years. In the plaint in Suit O.S. No. 4 of 1954 the plaintiffs claimed that one Kunjanna Ayyar, their predecessor-in-title purchased the lands from the in amdars before 1861. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the inamdars sold the! lands. The only direct evidence as to how Kunjanna Ayyar came into possession of the suit lands is furnished by Ex.\n\nA-2, a statement made by the imun-holders to the. Madurai District Collector on August 14, 1868.\n\nIt shows that Kunjanna Ayyar had taken the lands on cowle from the inamdars. The word \"cowle\" means a lease. In Wilson's Glossary it is stated that the word ordinarily denotes a lease and not a mortgage. Before the District-Collector the plaintiffs admitted that they were holding under a cowle lease. The District Collector held that the alienation was within the purview of s. 44-B. The High Court also held that the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title were in enjoyment of the lands under the lease. At no stage of the litigation either before the revenue authorities or in the plaint or before the District Judge or in the High Court did the plaintiffs contend that the alienation in their favour was not within the purview of s. 44-B\n\n(2) (a) (i). As a matter of fact, the case made in the plaint was that their predecessor-in-title had purchased the land from the inamdars.\n\nSuch an alienation is clearly witl1in the purview of s. 44-B(2)(a)(i).\n\nFor the first time in this Court it is contended that the alienation was by way of a lease from year to year. It may be conceded that all leases do not come within the purview of s. 44-B(2)(a)(i). The lease must be for a term exceeding 5 years. A lease from year to year is not a lease for a term exceeding 5 years howsoever long the lessee might have continued in possession of the demised lands.\n\nBut we think that the plaintiffs ought not to be allowed to raise at this late stage the novel contention that the lease was from vear to year. This contention is contrary to the case made by them in the plaint. Moreover, the materials on the record do not support the contention.\n\nThe plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title were in continuous possession of the lands for over 80 years under the cowle lease. The original cowle is not forthcoming. The plaintiffs claimed to be permanent alienees of the lands. . In all these circumstances, we are inclined to presume that the cowle granted\n\na permanent kase and the inams were resumable under s. 44-B (2)(a)(i).\n\nThere is no period of limitation prescribed for. the initiation of proceedings under s. 44-B(2) .. The section gave a new statutory right of resumption of the inams.\n\nOn a resumption of the inams, the title. if any, of all persons claiming through the inamdars to any subordinate interest in the inams stood determined.\n\nKunjanna Ayyar and his successors-in-title were lessees of the inam lands under the inamdars.\n\nDuring the continuance of the tenancy, their possession was not adverse to the inamdars.\n\nA fortiori, their possession was not adverse to the Government under whom the inamdars held the inam lands. They did not acquire any prescriptive title .to the k udiwaram rights either against the inamdars or against the Government.\n\nThe Government could. therefore, resume the inam lands made under s. 44-B(2) and dispossess the inamdars and the plaintiffs claiming as lessees under them.\n\nTJ1c question whether an alienee from the inamdar can acquire prescriptive title to the ku!liwaram rights in the inam lands against the Government and thereby defeat the latter's right to resume the inam does not, therefore, arise for decision, and we express no opinion on it.\n\nIt may be noted that In Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras( 1 ) this Court held that there is no limitation barring imposition of assessment on the land after resuming the melwaram.\n\nIt follows that both the kudiwaram and melwaram rights were rightly resumed under s. 44-B(2)(a)(i).\n\nIn the result, the appeals are dismissed. In all the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost~.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(I} [19661 .1 S.C.R. 283, 299.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "T. K. LAKSHMANA IYER & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. K. LAKSHMANA IYER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231, "end_char": 237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "S. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Thirumoolanathaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the ancient temple of Thirumoolanathaswami.", "canonical_name": "Thirumoolanathaswami"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 932, "end_char": 975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1309, "end_char": 1314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "statute": "the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2161, "end_char": 2166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2796, "end_char": 2799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3493, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4855, "end_char": 4860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966) 3 S.C.R. 283", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5285, "end_char": 5304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5701, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5721, "end_char": 5737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. C. Bhartari, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rangam, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakri.s*nan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakri.s*nan,."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dutta, for resp0ndents Nos."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.\n\nIn the village of Thenkarai in the Madurai District there is an ancient temple of Sri Thirumoolanathaswami."}}, {"text": "Thenkarai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6188, "end_char": 6197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.\n\nIn the village of Thenkarai in the Madurai District there is an ancient temple of Sri Thirumoolanathaswami."}}, {"text": "April 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6666, "end_char": 6680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order passed on April 10, 1947 under s. 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti resumed the inam lands and regranted them to the temple."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6687, "end_char": 6692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6715, "end_char": 6739, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Usilampatti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order passed on April 10, 1947 under s. 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti resumed the inam lands and regranted them to the temple."}}, {"text": "October 17, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6845, "end_char": 6862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 17, 194 7, his order was confirmed on appeal by the District Collector."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Madurai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The alienees instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Madurai under the proviso to s. 44-B(2)( d)(ii) asking for a decree declaring that the in am grants consisted of the melwaram only."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of the District Judge, Madurai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7345, "end_char": 7381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was withdrawn to the Court of the District Judge, Madurai and registered as O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Suboidinate Judge, Madurai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7469, "end_char": 7495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They instituted another suit in the Court of the Suboidinate Judge, Madurai, asking for a decree declaring that the order of the Collector dated October 17, 1947 was a nullity."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They instituted another suit in the Court of the Suboidinate Judge, Madurai, asking for a decree declaring that the order of the Collector dated October 17, 1947 was a nullity."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7928, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "746 of 1954 in the High Court of Madras from the decree in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8030, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madras filed an appeal registered as A.S. No."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9355, "end_char": 9360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10022, "end_char": 10027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10381, "end_char": 10386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10612, "end_char": 10617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10777, "end_char": 10820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 19, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10859, "end_char": 10875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927) was passed on January 19, 1927."}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10877, "end_char": 10887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1927"}}, {"text": "Act by Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10920, "end_char": 10937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act V of 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10974, "end_char": 10994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act X of 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10999, "end_char": 11019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11050, "end_char": 11055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act X of 1946", "statute": "Madras Act X of 1946"}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11063, "end_char": 11121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11207, "end_char": 11212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11538, "end_char": 11556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage, and any lease for a tenn exceeding five years, of the whole r any portion of any inam granted for the support or mamtenance of a math or temple or for the performance of a charity or service connected therewith and made, confinned or recognised by the British Government, shall be null and void."}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11788, "end_char": 11817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sree Padam Thangi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14100, "end_char": 14117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-4, B-5 and B-6 relating to the inam for the service of Sree Padam Thangi (palanquin-bearers).", "canonical_name": "Sree Padam Thangi"}}, {"text": "Periasami Mudali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14234, "end_char": 14250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-4, shows that in fasli 1272 corresponding to 1862-63, Veerabadra Mudali, Periasami Mudali, Andiappa Mudali were in enjoyinent of the inam and rendering the service under the direction of the Paisaldars or the trustees of the temple."}}, {"text": "Andiappa Mudali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14252, "end_char": 14267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-4, shows that in fasli 1272 corresponding to 1862-63, Veerabadra Mudali, Periasami Mudali, Andiappa Mudali were in enjoyinent of the inam and rendering the service under the direction of the Paisaldars or the trustees of the temple."}}, {"text": "Tirumulanathaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They made the following statement : \"For talcing the deities in procession round the village during the festival in the temple of Tirumulanathaswami and Akilandeswari Amman in the village of Kovil Thenkarai the aforesaid land has been granted as inarn.", "canonical_name": "Thirumoolanathaswami"}}, {"text": "Akilandeswari Amman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14548, "end_char": 14567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They made the following statement : \"For talcing the deities in procession round the village during the festival in the temple of Tirumulanathaswami and Akilandeswari Amman in the village of Kovil Thenkarai the aforesaid land has been granted as inarn."}}, {"text": "Verrabadra Mudali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15399, "end_char": 15416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-5 show that the inam belonged to the category of Devadayam and was for the service of Sree Padam Thangi which was being then rendered, that the original gant was made to the temple before fasli 1212 corresponding to 1802- 3, and that in 1863 the inam was being enjoyed by Verrabadra Mudali, Periasami Mudali and Andiappa Mudali."}}, {"text": "Devadayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15499, "end_char": 15508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The title deed acknowledged their title to Devadayan or pagoda service inam to 11.47 acres of land held for the service of Sree Padam Thang/ and confirmed the inam to them and their successors tax-free to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant were duly fulfilled."}}, {"text": "Sree Padam Thang/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15579, "end_char": 15596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The title deed acknowledged their title to Devadayan or pagoda service inam to 11.47 acres of land held for the service of Sree Padam Thang/ and confirmed the inam to them and their successors tax-free to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant were duly fulfilled.", "canonical_name": "Sree Padam Thangi"}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17615, "end_char": 17620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17654, "end_char": 17659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17824, "end_char": 17829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18189, "end_char": 18194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18262, "end_char": 18267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18405, "end_char": 18410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18858, "end_char": 18863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19482, "end_char": 19487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19768, "end_char": 19778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20137, "end_char": 20142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20201, "end_char": 20211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kunjanna Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20454, "end_char": 20468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1954 the plaintiffs claimed that one Kunjanna Ayyar, their predecessor-in-title purchased the lands from the in amdars before 1861."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1868", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20805, "end_char": 20820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madurai District Collector on August 14, 1868."}}, {"text": "Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20935, "end_char": 20941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Wilson's Glossary it is stated that the word ordinarily denotes a lease and not a mortgage."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21199, "end_char": 21204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21560, "end_char": 21565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21763, "end_char": 21768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21961, "end_char": 21966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22827, "end_char": 22832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22932, "end_char": 22937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23653, "end_char": 23658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24295, "end_char": 24300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_551_555_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KIRPAL SINGH DUGGAL v,\n\nMUNICIPAL BOARD, GHAZIABAD\n\nMarch 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Municipalities Act, 191&-Exemption under s. 157(3)-Rule.• requiring application for refund within six months of payment-Application for refund beyond six montlis-S11i1 for recovery.-lurisdictlon of CivU Court, if barred.\n\nThe appellant transported, between August 1953 and March 1955 certain materials in execution of a contract to supply goods fdr use by the Government of India.\n\nThe respondent Municipality collected toll while the appellant's trucks were passing through the toll barrier. The appellant obtained in June 1955 a certificate from the aitthority concerned that the goods transported were \"meant for Government work and had become the property of the Government\". The appellant then applied to the Municipality for refund of the amount paid pursuant to the exemption granted by the Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P.\n\nMunicipalities Act, 1916. The respondent declined to refund the amount.\n\nIn an action against the respondent the trial court decreed the claim. In appeal the Civil Judge decreed the claim only for the amount paid after December 13. 1954.\n\nThe High Court affirmed the order of the Civil Judge. Both the Civil Judge and the High Court took the view that bi• the Rules framed under the Act an application for refund \\Vithin six months from the date of actual payment is a condition precedent for rcf\\lnd of the toll. Allowing the appeal. this Court, HELD : The Civil Jbdge and tho High Court exalted, what were merely matters of procedure which the Municipality \\\\'as c°:titled to require compliance \\Vith in granting rcfunJ, into conditions precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The rules framed by the Government relating to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemptions on April 15, 1939, do not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the procedure is not followed.\n\nIf these procedural requirements are not fulfilled, the Municipality may decline to refund the toll and relegate the claimant to a suit. It would then be open to the party claiming a refund to seek the assistance of the Court, and to prove by evidence which is in law admissible that the goods transported by him fell within the order issued under s. 157(3) of the Act. [555 B-FJ.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 725 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 3, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in F.A.F.O. No. 122 of 1961.\n\nBishan Narain and Harbans Singh, for the appellant.\n\nRameshwar Nath, for the respondent.\n\nH The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Between August 1, 1953 and March 28, 1955, the appellant transported 521 truck-loads of \"stone-grit\" and other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nmaterials from Delhi to Muradnagar in execution of a contract to A supply goods for use by the Government of India. The trucks of the appellant had to pass through the toll barrier of the Municipality of Ghaziabad, and toll at the rate of Rs. 8 per truck was collected from the appellant. The appellant obtained a certificate from the Garrison Engineer, M.E.S., Meerut, on June 10, 1955, that the goods transported by the appellant \"were meant for Gov B ernment work and had become the property of the Government\".\n\nThe appellant then applied on June 14, 1955, to the Municipality of Ghaziabad for refund of the amount of toll paid pursuant to the exemption granted by Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and the Municipality having declined to refund the amount, the appellant served the statutory notice and commenced an action against the Municipality in the C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad on February 11, 1956, for a decree for Rs. 4,300. The trial court decreed the claim. In appeal, the Ilnd Civil Judge, Meerut, upheld the claim of the appellant only for the amounts paid after December 13, 1954. The High Court of Allahabad affirmed the order of the Civil Judge.\n\nThe appellant has appealed to this Court.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act, the rules and the orders issued by the Government may first be noticed.\n\nUnder s. 128 of th~ U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the Municipal Board is, subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in that behalf, competent to impose in the whole or part of a municipality the taxes specified in that sEction and one of the E taxes specified is \"a toll on vehicles and other conveyances, animals, and laden coolies entering the municipality\". Under s. 157\n\n(3) of the Act the State Government may, by order, exempt from the payment of a tax, or any portion of a tax, imposed under the Act any person or class of persons or any property or description of property. Pursuant thereto the Government of U.P. issued an F order on April 15, 1939, which, insofar as it is material, provides:\n\n\" .... the Provincial Government are . . . pleased to issue an order under section 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Aet, 1916, exempting those goods which are the property of Government or which become so sub- G sequent to their entry. within a Municipality, from the payment of terminal tax or toll.\n\n2. The procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemption sanctioned above shall be as follows :- 'When goods are imported by a private person for H supply to Government in fulfilment of a contract, or otherwise intended for the use of Government a Written intimation to that effect shall be given to the officer col-\n\nK, S. DUOOAL v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Shah,/,) 553\n\nlecting terminal tax/terminal toll who would immedia\n\ntely forward it to the Terminal Tax Superintendent.\n\nThe tax/ toll on goods shall then be paid but if subsequently they actually become the property of Government, it shall be refunded on a certificate of the offi cer authorised to receive the goods on behalf of Government' \" •\n\nThe State Government is authorized by s. 296 to make rules o~ sistent with the Act in respect, amongst others, of matters descnbed in s. 157 \"generally for the guidance of a board or any Government officer in any matter connected with the carrying out of the provisions of this or any other enactment relatg to munici palities\". The State Government framed rules relating to assessment and collection of toll in the Ghaziabad Municipality. Rules 1 and 5 are material :\n\n\"!. No person shall bring within the limits of the Ghaziabad Municipality any laden vehicle or other laden conveyances or laden animal in respect of which a toll is leviable, until the toll due in respect thereof has been paid to such persons and at such barriers or such other places as the board may from time to time appoint.\n\nExplanation.- .\n\n\"5. When goods are imported by a private person for supply to Government in fulfilment of a contract or otherwise intended for the use of Government, a written intimation to the effect shall be given to the officer collecting that tax who would immediately forward it to the Toll Tax Superintendent. The tax on goods shall then be paid, but if subsequently they actually become the property of Government, it shall be refunded on a certificate of the officer authorised to' receive the goods on behalf of Government. . . .\n\nThe application for refund of the tax paid shall be made within fifteen days of the date of the certificate referred to above and within six months of the date or dates of payment of the tax and shall be accompanied by the original toll receipts.\n\n, Note:- \" The Civil Judge was of the opinion that toll is immediately payable in all cases, but where goods are for the use of the Govern- H ment. it becomes refundable when the property becomes the proprty of the Government, and a certificate is issued by the officer concerned to that effect. He further held that the application for refund must be made within fifteen days of the date of the certi-\n\n-554 SUPll.l!MB COVRT llllPOll.TS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.11..\n\nJicate and within six months of the date of payment, and an ap- A _plication for refund within six months from the date of actual payment is a condition precedent to the refund of the toll and even though a certificate by othe prescribed _authority is issued beyond six months of actual paymenl.\n\nThe High Court a.greed with that view.\n\nUnder the order issued by the Government under s. I 57(3) -of the Act the amount of roll paid by the appellant became refundable to him. The appellant was therefore entitled to claim against the Municipality that the amount be repaid. The right to enforce that claim was a right of a civil nature, and could be enforced ; n a cfvil suit, unless the suit was barred by the law of limitation or the right was by reason of some statutory provision extinguished, , or the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred expressly or by necessary implication, or that the enforcement of the right de pended upon the fulfilment of a condition precedent or upon existence of some fact collateral to the actual matter which the Court had to try and which was not shown to exist. It was held by the Civil Judge, and rightly, that the claim was not barred by s. 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, because the suit was not in respect of any act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity. There is nothing in the order issued by tl; e State Government, or any other provision of the law, that on the expiry of any particular period or on the happening of a contingency, the claim stands extinguished. The jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for refund of tax levied under s. 128 of the Act is also not barred by express enactment or by necessary implication, arising ouu of the provisions of ss. 153(c), 160, 162 and 164 of the Act.\n\nSection 153(c) merely provides for framing of the rules regulating the system on which refunds shall be allowed and paid. Section 160 makes provisions for appeals relating to taxation and the authorities to which the right to appeal may be exercised.\n\nSection 162 provides for a reference to the High Court where a question of liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises on which the officer hearing the appeal entertaim reasonable doubt. Section 164 bars the jurisdiction of civil and cri minal courts in matters of valuation or assessment or about the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed. But the dispute in this case does not relate to valuation or assessment, or liability to be taxed or assessed. When the goods in respect of which toll was paid became the property of the Government, the toll paid by the appellant became refundable and the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a claim for refund of toll arising by virtue of an order under s. 157(3) was not eXcluded.\n\nIt was not contended either in the trial court, the first appellate Court or even the High Court that the jurisdiction of hte civil court to entertain a miit was excluded.\n\nThe first appellate Court has in fact granted refund of a part of the amount paid and the right of the civil\n\nK, S. DUGGAL V, MUNICIPAL BOARD (Shah; /,) 555\n\ncourt to direct refund in appropriate cases has not been challenged in this Court.\n\nBut counsel for the respondent contended that the rules framed by the Government regarding the procedure constituted a condition precedent to the exercise of the right to claim refund and recourse to the civil court being conditionally strict compliance with the procedure prescribed the civil court was incompetent to decree the suit unless the condition was fulfilled. We are unable to agree with that contention. The rules framed by the Government merely set up the procedure to be followed in preferring an ap, l'lication to the Municipality for obtaining refund of the tax paid.\n\nThe Municipality is under a statutory obligation, once the procedure followed is fulfilled, to grant refund of the toll. The application for refund of the toll must be made within fifteen days from the date of the' issue of the certificate and within six months from the date of payment of the toll. Jt has to be accompanied by the original receipts. If these procedural requirements are not fullillcd, the Municipality may decline to refund the toll and relegate the claimant to a suit. It would then be open to the party claiming a refund to seek the assistance of the court, and to prove by evidence which is in Jaw admissible that the goods transported by him fell within the order issued under s. 157(3) of the Act. The rules framed by the Government relating to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemptions on April 15, 1939, do not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court if the procedure is not followed. Jn our judgment, the Civil Judge and the High Court exalted what were merely matters of procedure, which the Municipality was entitled to require compliance with in granting refund, into conditions precedent to the exercise of juri, diction of the civil court. It is impossible on a bare perusal of the order issued by the Government and the rules framd by it to give to the order and the rules that effect.\n\nThe appeal is therefore allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree passed by the trial coun is restored with costs throughout.\n\nY.l'.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n7Sup. C.T.168", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "KIRPAL SINGH DUGGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KIRPAL SINGH DUGGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUNICIPAL BOARD, GHAZIABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUNICIPAL BOARD, GHAZIABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KIRPAL SINGH DUGGAL v,\n\nMUNICIPAL BOARD, GHAZIABAD\n\nMarch 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Municipalities Act, 191&-Exemption under s. 157(3)-Rule.• requiring application for refund within six months of payment-Application for refund beyond six montlis-S11i1 for recovery.-lurisdictlon of CivU Court, if barred."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 967, "end_char": 991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 13. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal the Civil Judge decreed the claim only for the amount paid after December 13."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rules framed by the Government relating to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemptions on April 15, 1939, do not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the procedure is not followed."}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2522, "end_char": 2542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 3, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in F.A.F.O. No."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and Harbans Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and Harbans Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2626, "end_char": 2640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2709, "end_char": 2713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Between August 1, 1953 and March 28, 1955, the appellant transported 521 truck-loads of \"stone-grit\" and other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nmaterials from Delhi to Muradnagar in execution of a contract to A supply goods for use by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Between August 1, 1953 and March 28, 1955, the appellant transported 521 truck-loads of \"stone-grit\" and other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nmaterials from Delhi to Muradnagar in execution of a contract to A supply goods for use by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Muradnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2894, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Between August 1, 1953 and March 28, 1955, the appellant transported 521 truck-loads of \"stone-grit\" and other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nmaterials from Delhi to Muradnagar in execution of a contract to A supply goods for use by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2965, "end_char": 2984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Between August 1, 1953 and March 28, 1955, the appellant transported 521 truck-loads of \"stone-grit\" and other\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nmaterials from Delhi to Muradnagar in execution of a contract to A supply goods for use by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3232, "end_char": 3238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant obtained a certificate from the Garrison Engineer, M.E.S., Meerut, on June 10, 1955, that the goods transported by the appellant \"were meant for Gov B ernment work and had become the property of the Government\"."}}, {"text": "June 10, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant obtained a certificate from the Garrison Engineer, M.E.S., Meerut, on June 10, 1955, that the goods transported by the appellant \"were meant for Gov B ernment work and had become the property of the Government\"."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied on June 14, 1955, to the Municipality of Ghaziabad for refund of the amount of toll paid pursuant to the exemption granted by Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and the Municipality having declined to refund the amount, the appellant served the statutory notice and commenced an action against the Municipality in the C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad on February 11, 1956, for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Municipality of Ghaziabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied on June 14, 1955, to the Municipality of Ghaziabad for refund of the amount of toll paid pursuant to the exemption granted by Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and the Municipality having declined to refund the amount, the appellant served the statutory notice and commenced an action against the Municipality in the C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad on February 11, 1956, for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied on June 14, 1955, to the Municipality of Ghaziabad for refund of the amount of toll paid pursuant to the exemption granted by Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and the Municipality having declined to refund the amount, the appellant served the statutory notice and commenced an action against the Municipality in the C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad on February 11, 1956, for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "February 11, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3805, "end_char": 3822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied on June 14, 1955, to the Municipality of Ghaziabad for refund of the amount of toll paid pursuant to the exemption granted by Government Order under s. 157(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, and the Municipality having declined to refund the amount, the appellant served the statutory notice and commenced an action against the Municipality in the C Court of the Munsif at Ghaziabad on February 11, 1956, for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ilnd Civil Judge, Meerut", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, the Ilnd Civil Judge, Meerut, upheld the claim of the appellant only for the amounts paid after December 13, 1954."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, the Ilnd Civil Judge, Meerut, upheld the claim of the appellant only for the amounts paid after December 13, 1954."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4017, "end_char": 4040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad affirmed the order of the Civil Judge."}}, {"text": "s. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4630, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4866, "end_char": 4884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant thereto the Government of U.P. issued an F order on April 15, 1939, which, insofar as it is material, provides:\n\n\" .... the Provincial Government are . . ."}}, {"text": "section 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "s. 296", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6016, "end_char": 6022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghaziabad Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government framed rules relating to assessment and collection of toll in the Ghaziabad Municipality."}}, {"text": "s. 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9206, "end_char": 9212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9659, "end_char": 9665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "ss. 153(c), 160, 162 and 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9779, "end_char": 9807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Section 153(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9821, "end_char": 9835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Section 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9943, "end_char": 9954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10073, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10278, "end_char": 10289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 157(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12532, "end_char": 12541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_556_562_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF KERALA\n\nCOCHIN CHEMICAL REFINERIES LTD.\n\nMarch 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 8\n\nContract-Mor{f:age deed providing for loan to company and for supply of goods by company to mortgagee-Sale price to be adiusted against loan and interest-Mortgagee not cdvancing loon-I/ relieved of obligation to purchase goods-Whether liable for da1nages for .'lot advancing loan and for bre(1ch of contract to buJ goods,\n\nA mdrtgagc deed was executed by the respondent company and one of its directors in favour of the State of Keral::i. It was provided inter alia by the terms of the deed that in consideration of the State granting a loan of a sum of lls. 2.5 lakhs to the company, the laUer wou1U supply lo the State 3.000 tons of ground-nut cake Yyjthin a specified pe'riod and make deliveries in accordance 'Nith instructions to be given by the State, and the account for this supplv will be adjusted against the loan amount and the interest thereon.\n\nIt Was comn1on ground however that the loan amount, though acknowledged in the mortgage deed as received by the company, was never in fact advanced by the State. The respondent company arranged for the supply of goods as agreed and sought the necessary instructions for dlivery, but these we're never given.\n\nThe company instit\\Ited a suit in 1Iarch 1953 against the appellant State for dumages for failure to advance the loan an1ount and for breach of contract to purchase the ground-nut cake. The trial court decTecd the suit for R.;;. 36,000 being damages for failure to advance the loan and for Rs. 1,23,000 as damages for breach of contract. An appeal to the High Court chaUenging the liability of the State to compensate the company for failure to take delivc'ry of the goods v.as dismissed.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the State that the obligation to take delivery of the good_s agreed to be purchased was contingent upon the Government's advancing the loan amount, so long as the amount was not atlvanced by the State~ the mortgage \\vas not in Jaw effective and the Company could not enforce the contract relating to ground-nut cake\n\n~1i;:recd to be purchased by the State.\n\nHELD : Dismissin.q the appeal.\n\nA transaction of mortgage formally executed docs not become void or ineffective merely because the mortgagee fails to advance the amount of money undertaken to be advanced by him.\n\nUnder the terms of the mortgage deed liability of the State to purchase the roundnut cake from the Company was not n1adc conllitional upon the State advancing the 1oan.\n\nBy failing to advance the loan an1ount the State could. not avoid liability to carry out the obligation to purchase the goods contracted to be purchased. Even if it be assumed thJ.t the indenture incorporated reciprocal promises, in the absence of anv express provision to that effect the contract could not be trn1inatcd by the default of the State. Breach of contract by one party does not auton1atica1ly terminate the obligation under the contract: the injured party has the option either to treat the cnntract as still in existence. or to regard himself as discharged. If he\n\nccepts the discharge of the contract by the other party, the contract i\"\n\nKllRALA V. COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 557\n\nA at an end. If he does not accept the discharge, he may insist on performance. (560 C-D; 561 DJ.\n\nTatia v. Babaji, I.L.R. 22 Bom. 176, Rashik Lal v. Ram Narain end Others, I.LR. 34 All. 273, Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshcr Prasad and Others. I.L.R. 52 All. 338, White and Cart., (Councils) Ltd, v.\n\nMc- Gregor, [1962] A.C. 413. referred to.\n\nThere was no substance in the contention that the State was by its default liable to compensate the Company only for loss arising out of its failure to advance the money, and not out of its failure lo purchase the goods. The State's undertakings to advance the loan and to take delivery of ground-nut cake were two independent, though inter-related transactions; and by committing a breach of its own obligation to advance the loan, the State did not absolve itself from liability for the breach arising from its refusal to take delivery of the goods offered. [561 F-H].\n\nCivn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 741 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 1, 1963 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 480 of 1958.\n\nSarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin. The relevant terms of the indenture were :\n\n\"In consideration of the sum of Rupees 2.5 lakhs (2,50,000) borrowed by the mortgagor No. 1 from the mortgagee (the receipt of which sum mortgagor No. 1 doth hereby admit and acknowledge) mortgagor No. 1 hereby covenants with the mortgagee as follows :-\n\n. (a) That the mortgagor No. 1 shall supply to the mortgagee 3,000 tons of groundnut cake at the rate of 600 tons per month within a period of five months commencing with the first day of November 1950 and ending with the last day of March 1951.\n\n. (b) That the account for the groundnut cakes supphed by mortgagor No. 1 to the mortgagee will be settled and adjusted against the Joan amount of Rs. 2.5 lakhs and interest .thereon at 4!% per annum at the end of March 1951, the groundnut cakes supplied being valued at t?e average price fixed by the Government during the penod for purchases from other sources.\n\nIf on sucli adjustment any amount is found due to the mortgagor No. 1 the same will be paid by the mortgagee. If how-\n\n558 SUP.REM!! COUllT .REPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\never it is found that the price of the groundnut cakes supplied is not sufficient to make up the loan amount with the interest thereon, mortgagor No. 1 shall pay the deficit amount to the mortgagee immediately after the settlement of account\n\n(c) That mortgagor No. I shall deliver the groundnut cakes at any depot in the Travancore-Cochin State as may from time to time be required by the Director of Agriculture from the mortgagee free of transport charges.\"\n\nII .. \"For the consideration aforesaid the mortgagor No. l hereby transfers by way of simple mortgage to the mortgagee\" all the assets described in Sch. I, \"and mortgagor No. 2 hereby transfers by way of simple mortgage to the mortgagee· the assets described in Sch. II, \"to the intent that the said premises shall remain and be charged as security for the payment to the mortgagee of the said principal money, interest and costs in accorda11ce with the Covenants hereinbefore contained.\"\n\nIll. \"The mortgagors hereby covenant with the mortgagee as follows :-\n\nThe indenture was executed by the Company and N. C. John and also by the Secretary to the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of His Highness the Rajpramulch. A supplementary deed was executed on November 7, 1950, whereby it was agreed that without prejudice to the right to recover the amount secured or any portion thereof as stipulated, it shall also be recoverable under the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force or in other marmer as the mortgagee may deem fit.\n\nIt is common ground that the amount acknowledged in the indenture was not advanced at the date of the indenture and was never advanced thereafter. The Company arranged for the supply of goods agreed to be sold under the terms of paragraph I(a) and wrote from time to time letters to the appropriate officers of the State asking them to give instructions about the depots where the supplies were to be made. In reply to the letter Ext H, the Assistant Director of Agriculture by Ext. M, dated January 3, 1951, replied that :\n\n\"I write .to invite your attention to my Jetter of even No. dated 12-12-1950 and to inform you that I shal~ be placing orders for the supply of groundnut cake as soon as I get orders from Government providing the necessary funds for paying you the advance of Rs. 2! lakhs.\"\n\nKERALA V, COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 559\n\nNo instructions for supply were however given to the Company to supply the goods agreed to be purchased by the State. The Company instituted on March 9, 1953, an action against !he State of Travancore-Cochin for a decree for Rs. 3,600/- bemg damages for failure to advance the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/-, and Rs. 1,68,600/- as damages for breach of contract to purchase\n\n3,000 tons of groundnut cake under the indenture.\n\nThe Trial Court decreed the suit for Rs. 3,600/- being damages for failure to advance the lcian, and for Rs. 1,23,000/- being damages for breach of contract to purchase groundnut cake. In appeal to the High Court, the liability of the State to compensate the Company for failure to take delivery of the goods offered to be delivered alone wa5 challenged. The High Court confirmed the decree -passed by tho Trial Court negativing the contention raised on behalf of the State that the obligation to take delivery of the goods agreed to be purchased was contingent on the Government's advancing Rs. 2,50,000/-. The State has appealed to this Court with special leave.\n\nTwo questions arise for determination in this appeal :\n\n(I) Whether under the terms of the indenture the State by refusing to advance the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/- was absolved from the obligation to purchase the goods referred to in paragraph l(a) of the indenture; and\n\n(2) Whether in the circumstances of the case, the Company was not entitled to claim damages for breach by the State to purchase the goods agreed to be purchased.\n\nThe indenture incorporated two transactions: ( 1 ) a mortgage in favour of the State by the Company and N. C. John charging properties belonging to the two mortgagors for repayment of Rs. 2,50,000/-; and (2) the Company agreeing to sell and the State agreeing to purchao; e 3,000 tons of groundnut cake at the rate of 600 tons per month for five months to be supplied at any of the depots in the Travanc<ire-Cochin State as may from time to time be designated by the Director of Agriculture. The indenture expressly recited that the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 /- was advanced to the Company but the supplementary deed dated November 7, 1950, and the correspondence make it clear that though the money wns recited to have been actually advanced, it was not in .fact advanced, but it was intended by the State Government to advance it.\n\nFor some reason, which it is difficult to ascertain from the record, the State Government did not carry out its obligation to advance the money, after obtaining the indenture and the supplementary deed from the Companv and its Director. But even as late as January 3, 1951, as is clear from Ext. M-the Assistant Director of Agriculture reiterated the promise that the money\n\n560 SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwill be advanced and delivery of goods offered by the Company will be accepted.\n\nCounsel for the State contended that so long as the loan was not advanced by the State, the mortgage was not in law effective, and the Company could not enforce the contract relating to groundnut cake agreed to be purchased by the State, for the obligation undertaken was in consideration of the loan of Rs. 2,50,000/- and arose only when the loan was advanced. But the assumption, that if the State did not advance the loan which it had undertaken to advance, the indenture was ineffective, cannot be accepted. There is no such express term in the deed, and none can be implied from the covenants and the surrounding circumstances.\n\nA transaction of mortgage formally executed does not become void or ineffective merely because the mortgagee fails to advance the amount of money undertaken to be advanced by him. If without advancing the amount agreed to be advanced, he sues on the title created under the deed of mortgage, the Court will not award him a decree for anything more than what he has advanced.\n\nBut that is not to say that the mortgage is invalid.\n\nIn Talia v. Babaji(1), Farran, C.J., observed :\n\n\"I am not, h9wever, . . . prepared to assent to the train of thought which puts conveyances of lands in the mofussil W{ected by possession or registration where the consideration expressed in the conveyance to have been paid has not in fact been paid in the same category as contracts void for want of consideration.\"\n\nSimilar observations were made in Rashik Lal v. Ram Narain arid others('), where Karamat Hussain, J., observed at p. 276 :\n\n\" . . . . . . mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act is a transfer of an interest in the land mortgaged, and not a mere contract. It therefore follows that no sooner a valid mortgage deed is registered, an interest in the property mortgaged, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, vests in the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage money has 110t been paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagor:' The mere nonpayment of the mortgage money cannot have the effect of rendering the mortgage invalid.\"\n\nSulaiman, J., in Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad and olhos(1) observed that once a document transferring immovable\n\nproperty has been registered, the transaction passes out of the domain of a mere contract and into one of a conveyance. Such a completed transaction is governed by the provisions of the\n\n(I) l.L.R. 22 Born. 176.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 34 All. 273.\n\n(l) I.LR. 52 All. 338.\n\nKERALA >\". COCHiX REFINERIES (Shalt, J.) 561\n\nTJ'llnsfer of Property Act and so much of the Contract Act a; is applicable thereto.\n\nThe argument that because the amount was not advanced by the State to the Company, the mortgage was void or ineffective thenfore cannot be accepted. Nor do the terms of the indenture justifv the plea that the liability of the State to purchase 3,000 tous of groundnut cake from the Company was conditional upon the State advancing Rs. 2,50,000/-. The two transactions incor porated in the indenture were undoubtedly inter-related. . The price payable for the supplies of groundnut was to be adjusted towards the amount advanced or to be advanced by the State.\n\nBut by failing to advance the amount the State could not avoid liability to carry out the obligation to purchase the goods contracted to be purchased. Even if it be assumed that the indenture incorporated reciprocal promises--the State to advance Rs. 2,50,000/- and the Company to deliver 3,000 tons of groundnut cake-in the absence of any express provision to that effect the contract could not be tenninated by the default of the State. Breach of contract by one party does not automatically terminate the obligation under the contract: the injured party has the option either to treat the contract as still in existence, or to regard himself as discharged. If he accepts the discharge of the contract by the other party, the contract is at an end. If he does not accept the discharge, he may insist on performance : see the judgment of the House of Lords White and Caner (Co1mcils) Ltd. v. McGregor(').\n\nThe case before the House was a Scottish case, but the law of Scotland is not different on the matter under consideration from the F.nglish Jaw, and the Indian Contract Act closely follows the English Common Law in that matter. It cannot, therefore, be said that by refusing to advance the loan which the State i1ad\n\nundertaken to t!dvance, the ooligation to purchase groundnut cake from the Company came to an elid.\n\nNor is there any substance in the secoud contention that the State was by its default liable to compensate the Company only for loss arising out of its failure to advance the money, and not out of its failure to purchase the goods. The State had undertaken to G advance Rs. 2,50,000/- to the Company. It had also undertaken .to take delivery of 3,000 tons of groundnut cake offered by the :Company under the terms of contract of sale.\n\nThese were two ]ndependent, though inter-related transactions, and by committing a breach of its own obligation to advance the sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-\n\nthe State did not absolve itself from liability for the breach arising from the refusal to take delivery of the goods offered. The cause of action arising out of the refusal to take delivery of the goods offered was independent of the cause of action arising out of the H\n\n(I) (1962) A.C. 413=(196113 All. E.R. 1178.\n\n562 SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nbreach committed by the State in not advancing the loan. The A two causes of action were cumulative and not alternative. There is therefore no warrant for the plea that by claiming damages for loss su1Iercd by it as a result of the failure to advance the loan. the Company elected to give up its claim for damages for breach of the contract to take delivery of 3,000 ions of groundnut cake by thf' S<ate.\n\nB The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COCHIN CHEMICAL REFINERIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COCHIN CHEMICAL REFINERIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 26, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "State of Keral::i", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 538, "end_char": 555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8\n\nContract-Mor{f:age deed providing for loan to company and for supply of goods by company to mortgagee-Sale price to be adiusted against loan and interest-Mortgagee not cdvancing loon-I/ relieved of obligation to purchase goods-Whether liable for da1nages for .'lot advancing loan and for bre(1ch of contract to buJ goods,\n\nA mdrtgagc deed was executed by the respondent company and one of its directors in favour of the State of Keral::i."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he\n\nccepts the discharge of the contract by the other party, the contract i\"\n\nKllRALA V. COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 557\n\nA at an end."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 1, 1963 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "A. G. Pudissery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4421, "end_char": 4436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "N. C. John", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "State of Travancore- Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and A. G. Pudissery, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nOn October 9, 1950, a deed styled an \"indenture of mortgage\" was executed by the Cochin Chemicals and Refineries Ltd.,-hereinafter called 'the Company' and N. C. John a Director of the Company, in favour of the State of Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6150, "end_char": 6167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I shall deliver the groundnut cakes at any depot in the Travancore-Cochin State as may from time to time be required by the Director of Agriculture from the mortgagee free of transport charges.\""}}, {"text": "Government of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ill. \"The mortgagors hereby covenant with the mortgagee as follows :-\n\nThe indenture was executed by the Company and N. C. John and also by the Secretary to the Government of Travancore-Cochin on behalf of His Highness the Rajpramulch."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7053, "end_char": 7069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A supplementary deed was executed on November 7, 1950, whereby it was agreed that without prejudice to the right to recover the amount secured or any portion thereof as stipulated, it shall also be recoverable under the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force or in other marmer as the mortgagee may deem fit."}}, {"text": "Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7256, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 3, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M, dated January 3, 1951, replied that :\n\n\"I write .to invite your attention to my Jetter of even No."}}, {"text": "12-12-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7927, "end_char": 7937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated 12-12-1950 and to inform you that I shal~ be placing orders for the supply of groundnut cake as soon as I get orders from Government providing the necessary funds for paying you the advance of Rs."}}, {"text": "KERALA V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA V, COCHIN REFINERIES (Shah, J.) 559\n\nNo instructions for supply were however given to the Company to supply the goods agreed to be purchased by the State.", "canonical_name": "KERALA V"}}, {"text": "March 9, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company instituted on March 9, 1953, an action against !"}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8361, "end_char": 8387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he State of Travancore-Cochin for a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Travanc<ire-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10092, "end_char": 10110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,50,000/-; and (2) the Company agreeing to sell and the State agreeing to purchao; e 3,000 tons of groundnut cake at the rate of 600 tons per month for five months to be supplied at any of the depots in the Travanc<ire-Cochin State as may from time to time be designated by the Director of Agriculture."}}, {"text": "Farran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12115, "end_char": 12121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Talia v. Babaji(1), Farran, C.J., observed :\n\n\"I am not, h9wever, . . ."}}, {"text": "Karamat Hussain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12541, "end_char": 12556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar observations were made in Rashik Lal v. Ram Narain arid others('), where Karamat Hussain, J., observed at p. 276 :\n\n\" . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12641, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sulaiman, J., in Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad and olhos(1) observed that once a document transferring immovable\n\nproperty has been registered, the transaction passes out of the domain of a mere contract and into one of a conveyance."}}, {"text": "KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13490, "end_char": 13496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KERALA >\".", "canonical_name": "KERALA V"}}, {"text": "Property Act and so much of the Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13550, "end_char": 13594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15152, "end_char": 15160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case before the House was a Scottish case, but the law of Scotland is not different on the matter under consideration from the F.nglish Jaw, and the Indian Contract Act closely follows the English Common Law in that matter."}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15243, "end_char": 15262, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_563_574_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "• B\n\n• D\n\n• H\n\n-,, , '/ --\n\nS. N. BOSE\n\nv. '\\\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR ', March 26, 1968 '\n\n.,;,\n\n[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]\n\nPre\"ention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), ss. 4(1), SA ond 6(1) (c)-Investigation by Inspector of Police after obtaining permission from First Class Afagistrate _to lay trap--Pernzission if sufficient for investiga- Iion-Rea.<>ons if to be ; ecOrded hy Alagistrate lvhile grcnting pernzission- Presumption under s. 4---Scope of and how rebutted-Sanction to prosecute-Granted by Chief Medical Officer of Rcilnay hospital a<; 'head of <lepartment-Accused a non-gazetted officer having prhileges of a-· ga:etted officer-uffeciencyr .:-\n\nThe appellant wits an assistant medical offiCCr in a_ railway hospital at Gaya.\n\nThough he had certain privileges ordinarily available to gazetted officers he was only a non-gazetted Class III officer. He was convicted for effcnC'es under s. 161 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) read \\\\ith s. S(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The complaint that be had received Hiegal gratification, \\vas investigated into by an Inspector of'. Police. The Inspector obtained permission from a First Class l\\Iagistrate for layin6 a trap, investigated into the case, and later, after th~ entire investigation was over. he obtained pcrmis.sion from the ~Iagistrate to investigate into the cas-::.\n\nThe sanction to prosecute :required under_ s. 6(1) of the Act, Was granted by the Chief l\\Icdical Officer, who was the hoad of tho Jcpartment.\n\nThe conviction \\\\'as _challenged on the fo1Iowing grounds: (1) The investigation \\Vas \\\\'ithout authority of la\\v, because, under s.\n\nSA,· the Inspector could not have investigated \\\\ithout the prior permission of a\n\n)Jagistrak~ of the First Class; (2) The permission granted by the l\\fagist'.ratc d_id not meet the -requirements of la\\V because, it was g!ven casually and '\"\"ithout applying his -mind to the question as to \\vhcther there was any need for departing from thenormal rule laid down in the section. namely, that such cases Should ordinarily be investigated by an officer of the rank of Dy. SuperintcnJcnt Of Police or above and there should be good reasons before a l\\lagistrate accords permission to officers below that rank; (3)- The presumption under s. 4 that the appc11ant h3.d accepted. - the sum as a mOtivc or reward should not be drawn unless t~ prosecution proved that the amouilt v.as paid as a bribe; ( 4) The presumption \\\\'aS\n\nrbuttcd by the appellant's explanation that \\\\'hat was paid to him was\n\nth~ return of a loan; and (5) the sanctionto p'rD!>ecute graritcd by the -Chief l\\fedieal Officer. \\Vas invalid as he -was not the authority competent to remove him; ·\n\nHELD : ( 1) There is no basis for the contention that. any portion of the investigation was done without authority of Jaw.\n\n[567 DJ. .\n\nInvestigation under s. 4(1) Cr. P.C. is one and indivisibleand includes all the steps taken by the Inspector to ascertain the truth of , the complaint allz-ging that the appellant \\vas attempting to obtain a bribe_.\n\nLaying a trap~ is a part of the investigation and a permission given under s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act enables the officer concerned not only to lay a trap but also to _further inv'2stigatc., The.fact that the I nspcctor of Police obtain-:!d t\\\\'O permissions, one for laying a trap and\n\n564 SUPRl!MB OOUllT llBPOl.1S\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nanother for investigating the case, does not alfect the eorlier order as the A SC-.\"Ond p-;!rmission was wholly superlluous. [566 G-H, 567 B-DJ\n\n(2) The ordet giving permission to the Inspector did not give ani reasons and there is thus a violation of s.. SA. But an illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not vitiate the mrult of a trial unless there was a miscarriage of justice. Jn the present ca!le the Icgalitv of the investigation was not challenged in the trial conn and prejudice tO the appellant was neither pleaded nor established. r568 ~D. F-0].\n\nB ( 3) Tho presumption under s. 4 arises when it is shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was nm legal remuneration. [569 DJ.\n\n( 4) The _words 'unless the contrary is proved' in s. 4( I) show that the presumption was to be rebutted by proof and not by a bale explanation which. i~ merely plausible. 1he burden resting on the accused \"ill C however ho satisfied if he establishes his case by a mere prePondermce oi probability and it is not necessary for him to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nJn the present case, the appellant's pica was not accepted by th.: trial court and the High Coutt and hence, it must be held that be had not\n\ndisarged the burden placed on him. [571 ~E].\n\nState of M.P. v. Mubarak A.Ii. [1959] 2 S.c.R.. 201, H. N. Risl1bm! and lnder Singh v. Sune of Delhi, (1955] 1 S.c.Il. 1150, Sfllte of U.P. ,. .\n\nD Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.R. 221, MlllUtllltll v. Sune <>.' U.P. A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 28, C. I. Enuln. >'. Stale of U.P. [1960] :!\n\nS.C.R. 592, Dhanvt111/1'11i Balwt111/1'11i Daai v. StaJe of Malumlshtra, A.l.R_.\n\n1964 S.C. 575 and V. D. lhangan v. State of U.P. [1966] 3 S.C.R. 736. followed.\n\n(5) Under s. 6(1) (c) of the Prevention of Cor'ruption Act, the appel lant couid n-ot be prosecuted without the previous sanction fJf the autho- E rity competent to remove him. Oral evidence of the officer gi\\\"ing sanction cannot be relied on for 4eciding the validity of the sanction. Tiie Court must be satisfied by reference to the rules on the snbject. Schedule II to the 1961 Rules relating to discipline and appeal of railway servants makes provision for the punishment of nilway servants employed in zonal railways.\n\nUnder the Schedule. a bead of a depattment was not mmpetent to impose on Class m officem the puoiabment of IelDO¥ll from\n\nservice. That punishment conld only be im-1 by an appointing autho- F rity or any other . higher authority. Under r. 134. the authorities competent to make first appointments to non-guetted pools arc the General Manager. the Chief Administrative Ofticer or a lower authority to whon1 he mcy dekgate power; but the power has notbeen delegat~ m head~ of departments.\n\nT'ttciefr4=~ !he Chief Med.ai Ollicer was neither the appointing authority nor was he competent to remove the appellant from his office.\n\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JUlllSDlcnON : al Appeal No. 109 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 4, l 967 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal J\\\"o.\n\nH 455 of 1965.\n\nDebobrata Mookherjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant B. P. !ha, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDegele, 1. In this appeal by special leave, Mr. Debabrata Mookherjea learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following contentions : (1) the investigation conducted in this case was without the authority of Jaw, (2) the nature. of the onus under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruptfon Act has been wrongly construed by the High Court as well as the trial court, and (3) the sanction granted under s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is invalid in Jaw as the authority who granted the same had no competence to do so.\n\nThe facts leading upto this appeal are these. The appellant was an assistant medical officer in the railway hospital at Gaya in the year 1964.\n\nPW 4 Doman Ram was a khalasi working under the inspector of works, Eastern Railway, Gaya. On March 2, 1964, as he was suffering from dysentery and stomach pain he was sent to the appellant along with a sick note for treatment.\n\nThe case of PW 4 was that when he went to the appellant for treatment the appellant demanded and received from him Rs. 2 as illegal gratification for treating him. Thereafter he was treated by the. appellant on the 5th, 7th; 9th and 12th of that month.\n\nBy the 12th he had completely recovered and therefore he wanted to rejoin duty and for that purpose he requested the appellant to give him a fitness certificate. For issuing him that certificate the appellant demanded Rs. 5 as bribe and he further told PW 4 that unless he paid him the said sum by March 14, 1964, he (appellant) would remove PW 4's name from the sick list. After this talk, when PW 4 was going out of the hospital he met a person by name Babu. He complained to Babu about the behaviour of the appellant. The said person told him that he would meet him again on March 14, 1964, but on March 14 Mr. A. C. Das PW 17, Inspector of Special Police Establishment, met PW 4 in his house and ascertained from him all that had happened. Thereafter PW 4 met PW 17 again at the railway station as desired by the latter. From there both of them went to the district Dak bunaa- Jow where PW 17 recorded the complaint\" of PW 4.\n\nThe sa;;,_e day PW 17 obtained from the First Class Magistrate an order under s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nThereafter, PW 4 produced before PW l 7 a five-rupee-currency note in the presence of panch witnesses. PW 17 noted the number of the currency note in question, prepared a memorandum in respect of the same, got it attested by the panch witnesses and thereafter re !llflled the said currency note to PW 4 to be given to the appellant m case he made any further demand for bribe. After these pre-\n\nIiminarle_s were over PW 4 went to the appellant along with the panch witnesses. There when PW 4 asked for the certificate the appellant repeated his earlier demand.\n\nThen PW 4 gave' him the currency' note in question.\n\nThis was seen by the pancll\n\n566 SUPREME COURT lll!POllTS [1968) J s.c.R.\n\nwitnesses.. Immediately signal was given to PW 17 who came to the hospital and asked the appellant to produce the five rupee note received by him from PW 4.\n\nAt this stage the appellant became extremely nervous.\n\nHe admitted that PW 4 had paid him Rs. 5 but that according to him. was a return of the loan given to him by the appellant. He produced the currency note in question. After investigation the appellant was charged under s. 161 IPC and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nThe plea of the appellant was that PW 4 and his wife were doing odd jobs in his house; PW 4 was a drunkard and hence was always in need; he used. to often borrow from him (appellant); he had borrowed Rs. 5 / - from him some days prior to the date of the trap and he returned that amount on that day. The appellant examined some witnesses in support of that plea.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court accepted the prosecution evidence; rejected the defence version and convicted the appellant both under s. 161, IPC as well ass. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They have given good reasons in support of the findings of fact reached by them. As this Court does not go into questions of fact except under exceptional circumstances, Mr.\n\nMookherjea primarily confined himself to the legal issues arising in the case.\n\nHis first contention was that the investigation held-in this case was without the authority of law and hence the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.\n\nHe urged that in view of s .. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, PW 17 who was only an Inspector of police could noi h_ave investigated the case without the prior pennission of a magistrate of the first class; on March 12, 1964 he merely applied for and obtained from a first class magistrate permission to lay a trap; the permission to investigate the case was obtained by him only on the 21st. but by that time the entire investigation was over; hence there was no valid investigation.\n\nThe applic.ation made by PW 17. on the 12th was under s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therein, it is true, he had only asked. for permission to lay a trap. It must be remembered that ihe permission given was one under s. 5A.\n\nA permission under ihat provision is a pennission to investigate the case. Laying the trap is a part of the investigation. It is so laid down by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali('). An investigation is one and indivisible.\n\nAll steps taken by PW 17 to ascertain the truth of the complaint made by PW 4 alleging that ihe appellant was attempting to obtain bribe from him, come within the expression 'investigation' under s. 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 'Investigation' includes all the proceedings\n\n\nB -\n\nunder the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or any person (other than a magistrate) who is authorised by a magistrate in this behalf. The scope of the expression 'investigate' found in s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was explained by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and lnder Singh v.\n\nState of Delhi(') and State of .Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi(\").\n\nSection 5A does not contemplate two sanctions, one for laying the trap, and , another for further investigation. Once an order under that provision is made that order covers the entie investigation.\n\nA permission given under that provision enables the officer concerned not only to lay a trap but also to hold further investigation.\n\nThere is no doubt that PW 17 was under a mistaken impression that he should obtain two permissions, one for laying the trap and another for investigating the case. Evidently because of that he applied for a second permission some days after the trap was laid.\n\nBut that permission v.ias wholly superfluous and the same does not affect the validity of the earlier order. Hence there is no basis for the contention that any portion of the investigation in this case was done without the authority of Jaw.\n\nIt was next urged that before granting the permission the learned magistrate did not apply hL~ mind to the question whether there was any need for granting the same.\n\nBefore permitting PW 17 he should have first ascertained whether any officer of the rank of Depnty Superintendent or above was not' immediately available to investigate the case, and whether there was any other reason for departing from the normal rule laid down by the legislature. namely, that cases of this nature should be investigated by officers of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or above. It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate made the order casually; he gave no reason in support of his order and hence the permission granted does not meet the requirements of the law. ·\n\nThe object of the legislature in enacting s. 5A was to see that the investigation of offences punishable under ss. 161, 165 or l 65A, IPC as well as those under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act should be done ordinarily by officers of the rank of deputy superintendent or allove.\n\nNo doubt s. 5 A also provides for an alternative procedure. An. officer below the rank of deputy superintendent can investigate those offences if he obtains the previous permission of a first-class magistrate. The legislature proceeded on the basis that except for good reasons the magistrate would not accord permission for officers below the rank of a deputy superintendent to investigate those offences.\n\nBut exigencies of dministrative convenience may . require that some of those\n\n(I) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 11 SO.\n\n(2) A.1.R.1964S.C. 221.\n\n568 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS [i968] 3 s.c.R.\n\ncases have to be investigated by officer.: below the rank of Deputy Superintendents. For that reason it was provided that in such cir.cumstances the permission of a magistrate of the first class shoulQ be .obtained. This Court has laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali(1) that the statutory safeguards under s. 5A must strictly be complied with for they are conceived in public interest and were provided as a guarantt; e against frivolous and vexatious proceedings. A magistrate. cannot surrender his discretion to a police officer but must exercise it having regard to the relevant material made available to him at the stage of granting permission. He must also be satisfied that there is reason owing to exigencies of the administrative convenience to entrust a subordinate officer with the investigation.\n\nIt is further observed therein that it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily on the face of it disclose the reasons for giving permission.\n\nThe order giving permission under s. SA in this case does not give any reason.\n\nOn the application submitted\n\nby PW 17 the learned magistrate merely ordered \"Permission granted\". PW 17 did not mention in 'his application any special reason for permitting him to investigate the case unless we con- D >ider the statement in the apJ:?lication \"Today is the date fixed for issuing the fit certificate after receiving a bribe money of Rs. 5 from him\" as impliedly a ground in support of his application. It is surprising that even after this Court pointed out the significance of s. 5A in several decisions there are still some magistrates and .police officers who continue to act in a casual manner. It is obvious that they are ignorant of the decisions of this Court. But the legality of the investigation held in this case does not appear to have been challenged in the trial court.\n\nThe charge levelled against the appellant is established by satisfactory evidenee and therefore all that we have now to see is whether the accused was prejudiced by the fact that investigation of this case was made by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent, as laid down\n\nby this Court in Munnalal v. Slate of Uttar Pradesh(') and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi(\"). No prejudice was pleaded much less established.\n\nAn illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless the miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby, See Rishbud and lnder Singh v. Slate of Delhi(').\n\nWe next take up the question as to the scope of ~. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As mentioned earlier, the appel- H\n\n(I) (1959] 2 S.C.R. 201.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 221.\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1964 S.C. 28.\n\n(4) (1955] 1 S.C.R.1150.\n\nlant admits the fact that he received a sum of Rs. 5 from PW 4 on March 14, 1964.\n\nOnce that fact is admitted by him, the court has to presume unless the contrary is proved by the appellant that he accepted the sum in question as a motive or reward for issuing the fit certificate. Mr. Mookherjea's contention was that the presumption in question does not arise unless the prosecution proves that the amount in question was paid as a bribe. He urged that the presumption under s. 4 arises only when the prosecution proves that the appellant had received \"any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any\n\nprson\". He laid stress on the word 'gratification' and according\n\nro him the word 'gratification' can only mean something that is given as a corrupt reward. If this contention of Mr. Mookherjea is correct then the presumption in question would become absolutely useless. It is not necessary to go into this question in any great detail as the question is no more res integra. In C.1. En:rden\n\nv. State of U .P. (1) this Court held that the \"presumption under s. 4 arose when it was shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word 'gratification' in s. 4(1) was given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction of appetite or desire; it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe.\" The Court further observed :\n\n\"If the word 'gratification' is construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe then it would be futile or superfluous to prescribe for the raising of the presumption. Technically it may no doubt be suggested that the object which the statutory presumption serves on this construction is that the court may then presume that the money was paid by way of a bribe as a motive or reward as required by s. 161 of the Code. In our opinion this could not have been the intention of the Legislature in prescribing the statutory presumption nuder s. 4(1). In the context we see no justification for not ving the word 'gratification' its literal dictionary meampg.\n\nThere is another consideration which supports this construction.\n\nThe presumption has also to be raised when it is shown that the accused person has received any valuable thing. This clause has reference to the offence punishable under s. 165 ot the Code; and there is no doubt that one of the essential ingredients of the said offence is that the valuable thing should have been received by the accused without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. It cannot be suggested that the relevant cfause in s. 4(1} OJ 11%0J 2 s.c.R: 592.\n\nwhich deals with the acceptance of any valuable thing should be interpreted to impose upon the prosecutiou an obligation to prove not only that the valuable thing has been received by the accused but that it has been received by him without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. The plain meaning of this clause undoubtedly requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything more.\n\nIf that is the true position in respect of the construction of this part of s. 4( 1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word 'gratification' in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but the incriminating character of the said payment.\n\nIt is true that the Legislature might have used the word 'money' or 'consideration' as has been done by the relevant section of the English statute; but if the dictionary meaning of the word 'gratification' fits in with the scheme of the section and leads to the same result as the meaning of the word. 'valuable thiRg' mentioned in the same clause, we see no justification for adding any clause to qualify the word 'gratification'; the view for which the appellant contends in effect amounts to adding a qualifying clause to describe gratification.\"\n\nThe same view was taken by this Court in Dhanvantrai Ra/wamrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra(') and again in V. D. Jhangan v.\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(').\n\nIt was next contended that to discharge the burden placed on the appellant under s. 4 all that he has to do is to offer a reasonable explanation, the burden placed on him by s. 4(1) being somewhat analogous to that placed on an accused under s. 114 of the Evidence Act. This branch of thei law is also Well-settled bv the decisions of this Court. Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides that the court !\\lay presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.\n\nUnder that provision the court is not bound to draw any presumption of fact. It is within its discretion to draw a presumption or not.\n\nBut under s. 4(1) the court is bound to draw the presumption mentioned therein.\n\nThe presumption in question will hold good unless the accused proves the contrary. In other words, the burden of proving the contrary is squarely placed on the accused. A fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it the court either believes it to exist or con-\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1964 S.C. 515.\n\n\nsiders its existence was so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists. The proof given by the accused must satisfy the aforementioned conditions. If it does not satisfy those conditions then he cannot be said to have proved the contrary.\n\nIn Dhanvantrai Balwantrai v. State of Maharashtra(') this Court considered the nature of the proof required to be given by the accused under s. 4(1). Therein this Court held that the urden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as that placed on him under s. 114 of the Evidence Act and the same cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by him is reasonable and probable.\n\nIt must further be shown that the explanation is a true one.\n\nThe words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in that provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible.\n\nThe same view was taken by this Court in V, D. Jhangan v. State of U ttar Pradesh (2) . But at the same time it was mentioned in that decisign that the burden resting on the accused will be satisfied if the accµsed person establishes his case by a preponderance of probability and it is not necessary for him to establish his case by the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the nature of the burden placed on him is not the same as that placed on prosecution which must not only prove its case but prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case the evidence adduced by the appellant in support of his plea was not accepted by the trial court as well as the High Court. Hence it must be held that he had not discharged the burden placed on him by law.\n\nThis takes us to the last point urged by Mr. Mookherjea namely that the sanction to prosecute granted fiy PW 1, the chief medical officer, under s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is invalid as he as not the authority competent to remove the ap pellant from his office and hence the prosecution is vitiated. Section 6 (1), to the extent it is material for our present purpose, reads : • \"No court shall take cognizance of an offence punish• able under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Pertal Code, or under sub'section (2) or sub-section ~A of section 5 .of this Act, alleged to have been. comm1ttd bt a public servant, except with the previous sanct10n ..\n\n(a)\n\n(~ . . (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.\"\n\n(I) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 575.\n\n(2) [1966] 3 SC R 736 L7 Sup. Cl/68-12 . . . . .\n\nThis Court has laid down in R. R. Chari v. State of UP. (1); Bil well as in several other decisions that no court can validly take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned in s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act without the previous sanction of the authority ompetent to remove from office the accused. Without a valid sanction the court had no jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nHence, if the sanction accorde4 in this case is invalid then the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.\n\nP.W. 1 deposed that the appellant was a class ill officer and that he could have been appointed or dismissed by the Deputy Agent Personnel who is subordinate to him. Therefore he (P.W. 1) was competent to grant previous sanction under s. 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. P. W. 1 's assertion that the appellant could have been removed from his office either by the Deputy Agent Personnel or by himself was challenged in his cross-examination.\n\nThe trial court as well as the High Court have relied on the oral evidence of P.W. 1 in coming to the conclusion that the sanction granted is valid. In our opinion those courts erred in relying on oral evidence in deciding the validity of the sanction granted. Hence, we asked the .learned counsel for the respondent t.o satisfy us with reference to the rules on the subject that P.W. 1 was competent to remove the appellant from his office. For this purpose wo granted him several adjournments. Though our attention has now been invited to some rules, those rules do not estab- }ish that P. W. 1 as competent to grant the sanction in question.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was a gazetted officer and therefore he . could be removed only by the Railway Board.\n\nThis contention does not appear to be correct.\n\nAs seen from the Government of India, Ministry of Railways' publication under the title \"authorised scales oi pay'', the appellant is a class III officer. From that publication it is further seen that only class I and Il officers are designated as gar.etted officers. In support of his contention that he was a gazetted officer, the appellant relied on the Railway Board's letter No. PC/60/PS-S/MH- 3 dated 2-3-1962. Paragraph 4 of that letter-the only relevant paragraph for our present purpose--i; ays that an assistant surgeon after five years service shall hold the honorary gazetted rank and shall be entitled to the usual privileges granted to gar.etted officers in matters such as passes,. allotment of quarters. This letter merely indicates that the officers mentioned therein are entitled to certain privileges which are ordinarily available to gazetted officers.\n\nWe are unable to read that letter as raising the rank of the appellant to that of a gazetted officer. Therefore we proceed on the basis that the appellan_t was a non-gazetted officer. But the question still remains whether P.W. 1 was competent to remove him\n\n(I) ll963J l S.C.R. 121.\n\nfrom service. In view of appendix 38 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code Vol. II (4th re-print, dated 26-7-1962), we may take it that P. W. 1 was the head of the department to which the appellant belongs. The next question is whether the head of his department was competent to remove the appellant from his service.\n\nAs per r. 134 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, published in 1959, authorities competent to make first appointment to non-gazetted posts in the Indian Railways are the General Manager, the Chief Administrative Officer or lower authority to whom he may delegate power. There is no evidence to show that this power has been delegated to the heads of the department. No provision in the Indian Railway Establishment Code 1959 prescribing the authorities competent to remove from office a class Ill officer was brought to our notice. But the prefatory note to Vol. I of the Code says, \"The revised Chapter XVII and revised Appendices I and XII will be printed later for inclusion in this edition.\n\nTill such times these are printed, the rules and provisions contained in Chapter XVII and Appendices IV and XVIIl in the 1951 Edition (Reprint) as amended from time to time shall continue to apply.\"\n\nIn 1961 new rules relating to discipline and appeal of railway servants other than employed in the railway protection force have been published. Rule 1701 says, \"Without prejudice to the provisions of any Jaw, for the time being in force, relating to the conduct of Government servants, or to the rules made under section 47 (e) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890), the conduct of railway servants shall be governed by the rules contained in Appendix VIIl.\" Our attention has not been invited to any rules made under s. 47 (e). of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 or any other statutory rules. Hence we are proceeding on the basis that the aforementioned r. 1701 governs the present case. Rule 1705 says that the authorities who are competent to place a railway servant under suspension and to impose penalties on him are specified in the Schedules I, JI and Ill appended to the Rules.\n\nRule 1707 sets out the various punishments that may be imposed on a railway servant,. which includes removal from service as well as dismissal from service. Schedule I deals with railway servants employed in the Railway Board's office, the Research, Design and Standard. Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above. Schedule I does not apply to the case of railway\n\ns:ryant~ employi;<I in the zonal railways. As regards them, prov1s1on 1s made m Sch. JI.\n\nFrom that Schedule it is seen that though a head of the Department can impose on Class Ill officers\n\ncensure as well as some other punishments detailed therein, he is not competent to impose on them the punishment of removal from service, compulsory retirement or dismissal from service.\n\nThose punishments, as seen from the Schedule, can be imposed on them only by the appointing authority or any other higher authority. P.W. 1 is not shown to be the appointing authority.\n\nOn the material before us it is not possible to come to the conclusion that P.W. 1 was competent to grant sanction under s. 6 ( 1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nWe accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant. He is on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nA ppea/ allowed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "S. N. BOSE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.N. 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HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439, "end_char": 443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4(1), SA ond 6(1) (c)-Investigation by Inspector of Police after obtaining permission from First Class Afagistrate _to lay trap--Pernzission if sufficient for investiga- Iion-Rea.<>ons if to be ; ecOrded hy Alagistrate lvhile grcnting pernzission- Presumption under s. 4---Scope of and how rebutted-Sanction to prosecute-Granted by Chief Medical Officer of Rcilnay hospital a<; 'head of <lepartment-Accused a non-gazetted officer having prhileges of a-· ga:etted officer-uffeciencyr .:-\n\nThe appellant wits an assistant medical offiCCr in a_ railway hospital at Gaya."}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1386, "end_char": 1393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3113, "end_char": 3151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 3997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4183, "end_char": 4191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5152, "end_char": 5159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5499, "end_char": 5510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Med.ai Ollicer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Chief Med.ai Ollicer was neither the appointing authority nor was he competent to remove the appellant from his office."}}, {"text": "Debobrata Mookherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debobrata Mookherjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant B. P. !", "canonical_name": "Debobrata Mookherjee"}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debobrata Mookherjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant B. P. !"}}, {"text": "B. P. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6548, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Debobrata Mookherjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant B. P. !"}}, {"text": "Degele", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDegele, 1."}}, {"text": "Debabrata Mookherjea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6672, "end_char": 6692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal by special leave, Mr. Debabrata Mookherjea learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following contentions : (1) the investigation conducted in this case was without the authority of Jaw, (2) the nature.", "canonical_name": "Debobrata Mookherjee"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6877, "end_char": 6881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7026, "end_char": 7030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7038, "end_char": 7066, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Doman Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7301, "end_char": 7310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 4 Doman Ram was a khalasi working under the inspector of works, Eastern Railway, Gaya."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2, 1964, as he was suffering from dysentery and stomach pain he was sent to the appellant along with a sick note for treatment."}}, {"text": "5th, 7th; 9th and 12th of that month", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7739, "end_char": 7775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant on the 5th, 7th; 9th and 12th of that month."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 as bribe and he further told PW 4 that unless he paid him the said sum by March 14, 1964, he (appellant) would remove PW 4's name from the sick list."}}, {"text": "Babu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8233, "end_char": 8237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this talk, when PW 4 was going out of the hospital he met a person by name Babu."}}, {"text": "March 14 Mr.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said person told him that he would meet him again on March 14, 1964, but on March 14 Mr. A. C. Das PW 17, Inspector of Special Police Establishment, met PW 4 in his house and ascertained from him all that had happened."}}, {"text": "A. C. Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8392, "end_char": 8401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said person told him that he would meet him again on March 14, 1964, but on March 14 Mr. A. C. Das PW 17, Inspector of Special Police Establishment, met PW 4 in his house and ascertained from him all that had happened."}}, {"text": "Dak bunaa- Jow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there both of them went to the district Dak bunaa- Jow where PW 17 recorded the complaint\" of PW 4."}}, {"text": "SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8790, "end_char": 8828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9960, "end_char": 9963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9968, "end_char": 9975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9986, "end_char": 9996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10004, "end_char": 10032, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10552, "end_char": 10555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10581, "end_char": 10609, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mookherjea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10786, "end_char": 10796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As this Court does not go into questions of fact except under exceptional circumstances, Mr.\n\nMookherjea primarily confined himself to the legal issues arising in the case."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11059, "end_char": 11087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11237, "end_char": 11251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He urged that in view of s .. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, PW 17 who was only an Inspector of police could noi h_ave investigated the case without the prior pennission of a magistrate of the first class; on March 12, 1964 he merely applied for and obtained from a first class magistrate permission to lay a trap; the permission to investigate the case was obtained by him only on the 21st."}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11567, "end_char": 11572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11580, "end_char": 11608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11742, "end_char": 11747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12190, "end_char": 12197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12205, "end_char": 12231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12502, "end_char": 12507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12515, "end_char": 12543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12686, "end_char": 12696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14368, "end_char": 14373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 161, 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14437, "end_char": 14449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14460, "end_char": 14463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14487, "end_char": 14491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14527, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14624, "end_char": 14628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 11", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15105, "end_char": 15123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15521, "end_char": 15526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17995, "end_char": 18023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1959] 2 S.C.R. 201", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18065, "end_char": 18084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18166, "end_char": 18170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lant admits the fact that he received a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18643, "end_char": 18647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19262, "end_char": 19266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19420, "end_char": 19427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20141, "end_char": 20148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20495, "end_char": 20501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22390, "end_char": 22394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22483, "end_char": 22490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22551, "end_char": 22557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22656, "end_char": 22667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23099, "end_char": 23106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23949, "end_char": 23956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24092, "end_char": 24098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25436, "end_char": 25443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25451, "end_char": 25479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25608, "end_char": 25617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25752, "end_char": 25763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25767, "end_char": 25778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25782, "end_char": 25793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25867, "end_char": 25876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SC R 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26120, "end_char": 26137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26344, "end_char": 26351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26359, "end_char": 26387, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26892, "end_char": 26896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26908, "end_char": 26936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27961, "end_char": 27980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As seen from the Government of India, Ministry of Railways' publication under the title \"authorised scales oi pay'', the appellant is a class III officer."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27982, "end_char": 28002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As seen from the Government of India, Ministry of Railways' publication under the title \"authorised scales oi pay'', the appellant is a class III officer."}}, {"text": "2-3-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28351, "end_char": 28359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PC/60/PS-S/MH- 3 dated 2-3-1962."}}, {"text": "26-7-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29211, "end_char": 29220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II (4th re-print, dated 26-7-1962), we may take it that P. W. 1 was the head of the department to which the appellant belongs."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29579, "end_char": 29594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As per r. 134 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, published in 1959, authorities competent to make first appointment to non-gazetted posts in the Indian Railways are the General Manager, the Chief Administrative Officer or lower authority to whom he may delegate power."}}, {"text": "No provision in the Indian Railway Establishment Code 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29799, "end_char": 29857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30643, "end_char": 30653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No provision in the Indian Railway Establishment Code 1959", "statute": "No provision in the Indian Railway Establishment Code 1959"}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30665, "end_char": 30690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30855, "end_char": 30860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30873, "end_char": 30898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "JI and Ill appended to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31187, "end_char": 31219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31379, "end_char": 31389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JI and Ill appended to the Rules", "statute": "JI and Ill appended to the Rules"}}, {"text": "Research, Design and Standard. Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31462, "end_char": 31505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schedule I deals with railway servants employed in the Railway Board's office, the Research, Design and Standard."}}, {"text": "Railway Staff College, Baroda", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31511, "end_char": 31540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31546, "end_char": 31591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Railway S.:i:'ice Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31597, "end_char": 31625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Railwy Rates Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31631, "end_char": 31652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Railway L1a1son Office", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31658, "end_char": 31680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Organisation, the Railway Staff College, Baroda, the Advanced Permanent Way Training School, Poona, the Railway S.:i:'ice Commission, the Railwy Rates Tribunal, the Railway L1a1son Office and all other ratlway offices which are not enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31743, "end_char": 31753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JI and Ill appended to the Rules", "statute": "JI and Ill appended to the Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32479, "end_char": 32483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32496, "end_char": 32524, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_575_586_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "B. S. VADERA\n\n''\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 27, 1968\n\n[M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nConstilution of India, Art. 309-Railway Establishn1ent Code, r. 157- Rc.ilway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Reorganisation) Scheme\n\nfr<11ned in 1957 hut nJade applicable from 1954-Board's power to frame rules with retrospective effect.\n\nThe petitioners who were wo'rking as Assistants were by the operation of the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Reorganisation) Scheme reverted as Upper Division CleTks in 1967. The said scheme was framed on Febtuary 5, 1957 but was brought into effect from December 1, 1954. Certain modifications to the scheme relating to the manner of filling. up of permanent and temporary vacancies in Grade I of the Service were made in 1963.\n\nThe. petitioners came to this Court under A'rt. 32 of the Constitution, challenging the orders of reversion passed against them as illegal. On behalf of respondents the o'rders were defended as being based on the order of seniority which had been re-fixe<l according to the said Scheme. The contentions advanced on behalf of .the petitioners were:· (i) That their promotion as Upper Division Clerks and later as Assistants had beeti. on a permanent basis and could not be disturbed;\n\n(ii) That the Scheme as well as the various orders passed by the respondents weTe violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; (iii) That the second respondent (Railway Board) had no power in law, to frame either the Scheme, or the modified Scheme so as to have retrospective effect from December I. 1954.\n\nHELD : (i) The ranking given to the petitioners as a result of which the impugned orders of reversion were passed was in accordance with the Scheme as . modified in 1963..\n\nOn the facts, the contention of the petitioners that their. appointment as Upper Division Clerks and later as F Assistants was on a permanent basis, could not be accepted. [582 B-C]\n\n(ii) Once it was held that the petitioners did not satisfy the requirements of the scheme for being retained as Assistants there was no question of any discrimination under .Art. 14 or violation of Art. 16 arising for consideration at all. (582 G]\n\n(iii) The Indian Railway Esiablishment Code has been issued by the President in exercise of the powers vested in him by th~ proviso to Art 309 of the Constitution'.\n\nRule 151 of the Code gives the Railway Board full powers to make rules of a general application to non-gazetted railway servants under their control. If full effect is given to: the wordS in Art. 309, namely 'and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act', then in the absence of any Act as afore.,.aid in the .pre.sent case, th~ power to make rules with retrospective effect ~.caiinot be .. demed to the Radway Board; Accordingly the Scheme fralll\"..d by the satd Board 10 1957 could be made retrospectively effective from December I, 1954. [583 E, 584 H, A-El\n\nState v. Padmanahhacharya, [19661 I S.C.R. 994 and Nagarajan v.\n\nMysore, [1966) 3 S.C.R1. 682. consideTed.\n\nRam Autar v. State of U.P. A.J.R., 1962 All. 328 F.B. approved.\n\nGovindaraju v. State of Mysore,\n\nA.I.R. 1963 Mys. 265 and Garindappa v. J.G. of Registration, A.J.R. 1965 Mys. 25, disapproyed.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 96 and 16S of 1967.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nS. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo. 96 of 1967).\n\nA. K. Sen, A. P. Chatterjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the Petitioner (in W.P. No. 16S of 1967).\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in both the petitions).\n\ni3. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos. 3, 6 to 9, 13, lS, 17, 18, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31, 36, 39, to 4S, 47, SO, S3 to SS, S8, 61, 64, 66, 69, 76, 77, 81, 82, 87, 91, 94, 96, 97, 103 to lOS, 108, 123, 136 and lSO (in W.P. No. 96 of 1967).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. In both these writ petitions, under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners seek to have quashed, certain orders passed by the 2nd respondent and, in particular; the order dated June 16, 1967, reverting them, as Upper Division Clerks, with effect from June 9, 1967. The Union of India, through the Chairman, Railway Board, and the Secretary, Railway Board, are respondents 1 and 2, respectively, in these proceedings. The other respondents are officers, working under the 2nd respondent, who, according to the petitioners, have been given preferential treatment, by way of promotion, under the orders, impugned, in these proceedings.\n\nAt the outset, it may be stated, that the various orders, passed by the 2nd respondent, referred to, by both the petitioners, are one and the same, and therefore, we shall refer to those proceedings, in accordance with the annexure number, given to them, in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967. Wherever necessary, we shall advert to any separate order, that has been referred to, by the petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 16S of 1967.\n\nAccording to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, he joined service, on July 16, 1955, as Lower Division Clerk, was promoted, with effect from February 2, 19S7, as Upper Division Clerk and further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3,\n\n1958.\n\nHis grievance is that while he was holding the post of such Assistant, from 1958, he has been illegall~, and without any justification, reverted, as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from June 9, 1967, as per the impugned order, dated June 16, 1967 (Annexure 16). Similarly, according to the petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, he joined as a Lower Division Clerk, on September 14, 1954, was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from February 2, 1957 and was further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3, 1958. His grievance is that while he was so holding the post of Assistant, from 1958, he has been illegally, and without any justification, reverted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from June 9, 1967, as per Annexure 16.\n\nAccording to the Railway Board, these promotions, made of the petitioners, either as Upper Division Clerk, in the first instance, or, later, as Assistant, were purely on a temporary and ad hoc basis, pending the framing of the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service (Re-organization) Scheme, which was in contemplation, at the material time. The Scheme (Annexure 4), was actually framed on February 5, 1957, and the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service was to be organized, in the manner, set out therein.\n\nUnder this Scheme, there were to be two grades of service-(i) Grade I-Upper Division Clerk; and\n\n(ii) Grade Il-'-Lower Division Clerk.\n\nThe authorised pennanent strength of the Service, in Grade I, was fixed at 45, and of Grade II, at 82.\n\nThe initial constitution of the service, was to be with effect from December 1, 1954.\n\nOn March 30, 1963, some of the provisions, contained in Annexure 4, were modified, by Annexure 7.\n\nOne of the modifications, effected undtir Annexure 7, related to the manner of filling up of pennanent vacancies and temporary vacancies, in Grade I of the Service, and this modification was also to have effect, from the date of the initial constitution of the Service, viz., December 1, 1954.\n\nIn 1965, a final panel was drawn up, strictly on the basis of the Scheme, for promotion to the Grade of Upper Division Clerks, in which the names of all the Lower Division Clerks were arranged, strictly -in accordance with their seniority positions, in that Grade. Accordingly, the names of the petitioners, who had been promoted as Officiating Upper Division Clerks, in 1957 were entered, in that panel, in accordance with their inter s;\n\nsniority as Lower Division .Clerks. As the posts of Upper Divismn Clerks were non-selectton posts, so far as promotion quota was cocei:n.ed, they had to be lied in, on the basis of senioritycu.m,-mtab1hty and hence a parttcular officer's seniority, as Lower\n\nD1vmon Clerk, was duly reflected, in his seniority as Upper\n\nDivision Clerk. Similarly, Upper Division Clerks, who were promoted as officiating Assistants, were also promoted, on the basis of their seniority, in the Upper Division Clerks' Grade and, therefore, their seniority, ie-Lower Division Clerks' Grade, was thus reflected in the -Assistants' Grade.\n\nThe petitioners were required to be reverted, for such Upper Division Clerks, who were senior to them, being posted in the Grade of Assistants.\n\nEffort, however, was made, to avoid hardship to persons, like the petitioners, who were functioning as Assistants, by deciding to make available, vacancies in the Assistants' Grade, by promotion and by curtailing the quota, reserved for direct recruits; but the petitioners could not be continued as Assistants, for an indefinite period, as difficulty arose, when there was contraction, in the Cadres, by some of the Section Officers, being reverted, as Assistants, in June 1967. This, in consequence, resulted in the reversion of certain Assistants, including the petitioners, to the posts of Upper Division Clerks. The reversions themselves were made, strictly in the reverse order of seniority. According to the Railway Board, the petitioner, in Writ Petition 96 of 1967 is still a temporary Lower Division Clerk, and he has not been even confinned in that Grade, because he has not passed the requisite typing test. It is further stated that the petitioner, in Writ Petition 165 of 1967 is even now not a permanent Upper Division Clerk, and that he was confirmed. as Lower Division Clerk, in 1966, with effect from September 14, 1957. Therefore, according to the Railway Board, the impugned orders were a!! valid and legal and did not contravene any provisions ofthe Constitution, nor did they infringe any of the rights of the petitioners.\n\nIn order to appreciate the arguments, addressed before us, on behalf of the petitioners, and respondents I and 2, it is necessary to give, in chronological order, the events, leading up to the filing of these writ petitions.\n\nOn August 22, 1956, the second respondent issued a Circular, Annexure 1, about having decided to hold a test, for drawing up a panel of staff considered suitable for promotion, to the Grade of Assistants.\n\nThe categories of staff, eligible to appear for the test, as well as the subject$ for the written tests, were mentioned, therein. There is no controversy legal and did not contravene any provisions of the Constitution, examination, and they also successfully got through the interview.\n\nThe second respondent simultaneously took a decision that posts of Upper Division Clerks, which were introduced at about that time, may also be filled up, on the basis of the results of the test, which was, no doubt, primarily held for the purpose of filling the posts of Assistants. The criterion for promoting Lower Division Clerks, to the posts of Upper Division Clerks and Assistants, was, that persons, who obtained 50% or more of the marks, were\n\nto be promoted, as Officiating Assistants, and those w!::; obtained between 40 and 49%, were to be promoted, as Officiating Upper Division Clerks. Their inter se seniority was also to be, in accordance with their inter se seniority, as Lower Division Clerks. As both the petitioners had passed the test, they were promoted, as Officiating Upper Division Clerks, with effect from February 2,\n\n1957. The order, appointing the petitioners, as Officiating Upper Divbion Clerks, is Annexure 3, dated February 1, 1957. It is the claim of the petitioners that they were promoted, on a regular basis, as Upper Division Clerks, and that a panel of Assistants and Upper Division Clerks, was formed, by the 2nd respondent.\n\nMennwhile, the framing of a scheme for the Rauway Board Secretariat Clerical Service, was in the offing, and such a scheme, was ultimately issued, under Annexure 4, on February 5, 1957.\n\nThe 2nd respondent has filed a statement, regarding the circumstances, under which the Scheme was framed, in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The scheme was for filling the posts of Lower Division Clerks, Upper Division Clerks and such of the Upper Division Clerks who can be promoted as Assistants.\n\nParagraph 14, subparas (1) and (3), dealt with the filling up of posts of Grade I, Upper Division Clerks, of the Clerical Service.\n\nThat provided for 'the different manner in which the permanent vacancies, and temporary vacancies, were to be filled up, in the authorized strength of Grade I of the Service. Under paragraph 14, sub-para 1 (b), promotion to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks, can only be made of permanent Lower Division Clerks, for permanent vacancies, and, under paragraph 14. sub-para (3), only permanent Lower Division Clerks. and temporary Lower Division Clerks, with more than three years' standing, and graduate Lower Division Clerks, could be promoted to Temporary vacancies in the Cadre.\n\nBut, in view of the non-availability of permanent Lower Division Clerks, the Scheme could not be implemented to fill permanent vacancies, immediately.\n\nSimilarly, under para 16 of the Scheme, permanent Upper Division Clerks, with three years' service in the grade, or in a higher grade, were eligible for promotion, as Assistants.\n\nBut, here again, no permanent Upper Division Clerks were available. at that time.\n\nAs certain vacancies existed, in the posts of Assistants, and required to be filled up, as a purely short-term measure, it was decided, by the 2nd respondent, that some of the posts of Assistants, may be temporarily filled up, by promotion from Upper Division Clerks. In view of this decision, the petitioners were promoted, as Assistants, on an ad hoc basis with effect from February 3, 1958, under Annexure 5, dated February l, 1958. That order clearly shows that the petitioners, including others, who were officiating as Upper Division Clerks,\n\nwere promoted to officiate, as Assistants, on a purely short-tenn\n\narrangt:;:!nt. It was further stated, in paragraph 5, of this Annexure, that the promotion is a purely short-term arrangement, till qualified Assistants become available, and that the promotion, under that order, will not confer, on the promotees, any claim for retention, as Assistants, as a long-term measure.\n\nIt may also be stated, at this stage, that it is the claim, of\n\nbot~ the petiioners, that the)'. have been promoted, on a regular basis, as Assistants, under this Order, and that, in consequence, the order of reversion, passed on June 16, 1967, is illegal. That contention is clearly belied, by the express terms of the Order, Annexure 5, promoting these petitioners.\n\nLater on, in or about 1959. as there were vacancies in the grade of Upper Division Clerks; a panel was drawn, by the 2nd respondent, called 'Interim Provision Panel', to fill in temporary vacancies, and certain Lower Division Clerks were considered suitable, for promotion. as Upper Division Clerks, again, on a purely short-term arrangement. That is Exhibit 6, dated June 24, 1959.\n\nOn March 3-0, 1963, the, original Service Scheme, Annexure 4, was amended in certain material particulars, by Apnexure 7.\n\nParagraph 14, of the original Scheme, was modified, by providing a different method of J'lromotion, to Grade I (Upper Division Clerks).\n\nUnder this modified scheme, the distinction between the manner of recruitment, in respect of pennanent vacancies, and temporary vacancies, which existed in the original scheme, was done away with.\n\nThe modified scheme provided a uniform method of promotion, to both permanent vacancies, in 'the autho rized strength of Grade I Service, as well as temporary vacancies.\n\nBroadly, the method of appointment, to this Grade, was :\n\n(a) 80%, by promotion of pennanent Lower Divi$ion Clerks and temporary Lower Division Clerks, with more than three years of service in the Grade, on the basis of seniority, subject to rejection of the unfit; (b) 20%, on the basis of competitive examination, limited to the Lower Division Clerks.\n\nIn 1965, a final panel was drawn up, according to the Railway Board, on the basis of the Scheme, Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7. That panel consisted of Lower Division Clerks, fit for promotion to the grade of Upper Division Clerks.\n\nTe Lower Division Clerks were arranged, strictly in accordance with their seniority position, in that Grade.\n\nThe final panel is Annexure 14, dated March 30, 1965; and, according to the pell tioner in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, he has lost 148 places, and according to the petitioner, in the connected writ petition. he has lost 110 places, in seniority.\n\nBoth the petitioners are aggrieved about the ranking, given to them, in this list.\n\nA On June 9, 1967, under .Annexure 18, the Railway Board had reverted, to the grade of Assistants, with immediate effect, the Ofliciating Section Officers, shown therein. In consequence, under Annexure 16, dated June 16, 1967, which is one of the orders, under attack, in boJh these petitions, the Railway Board reverted, as Upper Division Clerks, several officiating Assistants, including B the two petitioners, herein, with effect from June 9,\n\n1967. As mentioned earlier, the main grievance of the petitioners is, that they having been promoted, as Assistants, as early as February 3, 1958, and which posts they had been holding till 1967, their reversion, as Upper Division Clerks, under Annexure 16, is illegal and void.\n\nC We have referred to the relevant orders, promoting these two petitioners, in the first instance, as Upper Division Clerks and, later, as Assistants. The order promoting the petitioners, as Assistants, Annexure 5, dated February 1, 1958, has been referred to, already, and that order clearly shows that the promotion was only a short-term, temporary arrangement, on ari offi- D ciating basis, and that no claim could be based upon that promotion. No doubt, the order, Annexure 3, dated February 1, 1957, promoting the petitioners, as Upper_ Division Clerks, may, on a superficial reading of that order, give the impression that the promotion, is on a permanent basis, and from which further promotion is to be made, to the Grade of Assistants, but, in view of what is stated, on behalf of the Railway Board, the promotion, E under Annexure 3, is again, a temporary promotion, because the\n\nScheme, Annexure 4, was to c_ome into force, within a very short time, and that the promotions were made, only on a provisional basis. The regular promotions, or appointments, to Upper Division Grade, which is styled as Grade I, were to be made, as envisaged under the Scheme, Annexure 4, dated February 5, 1957.\n\nF Both the petitioners have, categorically, averred in their petitions. that Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7, has retrospective effect, from December 1, 1954.\n\nThe secqnd respondent has also given various particulars, regarding as' to how the framing of the Scheme originated, as\n\nvel\\ as the different stages, it had to pass through.\n\nIn fact, it G 1s also seen, from the documents filed, on behalf of the respondent, that there was a suggestion, by either the Home Ministry, or the Union Public Service Commission, that the Scheme was to come into effect, on the date it was promulgated; but that was met, by the Board, by replying that an assurance had been given to the staff, to whom the Scheme had been circulated, iliat the H crucial date, for initial constitution of the Scheme, was to be fixed as December 1, 1954. In fact, a reading of Annexures 4 and 7, also clearly shows that the initial constitution of the Service, is to be from December 1, 1954, and it is, on that basis,\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat appointments, or promotions, are o be made. Once it is held that the initial constitution of the Service, is from the date, mentioned above, on the basis of Annexure ,4, read with Annexure 7, it follows that the promotion of the petitioners, as Upper Division Clerks, under Annexure 3, was not under the Scheme, but really -on a provisional, or temporary basis.\n\nNotwithstanding the fact that the grievance of both the petitioners is that ranking has not been given to them properly, in Exhibit 16, we are satisfied that it is in accordance with the principles, under the Scheme Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7.\n\nTherefore, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the petitioners that there has been a promotion, on a permanent basis, in the first instance, as Upper Division Clerks and, later, as Assistants, which cannot be disturbed, by any orders that may be passed, by the 2nd respondent. We have already indicated that the 'regular promotions and appointments have to be made, under the Scheme, with effect from December 1, 1954.\n\nIn particular, a contention has been raised, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, that he stands on a different footing, in that he is a permanent Lower Division Clerk and, therefore, his promotion, as an Assistant, must, again, have been, on a permanent basis. There is no substance, in this contention, in view of the statement, made by the 2nd respondent, that this petitioner was confirmed, as a Lower Division Clerk, in 1966 with effect from Sep.tember 14, 1957, in which case it follows that he will not be eligible, for promotion, as an Upper Division Clerk, under the Scheme. The petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 96 of 1967, as pointed out, by the 2nd respondent, continues, even now, as a temporary Lower Division Clerk, and he has not been made permanent, and, therefore, he-cannot certainly be considered eligible, for promotion, under the Scheme.\n\nA further contention has been taken, on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, that the Scheltle, as well as the various orders, passed by the 2nd respondent, violate the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16, of the Constitution, Inasmuch as he has been deprived of the benefits of Chapters II and III, of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual. Once it is held that the said petitioner does not satisfy the requirement of the SClieme,\n\nthere is no question of any discrimination, under Art. 14, or violation of Art. 16, arising for consideration at all. Therefore, both the petitioners, will have to fail, on merits.\n\nA more serious contention has, however, been taken, by the petitioners, that the second respondent has no power, in law, to frame, either the Scheme, Annexure 4, or the modified Scheme, Annexure 7 so as to have retrospective effect, from December 1,\n\n1954. Tho'ugh both the petitioners have raised this contention\n\nin the writ petitions, Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 165 of 1967, was not prepared to take up that extreme position, because, his attempt, was to show that his client satisfies the requirement of the qualifications, laid down for promotion, in Annexure 4, read with Annexure 7. We have already negatived that contention; but this legal contention has been persisted, before us, by Mr. K. L. Mehta, counsel appearing for the petitioner, in Writ Petition No 96 of 1967.\n\nMr. Mehta, by reference to the provisions of the Indian Railway Board Act, 1905 (Act IV of 1905), and to the decision of this Court in State v. Padmanabhacharya('), urged that the 2nd respondent had no power to frame a rule, having retrospective .effect. In our opimon, this contention cannot be accepted.\n\nAct IV of 1905 is an Act to provide for investing the Railway Board with certain pcwers of functions, unde~ the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The preamble to that Act shows that a Railway Board has been constituted, for controlling the administration of Railways in India. Section 2 provides that the Central Govern- ment, may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, invest the Railway Board, either absolutely, or subject to conditions, with powers, or functions, stated therein.\n\nThat statute, does not,. in any way, advance the petitioners' contention. As we shall presently. show, the decision of this Court, referred to above, does not also support the pftitioners.\n\nThere is no controversy that the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in exercise of the powers, vested in him, by the proviso to Art. 309, of the C1>nsti tution. Only two rules require to be. noted, and they are rr. 157 and 158, occurring in Chapter I, under the sub-heading 'Power to frame rules'.\n\nThey are as follows : ·\n\n\"157. The Railway Board have full powers to make rules of a general application to non-gazetted railway servants under their control.\n\n158. The General Managers of Indian Railways have full .powers to make rules with regard to nongazetted railway serv, ants under their control, providd they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the President or the Railway Board.\"\n\nWe are not concerned, really in this matter, with r. 158, because the. Scheme, Annexurcs 4 and 7, in particular, and the various orders, have been passed by the 2nd respondent, the Railway Board. The Railway Board, as will be seen from r. 157, have full powers to make rules of general application, to non-gazetted railway servants under their control.\n\nThe question is whether the\n\n(I) '[t 966] I S.C.R. 994.\n\n.584 SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R . i I 2nd respondent, has, while acting under r. 157, power to make A a rule (in this case, the Scheme), having effect from an anterior -Oate.\n\nThe matter must be considered, in the light of the provisions .of Art. 309, of the Constitution. That Article provides :\n\n\"309. Subject to the provisions o' this Constitution, B Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State : Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services c and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act.\"\n\nWe may emphasize the words 'and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act', which must receive their due weight.\n\nTo that aspect, we. shall come, pre- E sently.\n\nWe have already pointed out, that Annexure 4 was issued on February 5, 1957, and Annexure 7, on March 30, 1963, and that the initial constitution of the Service was to be from December 1, 1954, and it is, on that basis, that the promotions, or appointments, to the Service, are to be made. In this case, there F is no Act of the appropriate Legislature, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service, under the 2nd respondent and, therefore, the main part of Art. 309 is not attracted. But, under the Proviso therein, the President has got full power to make rules, regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service, of . . persons, under the 2nd respondent. Further, under the Proviso, G such person, as may be directed by the President, can also make rules, regulating th.e recruitment and conditions of service\" of persons, under the 2nd respondent.\n\nThe rules so made, either by the President, or such person, as .he may direct, will have currency, until provision, in that behalf, is made by or under an Act, of 1he appropriate Legislature, under Art. 309.\n\nH It is also significant to note that the proviso to Art. 309, clearly lays down that 'any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguous\n\nexpressions, used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning, unless hedged-in, by any limitations.\n\nThe rules, which have to be 'subject to the provi.sions of the Constitution', shall have effect, 'subject to the provisions of any such Act'. That is, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Art. 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act; but, in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President, or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect, both prospectively and, retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other, imposed by the proviso to Art. 309, regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules.\n\nIn other words, the rules, unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority.\n\nIn the case before us, the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued, by the President, in the exercise of his powers, under 1he proviso to Art. 309. Under Rule 157, the President has directed the Railway Board, to make rules, of general application to non-gazetted railway servants, under their control. The rules, which are embodied in the Schemes, framed by the Board, under Annexures 4 and 7, are within the powers, conferred under r. 157; and, in the absence of any Act, having been passed by the 'appropriate' Legislature, on the said matter, the rules, framed by the Railway Board, will have full effect and, if so indicated, retrospectively also.\n\nSuch indication, about retrospective effect, as has already been pointed out by us, is clearly there, in the impugned provisions.\n\nThe decision of this Court in State v. Padmanabhacharya('), does not assist the petitioners. The rule, that came up, for consideration, has been referred to, at p. 999, of the Reports, in the judgment of Wanchoo, J., (as he then was); and the Court specifically says that the rule, referred to by it, cannot be made, under the proviso to Art. 309, of the Constitution. It is further stated that the notification, referred to, cannot be said to be a rule, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the services and posts, in connection with the affairs of the State. This Court further! observes that the effect of the notification, or the rule, that it had to consider, was to select certain\n\nGovernment servants, who had been illegally required to retire, and to say that even if the retirement had been illegal, that retirement should be deemed to have been properly and lawfully made.\n\nFinally. the Court said, that such a declaration, made by the Governor. cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a rule, made under\n\n(I) 11966] I S.C.R. 994.]\n\nthe proviso to Art. 309. Having held that the rule, which was before it, was not one made under the proviso to Art. 309, the Court further observed, in that case, that it was not necessary to decide, whether a rule, governing conditions of service, of persons appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, can be made retrospectively, under the proviso to Art. 309. This decision, in our opinion, can be distinguished, on two grounds : (i) that the rule, in question, construed by the Court, was held to be one, not coniing within the purview of the proviso to Art. 309; and (ii) the question, as to whether a rule, under the proviso to Art. 309, can be framed, to have retrospective effect, has been left open. •.\n\nIn this connection, we may refer to two decisions, of the Mysore High Court, and one of the Allahabad High Court. The Mysore High Court, in the decisions, Govindara; u v. State of Mysore(') and Govindappa v.\n\nI. G. of Registration('), has taken the view. that it is not open to the Governor, under the proviso to Art. 309, to frame a rule, having retrospective effect. We may state that the decision in Govindara; u's Case(i) came up, before this Court, on appeal, in Nagara; an v. Mysore('). But this Court, in Nagara; an's Case('), had no occasion to express any opinion on the question as to whether the Governor, under the proviso to Art. 309, could frame a rule, having retrospective operation, as it took the view that the relevant rules had not been made under Art. 309. ·\n\nA Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, in Ram Autar v. State of U.P.(') has taken a view, contrary to the one, expressed by the Mysore High Court. We are of opinion that the latter, represents the correct view. But, even the Allahabad High Court has not given due importance to the mandatory words, used in the concluding part of the proviso to Art. 309, that the rules made, by the authority mentioned therein, 'shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'.\n\nThis aspect has been emphasized by us, in the earlier part of this judgment.\n\nTo conclude, on this aspect, we are satisfied that the Scheme, Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7, framed by the 2nd respondent, Railway Board, such as it is, must have effect, as it does not suffer from any defect in its making and does not offend against the Constitution.\n\nIn the result, both the writ petitions are dismissed; but, in the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs.\n\nG.C.\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 265.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1965 Mys, 25.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n(ll (19661 3 S.C.R. 682.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1962 All. 328, F.B.", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "B. S. VADERA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. S. VADERA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 27, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 27, 1968\n\n[M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nConstilution of India, Art."}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 668, "end_char": 684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said scheme was framed on Febtuary 5, 1957 but was brought into effect from December 1, 1954."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1422, "end_char": 1437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2169, "end_char": 2176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3391, "end_char": 3398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3472, "end_char": 3483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3488, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta for the petitioner (in W.P.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, A. P. Chatterjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the Petitioner (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "A. P. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3558, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, A. P. Chatterjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the Petitioner (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "M. M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, A. P. Chatterjee and M. M. Kshatriya, for the Petitioner (in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. G. K. Achar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3884, "end_char": 3886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J. In both these writ petitions, under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India, through the Chairman, Railway Board, and the Secretary, Railway Board, are respondents 1 and 2, respectively, in these proceedings.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS"}}, {"text": "July 16, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5223, "end_char": 5236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1967, he joined service, on July 16, 1955, as Lower Division Clerk, was promoted, with effect from February 2, 19S7, as Upper Division Clerk and further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3,\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "February 2, 19S7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5294, "end_char": 5310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1967, he joined service, on July 16, 1955, as Lower Division Clerk, was promoted, with effect from February 2, 19S7, as Upper Division Clerk and further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3,\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "February 3,\n\n1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5375, "end_char": 5392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1967, he joined service, on July 16, 1955, as Lower Division Clerk, was promoted, with effect from February 2, 19S7, as Upper Division Clerk and further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3,\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 of 1967, he joined as a Lower Division Clerk, on September 14, 1954, was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from February 2, 1957 and was further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3, 1958."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 of 1967, he joined as a Lower Division Clerk, on September 14, 1954, was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from February 2, 1957 and was further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3, 1958."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5908, "end_char": 5924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 of 1967, he joined as a Lower Division Clerk, on September 14, 1954, was promoted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from February 2, 1957 and was further promoted, as Assistant, on February 3, 1958."}}, {"text": "June 9, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His grievance is that while he was so holding the post of Assistant, from 1958, he has been illegally, and without any justification, reverted as Upper Division Clerk, with effect from June 9, 1967, as per Annexure 16."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Scheme (Annexure 4), was actually framed on February 5, 1957, and the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Service was to be organized, in the manner, set out therein."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 30, 1963, some of the provisions, contained in Annexure 4, were modified, by Annexure 7."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9709, "end_char": 9727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Lower Division Clerk, in 1966, with effect from September 14, 1957."}}, {"text": "August 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10165, "end_char": 10180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 22, 1956, the second respondent issued a Circular, Annexure 1, about having decided to hold a test, for drawing up a panel of staff considered suitable for promotion, to the Grade of Assistants."}}, {"text": "February 2,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11487, "end_char": 11504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As both the petitioners had passed the test, they were promoted, as Officiating Upper Division Clerks, with effect from February 2,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11603, "end_char": 11619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order, appointing the petitioners, as Officiating Upper Divbion Clerks, is Annexure 3, dated February 1, 1957."}}, {"text": "Rauway Board Secretariat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11864, "end_char": 11888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mennwhile, the framing of a scheme for the Rauway Board Secretariat Clerical Service, was in the offing, and such a scheme, was ultimately issued, under Annexure 4, on February 5, 1957."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent has filed a statement, regarding the circumstances, under which the Scheme was framed, in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Home Affairs."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12180, "end_char": 12204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondent has filed a statement, regarding the circumstances, under which the Scheme was framed, in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Home Affairs."}}, {"text": "June 16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14653, "end_char": 14666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have been promoted, on a regular basis, as Assistants, under this Order, and that, in consequence, the order of reversion, passed on June 16, 1967, is illegal."}}, {"text": "June 24, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15160, "end_char": 15173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is Exhibit 6, dated June 24, 1959."}}, {"text": "March 3-0, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15179, "end_char": 15194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3-0, 1963, the, original Service Scheme, Annexure 4, was amended in certain material particulars, by Apnexure 7."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16549, "end_char": 16563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The final panel is Annexure 14, dated March 30, 1965; and, according to the pell tioner in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "9,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17287, "end_char": 17295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, under Annexure 16, dated June 16, 1967, which is one of the orders, under attack, in boJh these petitions, the Railway Board reverted, as Upper Division Clerks, several officiating Assistants, including B the two petitioners, herein, with effect from June 9,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17792, "end_char": 17808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order promoting the petitioners, as Assistants, Annexure 5, dated February 1, 1958, has been referred to, already, and that order clearly shows that the promotion was only a short-term, temporary arrangement, on ari offi- D ciating basis, and that no claim could be based upon that promotion."}}, {"text": "Sep.tember 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21338, "end_char": 21357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no substance, in this contention, in view of the statement, made by the 2nd respondent, that this petitioner was confirmed, as a Lower Division Clerk, in 1966 with effect from Sep.tember 14, 1957, in which case it follows that he will not be eligible, for promotion, as an Upper Division Clerk, under the Scheme."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21956, "end_char": 21971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22252, "end_char": 22259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22277, "end_char": 22284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 1,\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22622, "end_char": 22639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A more serious contention has, however, been taken, by the petitioners, that the second respondent has no power, in law, to frame, either the Scheme, Annexure 4, or the modified Scheme, Annexure 7 so as to have retrospective effect, from December 1,\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22726, "end_char": 22736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho'ugh both the petitioners have raised this contention\n\nin the writ petitions, Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23214, "end_char": 23219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mehta, by reference to the provisions of the Indian Railway Board Act, 1905 (Act IV of 1905), and to the decision of this Court in State v. Padmanabhacharya('), urged that the 2nd respondent had no power to frame a rule, having retrospective .effect."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Board Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23259, "end_char": 23289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23629, "end_char": 23654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23780, "end_char": 23785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble to that Act shows that a Railway Board has been constituted, for controlling the administration of Railways in India."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23787, "end_char": 23796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "is no controversy that the Indian Railway Establishment Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24195, "end_char": 24255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24351, "end_char": 24359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no controversy that the Indian Railway Establishment Code", "statute": "There is no controversy that the Indian Railway Establishment Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24711, "end_char": 24726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The General Managers of Indian Railways have full .powers to make rules with regard to nongazetted railway serv, ants under their control, providd they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the President or the Railway Board.\""}}, {"text": ".584", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25332, "end_char": 25336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".584 SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R ."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R . i I 2nd respondent", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25337, "end_char": 25396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".584 SUPREME COURT Jµ!PORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R ."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25586, "end_char": 25594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27192, "end_char": 27200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27789, "end_char": 27797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27853, "end_char": 27861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28331, "end_char": 28339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28742, "end_char": 28750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29144, "end_char": 29152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29995, "end_char": 30002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule, that came up, for consideration, has been referred to, at p. 999, of the Reports, in the judgment of Wanchoo, J., (as he then was); and the Court specifically says that the rule, referred to by it, cannot be made, under the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30129, "end_char": 30137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30886, "end_char": 30894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30982, "end_char": 30990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31236, "end_char": 31244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31441, "end_char": 31449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31517, "end_char": 31525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31654, "end_char": 31671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, we may refer to two decisions, of the Mysore High Court, and one of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31688, "end_char": 31708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, we may refer to two decisions, of the Mysore High Court, and one of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31909, "end_char": 31917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Govindara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31999, "end_char": 32008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may state that the decision in Govindara; u's Case(i) came up, before this Court, on appeal, in Nagara; an v. Mysore(')."}}, {"text": "Nagara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32064, "end_char": 32070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may state that the decision in Govindara; u's Case(i) came up, before this Court, on appeal, in Nagara; an v. Mysore(')."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32234, "end_char": 32242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32364, "end_char": 32372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32744, "end_char": 32752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_587_594_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MOTJLAL JAIN\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR .t ORS.\n\nMarch 27, 1968 (1. C. SHAH, S. M. Soou, R. S. BACllAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, 11.]\n\nPreventive Detention Acl (4 of 1950), sa. 3(l)(a)(li/) and 4- Se.veral grount!s in order of detention--Some vague and non-exi.rtent- WMther order can be sustained,\n\n C The appellant-a partner in a grocery shop, was detained under s. 3(l)(a)(iii) and s. 4 of the Preventive Detenfion Act for indulgiDg in black-marketing of essential COllllllodities. He was supplied with an order detailing a number of groµnds In support of his detention. In one of the arounds viz., cl. (a) of tlie order the name of the shopkeeper to whOlll the t was said to have sold match boxes and soap \"at a , price higher than that fixed for these C0111modities\" was not mentioned. Neither the price fixed nor, the priee at which it was said to have been sold was D mentioned.\n\nIn another round vk.,.cl. (d) of the order a sale was alleged to K who was not e><istina in the 'described locality.· On the questi0n of the validity of the order of detention, this Court,\n\nHELD : Tho order must be set aside.\n\nThe gi'ound mentioned ill cl. (a) was .vague. The futility of making representation in respect of an unknown man and of an ified price\n\ncan easily be imagined.\n\nThere waa no OllP<'rtilllity to the ap'pellant' to l8lilfy the Advilory. that .the alleged putchaaer was a :fictitious figure or that he ls an enemy of his or that the information given by him s!Jould otherwile be not accepted. [590 c.B]\n\n. Furth\", there was nothing to show that the Government had either fixed the sale price of the commodities or it had any power to do so.\n\nTherefore the gfoulld in cl •. (a) wils not only vague but also irrele\\>ant.\n\nThe ground mentioned in cl. (d) was. non....istenL The. State's e>tplanation. that the sale was made to K of another 1ocality and dne to typographical mistake the locality . wss wrongly described wss lbat apart, the appellant could not have made any l\\tation in respect of the such a new allegation against him. ·\n\nThe State's coiltention that even if the grounds .mentioned in els. {a) and (d) are if11ored, still the 'detention of the appellant could be justi&ed oa the remain~ grounds mentioned in that Order, Was wholly untenable.\n\nThe defects noticed in the two grounds 'vit, els.· (a)' and (d) w\"e sufiicient io vitiate . the order o! detention impugned In . these proceedinp as it was not .possible to . hold that those grounds could not have influenced the decision of. the detaining authority.\n\nThe constitutional requil'ement that the grounds must not be vigue must be satisfied .with respect to each of the rrounds C!)inmuilii:ated to !lie perion detained snbjeq to the claim of privilege under cl. ( 6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, and where one of the grounds mentioned is \"81!\\l~. even !bough other grounds are not vague lbe detention iS .nat in accordante with the procedure estalished by law ind la tbetdfdle. lllOiat [S9t .,. C.DJ.\n\nL7,!laP.Cl/68--13 .\n\nDr. Ram Kris/um B//ardwr.j v, State of Delhi, [i9S3] S.C.R. 708, S//ibban Lal Saksenr. v. State of U.P. [1954] S.C.R. 418, Dwarka Dass Bhatia\\'. State of Janunu and Kash1nir, (1956] S.C.R. 948 and Rameshwar Lal Pmwr.ri v. State of Bihar, [19~8] 2 S.C.R. SOS, followed,\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1968.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated December 15, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Crl. W.J.C.\n\nNo. 92 of 1966.\n\nM. C. Chagla, A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the appellant U. P. Singh, for respondent No. I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. In this appeal by special leave, the question for decision is whether the appellant's detention under sub-cl. (iii) ofcl. (a) ofsub-s. (1) ofs. 3 andofs. 4ofthePreventiveDeten tion Act, 1950, (IV of 1950 )--to be hereinafter refen-ed to as \"the Act\", as per order of the Governor of Bihar No. A-DE-Pur-\n\n1501/67-6357 /G dated September 25, 1967, is unlawful.\n\nThe appellant is a partner in the grocery shop by name \"Shanti Stores\" in Gulab Bagh where sugar, maida, soap, match boxes, kerosene oil and other articles are sold.\n\nHe is said to have indulged in black-marketing in essential commodities. As per the order of September 27, 1967 grounds in support of the appel lant's detention were supplied. They tead as follows :-\n\n\" (a) On 10-3 1967 he sold match boxes and soap to a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities and did not grant any receipt for the same.\n\n(b) On 15-3-1967 it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him match boxes at Rs. 11/· per gross which was Rs. 2/· higher than the price fixed.\n\nThis was also substantiated by Nagendra Ramoli, a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound who had also been supplied match boxes at the higher rate by him (Shri Motilal Jain). ( c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government.\n\n(d) On 7-5-1967 he sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Guiab Bagh at Rs. 12/ • per tin\n\nMOT!LAL JAIN v. lllHAR (Hegde, J.)\n\n(excluding cost of tin) which was higher than the price fixed by the Government.\n\n(e) On 4-7-1967 he sold sugar at Rs. 2/- per kg. to Shyamsunder Poddar and Jangli Singh of Dhamdaha.\n\nThe price charged by him was much higher than the rate fixed by the Government in this regard.\n\n(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence.\n\nIt was further learnt from Moti Sah a worker of Guiab Bagh Navayubak Sangh that he ( Shri Motilal Jain) obtained supplies of match boxes, vegetable oil from West Bengal to sell them in black market.\n\nThough the appellant made representation against his order of detention to the Advisory Board, the said Board did not recommend his case for release.\n\nThereafter he approached the High Court of Patna in Cr. W.J.C. No, 92 of 1966 under Art. 226 of the Constitution and s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a writ or order in the nature of habeas corpus directing his release from detention.\n\nA Bertch of that High Court consisting of the learned Chief Jutice and B. N. Jha J., refused to entertain that petition with these observations ;\n\n\"We have also gone. through the grounds stated in annexure-'B' and find that specific instances with full particulars have been given. On the basis of those instances the detaining authority. has held that the petitioner has been indulging in black-marketing of essential commodities. lt1r. Balbhadra Prasad Singh challenged .the correctness of _the facts stated in the grounds and also filed affidavits by certain persons and urged that those. allegations of facts should not be believed.\n\nThis Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot sit in sec.ond appeal and examine whether specific instances of black marketing were established by satisfactory eviderice.\n\n\"For these reasons, we are not satisfied that this is a iit case for admission. The application is accordingly dismissed.\"\n\nIt is against that -0rder the appellant has come up in appeal to H this Court.\n\nMr. Chagla, iearned counsel for the appellant, content; led that each. one of the .grounds supplied to the appellant in suPl'ort\n\n590 SUP.RBMB OO!mT llBPOl.TS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the order. of detention is either vague or non-esting, and therefore the appellant's detention is clearly illegal.\n\nAfter we have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as thQ learned counsel for the respondents in respect of the grounds mentioned in els. (a) and (d) of the order of September 27, 1967, we did not think it necessary to examine the remaining grounds as we were of the opinion that the ground set out in\n\ncl. (a) is vague as well as irrelevant and that set OJ, lt in cl. ( d) is non-existing, and as such the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained.\n\nOn an examination of facts set out in cl. (a) of the order, it is seen that the name of the shopkeeper to whom the J!Ppellant is said to have sold match boxes and soap \"at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities\" is not mentioned. Neither the price fixed nor the price at which the appellant is said to have sold the match boxes and soap is mentioned. The futility of making representation against an unknown man in respect of an unspecified price can easily be imagined. There was no opportunity to the appellant to satisfy the Advisor}' Board that the alleged purchaser is a fictitious figure or that he is an eneniy of his or that the information given by him should otherwise be not accepted.\n\nAs things stood the appellant was left to attack a shadow. He could not also make any representation as regards the alleged sale or the price at which the goods were sold excepting making a bare denial of the accusations made against him.\n\nThat is not all.\n\nThe appellant' definitely averred in his special leave application that the Government neither fixed the sale price of the match boxes or soap nor it had any power to do so. This averment is not controverted; On the other hand what was stated in reply by the respondents was that the manufacturers had fixed the retail price of those articles and the appellant could not have sold them for a price higher than that fixed by the manufacturers.\n\nIt is. not the case of the respondents that the price fixed by the manufacturers-assuming that there was any such fixation and further assuming that the appellant had sold the articles in question at a price higher than the price fixed-had any legal sanction behind it.\n\nA notification issued by the Bihar Government on January 20, 1967 and published on March 1. 1967, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), read with the order of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce nublished under notification No. S.O. 1844 dated June 18, 1966, the only provision of law on which reliance was placed by the resoondents, prescrll, es that a dealer should obtain a price list showine; the wholesale and retail nrice of the commodity nurchased bv him or obtained by him from everv manufacturer, imnorter or distributor where such prices are fixed by \\he manufacturer$ and disnlav at a consnicuous part of the place where he carries on his business the price list\n\nand stock position of the scheduled commodities specified in Schedules I and II of that Order; further he should not withhold from sale except under specified circumstances any of the commodities mentioned in Schedule II thereto. That Order empowers the State Government by order to regulate the distribution of any scheduled commodity mentioned in Sch. Il by any manufacturer, producer or distributor in such area or areas and in such manner as may be specified. It is not the case of the respondents that the aplant had contravened the aforementioned Order in any manner. Hence, the ground set out in cl. (a) of the order of September 27, 1967 is not only vague but also irrelevant.\n\nIn clause ( d) of that order it is mentioned that the appellant sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Gulab Bagh at Rs. 12/- per tin (excluding cost of tin) which was higher than the price fixed by the Government In his special leave application, among other things, the appellant asserted that there is no person by the name of Kishun Bhagat in Guiab {lagh. In the reply filed on behalf of the respondents that allegation is accepted as correct. The new case pleaded by the respondents is that the alleged sale was made to Kishun Bhagat of vi!lage Kishanpur, P. S. Dhamdaha, and there was typographical mistake in mentioning the name of the purchaser in the grounds supplied to the detenu. This is a curious explanation. That apart, quite clearly the appellant could not have made any representation in respect of the new allegation levelled against him. Hence the ground mentioned in\n\ncl. ( d) must be held tci be non-existing.\n\nIt was strenuously ur~ on behalf of the respondents that even if the grounds mentioned in els. (a) and ( d) of die order of Government dated September 27, 1967 are ignored, still the detention of the appellant _can be justified on the basis of the remaining grounds mentioned in that order. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention as being wholly .untenable. -\n\nIt must be remembered that in this case we are dealing with the_ liberty of a citizen of this country. The power given to the State under the Act is an extraordinary power. It is exercisable under special conditions and is subject io definite lirilltations. The nature of the power is such that the liberty of an individual can be deprived on the subjective satisfaction of the prescribed authority that there is sufficient cause for his detentfon. A detenu )las not the benefit of a regular trial or even an objective examination of the accusations made against him. - As observed by this Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi('), preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such\n\n(I) [19531 S. C.R. 708.\n\n592 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n( 1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nsafeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In that case this Court further laid down that under Art. 22 ( 5) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a person detained under the Act, is entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of his detention communicated . to him, to a further right to have particulars as full and adequate as the circumstances pennit furnished to him as to enable him to make representation against the order of detention and the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the second communication is .a justiciable issue, the test being whether they lµ'e sufficient to enable the detained person to make representation which on being considered may give him relief. It is also laid dQwn in that decision that the constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be vague m11st be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privi- 1.ege under cl. { 6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, and where one of the grounds mentioned is vague, even though the other grounds are not vague the detention is not in accordance with the proce, dure established by law and is therefore illegal.\n\nThe same view was reiterated by this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P.('). There it was found that out Of\n\nthe two grounds served on the deienu one was non-existent. The contention of the State that the detention of Shri Saxena should not be interfered with because one of the two grounds mentioned in the order is a gOod ground, was rejected by this Court with the observation that to say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute and in such cases the jlosition would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and that would vitiate the detention order as a whole.\n\nIn Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and K_ashmir('), Bhatia was ordered to be detained on the ground that\n\nit w.as necessary to detain him with aview to preventing him from G acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The said order was based ori the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by Bhatia of essential gs, .such as shatfon cloth~ zari and merc1icy to Pakistan. It was found that shaffon cloth and zari were not essential goods. It was not established that the smuggling attributed to Bhatia was .substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards shaffon H cloth and zari was of an inconsequential nature. On th0se facts\n\n(I) [195-1) S.C.R. 418. 12)\n\n1956) S.C.R. 948.\n\nthis Court held that the order of detention was bad and must be quashed.\n\nThe subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based. If some out of those reasons are found to be nonexistent or irrelevant, the court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the authority would have been on the exclusion of those reasons. To uphold the order on the remaining reasons would be to substitute the objective standards of the court for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.\n\nThe Court must, .however, be satisfied that ihe vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the authority.\n\nIn a recent case, Ramcshwar Lal Patwari v. The State of Bihar('), speaking for the Court, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then Was) observed :- ·\n\n\"The detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority, however high, is a serious matter. It must requirethe closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving no room for errors or at least avoidaole erroci.\n\nThe very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based, mdicates the need for the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others.\n\nSince the detenu is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board, the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must afford. a real \"opportunity to make a representation against the detention.\n\nSimilarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non-existing so that it could not have and ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration, the Court may attach some importance to this fact.\"\n\nThe defects noticed in the two grounds mentioned above are sufficient to vitiate the order of detention impugned in these proceedings as it is not possible to hold that those grounds could not have. influenced the decision of the detaining authority.\n\nIndividual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution to the citizens of this country. If that right is invaded, excepting strictly in accordance with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State for relief.\n\nWe are not unaware of the fact that the ill'lerest of the society is no less important than\n\n(I) [1968J 2 S.C.R. 505.\n\nthat of the individual. Our Constitution has made provision for safeguarding the interests of the society. Its provisions harmonise the liberty of the individual with social interest. The authorities have to act solely on the basis of those provisions. They Ciinnot deal with the liberty of the individual in a casual manner, as has been done in this case.\n\nSuch an approach does not _11dvance the true social interest.\n\nContinued indifference to individual liberty is bound to errode the structure of our democratic sliciety.\n\nWe wish that the High Court had examined the complaint of the appellant more closely.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is allowed and the order of detention impugned herein is set aside. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "MOTJLAL JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOTJLAL JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR .t ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1968 (1. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. Soou", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. SHAH, S. M. Soou, R. S. BACllAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, 11.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACllAWAT", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 93, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. SHAH, S. M. Soou, R. S. BACllAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, 11.]"}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. A. VAIDIALINGAM", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. SHAH, S. M. Soou, R. S. BACllAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, 11.]"}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3(l)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2765, "end_char": 2772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2985, "end_char": 2987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the appellant U. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3506, "end_char": 3517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the appellant U. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the appellant U. P. Singh, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "B. P. Jha"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, A. N. Sinha and B. P. Jha, for the appellant U. P. Singh, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. In this appeal by special leave, the question for decision is whether the appellant's detention under sub-cl. ("}}, {"text": "PreventiveDeten tion Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-DE-Pur-\n\n1501/67-6357 /G dated September 25, 1967, is unlawful."}}, {"text": "Gulab Bagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4075, "end_char": 4085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a partner in the grocery shop by name \"Shanti Stores\" in Gulab Bagh where sugar, maida, soap, match boxes, kerosene oil and other articles are sold."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As per the order of September 27, 1967 grounds in support of the appel lant's detention were supplied."}}, {"text": "10-3 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They tead as follows :-\n\n\" (a) On 10-3 1967 he sold match boxes and soap to a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities and did not grant any receipt for the same."}}, {"text": "Purnea Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4436, "end_char": 4448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They tead as follows :-\n\n\" (a) On 10-3 1967 he sold match boxes and soap to a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities and did not grant any receipt for the same."}}, {"text": "15-3-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) On 15-3-1967 it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him match boxes at Rs."}}, {"text": "Satyanarain Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4599, "end_char": 4617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) On 15-3-1967 it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him match boxes at Rs."}}, {"text": "Purnea Bus stand", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) On 15-3-1967 it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him match boxes at Rs."}}, {"text": "Motilal Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) On 15-3-1967 it transpired from one Satyanarain Prasad a shopkeeper of Purnea Bus stand, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) sold him match boxes at Rs.", "canonical_name": "MOTJLAL JAIN"}}, {"text": "Nagendra Ramoli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was also substantiated by Nagendra Ramoli, a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound who had also been supplied match boxes at the higher rate by him (Shri Motilal Jain). ("}}, {"text": "15-4-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government."}}, {"text": "Chandradeb Sao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government."}}, {"text": "Shankerlal Modi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government."}}, {"text": "Sitaram Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5017, "end_char": 5028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government."}}, {"text": "Guiab Bagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5037, "end_char": 5047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) On 15-4-1967 it transpired from Chandradeb Sao, Shankerlal Modi, and Sitaram Sah, all of Guiab Bagh that they got supplies of sugar and maida from him in excess of the quantity allotted to them on ration cards at a price higher than those fixed by the Government."}}, {"text": "7-5-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5220, "end_char": 5228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) On 7-5-1967 he sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Guiab Bagh at Rs."}}, {"text": "Kishun Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(d) On 7-5-1967 he sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Guiab Bagh at Rs."}}, {"text": "4-7-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(e) On 4-7-1967 he sold sugar at Rs."}}, {"text": "Shyamsunder Poddar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shyamsunder Poddar and Jangli Singh of Dhamdaha."}}, {"text": "Jangli Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shyamsunder Poddar and Jangli Singh of Dhamdaha."}}, {"text": "Dhamdaha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5516, "end_char": 5524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Shyamsunder Poddar and Jangli Singh of Dhamdaha."}}, {"text": "7-8-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence."}}, {"text": "Nathu Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence."}}, {"text": "Chanderdeb Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5669, "end_char": 5683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence."}}, {"text": "Kusumlal Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence."}}, {"text": "Ram Rattan Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) On 7-8-1967 it was learnt from Nathu Sah, Chanderdeb Sah, Kusumlal Sah, and Ram Rattan Sah, all of Guiab Bagh, that he (Shri Motilal Jain) indulged in black-marketing of sugar, maida, kerosene oil and other controlled commodities, to deal in which he had obtained licence."}}, {"text": "Moti Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further learnt from Moti Sah a worker of Guiab Bagh Navayubak Sangh that he ( Shri Motilal Jain) obtained supplies of match boxes, vegetable oil from West Bengal to sell them in black market."}}, {"text": "Guiab Bagh Navayubak Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further learnt from Moti Sah a worker of Guiab Bagh Navayubak Sangh that he ( Shri Motilal Jain) obtained supplies of match boxes, vegetable oil from West Bengal to sell them in black market."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further learnt from Moti Sah a worker of Guiab Bagh Navayubak Sangh that he ( Shri Motilal Jain) obtained supplies of match boxes, vegetable oil from West Bengal to sell them in black market."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6281, "end_char": 6300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter he approached the High Court of Patna in Cr."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6409, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "B. N. Jha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6571, "end_char": 6580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Bertch of that High Court consisting of the learned Chief Jutice and B. N. Jha J., refused to entertain that petition with these observations ;\n\n\"We have also gone.", "canonical_name": "B. P. Jha"}}, {"text": "Balbhadra Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balbhadra Prasad Singh challenged .the correctness of _the facts stated in the grounds and also filed affidavits by certain persons and urged that those."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7514, "end_char": 7520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chagla, iearned counsel for the appellant, content; led that each."}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9991, "end_char": 10007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification issued by the Bihar Government on January 20, 1967 and published on March 1."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10011, "end_char": 10027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification issued by the Bihar Government on January 20, 1967 and published on March 1."}}, {"text": "March 1. 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10045, "end_char": 10058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification issued by the Bihar Government on January 20, 1967 and published on March 1."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10105, "end_char": 10109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10117, "end_char": 10148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10190, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1967, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), read with the order of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce nublished under notification No."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10287, "end_char": 10300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.O. 1844 dated June 18, 1966, the only provision of law on which reliance was placed by the resoondents, prescrll, es that a dealer should obtain a price list showine; the wholesale and retail nrice of the commodity nurchased bv him or obtained by him from everv manufacturer, imnorter or distributor where such prices are fixed by \\he manufacturer$ and disnlav at a consnicuous part of the place where he carries on his business the price list\n\nand stock position of the scheduled commodities specified in Schedules I and II of that Order; further he should not withhold from sale except under specified circumstances any of the commodities mentioned in Schedule II thereto."}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Guiab {lagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11754, "end_char": 11765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12/- per tin (excluding cost of tin) which was higher than the price fixed by the Government In his special leave application, among other things, the appellant asserted that there is no person by the name of Kishun Bhagat in Guiab {lagh."}}, {"text": "P. S. Dhamdaha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The new case pleaded by the respondents is that the alleged sale was made to Kishun Bhagat of vi!lage Kishanpur, P. S. Dhamdaha, and there was typographical mistake in mentioning the name of the purchaser in the grounds supplied to the detenu."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n( 1968) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13464, "end_char": 13505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "592 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n( 1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nsafeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13700, "end_char": 13707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14570, "end_char": 14577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shibban Lal Saksena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14840, "end_char": 14859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was reiterated by this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P.(')."}}, {"text": "Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15031, "end_char": 15037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the State that the detention of Shri Saxena should not be interfered with because one of the two grounds mentioned in the order is a gOod ground, was rejected by this Court with the observation that to say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute and in such cases the jlosition would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and that would vitiate the detention order as a whole."}}, {"text": "Bhatia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15714, "end_char": 15720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and K_ashmir('), Bhatia was ordered to be detained on the ground that\n\nit w.as necessary to detain him with aview to preventing him from G acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16080, "end_char": 16088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said order was based ori the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by Bhatia of essential gs, .such as shatfon cloth~ zari and merc1icy to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17242, "end_char": 17254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a recent case, Ramcshwar Lal Patwari v. The State of Bihar('), speaking for the Court, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then Was) observed :- ·\n\n\"The detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority, however high, is a serious matter."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_595_604_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.\n\nP. SAGAR March 27, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMA.SWAMI AND G. K. MrrT!!ll, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 15(1) and (4)-Slate preparing a ll&t of backward c/arses within the meaning of cl. ( 4 )-Claiming to have done so on advice of experts who were satl&fied-re/evant tests were appli~ Not placing any material before court to consider validity of Ii.rt which ex-facie included 'castes' and not classes-Whether court can hold such\n\nUst as valid.\n\nBy an order of the State Government, Andhra Pradesh, .issued on July 29, 1966, 20% of the Iola! number of seats for admission to medical colleges in the State were reserved fdr members of the backward classes described in a list prepared by the Government. This order and the list were challenged in writ petitions before the High Court on the ground that another list published by the State Govet on June 21, 1963 determining backward classes for the purpose of. Art. 15(4) of the Con- •tltlJtlon bad been declared invalid by the High Court in an earlier c:aae as being violative of Art. 15(1); it was contended that the State Govemment had adopted substantially the &anlO list of backward claases with slight modifications and as the new list also made the reservation in fainur of castes and not clasoes, it infringed the guarantee under Art. 15(1). On behalf of the State Government it. was urged that cute is one of the relevant tests in determining backwafdness, and cannot be ig nored in determining socially and educationally backward clas\"'5 and if a group bas been classified as backward on other relevont considerations, the classification is not liable to be challenged as invalid on the ground that for the purpose of classifying, the 00.ignation of caste is . siven. It was stated in an affidavit on behalf of the State that the new list had been prepared by a Cabinet sub-committee and approved by the Cabinet after a detailed enquiry of the conditions of tho castes in qµestiQD and on expert advice of the Director of Social Welfare as well as under tho guidance of the Law Secretary; and that they were both satisfied that the correct tests were applied in the determination of the backward classeo.\n\nThe High Court held that the reservations of seats for the members of the backward classes described in the list prepared by the Government were in, lllid. The State appealed to this Court by special leave.\n\nHEID : dismissing the appeal,\n\nTho impugned list prepared by the State was ex-facle based on c:asle8 or communities and was substantiallv the same list which had been struck down by the High Court as invalid in the earlier case. No materials were placed on the record to enable the Court to decide whether the criteria laid down for detmnining that the list prepared by the Government cmformed to the requirements of cl. (4) or Art. IS we!re followed.\n\nArticle IS guarantees by the first . clause a fundamental right of farreaching importance. Clause ( 4) is an exception engrafted upon .the\n\nguarantee in cl. (I), but being m the nature of an exceptfon condition• which justify departure must be strictly shown to exist. When a dispute is raised before a Court that a particular law which is inconsistent with the guarantee against disc:'rimination is valid on the plea that if is permitted\n\nunder cl. ( 4) of Art. 15, the mere assertion by the State that the officers of the State had taken into consideration the criteria which had hn adopted by the courts for determining who the socially and educationaJh backward classes of the Society are, or that the authorities had acted in good faith in determining the socially and educationally hack\\\\'ard clas:1es of citizens, \\\\IOuld not be sufficient to sustain the validity of the clain1.\n\nIt a question arises \\Vhethcr a la\\v 'vhich prbna facie infringes a funda111cntal right is within an exception, the validity of that Jaw has to be determined\n\nby the courts on materials placed before them. By merely assertin~ that the law was made after full cons!deration of the relevant cvi<lcncl!' anJ criteria which have a bearing thereon, and was within the exception, the jurisdiction of the courts to determine whether by makin2 the law o fundamental right bas been infringed is not excluded. [603 c, GJ.\n\nCase law referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1336 c of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1268 of 1.966.\n\nP. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the appeJlants.\n\nK, Narayana Rao and G. Narayana Rao, for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nAgainst ihe order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh declaring invalid the \"reservatioIT for backward dasses under Rule 4A and SA respectively of the Telangana and the Andhra Rules, and the directions in respect of the President's Scouts and Guides\", under Government orders Nos. 1135 & 1136-Health, Housing & Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, as modified by G.O. M.S. 1880 dated July 29, 1966 for the Telangana region, and by G.O.M.s: 1789 dated August. 2, 1966 for the Andhra Region, the State of Andhra Pradesh has appealed to this Court with special leave.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh is divided into two areas-Telan- _gana and Andhra areas.\n\nIn the Telangana area there are two Medical Colleges having in the aggregate 270 seats for entrants 10 the medical degree course. In Andhra area there are four Medi- Cal Colleges having in the aggregate 550 seats for new entrants.\n\nIn admitting candidates for the medical degree course by Gov• errunent orders Nos. 1135 & 1136 Health, Housing and Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, seats were reserved for Centraf Government nominees, for N.C.C., A.C.C., President's Scouts & Guides, for candidates with sports and extra- curricular proficiency, for children of ex-Service army personnel. for children of displaced goldsmiths, for candidates from Scheduled\n\nCates and .Tribes, for .women candidates, for candidates appearlilg froin H.S.C.\n\nMultipurp<ise I.S.C. & P.U.C.\n\nExaminations,\n\nANDHRA PRADESH v. P. SAGAR (Shall, J.) 597\n\nand for candidates who had secured the M.Sc. & B.Sc. degrees.\n\nBy Government order No. 1880 dated July 29, 1966, twenty per cent. of the total number of seats were reserved for backward classes in each area, and pursuant thereto the Telangana Rules were atnended by G.O. M.S. No. 1784-Health and the Andhra Rules were amended by G.0. M.S. No. 1783-Health dated Augnst 2, 1966.\n\nThe :alidity of the Government orders Nos. 1135 & 1136 was challe11ged on the ground that they infririged the fundamental freedoJl>.S guaranteed under Arts. 15(4), 16(4) and 29(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court held that in reserving seats for nominees of the Central Government and from other States, for cultural scholars, for women, for graduates and for students from H.S.C. & P.U.C. Courses, no fundamental rights were infringed, but the reservations for members of the backward classes described in the list prepared by the Government of Andhra Pradesh were invalid.\n\nBy Art. 15 of the Constitution, as originally enacted, it was provided that ;.:_\n\n\"(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.\n\n(2)\n\n(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provisions for women and children.\" Article 29(2) provided that:\n\n\"No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.\"\n\nBy Art. 46, which occurs in Ch. IV relating to Directive Prin- Ciples of Stale Policy, the State was enjoined to promote the edu cational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, but Arts. lS and 29 as originally framed prohibited the making of any discrimination against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. In the State of Madras v .. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan(') an order issj!ed by the Government of the State of Madras fixing the number of seats for particular communities for selection of candidates for admission to the Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State was challenged on the ground that it violated the uarantee against discrimination. under Art. ~9(2) of the Constitution. T)lis Court held that the Government order constituted a violation of the\n\n(l). (1951 S.C.R. 525.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPO&TS [1968)\n\n.CR\n\nfundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Art. 29(2) A of the Constitution, notwithstanding the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution. The Parliament thereafter added cl. ( 4) in Art. 15, by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, providing that:\n\n\"Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\" On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore, in supersession of all previous orders made under Art. 15 ( 4) divided backward classes\n\nc into two categories : backward classes and more backward classes, and reserved 68% of the seats in the Engineering and Medical Colleges and other technical institutions for the educationally and socially backward classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and left 3 2 % seats for the merit pool. That order was challenged by a group of writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution before this Court. This Court in M. R. Balaji &: others D\n\nv. State of Mysore(1) held that the order passed by the State of Mysore \"was a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15(4)\" and was liable to be quashed, because the order categorised, contrary to the plain intendment of Art. 15(4), the backward classes on the sole basis of caste. A similar order\n\nG.O. M.S. No. 1880-Health issued by the State of Aiidhra Pradesh E on June 21, 1963, µotifying a list of castes for the purpose of selecting candidates from the backward classes in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh was declared invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the order which classified the backward classes solely on the basis of caste subverted the object of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution : see P.\n\nSukhadev and others v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (1).\n\nOn February 3, 1964, the. previous order issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh was cancelled.\n\nThereafter it is claimed by the State of Andhra Pradesh that it took steps to prepare a fresh list\n\nG of backward classes consistently with the provisions of the Constitution. 'fhe Chief Secretary of the Government cf Andhra Pradesh has sworn in his affidavit that the Council of Ministers appointed a Sub'.Committee to draw up a list of backward classes, inter alia, for the purpose of admission of students to profession.al Colleges.\n\nThe Committee invited the Law Secretary and the Director of Social Welfare to attend the meetings of the Sub-Committe, and letters were written to the other States calling for information about the criteria adopted by thole States for determining H backward classes for purposes of Arts. IS ( 4) !Ind 16 ( 4 J of tho\n\n(I) (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 439.\n\n(2) (1966) I Andhra W.R. 294.\n\nA Constitution, that after considering the replies received from the Chief Secretaries of the various States it was resolved that the existing list of backward classes pertaining to Andhra and Telangana areas he scrutinised with a view to selecting from that list those castes or communities which are \"considered\n\nbackward on account of the low standard of living, education, poverty, places of habitation, inferiority of occupations followed B etc.\"; that at another meeting it was resolved that the list of 146 backward communities prepared by the Director be re-arranged in \"the order of priority in consultation with the Law Secretary, taking into consideration the criteria given by Law Secretary in his note to the Cabinet Sub-Committee and that in doing so such of the cric teria as capable of being practically possible for consideration may be taken into account\", and, accordingly the Law Secretary and the Director of Social Welfare considered the representations made by certain communities to the Government from time to time and\n\n\"drew up a list of the order of priority as called for by the Cabinet Sub-Committee'', that thereafter the Cabinet Sub-Committee made its recommendations which were considered by the Council of D Ministers on July 4, 1966, and that the Council of Ministers considered the social, educational and economic conditions of the backward classes named in the lists submitted to them, and dealt with each individual class and deleted certain items or classes in the lists, changed the denomination of certain classes \"for the more precise effectuation of concessions to those classes only who\n\nreally need them\", and consolidated the backward classes into one list, ruling out the priorities suggested by the Director of Social\n\nWelfare in accordance with the opinion of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, and thereafter published resolution No. G.0. 1880 pursuant to which the rules were amended reserving 20% of the seats for the backward class11s mentiOned in the list prepared by the Cabinet of the State.\n\nThe list prepared on the basis of reservations for socially and educationally backward classes is indisputably a list communitywise.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioners it was contended in the High Court that the Government of Andhra Pradesh had adopted the same list of backward classes which was struck down by the High\n\nCou~ in P. Sukhadev's case(') with some slig!u modifications and the new list also having made a reservation in favour of castes and not classes, it infringed the guarantee under Art. 15(1). On behalf of the State it was urged that caste is one of the relevant tests in determi!ling backwardni; ss, and cannot be ignored in determining the socially and educationally backward classes : if a group has been classified as backward on other relevant considerations the classification is not liable to be challenged as invalid on the grund that for the purpose of classifying, the designation of caste is given. The High Court held that the earlier G.O. was struck down\n\nin P. Cukhadev's case(') on the ground that it was based on caste alone, and since the G.O. under challenge was again prepared on the same basis it could not be sustained as falling within the exception provided in Art. 15(4). Counsel for the State contends that the High Court erred in holding that the impugned rules reserving seats for backward dasses made caste the determining factor.\n\nIn the context in which it occurs the expression \"class\" means a homogeneous section of the people grouped together because of certain likenesses or common traits and who are identifiable by some common attributes such as status, rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race, religion and the like. In determining whether a particular section forms a class, caste cannot be excluded altogether.\n\nBut in the detennination of a class a test solely based upon the caste or community cannot also be accepted.\n\nBy cl. (1 ), Art. 15 prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. By cl. (3) of Art. 15 the State is, notwithstanding the provision contained in cl. (!), permitted to make special provision for women and children. By cl. ( 4) a special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is outside the purview of cl. (I). -But cl. (4) is an exception to\n\ncl. (1). Being an ext'eption, it cannot be extended so as in effect to destroy the guarantee of cl. (!). The Parliament has by enacting d. (4) attempted to balance as against the right of equality of citizens the special necessities of the weaker sections of the people by allowing a provision . to be made for . their advancement. In order that. effect may be given to cl. (4), it must appear that the beneficiaries of the special provision are classes which are. backward socially and educationally and they arc other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; arid thai the provision made is for their advancement. Reservation may be adopted to advance the interests of weaker sections of society, but in doing so, care must be taken to see that deserving and qualified candidates are not excluded from admission to higher educational 'institutions.\n\nThe. criterioll' for. determining the hackwardiles's n'nist not be b:red solely on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, and the backwardness being soeial and .educational must 'be simifar to the backwardness from which the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes suffer. . These are the principles which have been enuncited in the decisiOn of this Court in M. R. Balaji's case(') and R. Chitralekha & Another v. State of Mysore and others(').\n\nTn R. Chitralekha's case('), Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority of the Court Observed at p. 388 : ·\n\n(l) (1963)Supp, 1S.C.R.439.\n\n(2) (1964) 6 S. C. R. 368\n\n\"The important factor to be noticed in Art. 15(4) is that it does not speak of castes, but only speaks of classes. If the makers of the Constitution intended to take castes also as units of social and educational backwardness, they would have said so as they have said in the case of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Though it may be suggested that the wider expression \"classes .. is used in cl. (4) of Art. 15 as there are communities without castes, if the intention was to equate classes with castes, nothing prevented the makers of the c.onstitution from using the expression \"backward\n\nclasses or castes''. The juxtaposition of the expression \"backward classes\" and \"Scheduled Castes\", in Art. 15(4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the expression \"classes\" is not synonymous with castes. It may be that for ascertaining whether a particular citizen or a group of citizens belong to a backward class or not, his or their caste may have some relevance, but it cannot be either the sole or the dominant criterion for ascertaining the class to which he or they belong.\" In a recent judgment of this CoUrt P. Rajendran & Ors. v. The State of Madras and others('), Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Court observed :\n\n\" .... if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15(1). But it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citi7.ens within the meaning of Art. 15(4). . . . It is true that in the present cases the list of socially and educationally backward classes has been specified by caste. But that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that persons belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally backward citizens.\" Tliat case makes no departure from. the rule enunciated in the earlier cases.\n\nThe list dated June 21, 1963, of castes prepared by theArtdhra Pradesh Government to determine backward classes for the purpose of Art. 15(4) was declared invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in P. Sukhadev's case('). A fresh list was pub-\n\n~~ed under the amended rules with some modifications, but the\n\n602 SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOll'ql [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nbasic scheme of the list was apparently not altered. It is true that the affidavits filed by the Chief Secretary in the High Court and the Director of Social Welfare in this Court have set out the steps taken for preparing the list of backward classes. It is also stated in the affidavit of the Director of Social Welfare that he considered the representations made to him, consulted the Law Secretary and certain publications relating to the study of backward classes e.g.\n\nThurston's \"Caste and Tribes\" and Sirajul- Hasan's \"Castes and Tribes\", and made his recommendations which were modified by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Council of Ministers and ultimately the Council of Ministers prepared a final list of backward classes. But before the High Conn the materials which the Cabinet Sub-Committee or the Council of Ministers considered were not placed, nor was any evidence led about the criteria adopted by them for the purpose of determining the backward classes. The High Coun observed :\n\n\"A perusal of this affidavit (Chief Secretary's affidavit) as well as that of the Director of Social Welfare,\n\n. which are filed on behalf of the Government do not say what was the material placed before the Cabinet Sub-Committee or the Council of Ministers, from which we could conclude that the criteria laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been applied in preparing the list of backward classes.\n\nAfter referring to the opinion of the Law Secretary and the views E -Of the Director of Social Welfare they observed :\n\n\" .... We are not able to ascertain whether any material, 1µ1d if so, what material was placed before the Cabinet Sub-Coll)Illittee, upon which the list of backward classes was drawn. On the other hand, it is stated that the Law Secretary and the Director of Social Welfa£e sat together and drew up a list, the former specifying the legal requirements and the latter as an expert advising on the social and educational backwardness of class or Classes.\"\n\nIt was urged before the High Court that expert knowledge of the Director of Social Welfare and of the Law Secretary was brought to bear upon the consideration of the relevant materials in the preparation of the list and they were satisfied that the correct tests were applied in the determination of backward classes and on that .account the list should be accepted by the High Court. The High Court in dealing with the argument observed :\n\n\" .... the impugned backward classes list cannot be and has not been sustained by the Government as\n\ncoming within the exception provided in Art. 15(4) on any material placed before this Court. In fact, there is a total absence of any material, from which we can say that the Government applied the criteria enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, in preparing the list of backward classes.\n\nWe cannot accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that \"once there is proof that the Government bona fide coidered the matter it is sufficient\".\n\nAcceptance of this argument would make for arbitrariness, absolving the party on whom the burden of proof to bring it within the exception rests, from proving it.\n\nThe mere fact that the act is bona fide and that there was total absence of ma/a fides, is not relevant.\" Article 15 guarantees by the first clause a fundamental right of far-reaching importance to .the public generally. Within certain defined limits an exception has been engrafted upon the guarantee of the freedom in cL (1), but being in the nature of an exception, the conditions which justify departure must be strictly shown to exist. When a dispute is raised before a Court that a particular law which is inconsistent with the guarantee against discrimination is valid on the plea that it is permitted under cl. (4) of Art. 15, the assertion by the State that the officers of the State had taken into consideration the criteria which had been adopted by the Courts for determining who the socially and educationally backward classes of the Society are, or that the authorities had acted in good faith in determining the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, would not be sufficient to sustain the validity of the claim.\n\nThe Courts of the country are invested with the power to determine the validity of the law which infringes the fundamental rights of citizens and others and when a question arises whether a law which prima facie infringes a guaranteed fundamental right is within an exception, the validity of that law has to be determined by, the Courts on materials placed. before them. By merely asserting that the law was made after full consideration of the relevant evidence and criteria which have a bearing thereon, and was within the exception, the jurisdiction of the Courts to determine 'Yhether by making the law a fundamental right has been infringed is not excluded. '\n\nThe High Court has repeatedly observed in the course of their judgment that. no materials at all were placed on the record to enable them to decide whether the criteria laid down by this Court for determining that the list prepared by the Government conformed to the requirements of cl. (4) of Art. 15 were followed. On behalf of the State it was merely asserted that an enquiry was in fact made with the aid of expert officers and the Law Secretary and the question was examined from all points of view by the L7Sup.C.I/68-14\n\nofficers of the State, by the Cabinet Sub-Committee and by the Cabinet.\n\nBut whether in that examination the correct criteria were applied is not a matter on which any assumption could be made especially when the list prepared is. exfacie based on castes or communities and in substantially the list which was struck down by the High Court in P. Sukhadev's case(').\n\nHonesty of purpose of those who prepared and published the list was not and is not challenged, bl!! the validity of a law which .apparently infringes the fundamental rights of citizens cannot be upheld merely because the law-maker was satisfied that what he did was right or that he believes that he acted in manner consis.- tent with the constitutional guarantees of the citizen. The test of the validity of a law alleged to irifringe the fundamental rights of a citizen or any act done in execution of that law lies not in the belief of the maker of the law or of the person executing the law, but in the demonstration by evidence and argument before the Courts that the guaranteed right is not infringed.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. SAGAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. SAGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 27, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. SAGAR March 27, 1968\n\n(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMA.SWAMI AND G. K. MrrT!!ll, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 881, "end_char": 894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order and the list were challenged in writ petitions before the High Court on the ground that another list published by the State Govet on June 21, 1963 determining backward classes for the purpose of."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1321, "end_char": 1331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3317, "end_char": 3324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4404, "end_char": 4419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4427, "end_char": 4452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the appeJlants."}}, {"text": "A. V. V. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4507, "end_char": 4520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the appeJlants."}}, {"text": "K, Narayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Narayana Rao and G. Narayana Rao, for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "K, Narayana Rao"}}, {"text": "G. Narayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Narayana Rao and G. Narayana Rao, for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "K, Narayana Rao"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.\n\nAgainst ihe order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh declaring invalid the \"reservatioIT for backward dasses under Rule 4A and SA respectively of the Telangana and the Andhra Rules, and the directions in respect of the President's Scouts and Guides\", under Government orders Nos."}}, {"text": "SA respectively of the Telangana and the Andhra Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1135 & 1136-Health, Housing & Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, as modified by G.O. M.S. 1880 dated July 29, 1966 for the Telangana region, and by G.O.M.s: 1789 dated August."}}, {"text": "S. 1880", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SA respectively of the Telangana and the Andhra Rules", "statute": "SA respectively of the Telangana and the Andhra Rules"}}, {"text": "July 29, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1135 & 1136-Health, Housing & Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, as modified by G.O. M.S. 1880 dated July 29, 1966 for the Telangana region, and by G.O.M.s: 1789 dated August."}}, {"text": "Telangana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5087, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1135 & 1136-Health, Housing & Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, as modified by G.O. M.S. 1880 dated July 29, 1966 for the Telangana region, and by G.O.M.s: 1789 dated August."}}, {"text": "August. 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1135 & 1136-Health, Housing & Municipal Administration Department dated June 16, 1966, as modified by G.O. M.S. 1880 dated July 29, 1966 for the Telangana region, and by G.O.M.s: 1789 dated August."}}, {"text": "Andhra Region", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5156, "end_char": 5169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 1966 for the Andhra Region, the State of Andhra Pradesh has appealed to this Court with special leave."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 1966 for the Andhra Region, the State of Andhra Pradesh has appealed to this Court with special leave."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Andhra area there are four Medi- Cal Colleges having in the aggregate 550 seats for new entrants."}}, {"text": "Health and the Andhra Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Augnst 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1783-Health dated Augnst 2, 1966."}}, {"text": "Arts. 15(4), 16(4) and 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Health and the Andhra Rules", "statute": "Health and the Andhra Rules"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6829, "end_char": 6847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that in reserving seats for nominees of the Central Government and from other States, for cultural scholars, for women, for graduates and for students from H.S.C. & P.U.C. Courses, no fundamental rights were infringed, but the reservations for members of the backward classes described in the list prepared by the Government of Andhra Pradesh were invalid."}}, {"text": "H.S.C. & P.U.C. Courses", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that in reserving seats for nominees of the Central Government and from other States, for cultural scholars, for women, for graduates and for students from H.S.C. & P.U.C. Courses, no fundamental rights were infringed, but the reservations for members of the backward classes described in the list prepared by the Government of Andhra Pradesh were invalid."}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7099, "end_char": 7127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that in reserving seats for nominees of the Central Government and from other States, for cultural scholars, for women, for graduates and for students from H.S.C. & P.U.C. Courses, no fundamental rights were infringed, but the reservations for members of the backward classes described in the list prepared by the Government of Andhra Pradesh were invalid."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7146, "end_char": 7153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Health and the Andhra Rules", "statute": "Health and the Andhra Rules"}}, {"text": "Article 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Health and the Andhra Rules", "statute": "Health and the Andhra Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the State of Madras v .. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan(') an order issj!ed by the Government of the State of Madras fixing the number of seats for particular communities for selection of candidates for admission to the Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State was challenged on the ground that it violated the uarantee against discrimination."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPO&TS [1968)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8579, "end_char": 8607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPO&TS [1968)\n\n.CR\n\nfundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8671, "end_char": 8681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8808, "end_char": 8818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parliament thereafter added cl. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8968, "end_char": 8978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 31, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore, in supersession of all previous orders made under Art."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9197, "end_char": 9212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore, in supersession of all previous orders made under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9264, "end_char": 9271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9901, "end_char": 9911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10010, "end_char": 10020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Aiidhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10128, "end_char": 10152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1880-Health issued by the State of Aiidhra Pradesh E on June 21, 1963, µotifying a list of castes for the purpose of selecting candidates from the backward classes in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh was declared invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the order which classified the backward classes solely on the basis of caste subverted the object of Art."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10306, "end_char": 10320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1880-Health issued by the State of Aiidhra Pradesh E on June 21, 1963, µotifying a list of castes for the purpose of selecting candidates from the backward classes in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh was declared invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the order which classified the backward classes solely on the basis of caste subverted the object of Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10349, "end_char": 10377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1880-Health issued by the State of Aiidhra Pradesh E on June 21, 1963, µotifying a list of castes for the purpose of selecting candidates from the backward classes in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh was declared invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the order which classified the backward classes solely on the basis of caste subverted the object of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10498, "end_char": 10505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10606, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 3, 1964, the."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12770, "end_char": 12782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that at another meeting it was resolved that the list of 146 backward communities prepared by the Director be re-arranged in \"the order of priority in consultation with the Law Secretary, taking into consideration the criteria given by Law Secretary in his note to the Cabinet Sub-Committee and that in doing so such of the cric teria as capable of being practically possible for consideration may be taken into account\", and, accordingly the Law Secretary and the Director of Social Welfare considered the representations made by certain communities to the Government from time to time and\n\n\"drew up a list of the order of priority as called for by the Cabinet Sub-Committee'', that thereafter the Cabinet Sub-Committee made its recommendations which were considered by the Council of D Ministers on July 4, 1966, and that the Council of Ministers considered the social, educational and economic conditions of the backward classes named in the lists submitted to them, and dealt with each individual class and deleted certain items or classes in the lists, changed the denomination of certain classes \"for the more precise effectuation of concessions to those classes only who\n\nreally need them\", and consolidated the backward classes into one list, ruling out the priorities suggested by the Director of Social\n\nWelfare in accordance with the opinion of the Cabinet Sub-Committee, and thereafter published resolution No."}}, {"text": "P. Sukhadev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13882, "end_char": 13893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the petitioners it was contended in the High Court that the Government of Andhra Pradesh had adopted the same list of backward classes which was struck down by the High\n\nCou~ in P. Sukhadev's case(') with some slig!u modifications and the new list also having made a reservation in favour of castes and not classes, it infringed the guarantee under Art.", "canonical_name": "P. Sukhadev"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14053, "end_char": 14063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. Cukhadev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the earlier G.O. was struck down\n\nin P. Cukhadev's case(') on the ground that it was based on caste alone, and since the G.O. under challenge was again prepared on the same basis it could not be sustained as falling within the exception provided in Art.", "canonical_name": "P. Sukhadev"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14756, "end_char": 14766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15454, "end_char": 15461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15614, "end_char": 15621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. R. Balaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17208, "end_char": 17220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are the principles which have been enuncited in the decisiOn of this Court in M. R. Balaji's case(') and R. Chitralekha & Another v. State of Mysore and others(')."}}, {"text": "R. Chitralekha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17298, "end_char": 17312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn R. Chitralekha's case('), Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority of the Court Observed at p. 388 : ·\n\n(l) (1963)Supp, 1S.C.R.439."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17324, "end_char": 17333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn R. Chitralekha's case('), Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority of the Court Observed at p. 388 : ·\n\n(l) (1963)Supp, 1S.C.R.439."}}, {"text": "(1964) 6 S. C. R. 368", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17435, "end_char": 17456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17497, "end_char": 17507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17876, "end_char": 17883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18167, "end_char": 18177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18647, "end_char": 18654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State of Madras and others('), Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Court observed :\n\n\" .... if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19189, "end_char": 19199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "theArtdhra Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19647, "end_char": 19676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The list dated June 21, 1963, of castes prepared by theArtdhra Pradesh Government to determine backward classes for the purpose of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Thurston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20429, "end_char": 20437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also stated in the affidavit of the Director of Social Welfare that he considered the representations made to him, consulted the Law Secretary and certain publications relating to the study of backward classes e.g.\n\nThurston's \"Caste and Tribes\" and Sirajul- Hasan's \"Castes and Tribes\", and made his recommendations which were modified by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Council of Ministers and ultimately the Council of Ministers prepared a final list of backward classes."}}, {"text": "Sirajul- Hasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20463, "end_char": 20477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also stated in the affidavit of the Director of Social Welfare that he considered the representations made to him, consulted the Law Secretary and certain publications relating to the study of backward classes e.g.\n\nThurston's \"Caste and Tribes\" and Sirajul- Hasan's \"Castes and Tribes\", and made his recommendations which were modified by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Council of Ministers and ultimately the Council of Ministers prepared a final list of backward classes."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21300, "end_char": 21313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which are filed on behalf of the Government do not say what was the material placed before the Cabinet Sub-Committee or the Council of Ministers, from which we could conclude that the criteria laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been applied in preparing the list of backward classes."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22533, "end_char": 22543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23254, "end_char": 23264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23774, "end_char": 23781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25156, "end_char": 25163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_605_609_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA v.\n\nSTATE TRANSPORT APPELLA1E AUTIIORITY & ORS.\n\nMarch 28, 1968 [M. HlDAYATULLAH C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALJNGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Art. 13&- Decision on question of fact by State Transport Authorities-Interference by Supreme Court in appeal by special leave.\n\nThe Regional Transport Authority renewed a stage carriage permit in C favour of the appellant. The State Transport Appellate Authority set aside the order in apl\"\"'I, and granted the permit to the 3rd respondent.\n\nOne of the considerallons that prevailed with the Appellate Authority was that the 3rd :respondent bad offered to put into service an air cooled 1965-model vehicle. The order of the Appellate Authority was confirmed by the High Court in a writ petition.\n\nIn appeal to this Court under Art. 136, it was contended that after the renewal of the permit in his favour by the R.T.A. the appellant ac- D quired a 1966-i11odel bus whicli would have been equally serviceable; but this fact of acquisition of a new bus was not relied upon by the appellant before the Appellate Authority. It was also contended that the appellant was entitled to preference in the matter of renewal on the facts establish ed in the present case.\n\nHELD : This Court would be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the E Motor Vehicles Act, especially when the legislature has entrusted the task of granting cir renewing the stage carriage permits to such authorities which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the matters relevant under the provisions of the Act. This Court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave, under Art. 136, as if it we're an appellate court. It will not examine or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience. Tho power being of an exceptional and over F riding nature has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations when justice so requires. [608 FH;\n\n609 A-BJ.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 740 of 19~. .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated G December 19, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.\n\nPetition No. 225 of 1967.\n\nM. C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondeD, t No. 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing a petition filed under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution challenging an\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C. R.\n\norder made by the State Transport Appellate Authority in res A pect of a stage carriage permit for the route, Digthan Indore via Ghata Billod.\n\nThe appellant had applied for renewal of his stage carriage permit for that route. Respondent No. 3 and another person of the name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh permit for the same route. As the application of Balwantrao Gaikwad was not ripe for hearing and the Corporation withdrew its appli cation, the Regional Transport Authority considered the rival claims of !)le appellant and respondent No. 3. The latter made an offer at the hearing that he would run an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle. The Transport Authority, however, took the view that the offer had been made by way of a competitive bid. In its opinion both the applicants were at par in the matter of coverage and adverse remarks, but the appellant was superior in experience and provision of facilities for passengers. The permit of the ap pellant was renewed fora period of three years from the date of its expiry on (he existing terms. Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under s. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 193 9 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was disposed of by the State Trans port Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority gave weight to the fact that whereas respondent No. 3 had offered to run an air-cooled vehicle of 196;> mooel, 110 such offer had been made by the appellant who was operating the route with a vehicle of 1957 mooel. It further found that the appellant had not been running the bus on the kachha portion of the-road during the rainy season in the years 1962 and 1963. This was taken to an1ount to \"adverse record of considerable significance\" against the appellant. The Appellate Authority therefore decided that respon dent No. 3 was entitled to the grant of the permit as against the renewal of the perinit in favour of the appellant.\n\nIt made a direction that a permit be issued to respondent No. 3 for a period of three years provided he put into service an air-cooled vehicle within four months.\n\nThe appellant moved the High Court by means of a writ peti ti on. It appears ff\"lll the order of the Division' Bench that the following points were presed on behalf of the appellant: (!) Res pondent No. 3 had not applied for the grant of a fresh permit for the same route for which renewal had been applied for by the appellant.\n\n(2) The Appellate Authority had taken into account an extraneous consideration when it regarded respondent No. 3's offer of operating an air-cooled bus as giving material snperiority.\n\n(3) The finding that the appellant had been guilty of non-main tenance having not operated service on the kachha section of the route during the rainy season for two years was not well-founded.\n\n( 4) The Appellate Authority did not give due weight to all the relevant considerations.\n\nThe High Court found that the Appellate Authority had rightly regarded the application of respondent No. 3 as one made for the same route aud that the offer of operating an air-cooled bus was a perfectly relevant consideration and cou14 not be regarded as extraneous vide : Samrathmal v. State Transport Appellate Authority & Ors('). It was further of the opinion that the Appellate Authority had rightly not accepted the. explanation of the appellant that the kachha section of the route was not operable during the rainy season, because respondent No. 3, who held a permit for Indore-Digthan route (which was the same as the Digthan- Indore route), had maintained the service even during the rainy season without finding it risky to do so. The High Court repelled the last contention raised before it by relying on Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. C. Chandrasekaran &: Otherl(') according to which it was for the Transport Authority to appreciate how public interest would be best served and in doing so it was entitled to D take the view that one consideration was more likely to effectuate it than the other.\n\nMr. S. V. Gupte for respondent No. 3 sought to ask for revocation of the special leave on the ground that it had been obtained by a mis-statement of material facts, but it is altogether unnecessary to go into that matter as this appeal cannot succeed for other E reasons.\n\nMr. M. C. Chagla for the appellant laid a great deal of emphasis on the acquisition of a vehicle of 1966 model by the appellant after the renewal of his permlt had been ordered by the Regional Transport Authority. It was pointed out that respondent No. 3 had been. hitherto running a vehicle of 1957 model. and F had only made an offer to put into service an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle at the time of hearing. According to Mr. Chagla the 1966 model vehicle would have been equally, if not more, convenient and serviceable and jt was wholly unjust to deprive the appellant of the permit which he had held for the past several years. He further sought to attack the finding of the Appellate Authority about the adverse record of the appellant and the route for which the application for the permit had been made by the G\n\ncontending parties. Finally, he forcefully raised the question whether under the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act, the appellant was entitled to preference in the matter of renewal on the facts established in the present case.\n\nAccording to him the appellant's permit should have been renewed, although it was open to the Authority concerned to impose a condition under cl. (ix)\n\n(I). C.A. 503 of 1965 decided on 2Sth August 1965.\n\n(2) t1964J 5 S.C.R. 869.\n\n608 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof sub-s. (3) of s. 48 of the Act that the appellant should acquire an air-cooled bus within a specified-period. It was maintained that the High Court failed to approach a consideration of the case by keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of the Act which were of material consequence. It may be mentioned that the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act is to the effect that other conditions being equal an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permilS.\n\nAccording to sub-s. (3)(ix) of s. 48 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority while granting the permit may attach the condition, among other conditions, that vehicles of specified types fitted with bodies conforming to approved specifications shall be used.\n\nIt is significant that the acquisition of a 1966 model bus by the appellant found no mention in the order of the Appellate Authority which would show that either that fact was not brought to its notice or was not stressed before it. The findings or conclusions on questions of fact could hardly be re-examined or disturbed by the High Court since the decision rendered by the ap propriate authority under the Act could not be interfered with under Art. 226 unless the well recognised tests in that behalf were satisfied vide : Sri Ram Vilas Service(').\n\nThe other question which according to Mr. Chagla is of wide importance and relates to the scope and ambit of the second proviso to s. 5 8(2) of the Act does not appear to have been canvassed before the High Court and has not been raised in an appropriate manner in the petition for special leave and even in the additional grounds sought to be introduced by means of Civil Misc., Petition No. 934 of 1968. We did not permit Mr. Chagla to address us at any length on the point.\n\nIn cases of the present kind this Court would be naturally reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the Act, especially when the legislature bas entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice anii the relevant matters which should engage their attention tmder the provisions contained in the Act.\n\nThe present case has not been shown to contain any such infirmity as would justify interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The limitation on the exercise of power under that Article cannot be defined with any precision; but as observed in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal(\") the power being of an exceptional and overriding natnre it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special\n\n(j) (1964] S S.C.R. 869.\n\n(2) [19SSJ I S.C.R. 941.\n\nA and extraordinary situations. It is well known by now that this Court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave as if it were an appeal court and examine or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or are such as are shocking to judicial C!>nseience or the like, the paramount consideration always being the perpetuation of justice.\n\nB For all these reasons, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 28, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 94, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 28, 1968 [M. HlDAYATULLAH C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALJNGAM,\n\nK. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 188, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "The State Transport Appellate Authority set", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 487, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE AUTHORITY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 848, "end_char": 856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1423, "end_char": 1441, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1780, "end_char": 1788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Chagla"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2402, "end_char": 2419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondeD, t No.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondeD, t No."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing a petition filed under Arts."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2609, "end_char": 2637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing a petition filed under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 & 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pradesh Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3077, "end_char": 3111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and another person of the name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh permit for the same route."}}, {"text": "Balwantrao Gaikwad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3201, "end_char": 3219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the application of Balwantrao Gaikwad was not ripe for hearing and the Corporation withdrew its appli cation, the Regional Transport Authority considered the rival claims of !)"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3967, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, who held a permit for Indore-Digthan route (which was the same as the Digthan- Indore route), had maintained the service even during the rainy season without finding it risky to do so."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. V. Gupte for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. V. Gupte"}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7096, "end_char": 7108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. M. C. Chagla for the appellant laid a great deal of emphasis on the acquisition of a vehicle of 1966 model by the appellant after the renewal of his permlt had been ordered by the Regional Transport Authority.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Chagla"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Chagla the 1966 model vehicle would have been equally, if not more, convenient and serviceable and jt was wholly unjust to deprive the appellant of the permit which he had held for the past several years."}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8028, "end_char": 8033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2Sth August 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.A. 503 of 1965 decided on 2Sth August 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8451, "end_char": 8456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8784, "end_char": 8789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8972, "end_char": 8977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9652, "end_char": 9660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Vilas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9735, "end_char": 9744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 unless the well recognised tests in that behalf were satisfied vide : Sri Ram Vilas Service(')."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9889, "end_char": 9893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10842, "end_char": 10850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_610_613_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "IMAN ALI &. ANR. v.\n\nSTATE OF ASSAM\n\nMarch 28, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]\n\nCode of Crbninal Procedure, ss. 367, 439-Jndian Penal Code. ss. 396, 302-Accused convicted of 1nurder during dacoit; v-Trial Court passing Sentence of life imprison1nent lvit/Jout givbzg reasons-High Court en/Jc; ncing sentence to that of death-Considerations for interfering with discretion of trial court-Different considerationv do not necessaril.\" apply lihen conviction is under s. 396 and not s. 302 of I.P.C.\n\nThe appellants were convicted by the court of sessions for an offence punishable under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nTy were held to have shot dead two inmates of a house in which along with others they had gone to commit dacoily.\n\nOne of the appellants filed an appeal in the High Court against his con viction. The High Court thereafter gave notice to both the appellants to shO\\V cause why the sentence of impi'isonment passed againsteach of th.em should not be enhanced to death. After hearing them the High.\n\nCourt sentenced them both to death. The order was challenged in this Court and it wos urged that the High Court should not have interfered with the discretion of the Sessions Judge in the matter of passing the appropriate sentence and that the considerations which app]y to a sentence under s. 302 J.P.C. would not apply to a case under s. 396 I.P.C.\n\nHELD : (i) The offence committed by the appellants was heinous and committed in cold blood with the sole object of committing dacoity. It was not a case of constructive liability but the appellants had themselves committed the murders and therefore no advantage could be taken of the fact that the conviction was under s. 396 and not under s. 302. On the above facts the enhancement of sentence by the High Court from life imprisonment to death was justified especially whea the trial court had not given any reasons for _awarding the lesser s-cntencc.\n\nJn Dalip Singh's cnse this Court only cautioned the appcl1ate court against interfering if the discretion of the trying judge is exercised for reasons recorded by him' and if it appears from the :reasons that he had exercised a judicial mind in not awarding the sentence of death. (612 F-613BJ.\n\nDalip Singh & Ors. v. State of Punja/>. [1954] S.C.R. 145, 156. explained.\n\nLal Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Alld. 625, distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 30, 1967 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1964.\n\nK. Rajentlra Chaudhuri, for the appellants.\n\nNaunit Lal, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court. was delivered by Bbargava, J.\n\nThe appellants, Iman Ali and Jogesh Chan_dta.\n\nArjya, were convicted by the court of Session for an offence pumsh able under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe facts found by the <:ourt of Ses sion for convicting the appellants were that, on the mght between-\n\n11th and 12th Mav 1962, between 1 and 2 a.m., the appellants, along with about fi or 13 others, com.nitted dacoit~ in the boue of 1 Tenu Arjya. At the time of comm1tmg the daco1ty the daco1ts broke open the door of the house with the crossbar of a plough ..\n\nFour dacoits, including the two appellants, entered the house, while the remaining persons remained standing outside. As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya.\n\nBoth Golapi d her husband Tenu Arjya fell down dead. Thereafter, the dacmts de· mantled money from Hari Charan Arjya, the son of the two de ceased persons; They took away a sum of Rs. 2,500/. which.was. kept in a quilt and also removed the gold eaMings, on~ silver necklace and one waist band from the person of Golap1.\n\nThe commission of this offence in the manner descdbed above was held by the Sessions Court to be proved on the basis of the evidence given by the prosecution, and, thereupon, finding both the appel !ants guilty of the offence punishable under s. 396, I.P.C., that court sentenced each of these appellants to imprisonment for life ..\n\nIman Ali appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Assam and Nagaland. The learned Judges of the High Court, on pcrus ing the judgment, were of the prima facie opinion that, if the con viction of Iman Ali was to be upheld, there was no justification for not awarding to him the sentence of death and, consequently, they issued notice to Iman Ali to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. At the same time, a notice was also issued to the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya by the learned Judges suo motu to show cause why his sentence should also not be en hanced to sentence of death. Thereafter, tlie appeal of Iman Ali was heard and both the appellants were heard in respect of the show cause notices issued to them. Opportunity was, in addition. offered to Jogesh Chandra Arjya to urge whatever could be said\" on his behalf against his conviction also. The High Court affrnl ed the findings of fact of the Court of Session and enhanced the\n\nente.nce of both thse appellants, so that the sentence of rigorous 1mpnsonment for hfe was altered to sentence of .death with the\n\ndirection that they be hanged by the neck till they are d; ad. Doth the appellants sought leave from the High Court to appeal to this Cou:t, but leave was refused. Thereupon, both of them sought special leave under Article 13~ of the Constitution. By an order dated 8th December, 1967, this Court ranted special leave limit\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ned to the question whether, in this case, the enhancement of the sentence from life imprisonment to sentence of death was justified.\n\nConsequently, in this appeal, the only point that falls for determination is whether th~ order of the High Court enhancing the sentence of the appellants from life imprisonment to death was justified and should be upheld.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants, in challenging the justification for the order of enhancement of sentence by the High Court, relied on the principle laid down by this Court in Dalip S, ingh and OtMrs v. State of Punjab('), which was explained in the followinj! words :-\n\n\"In a case of murder, the death sentence should ordinarily be imposed unless the trying Judge for reasons w.hicJi should normally be recorded considers it proper tb award the lesser penalty.\n\nBut the discretion is his and if he gives reasons on which a judicial mind could properly be found, an appellate court should not interfere. The power to enhance a sentenee from transportation. to death should very rarely be exercised and only for the strongest possible reasons. It is not enough for till appellate court to say, or think, tl1at if left to itself it would have awarded the greater penalty because the discretion does not belong to the appellate court but to the trial Judge and the only ground on which an appellate court can interfere is that the discretion has been improperly exercised, as for example, where no reasons are _given and none can be inferred from the circumstances of the case, or where the facts are so gross that no normal judicial mind would have awarded the lesser penalty.\" It appears to us, however, that, in the .present case, this principle is of no assistance to the appellants for challenging the step taken by tile High Court.\n\nThis Court cautioned the appellate court against interfering if the discretion of the trying Judge is exercised for reasons recorded by him and if it appears from the reasons that he had exercised a judicial mind in not awarding the sentence\n\nof death. In the present case, as mentioned by the High Court G and as is apparent from the judgment of the Court of Session, the trial court awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life without giving any reasons at all for adopting that course. It is true that the appellants were not convicted in the present case for the offence of murder aimpllclter imder seefion 302, I.P .C.; but that, in our opinion, is immaterial. The conviction of the appellants under s. 396, I.P.C., was not based on constructive liability as members of the gang of dacoits. There was clear finding by the\n\n(i) [1954) S.C.R. \"145 at p, 156.\n\nCourt of Session which has been upheld by the High Court that each of these appellant& committed a cold-blooded murder by shooting two inmates of the house simply with the object of facilitating commission of dacoity by them. Those persons were shot and killed even though they had not even tried to put up any resistance.\n\nThe offence under s. 396, I.P.C., was therefore, no less heinous than an offence under s. 302, l.P.C. In these circumstances, when the Court of Session gave no reason at all for not awarding the sentence of death and for sentencing them to imprisonment for life only, it cannot be held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with that order.\n\nLearned counsel in this connection referred us to a decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v.\n\nEmperor('), where it was held :\n\n\"We do not consider that as a general rule a sentence of death should necessarily follow a conviction under s. 396, 1.P.C., and this Section differs from s. 302, D l.P.C., in that respe.ct. The rule is under s. 302, that a sentence of death should follow unless reasons are shown for giving a lesser sentence.\n\nNo such rule applies to s. 396, 1.P.C.\"\n\nAgain, we do not think that the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court intended to lay down that, even in cases where a per- E son is convicted for the offence under s. 396, l.P.C., and there is clear evidence that he himself had committed a cold-blooded murder in committing the dacoity, a sentence of death should not follow. Clearly, the view expressed was meant to apply to those cases where there could be no definite finding as to which person committed the murder and all the members of the gang are held F constructively guilty of the offence punishable under s. 396; I.P.C.\n\nA principle enunciated for such a situation cannot be applied to !\\ case where there is direct evidence that a particular accused committed the murder himself, as is the finding i.n the present case.\n\nIn these circumstances, the order made by the High Court must be held to be justified and the appeal is dismissed.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1938 Alld. 62S.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "IMAN ALI &. ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IMAN ALI &. ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ASSAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ASSAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 28, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSTATE OF ASSAM\n\nMarch 28, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 367, 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jndian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 396, 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jndian Penal Code", "statute": "Jndian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 488, "end_char": 494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jndian Penal Code", "statute": "Jndian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jndian Penal Code", "statute": "Jndian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1415, "end_char": 1421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1422, "end_char": 1427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1770, "end_char": 1776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Dalip Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 1998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Dalip Singh's cnse this Court only cautioned the appcl1ate court against interfering if the discretion of the trying judge is exercised for reasons recorded by him' and if it appears from the :reasons that he had exercised a judicial mind in not awarding the sentence of death. ("}}, {"text": "K. Rajentlra Chaudhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajentlra Chaudhuri, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bbargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Bbargava, J.\n\nThe appellants, Iman Ali and Jogesh Chan_dta."}}, {"text": "Iman Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2785, "end_char": 2793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Bbargava, J.\n\nThe appellants, Iman Ali and Jogesh Chan_dta.", "canonical_name": "IMAN ALI &. ANR"}}, {"text": "Jogesh Chan_dta.\n\nArjya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2798, "end_char": 2821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Bbargava, J.\n\nThe appellants, Iman Ali and Jogesh Chan_dta.", "canonical_name": "Jogesh Chan_dta.\n\nArjya"}}, {"text": "section 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2894, "end_char": 2905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2913, "end_char": 2930, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Golapi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3487, "end_char": 3493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya.", "canonical_name": "Golapi"}}, {"text": "Tenu Arjya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya."}}, {"text": "Iman Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya.", "canonical_name": "IMAN ALI &. ANR"}}, {"text": "Jogesh Chandra Arjya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya.", "canonical_name": "Jogesh Chan_dta.\n\nArjya"}}, {"text": "Hari Charan Arjya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3732, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the dacmts de· mantled money from Hari Charan Arjya, the son of the two de ceased persons; They took away a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Golap1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kept in a quilt and also removed the gold eaMings, on~ silver necklace and one waist band from the person of Golap1.", "canonical_name": "Golapi"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4197, "end_char": 4203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam and Nagaland", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4330, "end_char": 4362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ants guilty of the offence punishable under s. 396, I.P.C., that court sentenced each of these appellants to imprisonment for life ..\n\nIman Ali appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Assam and Nagaland."}}, {"text": "Jogesh Chandra Arjya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "offered to Jogesh Chandra Arjya to urge whatever could be said\" on his behalf against his conviction also.", "canonical_name": "Jogesh Chan_dta.\n\nArjya"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th December, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 8th December, 1967, this Court ranted special leave limit\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ned to the question whether, in this case, the enhancement of the sentence from life imprisonment to sentence of death was justified."}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8253, "end_char": 8259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8753, "end_char": 8759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9180, "end_char": 9200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel in this connection referred us to a decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v.\n\nEmperor('), where it was held :\n\n\"We do not consider that as a general rule a sentence of death should necessarily follow a conviction under s. 396, 1.P.C., and this Section differs from s. 302, D l.P.C., in that respe.ct."}}, {"text": "s. 396, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9359, "end_char": 9368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 396, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9773, "end_char": 9779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10175, "end_char": 10181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_614_622_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATESMAN (PRIVATE) LTD. v.\n\nH. R. DEB & ORS.\n\nApril 2, 1968\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., V. RAMASWAMI, C, A. VA!DIALINGAM, ..\n\nK. S. HEGf>E AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss. 7(3)(d) and 2•\"11ldicial Of!ic1\", if inc/udea office of Magistrate-Writ of Quo Warranto-/n.ru•\n\nance.\n\nSection 7(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that no person shall be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer. of a l.abour Court, unless he has held any judicial office for not less than seven years.\n\nSince 1940 the first respondent held the Office of Sub-Deputy Collector and was vested with Magisterial powers. In 1959 he was appointed the presiding officer of a Labour Court and he gave an award aaainst the appellant. TM appellant questioned the appointment on the ground that the first respondent had not held 'judicial office' for 7 yeal'S prior to his appointment.\n\nHELD : A Magistrate holds a judicial office.\n\nThat his duties are partly judicial and partly other does not in any way del!racl from the position that while acting as a Magistrate he is a judicial officer. An office means no more than a position to which certain duties are attached.\n\nA public office is one which entitles a man to act in the affairs of others without their appointment or permission. The office of a Magistrate is a correct expl'css1on in English and in law.\n\nThe word 'office' has been applied to Magistrates. The Judicial Officers Protection Act. is illlended\n\nto prouict not Civil Judges alone hut also Magistrate. (620 p:621 CJ,\n\nThe functions of a Labour Court are of great public importance and quasi civil in nature.\n\nMen of. experience on the civil side of the law are more suitable than Magistrates.\n\nPersons employed on multifarious duties and in addition performing some judicial functions may not truly answer the requirement of s. 7.\n\nFor it cannot be denied thac the express.ion \"holding a judicial office\" signifies more than discharge of judi cial functions while holding some other office.\n\nThe phrase postulalies that there is an office and that office is prilllMily judicial. In this case the distinction was unsubstantial because the Magistrate was holding a fixed position for nineteen years and performing functions primarily Of judicial character. [622 B-DJ.\n\nEven if there be some doubt that is to be resolved in favour of upholding the appointment on the ground that the legislature itself by s. 9 contemplatea that such appointments should not be called into queation.\n\nAlthough the provisions of s, 9 cannot shut out an inquiry (if there is a clear usurpation) for purposes of a writ of quo warranto at least in an unclear case the intent of the le)lislature is entitled to great weight The High C.mrt in a quo warranto proceeding should be slow to pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringement of the law.\n\n(621 D-FJ.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil APPCal No. 647 of 1967.\n\nSTATESMAN LTD. v. H. R. DEB (flidayatullah, C.J.) 615\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 5, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order\n\nNo. 134 of 1966.\n\nSachin Chaudhuri, !. K. Glzoslz and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nB S. C. Mazumilar and A. K. Mitter, for respondent No. 2.\n\nB. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for respondent No. 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. This appeal on certificate arises from a C petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India filed in the High Court at Calcutta by the appellant, the Statesman Private Ltd. This company prints 'and publishes daily and weekly newspapers and undertakes general printing work at Calcutta.\n\nBy that writ petition the Company asked for a writ of certiorari against the Second Labour Court, West Bengal with a view to quashing an award, 21 September 1960, reinstating one Sheikh D Kaloo, one of its employees. The Company had dismissed the said Kaloo after holding an inquiry but the Second Labour Court ordered his reinstatement with half wages for the period of his 'forced unemploymenf.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by B. N.\n\nBanerjee J. and by his order, 15 February, 1962, the petition was granted and the order of the Tribunal was quashed.\n\nThe E workmen who had sponsored the case of Kaloo appealed in the High Court. During the course of the appeal an application was filed by the Company stating that the Tribunal presided over by Mr. H. R. Deb was not qualified in law to agj_udicate upon the dispute inasmuch as the appointment of Mr. Deb was in violation of the provisions of s. 7(3)(d) of the IndustriaJ Disputes Act.\n\n1947. On June 16, 1964 by another affidavit the particulars of F the services of Mr. Deb were stated to show that Mr; Deb had not held a 'judicial office' in India for not less than 7 years and as this was a condition precedent his appointment was illegal and the award made by him was a nullity. The Company stated that this was so held in another matter (Matter No. 120/1961 decided on July 28, 1965 between Shree Hanuman Foundries v. H. R. Deb G and others. The appeal was heard and allowed and the order of B. N. Banerjee J. was set aside but liberty was given to the Company, oa terms as to costs, to amend the original petition and the learned Judge was directed to hear and determine the amended petition. The amendment was effected on August 5, 1964. On September 3, 1964 the Divisional Bench in Hanuman Foundries H case delivered judgment. Two separate judgments were delivered.\n\nBachawat J, held that the provisions of 11. 7(3) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act were directory while Basu, J. held them to be mandatory. Bachawat J. also held that even if the appointment\n\nof Mr. Deb was not regular, the doctrine of de facto determination by a Court apparently possessed of jurisdiction applied and the order could not be questioned. Basu J. held to the contrary. The matter was then referred to Sinha J. (as he then was) who held that (a) Mr. Deb had not held judicial office for 7 years prior to his appointment; (b) thats. 7 (3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory; ( c) a writ of quo warranto must therefore issue against him; ( d) that the de facto doctrine applied; and ( c) proceedings for a writ of certiorari was collateral and, therefore, not available to quash the award of Mr. Deb.\n\nThe case of Hanuman Foundries as decided by the Full Bench was followed in the present writ petition by B. C. Mitra J. on June 6, 1966 and the writ petition was dismissed. The Company appealed against the judgment of B. C. Mitra J. Sinha C.J. and A. K. Mookerjee J. dismissed the appeal, January 5, 1967 but granted a certificate and this appeal is the result.\n\nAlthough this appeal is quite separat\"' from the Hanuman Foundries case, the decision in that case was the one canvassed before us. After hearing the arguments in the case we are satisfied that the appeal must fail on the ground that Mr. Deb was competent to exercise jurisdictiiln and his appointment cannot be called in question. In this view of the matter the vecy interesting and learned discussion of the de facto doctrine need not detain us and we express no opinion about it.\n\nThe question falls to be considered on the words and scheme of s. 7 and some other sections. To approach the problem we may first see some other provisions.\n\nThe Act is intended to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Chapter II names the authorities under th.e Act. They are Works Committee (s. 3), Conciliation Officrs (s. 4), Boards of Conciliation ( s. 5), Courts of Inquiry ( s. 6), LabOur Courts ( s. 7), Tribunals ( s. 7 A), National Tribunals ( s. 7B). Each of these sections prescribes the qualifications of the persons fit to be appointed. They are either wholly or partially different as we\n\nshall see presently. Section 7C, however lays dowti that no person shall be appointed to, or continue in, the office of the presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal if (a) he is not an iildejiendent person; or (b) he has attained the age of 65 years.\n\nSection 8 deals with vacancies and then comes s. 9 laying down the finality of orders constituting Boards etc. We shall read 1t presently.\n\nWe are concerned with s. 7 which provides for the constitution. of Labour Courts and prescribes the qualifications for appointment. The section may be read here :\n\n\"7. Labour Courts.\"\n\n(1) The appropriate Government may, by notifica tion in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of imfustrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions a&-\n\nmay be assigned to them under this Act\n\n( 2) A Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government.\n\n( 3) A .person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Labour Court, unless-\n\n(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or\n\n(b) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or ( c) he has held the office of the chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal} Act, 1950, or of any Tribunal, for a period of not less than two years; or\n\n(d) he has held any judicial oflice in India for not less than seven years; or ( e) he has been the presiding officer of a Labour Comt constituted under any Provincial Act or State Act for not less than five years.\"\n\nThis matter is covered only by cl. ( d) of the third sub-section •.\n\nIt may, however, be noticed that no special qualifications are prescribed for Works Committees. Conciliation Officers, Boards F of Conciliation and Courts of Inquiry such as are to be found in s. 7 quoted here.\n\nSpecial qualifications of the members are 10 be found only in respect of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals. These are one-man bodies and tlle qualification of the member is stated. In the case of Tribunals the qualification is : G\n\n\"7 A. Tribunals.\n\n(I)\n\n(2) ..... . .... . ....\n\n(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal unless--\n\n( a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or\n\n(aa) he has, for a period of not less than three years,\n\nbeen a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; or\n\n( b) he has held the office of the chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, or of any Tribunal, for a period of not less than two years.\"\n\n:.and in the case of National Tribunals the qualifications are :\n\n\"7B. National Tribunals.\n\n( 1) .•...\n\n(2) .....\n\n( 3) A person shall not be qualified for appoint- :ment as the presiding officer of a National Tribunal :unless-\n\n(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or\n\n(b) he has held the office of the chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for a period of not less than two years.\" The selection thus is most restricted in the case of National Tribunals, and in varying degree less and less restricted as we pass to Tribunals and Labour Courts. Thus National Tribunals can be presided over only by a person who is or has been a Judge of ; a High Coun or has held the office of the chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal for a period of not Jess than two yeaci.\n\nThere qualifications do not admit of any doubt or exception since the incumbent's qualifications are quite clearly set down. In the case of Tribunals the range of selection is made wider by including a District Judge or an Additional District Judge, who has held this office for a period of not less than 3 years.\n\nThe selection is made still wider in the case of Labour Courts by making competent in addition presiding officers of LabQur Courts constituted under any Provinciru Act of State Act for not Jess than 5 years, and persons holding judicial office for not less than seven years. There is, however, no definition of judicial office and here the difficulty arises.\n\nMr. Deb, tlie incumbent of the office in the present case, had ; at his back the following career :.\n\n(a) Sri Hem Ranjan Deb was first appointed on 23rcl January 1940 as a Sub Deputy Collector on probation and on 24tb January 1940 was appointed as Sub-Deputy Collector and Circle Officer.\n\n,..\n\n- -\n\n(b) On 1st July 1940 he was vested wi~ power of a third class Magistrate. He was confirmed m the post of a Sub-Deputy Collector on 23rd January, 1941.\n\n(c) On 1st July 1950 the said Hem Ranjan Deb was vested with Powers of a Second class Magistrato\n\nand on 1st April 1951 he was vested with powers of a FJl'St Class Magistrate •••\n\nOn July 27, 1959 Mr. Deb was appointed the p,:esiiling officer of the Second Labour Court by Notification No. 3422-IR/IR/ 3A-9/59. The notification read:\n\n\"In exercise of power conferred by Sul!-sections\n\n(2) and (3) of S.T. of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 read with S. 7C of the sai<l Act, the Governor is pleased to appoint Hem Ranjan Deb who is an independent person and has not attained the age Of 65 years and has held a judicial office in India for not less than 7\n\nyears to be . the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court constituted under the Government of West BengaI's notification No. 1727-IR/IR/3A-1/58 dated 26th April 1958 vide Shri Probodh Chandra Maitra\n\n(Calcutta Gai.ettee, 6th August 1959)\".\n\nThe notification took into account the provisions of s. 7C already analysed by us and also declared that he was qualified under E s. 7 ( 3 )( d). Government apparently considered the office held by him from January 23, 1940 to July 27, 1959 a.~ a judicial office necessary for appointment. Since the period for which he held his earlier office is well in excess of 7 years the only question is whdher it was a 'judicial office'. If it was then undoubtedly Mr. Deb was qul&lified. If there be a dispute then the matter falls F to be considemi. In doing so we must take into further account the provisions of s. 9 of the Act as substituted by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1936 (36 of 1956). That amending Act also recasts. 7 in its present fo~ 11!1d ad<ied ss. 7 A, 7B and 7C. Section 9 may now be read\n\nbut 1t JS not necessary to read beyond the first sub-section :\n\n\"9. Finality of orders constituting Boards, etc.\n\n(1) No order of the appropriate Government or of the .Central Government appointing any person as the chairman or any other member of a Board or Court or as t!'e presi<!ing officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tnbunal shall be called in question in any manner; and no act or proceeding before any Board or Court shall be called in question in any manner on the ground. merely of .. the. existence of any vacancy in, or defect m the conshtuuon of, such Board or Court.\" L7 Sup.Cl/68-JS\n\nIt may be noticed that the first part refers to the appointment of any person as the chairman or any other member of a Board or Court or as the presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. The second part deals with Board or Court and in view of the definition of 'Board' and 'Court' in s. 2 ( c) and (f) refers to a Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act. With these we are not concerned and the second part of s. 9, therefore, has no bearing although in the High Court that part alone was considered and the first part ignored.\n\nNow the points for us to decide are first whether Mr. Deb held a 'judicial office' and next even if our opinion be that he did not can we declare his appointment to be invalid when s. 9 prohibits the calling in question of an appointment by Government.? Before we deal with these points in the light of the arguments addressed to us, we may say a few words about how these points were viewed by the High Court.\n\nBanerjee J. who first heard the Hanuman Foundrit!s case made a distinction between 'judicial office' and 'judicial function' and came to the conclusion that although magistrates perform judicial functions, they could not be said to hold 'judicial office'.\n\nBachawat J., distinguished between 'judicial office' and 'judicial o; ervice'. He referred to the provisions of the Constitution bearing upon the appointment of Judges of the High Court and the District and subordinate courts, where these expressions occur and demon strated the difference.\n\nIn his view magistrates could be said to occupy judicial office, but they did not belong to judieia! service.\n\nThe approach of Sinha and Basu JJ., was the same as that of Banerjee J., although the matter was stated with great elaboration and copious references to the Criminal Procedure Code, and Eng lish and American cases, and text books.\n\nIt is not necessary to go over this field. All learned Judges seem to agree that a magistrate exercises judicial functions. '11tls does not admit of any doubt and no reasons are required. That his duties are partly judicial and partly other does not in any way detract from the position that while acting as a inagistrilte\n\nhe is a judicial officer. The dispute, therefore, really reduces it- G self to this : Does the magistrate hold an \"office\".\n\nAn office means no more than a position to which certain duties are attached.\n\nAccording to Earl Jowitt's Dictionary a public offiee is one which entitles a man to act in the affairs of others without their appoint men! or permission. The 'office of a magistrate' is a correct expression in English and in law. Indeed the well-known maxim H of Coke on .Littleton (234a) officio magistratus non. debent esse\n\nvenalia (the offices of a magistrate ought not be saleable) clearly brings out that the word office can be applied to magistrates. Thus '\n\n< H\n\nthere may be an office of a judge ( ofjicii judicis) which in ecclesiastical law at least was said to be promoted when criminal proceedings were taken. But there may be also the office of a magistrate.\n\nCicero in his De Legibus and De officiis makes no difietcnce between a magistratum and a judex. His famous .saying MagiJtratum /egem esse loquentem, legem autem mutum magis-' tratum (The Magistrate is a speaking law., but the law is a silent magistrate) was intended to apply to all judges of all kinds. The word 'office' has been applied to magistrates by Tacitus, Ovid\n\nand others. Bachawat J. has given m'any references to bear out the meaning we have given and has very pertinently pointed out that the Judicial Officers Protection Act, is intended to protect not Civil Judges alone but also Magistrates. The distinction between judicial function and judicial office in this context is artificial and unsubstantial.\n\nWe agree with Bachawat J., that a magistrate holds a judicial office.\n\nOnce this is so held the appeal must fail.\n\nBu~ we cannot overlook the fact that even jf there be some doubt that is to be resolved in favour of upholding the appointment on the ground that the Legislature itself contemp!ates that such appointments should not be called into question.\n\nAlthough the provisions of s. 9 cannot shut out an inquiry (if there is a clear usurpation) for purposes of a writ of quo warranto but at least in an unclear case the intent of the legislature is entitled to great weight. The Legislature has created the conditions of appointment and with its last voice has shut out inquiry.\n\nThe provisions of s. 7 ( 3 )( d) therefore, are not so absolute as to be wholly mandatory in the same way as the provisions of other clauses .are since they admit of no doubt, and therefore do not require construction.\n\nThe High Court in a quo warranto proceeding should be slow to pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringement ol the law .. If a station master were appointed we can r.eadily question the appointment but when a per.son exercising judicial functions is appointed one cannot be too astute to say that the person does not hold a judicial office when it must at least be conceded that he holds an office of some kind. Nor does the argument that magistrates will claim to be appointed Judges of the High Court need detain us. The scheme of Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution has its on .ect OD; te meaning of the expressions 'judicial office' '.1fld 1ud1c1al semce . In any case the use of the same expression m any other enatmet J;!Ot in pari materia can have no bearing upon the Industnal Disputes Act and vice versa. In the Constitution these words must bear the meaning which the context dictates and in that connection the history of appointment of Judges cannot be overlooked.\n\nJ..e:; t our maning be extended by Government to cases undeservmg of savmg .under s. 9, we wish to make it clear that the\n\n622 SUPUMI! COtmT JUIPO&TS\n\n(1968] J S.C.R.\n\nintention of the Legislature really is that men who can be described as independent and with sufficient judicial experience i:nust\n\nbe selected. The :iru; ntion of High COllfl Judges and District Judges earlier in the same section indicates that Ordinarily judicial officers from the civil judiciary must be selected at last so long as the separation of judiciary from the Executive in the public services is not finally achieved. The appointment of a person from the ranks: of civil judiciary carries with it an assurance \"'.hich is unique. The functions of a Labour Court are of great pµblic importal)ce and quasi civil in nature. MeJ! ot experience on the civil side of the law are more suitable than Magistniles. Persons employed on .multifarious duties and in addition performing some judicial functions, may not truly answer the requirement of s. 7 and it may be open in a quo warranto proceeding to question their appointment on the ground that they do not hold essentially a judicial office because they primarily perform other functions.\n\nFor it cannot be denied that the expression \"liol!iing a judicial office\" signifies more than discharge Of judicial functions while holding some other office. The phrase postulates that there is an office and that that offic!l is primarily judicial. Office means a fixed position for performance of duties. In this case the distinction was unsubstantial because the Magistrate was holding a fixed position for nineteen years and performing functions primarily of a judicial character. The case was not fit for interference by a writ in view of the provisions of s. 9 of the Act.\n\nIn the result we are o( opinion that the judgment under appeal is right although the reasons justifying the conclusion are different from those accepted by the Divisional Bench from the earlier case of the same Court. Tue appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "STATESMAN (PRIVATE) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATESMAN (PRIVATE) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. DEB & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. R. DEB & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 2, 1968\n\n[M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., V. RAMASWAMI, C, A. VA!DIALINGAM, ..\n\nK. S. HEGf>E AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 7(3)(d) and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7(3)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Judicial Officers Protection Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1466, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sachin Chaudhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Chaudhuri, !."}}, {"text": "K. Glzoslz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3153, "end_char": 3163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Glzoslz and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Glzoslz and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B S. C. Mazumilar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3201, "end_char": 3218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B S. C. Mazumilar and A. K. Mitter, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B S. C. Mazumilar and A. K. Mitter, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3260, "end_char": 3266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3268, "end_char": 3284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. This appeal on certificate arises from a C petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India filed in the High Court at Calcutta by the appellant, the Statesman Private Ltd. This company prints 'and publishes daily and weekly newspapers and undertakes general printing work at Calcutta.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3496, "end_char": 3518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. This appeal on certificate arises from a C petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India filed in the High Court at Calcutta by the appellant, the Statesman Private Ltd. This company prints 'and publishes daily and weekly newspapers and undertakes general printing work at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Statesman Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3541, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. This appeal on certificate arises from a C petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India filed in the High Court at Calcutta by the appellant, the Statesman Private Ltd. This company prints 'and publishes daily and weekly newspapers and undertakes general printing work at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHidayatullah, C.J. This appeal on certificate arises from a C petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India filed in the High Court at Calcutta by the appellant, the Statesman Private Ltd. This company prints 'and publishes daily and weekly newspapers and undertakes general printing work at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Sheikh D Kaloo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3857, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that writ petition the Company asked for a writ of certiorari against the Second Labour Court, West Bengal with a view to quashing an award, 21 September 1960, reinstating one Sheikh D Kaloo, one of its employees."}}, {"text": "B. N.\n\nBanerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4107, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was heard by B. N.\n\nBanerjee J. and by his order, 15 February, 1962, the petition was granted and the order of the Tribunal was quashed.", "canonical_name": "B. N.\n\nBanerjee"}}, {"text": "15 February, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was heard by B. N.\n\nBanerjee J. and by his order, 15 February, 1962, the petition was granted and the order of the Tribunal was quashed."}}, {"text": "Kaloo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4276, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The E workmen who had sponsored the case of Kaloo appealed in the High Court."}}, {"text": "H. R. Deb", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the appeal an application was filed by the Company stating that the Tribunal presided over by Mr. H. R. Deb was not qualified in law to agj_udicate upon the dispute inasmuch as the appointment of Mr. Deb was in violation of the provisions of s. 7(3)(d) of the IndustriaJ Disputes Act.", "canonical_name": "H. R. DEB & ORS"}}, {"text": "Deb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the appeal an application was filed by the Company stating that the Tribunal presided over by Mr. H. R. Deb was not qualified in law to agj_udicate upon the dispute inasmuch as the appointment of Mr. Deb was in violation of the provisions of s. 7(3)(d) of the IndustriaJ Disputes Act."}}, {"text": "s. 7(3)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1964 by another affidavit the particulars of F the services of Mr. Deb were stated to show that Mr; Deb had not held a 'judicial office' in India for not less than 7 years and as this was a condition precedent his appointment was illegal and the award made by him was a nullity."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1964 by another affidavit the particulars of F the services of Mr. Deb were stated to show that Mr; Deb had not held a 'judicial office' in India for not less than 7 years and as this was a condition precedent his appointment was illegal and the award made by him was a nullity."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "120/1961 decided on July 28, 1965 between Shree Hanuman Foundries v. H. R. Deb G and others."}}, {"text": "B. N. Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard and allowed and the order of B. N. Banerjee J. was set aside but liberty was given to the Company, oa terms as to costs, to amend the original petition and the learned Judge was directed to hear and determine the amended petition.", "canonical_name": "B. N.\n\nBanerjee"}}, {"text": "5, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment was effected on August 5, 1964."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5379, "end_char": 5396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1964 the Divisional Bench in Hanuman Foundries H case delivered judgment."}}, {"text": "Hanuman Foundries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1964 the Divisional Bench in Hanuman Foundries H case delivered judgment."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bachawat J, held that the provisions of 11."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5589, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Basu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7(3) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act were directory while Basu, J. held them to be mandatory."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then referred to Sinha J. (as he then was) who held that (a) Mr. Deb had not held judicial office for 7 years prior to his appointment; (b) thats. 7 (3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory; ( c) a writ of quo warranto must therefore issue against him; ( d) that the de facto doctrine applied; and ( c) proceedings for a writ of certiorari was collateral and, therefore, not available to quash the award of Mr. Deb."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6069, "end_char": 6092, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "B. C. Mitra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of Hanuman Foundries as decided by the Full Bench was followed in the present writ petition by B. C. Mitra J. on June 6, 1966 and the writ petition was dismissed.", "canonical_name": "B. C. Mitra J. Sinha"}}, {"text": "June 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of Hanuman Foundries as decided by the Full Bench was followed in the present writ petition by B. C. Mitra J. on June 6, 1966 and the writ petition was dismissed."}}, {"text": "B. C. Mitra J. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company appealed against the judgment of B. C. Mitra J. Sinha C.J. and A. K. Mookerjee J. dismissed the appeal, January 5, 1967 but granted a certificate and this appeal is the result.", "canonical_name": "B. C. Mitra J. Sinha"}}, {"text": "A. K. Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6581, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company appealed against the judgment of B. C. Mitra J. Sinha C.J. and A. K. Mookerjee J. dismissed the appeal, January 5, 1967 but granted a certificate and this appeal is the result."}}, {"text": "January 5, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company appealed against the judgment of B. C. Mitra J. Sinha C.J. and A. K. Mookerjee J. dismissed the appeal, January 5, 1967 but granted a certificate and this appeal is the result."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7512, "end_char": 7516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7541, "end_char": 7545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7573, "end_char": 7577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7600, "end_char": 7604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7642, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 9813, "end_char": 9817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Labour Comt constituted under any Provincial Act or State Act", "statute": "Labour Comt constituted under any Provincial Act or State Act"}}, {"text": "Hem Ranjan Deb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) Sri Hem Ranjan Deb was first appointed on 23rcl January 1940 as a Sub Deputy Collector on probation and on 24tb January 1940 was appointed as Sub-Deputy Collector and Circle Officer."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 7C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13106, "end_char": 13111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Government of West BengaI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13396, "end_char": 13421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court constituted under the Government of West BengaI's notification No."}}, {"text": "Probodh Chandra Maitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1727-IR/IR/3A-1/58 dated 26th April 1958 vide Shri Probodh Chandra Maitra\n\n(Calcutta Gai.ettee, 6th August 1959)\"."}}, {"text": "s. 7C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13610, "end_char": 13615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13687, "end_char": 13691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14164, "end_char": 14168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14373, "end_char": 14382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15321, "end_char": 15325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15351, "end_char": 15418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15475, "end_char": 15479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act", "statute": "Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15775, "end_char": 15779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act", "statute": "Board of conciliation or Court of Inquiry constituted under the Act"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16006, "end_char": 16014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banerjee J. who first heard the Hanuman Foundrit!s case made a distinction between 'judicial office' and 'judicial function' and came to the conclusion that although magistrates perform judicial functions, they could not be said to hold 'judicial office'."}}, {"text": "Hanuman Foundrit!s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16038, "end_char": 16056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banerjee J. who first heard the Hanuman Foundrit!s case made a distinction between 'judicial office' and 'judicial function' and came to the conclusion that although magistrates perform judicial functions, they could not be said to hold 'judicial office'."}}, {"text": "Earl Jowitt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17439, "end_char": 17450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Earl Jowitt's Dictionary a public offiee is one which entitles a man to act in the affairs of others without their appoint men!"}}, {"text": "Cicero", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18102, "end_char": 18108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cicero in his De Legibus and De officiis makes no difietcnce between a magistratum and a judex."}}, {"text": "Tacitus", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18459, "end_char": 18466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word 'office' has been applied to magistrates by Tacitus, Ovid\n\nand others."}}, {"text": "Ovid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18468, "end_char": 18472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word 'office' has been applied to magistrates by Tacitus, Ovid\n\nand others."}}, {"text": "Judicial Officers Protection 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22505, "end_char": 22509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_623_630_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH\n\nMOHANLAL BHAGW ANDAS & ANR.\n\nApril 2, 1968 [M. HmAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, s. M. Soou,\n\nR. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)\n\nBonibay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947, s. 29(1) a11d (2)-amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965whether anumded s. 29(2) applied to a case where decision of appellate Court given before the ammded section came into for if High Court could o,,/y exercise power under s. 115 C.P.C. in such case.\n\nIn a suit filed by the respondent in July 1958 for a decree in cjectment, arrears of rent and other dues against the appellant in respect of certain premises in Ahmcdabad. the trial court dismissed the claim for ejectment and passed a decree for arrears. of rent and pennitted increases.\n\nJn appeal .under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 the decree was eonfirmed on February 25, 1963.\n\nBv s. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal lay against any decision in appeal under sub .. ection ( 1) from the order of the trial court.\n\nThe respondent therefore moved the High Court by a petition under s. 115 CPC. While this petition was pending Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 and it was provided in the amended s. 29(2) that while no appeal would lie against any decision in appeal under sul><; eetion ( 1). the ffigh Court may, .for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision in appeal was according to Jaw, call for the case and pass such order os it thinks fit.\n\nOn the assumption that the amended Act applied to all petitions pending before it, the High Court. after a detailed examination of the case, reversed the order of the appellate court and decreed the respondent's suit.\n\nIn appeal by special leave to this Court, it was contended, i11ter aJia. by the appellant that the order of the appellate court which had acquired finality, subject to the exercise of the limited jurisdiction by the ffigh Court under s. 115 C.P.C. could not. be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended s. 29(2) in t.he absence of a provision in the Amending Act making the an1endmcnt retrospective.\n\nHELD : The High Court exercised the jurisdiction invested by Act 18 of 1965 in respect of a judgment which had become final a Jong time before that Act. The appeal must therefore be allowed, the order passed by the High Court set aside and the proceedings remande<l to the High Court to deal v.\"ith and dispo~ of the revision application on the footing that it wns governed by s. 115 C.P.C. under which it was purported to have been filed. [630 G].\n\nWhen the revision application v:as entertained under s. 115 of th~ Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court assumed to itself a limited jurisdiction conferred by that ection, anJ. in the absence of any express\n\nprovision made in the Amending Act, the jurisdiction conferred by that seetion eould not be extended. r629 H-630 BJ.\n\nThere is nothing in the language of s. 29(2) as amended, which may indicate that it was intenccd to be retroscctive in operation. [630 DJ.\n\nIndira Sohan Lal \\', Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi [1955) A 2 S.C.R. 1117 and Moti Rw11 v. Smaj Bhan [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896; distin- RUisbed.\n\nVora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haii Safibhai, (1964] 5 S.C.R. 157; Colonial Sugc.r Refi11ing Company Ltd, v. Irving, [1905] A.C. 369; Garikapatti Veerava v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957] S.C.R. 488; Nana Bin Aha v. Sheku Bin Andu, I.L.R. 32 Bom. 337 and Dafedar Niranjan Singh & Anr. v. Custodian, Evacuee Property (Punjab) & Anr. [1962] I S.C.R. 214; referred to.\n\nIn conferring upon the High Court a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the decision of the appellate court was acoording to law, the Legislature did not attempt to legislate in the matter of procedure. It expressly sought to confer upon the High Court power to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided.\n\n[630 C].\n\nSection 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction upon the High Court to call for the record of a case for the purpose of satisfying itself that. the decision in appeal was according to law, which the High Court did not possess before the . date of the Amending Act. It could not be said that tho amending clause only sought to explain any pre-existing legislation which was ambiguous or defective. [630 D-EJ.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1271 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 2, 3, 1967 of the Gujarat High Coun in Civil Revision Application No. 1010 of 1963.\n\nB. C. Misrn, R. K. Mathur and M. V. Goswami, for the E appellant.\n\nS. K. Zarer and K. L. Hat/ti, for the respondents.\n\nOrder of Reference Shah, J. This appeal raises the question whether a revision petition filed in the High Court under s. 115,-Civil Procedure F Code, from an order passed by an appellate court under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 may after the amendment of s. 29(2) by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Cotrol (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965 be tried in accordance with the amended Act.\n\nThe High Court assumed that a proceeding pendinz before it at G the date on which the amending Act came into force had to be dealt with and decided in accordance with the provisions of subsec. (2) of s. 29' as amended.\n\nThere is no dispute that s. 29 (2) as Jmended has not expressly been given retrospective operation. In Colonial _sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving('), the Judicial Committee held that \"while H provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure\n\n(1) [19J5] A.C. 369\n\nr--\n\n'lmay properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of th_e statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment\".\n\nThe Judicial Committee further observed that \"provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute came into force, were Jina!, are provisions which touch existing rights.\" The same principle has been affirmed by the Judicial Committee in a later decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills v.\n\nIncome-tax Commissioner, Delhi(').\n\nIn Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi('), one of the points decided by this Court in dealing with a case under the Evacuee (Administration of Property) Act, 1947, as amended in 1948, was that even 'if at the date when an application was made for confirmation of a transaction of exchange by a evacuee, the order of the Custodian was to be deemed final, if by an amending Act passed before the order was made, the order was subject to revision by. the Custodian General, the order of the Custodian was denuded of its finality_. In Dafedar Niranjan Singh and Another v. Custodian Evacuee Property (Pb.) and Anr.( 3 ) this Court held that where an order of the Custodian had become final under the Patiala Evacuee (Administration of Property) Ordinance, its finality could not be affected retrospectively under s. 58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 which replaced. the Ordinance. The Court distinguished the observations made in Indira Sohan Lal's case('). Another judgment to which our attention was invited is Moti Ram v. Sura; Bhan(') in which this Court observed that according to the decision in Indira Sohanlal's case(') an appellate decision under s. SB of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act. 194 7 acquires finality after the order in question is inade, and \"even if there be in law any such right at all it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right'', and therefore notwithsta00in~ the declared finality of the judgment of the Controller under th~ Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, when the petition for ejectme11t was filed, the Act having been amended, the High Court invested with revisional jurisdiction by s. 15 ( 5) was competent to revise the order of the Controller. This Court observed that the finality of the order of the Controller atfached thereto only when the order was made and therefore if before the date on which the order was made, by amendment of the Act, the order ceased to be final, a revfsion application to the High Court was competent.\n\n(I) (1927)L.R. 541.A.421.\n\n(3) [1%2] I S.C.R. 214.\n\n(2) [1955] 2S.C.R.1117.\n\n(4) [19W] 2 S.C.R. 8%,\n\nIt is true that in the present case the order of the City Civil A Court was made before the amending Act was enacted.\n\nUnder tho Rent Act. before it was amended, no further appeal lay from the decision of the Appellate Court, but the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115 Code of Civil Procedure was not on tilat account excluded. By the amended Act the High Court is exprssly invested with revisional jurisdiction, which is not subject to the B restrictions prescribed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe result is that the revision petition when originally filed was triable under s. 115-Civil Procedure Code; it has been tried by the High Court iinder the amen~ s. 29(2) of the Rents, Rates Control Act.\n\nIndira Sohanlal's case(') has made a departure from what was C apparently a settled rule. The question in this case is whetherthe\n\nrule in Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case(') Will apply, or the exception engrafted upon the rule by the judgment in Indira Sohanlars case(') will apply. We direct that this case be pl:i.ced before a larger Bench.\n\nIt will be open to the parties to argue such other points as arise out of the order of the High Court, but 0 subject to the restridions imposed by the order granting rul~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah J. The respondents sued the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of shop Municipal Census No. 1754 at Ahmedabad and for rent in arrears and additional taxes.\n\nThe E trial court dismissed the claim for ejectment and passed a d.xree for arrears of rent and permitted increases. In appeal under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947, the decree was confinned on February 25, 1963. By s. 29(2) of that Act, as it then stood, no appeal lay against any decision in appeal under sub-s. ( 1) from the order of the Court of First Instance.\n\nThe respondent accordingly mov· ed the High Court of Gujarat by a petition under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nWhen this petition was pending in the High Court Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, and sub-s. (2) of s. 29 was replaced by the following sub-section : ''No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. ( 1), but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.\"\n\nOn the assumption that by ~~ amende~ Act the High Court '!as\n\nempowered to decide all petitions pending on the .date on which\n\n(I) [t955J 2 s.c.R. 1111.\n\n(2) [1905] A.C. 369.\n\nthe amended section came into operation, as if the amended section applied thereto, the High Court entered upon a detailed investigation of the questions raised by the respondent in the petition-\n\n( I) whether the tenant proved that he was ready and willing to pay the stlllldard rent and permitted increase$ within the meaning of s. 12(1) of the Act; (2) whether the tenant was in arrears of standard rent and permitted increases and the amount of tax for more than six months, and therefore the case fell within the purview of s. 12(3)(a) and not under s. 12(3)(b) of the Act; and\n\n(3) whether in any event the tenant having failed to observe the conditions of the tenancy was disentitled to the protection either, under s. 12(1) ors. 12(3)(b) of the Act, and reversed the order of the appellate court and decreed the respondent's suit.\n\nWith special leave, the appellant has appealed to this Court.\n\nThis Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimohomed \"· Haji Gulumr.ubi Haii Safibhai(') held that in a petition under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order made by the appellate court under s. 29 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947, the Higb Court had no power to set aside the order merely because if was of opinion that the judgment was assailable on the ground of error of fact or even of Jaw: the High Court may exercise its power under that section only if the appellate court had acted without jurisdiction or had failed to exercise its jurisdiction or had acted with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thereafter the Gujarat Legislature amended s. 29(2) by Act 18 of 1965 in the manner set out, so as to confer upon the High Court a jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction exercisable under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that in entering upon an enquiry into the questions raised by the respoµdent, the High Court exercised jurisdiction which it did not possess.\n\nCounsel contended that the right to appeal-and which expression includes the right to move a superior court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction-attaches to a litigation when it commences and it is not affected by any subsequent amendment unless an express provision is made giving retrospective operation to the amendment and tliat the right to appeal which originally attached to the litigation will continue to govern it till it is finally decided.\n\nCounsel relied in support of that contention upon the decisions in Colonial S11gar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving('); Garikapatti Veeraya v. N.\n\nS11bbiah Choudhur; v( 8 ); and Nana Bin Aha v. Sheku Bin Andu(').\n\nIn the alternative counsel contended that the order of the appellate court which had acquired finality, subject to tile exercise of the limited jurisdiction by the High Court under s. 11 S of the\n\n\n1190~] A.C. 369.\n\n(3) 11957] S.C.R. 488.\n\n(4) 1.l.R. 32 Born. )37\n\nCode of Civil Procedure could not, in the absence of a provision in the Amending Act making the amendment expre:; sly or by necessary implication retrospective, be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court bys. 29(2) of the Amending Act enacted after the date on which the judgment of the appellate court was delivered. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the first question, because, in our judgment, on the second point raised by counsel, the appeal must succeed.\n\nThe suit out of which this appeal arises was file4 by the respon-\n\n~ dent on July 22, 1958; it was decided on October 28, 1961; the appellate court decided the appeal on February 25, 1963 and the Amending Act 18 of 1965 came into effect on ; rune 17, 1965.\n\nThe High Court exercised the jurisdiction 'investe4 by Act 18 of 1965 in respect of a judgment which had become final a long time before that Act. It is true that this Court in Indira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others(') distinguished the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Colonial Sugar Refi11ing Co. Ltd.'s case(2 ) and observed at p. 1133:\n\n\". . . . . . it appears to be clear that while a right of appeal in respect of a pending action may conceivably be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action-though we do not so decide-no such vested right to obtain a determination with the attnb11tc of finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. By the very terms of section 5-B of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947, finality attaches to it on ¢he making of the order.\n\nEven if there be; in law, any such right at all as the right to a determination with the attribute of finality, it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right. lt does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in ...... \"\n\nJn J11dira SohMlal's case('), the Court was dealing with a case in which by amendment of statute, the finality which would but for the amendment have attached was taken away before the order was made. This Court in Dafedar Niranjan Singh and Another '!. C!!Stodian Evacuee Property (Pu11jab) and Another(') distin- G guished Indira Sohaniafs case(') and held that an order which had become final under a provision of the law could not be affected retrospectively under an Amending Act so as to deprive the order of its finality acquired under the original provisiqn. In Dafedar Niranjan Singh's case(') an order releasing the property in dispute u\n\nwas passed by the Custooian of Evacuee Property under Patiala Ordinance No. IX of 2004 Samvat. No appeal was filed against\n\n(1) [!955]2S.C.R.1117. (ll [1962] l S. C.R. 214.\n\n(2) [ ! 905] A.C. 369.\n\nKES!IAVLAL r. MOHANLAL (Shah, /.) 629\n\nA the order of the Custodian and it became final on that account.\n\nThe order was however set aside by the Custodian in exercise of jurisdiction under s. 58 ( 3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of 1950.\n\nThis Court held that since the order had become final in exercise of the jurisdiction subseq11ently conferred. in the absence of any positive indication giving s. 58(3) retrospec- B tive operation, the finality of the previous order could not be taken a\\vay;\n\nCounsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of this Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and Others(') in which following llldira Sohan/al's case(') it was held that the High Court could in exercise of jurisdiction under an Amending Act enacted after the litigation was commenced, set aside an order which, according 10 the law in force at the date when the litigation was commenced, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nIn Moti Ram's case(') an application for eviction of the appellant from a 'hop was made in August 1956 under s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. An appeal . was provided under s. 15 of the Act from the order of the Rent Controller, and sub-s. ( 4) of s. 15 provided that the decision of the appellate authority, and subject only lo such decision, the order of the Controller shall be final.\n\nBy Amending Act 29 of 1956 which came into force on September 24, 1956, the High Court was empowered to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed under the Act for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order. The landlord's application was dismissed by the Rent Controller and in appeal the appellate authority confirmed the order. Thereafter on the application of the landlord the High Court reversed the order.\n\nThis Court rejected the contention that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision application under s. 15(3) as amended. The decision brought before the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 15(5) of the amended Act was delivered o.n August 19, 1958, after amendment of the Act on September 24.\n\n1956. On the date on which it was made, the order had acquired no finality, for it was subject to an order which may be passed in a revision application which may be filed before the High Court under the amended Act. Moti Ram's case(') has, therefore, no application to this case.\n\nCounsel for the respondent urged that the extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court bys. 29(2) of Bombay Act 57 of\n\n1947 as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 related not to any right in existence, but to a matter of procedure, and on that account the Act as amended applied at the hearing, and in deciding 1hc revision application filed by the respondent the High Court - - fl) (l'J6G] 2 S.C.R. 896.\n\n(2) [1955P S.C.R. ttl7.\n\n630 SUPREJllE COURT REPORTS\n\n( 1968] J S.C.R.\n\nwas bound to apply the amended Act.\n\nBut when the revision application was entertained under s. 115 of the Code o[ Civil Procedure, the High Court assumed to itself a limited jurisdiction conferred by that section, and in the absence of any express provi sion made in the Amending Act, the jurisdiction conferred by that section could not be extended.\n\nThe question whether the High Cou1t could in exercise of its jurisdiction set aside, modify or alter the decision of the appellate court was not a matter. of procedure. The order of the appellate court, subject to scrutiny by the High Court within the limited field permitted by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was final. In conferring upon the High Court a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the decision of the appellate court was according to law, the Legis lature did not attempt to legislate in the matter of procedure. The Legislature expressly sought to confer upon the High, Court power to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided.\n\nCounsel for the respondent also submitted that s. 29(2) as amended was intended to have retrospective operation, because the Amending Act was in the nature of explanatory legislytion. There is nothing in the language of s. 29(2) as amended, which may indicate that it was intended to be retrospective in operation. Sec tion 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction upon the High Court to call for the record of a case for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decision in appeal was according to law, which the High Court did not possess before the date of the Amending Act.\n\nThe amending clause does not seek to explain any pre-existing legislation which was ambiguous or defective. The power of the High Court to entertain a petition for exercising revisional juris diction was before the amendment derived from. s. 115 Code of Civil Procedure, and the Legislature has by the Amending Act attempted to explain the meaning of that provision. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doullts as to the meaning of the previous Act. Section 29(2), before it was en11cted, was precise in its implication as well as in its expression : the meaning of the words used was not in doubt, and there was no omission in its phraseology which was required to be supplied by the amendment.\n\nThe appeal is therefore allowed and the order passed by th~ High Court is set aside, and the proceeding is rmanded to the High Court to deal with and dispose of the revision application on the footing that it is governed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which it purports to have been filed.\n\nThe. costs of this Court will be costs in the High Court.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KESHAVLAL JETHALAL SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHANLAL BHAGW ANDAS & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHANLAL BHAGWANDAS & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 2, 1968 [M. HmAYATULLAH, C.J., J. c. SHAH, s. M. Soou,\n\nR. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218, "end_char": 259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 500, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ahmcdabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 683, "end_char": 692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a suit filed by the respondent in July 1958 for a decree in cjectment, arrears of rent and other dues against the appellant in respect of certain premises in Ahmcdabad."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 828, "end_char": 833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 855, "end_char": 896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 25, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 936, "end_char": 953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn appeal .under s. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 the decree was eonfirmed on February 25, 1963."}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 959, "end_char": 967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1171, "end_char": 1177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1178, "end_char": 1181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "While this petition was pending Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1310, "end_char": 1318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While this petition was pending Bombay Act", "statute": "While this petition was pending Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While this petition was pending Bombay Act", "statute": "While this petition was pending Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2112, "end_char": 2120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2594, "end_char": 2599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2750, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Indira Sohan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3128, "end_char": 3144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Sohan Lal \\', Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi [1955) A 2 S.C.R. 1117 and Moti Rw11 v. Smaj Bhan [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896; distin- RUisbed.", "canonical_name": "Indira Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 896", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1964] 5 S.C.R. 157", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3334, "end_char": 3353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "March 2, 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 2, 3, 1967 of the Gujarat High Coun in Civil Revision Application No."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 2, 3, 1967 of the Gujarat High Coun in Civil Revision Application No."}}, {"text": "B. C. Misrn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misrn, R. K. Mathur and M. V. Goswami, for the E appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misrn, R. K. Mathur and M. V. Goswami, for the E appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misrn, R. K. Mathur and M. V. Goswami, for the E appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Zarer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Zarer and K. L. Hat/ti, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Zarer and K. L. Hat/ti, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure F Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 4967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure F Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure F Code"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 5035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5406, "end_char": 5411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5451, "end_char": 5456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7241, "end_char": 7285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indira Sohan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court distinguished the observations made in Indira Sohan Lal's case(').", "canonical_name": "Indira Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7538, "end_char": 7553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another judgment to which our attention was invited is Moti Ram v. Sura; Bhan(') in which this Court observed that according to the decision in Indira Sohanlal's case(') an appellate decision under s. SB of the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act.", "canonical_name": "Indira Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "statute": "Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8826, "end_char": 8832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "statute": "Evacuee Property Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8833, "end_char": 8856, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9034, "end_char": 9040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9044, "end_char": 9071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9155, "end_char": 9161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9162, "end_char": 9182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9260, "end_char": 9277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Colonial Sugar Refining Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9419, "end_char": 9450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question in this case is whetherthe\n\nrule in Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case(') Will apply, or the exception engrafted upon the rule by the judgment in Indira Sohanlars case(') will apply."}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlars", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9533, "end_char": 9549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question in this case is whetherthe\n\nrule in Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case(') Will apply, or the exception engrafted upon the rule by the judgment in Indira Sohanlars case(') will apply.", "canonical_name": "Indira Sohan Lal"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9847, "end_char": 9851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be open to the parties to argue such other points as arise out of the order of the High Court, but 0 subject to the restridions imposed by the order granting rul~.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah J. The respondents sued the appellant for a decree in ejectment in respect of shop Municipal Census No."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9964, "end_char": 9973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1754 at Ahmedabad and for rent in arrears and additional taxes."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rates Control Act", "statute": "Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10181, "end_char": 10222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent accordingly mov· ed the High Court of Gujarat by a petition under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10517, "end_char": 10523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10527, "end_char": 10554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court Bombay Act 57 of 1947", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10595, "end_char": 10627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this petition was pending in the High Court Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, and sub-s. (2) of s. 29 was replaced by the following sub-section : ''No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. ("}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10685, "end_char": 10690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11550, "end_char": 11558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11748, "end_char": 11759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11774, "end_char": 11785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11942, "end_char": 11950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vora Abbasbhai Alimohomed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12136, "end_char": 12161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimohomed \"· Haji Gulumr.ubi Haii Safibhai(') held that in a petition under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order made by the appellate court under s. 29 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947, the Higb Court had no power to set aside the order merely because if was of opinion that the judgment was assailable on the ground of error of fact or even of Jaw: the High Court may exercise its power under that section only if the appellate court had acted without jurisdiction or had failed to exercise its jurisdiction or had acted with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Haji Gulumr.ubi Haii Safibhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12165, "end_char": 12194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimohomed \"· Haji Gulumr.ubi Haii Safibhai(') held that in a petition under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order made by the appellate court under s. 29 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947, the Higb Court had no power to set aside the order merely because if was of opinion that the judgment was assailable on the ground of error of fact or even of Jaw: the High Court may exercise its power under that section only if the appellate court had acted without jurisdiction or had failed to exercise its jurisdiction or had acted with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12228, "end_char": 12234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12238, "end_char": 12265, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12314, "end_char": 12319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12775, "end_char": 12794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Gujarat Legislature amended s. 29(2) by Act 18 of 1965 in the manner set out, so as to confer upon the High Court a jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction exercisable under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12803, "end_char": 12811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12950, "end_char": 12956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13704, "end_char": 13707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13774, "end_char": 13777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14022, "end_char": 14027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "rune 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14864, "end_char": 14877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which this appeal arises was file4 by the respon-\n\n~ dent on July 22, 1958; it was decided on October 28, 1961; the appellate court decided the appeal on February 25, 1963 and the Amending Act 18 of 1965 came into effect on ; rune 17, 1965."}}, {"text": "Colonial Sugar Refi11ing Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15186, "end_char": 15219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that this Court in Indira Sohanlal v.\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi & Others(') distinguished the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Colonial Sugar Refi11ing Co. Ltd.'s case(2 ) and observed at p. 1133:\n\n\". . . . . ."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15663, "end_char": 15672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J11dira SohMlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16059, "end_char": 16074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in ...... \"\n\nJn J11dira SohMlal's case('), the Court was dealing with a case in which by amendment of statute, the finality which would but for the amendment have attached was taken away before the order was made."}}, {"text": "Dafedar Niranjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16626, "end_char": 16648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dafedar Niranjan Singh's case(') an order releasing the property in dispute u\n\nwas passed by the Custooian of Evacuee Property under Patiala Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "KES!IAVLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16903, "end_char": 16913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KES!IAVLAL r. MOHANLAL (Shah, /.) 629\n\nA the order of the Custodian and it became final on that account."}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17092, "end_char": 17097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17322, "end_char": 17330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llldira Sohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17545, "end_char": 17558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the absence of any positive indication giving s. 58(3) retrospec- B tive operation, the finality of the previous order could not be taken a\\vay;\n\nCounsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of this Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and Others(') in which following llldira Sohan/al's case(') it was held that the High Court could in exercise of jurisdiction under an Amending Act enacted after the litigation was commenced, set aside an order which, according 10 the law in force at the date when the litigation was commenced, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Moti Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17866, "end_char": 17874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Moti Ram's case(') an application for eviction of the appellant from a 'hop was made in August 1956 under s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17972, "end_char": 17977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17985, "end_char": 18029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18062, "end_char": 18067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18137, "end_char": 18142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18330, "end_char": 18348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Amending Act 29 of 1956 which came into force on September 24, 1956, the High Court was empowered to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed under the Act for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order."}}, {"text": "s. 15(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18851, "end_char": 18859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 18972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "August 19, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19010, "end_char": 19025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision brought before the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 15(5) of the amended Act was delivered o.n August 19, 1958, after amendment of the Act on September 24."}}, {"text": "September 24.\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19057, "end_char": 19076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision brought before the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 15(5) of the amended Act was delivered o.n August 19, 1958, after amendment of the Act on September 24."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19926, "end_char": 19932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20465, "end_char": 20471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20475, "end_char": 20502, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20930, "end_char": 20938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21103, "end_char": 21111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21708, "end_char": 21714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21715, "end_char": 21738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21967, "end_char": 21980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22438, "end_char": 22444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22448, "end_char": 22475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_631_638_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "S. K. GHOSH AND ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nApril 2, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]\n\nRules for recruiunent to the grade of Directors of Postal Services in Indian Postal Service, Class I, in the Posts and Telegraphs Department, r. 3-Pronzotion tis Directors froni time Scale of Class I service based on selection ar.d not senioritJ-Re1ision of their seniority in the ti111e sccle of Class J Service later-Seniority of Directors inter se if could be revised ~_uch revision if 1iolatire of Art. 16 of Constitution.\n\nThe petitioners were promoted from the Postal Superintendents Service Class II to the time scale of Class I Service, and, respondent. 3 to 7 were direct recruits to the time scale of Class I service.\n\nOn 30th January 1957. Government fixed the inter se seniority between them by\n\nshowing the petitioners as senior to respondents 3 to 7.\n\nSubsequently, the petitioners were promoted as Directors of Postal Services, and some time later, respondents 3 to 7 were alSo promoted as Directors, so that,\n\nthe petitioners were seniOr to respondents 3 to 7 even in the grade of Directors. On 5th June 1965 Government revised the seniority of these officers in the time scale of Class I , scrvicc, by shmving respondents 3 to 7 as senior to the petitioners, and on 17th January 1966, their seniority in the gra<lc of Directors y, as also revised placing respondents 3 to 7 as. senior to the petitioners.\n\nThe petitioners challenged the ty, o orders in a petition under Art. 32.\n\nThe Government justified its orders on the grounds. that. the order. of 30th January 1957 was passd by mistake as a relevant 'rule. namely, Supplementary r. 2(15) \\Vas not given effect t<i, and. since the revision of seniority in the time scale of Class I Service was justified, the conse quential revision of seniority in the grade of Directors was also valid.\n\nHELD: The revision of seniority in .the grade of Directdrs by order dated 17th January 1966 was not based on any rule or applicable principle. It was therefore arbitrary and violative of Art. 16 and must be.struck\n\ndown. Once that order was quashed, the petitioners would not be affected by the order dated 5th June 1965, and therefore, it Was not necessary to decide on its validity. [638 E-G].\n\nRule 3 of the Rules for recruitn1ent to the grade of Directors of Postal Services in Indian Postal Services Class L in the Posts and Telegraphs Department, shows that appointment to the grade of Directors is made by selection and not on the basis of seniority in the time scale. It must therefore be presumed tha:t the promotion and appointment of the Oetitioners and respondents 3 to 7 as Directors was based on merit, whic.b was to be taken into account at the time of selection and not on seniority in the time scale of Class I Service. Once a member of Class I Service in the time scale was selected for promotion to the grade of Directors and given seniority over another officer selected later, the seniority so determined _as_ a result of selection could not be made dependent' on the senioritv in the time scale. Therefore, even if there was iustification for revisipg the seniority inter se .of the petit~O!lers and respondents 3 to 7 in the time scale of Class I Sernce, that rev1s1on could not in any way affect their order of seniority in the grade of Directors to which they were promoted' on the basis of selection is accordance with the Rules. [637 G-H:\n\n638 A-C].\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 131 of 1966.\n\nPetition under An. 32 of the Constitution of India for th~ enforcement of fundamental rights. ·\n\nA. K. Sen and K. B. Mehta, for the petitioners.\n\nB. Sen and R. H. Dhebar for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari and S. M. Jain, for respondent No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. K. Ghosh and A. M. Narula, the two petitioners in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, appeared for the examination held in October, 1945 for recruitment to the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and other Allied Central Services. On the basis of the result of the examination, both of them were selected for appointment to the Postal Superintendents' Service Class II.\n\nPetitioner No. I, S. K. Ghosh, joined a post in that Service on probation with elfect from 9th April, 1947, while petitioner No. 2, A. M. Naruja, .ioined as a probationer on 11th February, 1947.\n\nAt that time there was no Class I Service in the Postal Department.\n\nIn Class II Service, to which these two petitioners were appointed, recruitment was made by a competitive examination to the extent of 50 per cent, while the remaining 50 per cent posts were filled by promotion from lower cadres of the Department.\n\nOn 24th May. 1948, the Government sanctioned the creation of Jnclian Postal Service Class I with four grades as follows :-\n\n(i) Directors of Postal Services, Grade I,\n\n(ii) Directors of Postal Services, Grade U,\n\n(iii) Senior Time Scale, and\n\n(iv) Junior Time Scale.\n\nThis decision of the Government was communicated to the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, by their letter dated 13th November, 1948, which also laid down the manner of recruitment to the Service and the various sources from which recruitment was to be made.\n\nThe nonnal rule laid down was that appointments to the junior time-scale were to be made by direct recruitment agafo.st 75% of the vacancies and the remai.ning 25% were to be filled by promotion by selection of th!! 1?est o!ficers in the Postal Superintendents' Service Class II, sentonty bemg regarded only when all other qualifications were practically equal.\n\nTo this rule, however, an exception was laid down to the effect tat all initial appointments to the time scale cadres of the Indt.an Postal Service Class I consisting of 64 post~ (23 in the semor scale and 41 in the junior scale) were to be made by promotio~ from amongst officers of Postal Superintendents' Service Class II by selection.\n\nFuture recruitmet was to be governed by . the general rule cited above.\n\nAppomtments to Grade .IT of the D1r_ectors of Postal Services was to be made by promotion by selection\n\nof the best officers in the senior time scale of the Indian Postal Service, Class I, seniority . being regarded only wl!ere other qualifications were practically equal.\n\nThese promotions were to be made through a Departmental Promotion Committee consisting of the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, Senior Deputy Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, and a member of the Federal Public Service Commission. Appointments to Grade I of Directors of Postal Services were to be mad~ by promotion from Grade II of Directors in the order of senioricy, provided the senior officer was considered fit for such promotion.\n\nThe Service under these rules was, in fact1 constituted with effect from 15th September, 1948, and, even in cases where appointments were actually made later, they were made effective retrospectively from 15th September, 1948 for purposes of confirmation.\n\nThe two petitioners were still probationers in Postal Superintendents' Service Class II on 15th September, 1948; and, since only persons holding permanent posts in the cadre of Class II were to be considered for appointment to this Class I Service, the petitioners were not considered at the initial stage.\n\nBoth the petitioners completed their probation in Class II Service in the year 1949.\n\nAccording to the petitioners, petitioner No. 1 was promoted to Class I Service on 2nd December, 1949, and petitioner No. 2 on 5th December, 1949. They were shown as officiating in this Service. Subsequently, petitioner No. 1 was confirmed in the junior time scale of Class I Service with effect from 11th May. 1951, while petitioner No. 2 was confirmed with effee't from 12th February, 1952. In the meantime, direct recruitment to Class I Service was also made on the basis of competitive examinations held in the years 1948 and 1949, and a number of direct recruits were selected for appointment to this Service.\n\nAmongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos. 3 to 7 in the petition. Besides these, a number of other direct recruits were also taken, but it is unnecessary to take notice of them, because the petitioners have sought relief against these five respondents only, the others having already retired by the time this petition was filed.\n\nThese five respondents joined Class I Service as probationers on various dates falling between 16th March, 1950 and 22nd November, 1950.\n\nThereafter, the question of fixing seniority inter se between the direct recruits and officers promoted from Class II Service came up for consideration of the Government.\n\nGovernment communicated their final decision through the letter dated 30ih January,\n\n1957. The letter indicated the considerations that-led the Government to fix the seniority of the various officers and to the letter was. annexed an Appendix giving the seniority of iunior time scale officers. In this list, the two petitioners were placed at Nos. 31 and 32, while the five respondents were placed junior to them at Nos. 33, 36, 41, 42 and 44. In the letter, the Government specifical!y stated that, in arriving at the decisions, the Government had given due consideration to all the representations submitted by officers on the subject and replies to these representations were not, therefore, being sent separately.\n\nOnly one representation of A. C. Mohamedi was still under consideration; but, with that representation, we are not concerned in the present writ petition.\n\nThe Govermnent added that the seniority list along with a copy of the memorandum was to be given to all the officers concerned for their information and they were to be informed that any further representations against the principles on the basis of which the seniority list had been prepared, would not be entertained.\n\nAt the time when this seniority was fixed, the principles, which, according to the petitioners, were applicable, were those laid down in the Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949, paragraph 2 of which contained the decision that seniority in respect of persons employed in any particular grade should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of the length of service in that Grade as well as service in an equivalent Graile, irrespective of whether the latter was under the Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan.\n\nThe order of seniority laid do.wn by the order dated 30th January, 1957 continued in force for a number of years.\n\nThe Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently issued an Office Memorandum on 22nd December, 1959, laying down general principles for determining seniority of various categories of persons employed in Central Services.\n\nThis Memo. referred to .various earlier Office Memoranda, including the one dated 22nd June, 1949 imed by the Home Ministry. Paragraph 3 of this Office Memo. laid down that the instructions contained in those various Office Memoranda were thereby cancelled but made an exception in regard to determination of seniority of persons appointed to the vatious Central Services prior to the date of this Office Memorandum.\n\nThe revised General Principles embodied in the Annexure to this Memorandum were not to apply with i; etrospectivc effect, but were to come into force with effect from the date of issue of these orders, unless a different date in respect of any particular service/grade from which these revised principles were to be adopted for purposes of determining seniority had already been or was to be thereafter agreed to by fae Home Ministry.\n\nJn para. 2 of the Annexure it was again laid down that, subject to the provision of para. 3 below. persons appointed in a substantive or officiatin~ capacity to a grade prior to the issue of these general principles were to retain the. relative seniority already a\"igned to them or such seniority as miht thereafter be assigned to them under the existing orders applicable to their cases and were to be e11 bloc senior to all others in that grade. Tt was. thus. the case of the petitioners that this Office Memorandum of 22nd December, 1959 did not in any way affect their seniority\n\ns. K. GHOSH I', L:NION (Bhargaia, J.) 635\n\nwhich had already been determined under the decision of the Government dated 30th January, 1957.\n\nSubsequently, the petitioners as well as respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were promoted as Directors. The common case of both the parties was that, by the time these promotions were made, the two grades of Directors of Postal Services were amalgamated into one single grade, and the promotions of the petitioners as well as respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were to that grade.\n\nThe case of the petitioners was .that respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were promoted as Directors after the petitioners, so that the petitioners were recognised as seniors in the grade of Directors also.\n\nThese promotions, according to the petitioners, were made some time in the years 196 l and 1962.\n\nSubsequently, by an Order dated 5th June, 1965, the Government suddenly revised the seniority of these various officers. The letter dated 5th June, 1965 mentioned the subject as \"Revision of seniority in the erstwhile Junior Time Scale of the Indian Postal Service, Class I of direct recruits from the combined competitive examinations held in the years 1947. 1948 and 1949.\" As a result of this revision of seniority in the junior time scale of the Indian Postal Service Class r, respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were shown as senior to the petitioners.\n\nThe places allotted to respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were at Nos. 17, 20, 22, 23 and 25, while the two petitioners were placed below them at Nos. 26 and 27. Later. again another Order was issued on 17th January 1966 revising the seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services, and, in that revision also, respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were placed as senio.rs at Nos. 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19, while the two petitioners were shown as junior to them at Nos. 20 and 21.\n\nThe petitioners, consequently, filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the revision of their seniority in the .iunior time scale by the order dated 5th June. 1965 as well as the revision of their seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services by the order dated 17th January, 1966.\n\nThe principal ground, on which these orders were challenged by the petitioners. was that they had been made by the Government arbitrarily in exercise of their power to fix seniority and. by such arbitrary action, had adversely affected the rights of the petitioners vis-a-vis respondents Nos. 3 to 7 in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. The point taken was that the seniority hnving once been fixed by the Order dated 30th January, 1957 in accordance with the Rules then in force could not be arbitrarily disturbed by the Government, particularly when the Rules were never revised subsequently, nor were any fresh Rules issued governing the seniority of these officers who had been appointed to the junior time scale of Class I Service prior to 30th January. l 957.\n\nLearned counel appearing for the petitioners formulated four differe, nt grounds for challenge of the Order dated 5th Jnne,\n\n1965, all leading to the contention that that Order violated Art.\n\nA 16 of the Constitution, or was passed against the principles of natural justice. In addition, the Order dated 17th January, 1966 was challenged on one more ground, viz., that, even if it be held that the re-fixation of seniority in the junior scale of Class I Service was justified, the Order of the Government revising the seniority in the grade of Directors was in any case void and ille- B gal.\n\nThis point was urged on the basis that appointment to the Directors' grade was made on the basis of selection and there\n\ncoud not be automatic revision of seniority in that grade consequent upon the revision of seniority in the time scale of the Service. ·\n\nThe petition was opposed by respondents 1 and 2, the Union C of India, and the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, as also on behalf of some of the other respondents. Most of the facts put forward by the petitioners haw been admitted, but the inferences and conclusions drawn by the petitioners as well as the submissions on their behalf in the writ petition were challenged.\n\nThe principal contention for resisting the petition was that the D order dated 30th January 1957 fixing the seniority had been made by mistake as a result of the Government having ignored Supplementary Rule 2(15), the effect of which was that for purposes of seniority the service of respondents 3 to 7 in junior time scale Grade I was wrongly taken as commencing from the date of their confirmation in the Service, while, correctly, it should have been taken from the date on which these respondents joined E as probationers. It was urged that, on a correct interpretation of. the Rules, respondents Nos. 3 to 7 should have been held, even initially, to be senior to the petitioners in the junior scale of the Class I Service. It was further urged that, since the revision of seniority in the junior time scale of Class I Service was justified and not arbitrary, the consequential revision of seniority in the F grade of Directors of Postal Services was also valid.\n\nArguments were addressed at length on both aspects of the case, but we think that it is not necessary for us in this case to decide the first point raised on behalf of the petitioners regarding the validity of the refixation of their seniority in the junior time scale of Class r Service by the order dated 5th June, 1965, be- G cause the petitioners could even obtain adequate relief on the ter native •round that the revision of seniority in the grade of Directors bythe order da•ed 17th January, 1966 was void. Th.e petitioners in para. 4 of their petition made a definite assertion tht respondents 3 to 7 were all promoted as Directors after the petitioners. This factual assertion made in this paragraph has .not ff been denied in any counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the vanous respondents. In the course of arguments before us, it was ur~ by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the pelltioners as well as respondents 3 to 7 were only shown as officiating in the grade of Directors in the Civil List and, consequently we should not base our decision on acceptance of the allegation made by the pelltioners that the petitioners and respondents 3 to\n\n7 had all been promoted as Directors. We are unable to accept this submission. The entry in the Civil List is no proof that the petitioners and the five respondents have not been promoted in accordance with the Rules laid down by the Government for promotion. If it was a fact that there had been no promotion in compliance with those Rules, the assertion made on behalf of the petitioners in the petition should have been specifically controverted.\n\nThe principles for appointment to the post of Directors of Postal Services were initially laid down by the Home Ministrys Memorandum dated 24th May, 1948 to which we have already referred.\n\nAs indicated earlier, it was laid dow11 that appointments to Grade II of the Directors of Postal Services were to be made by promotion by selection of the best officers in the senior time scale of the Indian Postal Services Class I, seniority being regarded only where other qualifications were practically equal.\n\nFrom the very first stage, therefore, appointmel)ts to the post' of Directors of Postal Services were to be made on the basis of merit and not on the basis of seniority.\n\nSeniority was to be taken into account only if other qualifications were practically equaL It appears that, after the two grades of Directora of Postal Services were amalgamated, some fresh rules were promulgated.\n\nThe relevant Rules have been brought to our notice by placin)! before us extracts from Posts and Telegraphs Manual Volume IV. 4th Edn., in which paragraph 153 mentioned that the rules for -recruitment to the grade of Directors of Postal Services in the\n\nIndian Postal Service Class I in the Posts and Telegraphs Department are given in Appendix 6-A. A copy of Appendix 6-A has also been placed before us.\n\nThe Appendix bears the heading \"Rules for recruitment to the grade of Directors of Postal Services in the Indian Postal Services, Class I in the Posts and Telegraph<\n\nDepartment\". Rule 2 in this Appendix lays down the scale of pay of the post in the grade which is admittedly Rs. 1,300-60-\n\n1 ,600.\n\nRule 3 prescribes the method of recruitment and is as follows:-\n\n\"Recruitment to posts in the grade shall be by selection from among the officers of the Senior Time\n\nScale of the Indian Postal Service, Class J;, one post being reserved for promotion of Presidency Postmasters, on the basis of selection.\" This Rule also makes it clear that appointment to the grade of Directors of Postal Services is made by selection and not on the basis of promotion in accordance with seniority. The presumption exists that the promotion of the petitioners and respondenh\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3 to 7 t9 the grade of Directors must have been made in accord ance with these instructions and rules, so that the appointmc.nt of all these concerned parties as Directors was based on merit to be taken into account at the time of selection and not 011 seniority in the time scale of Class I Service.\n\nOnce a member ot the Class I Service in the time scale was selected for promotion to the grade of Director and given seniority over another officer selected later, the seniority so determined as a result of selectio11 could not be made dependent on the seniority in the time scale.\n\nIt is clear that, in these circumstances, even if there was justifica tion for revising the seniority inter se of the petitioners and res pondents 3 to 7 in the time scale of Class I Service, that revision of seniority could not in any way affect their order of seniority in the grade of Directors to which they were promoted on the basis of selection in accordance with the rules. It is, therefore, clear that, even if it be held that the order of the Government dated 5th June, 1965 revising the seniority of these officers in the junior time scale was valid, the order dated 17th January, 1966 revising the seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services is not valid and justified.\n\nThe seniority in the grade of Directon. of Postal Services was not dependent on hte inter se seniority in the junior time scale and any alteration .in the seniority in the latter could not form the basis for revising the seniority in the . former grade.\n\nNo other justification for the revision of the seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services was put for. ward on behalf of any of the respondents. It is, thus, clear that the revision of seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services by the order dated 17th January, 1966 was not based on any rule or appropriate principle applicable to determination of seniority in that grade, and must, therefore, be held to be totally arbitrary.\n\nSuch an arbitrary order, which affects the civil rights of the petitioners in respect of future promotion, must, therefore. be struck down as violating Art. 16 of the Constitution. Once this order dated 17th January, 1966 is quashed, the petitioners will no longer be affected in future by the revision of their seniority in the time scale of the Service by the order dated 5th June, 1965 and, consequently. we have refrained from going into the question of the validity of that order.\n\nThe petitioners are not claimin~ any relief on the basis of the invalidity of the order dated 5th June, 1965 which would give to them any additional benefit over and above the relief which they can obtain on the order dated 17th January, 1966 being quashed.\n\nAs a result, we allow this petition and quash the order dated 17th January, 1966, revising the seniority ?f the petitioners and respondents Nos. 3 to 7 in the grade of Directors of Postal Services.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case, we direct that the peti tioners will receive their costs from respondent No. 1.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nL7Sup.C.T./68-2,500-Soc. Vl-24·4-69-GIPF.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "S. K. GHOSH AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. GHOSH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 2, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512, "end_char": 519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "30th January 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th January 1957."}}, {"text": "5th June 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1121, "end_char": 1134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th June 1965 Government revised the seniority of these officers in the time scale of Class I , scrvicc, by shmving respondents 3 to 7 as senior to the petitioners, and on 17th January 1966, their seniority in the gra<lc of Directors y, as also revised placing respondents 3 to 7 as."}}, {"text": "17th January 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1293, "end_char": 1310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th June 1965 Government revised the seniority of these officers in the time scale of Class I , scrvicc, by shmving respondents 3 to 7 as senior to the petitioners, and on 17th January 1966, their seniority in the gra<lc of Directors y, as also revised placing respondents 3 to 7 as."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1497, "end_char": 1504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2057, "end_char": 2064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and K. B. Mehta, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. B. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and K. B. Mehta, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari and S. M. Jain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. M. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari and S. M. Jain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. K. Ghosh and A. M. Narula, the two petitioners in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, appeared for the examination held in October, 1945 for recruitment to the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and other Allied Central Services.", "canonical_name": "Bhargava"}}, {"text": "S. K. Ghosh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. K. Ghosh and A. M. Narula, the two petitioners in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, appeared for the examination held in October, 1945 for recruitment to the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and other Allied Central Services.", "canonical_name": "S. K. GHOSH AND ANR"}}, {"text": "A. M. Narula", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3832, "end_char": 3844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. K. Ghosh and A. M. Narula, the two petitioners in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, appeared for the examination held in October, 1945 for recruitment to the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and other Allied Central Services.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Narula"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Audit and Accounts Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. S. K. Ghosh and A. M. Narula, the two petitioners in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, appeared for the examination held in October, 1945 for recruitment to the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and other Allied Central Services."}}, {"text": "S. K. Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, S. K. Ghosh, joined a post in that Service on probation with elfect from 9th April, 1947, while petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. GHOSH AND ANR"}}, {"text": "9th April, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, S. K. Ghosh, joined a post in that Service on probation with elfect from 9th April, 1947, while petitioner No."}}, {"text": "A. M. Naruja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, A. M. Naruja, .ioined as a probationer on 11th February, 1947.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Narula"}}, {"text": "11th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, A. M. Naruja, .ioined as a probationer on 11th February, 1947."}}, {"text": "24th May. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 24th May. 1948, the Government sanctioned the creation of Jnclian Postal Service Class I with four grades as follows :-\n\n(i) Directors of Postal Services, Grade I,\n\n(ii) Directors of Postal Services, Grade U,\n\n(iii) Senior Time Scale, and\n\n(iv) Junior Time Scale."}}, {"text": "13th November, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5104, "end_char": 5123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision of the Government was communicated to the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, by their letter dated 13th November, 1948, which also laid down the manner of recruitment to the Service and the various sources from which recruitment was to be made."}}, {"text": "Federal Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These promotions were to be made through a Departmental Promotion Committee consisting of the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, Senior Deputy Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, and a member of the Federal Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "15th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Service under these rules was, in fact1 constituted with effect from 15th September, 1948, and, even in cases where appointments were actually made later, they were made effective retrospectively from 15th September, 1948 for purposes of confirmation."}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was promoted to Class I Service on 2nd December, 1949, and petitioner No."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7528, "end_char": 7546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 on 5th December, 1949."}}, {"text": "11th May. 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was confirmed in the junior time scale of Class I Service with effect from 11th May. 1951, while petitioner No."}}, {"text": "12th February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7773, "end_char": 7792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 was confirmed with effee't from 12th February, 1952."}}, {"text": "K. Ramamurti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8035, "end_char": 8047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "N. C. Talukdar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8049, "end_char": 8063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Shiv Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8065, "end_char": 8074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. L. Rajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. N. Dubey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8092, "end_char": 8103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amongst them were K. Ramamurti, N. C. Talukdar, Shiv Nath, S. L. Rajan and B. N. Dubey, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "16th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These five respondents joined Class I Service as probationers on various dates falling between 16th March, 1950 and 22nd November, 1950."}}, {"text": "22nd November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8526, "end_char": 8545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These five respondents joined Class I Service as probationers on various dates falling between 16th March, 1950 and 22nd November, 1950."}}, {"text": "30ih January,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8790, "end_char": 8809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government communicated their final decision through the letter dated 30ih January,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "A. C. Mohamedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9467, "end_char": 9481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only one representation of A. C. Mohamedi was still under consideration; but, with that representation, we are not concerned in the present writ petition."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10058, "end_char": 10100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this seniority was fixed, the principles, which, according to the petitioners, were applicable, were those laid down in the Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949, paragraph 2 of which contained the decision that seniority in respect of persons employed in any particular grade should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of the length of service in that Grade as well as service in an equivalent Graile, irrespective of whether the latter was under the Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this seniority was fixed, the principles, which, according to the petitioners, were applicable, were those laid down in the Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949, paragraph 2 of which contained the decision that seniority in respect of persons employed in any particular grade should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of the length of service in that Grade as well as service in an equivalent Graile, irrespective of whether the latter was under the Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10460, "end_char": 10465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this seniority was fixed, the principles, which, according to the petitioners, were applicable, were those laid down in the Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949, paragraph 2 of which contained the decision that seniority in respect of persons employed in any particular grade should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of the length of service in that Grade as well as service in an equivalent Graile, irrespective of whether the latter was under the Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10469, "end_char": 10477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this seniority was fixed, the principles, which, according to the petitioners, were applicable, were those laid down in the Ministry of Home Affairs'Office Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949, paragraph 2 of which contained the decision that seniority in respect of persons employed in any particular grade should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of the length of service in that Grade as well as service in an equivalent Graile, irrespective of whether the latter was under the Central or Provincial Government in India or Pakistan."}}, {"text": "30th January, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10533, "end_char": 10551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of seniority laid do.wn by the order dated 30th January, 1957 continued in force for a number of years."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10599, "end_char": 10623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently issued an Office Memorandum on 22nd December, 1959, laying down general principles for determining seniority of various categories of persons employed in Central Services."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10668, "end_char": 10687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently issued an Office Memorandum on 22nd December, 1959, laying down general principles for determining seniority of various categories of persons employed in Central Services."}}, {"text": "K. GHOSH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12251, "end_char": 12259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the case of the petitioners that this Office Memorandum of 22nd December, 1959 did not in any way affect their seniority\n\ns. K. GHOSH I', L:NION (Bhargaia, J.) 635\n\nwhich had already been determined under the decision of the Government dated 30th January, 1957."}}, {"text": "Bhargaia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the case of the petitioners that this Office Memorandum of 22nd December, 1959 did not in any way affect their seniority\n\ns. K. GHOSH I', L:NION (Bhargaia, J.) 635\n\nwhich had already been determined under the decision of the Government dated 30th January, 1957.", "canonical_name": "Bhargava"}}, {"text": "5th June, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13075, "end_char": 13089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, by an Order dated 5th June, 1965, the Government suddenly revised the seniority of these various officers."}}, {"text": "Indian Postal Service Class r", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13493, "end_char": 13522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this revision of seniority in the junior time scale of the Indian Postal Service Class r, respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14108, "end_char": 14118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th June. 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14228, "end_char": 14242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, consequently, filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the revision of their seniority in the .iunior time scale by the order dated 5th June."}}, {"text": "17th January, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14350, "end_char": 14368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1965 as well as the revision of their seniority in the grade of Directors of Postal Services by the order dated 17th January, 1966."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "30th January. l 957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15127, "end_char": 15146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point taken was that the seniority hnving once been fixed by the Order dated 30th January, 1957 in accordance with the Rules then in force could not be arbitrarily disturbed by the Government, particularly when the Rules were never revised subsequently, nor were any fresh Rules issued governing the seniority of these officers who had been appointed to the junior time scale of Class I Service prior to 30th January."}}, {"text": "Union C of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16053, "end_char": 16069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was opposed by respondents 1 and 2, the Union C of India, and the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, as also on behalf of some of the other respondents."}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n3", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21155, "end_char": 21173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23310, "end_char": 23317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_639_647_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "SIDROMANI & ORS.\n\n11.\n\nHEM KUMAR & ORS.\n\nApril 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMY, JJ.j\n\nI11dilln Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 11(1)(b)-Partition of propem in specific shores-Deed not registered-Admissibility.\n\nPleadings-Plea of.acquiescence-Not raised in pleadings-Cannot be allowed to be set up subsequently.\n\nHindu Law-Agharla 'Caste-Custom of lethansi allowing larger share of family property to eldest son--Outmoded custom loses legal force.\n\nIndian Evidence Act (I of 1812), s. 91-Bar on oral evidence.\n\nD died in 1940 leaving certain agricultural land as well as house property.\n\nHe bad two children by his first wife the elder of whom was mpoodent no. 1.\n\nBy his second wife, appellant no. 2, he had a son, appellant no. 1. The family belond to the Agharia caste and wns aovemed by the Benares School of Hindu Law. In 1956 Appellants I and 2 liled a suit in the Court of the Qvi! Judge Raigarh (now m Madhya Pta\n\ndeob) claiming that they were entitled to th share each in D's estate and that there should be a partition by metes and bounds of joint family : property. According to their pleadings Ex.D.4 dated December 27, 1943 by which appellant no. 2 accepted a lesser share of the properties than was due to her and her son was executed as a result of coercion by respondent no. I. The latter along with other respondents contested the suit, relying on Ex.D-4. The trial court, the first appellate court, as well as the High Court decided against the appellants who by special leave came to this Court. The que.tions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether Ex.04 was admissible in evidence without having been register ed; (ii) whether Appellant No. 2 was precluded from demanding her share because her signing of Ex. D4 showed acqui..., eme on her part;\n\n(ill) whether a higher share far respondent no. 1 was justified because of tho custom of Jethansi in the Agbaria caste according to which the eldest son was entitled lo a larger share than others; (iv) whether it was\n\nopen to tho respondents to give oral evidence of actual partition subse quent to the execution of Ex.04.\n\nHELD: (i) Tho recitals in Ex.D.4 showed that there was allotment of specific properties to individual co-parceners and tho document therefore fell within tho mischief of s. 17(1J(b) of the Registration Act .. It followed that Ex.D-4 was not, admissible in evidence to prove tho title of any of the. C01'&fl'Cner& to any particular property or to prove that any particular progerty had ceased to be joint property. The document was only admDsiblo tO prove an intention on the part of the co-parceners. to becnme divided in status. [643 F-HJ\n\nNanni Bal v. Gita Bal, [1959] S.C.R. 479, relied on.\n\n(ii) There was no pleadin~ on behalf of the respondents and no i!sue framed to the effect that by signing Ex.D-4 appellant no. 2 had acquiese\n\ned in the division of properties among her sons without claiming the share to which she was entitled und\"I' the Mitaksbara Law of the Benares\n\nSchool. The respondents therefore could not be allowed to set up the A plea of acquiescence by appellant no. 2 (644 El\n\n(iii) The d0¥lfine of \"Jethansi\" or \"Jeshtbhagam\" is now obsolete and unen'forceable.\n\nThe principle of Hindu Law is equality of division and the exceptions to that rule, have almost, if not altogether disappeared.\n\nAll between br_others or other relations absolute equality is now the invariable rule in all the State5, unless, perhaps, where some special family B custom to the contrary is made out.\n\nThe re5pondents had failed to prove ihat such a custom was prevalent in the caste di Agharias to which the parties belonged. (644 F-0; 645 FG; 646 A-F]\n\nM. Y. A. A. Nachiappa Chettiar v.\n\nM. Y. A. A. Muthu Karuppan Cftettiar, A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 398 and Hur Purshad v. Sheo Dyal, 3 I.A. 259 at p. 285, referred to.\n\n(iv) The evidence showed that document Ex.D-4 was intended by the parties to be the sole evience of partition and since it had been held that Ex.D..4 was not admissible in evidence on account of non.registration to establish when the property was so partitioned, it was manifest that no oral evidence was admissible to prove any subsequent partition having regard to the prLvisions of s. 91 of the Evidence Act. [646 G-647 Al\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 749 and 750 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated November 8, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in second appeals Nos. 569 and 568 of 1960 respectively,\n\nS. V. Gupte and G. L. Sanghi, for the appellants (in both the appeals) .\n\nSarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1965 :\n\nRamaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur dated November 8, 1963 in Second Appeal No. 569 of\n\n1960.\n\nRespondents nos. 1 and 3, Hemlmmar and Dinomani and appellant no. 1 Shiromani are the sons of late Dharam Singh Agharia.\n\nAppellant no. 2 Mst. Subhagwati is the second wife of Dharam Singh and the mother of appellant no. 1. Mst. Jampalhin, the mother of respondents 1 and 3 died before Dharam\n\nA Singh married appellant no. 2.\n\nThe relationship of the parties will appear from the following pedigree :\n\nFirst wife: ~1st. Jampa\\hin\n\nHcn1Kumar (Dfdt. No. I l\n\nDharam Singh\n\nSi:i.:onU wife: Mst. Sl\n\n1l'h<'gwati (Pllf. No. 2)\n\nShironani (Plff. No. 1)\n\nDinmani (Dfdt. No. 3)\n\nEt war Singh Cha\n\n0 ndraBhusa11Singh (Dfdt. No. 2) !Dfdt. No. 4) It is not disputed that the parties are governed by the Benares.\n\nSchool of Hindu Law. It appears that Dharam Singh was mur dered in 1940 and his son Hemkumar was involved as an accused but he was acquit!ed in that case.\n\nMst. Subhagwati, appellant no. 2 appeared as a prosecution witness in the murder case and deposed against Hemkumar.\n\nAt the time of his death, Dharam Singh had left 102.28 acres of ryoti land in village Tilgi arid 16.56 acres of ryoti land at village Supaka and also some house properties.\n\nAppellants 1 and 2 instituted C.S. no. 43-A of 1956 in the court of the Civil Judge, First Class, Raigrah claiming that they were entitled to }th share each of Dharam Singh's estate and there should be partition by metes and bounds of the joint family properries. They challenged the validity of Ex. D-4 dated December 27, 1943. It was alleged that Mst. Subhagwati was compelled by Hemkumar under threat of violence to execute the deed, Ex. D-4.\n\nIt was said that the deed Ex. D-4 was prejudicial to Shiromani who was a minor at that time because he was given Jess than the share to which he was entitled and his mother Mst.\n\nSubhagwati was also not given her due share of joint family properties.\n\nThe appellants accordingly prayed that there should be a fresh partition by metes and bounds of the joint family properties and they should be given tth share each therein.\n\nThe suit was resisied by the respondents on the ground that the parties were bound by the deed of partition, Ex. D-4 and there was no ground for reopening the partition which had already taken place. The trial judge found that the partition deed, Ex.\n\nD-4 dated December 27, 1943 was not executed by Mst. Subhag wati under undue influence and that document was acted upon.\n\nIf was further held by the trial judge that though the partition\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n-deed did not reserve any share to Mst. Subhagwati, the appellants were not entitled to reopen the partition because Mst. Subhagwati\n\nwas not entitled to a share and Hemkumar was entitled to an increased share on account of the custom of \"Jetbansi\". 1he .appellants took the matter in appeal to the.District Judge of\n\nRaigarb but the appeal wa~ dismissed. The appellants preferred .a Second Appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which dismissed the Second Appeal. The High Court took the view that the deed, Ex. D-4 was neither an award nor was it a document effecting partition of immovable properties of the value of more than Rs. 100. It was held that Ex. D-4 was admissible in evidence in order to show that there was separation of status between the coparceners.\n\nThe High Court also rejected the plea of the appellants that the partition should be reopened be cause it did not give a share to Mst. Subbagwati.\n\nAccord.in~ to the Benares School of Hindu Law, Mst. Subbagwati was enutled to a share m the joint family properties equal to that of a son but the High Court found that there was a clear acquieicence on the part of Mst. Subbagwati when she executed the deed, Ex.\n\nD-4 and it must be taken that she relinquished her share in favour of the other coparceners. On.the question of \"Jethansi\" claimed by Hemkumar, the High Court found that the evidence established the custom of \"Jethansi\" whereby the elder son was given a greater share in the property of bis father. On the basis of these findings the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal.\n\nThe first question to be considered in this appeal is whether the deed, Ex. D-4 dated December 27, 1943 is admissible in evidence.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants Mr. Gu_pte put forward the argument that the document is inadmissible in evidence as it effected the partition of the properties of the value of more than Rs. 100 and it was not registered. It was argued that there was allotment of specific properties to individual coparceners in this document and its registration was therefore compulsory under s. 17 ( 1 )(b) of the Registration Act. In our opinion, the argu ment put forward on behalf of the appellants is. well-founded and must be accepted as correct. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the document was not necessary to be registered becaUSe there was only severance of joint status of the members of the coparcenary and there was no partition of the properties by metes and bounds. It is not possible to accept this argument as correct. The relevant portion of Ex. D-4 is to the following effect : \"For the partition of our joint land in Mauza Tilgi and Supa and house and utensils etc. and Dhan, movable and immovable property, amongst us three brothers, the Panchas have been appointed. The partition and distribution effected by the under-mentioned\n\nSllmOMANI v. HEM K1JMAlt (Ramaswami, /.) 64~\n\nPanchas Will be acceptable to us and also the undermentioned conditions will also have to be accepted by us.\n\n1. Out of lease land in Mauza Tilgi and Mauza Supa totalling 123 acres, Hem Kumar's share including Jetltosi will be 51 acres that is 51 shares and Dinmani's 39 acres that is 39 shares and minor Shiromani's whose guardian is Smt. Subhagwati 33 acres that is 33 shares. The three of them will be in possession of the same.\n\nOut of 123 acres of land, the . land near Munga Tikra Gara Para will be given to Dinmani ang\n\nminor Shiromani through guardian Smt. Subhagwa\\1 for building a house instead of the old house. For building of the house in Munga Tikra the three brothers will give Rs. 60.\n\nOut of the 'Mitti Khatu' and Gobar khatu, there is in the house, after deducting Hemkumar's tenth share will be divided into three equal shares amongst the three brothers and they will take it so.\n\nThey will also divide the buried Khatu into their shares. . . . . . .\n\n5. That out of the old house the house on the side of the v'1lage the length of which is 30 haath and the stone used in it and the house on the side of 'Patav' the length of which is 30 haath, is given to Hem Kumar E in his share and as Jethosi and the Bamboo, wood etc. used in the other house is given to the two brothers Dinmani and Shiromani.\n\nBesides the house and Kotha there is old and new wood and 3 new doors.\n\nAll this is given to Dinmani and Shiromani.\" With regard to ryoti lands, para 1 definitely states that H.em- F kumar is allotted 51 acres, Dinmani 39 and Shiromani 33 acres.\n\nWith regard to the joint family house there is partition between the three brothers by metes and bounds and specific shares are given to each.\n\nIn view of the recitals in Ex. D-4 we are of opinion that there is allotment of specific properties to individual\n\ncoceners and the document therefore falls within the mis- G chief of s. 17 (l )(b) of the Registration Act. It follows that Ex.\n\nD-4 is not admissible in evidence to prove the title of any of the\n\neoparceners to any particular property or to prove that any particular property has ceased to be joint property. Of course the document is admissible to prove an intention on the part of the coparceners to become divided in status; in other words to prove that the parties ceased to be joint from the date of the histrument H dated December 27, 1943 (See the decision of this Court in\n\nNanni Bai v. Gita Ba1'1).\n\n(I) [J959J S. C. R. 479.\"\"°\n\nWe proceed to consider the next question arising in this appeal, namely, whether Mst. Subhagwati was entitled to a share A\n\nin the joint family properties equal to that of a son and whether the alleged partition effected by Ex. D-4 was invalid because no such share was allotted to her. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that according to the Mitakshara Law of the Benares School a wife is entitled, on partition between her sons, to a, share equal to that of a son. But the contention put forward on behalf of the respondents is that by signing the docu ment, Ex. D-4 Mst. Subhagwati acquiesced in the division of the properties between her sons without claiming any share for herself and it must consequently be. taken that Mst. Subhagwati relinquished her share.\n\nIt was pointed out that Ex. D-4 was executed on December 27, 1943 and for a period of 11 years Mst. Subhagwati did not take any action to impeach that dot:u ment.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument pUt forward on behalf of the' respondents as correct.\n\nThere is no issue in the trial court regarding the alleged acquiescence of Mst. Subhag\n\nwati,, nor was it pleaded _on behalf of the respondents that there was an agreement by which Mst. Subhagwati gave up her share in favour of the other coparcen.ers.\n\nOn the contrary, it is alleged in para 9 of the Written Statement that Subhagwati was not entitled to any share and therefore the partition alleged to be effect\n\ned by Ex. D-4 was not prejudicial to the interests of plaintiff no. 1. To put it differently, there is no pleading on the part of respondents of acquiescence by Mst. Subhagwati and there is no E issue on the question of acquiescence. We are accordingly unable to accept the 1lrgument of the respondents that there was acquiescence on the part of Mst. Subhagwati or that she relinquished her share in favour of the other coparceners and the find ing of the High Court on this point iS erroneous.\n\nWe pass on to consider the next question arising in this appeal, namely, whether Hemkumar was entitled to a greater F share of joillli family properties for the reason that he was the eldest brother on the principle of \"Jethansi\". But the doctrine of \"Jethansi\" or \"Jeshtbhagam\" is now obsolete and unenforce able.\n\nThe principle of Hindu Law is equality of division and the exceptions to that rule have almost, if not altogether, disappeared. One of the exceptions was in favour of the eldest son, who was originally entitled to a special share on partition, either a tenth or a twentieth in excess of the others, or some special chattel, or an extra portion of the flocks (Apastamba, Il, 6, 14, 10..13; Baudh., Il, 2, 2-5; Gaut., XXVIII, U, 12; Vas., XVII, 42-45; Manu, IX. 112, 114, 156). But unequal partition of ancestral or joint propertY was from early times condemned. The Smritichandrika, the Vyavahara Mayukha and the Viramitrodaya declare that unequal partition is forbidden in the Kali age (Smritichandrika, III, 16; V. May., IV, iv, 11; Viramit.,\n\nSHIROMANl v. HEM KUMAR (Ramaswami, 1.) 645\n\nill, 16 (Setlur's ed., 319)._ The Commentary of Mitakshara on y ajnavalkya. n. 117 is briefly as follows :\n\n\"art !Wr! ~: lllffiili:\"<ffif'llfil <'!fi!; firf~\"\"oe~\"1~1w=1 ~: 1 awrd ~ 111'~1'1'~ <J:mr f~ I ~T-'f~ 'lT 'fT\n\nlf\"414i'liW~-mr <'IT'lif<rl<\"'1'i\"61~'J. 1 l{'TT 'fT- 4\"11<\\&•i <rt 'fWl'f'iil\"o!fT'fT; rif<r-f<r 'fiff<l!ffifil' <it1t1fqfa;;,;\"llq~'J.\"OT'flJ: 1 '1\"-lf'TT f~41•ra>il oil' '\"'l;-~Tf<r•r 1 Mi; t<fq'l\\iliTSfq' lf'f lfirfa •<fit 11 I ••• ftr<rirr flrin; r: mm;<itfii <'!T't1f~fi'l'f<\\<la1~<t 'fl'\\~ ef\" \"1'!1f'f mmr f.!<r...r, f 1 flrnr on 'IT l l-1 1 1 .\n\n\"Unequal division though found in the sastras (e.g. Mam1 IX. 105, 112, 116, 117, Yaj. II. 114) should not be practised because it has come to be condemned tor has become hateful to) by the people, since there is the prohibition (in Yaj .. I. 156) that an action, though prescribed in the sastras, should not be performed when it has come to be condemned by the people since such an action does not lead to the attainment f Heaven.\n\nFor example, though Yaj. t 109 prescribes the offering of a big ox or a goat to a learned brahmana guest, it is not now practised because people have come to hate it; or just as, although there is a Vedic text laying down the sacrificing of a cow 'one should sacrifice a barren cow called anubandhya for Mitra and Varona', still it is not done because people condemn it.· And it has been said 'just as the practice of niyoga or the killing of the anubandhya cow is not now in vogue, so also division after givinll a special share (to the eldest son) does not now exist\".\n\nAs between brothers or other relations, absolute equality is now the invariable rule in all the States, unless, perhaps, where some special family custom to the contrary is made out (For example, see the decision of the Madras High Court in M.Y.A.A. Nachiappa Chettiar v. M.Y.A.A. Muthu Karuppan Chettiar(')_.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents, however, reliance was placed upon the special custom of \"Jethansi\" said to be pr¢valent in the caste of Agharias to which the parties belong. Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad. 398.\n\n646 'SVPllEMB COUllT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968) J'S.C.ll.\n\nsatisfied on their evidence that the custom pleaded for has been established. It is well-established that a custom must be proved to be ancient, certain and reasonable if it is to be recognised and acted upon by Courts of law; ll!ld being in derogation of the general rules of law the custom must be construed strictly (See Hur Purshad v. Sheo Dyal)('). In the present case, the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents to prove the alleged custom is unsatisfactory and conflicting. D.W. 4, Baratram stated that the custom of \"Jethansi\" was prevalent ill Agharias community but he admitted when cross-examined, that he was not present at any partition.\n\nHe further said that there was \"no fixed custom about Jethansi and the1eldest brother could be given more or Jess\".\n\nD.W. 5, Sitaram sd that \"I got 16 acres of Jetbansi land in a partition between my own brother.\" The total area of land was 100 acres.\n\nHe admitted that there was no written document about the custom. D.W. 6, Yalobra said that his brother Sita Ram got Jethansi land of 16 acres out of a total area of 100 acres.\n\nWhen cross-examined, be said that no more than Dashanshi was . given \"and the people who divided did not fell any account of it\". The evidence of Khew!al, D.S. 7 is that there was partition among his brothers and the eldest brother Din Dayal was given 5-6 acres of land as Jethansi. The total area of the land to be divided was 100 acres.\n\nNo documentary evidence of partition has been adduced on behalf of the respondents and the oral evidence is vague and uncertain. We are accordingly of the opinion that the custom of J ethansi alleged on behalf of the respondents has not been established by proper evidence and the finding of the High Court is vitiated because it is not supported by proper evidence.\n\nWe accordingly reject the argument of the respondents that Hemkumar was entitled to a larger share of the joint family properties on the basis of the alleged custom of J ethansi in his caste.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents reference was made to the evi. dence of D.W. 1 Dinamani and D.W. 2 Dindayal that there was an actual partition of joint family properties not on December 27,. 1943 when Ex. D-4 was executed but about two months later and specific allotments Were made to each of the coparceners.\n\nThere is, however, no pleading in the Written S•atement on behalf of the respondents that apart from the document, Ex.\n\nD-4 there was a partition of the joint fan1ily properties. We are satisfied in this case, upon examination of the evidence. that the intention of the parties was that document Ex. D-4 should be the sole evidence of partition and since we have held that Ex.\n\nD-4 is not admissible in evidence on account of non-registration to establish when the property was so partitioned, it is manifest that no oral evidence is admissible to prove any subsequent parti\n\n(, I) 3 I. A. 259, at p. 28S.\n\nA .tion having regard ID the provisions of s. 91 of the Evidence Act.\n\nIt is clear therefore that the appellants are entitled to a prelimi nary decree for partition of joint family properties.\n\nFor the reasons ex~ we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the suit brought by the two appellants should B be &creed.\n\nThe appellants, Subhagwati and Shiromani are each entitled ID tth share in the joint family properties and there should be a preliminary decree drawn up for the partition of tth share of the joint family properties for each of the appellants, Mst. Subhagwati and Shiromani.\n\nThe question as to what are the joint family properties which are to be the subject-matter of partition would be determined by the trial court in proceedings C for 1he final decree.\n\nWe accordingly allow this appeal with costs.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 750 of 1965 :\n\nFor the reasons given by us in Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1965 we set aside the judgment of the High Court in Second Appeal D No. 568 of 1960 and C.S. No. 36-A of 1956 filed by Dinmani is dismissed. We accordingly allow this appeal with costs. There will be one hearing fee for both this appeal and Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1965.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\nLSSup.CI/68-2", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "SIDROMANI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIDROMANI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HEM KUMAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HEM KUMAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 54, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMY, JJ.j\n\nI11dilln Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 11(1)(b)-Partition of propem in specific shores-Deed not registered-Admissibility."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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Judge Raigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 878, "end_char": 909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1956 Appellants I and 2 liled a suit in the Court of the Qvi!"}}, {"text": "December 27, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.4 dated December 27, 1943 by which appellant no."}}, {"text": "Jethansi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was justified because of tho custom of Jethansi in the Agbaria caste according to which the eldest son was entitled lo a larger share than others; (iv) whether it was\n\nopen to tho respondents to give oral evidence of actual partition subse quent to the execution of Ex.04.", "canonical_name": "Jethansi"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1J(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2276, "end_char": 2287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2295, "end_char": 2311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "569 and 568 of 1960 respectively,\n\nS. V. Gupte and G. L. Sanghi, for the appellants (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "569 and 568 of 1960 respectively,\n\nS. V. Gupte and G. L. Sanghi, for the appellants (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4564, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents (in both the appeals).", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4582, "end_char": 4597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4718, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "749 of 1965 :\n\nRamaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur dated November 8, 1963 in Second Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "749 of 1965 :\n\nRamaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur dated November 8, 1963 in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Hemlmmar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 3, Hemlmmar and Dinomani and appellant no."}}, {"text": "Dinomani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 3, Hemlmmar and Dinomani and appellant no.", "canonical_name": "Dinomani"}}, {"text": "Shiromani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Shiromani are the sons of late Dharam Singh Agharia.", "canonical_name": "SIDROMANI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh Agharia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Shiromani are the sons of late Dharam Singh Agharia.", "canonical_name": "Dharam Singh Agharia"}}, {"text": "Subhagwati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5040, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhagwati is the second wife of Dharam Singh and the mother of appellant no.", "canonical_name": "Subhag wati"}}, {"text": "Jampalhin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jampalhin, the mother of respondents 1 and 3 died before Dharam\n\nA Singh married appellant no."}}, {"text": "Dinmani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1)\n\nDinmani (Dfdt.", "canonical_name": "Dinomani"}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Dharam Singh was mur dered in 1940 and his son Hemkumar was involved as an accused but he was acquit!ed in that case.", "canonical_name": "Dharam Singh Agharia"}}, {"text": "Hemkumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5684, "end_char": 5692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Dharam Singh was mur dered in 1940 and his son Hemkumar was involved as an accused but he was acquit!ed in that case.", "canonical_name": "HEM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Tilgi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of his death, Dharam Singh had left 102.28 acres of ryoti land in village Tilgi arid 16.56 acres of ryoti land at village Supaka and also some house properties."}}, {"text": "Supaka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6007, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of his death, Dharam Singh had left 102.28 acres of ryoti land in village Tilgi arid 16.56 acres of ryoti land at village Supaka and also some house properties."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, First Class, Raigrah", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6119, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43-A of 1956 in the court of the Civil Judge, First Class, Raigrah claiming that they were entitled to }th share each of Dharam Singh's estate and there should be partition by metes and bounds of the joint family properries."}}, {"text": "Subhagwati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhagwati was compelled by Hemkumar under threat of violence to execute the deed, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Subhag wati"}}, {"text": "Shiromani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-4 was prejudicial to Shiromani who was a minor at that time because he was given Jess than the share to which he was entitled and his mother Mst.", "canonical_name": "SIDROMANI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Subhag wati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhag wati under undue influence and that document was acted upon.", "canonical_name": "Subhag wati"}}, {"text": "deed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7401, "end_char": 7405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If was further held by the trial judge that though the partition\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\ndeed did not reserve any share to Mst."}}, {"text": "District Judge of\n\nRaigarb", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7699, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "District Judge of\n\nRaigarb but the appeal wa~ dismissed."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants preferred .a Second Appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which dismissed the Second Appeal."}}, {"text": "Subbagwati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8309, "end_char": 8319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subbagwati.", "canonical_name": "Subhag wati"}}, {"text": "Gu_pte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9125, "end_char": 9131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants Mr. Gu_pte put forward the argument that the document is inadmissible in evidence as it effected the partition of the properties of the value of more than Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9468, "end_char": 9473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9490, "end_char": 9506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hem Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of lease land in Mauza Tilgi and Mauza Supa totalling 123 acres, Hem Kumar's share including Jetltosi will be 51 acres that is 51 shares and Dinmani's 39 acres that is 39 shares and minor Shiromani's whose guardian is Smt.", "canonical_name": "HEM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Dinmani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10551, "end_char": 10558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of lease land in Mauza Tilgi and Mauza Supa totalling 123 acres, Hem Kumar's share including Jetltosi will be 51 acres that is 51 shares and Dinmani's 39 acres that is 39 shares and minor Shiromani's whose guardian is Smt.", "canonical_name": "Dinomani"}}, {"text": "s 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10559, "end_char": 10563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Munga Tikra Gara Para", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10768, "end_char": 10789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "land near Munga Tikra Gara Para will be given to Dinmani ang\n\nminor Shiromani through guardian Smt."}}, {"text": "Munga Tikra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10945, "end_char": 10956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For building of the house in Munga Tikra the three brothers will give Rs."}}, {"text": "Mitti Khatu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11007, "end_char": 11018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the 'Mitti Khatu' and Gobar khatu, there is in the house, after deducting Hemkumar's tenth share will be divided into three equal shares amongst the three brothers and they will take it so."}}, {"text": "Gobar khatu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the 'Mitti Khatu' and Gobar khatu, there is in the house, after deducting Hemkumar's tenth share will be divided into three equal shares amongst the three brothers and they will take it so."}}, {"text": "Khatu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They will also divide the buried Khatu into their shares. . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Hem Kumar E", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That out of the old house the house on the side of the v'1lage the length of which is 30 haath and the stone used in it and the house on the side of 'Patav' the length of which is 30 haath, is given to Hem Kumar E in his share and as Jethosi and the Bamboo, wood etc.", "canonical_name": "HEM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Jethosi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11501, "end_char": 11508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That out of the old house the house on the side of the v'1lage the length of which is 30 haath and the stone used in it and the house on the side of 'Patav' the length of which is 30 haath, is given to Hem Kumar E in his share and as Jethosi and the Bamboo, wood etc.", "canonical_name": "Jethansi"}}, {"text": "Kotha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the house and Kotha there is old and new wood and 3 new doors."}}, {"text": "H.em- F kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to ryoti lands, para 1 definitely states that H.em- F kumar is allotted 51 acres, Dinmani 39 and Shiromani 33 acres.", "canonical_name": "HEM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12187, "end_char": 12192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Subhag", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13874, "end_char": 13880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhag\n\nwati,, nor was it pleaded _on behalf of the respondents that there was an agreement by which Mst.", "canonical_name": "Subhag wati"}}, {"text": "wati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13882, "end_char": 13886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhag\n\nwati,, nor was it pleaded _on behalf of the respondents that there was an agreement by which Mst."}}, {"text": "Gaut", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15430, "end_char": 15434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Il, 2, 2-5; Gaut.,"}}, {"text": "Manu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVII, 42-45; Manu, IX."}}, {"text": "Vyavahara Mayukha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15607, "end_char": 15624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Smritichandrika, the Vyavahara Mayukha and the Viramitrodaya declare that unequal partition is forbidden in the Kali age (Smritichandrika, III, 16; V. May., IV, iv, 11; Viramit.,"}}, {"text": "Viramit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15633, "end_char": 15640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Smritichandrika, the Vyavahara Mayukha and the Viramitrodaya declare that unequal partition is forbidden in the Kali age (Smritichandrika, III, 16; V. May., IV, iv, 11; Viramit.,"}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15858, "end_char": 15868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commentary of Mitakshara on y ajnavalkya."}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17121, "end_char": 17126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t 109 prescribes the offering of a big ox or a goat to a learned brahmana guest, it is not now practised because people have come to hate it; or just as, although there is a Vedic text laying down the sacrificing of a cow 'one should sacrifice a barren cow called anubandhya for Mitra and Varona', still it is not done because people condemn it.·"}}, {"text": "Varona", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17131, "end_char": 17137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t 109 prescribes the offering of a big ox or a goat to a learned brahmana guest, it is not now practised because people have come to hate it; or just as, although there is a Vedic text laying down the sacrificing of a cow 'one should sacrifice a barren cow called anubandhya for Mitra and Varona', still it is not done because people condemn it.·"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17609, "end_char": 17626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between brothers or other relations, absolute equality is now the invariable rule in all the States, unless, perhaps, where some special family custom to the contrary is made out (For example, see the decision of the Madras High Court in M.Y.A.A. Nachiappa Chettiar v. M.Y.A.A. Muthu Karuppan Chettiar(')_."}}, {"text": "M.Y.A.A. Nachiappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17630, "end_char": 17648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between brothers or other relations, absolute equality is now the invariable rule in all the States, unless, perhaps, where some special family custom to the contrary is made out (For example, see the decision of the Madras High Court in M.Y.A.A. Nachiappa Chettiar v. M.Y.A.A. Muthu Karuppan Chettiar(')_."}}, {"text": "Baratrani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17918, "end_char": 17927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad."}}, {"text": "Sitaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17937, "end_char": 17944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad."}}, {"text": "Ya1obra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad."}}, {"text": "Khewla1", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17974, "end_char": 17981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the evidence of D.W. 4, Baratrani, D.W. 5, Sitaram, D.W. 6, Ya1obra and D.W. 7, Khewla1 to show that there such a custom in the caste whereby the eldest son was given a greaier share in .the property of the father: Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of these witnesses but we are not\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1946 Mad.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Baratram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18766, "end_char": 18774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 4, Baratram stated that the custom of \"Jethansi\" was prevalent ill Agharias community but he admitted when cross-examined, that he was not present at any partition."}}, {"text": "Yalobra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19255, "end_char": 19262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 6, Yalobra said that his brother Sita Ram got Jethansi land of 16 acres out of a total area of 100 acres."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19285, "end_char": 19293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.W. 6, Yalobra said that his brother Sita Ram got Jethansi land of 16 acres out of a total area of 100 acres."}}, {"text": "Dashanshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19406, "end_char": 19415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When cross-examined, be said that no more than Dashanshi was ."}}, {"text": "Khew!al", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19505, "end_char": 19512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Khew!al, D.S. 7 is that there was partition among his brothers and the eldest brother Din Dayal was given 5-6 acres of land as Jethansi."}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19516, "end_char": 19520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Din Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19591, "end_char": 19600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Khew!al, D.S. 7 is that there was partition among his brothers and the eldest brother Din Dayal was given 5-6 acres of land as Jethansi."}}, {"text": "Dinamani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20336, "end_char": 20344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence of D.W. 1 Dinamani and D.W. 2 Dindayal that there was an actual partition of joint family properties not on December 27,."}}, {"text": "Dindayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20356, "end_char": 20364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence of D.W. 1 Dinamani and D.W. 2 Dindayal that there was an actual partition of joint family properties not on December 27,."}}, {"text": "27,. 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20443, "end_char": 20452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence of D.W. 1 Dinamani and D.W. 2 Dindayal that there was an actual partition of joint family properties not on December 27,."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21219, "end_char": 21224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_648_654_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "PREM RAJ\n\nD.L.F. HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. & ANR.\n\nApril 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nPractice and Procedure-Suit for setting aside contract and prayer, in the alternative, for a decree for specific perforinance thereunder-Whether maintainable.\n\nSpecific Rlief Act (I of 1877), ss. 35 and 31-Scope of.\n\nCode of Civil Procedure (S of 1908), s. llS(c) Revisional jurisdiction of High Court.\n\nThe appellant filed a suit for a declaration that a certain contract against him was void and inoperative. having been obtained by undue in fl.uence, and in the alternative prayed 1for a decree for specific perform. ance of certain terms in the same contract. The first respondent objected that the appellant having claimed the agreement to be void and inopera tive could not in the same suit , PraY for specific performance of the same agreement.\n\nThe trial court reiected the preliminary objection, but the High C.ourt, in revision, held that the appellant could not in the alternative be permitted to sue for specific performance of the agreemen~ and therefore the suit must .fail so far as the relief for specific performance was concerned.\n\nDismissing the appeal, this Court : HELD : Under 0. 7, r. 7, Civil Procedure C.ode it i• open to a plaintiff to pray for inconsistent reliefs. But it must be shown by the plaintiff that each of such pleas is maintainable. So far as the relief of specific performance is concerned, the matter mwt be examined in the light Of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. Section 37 of the Act provides that a plaintiff suing for specific performance of the contract can alter natively sue for the rescission Of the contract but the converse is not pro vided. Section 35 of the Act statea the principles upon which the rescission of a contract may be adjudged.\n\nBut there is no provision in this •ection or any othec_ section of the Act that a plaintiff suing for rescission of the agreement may sue in the .alternative for specific performance. The omission is deliberate and the intention di the Act is that no such alter• native prayer is open to the plaintiff. It was therefore not open to the appellant to sue for rescission of the agreement and in the alternative sue for specific performance. [651 C--0)\n\nCawley v. Poole, 11 E.R. 23, applied.\n\nFurther, in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the present ca~ no such averment is made. in the plaint. On the other hand, the appellant has alleged that the agreement was a result of fraud and undue influence and not binding upon him. [652 0-E]\n\nArdeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, SS I.A. 360, referred to.\n\nThe appellant had not made out a cause of action so far as the relief H of specific performance was concerned and hence the appellant was not entitled to be put to election with regard to the two alternative reliefs.\n\n(653 HJ\n\nIn ho1ding that the appellant was entitled in the alternative to ask for the relief of specific performance, the trial court had committed an error of law and so had acted with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 115(c) of the CDde of Civil Procedure. It was therefore competent to the High Court tu interfere, in revision, with the order of the trial court on this p.:; int.\n\n1654 B-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgt:nent and order dated February 14, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 228-D of 1962.\n\nC B. C. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Chagla, Daya Krishan, S. C. Javali and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-The sole question involved in this appeal is whether a plaintiff suing for a declaration that a certain contract against him is void and inoperative having been obtained by undue intluence, can in the same suit in the alternative ask for the relief of specific performance of the same contract.\n\nOn October 26, 1956 Pt. Prem Raj, the appellant entered into an agreement with Shri Moti Ram Bhalla, respondent no. 2 for the purchase of lands from Shri Lila Ram, father of the appellant at the price of Rs. 1025 /- per bigha on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. On December 18, 1956, the appellant and respondent no. 2 entered into a partnership to carry on the business of buying and selling lands and developing the same under the name and style of \"L.M.G. Colonisers & Traders;'.\n\nSubsequently, on January 2, 1957 the said firm \"L.M.G. Colonisers.& Traders\" entered into a deed of partnership with D.L.F. Housing.: & Construction (P) Ltd., respondent no. 1 herein to carry onTue business of purchasing and developing the lands into a residential lcolony and to sell the same in plots either by auction or by tenders or in any other manner as the company, respondent no. 1 may find expedient after getting the scheme for development approved by the competent authority.\n\nOn the same day i.e., January 2, 1957 the newly formed partnership between the respondent no. 1 and L.M.G. Colonisers & Traders entered into an agreement for the purchase of the same land with Pt. Lila Ram on the terms and conditions set out therein.\n\nOn June 11, 1958 the parties cancelled the new partnership and agreement dated January 2, 1957 and entered into a fresh arrangement and executed the following four documents :\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"(i) A deed of dissalution of the new partnership between L.M.G. Colonisers and Traders (consisting of the appellant and respondent llOI. 2 and 1 entered into on 2nd January 1957 (Ex. P. 1).\n\n(ii) A deed of cancellation of agreement of sale of land between Lila Ram and the said new partnership firm of L.M.G. Colonisers and respondent no. 1.\n\n(iii) A new Agreement of sale of these same lands by Lila Ram in favour of respondent no. 1.\n\n(iv) An agreement to sell 22 plots out of the land\n\nagreed to be purchased from Lila Ram under the C agreement stated in (iii) above by respondent no. 1 in favour of the appellant.\"\n\nBy virtue of these documents the new partnership dated January 2, 1957 between L.M.G. Colonisers & respondent no. 1 came to an end as illso the agreement dated January 2, 1957 by which Lila Ram had agreed to sell his lands to the said new partnership D firm and there was a fresh agreement by Lila Ram to sell the same !ands to D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd., respondent no. 1 at a certain price and out of t)ie land thus to be bought, respondent no. 1 agreed to sell 22 plots of land to the appellant. After about 3 years, on or about June. 8, 1961, the appellant gave notice to respondent no. 1 repudiating the arrange- E ment dated June 11, 1958 as void and claimed that the documents were not binding upon him.\n\nThe appellant alleged that the deeds executed on June 11, 1958 were unlawful and ve>id and inoperative against him as they were executed as a resuh of undue influence and coercion exercised upon him. In the alternative the appellant prayed for a decree for specific performance of the F agreement dated June 11, 1958 to sell the aforesaid 22 plots of land and for damages in addition thereto. A preliminary objection was raised by the contesting respondent no. 1, D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd. to the effect that the appellant having claimed that the agreement dated June 11, 1958 was void and inoperative, cannot in the same suit pray for specific performance of the same agreement. The Subordinate Judge, First Class, G Delhi rejected the preliminary objection by his order dated February 26, 1962. Respondent no. 1 filed a Civil Revision Application no. 228-D of 1962 in the Circuit Bench pf the Punjab High Court at Delhi.\n\nBy his order dated February 14, 1964, Dulat, 1. allowed the Revision Application holding that the appellant having sued for a declaration that the agreement .of June 11, 1958 WllS' u void, cannot in the alternative be permitted to sue for specific performance of the. agreement and therefore the suit must fail so far as the relief for specific performance was concerned.\n\nThis appeal is brought by special leave f~ the .oder o~ he Punjab High Court dated February 14, 1964 1Il, Cm! Rev1S1on Application no. 228-D of 1962.\n\nIn support of this appeal it was argued, in the first place, that under 0.7 r. 7, Civil Procedure Code the appellant was entitled to claim a relief in the alternative on the facts stated. in the plaint and it was open to him to pray to the Court that a decree for specific perfoniiance should be granted if the Court did not accept his case that the impugned agreement dated June 11, 1958 was illegal and void.\n\nIt is true that under 0. 7, r. 7, Civil Procedure Code it is open to a plaintiff to pray for inconsistent reliefs. 13ut it must be shllwn by the plainiff that each of such pleas is maintainable.\n\nSo far as the relief of specific performance is concerned, the matter must be examined in the light of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. In this connection reference may be made to s. 37 -of the Specific Relief Act (Act No. 1 of 1877) which is to the following effect :\n\n\"A plaintiff instituting a suit for the specific performance of a contract in writing may pray in the alternative that, if the contract cannot be specifically enforced, it may be rescinded and delivered up to be cancelled; and the Court, if it refuses to enforce the contract specifically may direct it to be rescinded and delivered up accordingly.\"\n\nIt is expressly provided by this section that a pl!tlntiff suing for specific performance of the contract can alternatively sue for the rescission of the contract but the converse is not provided. It is therefore not open to a plaintiff to sue for rescission of the agreement and in the alternative sue for specific performance. Section\n\n35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 states the principles upon which the rescission of a contract may be adjudged. But there is no provision in this section or any other section of the Act that a plaintiff suing for rescission of the agreement may sue in the alternative for specific performance. In our opinion, the omission is deliberate and the intention of the Act is that no such alternative prayer is open to the plaintiff. This view is borne out by the following passage in \"Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 493\" :\n\nnit remains to remark that the plaintiff, bringing an act!on .for the specifi.c performance of a contra-ct, may clllllll m the alternattve that, if the contract cannot be enfroced, it may be rescinded and delivered up to be cancelled, provided that the a.lternative relief is based on the same state of facts, though with different conclusions as to law. When the action is brought by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R\n\nvendor, and the purchaser has been in possession, this alternative claim may embrace an accountof the rents and profits.\n\nBut, for the reason already stated, a suit to set aside a transaction for fraud or, in the alternative, for specific performance of a compromise could not be sustained in the Court of Chancery. And notwithstanding the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court as to alternative claims for relief, it seems probable that the same conclusion would still be arrived at, on the ground that the claims were inconsistent and embarrassing.\" The same principle is enunciated in Cawley v. Poole(') in which it wcis held by the Court of Chancery that in a case where a bill\n\nallg\"s a judgment obtained by fraud, and a subsequent compromi>e, and seeks to set aside the whole transaction on the ground of fraud. or in default to have the compromise carried out, and the Court is of opinion that the case of fraud fails, it will not en'orce the compromise, but the whole bill must be dismissed.\n\nThere is also another reason for holding that the appellant has m.:de out no cause of action with regard to the relief of specific performance of the contract. It is well-settled that in a suit for spe-:ific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready am:! willing to perform his part of the contract. In the present\n\nca~, no such averment is made in the plaint. On the other hand. the plaintiff has alleged that the agreement was a result of fraud and undue influence and was not binding upon him. For these reasons it must be held that so far as the relief of specific performance is concerned, the plaintiff has no cause of action. The legal position has been stated by Lord Blanesburgh in pronouncing the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Ardeshir Mama v. Fiora Sassoon( 2 ) as follows :\n\n\"Where the injured party sued at law for a breach, going, as in the present case, to the root of the contract, Ire thereby elected to treat the contract .as at an end and himself as discharged from its obligations.\n\nNo further performance by him was either contemplated or had to be tendered. In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting.\n\nHe had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness. from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing,\n\nto perform the contract on his part. . Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.\n\nThus it was that the commencement\n\n(l) 71 E. R. 23.\n\n(2) 55 J. A. 360, at p. 372.\n\nof an action for damages being, on the principle of such cases as Clough v. London and North Western Rly. Co. [(1871) L.R. 7 Ex. 26], and Law v. Law [(1904) I Ch. 140], a definite eleetion to treat the contract as at an end, no suit for specific performance, wl!atever happened to the action, could thereafter be maintained by the aggrieved plaintiff.\n\nHe had, by his election precluded himself even from making the averment just referred to, proof of which was essential to the success of his suit. The effect upon an action for damages for breach of a previous suit for specific performance will be apparent after the question of the competence of the Court itself to award damages in such a suit has been touched upon.\"\n\nIt was pointed out by Lord Blanesburgh that the Indian law on the subject as contained in the Specific Relief Act, 1877 is not different from the English law. At page 3 7 5 of the same Report Lord BJanesburgh states :\n\n\"Although, so far as the Act is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for specific performance as necessary as it always was in England [s. 24 (b) is tbe nearestj, it seems invariably to have been recognized, and, on principle, their Lordships think rightly, that tbe Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same : see, e.g., Karsandas v. Chhotalal (25 Born. L.R. 1037, 1050).\"\n\nIn the present case there is absence of an averment on the part of the plaintiff in the plaint that he was ready to perform his part of the contract. In the absence of such an averment it must be held that the plaintiff has no cause of action so far as the relief for specific performance is concerned.\n\nIt was n_ext contended on behalf .of the appellant that in any event the Htgh Court should have given the appellant an option to elect either of the two reliefs and ought not to have dismissed the suit at a preliminary stage so far as relief for specific performance was concerned.\n\nWe do not think there is any substance in this argument.\n\nThe question of election between the two reliefs would have arisen only if the appellant could have shown that in respect of specific performance he had a cause of action.\n\nAs we have already pointed out, the appellant has not made out a cause of action so far as he relief of specific performance is\n\nconcrned. and hence the appellant is n?t entitled to be put to election with regard to the two alternative reliefs.\n\nWe accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case. ·\n\n654 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nLastly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the trial court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was said that the finding of the trial court did not involve any question of jurisdiction and the High Court has fallen into an error in reversing the finding of the trial court on issue no. 4, whether the relief for specific perfonnance was open to 'the appellant in the alternative.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no warrant for the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant. It is manifest that in holding that the appellant was entitled in the altenµtive to ask for the relief of ; pecific perfonnance, the trial court had committed an error of law and so had acted with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 115{c) of the Civil Procedure Code. It was therefore competent to the High Court tu interfere, in revision, with the order of the trial court on this point. To put it differently, the decision of the trial court on this questiqn was not a decision on a mere qu!'Stion of law but it was a decision on a question of law upoµ which the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the particular relief depended. The question was therefore one which involved the jurisdiction of the trial court; the trial court could not, by an erroneous finding upon that question, confer upon itself a jurisdiction which it did not possess and its order was therefore liable to be set aside by the High Court in revision.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "PREM RAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM RAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L.F. HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.L.F. HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 4, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 4, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Specific Rlief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 35 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Rlief Act", "statute": "Specific Rlief Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 349, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1524, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526, "end_char": 1536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1714, "end_char": 1724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3204, "end_char": 3213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3607, "end_char": 3620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C B. C. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C B. C. Misra and M. V. Goswami, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Daya Krishan, S. C. Javali and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Daya Krishan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Daya Krishan, S. C. Javali and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Daya Krishan, S. C. Javali and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, Daya Krishan, S. C. Javali and Ravinder Narain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-The sole question involved in this appeal is whether a plaintiff suing for a declaration that a certain contract against him is void and inoperative having been obtained by undue intluence, can in the same suit in the alternative ask for the relief of specific performance of the same contract."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 26, 1956 Pt."}}, {"text": "Prem Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Raj, the appellant entered into an agreement with Shri Moti Ram Bhalla, respondent no.", "canonical_name": "PREM RAJ"}}, {"text": "Moti Ram Bhalla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4183, "end_char": 4198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Raj, the appellant entered into an agreement with Shri Moti Ram Bhalla, respondent no."}}, {"text": "Lila Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for the purchase of lands from Shri Lila Ram, father of the appellant at the price of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 18, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 18, 1956, the appellant and respondent no."}}, {"text": "L.M.G. Colonisers & Traders", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 entered into a partnership to carry on the business of buying and selling lands and developing the same under the name and style of \"L.M.G. Colonisers & Traders;'."}}, {"text": "January 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4611, "end_char": 4626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on January 2, 1957 the said firm \"L.M.G. Colonisers.&"}}, {"text": "L.M.G. Colonisers.& Traders", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on January 2, 1957 the said firm \"L.M.G. Colonisers.&"}}, {"text": "D.L.F. Housing.: & Construction (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Traders\" entered into a deed of partnership with D.L.F. Housing.: &"}}, {"text": "June 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1958 the parties cancelled the new partnership and agreement dated January 2, 1957 and entered into a fresh arrangement and executed the following four documents :\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"(i) A deed of dissalution of the new partnership between L.M.G. Colonisers and Traders (consisting of the appellant and respondent llOI."}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1958 the parties cancelled the new partnership and agreement dated January 2, 1957 and entered into a fresh arrangement and executed the following four documents :\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"(i) A deed of dissalution of the new partnership between L.M.G. Colonisers and Traders (consisting of the appellant and respondent llOI."}}, {"text": "L.M.G. Colonisers and Traders", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1958 the parties cancelled the new partnership and agreement dated January 2, 1957 and entered into a fresh arrangement and executed the following four documents :\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"(i) A deed of dissalution of the new partnership between L.M.G. Colonisers and Traders (consisting of the appellant and respondent llOI."}}, {"text": "2nd January 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 1 entered into on 2nd January 1957 (Ex."}}, {"text": "L.M.G. Colonisers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6252, "end_char": 6269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of these documents the new partnership dated January 2, 1957 between L.M.G. Colonisers & respondent no."}}, {"text": "D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6501, "end_char": 6547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ands to D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd., respondent no.", "canonical_name": "D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd."}}, {"text": "June. 8, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6725, "end_char": 6738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After about 3 years, on or about June."}}, {"text": "D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7369, "end_char": 7409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) Ltd. to the effect that the appellant having claimed that the agreement dated June 11, 1958 was void and inoperative, cannot in the same suit pray for specific performance of the same agreement.", "canonical_name": "D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7698, "end_char": 7715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge, First Class, G Delhi rejected the preliminary objection by his order dated February 26, 1962."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7815, "end_char": 7841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "228-D of 1962 in the Circuit Bench pf the Punjab High Court at Delhi."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7863, "end_char": 7880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated February 14, 1964, Dulat, 1."}}, {"text": "Dulat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated February 14, 1964, Dulat, 1."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8276, "end_char": 8293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal is brought by special leave f~ the .oder o~ he Punjab High Court dated February 14, 1964 1Il, Cm!"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8814, "end_char": 8834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9101, "end_char": 9120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9180, "end_char": 9199, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section\n\n35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9955, "end_char": 9980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11277, "end_char": 11290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And notwithstanding the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court as to alternative claims for relief, it seems probable that the same conclusion would still be arrived at, on the ground that the claims were inconsistent and embarrassing.\""}}, {"text": "Blanesburgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legal position has been stated by Lord Blanesburgh in pronouncing the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Ardeshir Mama v. Fiora Sassoon( 2 ) as follows :\n\n\"Where the injured party sued at law for a breach, going, as in the present case, to the root of the contract, Ire thereby elected to treat the contract .as at an end and himself as discharged from its obligations.", "canonical_name": "Blanesburgh"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14372, "end_char": 14391, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "BJanesburgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14475, "end_char": 14486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 3 7 5 of the same Report Lord BJanesburgh states :\n\n\"Although, so far as the Act is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for specific performance as necessary as it always was in England [s. 24 (b) is tbe nearestj, it seems invariably to have been recognized, and, on principle, their Lordships think rightly, that tbe Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same : see, e.g., Karsandas v. Chhotalal (25 Born.", "canonical_name": "Blanesburgh"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14696, "end_char": 14703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 3 7 5 of the same Report Lord BJanesburgh states :\n\n\"Although, so far as the Act is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for specific performance as necessary as it always was in England [s. 24 (b) is tbe nearestj, it seems invariably to have been recognized, and, on principle, their Lordships think rightly, that tbe Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same : see, e.g., Karsandas v. Chhotalal (25 Born."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14705, "end_char": 14710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was pointed out by Lord Blanesburgh that the Indian law on the subject as contained in the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "It was pointed out by Lord Blanesburgh that the Indian law on the subject as contained in the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16300, "end_char": 16306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17009, "end_char": 17015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_655_661_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "~-.\n\nCHIEF SETI'LEMENT COMMISSIONER, REHABILITADON\n\nDEPARTMENT, PUNJAB & ORS, ETC. v.\n\nOM PARKASH & ORS. ETC.\n\nB April 5, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J\n\nThe East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947- Definition of 'displaced perwn' in para 2(e) of Notification ssued under Rules made pursuant to s. 22(2){f) and (ft); The East Pun1ab Refugets c (Registration of Land Claims) Act 12 of 1948, s. 2(d)-Definition of 'refugees'; Person with proprty in Pakistan coming to Jnda .Prior to partition-Dying in June 1941-Shown as owner of properties in revenue records received from West Punjab-If displaced person-Whether allotment of land in India must be made in his name or in the name of /lis heirs.\n\n.~.:;;!\n\nN owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of D Pakistan and also owned some property in Pnnjab in India. He died in June 1947 while on a visit to India in the normal course of business, leaving behind three sons, the respondents in the appeal. On the partition of India, the land in Pakistan originally owned by N and after his death by his sons, had to be abandoned. After migrating to India, the three respondents filed separate claims as displaced persons and were allotted an area of land in Punjab.\n\nTherea'fter a complaint was filed before the Managing 'Officer that these respondents had received double E allotments. The Managing Officer, held this allegation was not substantiated but came to the conclusion that N, although he had died before the partition, must be treated as a displaced land:.holder for the purpose (j( allotment of land as his name continued to be shown in the J amabandi as the owner of the abandoned land in Pakistan.\n\nIn consequence of this finding a large portion of the land allotted to the three rcspc>ndents was cancelled by an order of the Managing Officer dated September\n\nF 18, 1961. Appeals made by the respondents to the A>si<tant Settlement Commissioner as well as revision petitiom betfore the Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab, were dismissed.\n\nIn dismissing the revision petilions, the Chief Settlement Commissioner relied on para. 17 of ''Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual\"-1952 edition-Page 180, to the effect that \"Even where a displaced land-holder in who<e name the land stands in the records received from West Punjab has died, the allotment is made in the name of the deceased\". He therefore upheld the view\n\nG that the land could only be allotted in the name of N. The respondents then filed a writ petition against the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner which was allowed.\n\nOn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Dismissing the appeal,\n\nH . The definition of a. \"displaced person\" in para 2(e) of the Notifica !!on of July 8. 1949, JSsued by the Custodian in accordance with provisions of the East Pnnjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act 1947, and the Rules made thereunder, or of a \"Refugee\" in Section 2(d) of the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act 12 di\n\n1948, show that these expressions have been used in the relevant enactments \\vith refereiice to a person who has migrated to India as a result of disturbances O'f fear of disturbances or the partition of the country. Therefore if a person had died before the disturbances took place or he had never migrated to India as a result of the disturbances and he died before such migration, he could not come within the meaning of the expression \"displaced person\" or the word '\"refugee\"' under the relevant statutory enactments. N died in June, 1947, long before the partition of the country and he did not abandon or was not made to abandon his land in Bahawalpur on account of the civil disturbances or the fear df such disturbances or the partition of the country. [660 A-DJ\n\nThere WRS no force in the contention that even though N never became a refugee or a displaced land-holder, the allotment had to be made in his name because he was shown in the revenue records received from West Punjab as the owner of the land and there had been no mutation of the names of the respondents in the revenue records. The rule in pa'ra 17 o'f \"Tarlok Singh's Manual\" consistently with the statutory enactments, \\vould be applicable only to such persons who were land-holders at the time of their becoming displaced persons or refugees and who died afterwards before allotment could be made in their favour.\n\nIt does not apply to a person like N who was not a displaced land-holder at the time of his death. [661 D-F]\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 937 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated September 13. 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 841 of 1962\n\nand Civil Appeal No. 938 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the order dated September 13, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 526 of 1963 and Civil Appeal No. 1195 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the order dated August 6. 1964 of the Punjab F High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 136 of 1964.\n\nD. R. Prem, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 937 of 1965).\n\nR. N. Sachthey, and S. P. Nayar, for the appellauts (in C.A.'s G Nos. 938 of 1965 and 1195 of 1967).\n\nS. V. Gupte, Bhawani Lal and B. P. Jha, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 937 of 1965).\n\nR. V. Pillai, for the reipondent (in C.A. No. 938 of 1965).\n\nH. L. Mittal and Naunit Lal, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo. 1195 of 1967).\n\nA Civil Appeal No. 937 of 1965\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated September 13, 1963 in Civil Writ No. 841 of 1962.\n\nNanak Chand owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of West Pakistan.\n\nHe also owned some property at Kot Kapura, Tehsil Faridkot, District Bhatinda now Joca'ted in India.\n\nNanak Chand had in normal course of business come to Bhatinda where he died in June, 194 7 leaving behind three sons, Om Parkash, Sat Narain and Ram Parshotam who are the respondents in this appeal.\n\nAs a result of the partition of India the land originally owned by Nanak Chand and after his death by his sons in Bahawalpur State had to be abandoned.\n\nAfter the partition of India the three respondents migrated to India and filed separate claims in accordance with law and obtained allotment of certain area in village Kot Kapura, district Bhatinda in lieu of the land abandoned by them in Pakistan: The Revenue Authorities allotted an area measuring 206.8t standard acres in ;-il!age Kot Kapura, District Bhatinda.\n\nAfter the allotment was made one Rur Singh filed a complaint before the Managing Officer that these respondents had received double allotments in village Kot Kapura.\n\nThe complaint was examined by Shri Shankar Das Katya!, Managing Officer who held that Shri Rur Singh failed to substantiate the allegation of double allotment.\n\nBut the Managing Otlicer came to the conclusion that Nanak Chand although he had died long before the partition of the country must be treated ·\n\nas a displaced land-holder for the purpose of allotment of land.\n\nThe reason given was that his name continued to be shown in the J amabandi as the owner of the abandoned land in Pakistan.\n\nIn consequence of this finding a large portion of the land allotted to the three respondents was cancelled by the Managing Officer by his order dated September 18, 1961.\n\nThe three respondents preferred an appeal before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab but the appeal and the revision petition were both dismissed. In dismissing the revision petition the Chief Settlement Commissioner relied upon paragraph 17 of Tadok Sinah's Land Resettlement Manual, 1952 Edition, page 180 which\\vas to the following effect :\n\n\"Even where a displaced land holder in whose name the lad stands in the records received from West Punjab has died, the a!Jotment is made in the name of the deceaed. In the fard taqsim, 'therefore, the entry will ?e m he name of the deceased land holder.\n\nPossession is ordmarily given to the heirs but there must be regular\n\nmutation proceedings before the entry in column 3 of the fard taqsim is altered in favour of the heirs.\" It was held by the Chief Settlement Commissioner that this para graph related to all persons who continued to be shown as owners in the revenue records irrespective of the fact whether they had died before or after migration. In other words, the Chief Settle ment Commissioner took the view that the land could only be allotted in the name of Nanak Chand even assuming that he had died in June, 1947. Against the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner the respondents filed a Writ Petition (Civil Writ No. 841of1961) before the Punjab High Court. The Writ Peti tion was allowed by the High Court by its order dated September 13, 1963 and the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated June 8, 1962, of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner dated December 26, 1961 and of the Managing Officer dated September 18, 1961 were all quashed by the grant of a writ in th~ nature of certiorari.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to set out the provisions of the relevant statutes.\n\nSection 2(b) of the East Punjab Evacuee;· (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act No.\n\nXIV of 1947) defines an \"evacuee\" as meaning \"a person ordi narily resident in or owning property or carrying on business within the territories comprised in the Province of East Punjab, who on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such distur bances, or the partition of the country : (i) leaves or has s:nce the first day of March 194 7, left the said territories for a place outside India, or (ii) cannot personally occupy or supervise hi' property or business.\" Section 4 of that Act provided that \"All evacuee property situated within the Province shall vest in the Custodian for the purposes of this Act and shall continue to be so vested until the Provincial Government by notification otherwise\n\ndirects.\" In pursuance of the powers conferred by the rules made by the State Government under els. (f) and (ff) of s. 22(2) of the East Punjab Evacuees, (Administration of Property) Act, 1947, the Custodian issued a notification no. 4892/S on July 8, 1949 regarding the conditions on which he was prepared to grant allotment of land vested in him under' the provisions of the said Act to displaced persons.\n\nPara 2 ( e) of this notification states :\n\n\" \"Displaced person\" means a land holder in the terri tories now comprised in the province of West Pun.iab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-Western Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakis\n\ntan and who has since the 1st day of March, 1947, abndoned or been made to abandon his land in the\n\nSETTLEMENT COMMR. v. OM PARKASH (Ramaswa111i, J.) 659\n\nsaid territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country.\" Section 2(d) of the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act. 1948 (East Punjab Act No. XII of 1948) states:\n\n\"2. Interpretation.-In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n( d) 'refugee' means a landholder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab, or who or whose ancestor migrated as a colonist from the Punjab since 1901 to the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or to any State\n\nadjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March, 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country;\" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"landholder\" to mean \"an owner of land: or a tenant having a right of occupancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887) or a tenant as defined in section 3 of the Colonization of Governmell'I Lands Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912) and such other holder or grantee of land as may be specified by the Provincial Government;\".\n\nSection 2(c) of the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act No. XXXVI of 1949) defines a \"displaced person\" as follows :\n\n\" 'displaced person' means a land-holder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country\".\n\nSection 2(b) o.f this Act defines an \"allottee\" as follows :\n\n\" 'allottee' means a displaced person to whom land is allotted by the Custodian under the conditions published with East Punjab Government notification no. 4892/S, dated the 8th July, 1949, and includes his heirs, legal representatives and sub-lessees\".\n\nThe main question to be considered in this .appeal is whether Nanak Chand was a 'displaced person' as defined in para 2(e) of the notification dated July 8, 1949 iir a \"refugee\" as defined under s. 2(d) of Act No. XII of 1948 and whether he was entitled for aliotment of land. It is manifest that the expression \"displaced person\" or the word \"refugee\" has been used in the relevant enactments with reference to a person who has migrated to India as .a result of disturbances or fear of disturbances or the partition of the country.\n\nTherefore if a person had died before the disturbances took place or he had never migrated to India as a result of the disturbances and he died before such migration, he could not come within the meaning of the expression \"displaced person'' or the word \"refugee\" under the relevant statutory enactments.\n\nIt is manifest in the present case that Nanak Chand died in Jun~.\n\n1947 long before the partition of the country and he did not abandon or was not made to abandon his land in Bal)awalpur on account of the civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances or the partition of the country: It was, however, contended by Mr. D. R. Prem on behalf of the appellants that even though Nanak Chand never became a refugee or a displaced land-holder, the allotment had to be made in his name because he was shown in the revenue records received from West Punjab as the owner of the land and there had been no mutation of the names of the respondents in the revenue records.\n\nReference was made in this connection to paragraph 17 of Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual which has already been quoted.\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Prem that the instructions contained in this paragraph would apply even though Nanak Chand had never become a refugee or a displaced land-holder and the allotment has to be made in his name by the revenue authorities because bis name still stands in the revenue records received from West Punjab. We are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nIt is not disputed that paragraph 17 of Tarlok Singb's Manual has no statutory authority but it merely embodies executive or administrative instructions for general guidance. If there is a conflict between the provisions contained in this paragraph and the statutory enactments already referred to it is manifest that the statutory provisions must take precedence and must prevail over the directions contained in para 17 of Tarlok Singh's Manual.\n\nIn this context it is essential to emphasise that under our con~ titutional system the authority to make the law is vested in the Parliament and the State Legislatures and other law making bodies and whatever legislative power the executive administration possesses must be derived directly from the delegation of the legis- 1ature and exercised. validly only within the limits prescribed. The notion of inherent or autonomous law-making power in the exe- Cutive administration is a notion that must be emphatically rejected.\n\nAs observed by Jackson, J. in a recent American case- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer( 1 )-\"With all i:ts defects delays and inconveniences men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.\" In. our constitutional system, the central and most characteristic feature is the concept of the rule of law which means, in the present context, the authority of the law courts to test all administrative action by the standard of legality. The administrative or executive action that does not meet the standard will be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the appropriate action in the competent court. The rule of law rejects the conception of the Dual State(\") in which governmental action is placed in a privileged position of immunity from control by law.\n\nSuch a notion is foreign to our basic constitutional concept.\n\nIn our opinion, however, it is possible to give a restricted interpretation to paragraph 17 of Tarlok Singh's Manual so as to make it consistent with the requirements of the statutory enactments.\n\nThe intention of para 17 is that it is applicable only to such persons who are land-holders at the time of their becoming displaced persons or refugees and who died afterwards before allotment could be made in their favour. In other words, the paragraph applies tu a displaced land-holder who dies after having become a \"displaced person\" within the meaning of the relevant statutory enactments referred to above.\n\nThe paragraph does not apply to a case of a person who was not a displaced land-holder at the time of his death. In the present case it is admitted that Nanak Chand never became a displaced land-holder.\n\nOn the other hand, Nanak Chand died before he became a displaced land-holder and therefore para 17 of Tarlok Singh's Manual has no application to the facts of the present case.\n\nFor these reasons we hold that this appeal has no merit and it must be dismissed with costs.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 938 of 1965 & 1195 of 1967\n\nThe question arising in these two appeals is identical wilt the question of law in Civil Appeal No. 937 of 1965. For the reasons given in that judgment we hold that the decision of the High Court challenged in these appeals is correct and these appeals must be dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(I) 343 u. s. 579, 655.\n\n(2) This term is deri\\rcd from Fraenkel, Tile Dual State (1941).", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "CHIEF SETI'LEMENT COMMISSIONER, REHABILITADON\n\nDEPARTMENT, PUNJAB & ORS, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT, PUNJAB & ORS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OM PARKASH & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OM PARKASH & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B April 5, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J\n\nThe East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947- Definition of 'displaced perwn' in para 2(e) of Notification ssued under Rules made pursuant to s. 22(2){f) and (ft); The East Pun1ab Refugets c (Registration of Land Claims) Act 12 of 1948, s. 2(d)-Definition of 'refugees'; Person with proprty in Pakistan coming to Jnda .Prior to partition-Dying in June 1941-Shown as owner of properties in revenue records received from West Punjab-If displaced person-Whether allotment of land in India must be made in his name or in the name of /lis heirs."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B April 5, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J\n\nThe East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947- Definition of 'displaced perwn' in para 2(e) of Notification ssued under Rules made pursuant to s. 22(2){f) and (ft); The East Pun1ab Refugets c (Registration of Land Claims) Act 12 of 1948, s. 2(d)-Definition of 'refugees'; Person with proprty in Pakistan coming to Jnda .Prior to partition-Dying in June 1941-Shown as owner of properties in revenue records received from West Punjab-If displaced person-Whether allotment of land in India must be made in his name or in the name of /lis heirs."}}, {"text": "Bahawalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of D Pakistan and also owned some property in Pnnjab in India."}}, {"text": "Pnnjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of D Pakistan and also owned some property in Pnnjab in India."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the partition of India, the land in Pakistan originally owned by N and after his death by his sons, had to be abandoned."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1252, "end_char": 1258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After migrating to India, the three respondents filed separate claims as displaced persons and were allotted an area of land in Punjab."}}, {"text": "September\n\nF 18, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence of this finding a large portion of the land allotted to the three rcspc>ndents was cancelled by an order of the Managing Officer dated September\n\nF 18, 1961."}}, {"text": "Tarlok Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 of ''Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual\"-1952 edition-Page 180, to the effect that \"Even where a displaced land-holder in who<e name the land stands in the records received from West Punjab has died, the allotment is made in the name of the deceased\".", "canonical_name": "Tarlok Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2928, "end_char": 2940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4988, "end_char": 5002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5007, "end_char": 5018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Nayar"}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5087, "end_char": 5098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, and S. P. Nayar, for the appellauts (in C.A.'s G Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Nayar"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Bhawani Lal and B. P. Jha, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhawani Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5182, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Bhawani Lal and B. P. Jha, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "B. P. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Bhawani Lal and B. P. Jha, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "R. V. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5264, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. Pillai, for the reipondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "H. L. Mittal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5325, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Mittal and Naunit Lal, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Mittal and Naunit Lal, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "937 of 1965\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated September 13, 1963 in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5559, "end_char": 5576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "937 of 1965\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated September 13, 1963 in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "937 of 1965\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated September 13, 1963 in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5634, "end_char": 5645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of West Pakistan.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand"}}, {"text": "Bahawalpur State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5674, "end_char": 5690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand owned agricultural lands in Bahawalpur State now forming part of West Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Kot Kapura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned some property at Kot Kapura, Tehsil Faridkot, District Bhatinda now Joca'ted in India."}}, {"text": "Faridkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned some property at Kot Kapura, Tehsil Faridkot, District Bhatinda now Joca'ted in India."}}, {"text": "Bhatinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5796, "end_char": 5804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also owned some property at Kot Kapura, Tehsil Faridkot, District Bhatinda now Joca'ted in India."}}, {"text": "Om Parkash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand had in normal course of business come to Bhatinda where he died in June, 194 7 leaving behind three sons, Om Parkash, Sat Narain and Ram Parshotam who are the respondents in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Sat Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand had in normal course of business come to Bhatinda where he died in June, 194 7 leaving behind three sons, Om Parkash, Sat Narain and Ram Parshotam who are the respondents in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Ram Parshotam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5974, "end_char": 5987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand had in normal course of business come to Bhatinda where he died in June, 194 7 leaving behind three sons, Om Parkash, Sat Narain and Ram Parshotam who are the respondents in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6096, "end_char": 6107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the partition of India the land originally owned by Nanak Chand and after his death by his sons in Bahawalpur State had to be abandoned.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand"}}, {"text": "Rur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6581, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the allotment was made one Rur Singh filed a complaint before the Managing Officer that these respondents had received double allotments in village Kot Kapura."}}, {"text": "Shankar Das Katya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6750, "end_char": 6767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint was examined by Shri Shankar Das Katya!,"}}, {"text": "September 18, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence of this finding a large portion of the land allotted to the three respondents was cancelled by the Managing Officer by his order dated September 18, 1961."}}, {"text": "Tadok Sinah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dismissing the revision petition the Chief Settlement Commissioner relied upon paragraph 17 of Tadok Sinah's Land Resettlement Manual, 1952 Edition, page 180 which\\vas to the following effect :\n\n\"Even where a displaced land holder in whose name the lad stands in the records received from West Punjab has died, the a!Jotment is made in the name of the deceaed."}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9214, "end_char": 9226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10145, "end_char": 10153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All evacuee property situated within the Province shall vest in the Custodian for the purposes of this Act", "statute": "All evacuee property situated within the Province shall vest in the Custodian for the purposes of this Act"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4892/S on July 8, 1949 regarding the conditions on which he was prepared to grant allotment of land vested in him under' the provisions of the said Act to displaced persons."}}, {"text": "Sind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Para 2 ( e) of this notification states :\n\n\" \"Displaced person\" means a land holder in the terri tories now comprised in the province of West Pun.iab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-Western Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakis\n\ntan and who has since the 1st day of March, 1947, abndoned or been made to abandon his land in the\n\nSETTLEMENT COMMR."}}, {"text": "Baluchistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10698, "end_char": 10709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Para 2 ( e) of this notification states :\n\n\" \"Displaced person\" means a land holder in the terri tories now comprised in the province of West Pun.iab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-Western Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakis\n\ntan and who has since the 1st day of March, 1947, abndoned or been made to abandon his land in the\n\nSETTLEMENT COMMR."}}, {"text": "1st day of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10831, "end_char": 10853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Para 2 ( e) of this notification states :\n\n\" \"Displaced person\" means a land holder in the terri tories now comprised in the province of West Pun.iab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-Western Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakis\n\ntan and who has since the 1st day of March, 1947, abndoned or been made to abandon his land in the\n\nSETTLEMENT COMMR."}}, {"text": "Section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11079, "end_char": 11091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11161, "end_char": 11176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "North-West Frontier Province", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11493, "end_char": 11521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interpretation.-In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n( d) 'refugee' means a landholder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab, or who or whose ancestor migrated as a colonist from the Punjab since 1901 to the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or to any State\n\nadjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March, 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country;\" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"landholder\" to mean \"an owner of land: or a tenant having a right of occupancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887) or a tenant as defined in section 3 of the Colonization of Governmell'I Lands Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912) and such other holder or grantee of land as may be specified by the Provincial Government;\"."}}, {"text": "Dominion of Pakistan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11623, "end_char": 11643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interpretation.-In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n( d) 'refugee' means a landholder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab, or who or whose ancestor migrated as a colonist from the Punjab since 1901 to the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or to any State\n\nadjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March, 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country;\" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"landholder\" to mean \"an owner of land: or a tenant having a right of occupancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887) or a tenant as defined in section 3 of the Colonization of Governmell'I Lands Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912) and such other holder or grantee of land as may be specified by the Provincial Government;\"."}}, {"text": "1st day of March, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interpretation.-In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n( d) 'refugee' means a landholder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab, or who or whose ancestor migrated as a colonist from the Punjab since 1901 to the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or to any State\n\nadjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March, 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country;\" Section 2 ( c) defines a \"landholder\" to mean \"an owner of land: or a tenant having a right of occupancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887) or a tenant as defined in section 3 of the Colonization of Governmell'I Lands Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912) and such other holder or grantee of land as may be specified by the Provincial Government;\"."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11861, "end_char": 11870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11976, "end_char": 12000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12041, "end_char": 12050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887", "statute": "the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Lands Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12087, "end_char": 12102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act V of 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12104, "end_char": 12124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12220, "end_char": 12232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act V of 1912", "statute": "Punjab Act V of 1912"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12301, "end_char": 12316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st day of March 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12723, "end_char": 12745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXXVI of 1949) defines a \"displaced person\" as follows :\n\n\" 'displaced person' means a land-holder in the territories now comprised in the Province of West Punjab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March 194 7, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country\"."}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12917, "end_char": 12929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2(b) o.f this Act defines an \"allottee\" as follows :\n\n\" 'allottee' means a displaced person to whom land is allotted by the Custodian under the conditions published with East Punjab Government notification no."}}, {"text": "8th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13153, "end_char": 13167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4892/S, dated the 8th July, 1949, and includes his heirs, legal representatives and sub-lessees\"."}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13429, "end_char": 13436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bal)awalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14249, "end_char": 14260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is manifest in the present case that Nanak Chand died in Jun~.\n\n1947 long before the partition of the country and he did not abandon or was not made to abandon his land in Bal)awalpur on account of the civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances or the partition of the country: It was, however, contended by Mr. D. R. Prem on behalf of the appellants that even though Nanak Chand never became a refugee or a displaced land-holder, the allotment had to be made in his name because he was shown in the revenue records received from West Punjab as the owner of the land and there had been no mutation of the names of the respondents in the revenue records."}}, {"text": "Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14894, "end_char": 14898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Prem that the instructions contained in this paragraph would apply even though Nanak Chand had never become a refugee or a displaced land-holder and the allotment has to be made in his name by the revenue authorities because bis name still stands in the revenue records received from West Punjab."}}, {"text": "Tarlok Singb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15282, "end_char": 15294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that paragraph 17 of Tarlok Singb's Manual has no statutory authority but it merely embodies executive or administrative instructions for general guidance.", "canonical_name": "Tarlok Singh"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this context it is essential to emphasise that under our con~ titutional system the authority to make the law is vested in the Parliament and the State Legislatures and other law making bodies and whatever legislative power the executive administration possesses must be derived directly from the delegation of the legis- 1ature and exercised."}}, {"text": "Jackson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16233, "end_char": 16240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Jackson, J. in a recent American case- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer( 1 )-\"With all i:ts defects delays and inconveniences men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.\""}}, {"text": "s. 579, 655", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18624, "end_char": 18635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_662_684_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "DHULABHAI AND OTHERS\n\n'V.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER April 5, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALIN•\n\nGAM, K. S. HEGDE AND A, N. GROVER, JI.] M\"lhya Bharat Sales Tax Act (30 of 1950), s. 11-lurisdiction of civil court barred-Scope of the bar.\n\nBy Notifications issued by the State Govetnment under s. S of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950, sales-tax was imposed and collected from the appellants. They filed suits for refund of the tax on the ground that it was illegally collected from them being against the constitutional prohibition in Art. 301 and not saved under Art. 304(a). In Bhailal v.\n\nState of M.P. [(1960) M.P.L.J. 601), the petitioner therein challenged in a writ petition, the levy of sales tax on the same grounds and the High Coun declared the notifications to be offensive to Art. 30 I and held that the imposition of tax was illegal. Following that decision, the !'rial court decreed the suits filed by the appellants. In appeal before the High Court it was conceded by the State that the tax. could not be imposed in view of Art. 301, but it was contended that the suits were not maintainable in view of s. 17 of the Act which provides that no assessment made under the Act shall be called in question in any court. Tue High Coun held that the suits were incompetent.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The suits were maintainable. [684 DJ\n\nAn enquiry into the diverse views expressed in the decisions of this Court shows that an exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil cowt is not readily to be inferred unless the following conditions apply :\n\n(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy lo do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit.\n\nSuch provision, however. does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the patticular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. [682 A-C; 683 CJ\n\nSecretary of State v. Mask [1940] L.R. 67 I.A. 222; Fi'rm 11/uri Subba, vY<J Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1964) 1 S.C.R. 752 and Kera/a v. Ramoswami Iyer and Sons, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 582.\n\nIn Firm Illuri Subbttyya Chetty & Sons' case the assessee conceded G that the tax was payable and did not raise the issue before the appellate authorities under the Act. The suit for refund of tax was held not maintainable on those special facts, with reference to the addition of a.\n\nISA excluding the jurisdiction of civil court and the special remedies provided in ss. 12A to 120 in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939.\n\nThis Court. however, did not think it necessary to pronounce any opinion on the Judicial Committee's view in the Rcleigh Investment Co. case ([1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 50) that even the vires of the provisions could be H consideted by the Tribunals constituted under the Act. Dealing with Mask & Co.'s case, it was pointed out that non-compliance with the provisions of the statute meant non-compliance with such fundamental\n\nDHULABHAI V, MADHYA PRADESH 663\n\nprovisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. [679\n\nG-H;\n\n680 D-D]\n\n(2) Whore there is an expreso bar o~ the jurisdiction of the coutt, an examination of the scheme of the pal11cular Act to find the aduacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but ,. not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. [682 DJ\n\nWhore there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment become& aecessary and the result of the inquiry may be deciive. . In the I~\n\nc~ it is necessary to see if the sliaute creates special .rig~~ or a liab1 lily and provides for the determination of the nt or hab11tty, !\"'d further lays down that all . questions about. the said nght and habilt!Y oball be determined by the tnbunals so consltf:ujed, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said\n\nstatute or not. [682 D-F] In Provincial Government v. J. S. Basappa, [1964J 5 S.C.R. 517 it was held that the civil court had jurisdiction beca.use, at the relevant time, (a) the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, did not have s. 18A (which was introduced later barring the jurisdiction of civil cou!1)\n\n(b) the Act did not have the elaborate machinery for adequate remed< which was also introduced later, and (c) the tax was illegally collected\n\ninorin.g the furidamental provisions of the Act.\n\nTherefore. the observa Uon in Kera/av. ROJna.r.v01ni Iyer&: Sons that Basappa's case was wrongly decided is open to doubt. (678 D, HJ\n\nMis. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay. [1966] I S.C.R. 64 was a decision of a Special Bench holding that s. 20 <if the Bombay Sal\"\" Tax Aot, 1946 excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court in suits for refund of tax, in cases. where the decision of the authorities under the Act was rely an error in assessment capable of correction by the usual procedure of appeals etc. But the Dench observed, that in such cases, where the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by providing an adequate machinery in the Act, it becomes \"pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil court are presdribed by the '!Ctatute or not', and thus expressly left open the question as to how far the bar would operate in cases where the charging provision is ultra vires, [681 A-B. G; 684 C.Dl\n\n( 3) .Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires canno~ be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act.\n\n\nSOS; Cm; o\" Coffee Co. v. State of Mysore, 19 S.T.C. 66 (S.C.); C, T.\n\nSenthulnathan Chettfar v. Madras, CC.A. 1045 Of 1966. dated 20th July,\n\n1967) and Pcbbo1an Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner, Lakhimp1u\n\n11968] I S.C.R. 260; A.I.R. 1968 S.C, 271. '\n\n(~) he~ a pru'vision is already declared unconstitutional or the t1tut1~1ty !\"f any. provision is to be challenged, a suit is open.\n\nA wnt of crtorari Illf'Y mclude a direction for refund if the claim i• clearly within the tlIIlC prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to .. replace a suit. [682 G-HJ\n\n~ Stre of M.P. v. B!taila/, [1964J 6 S.C.R. 261 which confirmed the dectst<)n •n 1960 M.P.L.J. 601 this Court upheld the order of refund by the j!h urt in ill! writ jutisdiction, held that in es where a defence of lumtation was open or other facts had to be decided. the order of 8 Sup.CIJ68\n\nrefWld was not proper, and aeellpted the proposition that a suit lay in such case. without adverting to the provisions of the Act to see whether the jurisdiction of civil coun was barred either expressly or by necessary implication. Therefore, this case cannot be an authority for holding that th!'\" civil court has jurisdiction to entertain such suits. [668 D---GJ\n\n(SJ Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a ruit lies. f683 Al Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. Municipal CouncU, Dhamcngaon, [196SJ 3 s.C.R. 499.\n\n( 6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its .constitutionality are for the decision of the authoritit\\11 and a civil suit doeo not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. Io either 0390, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant C enquiry. [6 83 BJ In the present case, though the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act contains provisions for appeal, revision, recliJication and reference to the lfi&h -Court. the notifications having been rightly declared void in the earli<i decision of the High Court, the appellants could take advantage of the fact that tax was levied without a complete charging section. Sinee the tax authorities could not even proceed to assess the party their juriadic-- D tion was affected and the case fell within categories (3) and (4) above .and not in category (2). [684 A-CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIBTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 260 to 263 of 1967.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated January 5, 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in First Ap peals Nos. 68, 69, 71 and 70 of 1961 respectively.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nB. Sen and 1. N. Shroff, for the respondents (in all the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hldayatullah, C.J. These are four appeals by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 1964/5 January, 1965 dismissing four suits filed by the appellants to recover sales-tax alleged to be realized illegally from them by the State of Madhya\n\nPradesh, the respondent in these appeals. The suits were earlier decreed by the District Judge, Ujjain. The facts in the suits are common and were as follows: The appellants are dealers in tobacco and have their place& of business at Ujjain. They purchase and sell tobacco used for eating, smoking and for preparing bldls. They get their tobacco locally or import it frQm extra-state places. The former Madhya Bharat State enacted in 1950 the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act {Act 30 of 1950) which came into force on May 1, 1950. Under\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 665\n\ns. 3 of the Act every dealer whoso business in the previous year in respect of sales or supplies of goods exceeded in the case of an importer and manufacturer Rs. 5,000 and in other cases R~. 12,000 had to pay tax in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected 'in Madhya Bharat from !st May 1950. Under s. 5, the tax was a single .point tax and it was provided that the Government might by a notification specify the point of the sales at which the tax was payable. The section also fixed the minimum and maximum rates of tax leaving it to Government to notify the actual rate.\n\nGovernment, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950, May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954. All these notifications imposed tax at different rates on tobacco above described on the importer, that is to say at the point of import. The tax was not levied on sale or purchase of tobacco of similar kind in Madhya Bharat. The tax was collected by the authorities in varying amounts from the appellants for different quarters. We are not concerned with the amounts. The appellants served notices under s. SO of the Code of Civil Procedure and filed the present suits, for refund of the tax on the ground that it was illegally collected from them being against the constitutional prohibition in Art. 301 and not saved under Art. 304(a) of the Constitution.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh was formed on November I,\n\n1955. In Bhai/al v. M.P.(1) the High Court of Madhya Pradesh declared the notifications to be offensive to Art. 301 of the Constitution on the ground that it was illegal to levy a tax on the\n\nimportr when an equal tax .as not levied on similar goods pro\n\nuced m the State. The dec1smn was later confirmed on this point 1n State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai('). The appellants did not take recourse to the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution but filed their suits on December 21, 1957.\n\nThe sits were opposed by the State on the main ground that such. a suit was barred by the provisions of s. 17 of the Act which provides:\n\n. \"1 ?· Bar to certain proceedings.-Save as is provided m ~- 13, no assessment made and no order passed\n\nundr this Act. or the rules made thereunder by the as- smg authonty, appellate authority or the Commissioner shall be called in question in any Court and save. as !s provided _i~ sections 11 and 12 no apal or application for revJSJon shall lie against any such assessment or order.\"\n\nThe tale also pleaded that as appeals against the assessment were pending before the Sales Tax Appeal Judge the plaintiffs were\n\n(l) 1960 M. P. L. J. 601.\n\n(2) [1964) 6 S. C.R. 261.\n\nnot entitled to file the suits. The District Judge, following State A of Tripura v. The Province of East Bengal(') and Bhailal Bhai Gokal Bhai v. StQ/e of M.P. (2), held that such a suit lay wheJl a I declaration was sbught that the provisions of law relating to an assessment were ultra vires, !\\lld demand was made for refund of amounts illegally collected under it. On the second point the District Judge held that s. 21 of the Act which allows the Com- B missioner or the appellate authority to order refund of tax wrongly paid did not apply since no such appeal was proved to have been filed and the tax was not wrongfully paid but wrongfully realised.\n\nOn appeal by the State the High Court reversed the decision.\n\nBefore the High Court it was conceded (as it is conceded even now) that the tax could not be imposed in view of the bar of Art. 301.\n\nThe short question thus was whether the suit was barred expressly by s. 1 7 of the Act or any implication arising from the Act. The contention on behalf of the appellants was that if it was a question\n\nO!f the correctness of the imposition within the valid framework of the statute, rules or notifications s. 17 might have operated but not when the imposition was under a void law. In the latter event tbe assessee was free to challenge the validity of the law in a civil suit and also to claim a refund\n\nThe High Court considered the matter in the light of the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Raleigh Investment Co. v.\n\nGovernor General in Council('), Secretary of State v. Mask('), Firm I. S. Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh('), State of Andhra Pradesh v. Firm Subbayya & Sons(\"), and others, and came to the conclusion that the suit was incompetent. The High Court conceded that both aspects of the case were well supported by authority. It is not necessary to enter into the reasons which weighed with the High Court because our discussion of the authorities in this judgment will clearly expose the rival views and the one preferred in the High Court.\n\nThe question that arises in these appeals has been before this Court in relation to other statutes and has been answered in different ways. These appeals went before a Divisional Bench of this Court but in view of the difficulty presented by the earlier rulings of this Court, they were referred to the Constitution Bench and that is bow they are before us. At the very start we may observe that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. This is the purport of\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 23.\n\n(2) 1960 M.P.L.J. 601.\n\n(3) [l947)L:R. 741. A. SO; A. I. R. 1947 P. C. 78.\n\n(4) [1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 222; A. I. R. 1940 P. C. !OS.\n\n(S) (1964) IS. C.R. 752; A. I. R.1964 S. C. 322.\n\n(6) A. I. R. 1958 Mad. S44 (F. B.).\n\nDHULAbHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatulla/1, C.1.) 667\n\ns. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. How s. 9 operates is perhaps best illustrated by referring to the categories of cases, mentioned by Willes, J. in Wolverhampto11 New Waterworks co. v. Hll.W\n\nkesford( 1)-They are:\n\n\"One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law : there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to ptirsue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides, no particular form of remedy : there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it ....... .\n\nThe remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.\" Th:is view of Willes, I.· was accepted by the House of Lords in Neville v. London 'Express' Newspaper, Ltd.(').\n\nTo which category do such cases belong in India ? The controversy in India has revolved round the principles accepted in Secretary of State v. Mask(') and in Raleigh Investment Co. v.\n\nGovernor General in Council('). In the first case it was laid down by the Judicial Committee that the ouster of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not to be lightly inferred and can only be established if there is an express provision of law or .is clearly implied.\n\nIn the second case it was held that where a liability to tax is created by statute which gives special and particular remedies against illegal exactions the remedy contemplated by the statute must be followed and it is not open to the assessee to pursue the ordinary process of Civil Courts. To the latter case we shall refer in some detail presently. Opinion in this Court has, however, wavered as to how far to go with the dicta of the Privy Council in the two cases.\n\nBefore, however, we go into the question we may refer to State of M.P. v. Bhailal('). In that .case the notifications were\n\ndeclared ultra vires Article 301 of the Constitution and not saved by Art. 304(a). It was therefore held that the portion of the tax already paid must be refunded by Government The question then posed was :\n\n(I) [18S9) 6 C. B. (NS) 336.\n\n(2) (1919] A.C. 368.\n\n(2) (1940] 67 I. A. 222.\n\n(4) [1947) 74 I. A. 50.\n\n(5) (1964) 6 S. C.R. 261.\n\n\"The question is whether the relief of repayment has to be sought by the tax-payer by an action in a civil court or whether such an order can be made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 of the Constitution ?\"\n\nThis Court after examining the jurisdiction under Art. 226 concluded that the High Court had the power to order refund in proceedings for a writ since complete relief could not be said to be given if 011ly a declaration were given.\n\nThe Court, however, observed:\n\n\"At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided in Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil cout or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions.\"\n\nPointing out that where a defence of limitation could be raised or other issues of fact l1ad to be tried, it was held that the Court should leave the party aggrieved to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of a civil suit.\n\nTherefore in those cases (there were 31 appeals before this Court) where the writ was asked for within three years, this Court upheld the order of refund by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, but in those cases in which the parties had gone to the High Court after a lapse of 3 years, the order of refund was questioned and not approved observing that the petitioners would be at liberty to seek such relief as they might be entitled to in a Civil Court if it was not barred by limitation.\n\nIt will appear from this analysis of the case that this Court accepted the proposition that a suit lay.\n\nThis it did without adverting to the provisions of the Act there considered to see whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred or not, either expressly or by necessary implication. This Court was, of course, not invited to express its opinion on the matter but only on whether the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction could order refund of tax paid under a mistake.\n\nHaving held that in some cases the High Court should not order refund, this Court merely pointed out that the civil suit would be the only other remedy open to the party. The case cannot, therefore, be treated as an authority to hold that the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to entertain such suits. -\n\nWe may now proceed to consider first the two cases of the Judicial Committee before examining the position under the rulings of this Court. In Secretary of State'\" Mask(') the sole question was the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a s~\n\n(I) [194CJ L. R. 67 T. A. 222.\n\n8'.\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 669\n\nA recover an excess amount of customs duty collected from Mask\n\naild Co.\n\nThe suit was filed after an appeal to the Collector of Customs and a revision taken to the Government of India under the Land Customs Act, 1924 was dismissed. The. suit was dismissed by the trial Judge on the preliminary ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. An appeal by Mask and Co. to the B High Court succeeded, and there was a remit. The appeal to the Judicial Committee followed. Section 188 of the Land Customs Act, 1924 provided inter a/ia :\n\n\"Every order passed in appeal under this section shall, subject to the power of revision conferred by s. 191, be final.\" The Judicial Committee first made a gene'ral observation :\n\n\"It is settled law that the exclusion of the .iurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been' complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.\" Then it proceeded to quote s. 188 (as above) and observed :\n\n\"By Ss. 188 and 191 a precise and self-contained code of appeal is provided in regard to obligations which are created by the statute itself, and it enables the appeal to be carried to the supreme head of the executive Government. It is difficult to conceive what further challenge of the order was intended to be excluded other than a challenge in the Civil Courts, , ._ ... \" and came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was excluC!ed. The decision of the High Court was reversed and that of the trial Judge restored.\n\nThe next case is the Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General Jn Council ( 1) • 1bis was an appeal to the Privy Conncil\n\nro~ :'- Judgment ?f the Federal Court of India in civil appellate 1unsdict10n reversmg a decree passed by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in its original civil jurisdiction.\n\nIt arose from a suit filed for recovery of a sum paid under protest pursuant to an assessment to income-tax of .the Investment Company on the ground that the computation was under a provision of the Income Tax Act which was ultra vires the Indian Legislature.\n\nOne of the defences in the suit was that whether the said provision\n\n(I) [19471 L. R. 741.A. SO.\n\nwas u/lra vires or not, .the Civil Courts were excluded from elCcrcising their jurisdiction by s. 226 of the Governmen; of Indil Act, 1935 and s. 67 of the Indian Income Tax Act. The provision in question was held ultra vires by the High Court and it further held that neither of the two provisions was a bar to th< civil courts' jurisdiction. The Federal Court in disagreement held that s. 22() of the Government of India Act, 1935 barred tho jurisdiction and that the provision impugned was not ultra vfres.\n\nThe bar of s. 67 of the Ineome Tx Act was not pressed befor< the Federal Court.\n\nWhen the case readhed the Judicial Committee, the ca; e was considered under s. 67 but not under s. 226. 'fhe Judicial Committee was of the opil)ion that s. 67 barred the jurisdiction. The Investment Company had raised the question before the Jncometax authorities that .Explanation 3 to 'Para 4(1) of the Income-tax Act 1922 was ultra vires. This was not accepted and the assessment was made.\n\nThe Investment Company filed an appeal but <lid not proceed with it and the assesst wa~ confirmed. The appellate authority' also said in its orderrhat the constitutional question could not be raised before it.\n\nThe suit was thn in- >tituted.\n\n• Section 67 of the lndian Income-lax Act in specific -terms <lated :\n\n\"\"No suit shall be brought in any civil court t6 \"t aside or modify any as., essmcnt made under the Act ... '\"\n\nThe result of thesuit has already been slated. The-Judicial Committee considered this section and observed that the suit in form did not profess to modify the assessment.but in substance it did\n\n>O.\n\nThe declaration that a certain provision was 11/lra vires was but a 'step.\n\nJ\\ceording to the Judi9ial Committee the as.>e-<sment made under an 11/tra vires statute was not a nullity and the assessment ought to be taken to proceed on a mistake ofAaw in the course of assessment. Therefore, without going into the questiol\\ whether the provision impugned was 11/tra vlres or not the Judicial comn1ittec considered. the 1n,µtter.\n\n1; he argument was tha(\"the assessment was not one under ti.le Act', if effect was given to an ultra vires provision since the provision would he \" nullity and non-existent. To discover the force of tile prohibition in s. 67 th.! following tests were applied:-\n\n(al Docs the Act contain machinery by which the assessee can raise the question. of the ••ires of the provision before the special authorities ? ,\n\n(b) This tes~ was not conclusive but one to be considered.\n\n()·\n\n. DHULABIIAI \"· MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatul/ah, C.l.) 671\n\n(c) If. there was no such machlliery and yet the civil courts were barred the vires of s. 67 itself might come . in for consideration.\n\nThe Judicial Committee, however, came to the conclusion that the .\n\nIncome-tax Act gave the assessce an opportunity to raise the question under the lncome-tax Act. The provision for a case stated for the advisory opinion of the High Court was available and even if the authorities refused . to state a case, the High Court could be directly approached. The decision of the High Court was also subject to further appeal.\n\nThus there was adequate machinery in. the Income-tax Act. The words of s. 67 'under the Act' were construed as the\n\nactivitf of an assessing officer acting as such. That this activity took into consideration an ultra vires provision did not take the matter out of these words.\n\nThat phrase meant the provenance of the assessment, and not the accuracy 9r • correctness of the assessment or the. machinery of the Income-tax Act or the result of the activity. There was no difference between an incorrect ap D prehension of the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the invali: dity of a provision. :The Judicial Committee explained that if this were not so all questions of the correctness of the assessment nnde(. the Income-tax Act could be brought before the C9urt and tl1e section rendered otiose. The section made no distinction between\n\nan inquiry into the merits cif the assessment and jurisdiction to .· embark on an enquiry at all. The Civil Courts' jurisdiction in either case was invoked as to the correctness of the assessment and the language of the section precluded consideration of jurisdiction in such circumstances .. The .Income-tax Act having a suitable and adequate machinery, jurisdiction to questiol\\ the assess- ment otherwise than by that machinery was, therefore, held barred.\n\nF . The Judicial Committee even doubted whether a provision such as s. 67 was at all necessary in the circumstances.\n\nBoth these cases thus appear to be decided on the basis of provisions in the relevant Acts for the correction, modification and setting aside of assessments and the express bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The presence of a section barring the jurisdiction was the main reason and the existence of an adequate machinery for the same relief was the supplementary reason. The provision for a reference of a. question. to the High Court. was con-,_ sidered adequate to raise the issue of the validitY of any provision of law under which the taxing authorities acted.\n\nThis follows from the Raleigh Investment Co.'s case(1). Mask & Co.'s case(') was more concerned with the finality to the orders given by the Land Customs Act. Even so in the Mask & Co.'s case(2 ) room . was left for interference by the Civil Courts by observing that\n\n(I) [1947) L. R. 74 LA. 50.\n\n(2) (1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 222.\n\nthe Civil Courts had jurisdictio11 to examine into cases where the A provisions of the Act had not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformit>: , with the fundamental principles of judicial procedures. These observations were accepted by this Court in Firm of ll/11ri Subba.vya Chetty Scnu .v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh(1) and in Kera/a v. Rama.rwaini Iyer and Sons(2). A passage from the latter case might be quoted B here:\n\n\"It is true that even if the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded, where the provisions of tlie statute have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the civil courts have jurisdiction to C examine these cases.\" The observations of the Judicial Committee were thus completely accepted.\n\nWe may now examine how the matter was further viewed in this Court. In two other cases this Court laid down that the validity of the provisions under which the authorities act is not a matter for those authorities to decide. In Circo's Cof/u Co .. v.\n\nState of Mysore(•) it was contended thats. 40(2) of the Myaere Sales Tax Act 1957 was ultra vires and beyond the competence of the State Legislature. This Court observed :\n\n\"t is true that a question as to the vires of section 40(2) of the Sales Tax Act was raised, but it is now settled by decisions of this Court that the question -as to the vires of a statute which a taxing officer has to administer cannot be raised before him.\" The same was again reiterated in C. T. Santhulnathan Chetti11r v.\n\nMadras(') in the following words:\n\n\" ..... this Court has held, in Venkataraman and Co. v. State of Madras (60 I.T.R. 112) that the authorities under a taxing statute are not concerned with the validity of the taxing provisions and the questi()ns <1f ultra vires is foreign IQ the scope <1f-their jurisdiction. As no such point could be raised before the Income-tax authorities, neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court can go into these questions in a revision or reference from the decision of those authorities. This case was followed in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Straw Prod11Ct3\n\n[1966, 2 S.C.R. 881]; (60 I.T.R. 156)\".\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n\n0) 19 S. T. C. 66.\n\n(4) C. A. 1045 of 1966 decided on 20.th July, 1967\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatu//ah, C.I.) 673\n\n.The party was left to 'appropriate proceedings' without specifying what they would be. Perhaps a suit was meant.\n\nIt follows that the question of validity .of the taxing laws is always open to the Civil Courts for it cannot be the implican of any provision to make such a decision final or that even v01d or invalid laws must be enforced without any remedy.\n\nTherefQre, in Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner, Lakhimp11r('), after, quoting the obsel\"Vations of Viscount Simonds (Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Loe.al Govt. (1960 A.C. 260 at p. 286) ·\n\n\"It is a principle not by any means to be whittled C down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's Courts for determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words.\";\n\nour brother Mitter added that the extreme proposition in Raleigh\n\nInvestment Co.'s case(') had not found favour with this Court.\n\nD Our learned brother observed :\n\n\ncontracts' of an indivisible nature were held not to fall within the taxing provisions of the M<idras General Sales Tax Act, 1939.\n\nSection 18-A was pleaded as a bar. It was held that since the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 were declared ullra vires in their application to 'indivisible works contracts' the action of the authorities was outside the said Act and not • U1lder the Act for the purposes of s. 18-A. The suit cwas held not barred.\n\nSubbarao, J. (as he then. was) speaking for the majority distinguished both the Raleigh Investment Co!s case(•) and.the Comml.rsioni!r of I. T.-Punjab, North West Frontier & Delhi Provinces, Lahore\n\nv. Tribune Trust, Lahore(') on the ground that no question of the\n\n(!) A. I. R.19688. C. 271.\n\n(3) (1.966] 2_ S. C. R. 229. ·,\n\n(5) (1947) L .. R. 74 I. A. SO.\n\n(2) [1947) L. R.74 I. A, 50.\n\n(4) (1959J S. C.R. 379.\n\n(6) [1947J L. R. 74. I. A. 306.\n\n. '.--:. ' .. _ . _, __\n\n674 ' '\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS\n\n (1968] 3 S.C.R. \" vires of the law wa~ ra, ised in them. Referring to Raja Bahadur ,.;_ Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. C.I.T.(1 ) and State of\n\nTripura v. The Province of East Bengal(2 ); Subbarao J. pointed out that the suit W'llS hld maintainable in the latter and there was nothing in the former to support the contention .that the question \"\"' of ultra vires of a statutory provision could be convassed only. through the machinery provided under the statute. Referring B next to the case of . Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty. and Sons' case(3} the learned Judge said that the question whether s. 18.A' of the Madras. General Sales Tax Act, 1939 could apply where a particular provision of the.Sales Tax Act was ultra vires was left open (seep. 243 ). The learned Judge next quotedJhe opinion of the m(joritY in Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. v. M. C. Dhaman- .C gaon ) to the following effect : .\n\n\"But, with respect,' we find it difficult to appreciate . how taking into account an ultra vires provision which in law must be regarded as not being .a part of the Act at all, will make 1he assessment as one 'under the Act'.\n\nNo doubt the power to make an assessment was conferred by the Act and,. therefore, making all' assessment would be within the jurisdiction of the assessing authoririty. But. the jurisdfotion can be exercised only accord ing; as well as with reference, to the valid provisions of - the Act. When, however, the authority travels beyond the valid provisions it must be regarded as acting in excess of its jurisdiction. To give too wide a construction to the expression 'under the Act' may lead to the serious consequence of attributing to the legislature which owes its existerice itself to the Constitution, the intention of affording protection to unconstitutional activities by limiting challenge to them only by resort to the special machinery provided by it in place of the normal remedies available under t)Je Code of Civil Procedure, that is, to .. a machinery whiCh cannot be as efficacious as the one provided by the general Jaw. Such a constmction might necessitate the consideration of the very constitutionality pf the provision which contains this expression .. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been con-.\n\nSidered in Raleigh Investment Co.'s case.\" ·\n\nThe JeaTAJed Judge next .considered whether these observations, although obiter, were departed from in Ml s. Kamla Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bomba.v(') and came to the conclusion that that de cision did not touch upon the question whether. a suit would lie in.\n\n(I) (1947) F. C. R.130.\n\n(2) (19511 S. C. R, I.··\n\n(3) [1964] I S. C.R. 752. .\n\n(4)_ (1965] 3 S. C, R. 499 •. .\n\n(5) (19661 I S. C. R. 64 ..\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatu/lah,_ C.I.) 67 5\n\na case where the assessment was made on the basis of a provision which was ultra vires the Constitution (see p. 246).\n\nHaving considered these rulings the learned Judge examined the remedies provided by the Indian Income-tax Act and found that all authorities were creatures of the statute and functioned under it and could not ignore its provisions since the said Act conferred no such 'right' on them.\n\nWhether the provisions were good or bad was not their concern. Pointing out that the reference to the High Court under the Indian Income-tax Act was confined to questions arising from the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the learned Judge observed that 'the question of ultra vlres is foreign to the scope of the Tribunals' jurisdiction' and that if such a question were raised the Tribunal could only reject it on the ground that it had np jurisdiction to decide it, and the High Court and the Supreme Court would be equally incompetent on appeal to go into the question.\n\nThe learned Judge next considered the decisions of the High Courts into which it is not necessary to go here and on the strength of some observations which supported his view, stated his view in the following words :\n\n\"The legal position that emerges from the discussion may be summarized thus : lf a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law or fact arising in regard to that liability, it may, by necessary implication, bar the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituting the said machinery to decide finally a jurisdictional fact thereby excluding by necessary implication the jurisdiction of a civil court in that regard. But an authority created by a statute cannot question the vire~ of that statute or any of the provisions thereof whereunder it functions. It must act under the Act and not outside it. If it acts on the basis of a provision of the statute, which is ultra vires, to that extent it would be acting outside the Act. In that event, a suit to question the validity of such an order made outside the Act would certainly lie in a civil court.\"\n\nAs the head-note correctly states the effect of the decision was that the foundation laid by the Judicial Committee in Raleigh lfrvestment Co.'s case(') for construing the expression 'under the, Act' had no legal basis.\n\nIt may be mentioned that in Bharat Kala Bhandar(') case also it was held that there was no machinery provided in the Central Provinces and Berar Municipal Act for refund of tax assessed\n\n(I) (1947) LR. 741. A. 50.\n\n(2) 11965] 3 S, C. R. 499.\n\nahd recovered in excess of constitutional limits and that the remedy furnished by ¢hat Act w, as inadequate for enabling the assessee to challenge effectively the constitutionality or legality of assessment or levy of tax by a municipality or to recover from it what was realised under an invalid Jaw (see the judgment of Mitter, J. also in Pabbojan case(1) at page 276). In Bharat Kala Bhandar case(') it was pointed out that :\n\n\" ........ one of the corollaries flowing from the principle that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land is that the normal remedy of a suit will be available for obtaining redress against the violation of a constitutional provision. The Court must, therefore, lean in favour of construing a Jaw in such a way as not to take away this right and render illusory the protection afforded by the Constitution.\"\n\nAgain in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras v. Rayalaseema Constructions(') the problem was the same as was dealt with in Venkataraman's Co. Ltd. case('). The earlier case was followed and it was held that th~ sales tax authorities having given effect to an ultra vires provision section 18-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 was no bar to the maintainability of the suit to recover tax paid under such an assessment since the authorities must be taken to have acted outside and not under the Madras General Sales Tax Act.\n\nThis brings us to the case of Provincial Government v. J. S.\n\nBasappa('). There too three suits were filecl alleging 'that the goods had passed to extra state points while they were still in the possession and ownership of the seller. Since the proyerty in the goods remained in the seller till the goods had entered into other provinces, the sales could not be subjected to a tax in Madras\n\nPresidency.\n\nSection 11 (4) of the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939 made orders of the taxing authorities final but the Act applied only to sales within the Presidency of Madras and not outside it. There was at that time no provision to oust the jurisdiction of the civil courtr.\n\nSection 18-A of which we have spoken earlier and on which most of the cases turned, was added much later. Many of the remedies such 8$ were considered in Raleigh lnvestmelll Co.'s case(') and Venkataraman's case(') were also added at the same time as s. 18-A. The question thus had to be decided without an express provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1968 S, C. 271.\n\n(2) (1965) 3 S, C. R. 499.\n\n(3) 17 S. T. C. 505.\n\n(4) (1966) 2 S. C. ll. 229.\n\n(5) [1964) 5 S. C.R. 517.\n\n(6) (1947) L. ll. 74 I. A. 50.\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatu/lah, C.l.} 677\n\nwithout the existence of an adequate machinery for raising such an issue before the authorities. The only provision which had to be considered was s. 11(4) which provided 'every order passed in appeal under this section, shall, subject to the powers of revision conferred by s. 12, be final.' The fundamental provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (as it then stood} were that the sales must be within the Presidency of Madras. The authoritiell ignoring these provisions held that 'outside sales' were taxable.\n\nRelying upon the dictum of the Judicial Committee in Mask &: Co.'s case('), as applied in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty's case('), this Court held that the suits were competent.\n\nIn the case of this Court last cited the following observation was made: • \"It is necessary to add that these observations, though made in somewhat wide terms, do not justify the assumption that if a decision has been made by a taxing authority under the provisions of the relevant taxing statute, its validity can be challenged by a suit on the ground that it is incorrect on the merits and as such, it can be claimed that the provisions of the said statute have not been complied with.\n\nNon-compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non-compliance with such fundan1ental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, that may also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void aBd this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question.\"\n\nThe Divisional Bench relying upon this observation pointed out :\n\n\"It was thus held that the civil court's jurisdiction may not be taken away by making the decision of a tribunal final, because the civil court's jurisdiction to examine the order, with reference to fundamental provisions 6f the statute, non-compliance with which would make the proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction still remains, unless the statute goes further and state~ either expressly or by necessary implication that the civil court's jurisdiction is completely taken away.\n\nApplying these tests, it is clear that without a provision like s. l 8A in the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be taken away at least where the action\n\n(I) (1940) L. R. 671. A. 222.\n\n(2) [1964J 1 S. C.R. 752.\n\n678 SUl'RBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the authorities is wholly outside the law and is not a mere error in lhe exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Sastri ll)'S that we must interpret the Act in the same way u if s. l 8A was implicit in it and that s. l 8A was added eo make explicit what was already implied. We cannot agree. . The finality that statute conferred upon orders, ef assessment, subject, however, to appeal and revision, was a finality for the purposes of the Act. It did not make valid an action which was not warranted by the Act, as for example, the levy of tax bn a commodity which was not taxed at all or was exempt. In the present case, the taxing of sales which did not take place within the State was a matter wholly outside the jurisdic lion of the taxing authorities and in respect of such illegal action the jurisdiction of the civil court continued to subsist. In .our judgment the suits were competent.\"\n\nThis case was, therefore, stronger than any so far noticed because of the absence of s. 18-A and the elaborate machinery for adequate remedy 'ivas introduced later and the tax was illegally cofiected ignoring the fUndamental provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939.\n\nHowever, in Kera/a v. Ramaswami Iyer and SoltS(.') ( altbough it was not pointed out what express provision or clear intendment in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 as it then stood, barred a civil suit) Bl13Qppa's( 2 ) case was declared to be wrongly decided. In that very case the learned Judges considered a rule which gave exemption but held that it did not give protection because it was enacted after the account period. What if it had been enacted before ? The observations in Basapptfs cue(')\n\nthat if a commodity was not taxable at all or was exempt the civil Court would have jurisdiction were, however, not accepted. It F wll$ sufficient to have said in Ramaswami lyer's case(') that exemption .or no exemption that was for the authorities to decide and not a matter for the Civil Courts. The argument of exemption was rejected by observing :\n\n\"There was in .the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act at the material ti~ no express provision which ol>Iiged the taxing authority to exClude from the computation of taxable turnover the amount of salcstax collected by the. dealers.\" (emphasis supplied) This reasoning 'shows that if it. had been, the suit might have been 11.eld competent. It is not necessary for us to pursue this mattet further than to say that the observation that B11.f11Ppt/11 case waS wronely decided is open to serious doubt.\n\n(,!) [1966) 3 S. C.R. 582.\n\n(2) )1964) 5 S. C, R. 517.\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatullah, C./.) 679\n\nThis leaves for consideration only the cases Firm of lllurl Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh(') and Kanl/a Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay('). The case of Firm of 1/luri Subayya Chetty(1) arose under the Madras Genra! Sales Tax Act, 1939, and s. 18, A was pleaded to make the smt mcompetent. The transactions in respect of which tax was recovered were said to be of sales and not purchases and the latter only were to be taxed. It was held thats. 18-A barred the suit because the attempt was to set aside or modify an assessment made under the said Act. It was pointed out that any challenge to the correctness of the assessment must be made before the appellate or revisional forums under the same Act since the character of the transaction was a matter into which the appellate and revisional authorities could go. A litigant who accepted the assessment when he could call it in question by other proceedings under the same Act could not begin a suit. The expression 'under the Act' was sufficient to cover even an incorrect assessment. The assessee firm succeeded in the suit but the High Court held it barred under s. 18-A and also held against the assessee firm on the nature of the transaction.\n\nThis Court first held that there was no provision in the said Act for bringing a civil suit to question the assessment. Therefore the matter must fall in s. 18-A. This Court analysed the provisions of the said Act which provided bys. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C and 12-D for special appeals, including an appeal to the High Court, the highest Civil Court in the State, laying down further that 1!1e appeal should b7 heard by a Diyision Bench. In the light of this elaborate machmery the question of alternative remedy was approached. It was also pointed out that the assessee firm had itself included these transactions in its returns. Having conceded that the tax was payable and not having raised the issue !'efore the appellate authorities constituted under the said Act,\n\nt was }teld at the firm could not be allowed to raise the issue m a suit. This was enough to dispose of the appeal to this Court .\n\n. The Constitut.in Bench., however, went on to examine the rulings of the Judicial Committee in Mask & Co.'s(8) and Raleigh G l1J11estme'!t Co.'s(') cases. Dealing with the former case this Court pomted out that n<; m-comp!iance with the provisions 'of the statute meant non-comphance with such fundamental provisions of the tatute as ou.ld make the entire proceedings before the appropnate authonty illegal and withput jurisdiction. The defect of procedure must also be fundamental. In either case the defect H must make the order invalid in law and void. The Court went on to observe :\n\n(I) [1964] l S. C. R. 752.\n\n(3) (1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 222.\n\nLBSup. Cl/68-4\n\n(2) [1966) l S. C, R. 64.\n\n(4) (1947) L. R. 74 I. A. SO.\n\n\" .... In what cases such a plea would succeed it is A Jnnecessary for us to decide in the present appeal be- . cause we have no doubt that the contention of the appellant. that on the merits, the decision of the assessing authonty was wrong, cannot be the subject-matter of a suit because s. 18-A clearly bars such a claim in the civil courts.\" B\n\nReferring next to the Raleigh Investment Co.'s case(') this Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, the Judicial Committee thought that a .question of vires of the provisions could also be considered, but this Court did not think it necessary to pronounce any opinion whether this assumption was well-founded or not.\n\nThis point was later considered in C Venkataraman's case( 2) by Subbarao, J. (as he then was) and we have sufficiently analysed the views of this Court. The case of Firm of 11/uri Subbayya(') may be said to be decided on special facts with additional reference to the addition of s. 18-A excluding the jurisdiction of civil court and the special remedies provided in ss. 12-A to 12-D by which the matter could be taken to D the highest civil court in the State.\n\nThis brings us to the last case on the subject. That is the Kam/a Mills case(').\n\nThat case was heard by a special Bench of 7 Judges and is of more binding value than the others. Kamla Mills Ltd. was assessed to certain sales effected between 26 January 1950 and 31 March 1951 which the taxing authorities treated as 'inside sales' and the Company claimed to be 'outside sales' as determined under the Bengal Immunity . Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nState of Bihar and others('). The judgment in the last cited case was delivered on September 6, 1955. The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 under which the assessment was made bad expired.\n\nA suit was, therefore. filed to claim refund.\n\nThe Bombay Act contained s. 20 which read:\n\n\"20. Save as is provided in s. 23, no assessment made and no order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder by the Commissioner or any person appointed under s. 3 to assist him shall be called into question in any Civil Court_, and save as it provided in sections 21 and 22, no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment or order.\" The suit was dismissed on the preliminary point arising from this bar. A Letter Patent appeal in the High Court of Bombay also\n\n(1) [1947 1L. R 741. A. 50.\n\n(2) [1966] 2 S. C.R. 229.\n\n(3) [1964 1 S. C.R. 752\n\n(4) [1966] 1 S. C.R. 64.\n\n(5) !19551 2 S. C. R. 603.\n\n...\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 681\n\nfailed.\n\nThe case came bfore this Court on a certificate. It was referred to a Special Bench because s. 20 was challenged as unconstitutional because it barred a suit even where the assessment was unconstitutional. This Court held that as there was adequate remedy to raise the question before the authorities by asking for rectification of the assessment, the section could not be said to deprive him of remedy in such a way as to render the section itself unconstitutional as was hinted in Raleigh Investment Co.'s case(') about s. 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act. We are not concerned with that question.\n\nThe next question which was considered was whether the jurisdiction conferred on the taxing au1horities included the jurisdiction to determine the nature of the transaction or was the decision about the character of the transaction, a decision on a collateral fact ? This Court held that it was the former and not the latter. Therefore the decision was held to be merely an error in assessment which was capable of correction by the usual procedure of appeals etc. The bar of s. 20 was, therefore, held to apply.\n\nDuring the course of the arguments the Special Bench considered Basappa's case(2). and distinguished it from the Firm of llluri Subayya Chetty's case(3 ) on the ground that the former was not barred by s. 18-A as it did not exist. The Special Bench, however, made an observation to the following effect :\n\n\"In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts' jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such consideration would be very important,· and in conceivable circumstances, :might even become decisive.\n\nIf it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lay5 down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.\"\n\nThe Special Bench refrained from either accepting the dictum of Mask & Co.'s case(4 ) or rejecting it, to the effect that even if jurisdiction is excluded by a provision making the decision of the authorities finJI, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into\n\n(1) [1947! L.R. 74 I. A.50.\n\n(2) [1964J 5 S. C.R. 517.\n\n(3) (1964] IS. C.R. 572.\n\n(4) (1940] L. R. 671. A. 222.\n\n682 SUPREMB COURT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\ncases where the provisions of the particular Act are not complied with.\n\nNeither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya(1) or Kamla Mills(2) can be said to run eonnter to the series of cases earlier noticed.\n\nThe result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows :-\n\n( 1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit.\n\nSuch provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judi cial procedure. ·\n\n(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the par ticular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency o~ the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.\n\nWhere there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies ana the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all ques tions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether re medies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.\n\n(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra v/res cannot be brought before Tribunals con stituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.\n\n( 4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open.\n\nA writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly Vlrithin the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.\n\n(I) [1964]1 S. C.R. 752.\n\n(2) [1966) IS. C. R. 64,\n\nDHULABHAI v. MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatu/lah, C.J.) 683\n\n(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of. tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.\n\n(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.\n\n(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.\n\nIn the light of these conclusions we have to see how the present case stands. Section 3 was the charging section. It spoke of the incidence of the tax. In consisted of several sub-sections.\n\nThese sub-sections laid the tax on dealers according to their taxi> able turnover and in the case of a dealer who imported goods into Madhya Bharat the taxable turnover was Rs. 5000 /-.\n\nSection 4 made certain exclusions and exemptions, and section 5 prescribed the rate of tax.\n\nThat section read :\n\n\"5(1) The tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be at a single point and shall not be less than Rs. 1-9-0 per cent. or more than 6t per cent of the taxable turnover, as notified from time to time by the Government by publication in the official gazett&.\n\nProvided that Government may in respect of special class of goods charge tax up to 12t per cent. on the taxable turnover.\n\n(2) The Government while notifying the tax payable by a dealer may also notify the goods and the point of their sale at which the tax is payable.\"\n\nIn notifying the rate provision was made for rates in respect of importers, the point of time being the import. As the import itself pootulated movement of goods, the matter fell within Article 301 and as trade and commerce is declared to be free throughout the territory of India, it became unfree by reason of the tax. The tax would therefore have ex facie offended Article 301.\n\nThis could however be avoided if the tax was saved by Article 364(a).\n\nThat required that similar goods manufactured or ' produced in Madhya Bharat had to bear an equal tax.\n\nSuch equal tax was not imposed hence the notifications were struck down as making\n\n684 SUPIUlJm OOU&T UPO&TS\n\n(1968) 3s.c.R.\n\ndiscrimination and rendering trade and commerce unfree. This I& was the effect of. Bhailal's case(1), No doubt the Madhya Bharat Sales-tax Act contained provi sions for appeal, revision, rectification and reference to the High Court, the notifications being declared void the party could take advantage of the fact that . tax was levied without a complete charging section. This affected the jurisdiction of the tax authorities because they could nqt even proceed to assess the -party. The question was one falling in category Nos. 3 and 4 rather than in category No. 2 above. It was directly covered by the decision of\n\nthis Court in Venkataraman's case(2 ) read with Circo's Coffee Co.(') and Senthulnathan Chettiars case(') already referred to We would have considered this matter again if Venkataraman'1 C case(2) had belin doubted before but it seems to have been fol lowed in the la, st mentioned case and Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1 case(\"). U Ka111la Mills Ltd. case(') had not expressly left the question open we would have applied the earlier case of the Spe cial Bench but as it is we are bound not by the Special Bench de cision but by Venkataraman's case('). We must therefore allow D these appeals with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and suits are decreed. The order for costs shall be as in the suit. The costs in the High Court shall be borne as incurred.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(I) [1964) 6 S. C. R. 261.\n\n(2) [1966)28.C.R.229.\n\n(3) 19 S. T. C. 66 (S. C.).\n\n(4) C A. IQ4S of 1966, dated 20-7-1967.\n\n(S) A. I. R. 1968 S.C. 271.\n\n(6) [1966) .J S. C. R. 64.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 202, "entities": [{"text": "DHULABHAI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHULABHAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 5, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DHULABHAI AND OTHERS\n\n'V.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER April 5, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALIN•\n\nGAM, K. S. HEGDE AND A, N. GROVER, JI.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bharat Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bharat Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Bharat Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 348, "end_char": 381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 837, "end_char": 844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "L.R. 67 I.A. 222", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 1 S.C.R. 752", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 S.C.R. 582", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 12A to 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rcleigh Investment Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, did not think it necessary to pronounce any opinion on the Judicial Committee's view in the Rcleigh Investment Co. case ([1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 50) that even the vires of the provisions could be H consideted by the Tribunals constituted under the Act."}}, {"text": "L.R. 74 I.A. 50", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mask & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with Mask & Co.'s case, it was pointed out that non-compliance with the provisions of the statute meant non-compliance with such fundamental\n\nDHULABHAI V, MADHYA PRADESH 663\n\nprovisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. ["}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Basappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ROJna.r.v01ni Iyer&: Sons that Basappa's case was wrongly decided is open to doubt. ("}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4907, "end_char": 4912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "IIlC prescribed by the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SJ Where the particular Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 7020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIBTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "684 A-CJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIBTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8300, "end_char": 8339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated January 5, 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in First Ap peals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8404, "end_char": 8418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8420, "end_char": 8434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8439, "end_char": 8454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8498, "end_char": 8504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and 1."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8512, "end_char": 8521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shroff, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Hldayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8609, "end_char": 8621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hldayatullah, C.J. These are four appeals by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 1964/5 January, 1965 dismissing four suits filed by the appellants to recover sales-tax alleged to be realized illegally from them by the State of Madhya\n\nPradesh, the respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 1964/5 January, 1965", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hldayatullah, C.J. These are four appeals by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 1964/5 January, 1965 dismissing four suits filed by the appellants to recover sales-tax alleged to be realized illegally from them by the State of Madhya\n\nPradesh, the respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hldayatullah, C.J. These are four appeals by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), 16 December, 1964/5 January, 1965 dismissing four suits filed by the appellants to recover sales-tax alleged to be realized illegally from them by the State of Madhya\n\nPradesh, the respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Ujjain", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 9016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits were earlier decreed by the District Judge, Ujjain."}}, {"text": "Ujjain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9148, "end_char": 9154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in the suits are common and were as follows: The appellants are dealers in tobacco and have their place& of business at Ujjain."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former Madhya Bharat State enacted in 1950 the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act {Act 30 of 1950) which came into force on May 1, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 and in other cases R~. 12,000 had to pay tax in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected 'in Madhya Bharat from !"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10160, "end_char": 10174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950, May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10176, "end_char": 10188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950, May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10190, "end_char": 10206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950, May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government, in pursuance of this power, issued a number of notifications on April 30, 1950, May 22, 1950, October 24, 1953 and January 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10643, "end_char": 10670, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10826, "end_char": 10834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10855, "end_char": 10866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10893, "end_char": 10916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh was formed on November I,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "November I,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10931, "end_char": 10942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh was formed on November I,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10976, "end_char": 11004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhai/al v. 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MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 669\n\nA recover an excess amount of customs duty collected from Mask\n\naild Co.\n\nThe suit was filed after an appeal to the Collector of Customs and a revision taken to the Government of India under the Land Customs Act, 1924 was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20536, "end_char": 20547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mask and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20693, "end_char": 20705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal by Mask and Co. to the B High Court succeeded, and there was a remit."}}, {"text": "Section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20807, "end_char": 20818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The suit was filed after an appeal to the Collector of Customs and a revision taken to the Government of India under the Land Customs Act, 1924", "statute": "The suit was filed after an 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"s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23339, "end_char": 23344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23486, "end_char": 23491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23506, "end_char": 23512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23563, "end_char": 23568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24049, "end_char": 24059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25078, "end_char": 25083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DHULABIIAI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25336, "end_char": 25346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DHULABIIAI \"· MADHYA PRADESH (Hidayatul/ah, C.l.)"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25478, "end_char": 25483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act gave the assessce an opportunity to raise the question under the lncome-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25595, "end_char": 25689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 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Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38963, "end_char": 38986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras v. Rayalaseema Constructions(') the problem was the same as was dealt with in Venkataraman's Co. Ltd. case(')."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39121, "end_char": 39131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39141, "end_char": 39175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39758, "end_char": 39764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the proyerty in the goods remained in the seller till the goods had entered into other provinces, the sales could not be subjected to a tax in Madras\n\nPresidency."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39779, "end_char": 39789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39801, "end_char": 39835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40049, "end_char": 40059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Raleigh lnvestmelll Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40203, "end_char": 40226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many of the remedies such 8$ were considered in Raleigh lnvestmelll Co.'s case(') and Venkataraman's case(') were also added at the same time as s. 18-A. The question thus had to be decided without an express provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1968 S, C. 271."}}, {"text": "Venkataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40241, "end_char": 40253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many of the remedies such 8$ were considered in Raleigh lnvestmelll Co.'s case(') and Venkataraman's case(') were also added at the same time as s. 18-A. The question thus had to be decided without an express provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and\n\n(I) A. r. R. 1968 S, C. 271.", "canonical_name": "C Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40300, "end_char": 40305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "[1964) 5 S. C.R. 517", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40537, "end_char": 40557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40793, "end_char": 40801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General SaJes Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40921, "end_char": 40926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fundamental provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40943, "end_char": 41007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mask &: Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41225, "end_char": 41236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon the dictum of the Judicial Committee in Mask &: Co.'s case('), as applied in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty's case('), this Court held that the suits were competent."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43332, "end_char": 43338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sastri ll)'S that we must interpret the Act in the same way u if s. l 8A was implicit in it and that s. l 8A was added eo make explicit what was already implied."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44201, "end_char": 44206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Undamental provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44330, "end_char": 44393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44531, "end_char": 44565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramaswami lyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45066, "end_char": 45080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It F wll$ sufficient to have said in Ramaswami lyer's case(') that exemption .or no exemption that was for the authorities to decide and not a matter for the Civil Courts."}}, {"text": "[1966) 3 S. C.R. 582", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45768, "end_char": 45788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46108, "end_char": 46127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46133, "end_char": 46138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47009, "end_char": 47014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47246, "end_char": 47251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 222", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48610, "end_char": 48635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49002, "end_char": 49007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49121, "end_char": 49182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C Venkataraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49437, "end_char": 49451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This point was later considered in C Venkataraman's case( 2) by Subbarao, J. (as he then was) and we have sufficiently analysed the views of this Court.", "canonical_name": "C Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49682, "end_char": 49687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49769, "end_char": 49775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Kamla Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50044, "end_char": 50060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Mills Ltd. was assessed to certain sales effected between 26 January 1950 and 31 March 1951 which the taxing authorities treated as 'inside sales' and the Company claimed to be 'outside sales' as determined under the Bengal Immunity ."}}, {"text": "26 January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50108, "end_char": 50123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Mills Ltd. was assessed to certain sales effected between 26 January 1950 and 31 March 1951 which the taxing authorities treated as 'inside sales' and the Company claimed to be 'outside sales' as determined under the Bengal Immunity ."}}, {"text": "31 March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50128, "end_char": 50141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Mills Ltd. was assessed to certain sales effected between 26 January 1950 and 31 March 1951 which the taxing authorities treated as 'inside sales' and the Company claimed to be 'outside sales' as determined under the Bengal Immunity ."}}, {"text": "September 6, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50382, "end_char": 50399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment in the last cited case was delivered on September 6, 1955."}}, {"text": "period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50405, "end_char": 50470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50593, "end_char": 50598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50640, "end_char": 50645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50780, "end_char": 50784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "sections 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50877, "end_char": 50895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51085, "end_char": 51105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Letter Patent appeal in the High Court of Bombay also\n\n(1) [1947 1L. R 741."}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S. C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51145, "end_char": 51165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964 1 S. C.R. 752", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51172, "end_char": 51191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 1 S. C.R. 64", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51197, "end_char": 51216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51407, "end_char": 51412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946", "statute": "The period for invoking remedies under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51837, "end_char": 51842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51857, "end_char": 51871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52391, "end_char": 52396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subayya Chetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52557, "end_char": 52571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and distinguished it from the Firm of llluri Subayya Chetty's case(3 ) on the ground that the former was not barred by s. 18-A as it did not exist."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52631, "end_char": 52636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vlrithin the time prescribed by the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56189, "end_char": 56239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57131, "end_char": 57140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vlrithin the time prescribed by the Limitation Act", "statute": "Vlrithin the time prescribed by the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57431, "end_char": 57440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57485, "end_char": 57494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58264, "end_char": 58275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58446, "end_char": 58457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 364(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58514, "end_char": 58528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhailal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58844, "end_char": 58851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhailal's case(1), No doubt the Madhya Bharat Sales-tax Act contained provi sions for appeal, revision, rectification and reference to the High Court, the notifications being declared void the party could take advantage of the fact that ."}}, {"text": "No doubt the Madhya Bharat Sales-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58863, "end_char": 58903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Circo's Coffee Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59430, "end_char": 59448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was directly covered by the decision of\n\nthis Court in Venkataraman's case(2 ) read with Circo's Coffee Co.(') and Senthulnathan Chettiars case(') already referred to We would have considered this matter again if Venkataraman'1 C case(2) had belin doubted before but it seems to have been fol lowed in the la, st mentioned case and Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1 case(\")."}}, {"text": "Senthulnathan Chettiars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59456, "end_char": 59479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was directly covered by the decision of\n\nthis Court in Venkataraman's case(2 ) read with Circo's Coffee Co.(') and Senthulnathan Chettiars case(') already referred to We would have considered this matter again if Venkataraman'1 C case(2) had belin doubted before but it seems to have been fol lowed in the la, st mentioned case and Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1 case(\")."}}, {"text": "Venkataraman'1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59554, "end_char": 59568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was directly covered by the decision of\n\nthis Court in Venkataraman's case(2 ) read with Circo's Coffee Co.(') and Senthulnathan Chettiars case(') already referred to We would have considered this matter again if Venkataraman'1 C case(2) had belin doubted before but it seems to have been fol lowed in the la, st mentioned case and Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1 case(\").", "canonical_name": "C Venkataraman"}}, {"text": "Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59673, "end_char": 59696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was directly covered by the decision of\n\nthis Court in Venkataraman's case(2 ) read with Circo's Coffee Co.(') and Senthulnathan Chettiars case(') already referred to We would have considered this matter again if Venkataraman'1 C case(2) had belin doubted before but it seems to have been fol lowed in the la, st mentioned case and Pabbojan Tea Comparry'1 case(\")."}}, {"text": "U Ka111la Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59706, "end_char": 59726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U Ka111la Mills Ltd. case(') had not expressly left the question open we would have applied the earlier case of the Spe cial Bench but as it is we are bound not by the Special Bench de cision but by Venkataraman's case(')."}}, {"text": "[1964) 6 S. C. R. 261", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60162, "end_char": 60183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20-7-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60267, "end_char": 60276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) C A. IQ4S of 1966, dated 20-7-1967."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_685_691_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "LAXMAN KAJ, U NIKAJ, JE\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 5, 1968\n\n[M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N.\n\nGROVER. JJ.J\n\nIndian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) ss. 299 altd 300-Scope of-\n\nWben appellant and his wife's brother-the deceased, were uarrelliag about the time of his wife's going with him, the appellant whipped out a knife and gave one blow to the deceased. by which an injury on the right side of the chest penetrating 4\" deep into the che.'lt cavity was caused, resulting in death.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under •· 302\n\n!PC.\n\nHELD : The case fall within the third pan of s. 299 IPC and was punishable under the second part of s. 304 !PC as culpable homicide not amounting to murder.\n\nThough the injury was serious, it did not penetrate the lung. Death was caused mainly because it cut the axiliary artery and veins and caused shock and haemorrhage leading to death.\n\nThe quarrel was not such as would have prompted the appellant to make a homicidal attack. ·\n\nThirdly of s. 300 requires that the bodily injury must be intended and the bodily injury intended to be caused must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nThis clause is in two parts; the fint part is a subjective one which indicates that the injury must be an inten tional one and not an accidental one; the -second part is objective in that looking at the injury intended to be caused, the court must be satisfied that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The first pan was complied with because the injury which was intended to be caused was the one which was found on the person of the deceased. But the second pan was not fulfilled. because but for the fact that the injury caused the severing of anery, death might not have ensued.\n\nIn other words. looking at the matter objectively, the injury which the appellant intended to cause did not include specifically the cutting of the artery but to wound the deceased in the neighbourhood 'Of the clavicle. Therefore, thirdly of ~. 300 did not cover the case.\n\nInasmuch as death had been caused, the matter came within at least culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There again, s. 299 is in three parts. The first\n\npart takes in the doing of an act with the intention of causing death.\n\nThe appellant did not intend causing death and the first pan of s. 299 did not apply. The second part deals with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here again, the intention must be to cause the precise injury likely to cause death and that also wa1\n\nnot the intention of appellant.\n\nThe matter therefore came wi•hin the third part. 'the act was done with the knowledge that the apPellant was likely by such act to cause the death Of the deceased. [690 B-691 CJ\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1966.\n\n686 SUPll.BMB OOUll.T llBPOll.TS\n\n( 1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 19, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 1963, .\n\nM. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant.\n\nD. P. Bhandari and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah C. J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay setting aside the acquittal of the appellant Laxman Kalu Nikalje and convicting him under s. 302 with a seotence of imprisonment for life. The facis of the case are as follows :\n\nThis Laxman was married to Shantabaii (P.W. 3) who is the daughter of one Bhika Ganpat Nikam (P.W. 2) a Railway employee working at a Railway crossing at Gartad District Dhullia. This crossing is situated on the Dhulia-Cbalisgaon Railway line. Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat. Shantabai was married some five years before the occurrence and lived with her husband, Laxman at Ganeshpur Pimpri in Taluka Chalisgaon.\n\nSome days before Nag Panchami of the year 1962 Shantabai was . brought to her parent's place. She stayed with them tfil E the 10th August 1962. Laxman wanted his wife back and arrived at Gartad to take her away to his own house.\n\nBhika put in some excuses saying that he had no money and he could only send his daughter back after he gets his pay on the 2 lst or the 22nd.\n\nThe excuse given by Bhika and his wife Gangubai was that they could not let the girl go without giving her some.\n\nF ts and that money was needed for the purchase of these presents.\n\nHowever, as Laxman insisted on taking his wife away illllllediat.ely, a sum of Rs. 10 was borrowed. It is said in one\n\nplace that money was borrowed from one Tarachand and in another, from Laxman, himself.\n\nGangubai in the company of Shantabai went to Dhulia to make SQJlle. purchases and returned on August 10 in the afternoon. It appears that a train was then G due and Laxman is said to have insisted that his wife should go with him by that train. The parents, however, said. that it was\n\nnot auspicious to send the girl at night and that they could go in the morning'.\n\nIt does not appear that any quarrel over this took.\n\nWhether Laxman was reconciled to this suggestion or was still angry is not known. In the evening at about 7 P.M.\n\nH Laxman was sitting with Shantabai and Ramrao outside the -quarter and Bhika was chopping some fuel at the back of the hut, Kamlabai (the widow of Ramrao), Gangubai, Bharat and\n\nLaxman were inside the room.\n\nAccording to Shantabai, Ramrao and Laxman had a few words and on that Laxm.an took out a knife and stabbed Ramrao on the shoulder and ran away.\n\nRamrao shouted and so did Shantabai; Bhika and others arrived on the scene.\n\nThey carried Ramrao on a cot to. the Railway Crossing and when the train arrived, it was stopped by showing the danger signal. Ramrao was placed on the train and left on the train accompanied by Bhika, Gangubai and Kamlabai.\n\nOn the train, Bhika told the Guard that his sonin-law had stabbed the injured man. The Railway guard noted this fact in his log book.\n\nRamrao was carried to the Dhulia hospital and was found to have died before his entry in the hospital.\n\nA report of the incident was then also made, in which the name of Laxman was mentioned as the assailant.\n\nThe police, after investigation, prosecuted Laxman.\n\nOn behalf of the prosecution, Shantabai was the main witness and in fact \\he only eye-witness.\n\nGangubai and Bhika did not claim to have seen the actual happening.\n\nOn behalf of the defence, Kamlabai, the widow of Ramrao was examined and it is because of the contrary versions of these two ladies that tbe conflicting decisions in the High Court and the Court of Sessions have taken place. According to Shantabai it was her husband who had in flicted the injury.\n\nAccording to Kamlabai the injury was caused by one Kacharu, a son of Bhika. who has been missing from home for over 15 years and who had arrived and quarrelled E with Ramrao and assaulted him. In support of the defence evidence of Kamlabai, three other witnesses were examined.\n\nOne was C. Ananda Patil, M.P. who s•ated that his jeep had stopped near the level crossing because the gates were shut and the train was due. He heard shouts from the quarter of Bhika\n\nand went there and enquired what had happened and he was told that the \"elder brother had stabbed tbe younger brother\".\n\nIn other words, his evidence was to the effect that it was Kacharu the elder missing brother of Ramrao who had stabbed the victim.\n\nTwo other witnesses who are railway employees also came forward to depose that after this incident they had met Kacharu and that Kacharu had threatened them and told them that he would cause them injury asking them about \"circumstances of his family\". These two persons made a report to their superior officer and in that it is mentioned that on the 10th, 11th and 13th August they had seen Kacharu. Kamlabai also made two written reports to the D.S.P. on the 26th and 27th Aul?Ust alleging that an innocent person was being prosecuted inst.cad of the right offender, namely, Kacharu. She adhered to her story in the Court of Sessions and said that these reports were orepared to her dictation.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge who tried the case did not accept Skantabai's evidence in view of two or th.:ee contradictions\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhich were brought out in her cross-examination on the basis of her previous statement in the committal court.\n\nHe thought that in all t; he circumstances Kamlaba.i's version appeared to be the more probable, supporred as it was by the evidence of Ananda Patil and the other two railway employto whom we have referred.\n\nOn appeal the High Court went into this question exhaustively.\n\nThe learned Judges discussed the matter both from the point of view of actual evidence led in the case and also probabilities.\n\nThe learned Judges discarded the evidence of Kamlabai holding that she was interested in saving Laxman, the appellant, because he was related in a distant way with her.\n\nThey felt that there was no reason for Shantab11i to have deposed agai!nst her own husband and the suggestion made in 'the Sessions Court that Shantabai wanted to get rid of her husband because he was a cripple and was ill-treating her had no substance in fact.\n\nWe have had the evidence of these two ladies read to us and also the judgments of the High Court and the Court of Sessions.\n\nWe think that on a proper appraisal of all the cirumstances of the case the view expounded by the High Court is to be preferred.\n\nWe may say here that it is now the settled\n\nlaw that the powers of the High Court in an appeal against the acquittal are not different from the powers of the same court in hearing an appeal agjlinst a conviction.\n\nThe High Court in dealing with such an appeal can go into all questions of fact E. and law and reach its own conclusions on evidence prov'ded it pays due regard to the fact that the matter had been before the Court of Sessions and the Sessions Judge had the chance and opportunity of seeing the witnesses depose to the facts. Further the High Court in reversing the judgment of the Sessions Judge must pay due regard to all the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for disbelieving a particular witness and must attempt to dispel those reasons effectively before taking a contrary view of the matter. It may also be pointed out that an accused starts with a presumption of innocence when he is put up for trial and his acquittal in no sense weakens that presumption, and this presumption must also receive adequate consideration from the High Court.\n\nWe have borne all these principles in mind and we think that the H'gh Court was also alive to them, because the High Court\n\nhas considered the matter in a closely reasoned judgment in which it has taken 'into account every single reason given by the Sessions Judge in reaching the conchisioti that Shantabai's version was to be preferred and the evidence of Kamlabai to be H rejected. If the evidence which has come before the High Court in supoort of Kamlabai's version had existed before the incid'?flt\n\ntook place, it would have been a significant but not conclusive\n\nfact. It is, however, clear that these persons speak to have seen Kacharu after the incident and not before. Only one witness said that he was living for five months with his parents.\n\nIt jg. significant that the father and the mother were not closely questioned about Kacharu Jiving with them for as many as five months.\n\nThat apart, if Kacharu had been riving in the village for as many as five months, much more evidence would have been vai!able, to prove the fact.\n\nThe evidence which has. been brought before the Court is of his doings on the 10th and after the 10th of August and there is nothing to show that there was any other thing he had done in the village before.\n\nThe fact is that he had disappeared from home as many as 15 years all?· and it is unlikely that he would have appeared just at the crucial time when LaXIDan had gone to fetch his wife and had a diil'erence of opinion as to whether she should go by the evening train or the morning train. In our opinion advantage was taken of the fact that Kacharu had disappeared from home.\n\nThere was no risk in naming him as the assailant with a view to saving taxman from the charge which was immediately brought against him not only by his father-in-Jaw but also by his own wife and' was reported to the guard on the Railway train and also stated in the report to the Police made immediately afterwards. Kamlabai Sf'.ems to have delayed making her statement to the Police and there is nothing to show on the record of\" the case that she ever named Kacharu as the real assailant to the Police. It is unfortunate that our law does not admit of cross-examination of such a witness in respect of statements before the Police.\n\nWe endorse the action of the Sessions Judge in excluding reference to this statement in the Sessions trial.\n\nThe fact thus remains that the evidence did not disclose that Kacharu came on the scene at any earlier moment and the only evidence is that of Ananda Patil who, on enquiry, was told, we d<? not know by whom, that the elder brother had stabbed the younger brother. This in any case, is hearsay evidence and' cannot be acted upon.\n\nTherefore, without going too much into the details of-the matter, we only wish to 'say that between the two juents which we have closely examined and which have be_en read to u.s in full, we prefer that of the' High Court and thmk that in all the circumstances of the case, it was a fair and proper appraisal of the divergent evidence in the case.\n\nWe must therefore hold that it Was Laxman, the appellant who was responsible for caustng the injury to Ramrao.\n\nThe ne'.'t question is what was the offence which was brought H home to him? The injury is a single one.\n\nShantabai did not • speak about the weapon; she only stated that he hit him with a\n\nweapo~ and ran. away.\n\nOn examination the injury was found to be situated 2 mch below the outer 1/3 of right clavicle on the\n\nil90 SUP.IU!MB COUllT UPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nright side of the chest and penetrated to the depth of 4 inch A into $e chest cavity. It is no doubt true that the injury was serious, but it is io be noticed that it did not penetrate the Jung.\n\nDeath was caused mainly because it cut the axillary artery and veins and caused shock and haemorrhage leading to death. In these circumstances, it is necessary to consider whether this case is covered by any of the clauses of s. 300 of the Indian Penal\n\nJI.\n\nCode.\n\nMr. Bhandari who appeared before us for the State frankly conceded, and we think rightly, that the case was not covered by the first and tire second clause. It must be remembered that the quarrel between Ramrao and Laxman was not such as would have prompted Laxman to make a homicidal attack upon c his brother-in-law. The quarrel was only this much, whether Laxman's wife should accompany him by the evening train or the morning train. It may be that some abuses might have en sued as is common among these people, and Laxman having ]06t his temper whipped out his knife and gave one blow.\n\nIt must be remembered that he gave one blow and alth6ugh it was given on the chest, it was not on a vital part of the chest and but for D the fact that the knife cut an artery inside, death might not have ensued. Therefore the question is whether the offence can be said to be covered by thirdly of s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThat section requires that the bodily injury must be intended -and the bodily injury intended to be caused must be sufficient\n\nin the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nThis clause E\n\nis in two parts; the first part is a subjective one which indicates that the injury must be an intentional one and not an accidental one; the second part is objective in that looking a1 the injury intended to be caused, the court must be satisfied that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nWe think that the first part is complied with, because the injury F which was intended to be caused was the one which was found on the person of Ramrao. But the second part in our opinion is not fulfilled, because but for the fact that the injury caused the severing of artery, death might not have ensued.\n\nIn other words, looking at the matter objectively, the injury which Laxman intended to cause did not include specifically the cutting of the artery but to WOUl!d Ramrao in the neighbourhood of the clavicle. Therefore, we are of opinion tl!l-t the thirdly of s. 300\n\ndoes not cover the case.\n\nInasmuch as aeath bas been caused, the matter must still come within at least culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There again, s. 299 is in three parts.\n\nThe first part takes in the doing of an act with the inntion _of\n\ncausing death.\n\nAs we have shown above, Laxman did not intend causing death and the first part of s. 299 does not app!Y 'The second part deals with the intention of causing such bodily\n\nv. STATE (Hidayatul/ah, C.I.) 691\n\nA injury as is likely to cause death. Here again, tho intention must be to cause the precise injury likely . to cause death and that also, as we have shown above, was not the intention of Laxman. The matter therefore comes within the thitd part.\n\nThe act which was done was done with the knowledge that Laxman was likely by such act to cause the death of Ramrao.\n\nB The case falls within the thitd part of s. 299 and will be punishable under the second part of s. 304 of the Indian Penal Code as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordinaly\n\nalter the conviction of LaX!ll8n from s. 302 to s. 304 of the Indian Penal Code and in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on him, we impose a sentence of rigorous im C prisonment for 7 years. With this modification, the appeal shall stand dismissed.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "JE\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 5, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAXMAN KAJ, U NIKAJ, JE\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 5, 1968\n\n[M. HlDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N.\n\nGROVER."}}, {"text": "GROVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 651, "end_char": 657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2176, "end_char": 2182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3043, "end_char": 3058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. K. Pillai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3080, "end_char": 3094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Bhandari and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Bhandari and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3176, "end_char": 3188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah C. J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay setting aside the acquittal of the appellant Laxman Kalu Nikalje and convicting him under s. 302 with a seotence of imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Laxman Kalu Nikalje", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3323, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMAN KALU NIKALJE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shantabaii", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facis of the case are as follows :\n\nThis Laxman was married to Shantabaii (P.W. 3) who is the daughter of one Bhika Ganpat Nikam (P.W. 2) a Railway employee working at a Railway crossing at Gartad District Dhullia."}}, {"text": "Bhika Ganpat Nikam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facis of the case are as follows :\n\nThis Laxman was married to Shantabaii (P.W. 3) who is the daughter of one Bhika Ganpat Nikam (P.W. 2) a Railway employee working at a Railway crossing at Gartad District Dhullia."}}, {"text": "Bhika", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3682, "end_char": 3687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat."}}, {"text": "D Gangubai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat.", "canonical_name": "D Gangubai"}}, {"text": "Ramrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat."}}, {"text": "Laxman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat.", "canonical_name": "H Laxman"}}, {"text": "Bharat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3829, "end_char": 3835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhika was residing in one of the quarters intended for such people near the Railway crossing with his wife D Gangubai, his sons Ramrao, Laxman and Bharat."}}, {"text": "Shantabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shantabai was married some five years before the occurrence and lived with her husband, Laxman at Ganeshpur Pimpri in Taluka Chalisgaon.", "canonical_name": "Shantab11i"}}, {"text": "Ganeshpur Pimpri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3935, "end_char": 3951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shantabai was married some five years before the occurrence and lived with her husband, Laxman at Ganeshpur Pimpri in Taluka Chalisgaon."}}, {"text": "Taluka Chalisgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shantabai was married some five years before the occurrence and lived with her husband, Laxman at Ganeshpur Pimpri in Taluka Chalisgaon."}}, {"text": "Gartad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4162, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxman wanted his wife back and arrived at Gartad to take her away to his own house."}}, {"text": "Gangubai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The excuse given by Bhika and his wife Gangubai was that they could not let the girl go without giving her some.", "canonical_name": "D Gangubai"}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said in one\n\nplace that money was borrowed from one Tarachand and in another, from Laxman, himself."}}, {"text": "Dhulia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4783, "end_char": 4789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gangubai in the company of Shantabai went to Dhulia to make SQJlle."}}, {"text": "August 10 in", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purchases and returned on August 10 in the afternoon."}}, {"text": "H Laxman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5273, "end_char": 5281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the evening at about 7 P.M.\n\nH Laxman was sitting with Shantabai and Ramrao outside the -quarter and Bhika was chopping some fuel at the back of the hut, Kamlabai (the widow of Ramrao), Gangubai, Bharat and\n\nLaxman were inside the room.", "canonical_name": "H Laxman"}}, {"text": "Kamlabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the evening at about 7 P.M.\n\nH Laxman was sitting with Shantabai and Ramrao outside the -quarter and Bhika was chopping some fuel at the back of the hut, Kamlabai (the widow of Ramrao), Gangubai, Bharat and\n\nLaxman were inside the room.", "canonical_name": "Kamlabai Sf'.ems"}}, {"text": "Dhulia hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6091, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramrao was carried to the Dhulia hospital and was found to have died before his entry in the hospital."}}, {"text": "Shantabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6358, "end_char": 6367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the prosecution, Shantabai was the main witness and in fact \\he only eye-witness."}}, {"text": "Gangubai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gangubai and Bhika did not claim to have seen the actual happening."}}, {"text": "Bhika", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6437, "end_char": 6442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gangubai and Bhika did not claim to have seen the actual happening."}}, {"text": "Kamlabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6519, "end_char": 6527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the defence, Kamlabai, the widow of Ramrao was examined and it is because of the contrary versions of these two ladies that tbe conflicting decisions in the High Court and the Court of Sessions have taken place."}}, {"text": "Kacharu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Kamlabai the injury was caused by one Kacharu, a son of Bhika.", "canonical_name": "Kacharu Jiving"}}, {"text": "C. Ananda Patil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7079, "end_char": 7094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One was C. Ananda Patil, M.P. who s•ated that his jeep had stopped near the level crossing because the gates were shut and the train was due."}}, {"text": "Bhika", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He heard shouts from the quarter of Bhika\n\nand went there and enquired what had happened and he was told that the \"elder brother had stabbed tbe younger brother\"."}}, {"text": "D.S.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamlabai also made two written reports to the D.S.P. on the 26th and 27th Aul?Ust alleging that an innocent person was being prosecuted inst.cad of the right offender, namely, Kacharu."}}, {"text": "26th and 27th Aul?Ust alleging", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7969, "end_char": 7999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamlabai also made two written reports to the D.S.P. on the 26th and 27th Aul?Ust alleging that an innocent person was being prosecuted inst.cad of the right offender, namely, Kacharu."}}, {"text": "Skantabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge who tried the case did not accept Skantabai's evidence in view of two or th.:ee contradictions\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhich were brought out in her cross-examination on the basis of her previous statement in the committal court.", "canonical_name": "Shantab11i"}}, {"text": "Kamlaba.i's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8523, "end_char": 8534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thought that in all t; he circumstances Kamlaba.i's version appeared to be the more probable, supporred as it was by the evidence of Ananda Patil and the other two railway employto whom we have referred.", "canonical_name": "Kamlabai Sf'.ems"}}, {"text": "Ananda Patil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8616, "end_char": 8628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thought that in all t; he circumstances Kamlaba.i's version appeared to be the more probable, supporred as it was by the evidence of Ananda Patil and the other two railway employto whom we have referred."}}, {"text": "Shantab11i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They felt that there was no reason for Shantab11i to have deposed agai!nst her own husband and the suggestion made in 'the Sessions Court that Shantabai wanted to get rid of her husband because he was a cripple and was ill-treating her had no substance in fact.", "canonical_name": "Shantab11i"}}, {"text": "Kacharu Jiving", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11472, "end_char": 11486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "significant that the father and the mother were not closely questioned about Kacharu Jiving with them for as many as five months.", "canonical_name": "Kacharu Jiving"}}, {"text": "10th of August", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11770, "end_char": 11784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been brought before the Court is of his doings on the 10th and after the 10th of August and there is nothing to show that there was any other thing he had done in the village before."}}, {"text": "LaXIDan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12030, "end_char": 12037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it is unlikely that he would have appeared just at the crucial time when LaXIDan had gone to fetch his wife and had a diil'erence of opinion as to whether she should go by the evening train or the morning train."}}, {"text": "Kamlabai Sf'.ems", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12573, "end_char": 12589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamlabai Sf'.ems to have delayed making her statement to the Police and there is nothing to show on the record of\" the case that she ever named Kacharu as the real assailant to the Police.", "canonical_name": "Kamlabai Sf'.ems"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14577, "end_char": 14583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14621, "end_char": 14629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhandari who appeared before us for the State frankly conceded, and we think rightly, that the case was not covered by the first and tire second clause."}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15508, "end_char": 15514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15522, "end_char": 15539, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16621, "end_char": 16627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16789, "end_char": 16795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16980, "end_char": 16986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17509, "end_char": 17515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17578, "end_char": 17595, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17696, "end_char": 17702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17706, "end_char": 17712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17720, "end_char": 17737, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_692_705_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "•692\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT ETC.\n\nVAKHTSINGH11 SURSINGHJI VAGHELA & ORS. ETC.\n\nApril 8, 1968\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J\n\nBombay Taluqdari Abolition Act 62 of 1949. ss. 7 and 14-Right to 'JJ(ly ; ania or land revenue at reduced rates-Whether a right for whicli compensation 1) payable under s. 14-15% solatium whether pa, vable in addition to conipensation for lands under s. 1-Method of 1vorking out .contpensation for irrigation bunds, tanks and 1vells-Right to compensa- --- tion for river, river beds, Bht4has.\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 227-Scope of High Court's power to interfere with Tribunal's order and to give directions.\n\nThe respondcnts filed claims before the Collector Ahmedabad for compensation under ss. 11 and 14 of the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. Against the Collector's awards !hey appealed to the Revenue Tribunal and thereafter filed petitions under Art. 227 before the High Court. From the High Court's orders the State of Gujarat appealed to Ibis Court. The matters in dispute were: (i) whethel' the right to pay .only 60% of the full jama or revenue assessment on their lands which the respondents had been enjoying was a right for the extinguishment of which compensation under s. 14 of the Act was pavable; (ii) whether under the provisions of the Act the respondents were entitled to 15%\n\nsolatium in addition to the compensation which they were awarded for their lands; (iii) what was the proper method of working out the value Of irrigational bunds, tanks and weUs for the purpose of compensation;\n\n(iv) whether compensation was payable to the respondents in respect of river and river beds. The Court had also to consider the scope of the High Court's power under Art. 227 of the Constitution in the context of the case.\n\nHELD: (i) The taluqdari estates were liable to payment of jama.\n\nAs a matter of concession the jama was generally 60% of the survey\n\n....., sment. The taluqdars had no legal right to claim the concession on the expiry of their current settlements, and at the next revisional settlement the Government had the right to withdraw the concession and impoae full assessment The right of the taluqdars to pay the jama at the concessional rate till the expiry of the current settlement was pre 861\"Ved by s. 5 of. the Abolition Act. The enhanced assessment which they had to pay thereafter did not affect any contractual or statutolry right vested in them.\n\nEven assuming that it modified or extinguished any right, such modification or extinguishment did not amount to trans. ference to public ownership of land or any right in or owr land within the meaning of s. 14 of the Abolition Act. The CoUector, the Revenue Tribunal and the High Court therefore rightly rejected the claim of the respondents for compensation for the difference in the jama and the full a8'cssment. [698 C, 699 H, 700 A]\n\nRao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar, [1944] F.C.R, 284, applied.\n\nNalfllb Sardar f\\larharsinghji lshvarshinghji v. The Secretarv of State for India. 43 Born. L.R. 167, referred to.\n\nGUJARAT V. VAKHTSINGHJI 693\n\n(ii) The Collector is required by s. 7(1)(b) , to make an award in the manner prescribed in s. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Collector has to make an award under s. 11 and having regard to s. 15 in determining the amount of compensation, he is guided by the provisions of s. 23 and s. 24. Section 23(1) requires an award of the market value of the :and. Section 23(2) requires an additional award of a sum of fifteen pee centum on such market value, in consideration of the com~ pulsory nature of acquisition.\n\nIt follows that under s. 7(1)(b) of the Abolition Aet read with s. II of the Land Acquisition Act the taluqdars a£e entitled to receive as compensation the market v.alue of all rights in any property extinguished under s. 6 and in addition a sum of 15 per cent on such market value.\n\nTho right is subject to the conditions and exceptions enumerated in sub-els. (i), (ii) and (ili) of s. 7(i)(b).\n\n(701 C-FJ\n\n(iil) In regard to irrigational bunds, tanks and weJls the High Court rightly rejected the claim for compensation based on reinstatement value.\n\nThis method should not be adopted when the market value deduced from the income derived from the lands would fairly compensate the owner and in no case can reinstatement value be gin untess reinstatement in\n\nsome other place is bona fide intended. lo the present case the High Court found that there was no intention to reinstate the bunds. (703 C-DJ\n\nlbe value of irrigational bunds, tanks and wells is not what they cost but what they yield in annual income. The High Court rightly adopted the yield basis of valuation. The Himayat assessment and the water tales adopted by the Collector and the Tribunal did not give the correct yield.\n\nThe. High Court therefore rightly directed further inquiries into this claim. [703 El\n\nRaia Vyricherla Gajapatiraju v.\n\nThe .Revenue Divisional Officer, Viz; agapatam, 66 I.A. 104, Harish Chandra Neogy v. Secretary of State for India, 25 C.W.N. 875 and Province of West Bengal v. Roja Jhargram, A.I.It 1955 Cal. 392, referred to. ( {iv) In regard to river and river beds, the taluqdars had no property in running water. They were the owners of the river beds but the submerged river beds were of no value to them. They could rightly claim compensation only for the Bhathas formed in the rivers and other portiOll.S of the river beds whe're crops could be raised during some parts of the vear. [703 F-01\n\n(v) Article 227 of the Constitution gives the High Court the power of superintendenee over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories ation to which it exercised jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be !muted or ~·red .by any A71 of the . tate Legislature.\n\nThe High Court had 1urisd1ct1on to revise the dec1S1on of the Tribunal in respect of the olatill!\" and irrigational bunds tanks and wells, when the Tribunal on a mISreadmg of ss. 7 and 14 of the Abolition Act declined to do what was by those l'rov!sions !t!cumbent on it. to d.o.\n\nThe High Coun could not only set aside its dec1S1on. but also direct 11 to mak~ further inquiries aftol' taking evidence. (705 B-GJ -\n\nl .edHari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmed /shaque, [1955] !$.C.R. J!()4, re 1 on. _ .\n\n. CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 517 to 534 of 1965,\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated January 12 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application; Nos. 78 to 83 and 96 to 101 of 1960.\n\n694 SUPREME ccfthtT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nN. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (in C. A.\n\nA Nos. S 17 to 528 of 1965) and for respondent-State of Gujarat (in CAs. Nos. 5~9 to 534 of 1965).\n\nA. K. Sen, Bhuvanesh Kumari, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. c.\n\nMathur, Ravinder Narain and M. H. Chhatrapati, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 517 and 524 of 1965).\n\nA. K. Sen, M. H. Chhatrapati, and Bhuvanesh Kumarl, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 518 to 522 of 1965) and the appellant (in C.A. No. 530 of 1965).\n\nM. H. Chhatri[1ati and Bhuvanesh Kumari for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 523, and 526 to 528 of 1965) an.d appellant (in C.A. No. 529 and 531 to 534 of 1965).\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, M; H. Chhatrapati and Bhuvanesh Kumari, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 525 of 1965). \"'\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBachawat, J.-These appeals are directed against the orders of the Gujarat High Court passed under Art. 227 of the Consti- D tution revising the appellate orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal modifying certain awards of the Special Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad.\n\nClaims for compensation under secs. 7 and 14 of the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LXII of 1949) were filed before the Collector by the Taluqdars of certain villages in the district of Ahmedabad. The Collector J: made his awards of compensation under secs. 7 and 14. The claimants filed appeals before the Revenue Tribunal and later petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution to the High Court.\n\nThe present appeals are filed by the State of Gujarat and some of the claimants.\n\nThe principal matters in oontroversy in these appeals relate to the award of compensation under the heads : I'\n\n(1) difference in Jama and full assessment, (ii) solatium of 15 % .on the market value, (iii) irrigational bunds, tanks and wells and (iv) river and river beds.\n\nExcellent accounts of the history and incidents of the taluqdari tenures are given in Dr. Govind D. Patel's Agrarian Reforms in Bombay, 1950, Mr. J. B. Peile's Report, Government G Selection No. CVI New Series, p. 13, Mr. L. Robertson's Report on the conditions of the taluqdars of the Ahmedabad district,\n\n1903, statement of objects and reasoJ!S for Bill No. 6 of 1885 printed in Bombay Government Gazette, dated the 26th December, 1885, Part V, at p. 65 and Nawab Sardar Narharsinghji Ishvarsinghjl v. The Secretary of State for India('). The origin 11 of the Gujarat taluqdars may be traced to Moghul and pre- Moghul times.\n\nThey are found mainly in the / districts of\n\n(!) 43 Bom. L. R. 167.\n\nGUJARAT I'. VAKHTS!NGJIJI (Bachawat, J.) 695\n\nAhmedabad, Kaira, Broach and the Panchmahals. The leading charac,'.eristics of the taluqdari tenure is that the taluqdari estate is neither alienated nor unalienated but is proprietary.\n\nUntil 1862 the taluqdars were legally though incorrectly regarded as mere lease holders.\n\nFrom 1862 till 1888 they were full proprietors with unlimited powers of alienation.\n\nFrom 1888 onwards they were full proprietors with restricted powers of alienation.\n\nTheir estates were subject to payment of a jama to the Government. Originally th'e jama was regarded as a tribute but later it beca, me a roughly calculated tax on the rental, then a land tax and finally land revenue.\n\nActs were passed from time to time for ameliorating the conditions of the taluqdars.\n\nSince 1888 the taluqdari villages and estates were governed by the provisions of the Gujarat Taluqdars' Act, 1888 (Bom. Act VI of 1888).\n\nUnder sec. 2(1) (c) of this Act Jama meant land revenue payable by the taluqdars to the Government.\n\nSection 4 empowered the Government to direct a revenue survey of a taluqdari estate under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Sections 22 and 23 deal with the taluqdar's .iama :\n\n\"22(1). If a taluqdar's estate, or any portion thereof is not wholly or partially exemp'. from land-revenue and its liability to payment of land revenue is not subject to special conditions or restrictions, the jama payable to (the Provincial Government) in respect of such estate or portion thereof shall, if a survey settlement has been extended thereto, be the aggregate of the survey assessment of the lands composing such estate or such portion thereof minus such deduction, if any, as (the Provincial Government) shall in each case direct.\n\n(2) nte (Provincial Government) may declare the amount of jama so ascertained fixr.d for any term not exceeding thitty years.\n\n23 (1) Nothing in this Act shall . be deemed to affect the validity of any agreement, heretofore, entered into by or with a taluqdar and still in force as to the amount of his jama nor of any settlement of the amoun'. -of jama made by or under the orders of the (Provincial Government) for a term of years and still i11 force. t\n\n(2) Every such agreemen: and settlement shall . have effect a'.sif this Act had not been passed:\" The iama was usually fixed ( uddhad) in respect of the estates in Kaira and Broach but those in Ahmedabad and Panchmahals\n\n8SupCl/6S-l\n\n696 StlP.IUlME COURT lUlPOllTS\n\n('968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nwere liable to revision at every revisional settlement. The A. ftuctuating jam.a in respect of these latter estates could ndcr s. 22 be fixed at an amount equal to the full survey assessment of all the lands comprised within the estate. In practice the l jam.a of the claimants' estates in Ahmedabad was limi~ to about 60% of the full assessment. As a measure of. agrarian reform the Government decided to abolish the taluqdar tenures It altogether.\n\nAccordingly the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Aot, 1949 was passed on January 24, 1950. It came into• force oil August 15, 1950. It extends to the districts of Ahmedabad, Kaira, Broach and Panchmahals.\n\nIt repealed the Gujarat Taluqdars' Act of 18 8 8 and certain other ial Acts !elating to taluqdars. Section 3 abolish.ed the taluqdari tenure and ex- I; tinguished all incidents of the tenure attached to any land comprised in a taluqdari estate save as provided in the Act. Under sec. 4 all revenue surveys and settlements made under sec. 4 of the Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888 are deemed to have been made under Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code.\n\nBy section 5 (1 )(a) all taluqdari lands are henceforth \" liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the I> provisions of the Land Revenue Code and the rules made thereunder. But this provision does not , affect the right of any person to hold any taluqdari land wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue under a special contract or any other law for the time being in force [s. 5(2)(a)] nor the right of any person to pay jama under any agreement or settlement re- E. cognised under sec. 23, or under a declaration made under sec tion 22 of the Gujarat Taluqdars' Act so long as such agieement, settlement or declaration remains in force [s~ 5 (2 }(b )].\n\nSection 5 ( 1) (b) provides that a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Land Revenue Code or any other law for the time being in , force.\n\nSection 6 provides that all public roads, !!Illes etc., ndf f situate within the limits of the wantas belonging to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate shall vest in the Government and all rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished.\n\nSection 7 proV1des for payment of compensation to taluqdars for extinguismnent of rights under section 6.\n\nSec- . tion 14 provides for payment of compensation for extingwsh- G ment or modification of any other right in any land where such extinguishment or modification amounts to transference to public ownership of such land or any right in or over such land.\n\nSection 17 makes applicable provisions of the Land Revenue Code to all taluqdari lands with certa.in modifications. Sections\n\n8 9 and 1 O provide for appeals from lhe Collector's award. 8 S::Won 12 provides that the awanl made by the Collector and the decision of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal on appeal shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any suit\n\nGU.JAR:'AT v. VilHTSINGHJl (Bachawat, /.) 697\n\nor proceeding in any court.\n\nThe Act is protected by Art. 31B of the Constitution. It was amended from time to time. ClaUS6\n\n(a) of section 5(2) was deleted by Bombay Act 42 of 1953.\n\nSection SA was inserted by Bombay Act I of 1955. Section SA\n\nmade a pennanent tenant and an inferior holder in possession of, any taluqdari land an occupant in respect of such land on payment of compensation to the taluqdar.\n\nIn these appeals the taluqdars claim compensation for the loss of benefit of the difference between the jama and the full assessment. The jama payable under the settlements made before the.Abolition Act was 60% of the total assessment. Their right to pliy the jama only under those settlements were not affected in view of section 5 (2 )(b). They have obtained the full benefit of the concessional jama while the settlements remained in force. The period of those settlements have now expired and they are now liable to pay full assessment.\n\nThey have thus suffeRld a loss of 40% of the land revenue of the villages. They claim compensation for this loss under s. 14 (1 ) of the Abolition Act which reads..:~\n\n• \"14.(1). If any person is aggrieved by any of the provisions of this Act as extinguishing or modifying any of his rights in any land other than those in respect\n\nof which provision for the payment of compensation has been made under section 7 and if such person proves that such extinguishment or modification amounts to the transference to public ownership of such land or any right in or over such land, such person may apply to the Collector for compensation within a\n\npei-iod of twelve months from the date on which this Act comes into force.\"\n\n\"Any person\" in sec. 14( 1) includes a taluqdar. To get com pensation under the section the claimant must establish firstly that his rights in any land other than those for which provision for comJle'Ilsation is made under s. 7 has been extinguished or modified and secondly' that such extinguishment or modificati9n amounts fo .the transference to public ownership of such land or any right in or over such land. The taluqdars contend that they had the right to pay a jama not exceeding 60% of the survey assessment of the lands comprised in the estate.\n\nAccording to them the Government had issued directions under section 22 (1 ) of. the Gujarat Taluqdars' Act, 1888 so limiting the jama. They say that such direction is to be found in the memorandum of the Government of Bombay issued on October 2, 1914 with reference to the recommendation made by the Commissioner, .\n\nNorthern Division, in his letter dated April 13, 1914. The ltigh Court has ref.erred to these documents in some detail. It appears\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat the Gujarat Taluqdari Bill was then pending before the A Legislative Council. The memorandum shows the Government's willingness to incorporate in the Bill suitable provision regarding the fixation of olhe jama. In our opinion, the memorandum was not a direction under sec. 22( 1) nor did it create a legal right in the taluqdars to pay a jama of 60% of the survey assessment.\n\nB The taluqdari estates were always liable to payment of jama or land revenue.\n\nAs a matter of concession the jama was generally 60% of the survey assessment of the lands comprised in the esta1e.\n\nThe taluqdars had no legal right to claim the concession on the expiry of their current settlements.\n\nAt the next revis1onal settlement the Government had the right to withdraw C the concession and to impose full assessment on the taluqdari lands.\n\nSection 5(1)(a) of the Abolition Act by imposing full assessment on the taluqdari lands after the expiry of the period of the current settlements did not extinguish or modify any vested right of the taluqdars.\n\nMr. Palkhiwala argu.ed that section 5 effected a transfer of D the proprietary rights of the taluqdars in their lands to the Government together with the advantage of paying reduced revenue and a re-transfer of the occupancy rights in those lands to the taluqdars and consequently there was extinguishment or modification of their rights amounting to transference to public ownership of rights in and over such lands. The argument, though E ingenious, does not bear scrutiny.\n\nBefore the High Court the faluqdars made no claim for compensation generally for any loss of proprietary right.\n\nMr. Palkhiwala therefore said that he did not make any claim for compensation for the loss of proprietary right other than the loss arising from the liability to pay full assessmeni.\n\nWe have therefore to consider only the claim for compensation for the difference between the jama and the fn11 F assessment.\n\nIn Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar(') the appellant Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh held in Zamindari rights certain estates in the Central Provinces. The land revenue in respect of the estates was settled in 1921 und.cr the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917 for a period of 19 years from July 1, 1919 and July 1, 1920 and thereafter until a fresh settlement was made.\n\nSection 88 of the Act provided that if the assessmeni of an estate, had been accepted under the Act, the proprietors would be bound to pay the land revenue assessed thereon from such date and for such term as the Provincial Government might appoint in that behalf and if at the expiry of wch term no new assessment had been made, until a\n\n(1) [1944! P. C. R. 284.\n\nH <\n\nGUJARAT v. VAKHTSINGHJI (Bachawat, J.) 699\n\nnew assessment was made. . The Central Provinces Revision. of the Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939 enacted that with effect from July 1, 1938 notwithstanding anything .contained in the Act of 1917 the land revenue payable to the Government in respect of the estates would be enhanced to the amounts mentioned in the Schedule to the Act of 1939. By an Amending Act of 1941 it was provided that those amounts would be deemed to have been assessed, offered and accepted under the Act of 1917.\n\nThe appellant contended that as no. new settlement had been made the Act of 1939 extinguished or deprived him of his contractal as well as statutory right to hold his estates subject only to the payment of the takoli fixed in 1921 and thus amounted to an acquisition of his right in land in contravention of section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935: The Federal Court repelled this contention.\n\nSpens, C.J. observed :-\n\n\"It is, we think, impossible to hold that the mere increase of an assessment for land revenue involves any acquisition ofthe land or any rights in or over immovable property.\n\nIt further seems to us that the word 'acquisition' implies that there must .be an actual transferenee of, and it must be possible to indicate some person or body to whom is or are transferred, the land or righis referred to.\n\nIt is impossible, in our view to suggest that when the land revenue is increased, there is any transference to the PrOvincial Government or .any other person of any land or rights in or over immovable property, which remain in the same possession or ownership as immediately before the increase of the assessment. In our judgment, the attempt to bring the case within s. 299(2) must. fail.\" .\n\nIt. will be noticed that the Zamindar in that case was bound to pay only the fixed land revenue for the period of 19 years and thereafter until a new settlement was made.\n\nThe increase in land revenue made by the 1939 Act affected this right. Nevertheless it was held that the increase in land revenue did not involve any transference to ' the Government of any right in or over any immovable property. The case of the taluqdars in the. present case is \\Yealcer.\n\nTheir. right to pay the jama only while the . old settlements remained . m force was not affected by section S.\n\nThe increase in land revenue on the expiry of. those settlements was not due to any change in ownership.\n\nThe enhanced. assessment did not affect any contractual or statutory right vested in them. Even assU111ing that it modified or ex tingu~ any right, such modification or extinguishment did not amount to transference to pµblic ownership of land or any\n\n?00 SUPllBMB COU.llT llBPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nright in or over land within the meaning of sec. 14 of the .Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act. The Collector, the Revenue Tribunal and the High Coun therefore rightly rejected the claim of the taluqdars for compensation for the difference in the jama and the full assessment.\n\nThe n¢xt claim is for payment of a solatium of 15 per cen tum on the market value awarded under .section 7 of the Aboli- B tion Act.\n\nThe Collector and the Revenue Tribunal rejected this claim.\n\nThe High Coun partially allowed it and directed that an amount of 15 % should be added to the market value awarded under section 7(1)(b)(ili). This ruling is challenged by both the State of Gujarat and the taluqdars.\n\nSection 7 (l) reads :- c 7.(1) Any taluqdar having any rights in such property shall be entitled to compensation in the manner provided in the following paragraphs namely:-\n\n(a) within a period of twelve months from the date on which this Act comes into force, the taluqdar shall apply in writing to the Collector stating the nature of Iris right, the ground of his claim and the amount of compensation claimed by him for the extinguishment of his right; ( b) the Collector shall hold a formal inquiry in the manner provided in the Code and if the Collector ia satisfied that the applicant had any rights in the land and that such rights have been extinguished under the last preceding section, shall make an award in the manner prescribed in seciion 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (l of 1894). subject to the following conditions :-\n\n(i) if the property acquired is waste or uncultivated but is culturable land the amount of compensation shall not exceed three times the assessment of the land; Provided that if the land has not been assessed, the amount of compensation shall not exceed such amount of assessment as would be leviable in the same village on the same extent of similar land used. for the same purpose;\n\n(II) if the property is land over which the public has been enjoying or acquired a right of way or any individual has any right of easement, the amount of compensation shall not exceed the amount of the annual assessment leviable in the village for unculti-\n\nGUJARAT v. VAKHTS!NGHJI (Bachawat, J.) 701\n\nvai.ed land in accordance with the rules made under the Code or if such rules do not provide , the levy of such assessment, such amount as in the opinion of the Collector shall be the market value of the right or interest held by the claimant;\n\n(iii) if there are any trees or structures on the land, the amount of compensation shall be the market value if such .trees or structures, as the case may be; Explanation-For the purpose of this section the \"market value\" shall mean the value as estimated in accordance with the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), in so far as such provisions may be applicable.\" Section 7 ( 1) gives compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment of rights in any property under sec. 6.\n\nThe Collector is required by sec. 7 (1 )(b) to make an award in the manner prescribed in section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Collector has to make an award of compensation under sec. 11 and having regard to sec. 15 in determining the amount of compensation, he is guided by the provisions of secs. 23 and .24 ..\n\nSection 23 ( 1) requires an award of the market value of the land.\n\nSection 23(2) requires an additional award of a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition. It follows that under sec. 7 ( 1 )(b) of the Abolition Act read with section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the taluqdars are entitled to receive as compensation the market value of all rights in any property extinguished under sec. 6 and in addition a sum of 15 per centum on such market value. This right is subject to the conditions and exceptions enumerated in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and\n\n(iii) of section 7(l)(b). In cases falling under clause (i) and in some cases under clause (ii) the amount of compensation is liniited.\n\nIn cases falling under clause (iii) and in some cases under clause (ii)· the amount of compensation is the \"market value\" which according to the explanation to sec. 7 (1 ) means. the value estimated in accordance with sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The value so determined includes the G solatium of 15 per centum payable under sub-section\n\n(2) of s. 23. Where the legislature intended to exclude the application of sub-section (2) of sec. 23, it has said so, as in section 14(2) und<tr which compensation is determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of sections 23 and 24.\n\nIt follows that the taluqdar is entitled to the solatium of 15 per centum on the market value, ( 1 ) under the main part of sec. 7 ( 1 )(b) subject to the provisions of the several sub-clauses JI\n\nthereof: (2) in cases falling under clause (iii) of section 7(1)(b) and (3) in cases under clause (ii) of section 7(1)(b) where\n\n7 02\n\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nmarket value is awarded.\n\nThe direction of the High Court is /'!,, modified accordingly.\n\nThe next claim is with regard to irrigational bunds, tanks and wejls.\n\nThe Collector awarded compensation .on the basis of Hirnayat and water rates of assessment.\n\nThe Revenue Tribunal confinned his award. The High Court set aside this award and directed the Collector to award compensation after further inquiry on the basis of twenty-five iimes the annual profits derivable from the properties.\n\nThis ruling is challenged by the State of Gujarat and also by the Taluqdars.\n\nMr. Bindra contended that the Tribunal's award should be restored. Mr. A. K.\n\nSen contended 1hat the compensation should be awarded on the basis of reinstatement value.\n\nIn our opinion, both .these c:in tentions should be rejected.\n\nThe duty of the Collector is to award the \"market value\".\n\nThe market value is the amount which the laml if sold in the open market by u willing seller might be expected to realise. ln the case of land the market value is generally ascertained on a consideration of the prices obtained by sale of adjaceni lands with similar advantages.\n\nWhere there are no sales o1' comparable lands, the value must be found in some other way.\n\nOne method is to take th.e annual income which the owner is expected to obtain from the land and to capitalise it by a number of years purchase.\n\nThe capitalised value is then taken as the market value. which a willing vendor mig:ht reasonably expefa to obtain from a willing buyer.\n\nTn some special cases awards have been given on the basis of the reinstatement value which is assessed according to the cost of acquiring an equally convenient land or premises.\n\nCripps on Compulsory Acquisition of Land. 11th ed., Arts. 4-203, p. 907 exrlains this method thus :-\n\n\"Before the Acquisition of Land Act, 1919, reinstatement value, instead of market value, was sometimes given so as to give proper effect to the principle of compensation on the basts Of value to the owner.\n\nGenerally it was only given in respect of property which was of such a nature (for example, a school. church. hospital, houe of exceptional character, business premises in which the business could be carried on under special conditions or by means of a special licence) that there was no market or general demand for such properiy; and a market value deducted from the income derived would not constitute a fair basis in assessing the value to the owner.\"\n\nThe measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 was their value to the owner.\n\nJn special cases reinstatement value enabling the O)Vner to\n\nGUJARAT v. VAKHTSINGHJI (Bachawat, /.) 703.\n\nreplace the lands or premises taken from him was taken to be the correct measure of this value.\n\nThis principle was later enacted in Rule 5 of section 2 of Acquisition of Land (assessment of compensation) Act, 1919 which is now replaced by Rule 5 of section 5 of the Land Compensation Act, 1961. In Raja Vyricherla Gajapatiraju v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vii.agapatam (1) Lord Romer said that the general principles for determining compensation under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1848 did not differ in any material respect from those upon which compensation was awarded under the Lands Clauses Act of 1845. In Harish Chandra Neogy v. Secretary of State for India(') and Province of West Bengal v. Raja Jhargram(1 ) it was suggested that in special cases the reinstatement value may be awarded as compensation under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nFor the purpose of this case it is sufficient to say that this method should not be adopted where the market value deduced from the income derived from the lands would fairly compensate the own.er and in no case can reinstatement value be given unless reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended.\n\nThe High Court found that there was no intention to reinstate the bunds.\n\nThe owners could be fairly compensated by giving the market value deduced from 1 the estimated yield ..\n\nThe High Court rightly rejected the reinstatement method. The value of irrigational bunds, tanks and wells is not what they cost but what. they yield in annual income.\n\nThe High Court rightly adopted the yield basis of valuation. The Himayat assessment and water rates did not give the correct yield. The High Court therefore directed further inquiries into this claim.\n\nThe next claim for compensation is with regard to river and river beds.\n\nThe Collector and the. Tribunal rejected this claim but the High Court allowed it a.nd directed further inquiries. The\n\nState of Gujarat challenges this ruling.\n\nNow the taluqdars had no property in running water.\n\nThey were the owners of the river beds but the submerged river beds were of no value to them.\n\nCounsel for the taluqdars therefore conceded that the High Crt's g canno~ be supported.\n\nBefore us they con' fined their claun under thts head to Bhathas . formed in the rivers and other portions of the river beds where crops could be raised. during some parts . .; if the year particularly during summer. <; o?nsel foF the State dtd not oppose further inquiries into this ltmtted claim for compensation.\n\nWe therefore set aside the directions of .the High Court in respect of river and river beds.\n\nW~ direct . the Spec!31 Deputy Colltor to inquire into the claim for comp_ensati?n for Bhathas, 1f any, formed in the rivers, And other portions, 1f any, of the river beds where crops could' be~.\n\n(I) 66 J, A. 104 at 113. '\n\n(2) 25 C. W. N. 875.\n\n(3) A. J.R. 1965 Cal. 392.\n\n104 SUPllBME COUllT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nCounsel for the taluqdars sought to challenge the findings of the High Court with regard to compensation for unbuilt village sites, trees, siJn road and non-irrigation al tanks and wells.\n\nWe find no error of principle in the award of compensation under these heads.\n\nThere is no ground for our interference in respect <>f these claiJns.\n\nMr. Bindra submitted that section 12 of the A\\i<>lition Act makes the decision of the Tribunal final and conclusive and the High Court had no jurisdiction \"> interfere with this decision, particularly in respect of solatium of 15 per centum and nonirrigational bonds, tanks and wells.\n\nWe are unable to accept this contention.\n\nArticle 227 of the Constitution gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughou, l the territories in relation to which it eurcises jurisdictron. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of thc State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. It was the duty of the Revenue Tribunal to award compensation to the Taluqdars in accordance with the provisions of secs. 7 and 14 1lf the Act.\n\nThe High Court had jurisdiction to revise the decision of the Tribunal where the Tribunal on a misreadipg of the provisions of secs. 7 and 14 declined to do what was by those provisions of law incumbent on it to do.\n\nTested in this light it does not appear .that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Art. 227 in revising the. decision of the Tribunal in respect of the solatium and irrigational bunds, tanks and . wells.\n\nNumerous cases were pending before the Ravenue Tribunal in respect of corilpensation payable to the taluqdars under the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act.\n\nTo prevent miscarriage of justice it was necessary for the High Court to lay down general principles on which compensation should be assessed so that the Tribunal may act within the limits of their authority.\n\nOn finding that the Tribunal had misconceived its duties under secs. 7 and 14, the High Court could not only set aside its decision, but also direct it to make further inquiries after taking evidence. As pointed out in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed lshaque(') the High Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 cannot only annul the decision of the Tribunal but can also issue further direction in the matter.\n\nIn the result, in modification of the High Court's decision in respect of solatium of 15 per centum on the market value, we direct that in all these cases the taluqdars be awarded solatium in accordance with this judgment.\n\nWe set aside the High Court's -decision with .regard to river and river bedS.\n\nInstead, we. direct 1hat 1the Special Deputy Collector will inquire into the cla.tm for\n\n(I) (1955) I S. C.R. 1104 at 1120.\n\nGUJARAT v. VAKHTSINGHJI (Bachawat, !.) 705\n\ncompensation for Bhathas, if any, formed in the river and other portions of the river beds, if any, where crops could be raised lluring some parts of the year, particularly during the summer.\n\nThe Special Deputy Collector will make awards under these two heads after giving opPOrtunity to the parties to adduoe evidence Subject to these modifications, the appeals are dismissed and the decision of the High Court in other respeots is confirmed. As success is divided, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nG.C.\n\n';:\n\nAppeals dimiissed with modifications.", "total_entities": 156, "entities": [{"text": "692\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VAKHTSINGH11 SURSINGHJI VAGHELA & ORS. 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VAKHTS!NGJIJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9138, "end_char": 9163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUJARAT I'."}}, {"text": "Broach", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9202, "end_char": 9208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VAKHTS!NGJIJI (Bachawat, J.) 695\n\nAhmedabad, Kaira, Broach and the Panchmahals."}}, {"text": "sec. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10174, "end_char": 10183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10318, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government to direct a revenue survey of a taluqdari estate under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Government to direct a revenue survey of a taluqdari estate under the provisions of the Bombay Land 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"end_char": 13195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13293, "end_char": 13300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13466, "end_char": 13475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13664, "end_char": 13673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Chapters VIII and VIlfA of the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", 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"section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15452, "end_char": 15461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section SA was inserted by Bombay Act", "statute": "Section SA was inserted by Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15790, "end_char": 15795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section SA was inserted by Bombay Act", "statute": "Section SA was inserted by Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16074, "end_char": 16083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 14( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16406, "end_char": 16417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17007, "end_char": 17017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17151, "end_char": 17171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They say that such direction is to be found in the memorandum of the Government of Bombay issued on October 2, 1914 with reference to the recommendation made by the Commissioner, ."}}, {"text": "October 2, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17182, "end_char": 17197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They say that such direction is to be found in the memorandum of the Government of Bombay issued on October 2, 1914 with reference to the recommendation made by the Commissioner, ."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17303, "end_char": 17317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Northern Division, in his letter dated April 13, 1914."}}, {"text": "sec. 22( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17709, "end_char": 17720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18264, "end_char": 18279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palkhiwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18479, "end_char": 18489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Palkhiwala argu.ed that section 5 effected a transfer of D the proprietary rights of the taluqdars in their lands to the Government together with the advantage of paying reduced revenue and a re-transfer of the occupancy rights in those lands to the taluqdars and consequently there was extinguishment or modification of their rights amounting to transference to public ownership of rights in and over such lands."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18503, "end_char": 18512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar(') the appellant Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh held in Zamindari rights certain estates in the Central Provinces."}}, {"text": "Zamindari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19496, "end_char": 19505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces and Berar(') the appellant Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lal Singh held in Zamindari rights certain estates in the Central Provinces."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19629, "end_char": 19669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 1, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19700, "end_char": 19712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land revenue in respect of the estates was settled in 1921 und.cr the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917 for a period of 19 years from July 1, 1919 and July 1, 1920 and thereafter until a fresh settlement was made."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19717, "end_char": 19729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land revenue in respect of the estates was settled in 1921 und.cr the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917 for a period of 19 years from July 1, 1919 and July 1, 1920 and thereafter until a fresh settlement was made."}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19781, "end_char": 19791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917", "statute": "the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20995, "end_char": 21009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939", "statute": "the Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21017, "end_char": 21046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Spens", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21093, "end_char": 21098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Spens, C.J. observed :-\n\n\"It is, we think, impossible to hold that the mere increase of an assessment for land revenue involves any acquisition ofthe land or any rights in or over immovable property."}}, {"text": "s. 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21888, "end_char": 21897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22939, "end_char": 22946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22955, "end_char": 22995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23276, "end_char": 23285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act", "statute": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(b)(ili)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23495, "end_char": 23515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act", "statute": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23592, "end_char": 23601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act", "statute": "Bom A bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24353, "end_char": 24379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25659, "end_char": 25677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25685, "end_char": 25711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25774, "end_char": 25783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25872, "end_char": 25878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25910, "end_char": 25916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25970, "end_char": 25980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25988, "end_char": 26014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26073, "end_char": 26080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26102, "end_char": 26109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26208, "end_char": 26218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26452, "end_char": 26458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26499, "end_char": 26509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26659, "end_char": 26665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 7(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26832, "end_char": 26847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27120, "end_char": 27126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27178, "end_char": 27196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27204, "end_char": 27230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27331, "end_char": 27336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27418, "end_char": 27425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27449, "end_char": 27462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27560, "end_char": 27578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27705, "end_char": 27711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27830, "end_char": 27845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27884, "end_char": 27899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28501, "end_char": 28507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra contended that the Tribunal's award should be restored."}}, {"text": "A. K.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28568, "end_char": 28573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. K.\n\nSen contended 1hat the compensation should be awarded on the basis of reinstatement value.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Arts. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29674, "end_char": 29681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Before the Acquisition of Land Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29725, "end_char": 29765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30392, "end_char": 30477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30758, "end_char": 30767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845", "statute": "The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30865, "end_char": 30874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845", "statute": "The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845"}}, {"text": "Land Compensation Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30882, "end_char": 30909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31000, "end_char": 31005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Raja Vyricherla Gajapatiraju v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vii.agapatam (1) Lord Romer said that the general principles for determining compensation under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1848 did not differ in any material respect from those upon which compensation was awarded under the Lands Clauses Act of 1845."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31074, "end_char": 31084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Compensation Act, 1961", "statute": "the Land Compensation Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1848", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31092, "end_char": 31118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31450, "end_char": 31460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1848", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1848"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33919, "end_char": 33929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34221, "end_char": 34232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35098, "end_char": 35106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ravenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35259, "end_char": 35275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Numerous cases were pending before the Ravenue Tribunal in respect of corilpensation payable to the taluqdars under the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35922, "end_char": 35930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_706_711_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "\\ 706\n\nJAMBU RAO SATAl'l'A KOCBEIU\n\nNEMINA.Ill APPAYYA HANAMMANNAVER\n\nApril 10, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nBomoay Tenancy and Agric11/t11ral Lr.ad• Act 67 of 1948-s.r. 34. 35. 70(mb), 84C & 85-Agreement to sell land wliicli if rformed wo11ld lead to purchtued liolding land in excess of ceiling prescribed-If enforceabie by a decree for specific perforn1ance.--WhetMr jurisdiction of civil court to aH'anl decree excluded by s..'f. 70(mb) or 84C.\n\nThe appellant agreed to sell to the respondent 41 acres of jirayat bod in Mysore, but failed to execute a conveyance. The respondent filed a suit for a decree for specific performance of the agreement and pos>eSSion\n\no[ the land.\n\nThe trial court dismissed the suit holding that the agreement, if enfom:d, would result in \"transgn:ssioo of the provisions of th< Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948\". Jn appeal. the High Court of Mysore granted a decree for specific performance.\n\nIn appeal lo this Court it was conlendod on behalf of the appellant that the rc'pondeot was already holding 31 acres of jirayat land at the time the :1g:n.-ement was entered into and by acquiring aoother 41 acres the resrondent's holding would ex\"\"'<! the ceiling preschDed by s. S of Bombay Ac! 67 of 1948, and further more. that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for specific performance.\n\nHELD : ( i) A eon tract for the sale of land entered into with the knowledge that the purchaser may bold land in excess of the ceiling is not void, and the seller cannot resist enforcement on the ground that, it permitted, it ,.; u result in transgression of the law. [711 C-DJ\n\nBy the acquisition declared invalid under s. 35. the land does not rcve1 t to the transferor; it is deemed to be in the ttansferees ownership and. on the Mamlatdar making a declaration that any land held in excess of the ceiling. the excess lB!ld vests in the Government. The statotory forfeiture incurred in the event of the transferee coming to hold land in excess of the <>eiling does not invalidate the transfer between the parties. [710 El There \\\\ilS nothing in the agreement. nor could it be implied from the circumstam:cs. that it was the object of the parties that the provisiom of the Act relating to the ceiling should be transgressed. The mere possibility that the nspondent may not have disposed of his original holding at the date of the acquisition of title would not render the object of the agreement such. that. if permitted. it would defeat the provisions of arty law. 17!0 HJ\n\n(ii) There \\Vas no substance in the contention that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decree the suit for specific perfor mance of an agreement to sen land. Power to decide whether the transfer or acquisition is invalid under s. 84C and to dispose of the land as provided in that section is conferred upon the Mamlatdar, and the civil cOurt has no jurisdiction in that behalf. But there is nolhing in cl.\n\n(mb) of s. 70 or in s. 85 which excludes-the jurisdiction of the cMl court to entertain a suit for specific performance of a contract to Bell land. An inquiry under s. 84C to determine whether the transfer .or\n\nJAMBU llAO V. NEMINATH (Shah, J.) 707\n\nA acquisition is inv:ilid may be made only after the acquisition of tiUe p'1t>Uant to a decree for specific performanee or otherwise. [711 D-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal No. 932 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and deaee dated August 20, 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 257 of 1960.\n\nM. C. Chagla, B. P. Singh and R. B. Datar, for the , appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, N. D. Mandigi and Bhuvanesh Kumari, for the respondent.\n\nC The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSllah, J. The appellant agreed to sell to the respondent Survey Nos. 5 & 12 of village Pattihal in District Belgaum, Mysore\n\nState, admeasuring 41 acres 26 gunthas of jirayat land for Rs. 32,000/-. The appellant having failed to execute a conveyance of the land, the respondent commenced an action in the Court of D the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, for a decree for specific performance of the agreement and for possession of the land. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the agreement, if enforced, would result in \"transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948\". Jn appeal, the High Court of Mysore granted a decree for specific E performance. With certificate granted by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court have concurrently found that the appellant failed to prove that the contract was abandoned by mutual agreement, and nothing more need be said about the plea raised by the appellant. Two questions survive for decision F in this appeal ;\n\n(I) Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948; and\n\n(2) Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for specific performance.\n\nBy s. 5 of. the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948, as 1t stood at the relevant time, it was provided ;\n\n\"(l) For the purj, oses of this Act, the ceiling area of land shall be-\n\n(a) 48 acres of Jirayat land, or . (b) 24 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or nee land, or\n\n(c) l2 acres of perennially irrigated land.\n\n708 SUPllKB <X>tD.T IBPOJl.TS\n\n[1!168) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(2) Where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds of land specified in sub-section (1), the ceiling area of sll4iji holding shall be determined on the basis of one acre of perennially irrigated land being equal to two acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or four acres of j1'rayat land.\"\n\n_Section 34(1) of the Act provided:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of section 35, it shall not be lawful, with effect from the appointed day, for any person to hold, whether as OWllflr or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant, Jana in excess of the ceiling area.\" The expression \"to hold land\" is not defined in the Tenancy Act.\n\nIt is defined in the Land Revenue Code, and by virtue of s. 2(21) of the Tenancy Act it has the same meaning which it has under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, i.e., \"t() be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not\" : s. 3(11) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Section 35 provided that :\n\n\"Where on account of gift, purchase, assignment, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest except in favour of recognised heirs and land comes into the possession of any person and in consequence thereof, the total land held by such person exceeds the area, which he is authorised to hold under section 34, the acquisition of such excess land shall be invalid.\n\nExplanation. \" .• The material part of s. 84C provided :\n\n\"(1) Where in respect of the transfer of acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955, the Mamlatdar suo motu or on the application of any person interested in such land has reason to believe that such transfer or acquisition is or becomes invalid under any of the \\)OOvisions of this. Act, the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice and hold an inquiry as provided for in section 84B and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid.\n\n(2) If after holding such inquiry, the Mamlatdar comes to a conclusion that the transfer or acquisition of land is invalid, he shall make an order dec!aring the transfer or acqllisition to be invalid.\n\n(3) On the declaration made by the Mamlatdar under sub-section (1) ,-\n\nJAMBU RAO v. NBMINATH (Shah,/.) 70&\n\nA \"(a) the land shall be deemed to vest in the State\n\nGovernment, free from all encumbrances lawfully subsisting thereon on the date of such vesting, and shall be disposed of in the manner provided in sub-section (4); ..\n\nThe appellant resisted the claim of the respondent for specific performance of the agreement of sale on the plea that the respondent was already holding 31 acres 2 gunthas of jirayat land, and by acquiring 41 acres 26 gunthas of jirayat land, the respondent's holding would exceed the ceiling prescribed by the statute.\n\nThe evidence on the record about the area of lands held by the respondent at the relevant time is obscure. The agreement was dated July 20, 1958. On April 1, 1960 the respondent filed a statement in the Court that, barring lands which were liable to be excluded in determining whether the holding exceeded the ceiling, he was in possession of 11 acres 1 guntha of jirayat land. If that holding were to be taken into account, and if in pursuance of a decreee for specific performance the respondent acquired possession of the land agreed to be sold, his total holding would exceed the ceiling.\n\nIn the trial court the parties proceeded to trial on the footing that if the agreement was enforced specifically, the holding of the respondent would exceed the ceiling area. In appeal, the High Court observed that there was no evidence that the respondent was a holder of land in excess of the ceiling area on the date of the agreement nor was there evidence to show that he was holding an area of land in excess of the ceiling area on the date of the suit or even at the date of the statement dated April 1, 1960. and therefore s. 34 had no relevance. The High Court observed in the last paragraph of the judgment that they had not recorded any finding about the actual area of jirayat land in the possession of the respondent at any point of time either on the date of the suit or on April 1, 1960, and the question was left open as desired by the parties, Since in the trial court the parties chose to go to the trial on the footing that if the contract is specifically enforced, having regard to the holding of the respondent, the total area would exceed the ceiling, we proceed to decide the appeal on that footing.\n\nBy s. 23 of the Contract Act, consideration or object of an agreement i~ unlawful if it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent. Both the parties to the contract are agriculturists. By the agreement the appellant agreed to sell jirayar\n\n710 SUPREME COURT Rll'PORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA . land admeasuring 4lacres 26 guntllilS for a price of .Rs. 32,000/-.\n\nThe consideration of the agreement per \"se was not unlawful, for there is no provision in the Act which expressly or by implication forbids a contract for sale of agricultural.lands between two agriculturists. Nor is the object of the agreement to defeat the provisions of any law. The Act has imposed no restriction upon the transfer of agricultural lands from one agriculturist to another.\n\nIt is true that by s. 35 a person who comes to hold, -after the appointed day, agricultural land in excess of the ceiling, the lands having been acquired either by purchase, assignment, lease, surrender or by beg_uest, the acquisition in excess of the ceiling is invalid. The expression \"acquisition of such excess land shall be invalid\" may appear somewhat ambiguous. But when the scheme of the Act is examined, it is clear that the Legislature has not declared the transfer or bequest invalid, for s. 84C provides that\n\nthe land in excess of the ceiling shall be at the disposal of the Government when an order is made by the Mamlatdar. The invalidity of the acquisition is therefore only to the extent to which the holding exceeds the ceiling prescribed by s. 5, and involves the consequence that the land will vest in the Government.\n\ni By the acquisition declared invalid under s. 35, the land does not revert to the transferor or the testator; the land is deemed to be of the ownership of the person acquiring it by transfer or by bequest andon the Mamlatdar making the order, the land in excess of the ceiling vests in the Government. It only will mean\n\nthat the purchaser will not be entitled ta hold the land in excess . E of the ceiling and the excess will be at the disposal of the Government.\n\nAn agreement to sell land does not under the Transfer of Property Act create any interest in the land in the purchaser. By agreeing to purchase la'nd, a person cannot be said in law to hold that land. It is Ol)ly when land is conveyed to the purchaser that he holds that land. Undoubtedly the respondent was holding some area of land at the date of the agreement and at the date of the suit, but on that account it cannot be inferred that by agreeing to purchase \\and under the agreement in question his object was to hold in excess of the ceiling. It was open to the respondent to transfer or dispose of the land held by him to another agriculturist. The Act contins no general restrictions upon such transfers, and unless at the date of the acquisition the transferee holds land in excess . of the ceiling, the acquisition to the extent of the excess over the ceiling will' not be invalid. There is nothing in the agreement, nor can it be implied from the circumstances, that it was the object of the parties that the provisions of the Act relating to the ceiling should be transgressed.\n\nThe mere possibility that the respondent may not have disposed of his original holding at the date of the acquisition of title pur:\n\nJ, A.MBU RAO v. NEMINATH (Shah, J.) 711\n\nsuant to the agreement entered into between hinl and the appellant will •not, in our judgmeut, render the object of the agreement such, that, if permitted, • it would defeat the provisions of any law.\n\nThe Court, it is true, will not enforce a contract which is expressly or inlpliedly prohibited by statute, whatever may be the intention of the parties, but there is nothing to indicate .that the Legislature has prohibited a contract to transfer land betv<een one 11griculturist and another. The inability of the transferee to hold land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the\n\nstatute; has no effect upon the contract, or the operation of the transfer.\n\nThe statutory forfeiture incurred in the event of the transferee coming to hold land in excess of the ceiling does not invalidate the transfer between the parties.\n\nWe hold that a oontract for purchase of land entered into with the knowledge that the purchaser may hold land in excess of the ceiling is not void, and the seller callilot resist enforcement thereof on the ground that, if pennitted, it will result in transgression of the law.\n\nThere is no substance in the argument that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decree a suit for specific performance of an agreement tq sell land. Section 70 of the Act sets out the duties and functions of the Mamlatdar and, amongst the duties and functions which the Mamlatdar for the purpose of the Act shall discharge or perform is the duty and function to decide under s. 84C whether a transfer or acquisition of land is invalid and to dispose of the land as provided in s. 84C .. Section 85 of the Act excludes from the jurisdiction of the civil court proceedings to settle, decide or deal with questions which are required by s. 70 (mb) to be settled, decided or dealt with by the authorities specified in that behalf. Power to decide whether the transfer or acquisition is invalid under s. 84C and to dispose of the land as provided in that section is undoubtedly conferred upon the Mamlatdar, and the civil court has .no jurisdiction in that behalf.\n\nBut there is nothing in cl. (mb) of s. 70 which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil cdurt to entertain a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land. An inquiry under s. 84C to determine whether the transfer or acquisition is invalid m'y be made only after the acquisitjon of title pursuant to a decree for specific perfonnlince or otherwise. The civil court has no juris• diction to detennine whether the acquisition is invalid, but there is nothing in s. 70 or in other provisions of the Act which excludes the civil court's jurisdiction to decree specific perfonnance of a contract to transfer land.\n\nThe apPeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissM. 8SupC1/68-6", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "NEMINA.Ill APPAYYA HANAMMANNAVER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEMINATH APPAYYA HANAMMANNAVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ 706\n\nJAMBU RAO SATAl'l'A KOCBEIU\n\nNEMINA.Ill APPAYYA HANAMMANNAVER\n\nApril 10, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Mysore granted a decree for specific performance."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2985, "end_char": 2990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An inquiry under s. 84C to determine whether the transfer .or\n\nJAMBU llAO V. NEMINATH (Shah, J.) 707\n\nA acquisition is inv:ilid may be made only after the acquisition of tiUe p'1t>Uant to a decree for specific performanee or otherwise. ["}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and deaee dated August 20, 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Chagla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, B. P. Singh and R. B. Datar, for the , appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3566, "end_char": 3577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, B. P. Singh and R. B. Datar, for the , appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla, B. P. Singh and R. B. Datar, for the , appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, N. D. Mandigi and Bhuvanesh Kumari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "N. D. Mandigi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, N. D. Mandigi and Bhuvanesh Kumari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bhuvanesh Kumari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, N. D. Mandigi and Bhuvanesh Kumari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSllah, J. The appellant agreed to sell to the respondent Survey Nos."}}, {"text": "Pattihal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 & 12 of village Pattihal in District Belgaum, Mysore\n\nState, admeasuring 41 acres 26 gunthas of jirayat land for Rs."}}, {"text": "Belgaum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 & 12 of village Pattihal in District Belgaum, Mysore\n\nState, admeasuring 41 acres 26 gunthas of jirayat land for Rs."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 & 12 of village Pattihal in District Belgaum, Mysore\n\nState, admeasuring 41 acres 26 gunthas of jirayat land for Rs."}}, {"text": "Court of D the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant having failed to execute a conveyance of the land, the respondent commenced an action in the Court of D the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, for a decree for specific performance of the agreement and for possession of the land."}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4311, "end_char": 4358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5054, "end_char": 5058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "Whether enforcement of the contract would result in transgression of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6163, "end_char": 6171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act it has the same meaning which it has under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6179, "end_char": 6268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tenancy Act it has the same meaning which it has under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Tenancy Act it has the same meaning which it has under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6376, "end_char": 6406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6408, "end_char": 6418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6762, "end_char": 6772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6868, "end_char": 6874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "section 84B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7291, "end_char": 7302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Where in respect of the transfer of acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "Where in respect of the transfer of acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "July 20, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8357, "end_char": 8370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was dated July 20, 1958."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 1, 1960 the respondent filed a statement in the Court that, barring lands which were liable to be excluded in determining whether the holding exceeded the ceiling, he was in possession of 11 acres 1 guntha of jirayat land."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9946, "end_char": 9951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10795, "end_char": 10800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11276, "end_char": 11282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11536, "end_char": 11540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11659, "end_char": 11664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12127, "end_char": 12151, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14841, "end_char": 14847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14943, "end_char": 14949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14953, "end_char": 14963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15100, "end_char": 15105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15262, "end_char": 15268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15463, "end_char": 15468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 84C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15610, "end_char": 15616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15897, "end_char": 15902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_712_723_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC. v.\n\nMADHA VRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND AND ORS. ETC.\n\nApril 10, 1968\n\n[M. lln>AYATULLAH, C.J., J, c. SHAH, s. M. SIKRI,\n\nR. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nG. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM .\n\nAND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]\n\nConstitution 'of Jndic, 1950, Art. JIB-Maharashtra Act 13 of 1962 amending the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961)-1961 Act mentioned In Ninth Schedule, but not amending Act-Amending Act if protected by Art, JIB-Seventeenth Amendment, if valid-Entry 35, of List II of Seventh Schedule-Scope of-Order passed under Defence of India Rules, r. 12SB-lf overrides s. 28 of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961.\n\nThe Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, as amended by Act 13 of J962, was passed for securing the distri bution of agricultural land to subserve the common good by imposing a ceiling on the holding of agricultural land. Section 28 of the Act is, intt7 alia, concerned with ensuring supply of sugarcane to factories and\n\nensurin~ that the persons to whom surplus land is granted, after it has vested 1n the State Government, also supply it at fair price.\n\nThe Godavari Sugar Mills was a public limited company owning two factories fOlr the manufacture of sugar and allied prequels and held large area• of land for the purpese of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories.\n\nJn proceedings under the Act, large areas of land held by the Mills were declared surplus. The valid'ty of the Act was challenged on the following grounds: (I) Article 31B does not protect the Amending Act 13 of 1962 from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights, because, in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, only the Maharaahtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, was included and not the Amending Act of 1962, (2) Jn spite of the detjsion of this Court in Go/ak Nath v. State of Puniab, (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, the Seventeenth Amendment is invalid; (3) The State Legislature was not competent to enact the impugned Act; and ( 4) The order passed by the Sta•e Govern. ment under r. l 25B of the Defence of India Rules.· teserving certain areas for the factories mentioned by the schedule to the order--One of which was Mills-and prohibWng (a) the working of certain power crushers, (b) the export of sugarcane from the reserved areas except in accordance with a permit issued by the Collector, and (c) the purchof sugarcane for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of growers of sugarcane except in accorda'lce with a permit issued by the Collector, rendered ineffective s. 28 of the impugned Act.\n\nHELD: (I) Even on a strict interpretation of Art. 31B the only requirement laid down by the Article for protecting an enactment from challenge on the ground . of violation of fundamental rights is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule. Ordinarily, if an Act is referred to by its title, it means the Act with all the amendments made in it up to the date of reference, and there is no reason for not applying this rule of interpretation to the Ninth Schedule. Certain amending Acts are, no doubt, mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, but the only reason for\n\nMAHARASHTRA V. PATILCHAND 713\n\nA inserting them expressly was that some States, out of abundant caution, recommended their amending Acts to be specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. (719 D-E, F, H; 720 C-D]\n\nObservations in Shri Ram Narain v. Tlw Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd., [1956) S.C.R. 603, 614, explained.\n\n(2) The result arrived at in Go/aknath's case was that the Se..., nteenth Amendment was valid and this result is binding on this Bench of this Court. (721 CJ\n\n( 3) The impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with respect to Entry 18 of List II which deals with 'Land etc.' and Entry 42 of List ID, which deals with 'Acquisition and Requisition of Property.' Section. 28 itself falls within Entry 35 of List II which deals with 'Works, laru!S and buildill,11> vested in or in the po!ISOSSion of the State,' as that section only C deals with lands which have vested in the State. The'refore, the State Legislature was competent to pass the enactment. [721 F-0; 722 A.CJ\n\n( 4) If an order made under the Defence of India Rules is in conJlict with the provisions of s. 28 of the impugned Act, the order would ovemde the section. But the order passed by the State Government, in the instant case, was not in conllict with the section and the two could stand together. (722 G-Hl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2239 to 2250 of 1966.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated October 25; 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 970, 884, 692, 963, 959 and 1124 to 1130 of 1963 and Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated March 9, 10, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, M. S. K: Sastri and S. P.\n\nNayar, for the appellant (in C.A. Nos. 2239 to 2250 of 1966).\n\nF. S. Nariman, D. S. Nargo/kar and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966).\n\nR. V. S. Mani, for intervener No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2239 of G 1966).\n\nD. P. Singh, for intervener No. 2 (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966).\n\nF. S. Nariman, Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Part\"4sarathy, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).\n\nH C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967). ·\n\nS, K. Mehta, for the intervener (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).\n\n114 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 and Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966. In September 1963, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) in the B High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the validity of the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961) as amended by Maharashtra Act Xffi of 1962-hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act.\n\nThe first appellant is a public limited company and ciwns two factories for the manufacture of sugar and allied products situate at Taluka Kopergaon in Ahmednagar District C of the State. of Maharashtra. The first appellant also held large areas of land in several villages in Taluka Kopergaon for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories. In the proceedings under the impugned Act large areas held by the first appellant were declared surplus.\n\nVarious persons had earlier filed similar petitions in the High I> Court challenging the validity of the impugned t. The High Court by Its judgment dated October 25, 1963, disposed of them.\n\nThe High Court held that \"the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings)• Act, 1961, is a valid piece of legislaticin and Within the competence of the State Legislature to enaet, except that the provisions of s. 2.8 thereof offend Art. 14 of the Constitu- E tion and are void.\n\nThe effect of our decision however would not be to entitle the petitioners to get any declaration that their lands which are held by an induStrial undertaking are exempt from the operation of the Act nor that the orders passed by the first respondent on the 28th of February 1963 are null. and vold and have no legal effect. The lands will vest in the State but they F will not be entitled to deal With the lands under any of the provisions of s. 28.\" The High Court, subject to the above declaration, dismissed the petitions. The State having obtained certificates of fitness under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution filed appeals Nos. CA 2239-2250 of 1966 against the above mentioned judgment.\n\nG After this judgment, the Constitution was amended by the Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964-hereinafter referred to as the Seventeenth Amendment-which came into force on June 20, 1964. This amendment included 44 more Acts, as items 21 to 64, in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. Item 34 in the Schedule as amended reads :\n\n\"Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961).\n\nMAHAllASHTRA v. PAT!LCHAND (Sikri, J.) Tl 5\n\nThe petition of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) was dismissed by the High Coun by its judgment dated March 10, 1965. The High Coun held that the Seventeenth Amendmen.t had put s. 28 and other provisions of the impugned Act beyond challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or take away or abridge any fundamental rights. The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962, and the Rules made thereunder.\n\nThe appellants having obtained certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(a) have appealed. ·\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, who .appears for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 and for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966 submits the following.points before as:\n\n( 1) That Art. 3 lB does not protect from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights the provisions of Acts amending the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Acts, 1961, as originally enacted :\n\n(2) That the Seventeenth Amendment in spite of the decision of this Court in I. C. Go/ak Nath v. State of P11njab(') is invalid;\n\n(3) That the State Legislature was not competent to enact the impugned Act in so far as it affects sugarcane farms held by Industrial undertakings and lands on 'vhich sugarcane is grown; and\n\n(4) That the Defence of India Act (LI of 1962) and the Rules made thereunder override or render in effective s. 28 of the impugned Acl\n\nIn order to appreciate the points raised before us it is necessary to notice the scheme of the impugned Act and set out the ;:elevant provisions.\n\nThe preamble of the impugned Act gives broadly the general purpose of the Act. It reads :\n\n\"Whereas, for securing the distribution of agricul tural land as best to subserve the common _good, it is expedient in the public interest to impose a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling, and for. the distribution thereof to landless and other persons; and for\n\nII) (1967 2S.C.R. 762.\n\nl .!\n\n' '\n\nmatters connected with the purposes aforesaid; it is A hereby enacted •.•• \"\n\nThe provisions of the impugned Act carry out these objectives by imposing a ceiling on holding of land (Chapter II) and determination, declaration and vesting of surplus land (Chapter IV).\n\nChapter V deals with determination and payment of compensation. Chapter VI deals with distribution of surplus land. Chap- B ter VII is concemed with procedure and appeal, and in-Chapter VIII various miscellaneous provisions are made. We may notice s. 21, s. 27 and s. 28 in detail. lfnder s. 21 the Collector makes a declaration stating therein his decision, inter alia, on the area, description and full particulars of the land which is delimited as surplus land. Under sub-s. (2) the Collector notifies this area, C and under sub-s. ( 4) after a lapse of a certain time the Collector takes possession of the land which is delimited as surplus. The elfect of thus taking possession, in brief, is that '.'the surplus land shall be deemed to be a<; guired by the State GOvernment for the purposes of the Act and shall accordingly vest fu the State Govem ment.\" Section 27 directs distribution of surplus land in the I> of priority set out in sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and (5), For instance, sub-s. (2) gives priority to a tenant who was rendered . landless because the person to whom the surplus land belonged had resumed land from his tenant for pel'SQnal cultivation under any tenancy law.\n\nSub-s. (5) provides: \"(5) Thereafter all surplus land (including surplus land which has not been gran~ under sub-section\n\n(2) or ( 3) . or ( 4) shall be olfered in the following order of priority, that is to say,-\n\n. (i) a petson from whom any land has been resumed by his landlord for pel'SQnal cultivation under any tenancy Jaw .and who in consequence thereof has been rendered landless, provided that such persQn is a resident of the village in which die surplils land for distri~ blition is si\"!ate, or within five miles thereof; ( i-a) serving members of the armed forces, and ex servicemen;\n\n. (ib) a joint fanning society or a farming society, the members of which answer to any of the following descriptions, namely :-\n\n(i) serving members of the aniled forces,\n\n(ii) ex-servicemen,\n\n(iii) agriculfural labourers,\n\n(iv) landless persons, or ( v) small holders;\n\nProvided that the majority of members of such society are serving members of the armed forces or exservicemen;\n\n(ii) a joint farming society, the members of which answer to the one or more of the following descriptions, namely:- agricultural labourer or landless person or\n\nsmall holder;\n\n(iii) a farming society, the members of which answer to the one or more of the following descriptions, namely:·-\n\nagricultural labourer or landless person or small holder;\".\n\nSection 28 which is the subject matter of special attack D provides:\n\n\"28 (1) Where any land held by an industrial undertaking is acquired by, and vests in, the State Government under section 21, such land being land which wail being used for the purpose of producing or providing raw material for the manufact\\lre or produc- 1: tion of any goods, articles or commodities by the undertaking, the State Goveniinent shall take particular care to ensure that the 3C'1Uisition of the land does not affect adversely the production and supply of raw material from the land to the undertaking.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding any'lhing contained in section 27, but subject to any rule8 made in this behalf, for the purpose of so ensuring the continuance of the supply of such raw material . to the undertaking, and generally for the full and efficient use of the land for agriculture and its efficient management, the State GoVemment-\n\n( a) may, if it is in the opinion . of that Government necessary for the purpose aforesaid (such opinion being formed after considering . the representation of persons interested therein) maintain the integrity of the area so acquired, in one or more compact blocks; - and\n\n(b) may, subject to such terms and conditions (including in particular, conditions which are calculated to ensure the full and continuous supply of raw mate- riai to the Ulldertaking, at a fair price), grant the land,\n\n718 SUPl.EMB COUl.T llBPO&TS [1968] 3 S.C.ll\n\nor any part thereof, to a joint farming socioty (or a member thereof) consisting as far as possib~ of-\n\n( i) persons who had previously leased such land to the undertaking,\n\n(ii) agricultural labour (if any) employed by the undertaking on such !and,\n\n(iii) technical or other stall engaged by the undertaking on such land, or in relation: to the production of any raw ll!aterial,\n\n(iv) adjoining landholders who are small holders, ( v) landless persons :\n\nProvided that, the State Government may- ( a) for such period as is necessary for the setting up of joint farming societies as aforesaid, being not more than three years in the first instance (extensible to a further period not exceeding two years} from the date of taking possession of the land, direct that the .land acquired, or any part thereof, shall be cultivated by one or more fanns run or managed by the State, or by one or more corporations (including a company) owned or controlled by the State;\n\n(b) grant to the landlord so much of the surplus land leased by him to the undertaking, which together with any other land held by him does not exceed the ceiling area (but if the landtord be a public trust and and major portion of the income from t.he land is being appropriated for purposes of education or edical relief, grant the entire land to the public trust} on condition that the landlord, or as the case may be, the public trust lease the land to a farm or corporation described in clause (a) aforesaid, and thereafter, in the case of a landlord (not being a public trust) that he becomes a member of the joint farming society, and in the of a public trust, that it lease the lafid to a joint farming society. ( 3) The State Government may provide that,- ( a) for the breach of any term oi condition referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2), or\n\n(b) if the landlord to whom the land is granted fails to lease the land to the farm or corporation or to become a member of a joint farming society; Qr ( c) if it considers after such inquiry &j it thinks fit, that the production and supply of raw material to\n\n;--\"\n\n, F\n\nthe undertaking is not maintained at the level or in the manner which, with proper and efficient management it ought to be maintained, or\n\n( d) Jor any other reason it is undesirable in the interest ci~ the full and efficient cultivation of the land, that the joint farming society should continue to cultivate the land, the grant shall, after giving three months' notice of termination thereof and after giving the other party reasonable opportunity of showing cause, be terminated, and the land resumed.\n\nThereafter, the State Government may make such other arrangements as it thinks fit for the proper cultivation of the land and maintenance of the production and supply of raw material to the undertaking.\"\n\nRegarding the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that Art. 3 lB does protect the impugned Act from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights.\n\nThere is no doubt that Art. 3 lB should be interpreted strictly. But even interpreting it strictly, the only requirement which is laid down by Art. 31B is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nNow the question arises whether the impugned Act has been specified in the Ninth Schedule or not. It is true that what is mentioned in entry 34 of the Ninth Schedule is \"The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961)\" which may be referred to as the Principal Act. and no mention is made of the Amending Act, namely, Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962. Ordinarily if an Act is referred to by its title, it is intended to refer to that Act with all the amendments made in it upto the date of reference.\n\nFor instance, the Constitution refers to 'the General Clauses Act, 1897, in Art. 367. This Article provides that \"unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897. shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Ariicle 372, apply for the interpretation cif this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.\" If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted it would mean that for the purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution the General Clauses Act, as originally enacted in 1897, would alone be taken into consideration.\n\nWe can hardly imagine that this was the intention of the Constit11tion makers.\n\nFurther, when one refers to the Code of Civil Procedure or the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code one ordinarily means to refer to them as amended up to date.\n\nThere is no reason why this ordinary manner of referring to Act>\n\nshould not be borne in mind while interpreting the Ninth Schedule.\n\nIt is true that some amending Acts are mentioned in the Nmth Schedule apart from the principal Acts. For example, the Madras Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) is mentioned in item 9, while the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1950 (Madras Act I of 1950) is mentioned in item 10. Further item 20 specifically mentions the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act XXI of 1948), as amended by West Bengal Act XXIX of 1951.\n\nBut then there ate many other Acts which had be•:n amended before they were inserted in the Ninth Schedule, anc; Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Acts as original!y passed and not the amendments made up to the date of their incorporation into the Ninth Schedule. The. reason for this express insertion of certain amending Acts seems to be that some States, out of abundant caution, recommended that their amending Acts be specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. It is true that for some purposes an amending Act retains its jndividua!ity, as observed by Jagannadhadas, J., in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. (1) :\n\n\"In the present case what we are concerned with is not the meaning of any particular phrase or provision of the Act after the amendment but the effect of the amending provisions in their relation to and effect on other statutory provisions outside the Act.\n\nFor such a purpose the amendment cannot obviously be treated as having been part of the original Act itself so as to enable the doctrine to be called in aid that a later Act overrides an earlier Act.\"\n\nThese observations, however, do not lead to the conclusion that when an Act is referred to by its title it is not intended to include the amendments made in it.\n\nAccordingly we must overrule the first submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that Art. 3 lB protects the impugned Act including the amendments made in it upto the date of its incorporation into the Ninth Schedule.\n\nThe impugned Act cannot, therefore, be challenged on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. We, accord-. ingly, agree with the High Court that s. 28 which was originally held by the High Court to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution is now protected under Art. 31B from attack on the ground that it infringes Art. 14.\n\n(I) (19S6] S. C.R. 603, 614.\n\nComing to the second point, the learned counsel merely mentions the point.\n\nHe says that there was no majority for any particular ratio as five Judges held the Seventeenth Amendment to be void because it contravened Art. 13(2), but by applying the doctrine of \"prospective overruling\" they declared that their decision would not affect the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment.\n\nHidayatullah, J., as he then was, on the other hand did not apply the doctrine of \"prospective overruling\", but held s. 3 ( 2) of the Seventeenth Amendment to be bad. The other five Judges held that the Seventeenth Amendment was a valid amendment of the Constitution.\n\nWe are, however, bound by the result arrived at by this Court in that decision and the result that the Seventeenth Amendment is valid is binding on us.\n\nWe may mention that Mr. Mani, appearing for one of the interveners, also raised this point but ultimately asked for permission to be allowed to withdraw 'the point.\n\nComing to the third point, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that s. 28 is a law with respect to entry 52 of List I, and therefore beyond the competence of the State Legislature.\n\nThe entry reads thus :\n\n\"52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.\" He points out that one of the industries specified in the Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV of 1951) is \"sugar''. He says that the whole object of s. 28 of the impugned Act with regard to lands held by industrial undertakings who were producing sugarcane was to ensure the production of sugarcane and its supply to the sugar factories and this object falls squarely within entry 52, List I. In the alternative he urges that the State Legislature had no authority to legislate adversely on matters falling within item 52. There is no doubt that the impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with respect to entry 18 of List II and entry 42 of List III. These entries read\n\nas follows:\n\n\"Entry 18, List II : Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural Joans; colonization.\n\nEntry 42, List III : Acquisition and Requisition of property.\" It is' no tseriously disputed that apan from s_. 28 the rest of the impugned Act is a law with respect to entry 18, List II and entry 42 List III. .\n\nIt is not necessary to consider whether s. 28 can be sustaini:d -0n the ground that it is an ancillary or subsidiary matter to the Jaw made under entry 18 List II and entry 42, List III, for, in our .opinion, s. 28 falls within entry 35 list II, which reads :\n\n\"Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State.\" It will be noticed that s. 28 only deals with lands which have vested ip the State.\n\nThere cannot be any doubt that the Stat\" Legislature is competent to enact provisions regarding the production and supply of raw materials from land which bas vested in the Stale and for the full and efficient use of such 'land and ic; efficient management.\n\nComing now to the last point, the learned counsel for the appellants urges that by virtue of Art. 251 of the Constitution s. 28 can no longer be effective as it is repugnant to the Defence of India •Act and the Rules made thereunder. He says that under s. 3(2) (26) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, the Central Government is enabled to make orders providing for \"the control of agriculture (including the cultivation of agricultural land and crops to be raised therein) for the purpose of increasing the pro duction and supply of foodgrains and other essential agricultural products.\" By notificalion dated October 30, 1963, the Govern· ment of Maharashtra made an order whereby it \"reserved each of the areas specified in coJumn ( 3) of the Schedule hereto annexed for the factory respectively specified against it in column (2) thereof'', and made other provisions regarding the purchase and export of sugarcane. In the Schedule the following areas wr~ made reserved areas for the appellant, the Godavari Sugar Mills Limited: ;'Areas comprised within the limits of the following talukas. ·\n\n(i) Kopergaon of Ahmednagar District.\n\n(ii) Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District.\"\n\nThis order was made by the Government of Maharashtra in the exercise of its powers under r. 125-B of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nThe learned counsel is right that to the extent valid orders made under the Defence of India Rules conflict with the provisions in s. 28, the orders would override s. 28 of the impugned Act. But it has not been shown to us on the material available here how the order dated October 30, 1963, is in conflict withs. 28.\n\nThe order first reserves certain areas for the factories mentioned in the Sche dule, and then prohibits the working of certain power crushers and also prohibits the export of sugarcane from the reserved area;\n\nMAHARASHTRA V. PAT!LCHAND (Sikri, J.) 723\n\nexcept in accordance with a pennit issued by the Collector of the District. It furtjler prohibits the purchase of sugarc1111e for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or jaggery by a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of growers of sugarcane except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the CoJ!ector.\n\nSection 28, inter alia, is concerned with ensuring the supply of sugarcane to the factories and ensuring that the persons to whom -the land is granted also supply it at fair price. It seems to us that the provisions of s. 28 can stand together with the order dated October 30, 1963. In our opinion there .is no force in the point raised by the learned counsel.\n\nIn the result Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 is dismissed. The other appeals (Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966) are allowed, judgment of the High Court, insofar as it declared s. 28 void, set aside and the petitions out of which these appeals arose dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nC.A. No. 694 of 1967 dismissed,\n\nother appeals allowed.", "total_entities": 133, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MADHA VRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADHAVRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. 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Thakore", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5467, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Part\"4sarathy, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "B. Part\"4sarathy,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5485, "end_char": 5502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Part\"4sarathy, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "H C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5589, "end_char": 5600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. P.\n\nNayar"}}, {"text": "K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S, K. Mehta, for the intervener (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6098, "end_char": 6134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1642 of 1963) in the B High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the validity of the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961) as amended by Maharashtra Act Xffi of 1962-hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6237, "end_char": 6266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ahmednagar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellant is a public limited company and ciwns two factories for the manufacture of sugar and allied products situate at Taluka Kopergaon in Ahmednagar District C of the State."}}, {"text": "Taluka Kopergaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellant also held large areas of land in several villages in Taluka Kopergaon for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories."}}, {"text": "October 25, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various persons had earlier filed similar petitions in the High I> Court challenging the validity of the impugned t. The High Court by Its judgment dated October 25, 1963, disposed of them."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7231, "end_char": 7235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "statute": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "statute": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961"}}, {"text": "28th of February 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of our decision however would not be to entitle the petitioners to get any declaration that their lands which are held by an induStrial undertaking are exempt from the operation of the Act nor that the orders passed by the first respondent on the 28th of February 1963 are null."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7744, "end_char": 7749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8080, "end_char": 8099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 20, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8178, "end_char": 8191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G After this judgment, the Constitution was amended by the Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964-hereinafter referred to as the Seventeenth Amendment-which came into force on June 20, 1964."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8257, "end_char": 8271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1964", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1964"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8403, "end_char": 8432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 10, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8641, "end_char": 8655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1642 of 1963) was dismissed by the High Coun by its judgment dated March 10, 1965."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8716, "end_char": 8721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "statute": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9317, "end_char": 9323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "The High Court also held that the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot the Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"Whereas, for securing the distribution of agricul tural land as best to subserve the common _good, it is expedient in the public interest to impose a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling, and for."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11176, "end_char": 11181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11186, "end_char": 11191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11210, "end_char": 11215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11781, "end_char": 11791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13443, "end_char": 13453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14074, "end_char": 14084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17844, "end_char": 17850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17973, "end_char": 17979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18093, "end_char": 18101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18145, "end_char": 18159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18237, "end_char": 18251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18313, "end_char": 18327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18400, "end_char": 18429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18757, "end_char": 18782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18787, "end_char": 18795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18868, "end_char": 18893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19288, "end_char": 19307, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19490, "end_char": 19517, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19556, "end_char": 19573, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19753, "end_char": 19767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXVI of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19954, "end_char": 19977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20069, "end_char": 20088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act I of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20090, "end_char": 20110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20179, "end_char": 20230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20232, "end_char": 20247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20276, "end_char": 20291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20399, "end_char": 20413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Act", "statute": "West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20420, "end_char": 20490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20588, "end_char": 20602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Act", "statute": "Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Act"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20792, "end_char": 20806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Act", "statute": "Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Act"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20900, "end_char": 20913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that for some purposes an amending Act retains its jndividua!ity, as observed by Jagannadhadas, J., in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. (1) :\n\n\"In the present case what we are concerned with is not the meaning of any particular phrase or provision of the Act after the amendment but the effect of the amending provisions in their relation to and effect on other statutory provisions outside the Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21722, "end_char": 21728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21838, "end_char": 21852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21936, "end_char": 21955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22028, "end_char": 22033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22089, "end_char": 22096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22140, "end_char": 22148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22193, "end_char": 22200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22449, "end_char": 22459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22613, "end_char": 22625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, on the other hand did not apply the doctrine of \"prospective overruling\", but held s. 3 ( 2) of the Seventeenth Amendment to be bad.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22730, "end_char": 22734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23059, "end_char": 23063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention that Mr. Mani, appearing for one of the interveners, also raised this point but ultimately asked for permission to be allowed to withdraw 'the point."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23280, "end_char": 23285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23617, "end_char": 23666, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23727, "end_char": 23732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24153, "end_char": 24158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24775, "end_char": 24780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24944, "end_char": 24949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25094, "end_char": 25099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25507, "end_char": 25515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25536, "end_char": 25541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25667, "end_char": 25674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25687, "end_char": 25713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25719, "end_char": 25737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says that under s. 3(2) (26) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, the Central Government is enabled to make orders providing for \"the control of agriculture (including the cultivation of agricultural land and crops to be raised therein) for the purpose of increasing the pro duction and supply of foodgrains and other essential agricultural products.\""}}, {"text": "October 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26023, "end_char": 26039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By notificalion dated October 30, 1963, the Govern· ment of Maharashtra made an order whereby it \"reserved each of the areas specified in coJumn ( 3) of the Schedule hereto annexed for the factory respectively specified against it in column (2) thereof'', and made other provisions regarding the purchase and export of sugarcane."}}, {"text": "Godavari Sugar Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26414, "end_char": 26442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Schedule the following areas wr~ made reserved areas for the appellant, the Godavari Sugar Mills Limited: ;'Areas comprised within the limits of the following talukas. ·"}}, {"text": "Kopergaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26513, "end_char": 26522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) Kopergaon of Ahmednagar District."}}, {"text": "Shrirampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26553, "end_char": 26563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District.\""}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26567, "end_char": 26585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District.\""}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26616, "end_char": 26641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was made by the Government of Maharashtra in the exercise of its powers under r. 125-B of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26850, "end_char": 26855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26883, "end_char": 26888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA V. PAT!LCHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27248, "end_char": 27273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order first reserves certain areas for the factories mentioned in the Sche dule, and then prohibits the working of certain power crushers and also prohibits the export of sugarcane from the reserved area;\n\nMAHARASHTRA V. PAT!LCHAND (Sikri, J.) 723\n\nexcept in accordance with a pennit issued by the Collector of the District."}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27637, "end_char": 27647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27856, "end_char": 27861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28177, "end_char": 28182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_724_733_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "AMRIT LAL GOVERDHAN LALAN v.\n\nSTATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE & ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH AND V. RAMASWAM!, JJ.J\n\nIndian Contract Act (9 of 1872), ss. 133, 135 and 141-Variance in -tern\"iS of contract-When to be infe\"ed-'Promise to give time to prin•\n\ncipal debtor', in s. 135-What amounts t<>-Scope of s. 141.\n\nIn February 1956, respondents 3 to 6, as partners of respondent 2 firm, .entered into an agreement with a Bank (Predecessor-in.tnterest of the first\n\nMipondent-bank), undertaking to open in the Bank a cash credit account to the extent of Rs. I 00,000 to be secured by goods to be pledged with the llMlk. Clause 9 of the agreement provided that the borrowers shall be responsible for quantity and quality of goods pledged. The appellant executed a letter of guarantee in favour of the Bank guaranteeing the liabi lily of the borrowers in respect of the account upto a limit Rs. I 00,000.\n\nUnder cl. 5 of the letter of guarantee, the appellant agreed that the Bank may enforce and recover upon the guarantee the full amount guaranteed notwithstanding any other security the Bank may hold. The weekly statement dated 15th March 1957 showed that the stock pledged was valued at about Rs. 99,991 but when the quantity of the goods actually in stock was verified with the weekly statement dated 18th April 1957, shortage of goods to the value of Rs. 35,690 was found. It was admitted on behalf of the Bank that. it was not known how the shortage occurred arid that res pondenll! 2 tu 6 must have taken away the goods. Respondents 2 to 6 were granted one month's time to make up the deficit, and in spite of the time being extended, the deficit was neyer made up. In May 1958, after adjusting the money realised. on the sale of the goods pledged and other adjustments, a sum of Rs. 40,933.58 was found due to the Bank from respondents 2 to 6. The Bank filed a suit against them and the appellant, and the suit was decreed. The decree was confirmed by the High Court.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (I) Certain entries in the account books .of the Bank showed that the maximum limit of credit was reduced to Rs. 50,000 and again raised to Rs. 100,000 without consulting the appellant, that therefore there was a variation in the terms of the contract without the surety's (appellant's) consent and, under s. 133 of the Indian Con\"ract Act the liability of the appellant was discharged;\n\n(2) Under s. 135 of the Act, the conduct of the Bank in giving time to respondents 2 to 6 to make up the deficit in the quantity of goods absolved the appellant of all liability; and (3) under s. 141 of the Act, sin<\" a portion of the security was parted with or l<><t by the creditor without surety's consent, the liab'lity of the appellant was discharged to the extent of the value of the security so lost.\n\nHELD : (I) The entries in the books of account were mere internal instructions not legally binding on the respondents, and in view of the formal record in the original agreement and letter of guarantee. there could not have been a varia•ion in the terms without a proper written agreement.\n\nTherefore. the're wac; no variance in the terms of the contract between the creditor and the mincioal debtor and the provisions of s. 133 of the Act were not attracted. [729 B-C. El\n\n(2) What really ronstitutes a promise to give time within the meaning of s. 135 of the Act is the extension of the period at which, the principal debtor was uy the original contract obliged to pay the creditor, by substituting a new and valid contract between them, or, whenewr the taldng of a new secunty from the principal debtor operates as giving time. There'fore, the act of the Bank in giving time to the principal deb!or to make up the quantity of goods pledged is not tantamount to giving of time to the principal debtor for making payment of the money, within the meaning of the section. [730 E-F]\n\nRouse v. Broad/ord Banking Co. (1894] 2 Ch. 32, referred to.\n\n(3) Under s. 140 of the Contract Act the surety is, on payment of the amount due by the principal debtor, entitled to be put in the same position in which the creditor stood in relation to the principal debtor.\n\nUnder s. 141 of the Act the surety has a right to the securities held by the creditor at the date when he became surety.\n\nThe word 'security' is not used in any technical senSe and includes all rights which the creditor bas against the prope'rty at the date of the contract.\n\nTherefore, if the creditor has lost or parted with the security without the consent of the surety, the la tier is by the express provision conained in s. 141. discharJ:eci to the extent of the value of the security lost or parted with. [731 F; 732 D-F; 733 C-DJ In the present case, the shortage of goods of the value of Rs. 35,690 was brought about by the negligence of the Bank and to that extent there must be deemed to be a loss by the Bank of the securty which the Bank had at the time when the contract of sure y was entered into; and there is nothing in cl. 5 of the letter of guarantee to indica e that the appellant was not entitled to invoke the provisions of s. 14 J • The words •any other security' in the clause meant any secur; ty ot'ir than the pledge of goods mentioned in the prima'ry agreement. Tierefore. the principle of the section applies and the surety was dischar!!ed of his liability to the Bank to the extent of Rs. 35.690. [731 D, E; 733 E-F]\n\nState of M.P. v. Kaluram, [1967) l S.C.R. 266. followed.\n\nWulff and Billing v. Jay, L.R. [1872) 7 Q.B. 756, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 930 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1963 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 444 of 1960.\n\nK. Viswanatha Iyer, Kutty Krishna Meno11 and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, H. L. Anand, and K. B.\n\nMehta, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment. of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated September 11, 1963 in 1-ppeal Suit No. 444 of 1960.\n\nOn February 27, 1956 respondents 3 to 6, as partners of respondent No. 2 firm, entered into an aereement with the then Trav:incore Forward Bank Ltd. undertaking to open in the books\n\nof the Bank at Ernakulam a C-ash Credit Account to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000 to remain in force until closed by the Bank and to be secured by goods to be pledged with e Bank. The said respondents also agreed that if they failed or glected to repay the Bank on demand the amount due to the Bankjt shall be lawful for the Bank, without any notice to them, to sell or otherwise dispose of all securities, either by pul;>lic auction or by private contract and to apply the' net proceeds of such sale towards the liquidation of the debt. It was also agreed that if any balance was still left the Bank shall be at liberty to apply any other money in the hands of the Bank standing to the credit of the said respondents towards repayment of the debt. The agreement between the Bank and the said respondents is Ex. P 1. By cl. 2 of the document the borrowers agreed not to pledge or encumber the security nor permit any act whereby the security hereinbefore expressed to be given to the bank shall be in any way prejudicially affected.\n\nClause 3 provided as fo]!ows :\n\n\"That the Borrowers shall with the consent of the Bank be at liberty from time to time to withdraw any of the goods for the time being pledged to the Bank and forming part of the Securities the subject of this Agreement provided the advance value of the said goods is paid into the said account or goods of a similar nature and of at least equal value, are substituted for the goods so withdrawn.\n\nProvided always that with the previous consent of the Bank the Borrowers shall be at liberty to withdraw any of the goods for the time being pledged to the Bank without paying into the said account such advance value as aforesaid or substituting any goods as aforesaid provided the necsary margin required hereunder is fully maintained.\"\n\nClauses 8 and 9 are to the following effect :\n\n\"8. That the Borrowers shall make and furnish to the Bank such statements and returns of the cost and market value of the securities and a full description thereof and produce such evidence in suppon thereof as the Bank may from time to time require and shall maintain, in favour of the Bank a margin of 10 per cent at Bank's discretion between the market value from time to time of the Securities and the balance due to the Bank for the time being.\n\nSuch margin shall be calculated on such valuation of the Securities as fix_ed by the Bank from time to time and shall be maintained by the Borrowers either by the delivery of further securities to be app'oved bv the Bank or by cash. payment by the Borrowers immediately on the market value for the time\n\nbeing of the securities becoming less than the aggregate of the balance due to the Bank plus the amount of the margin as calculated above;\n\n9. That the Borrowers shall be responsible for the quantity and quality of the goods pledged with the Bank and also for the correctness of Statements and Returns furnished by them to the Bank from time to time as mentioned above.\n\nThe Borrowers have assured the Bank that all information regarding the quantity, quality, value etc., and other description of the goods pledged with the Bank as given in the said statements and retun'l'.s Is or would be , correct and the Bank has agreed to advance monies under the above account on such representations.\n\nThe Borrowers further declare and agree that the goods pledged with the Bank have not been actually weighed and/ or valued and in order to verify the quantity or quality of the goods pledged or Statements and Returns furnished by the Borrowers, the Bank shall be at liberty at any time, in its discretion, to get the goods weighed and valued at the expense of the Borrowers and the Borrowers agree to !lCCept as conclusive proof the result of such weighrnent and valuation as certified by an authorised officer of the Bank.\n\nIf, on such weighment and valuation the goods pledged are found io be short or less than the weight as shown by the Borrowers, or of a lower value so as to effect the stipulated margin, the Borrowers undertake to make up the deficit on demand and to re-imburse the Bank for al! losses, damages or expenses incurred by the Bank on that account.\"\n\nOn March 7, 1956, the appellant executed Ex. P-4, the letter of guarantee in favour of the Bank, guaranteeing the liability of the borrowers in respect of the cash credit account up to a limit of Rs. 1,00,000 and in respect of liability under bills discounted up to a limit of Rs. 45,000.\n\nClause 5 of the letter of guarantee reads as follows :\n\n\"To the intent that you may obtain satisfaction of the whole of your claim against the customer, I agree that you may enforce and recover upon this guarantee the full amount hereby guaranteed and interest thereon notwithstanding any such proof or composition as aforesaid, and notwithtanding any other guarantee, security or remedy, guarantees, securities or remedies, which you may hold or be entitled to in respect of the sum intended to be hereby secured or any part thereof, and notwithstanding any charges or interest which may 8 Sup, C I/68-7\n\nbe debited in your account current with the customer, or in any other account upon which he may be liable.\" Respondents 2 to 6 neglected to pay the amount due to the Bank in the said account and the goods pledged with the Bank were consequently sold with notice to the said respondents and the proceeds were credited to the account of the respondents. The amount due to the Bank as on September 30, 1957 was Rs. 73,931.35. Respondents 3 to 5 had a Suspense Account with the Bank to the extent of Rs. 5,000 and the said amount was adjusted in the account. Respondent No. 6 had a deposit of Rs. 5,000 with the Bank and the same was also adjusted in the said account. Under the Cash Credit Account, the balance due to the Bank as on May 21, 1958, stood at Rs. 40,856.34.\n\nA sum of Rs. 77 .24 was due to the Bank from respondents 2 to 6 as per short bills account as on April 23, 1958. The Bank served registered notices of demand on respondents 2 to 6 as well as the Appellant and on their failure to make the payment of the amount due the Bank filed a civil suit against the said respondents and the appellant, being Original Suit No. 171 of 1958 for recovery of Rs. 40,933.58 in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Ernakulam.\n\nRespondents 2 to 6 did not contest the suit.\n\nThe appellant, however, contested and filed a Written Statement exonerating himself from the liability on the allegation that the contract of guarantee was discharged on account of the misconduct of the creditor-bank.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge of Ernakulam granted a decree in favour of the Bank as against respondents 2 to 6 and also against the appellant by his judgment dated December <}, 1958.\n\nThe judgment of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed in appeal by the High Court of Kerala on September 11, 1963 in Appeal Suit No. 444 of 1960.\n\nDuring the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, respondent No. I, State Bank of Travancore, a subsidiary of the F State Bank of India was substituted in place of the Travancore Forward Bank Limited as successor-in-interest of the said Bank.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was contended ih the first place that there was a variation made in . the terms of the contract between the principal-debtor and the creditor in the present case and the appellant was accordingly discharged of his liability under the contract of guarantee.\n\nReference was made to s. 133 of the Indian Contract Act which states :\n\n\"Any variance, made witbout the surety's consent in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor( s) and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance\".\n\nIt was pointed out that the maximum limit of Rs. 1,00,000 ~Bow ed as credit in Ex. P-1 was reduced to Rs. 50,000 and that it was\n\nagain raised to Rs. 1,00,000 subsequently without consulting the appellant.\n\nThe only evidence in support of this contention is certain entries in the pages of accounts maintained by the Bank of the \"limit\" as Rs. 50,000. It was also pointed out that the appellant had withdrawn Rs. 5,000 out of Rs.' 10,000 dep05ited by him with the Bank towards security for advances to the firm.\n\nBut there is no written agreement between respondent no. 1 Bank on the one side and the respondent-firm on the other side reducing the limit of cash, credit accommodation under Ex. P-1.\n\nIn view of the formal record in the agreements, Ex. P-1 and Ex. P-4 it is difficult to hold that the variation of the terms would have been made without any written record.\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that the entry in the books of account of the Bank might well be a private instruction to the Cashier that advances were not to be made by him beyond Rs. 50,000 which instruction may not be legally binding upon the other respondents.\n\nNo inference may also be drawn from the withdrawal of Rs. 5,000 from the initial deposit of Rs. 10,000 by the appellant.\n\nThe reason is that there is no obligation under Ex. P-4 imposed upon the appellant to make any deposit of money with the Bank and the circumstance that. he made an initial deposit of Rs. 10,000 to reinforce his guarantee or that he withdrew Rs. 5,000 out of the deposit appears to be quite immaterial. In our opinion, the High Court was right in reaching the conclusion that there was no variation of the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor without the consent of the appellant and the provisions of s. 133 of the Indian Contract Act are not attracted. We accordingly hold that the Counsel for the appellant has been unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.\n\nIt was contended, in the second place, on behalf of the appellant that respQndent no. 1 Bank had given time to respondents 2 to 6 to make up the shortage of the goods pledged to the value of Rs. 35,690. It appears that under the agreement, Ex. P-1 respondents 2 to 6 had pledged goods which were verified by the employees of the Bank. When the quantity of the goods actually in stock was verified with the weekly statement dated April 18, 1957, the shortage of goods to the value of Rs. 35,690 was found.\n\nThe Bank immediately requested respondents 2 to 6 to make up th~ deficit. On April 23, 1957 the respondent firm intimated that the deficit will be made up within one month (See Ex. P-13).\n\nAccording to the Bank, one month's time was granted by it to enable respondents 2 to 6 to make up the deficit in the quantity of goods.\n\nP.W. 1, the Agent of the respondent Biink admitted that within one month the deficit was not made up and thereafter even though the time for making up the deficit was extended.\n\nespondents 2 to 6 did not, in fact. make up the deficit by supplymg goods to the value of Rs. 35,6~0. It was contended on behalf\n\n~··\n\n730 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nof the appellant that the conduct of the Bank in giving time to the A. principal-debtor to make up the deficit in the quantity of goods absolved the appeJlant of all liability under the guarantee. Reference was made to s. 135 of the Indian Contract Act which states :\n\n\"A contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the creditor makes a composition with, or promises to give time to, or not to sue, the principal debtor discharges the surety, unless the surety assents to such contract.\"\n\nIn our opinion, there is no warrant for the argument of the appellant.\n\nIt is manifest that the act of giving time to the borrowers to make up the quantity of the goods found to be short on weighment by the Bank cannot be considered to be a \"promise to give time\" to the borrowers as contemplated by s. 135 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nIn this connection reference should be made to\n\ncl. 9 of Ex. P-1 which provides that the borrowers shall be responsible for the quantity and quality of goods pledged and also for the correctness of the statements and returns furnished to the Bank from time to time. It is stated in Ex. P-1 that the borrowers have declared and agreed that the goods pledged with the Bank have not been actually weighed or valued in order to verify the quantity and qualify of the goods pledged.\n\nIt is in the light of these clauses of the agreement that the act of giving time to the principal debtor has to be considered. The act of the Bank in giving time to the principal debtor to make up the quantity of the goods pledged is not tantamount to the giving of time to the principal debtor for making the payment of the money within the meaning of s. 135 of the Indian Contract Act. What really constitutes giving of time is the extension of the period at which, by the contract between them, the principal debtor was originally obliged to pay the creditor by substituting a new and valid contract between the creditor and the principal debtor to which the surety does not assent.\n\nThe reason why an agreement to give time discharges the surety is because if, after making such an agreement, the creditor were to sue the surety the latter would at once be. turned on the principal debtor in breach of the agreement to give time, so that the effect of such an agreement is to prevent the surety from either requiring the creditor to call upon the principal debtor to pay off the debt, or himself paying off the debt, and then suing the principal debtor, thereby causing prejudice to the surety [Rouse v. Bradford Banking Co. (1), per A. L. Smith, L.J.]. \"Thus, to substitute for payment in one sum payment by instalments amounts to a giving of time.\n\nAgain, whenever the taking of a new security from the principal debtor by the creditor operates as a giving of time, the surety is no longer liable. but not where that transaction has no such effect.\" (Halsbury's\n\n(I) (1894] 2 Ch. 32, 7S.\n\nA Laws of England, Vol. 18, p. 509). In our opinion, the provisions of s. 135 of the Indian Contract Act are not attracted to the present case and the argument of the appellant on this point must be rejected.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next important question arising in this case, namely, whether a portion of the security was lost by the creditor or parted with without the surety's consent and whether the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security so lost. It was pointed out on behalf of the appellant that when the quantity of the goods actually in stock was verified with the weekly statement dated April 18, 1957, shortage of goods to the value of Rs. 35,690 was found.\n\nThe weekly statement dated March 15, 1957 shows that the stock was valued at Rs. 99,991 and odd and in the course of his evidence the Agent of the respondent Bank said that \"he did not know how the shortage occurred\" and \"there was a possibility of defendants 1 to 5 taking away the goods\".\n\nOn behalf of the respondent Bank reference was made to cl. 5 of Ex. P-4 which has already been quoted.\n\nIt was contended that on account of this clause in Ex. pq the appellant has opted out of the benefit of s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument put forward by the Attorney-General on behalf of the respondent Bank. In our opinion, the expression \"any security\" in cl. 5 of Ex. P-4 should be properly construed as \"any security other than the pledge of goods mentioned in the primary agreement, Ex. P-1 between the Bank and the firm.\" We consider that there is nothing in cl. 5 of Ex. P-4 to indicate that the appellant is not entitled to invoke the provisions of s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nIn this connection it is necessary to consider the provisions of s. 140 of the Indian Contract Act, 18 72 which states :\n\n\"Where a guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety, upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for is invested with all the rights which the creditor had against the principal debtor(s) .\"\n\nThis section embodies the general rule of equity expounded bv Sir Samuel Romil!y as counsel and accepted by the Court of Chancery in Craythorne v. Swinburne('), namely:\n\n\"Tht; surety will be entitled to every remedy which the cred1to~ has against the principal debt.or; to enforce every secunty and all means of payment to stand in the place of the creditor; not only through' the medium of contract, but even by means of securities entered into\n\n(I) [I 807] 14 Ves. 160.\n\nwithout the knowledge of the surety; having a right to A have those securities transferred to him, though there was no stipulation for that; and to avail himself of all those securities against the debtor. This right of a surety also stands, not upon contract, but upon a principle of natural justice.\"\n\nTh~ language of the section which employs the words \"is invested B with all the rights which. the creditor had against the principal . debtor\" makes it plain that even without the necessity of a transfer, the Jaw vests those rights in the surety. Section 141 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states: ·\n\n\"A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or not; and, if the creditor loses, or, without the consent <if the surety, parts with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security.\"\n\nD As pointed out by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.\n\nKaluram ( 1) , the expression \"security\" in this section is not used in any technical sense; it includes all rights which the creditor has against the property at the date of the contract. The surety is entitled on payment of the debt or performance of all that he. is liable for to the benefit of the rights of the creditor against E the principal debtor which arise out of the transaction which gives rise to the right or liability. The surety is therefore on payment of the amount due by the principal debtor entitled to be put in the same position in which the creditor stood in relation to the principal debtor. If the creditor has lost or parted with the security with'out the consent of the sure:y, the latter is by the express provision contained in s. 141, discharged to the extent of the value of the security lost or parted with. In Wulff and Billing v. Jay( 2 ) Hannen, J. stated the law as follows :\n\n\" ........ I take it to be established that the defendant became surety upon the faith of there being some . real and substantial security pledged, as well as his own credit, to the plaintiff; and he was entitled, therefore, to the benefit of that real and substantial security in the event of his being called on to fulfil his duty as a surety, and to pay the debt for which he had so become surety.\n\nHe will, however, be discharged from his liability as surety if the creditors have put it out of their power to hand over to the surety the means of recouping himself by the security given by the principal. That\n\n\\\\) [196711 S. C.R. 266.\n\n(2) L. R. (1872) 7 Q. B. 756.\n\ndoctrine is very clearly expressed in the notes in Rees\n\nv. Barrington-2 White & Tµdor's L.C., 4th Edn. at p. 1002-'As a surety, on payment of the debt, is entitled to all the securities of tbe creditor, whether he is aware of their existence or not, even though they were given after the contract of suretyship, if the creditor who has had, or ought to have had, them inhis full possession or power, loses them or permits them to get into the possession of the debtor, or does .not make them effectual by giving proper notice, the surety to the extent of such security will be discharged.\n\nA surety, moreover, will be released if the creditor, by reason of what he has done, cannot, on payment by the surety, give him the securities in exactly the same condition as they formerly stood in his hands.' \" It is true that s. 141 of the Indian Contract A'.ct has limited the surety's right to securities held by the creditor at the date of his becoming surety and has modified the English rule that the surety is entitled to the securities given to the creditor both before and after the contract of surety.\n\nBut subject to this variation, s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act incorporates the rule of English law relating to the discharge from liability of a surety when the creditor parts with or loses the security held by him.\n\nUpon the evidence adduced by the parties in this case we are satisfied that there was shortage of goods of the value of Rs. 35,690 brought about by the negligence of the Bank or for some other reason and to that extent there must be deemed to be a loss by the Bank of the securities which the Bank had at the time when the contract of surety was entered into. It follows therefore that the principle of s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act applies to this case 1111d the surety is discharged of the liability to the Bank to the exteat of Rs. 35,690. We accordingly hold that the respondent Bank is\n\nentitled to a decree against respondent 6, the appellant only to the extent of Rs. 5,243.58 and not to the Sll1Il of Rs .. 4;0,933.58 and to proportionate costs. · ·\n\nFor these reasons we allow the appeal to the extent indicated above and modify the decree of the High Court aceoldingly. The parties will bear their respective costs. in this Court.·\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "AMRIT LAL GOVERDHAN LALAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMRIT LAL GOVERDHAN LALAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH AND V. RAMASWAM!,"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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Viswanatha Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5743, "end_char": 5761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Viswanatha Iyer, Kutty Krishna Meno11 and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Kutty Krishna Meno11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5763, "end_char": 5783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Viswanatha Iyer, Kutty Krishna Meno11 and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5788, "end_char": 5795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Viswanatha Iyer, Kutty Krishna Meno11 and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, H. L. Anand, and K. B.\n\nMehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "H. L. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5861, "end_char": 5872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, H. L. Anand, and K. B.\n\nMehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. B.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5878, "end_char": 5890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, H. L. Anand, and K. B.\n\nMehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated September 11, 1963 in 1-ppeal Suit No.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.-This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated September 11, 1963 in 1-ppeal Suit No."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1956, the appellant executed Ex."}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 30, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11750, "end_char": 11768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount due to the Bank as on September 30, 1957 was Rs."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12095, "end_char": 12107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Cash Credit Account, the balance due to the Bank as on May 21, 1958, stood at Rs."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12231, "end_char": 12245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "77 .24 was due to the Bank from respondents 2 to 6 as per short bills account as on April 23, 1958."}}, {"text": "court of the Subordinate Judge at Ernakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12547, "end_char": 12590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,933.58 in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Ernakulam."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Ernakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge of Ernakulam granted a decree in favour of the Bank as against respondents 2 to 6 and also against the appellant by his judgment dated December <}, 1958."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13128, "end_char": 13146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed in appeal by the High Court of Kerala on September 11, 1963 in Appeal Suit No."}}, {"text": "State Bank of Travancore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13256, "end_char": 13280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, State Bank of Travancore, a subsidiary of the F State Bank of India was substituted in place of the Travancore Forward Bank Limited as successor-in-interest of the said Bank.", "canonical_name": "STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE & ORS"}}, {"text": "F State Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13302, "end_char": 13323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, State Bank of Travancore, a subsidiary of the F State Bank of India was substituted in place of the Travancore Forward Bank Limited as successor-in-interest of the said Bank."}}, {"text": "Travancore Forward Bank Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13356, "end_char": 13387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, State Bank of Travancore, a subsidiary of the F State Bank of India was substituted in place of the Travancore Forward Bank Limited as successor-in-interest of the said Bank."}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13756, "end_char": 13775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15776, "end_char": 15782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15790, "end_char": 15809, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 18, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16384, "end_char": 16398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the quantity of the goods actually in stock was verified with the weekly statement dated April 18, 1957, the shortage of goods to the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16538, "end_char": 16552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 23, 1957 the respondent firm intimated that the deficit will be made up within one month (See Ex."}}, {"text": "Biink", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 1, the Agent of the respondent Biink admitted that within one month the deficit was not made up and thereafter even though the time for making up the deficit was extended."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17366, "end_char": 17372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17380, "end_char": 17399, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17971, "end_char": 17990, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18041, "end_char": 18046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18825, "end_char": 18831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18839, "end_char": 18858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "A. L. Smith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19710, "end_char": 19721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "turned on the principal debtor in breach of the agreement to give time, so that the effect of such an agreement is to prevent the surety from either requiring the creditor to call upon the principal debtor to pay off the debt, or himself paying off the debt, and then suing the principal debtor, thereby causing prejudice to the surety [Rouse v. Bradford Banking Co. (1), per A. L. Smith, L.J.]. \""}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20029, "end_char": 20037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Halsbury's\n\n(I) (1894] 2 Ch."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20138, "end_char": 20144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20152, "end_char": 20171, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20795, "end_char": 20809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The weekly statement dated March 15, 1957 shows that the stock was valued at Rs."}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21115, "end_char": 21120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21268, "end_char": 21274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21282, "end_char": 21301, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21460, "end_char": 21465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21667, "end_char": 21672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21759, "end_char": 21765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21773, "end_char": 21792, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21860, "end_char": 21866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21874, "end_char": 21893, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Samuel Romil!y", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22265, "end_char": 22279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section embodies the general rule of equity expounded bv Sir Samuel Romil!y as counsel and accepted by the Court of Chancery in Craythorne v. Swinburne('), namely:\n\n\"Tht; surety will be entitled to every remedy which the cred1to~ has against the principal debt.or; to enforce every secunty and all means of payment to stand in the place of the creditor; not only through' the medium of contract, but even by means of securities entered into\n\n(I) [I 807] 14 Ves."}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23223, "end_char": 23234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23242, "end_char": 23267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24499, "end_char": 24505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hannen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24615, "end_char": 24621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Wulff and Billing v. Jay( 2 ) Hannen, J. stated the law as follows :\n\n\" ........ I take it to be established that the defendant became surety upon the faith of there being some ."}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26147, "end_char": 26153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26464, "end_char": 26470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26478, "end_char": 26497, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27056, "end_char": 27062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27070, "end_char": 27089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_734_741_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF BJBAR A ANR.\n\nMAHARA.JA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR\n\nApril 11, 1968 [R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. Hl!GDB, JJ.] Blluv Land Reforms Act 30 of 1950-N \";{ica1ib11 u,,, Ur 1. 3 of Act V'1P\"ll all estates in Stat.,_Permanent mdiloana payable to Zemil!dar whether a proprietary or intemudiary irtlerest-Whether tubject to vesting provision.\n\n1be respondent was the proprietor of certain estates in Bihar. He was also in receipt of a permanent malikana allowance from the CloYernm<nt.\n\nAfter the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950 fOllowed by a notification under s. 3 thereof the .,,.tat<:a Of the respondent vest<ld in the State of Bihar. In 1958 the Slate of Bihar stopped payment all the malikana allowance Oil the ground that it was a proprietary inte!rest which bad >ested in the State.\n\nThe respondent thereupon filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that the respoodent's riaht to the malill:ana was not an intermediary interest and did not cease with Ike atinction of his proprietary rights in the estate. The State of Bihar appealed to this Court The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant were: (i) that the right to malikana was an interest in the estates belonaing to the respondent which on the issue of the notification under s. 3 became extinguished and (ii) alternatively, the respondent was an interme diary of temporary settled estates in respect of which malikana was payable and on the transference of his intermediary interests in those ...iates, his right to the malikana stood extinguished and he became entitled only to the compensation payable under s. 24A\n\nHEID : (i) The history of the malikana allowance showed that it was a permanent grant of money in lieu of the proprietor's rights in lands original!} held by him.\n\nThe proprietors retained certain estate& and it was only the interest in these estates that was !Oil on the publication of the notification under s. 3. The malikana payable to the respondent in the present case was not an interest in such ..iates and did not ceaae on the issue of the notification. [740 BJ\n\n(ii) The respondent was not a pro(tietor, tenure-holder or an intermediary of the estates in respect of which malikana was paid to him. The malikana was not rent or income derived from those estates. Nor was the malikana an incumbrance on them. The respondent's right to the malikana was not an intermediary interest in the estates for which compensation was payable under s. 24A and it did not therefore vest in the G<Wemment.\n\n[740 HJ\n\nHerranund Shoo v. Mst. Ozeerun & Ors., 9 W.R. 102.\n\nGobinda Cliunder Roy Chaudhuri v. Rom Chunder Chowdhur, v,\n\n19 W.R. 95, Hurmuzi Begum v. Hirday Narayan, S Cal. 921 and Jaggo Bai v. U1sa1'a Lal, 51 All. 439, distinguished.\n\nBhoalee Singh v. Mst. Neemoo Behoo, 12 W.R. 498, Syed Shah Najamuddin Hyder v. Syed Zahid Horsein, 8 C.L.J. 300, Maharaia P. S.\n\nBahodur v. State of Bihar, 18 Pat. 1018, Deo Kuar v. Man Kuar, 21 I.A. 148 and Mahendra Narayan Ray Chowdhuri v. Abdul Gafur Chaudhry, 35 C.W.N. 1233. referred to.\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh v. Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 213, relied on.\n\nBDIAll v. PRATAP SINGH (Bachawat, /.) ?35\n\nA CIVIL APPELLATE JUlllSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 157 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated January 7, 1960 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 693 of 1958. '' C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !ants.\n\nSarjoo Prasad and D. Goburdhun, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nc Bacbawat, J.-This appeal is directed against an order allowing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nMaharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur was the proprietor of th~ estates collectively known as the Gidhaur estate, in Monghyr district. On the publi\n\ncation of a notification under s. 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act :XXX of 1950) on July 24, 19~3 'the Gidhaur estate and the interests of the Maharaja therein vested in D the State of Bihar. The Maharaja was receiving a permanent ' malikana allowance of Rs. 5743/14/6 annually in two equal six ,\n\nmonthly instalments as shown in annexure \"A\" to the writ application. The registers and rolls of the recipients of the malikana maintained by the Collector of the district since a long time past show that the successive proprietors of the Gidhaur estate were E receiving the malikana for a long time past. The State of Bihar stopped payment of the malikana allowance from April 1, 1958\n\non the ground that the proprietary interests of the Maharaja in the Gidhaur estate vested in the State and consequently his right to the malikana was extinguished.\n\nThe Maharaja alleged in the writ petition that the permanent F malikana was payable irrespective of his proprietary rights in his estates notified under sec. 3 and was not income or rent from those • estates nor a charge or incumbrance on them . He alleged that \" the stoppage of the payment of the malikana .was illegal and asked for a writ directin~ the State to make payment of the malikana.\n\nThe State did not file any return to the petition. The High Court\n\nG held that the Maharaja's right to the malikana was not an inter mediary interest in the Gidhaur estate and did not cease with the extinction of bis proprietary right in the estate. Accordingly, the High Court issued a writ in the nature of mandamus command ing the State of Bihar to pay the malikana due to the Maharaja from April 1, 1958. The State of Bihar has filed this appeal on a\n\nH certificate granted by the High Court.\n\nSection 2 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is the definition section.\n\nSection 2(i) defines an estate to mean any land included under one en1ry in any of the general registers of revenue paying\n\nand. revenue free lands and: includes a share of or in. any estate.\n\nSection 2 (jj) defines an \"intermediary\" in relation to any estate or tenure to mean a proprietor, tenure-holder, under tenure holder and trustee. . Section 2(jjj) defines .an \"intermediary interest\" as meaning the interest of an intermediary in an estate or tenure: Section 2 ( o) defines \"proprietor\" to mean a person holding. in trust or owning for his own benefit an estate or part of an estate, Section 2 ( r) defines a \"tenure holder\" to mean a person who has acquired from a proprietor or another tenure holder the right to . hold land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants on it and includes inter a/ia the holder of a tenure created for maintenance of any person. Section 2( q) defines tenure to mean the interest of a tenure holder ; ir under tenure holder.\n\nUnder section 2A the expressions \"proprietor or tenure-holder\" and \"estate or tenure\" mean and include\n\n\"intermediary\" and the \"intermediary interest\" respectively: Section 3(1) states that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification declare that the estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure-holder, specified in the notification, have passed to and btlcome vested in the State. Sections 4(a) and 23(1) are as follows:- ·\n\n\"4. (a) consequences of the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State.\n\nNotwithstanding anything con- . tained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification under sub-section ( 1) of section 3, or sub-section ( 1) or 2 of section 3A the following consequences shall ensue, namely :-\n\n(a) Such estate or tenure including the interests of th~ proprietor or tenure-holder in any building or , part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure\n\nand used primarily as office or cutchery for the collectfon of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars hats, bazars mela and ferries and all other sairati interests as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or. not, inclusiye of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under raiyats) s.h3JI, with effect f(om the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure holder shall cease to have any interests in such estate or tenure other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nBlllAR v. PRATAP SINGH (Bachawat, J,) 7.37\n\nSection 24A ( 1) Determination of compensation of any intermediary of temporarily settled estate-( 1) In the case of such intermediary of a temporarily settled estate, the Compensation Officer shall determine the compensation payable in respect of the transference to the State of the interest of the intermediary in such temporarily settled estate, whether Jet in farm or held in khas, at a sum equal to twenty times of the malikana payable to him during the previous agricultural year and, where the intermediary has taken out the engagement of the lands comprised in such estate for a fixed period on the payment of a fixed jama, also a sum equal to the pro rata refund of the fixed jama paid by him for the unexpired period of the engagement.\" It may be noted that SS. 2(jj), 2(jjj); 2A anjl 24A were inserted in the parent Act by the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1953 (Bihar Act XX of 1954). Section 4 was also amended by the same Act.\n\nLearned Attorney-General contended ( 1) that the right to the mal)kana was an interest in the estates called the Gidhaur estate specified in the notification of July 24, 1953 and on the issue of the notification the right to malikana stood extinguished and (2) alternatively, the Maharaja was an intermediary of temporary settled estates in respect of which the malikana was payable and on the transference of his intermediary interests in those estates, his right to the ma!ik.ana stood extinguished and lie became entitled only to the compensation payable under sec. 24A.\n\nRegulation VIII of 1793 (sec. 43) described malikana as an allo}Vance to proprietors in consideration of their proprietarv rights. Baden-Powell's Lands Systems of British India, Vol. II, p. 717 said that malikana in Bengal and places other than the Punjab usually means an allowance to an ex-proprietor by way of sol; itium for a lost right.\n\nThe custom of paying malikana allowance to displaced proprietors may be traced back to the Moghul period. \"The claims of the ancient zemindars and village headmen, when thus displaced G. were usually recognised to the extent of giving them an allowance for subsistence, and sometimes they continued to receive this. allowance in the shape of payments from the new occupants called rassoomi-zemindaree.\" (See Phillips on Law Relating to the Land Tenures of Lower Bengal, p. 126). It was said that \"Malikana is the unalienable right of proprietorship.\" (see the answer of H Ghulam Hosein Khan, Appendix No. 16 to Mr. Shore's Minute~ of 2nd Aril 1788 quoted in C.D. Field's Regulations of the Bengal Code p. 717). The Regulations from 1788 onwards recognised this custom. Regulation VIII of 1793, secs. 43 to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.ll.\n\n4 7 provided that in the event of the proprietor refusing to accept a reasonable settlement his lands were to be let in farm or held kbas.\n\nWhen the lands were let in farm, the farmer was to engage to pay 10% of the jama as malikana to the exclded proprietors in addition to the jama and the Government was to be considered\n\nas guarantees for the payment. The malikana was realisable from the farmer as arrears of revenue. When the laoos were held B in khas 10% of the net collections was to be paid as malikana from the treasury. Section 5 of Regulation VII of 1822 repealed the existing regulations regarding malikana and substituted fresh provisions for such allowance. The new provisions were declared by section 11 of Regulation IX of 1833 to be prospective only and to be applicable solely to the settlements made under them. (see Clarke, Regulations Vol. I p. 71). Regulation VII of 1822 was originally enacted for the ceded and conquered Provinces, Cuttack, Pataspur and its dependencies. It was extended to other Provinces by sec. 2 of Reg. IX of 1825. Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act XIX of 1873 and fresh provisions for allowance to displaced proprietors were substituted. The malikana was for a term of years when the proprie- D tors were dispossessed from management temporarily. It was a permanent grant when th~ proprietors' rights in their lands were completely extinguished.\n\nThe decisions under, the Limitation Acts relating to the malikana turned on the particular language of those Acts. Clause 12 of s. 1 of the Limitation Act of 1859 seemed to make it imperative on the courts to deal with malikana as an interest in land\n\nand to treat a claim for it as barred if. not made within a period\n\nof 12 years after the last receipt by the proprietor. (see Herranund Shoo v. Mst. Ozeerun & Ors.('), Govinda Chunder Roy Chaudhuri v. Ram Chunder Chowdhury('). But under the Limitation Act of 1877 tire non-receipt of malikana for 12 years <lid F not extinguish the right and malikana could be sued for within twelve years fom the time when it became due. (see Hurmuzi Begum v. Hirday Narayan( 8 ). Jn Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal(') the courts below treated malikana as immovable property and since the point as to its not being immovable property was not takllll earlier, the Privy Council did not allow the point to be taken before -it for the first time.\n\nNevertheless the Privy Council held that a suit to establish a right as to malikana was not a suit for possession within the meaning of art. 141 and was governed by art 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Though malikana is not a charge on immovable property the explanation to art. 132 of that Act declared that for the purposes of that article, it was \"deemed\" to be money charged on immovable property.\n\n(I) 9 W. R. 102.\n\n(3) S Cal. 921.\n\n(2) l9W.R. 95.\n\n(4) 51 Allahabad 439.\n\nBIHAll v. PRATAP SINGH (Bachawat, I.) 73~\n\nA Malikana. is not rent. (see Bhoalee Singh v. Mst. Neemoo Behool(') and Syed Shah Najamuddin Hyder v. Syed Zahid Hossrin('). It is not rent or revenue derived from land and not\n\nassessable as agricultural income. (Maharaja P. S. Bahadur v.\n\nState of Bihar(8 ). In Deo Kuar v. Man Kuar(') malikana was described as a grant of a portion of a land revenue. For purposes B of the Pensions Act, 1871 becaUSe sec. 3 of the Act interpreted\n\nthe expressiOn \"grant of money or land revenue\" to include anything payable on the part of the Government in respect of a right.\n\nThe Privy Council held that malikana was something payable on the pan of Government in respect of a right and therefore a suit relating to malikana was not cognizable by the court without a certificate from the Collector. The plea of bar under the Pension~ Act is not taken in the present appeal. c\n\nMalikana is not an incumbrance on the estate of the proprietor liable to pay it and is not extinguished on the sale of that estate for recovery of arrears of land reven0e under Act XI of 1859. (see Mahendra Narayan Roy Chowdhuri v. Abdul Gafur Choudhury('). The person in receipt of a permanent malikana is not a proprietor of the estate for which malikana is payable and has no title to the alluvial accretion to the estate. (see Soudamini Dassya v. Secretary of Stale for India(').\n\nThe proprietors of the Gidhaur estate in Bihar are in receipt of a permanent malikana for over a century. The origin of this E malikana allowance is not known. From time immemorial it has been customary in Bihar to pay a permanent malikana allowance to ex-proprietors in lieu of their lost proprietary right.\n\nPhillips in his Law Relating to t.'te Land Tenures of Lower Bengal, pp. 144, 147, 269, said that the proprietors of the soil in. Bihar universally claimed and possessed a right of malikana and he F endeavoured in vain to trace its Qrigin in Bihar. The malikana right of the excluded proprietors in Bihar was acknowled2ed in the Regulations passed on August 8, 1788. At ihe time of Permanent Settlement, the new grantees were forced to acknowledge this. right. (see Baden-Powell, Land-8ystem of British India, Vol. I pp. 516, 517). The Bihar Board of Revenue Misc. Rules G 1939, art. 342 p. 166 divides malikana into two classes. Malikana of the first class is for a term of years only, that is, during the currency of a settlement. Malikana of the second class is permanent. It states that \"the Bihar malikana falls under this class and is a compensation permanently granted to' the proprietors . . . It is of a pensionary nature and does not depend upon col- 8 lections.\" The permanent malikana is payable at the treasury on\n\n(I) 12 W.R. 498.\n\n(2) 8 C. L. J. 300 at 450.\n\n(3) 18 Patna, 1018.\n\n14) 21 I. A. 148, 160, 161.\n\n(S) 35 C. W. N. 1233.\n\n(6) SOCal. 522, 538, S4S.\n\nApril l, and October 1, every year on presentation of pay orders A issued by the Collector accompanied by a life certificate of the recipient.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the malikana payable to the proprietors of the Gidhaur estate is a permanent grant of money in lieu of their proprietary rights in lands originally held by . them.\n\nThe proprietors retained certain estates.\n\nOn the publication of B the notification under s. 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 the interest of the Maharaja in those .estates was extinguished.\n\nBut the malikana payable to him is not an interest in those estates .and did not cease on the issue of the notification.\n\nAnnexure A to the writ application shows that cess was deductee. from the malikana. Under secs. 5 and 421 of the Cess Act., 1880 cess is charged on immovable property and is payable by .the holder of an estate or tenure or chaukidari chakran lands and by a cultivating raiyat. It is not known under what circumstances oeess used to be deducte:I from the malikana.\n\nFrom the fact that oeess was so deducted it is not possible to hold that malikana is an interest in the estates held by the Maharaja.\n\nIn this Court the appellant raised the second contention for\n\nthe first time. The learned Altomey-General contended that the malikana was payable in respect of certain other estates, that the Maharaja should be regarded as an intermediary of those estates and that on the vesting of those estates in the Government the E right to malikana ceased and the Maharaja became entitled to oeompensation only under sec. 24A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.\n\nThe State of Bihar has filed a petition asking for an order admitting certain documents as additional evidence. We have allowed this petition. The first document is a letter of the Collector, Monghyr, stating that the Gidhaur estate was gtting malikana in respect of 17 tauzis noted in the margin.\n\nThe second document is the khewat of those tauzis. They show that various persons other than the Maharaja were the proprietors.of the estates comprised in .the tauzis.\n\nThe petition states that all these estates 'have been notified under sec. 3 and have now vested in the State Government.\n\nThe third document is the notification published\n\non July 24, 1953 showing the estates of whicb'-the Maharaja was the proprietor and which have now vested in the State Government.\n\nOn the publication of the notification under sec. 3, all the estates in respect of which .the malikana is payable including 1he interest of any intermediary therein vested in the Government free from all incumbrances. But the Maharaja is not a proprie-· tor, tenure holder or an intermediary of those estates. The malikana is not rent or income derived ff9m the estates. Nor is his . right to the malikana an incumbrance on them.\n\nThe Maharaja's Tight to the malikana is not an intermediary interest in the 'estates\n\nBIHAR v. PRATAP SINGH (Bachawat, J.) 741\n\nand did not vest in the Government.\n\nConsequently he has no right to claim compensation for the malikana under s. 24A. That section provides for determination of compensation payable to the intermediary of a temporarily settled estate is respect of the transference to the Government of the interest of the intermediary in such estate.\n\nThe Maharaja had no intermediary interest in the estates for the transference of which he could claim any compensation under sec. 24A.\n\nIn State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh(') this Court held that an allowance of a fixed sum of inoney computed on the basis of 1/ 4th share of the net revenue of certain estates payable by the Government to the ex-jagirdars as compensation for abandonment of their right in those estates was not a right or privilege in respect of land in any estate or its land revenue within the meaning of s. 6 (b) of the Uttar Pradesh Zemindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and on the issue of a notification vesting those estates in the Government the right to the allowance did not cease. The allowance in that case was described as a pension.\n\nIt may be that the allowance was not strictly a malikana.\n\nNevertheless the case is instructive. It shows that an allowance paid to ex-jagirdars in consideration of the extinction of their rights in land is not an interest in the land.\n\nThe permanent malikana stands on the same footing.\n\nIt is an allowance paid to ex-proprietors for extinguishment of their right to the estate formerly held by them. It is not an interest in that estate, nor an incumbrance on it, and does not cease on the vesting of the estate in the Government.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) [1962] 3 S. C.R. 213, 226-228.", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "MAHARA.JA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARA.JA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARA.JA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR\n\nApril 11, 1968 [R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. Hl!GDB, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Blluv Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 562, "end_char": 566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "in the State of Bihar. In", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 641, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar appealed to this Court The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant were: (i) that the right to malikana was an interest in the estates belonaing to the respondent which on the issue of the notification under s. 3 became extinguished and (ii) alternatively, the respondent was an interme diary of temporary settled estates in respect of which malikana was payable and on the transference of his intermediary interests in those ...iates, his right to the malikana stood extinguished and he became entitled only to the compensation payable under s. 24A\n\nHEID : (i) The history of the malikana allowance showed that it was a permanent grant of money in lieu of the proprietor's rights in lands original!}"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "After the passing of the Bibar Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2468, "end_char": 2474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 213", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3381, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !"}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3428, "end_char": 3438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !"}}, {"text": "B S. C. Agarawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !"}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !"}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3477, "end_char": 3488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, B S. C. Agarawala, K. M. K. Nair and S. P. Singh, for the appel- I !", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3515, "end_char": 3528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. Goburdhun, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3533, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. Goburdhun, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "c Bacbawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nc Bacbawat, J.-This appeal is directed against an order allowing a writ petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3699, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3730, "end_char": 3759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur was the proprietor of th~ estates collectively known as the Gidhaur estate, in Monghyr district.", "canonical_name": "MAHARA.JA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the High Court issued a writ in the nature of mandamus command ing the State of Bihar to pay the malikana due to the Maharaja from April 1, 1958."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5631, "end_char": 5640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5892, "end_char": 5901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(jjj)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6041, "end_char": 6055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6159, "end_char": 6168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6292, "end_char": 6301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2( q)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 4(a) and 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8500, "end_char": 8511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SS. 2(jj), 2(jjj)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9269, "end_char": 9286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9345, "end_char": 9373, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XX of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9381, "end_char": 9401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9404, "end_char": 9413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XX of 1954", "statute": "Bihar Act XX of 1954"}}, {"text": "sec. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10013, "end_char": 10021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XX of 1954", "statute": "Bihar Act XX of 1954"}}, {"text": "sec. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10049, "end_char": 10056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XX of 1954", "statute": "Bihar Act XX of 1954"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10240, "end_char": 10246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II, p. 717 said that malikana in Bengal and places other than the Punjab usually means an allowance to an ex-proprietor by way of sol; itium for a lost right."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II, p. 717 said that malikana in Bengal and places other than the Punjab usually means an allowance to an ex-proprietor by way of sol; itium for a lost right."}}, {"text": "H Ghulam Hosein Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10937, "end_char": 10957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "see the answer of H Ghulam Hosein Khan, Appendix No."}}, {"text": "Shore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10982, "end_char": 10987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 to Mr. Shore's Minute~ of 2nd Aril 1788 quoted in C.D. Field's Regulations of the Bengal Code p. 717)."}}, {"text": "Regulations of the Bengal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulations of the Bengal Code", "statute": "Regulations of the Bengal Code"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11924, "end_char": 11934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulations of the Bengal Code", "statute": "Regulations of the Bengal Code"}}, {"text": "Cuttack", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12172, "end_char": 12179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulation VII of 1822 was originally enacted for the ceded and conquered Provinces, Cuttack, Pataspur and its dependencies."}}, {"text": "Pataspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12181, "end_char": 12189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulation VII of 1822 was originally enacted for the ceded and conquered Provinces, Cuttack, Pataspur and its dependencies."}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12250, "end_char": 12256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12759, "end_char": 12768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act", "statute": "Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12772, "end_char": 12776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act", "statute": "Later it was repealed as regards the North Western Provinces by Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12798, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13138, "end_char": 13152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13754, "end_char": 13762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But under the Limitation Act", "statute": "But under the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "art 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But under the Limitation Act", "statute": "But under the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13798, "end_char": 13812, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13895, "end_char": 13903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But under the Limitation Act", "statute": "But under the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "For purposes B of the Pensions Act, 1871", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14496, "end_char": 14536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "For purposes B of the Pensions Act, 1871", "statute": "For purposes B of the Pensions Act, 1871"}}, {"text": "Phillips", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15801, "end_char": 15809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phillips in his Law Relating to t.'te Land Tenures of Lower Bengal, pp."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1788", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16151, "end_char": 16165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The malikana right of the excluded proprietors in Bihar was acknowled2ed in the Regulations passed on August 8, 1788."}}, {"text": "Baden-Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16266, "end_char": 16278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "see Baden-Powell, Land-8ystem of British India, Vol."}}, {"text": "art. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16379, "end_char": 16387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 16971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17400, "end_char": 17404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17461, "end_char": 17469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the publication of B the notification under s. 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 the interest of the Maharaja in those .estates was extinguished."}}, {"text": "sec. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18536, "end_char": 18544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18552, "end_char": 18580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18587, "end_char": 18601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar has filed a petition asking for an order admitting certain documents as additional evidence."}}, {"text": "Monghyr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18775, "end_char": 18782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first document is a letter of the Collector, Monghyr, stating that the Gidhaur estate was gtting malikana in respect of 17 tauzis noted in the margin."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19120, "end_char": 19126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "July 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19226, "end_char": 19239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third document is the notification published\n\non July 24, 1953 showing the estates of whicb'-the Maharaja was the proprietor and which have now vested in the State Government."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19399, "end_char": 19405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20024, "end_char": 20030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 24A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20375, "end_char": 20383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20801, "end_char": 20805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Zemindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20817, "end_char": 20877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S. C.R. 213", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21667, "end_char": 21687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_742_745_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "7'4.2\n\nMAHESH BHAGAT v.\n\nRAM BARAN MAHTO & ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]\n\nBih41' TellQllC)I Act (Act 8 of 1885)-SO<ltions 5(2), 21(1)-Conslrlletion of deed-whether least or usufructory nwrtll\"ge TtnurNwlder prohibited from executing I.mes for terms extending beyond the term of tM tenure-Tenants inducted by tenure-holder-Whether acquires occupancy riahts.\n\nA, the predecessorn-tnterest of the plaintiff executed a tbika patta in favour of B, in respect of a village for a term of 40 years from 1320 to 1959 fasli, the rent to be appropriated up ro. 1344 fasli towards satisfaction of debts owing from A to B and others. The patta B stipulated that B could not execute a lease in favour of any tenant fOr any term extending beyond 1359 fasli.\n\nB settled plots in the village with the pmlecessara-ininterest of the defendants. The first settlement was for 5 years from 1347 to 1351 fasli. The s<cond settlement was for 5 years from 1352 to 13S6 fasli. The tenants were settled raiyats of the village. After the expiry of the term of the thika patta, the plaintiff instituted a suit for r(covery of possession of the plots. The Courts below dismissed the suit. In an appeal to this Court it was contended that (I) the thika patta was a mortgase\n\nand net a lease and the mortgagee B had no authority to induct raiyata, and (ii) that assuming that it was a lease, B had no authority to settle raiyats having occupancy rights enuring after the expiry of the lease. It was conceded that if the thika patta was a lease, B was a tenure-holder.\n\nHELD : dismissin11 t~ appeal,\n\n( 1) The thika patta was a lease and not a usufructory mortgage, The gist of the document was letting for the full term of 40 years. There was\n\nno expres, s or implied grant of a right of redemption on repayment of the loan. The document was not intended to create relationship of debtor and creditor or a security for the! repayment of a debt; [744 DJ\n\n(2) The tenants of B, having acquired the right to hold land as cultivating tenants of a tenure-holder, were raiyats as defined in s. 5 (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act The tenancies were lawful at their inception. B was not prohibited by the thika patta from inducting raiyats on the land.\n\nIn spite of the stipulation in the patta that B would not execute a lease in favour of any tenant for a term extendin~ beyond 1359 fasli, the tenants acquired the right to hold the land as raiyats.\n\nAs settled raiyats of the village tb\"Y got rights of occupancy in the lands under s. 21 (!) of the Act. [745 A-BJ\n\nThe jlffieral rule is that no one can confer on another a better title than he himself has.\n\nB could not make a grant of the right to occupy the lands after the expiry of the lease in its favour.\n\nBut the right of Occupancy is n<>t the creation of any grant from B. It is conferred bys. 21(1).\n\nAs the tenants are raiyats, the law stePs in and protects them from eviction. [745 B-Cl Mahabir Gope v. Harbc:ns Narain Singh, [1952] S.C.R. 775, dmtin- Jlllished.\n\nAlill Chandra Rishl v. Lakhi Narain Ghose 10, C.L.J. 55 approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUitISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 394 of 1965.\n\nA Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 22, 1961 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 277 of 1956.\n\nSarjoo Pras@ and D. Goburdhun, for the appellant.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Hardev Singh. for respondents Nos. 1 B and 13 to 18.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.-On July 15, 1912 Abdul Karim the predecessor-in-interest of the plai, ntilf executed in favour of the proprietors of an indigo concern collectively known as the Bhikhanpur Kothi a thika patta (Ex. 4) in respect of village Khanjadpur for a term of 40 years from 1320 to 1339 fasli corresponding to 1913 to 1952. By two patta Katkenas (Exs. A and Al) dated April 25, 1940 and May 23, 1944 the .Bhikhanpur Kothi settled plots Nos. 183 and 184 in village Khanjadpur with the predecessors-in-interest of the contesting defendants. The first settlement was for five years from 134 7 to 13 51 fas Ii. The D second settlement was for five years from 1352 to 1356 fasli. The term of the thika patta (Ex. 4) expired in 1359 fasli. Thereafter on April 24, 1953 the plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the plots.\n\nHe also asked for certain other reliefs with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The trial court found that ( 1) plots Nos. 183 and 184 were bakasht and not zeriat lands, (2) the tenants under Ex. A and Al were settled E raiyats of the village, ( 3) the thika patta in favour of the Bhikhanpur Kothi was a lease, ( 4) the Kothi had tl1e authority to induct raiyats on the village and ( 5) tl1e tenants held tl1e plo1s as raiyat~ and they acquired occupancy rights under sec. 21 of the Bihar Tenancy Act.\n\nOn these findings the trial court disallowed the plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession o! plots Nos. 183 and F\n\nI 84.\n\nThe plaintiff filed an appeal in the High Court of Patna.\n\nBefore the High Court the plaintiff did not dispute the correctness of the first two findings of the trial court.\n\nThe High Court agreed with the other findings and dismissed tlie appeal. The plaintiff has now filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nIn this Court Mr. Sarjoo Prasad contended (1) that Ex. 4 was a mortgage and not a lease and the mortgagee under Ex. 4 had no authority to induct raiyats; (2) that assuming that Ex. 4 wa~ a lease, the lessee had no authority to settle raiyats having c>ccuparicy rights enuring after the expiry of the lease. We are unable to accept either of these contentions.\n\nExhibit 4 was executed by Abdul Karim in favour of ihe Bbjkhanpur Kothi on July 15, 1912. It was styled a thika patta.\n\nIt proVided that the kothi would remain in possession of Khanjad- 8 Sup. Cl/68--8\n\n74{ SuPIU!MB. COUl.T llBPOl.TS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\npW: village for a term of 40 years from'l320 to 1359 fasli on paymCllU of a fixed annual jama of Rs. 6,203/4/-. Out of this 1ama the Kothi was to pay annually government revenue and cei; s amounting to Rs. 1,203/4/-. It appears that on the same day Abdul Karim took loans from the Bhikhanpur Kothi and two ladies on executing two separate bonds. Ex. 4 provides that between 1320 to 1331 fasli the balance Rs. 5,000 ol the annual jama would be paid or appropriated towards the liquidation of the two debts and between 1332 and 1344 fasli would be appropriated towards full satisfaction of the debt due to fhe Kothi. The deed further provided that from 1345 fasli until 1359 fasli the Kothi would pay the entire balance of Rs. 5,000 to Abdul Karim.\n\nIt is to be noticed that the ladies were not parties to Ex. 4. The loan was taken from the Kothi on a separate bond. Ex .. 4 provided for the repayment of the loan, but the Kothi was entitled to remain in possession for 15 years after the loan was fully satisfied.\n\nThe gist of the document was a letting of the village for the full term of 40 years. There was no express or implied grant of a right of redemption of the village on repayment of the loan. The document was not intended to create a relationship of debtor and creditor or a security for the repayment of a debt. In our opinion, the transaction was a I.ease and not a usufructuary mortgage.\n\nThe question then is whether the tenants of the Bhikhanpur Kothi acquired occupancy rights in plots Nos. 183 and 184.\n\nSection 21(1) of the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885 (Act 8 of 1885) reads:\n\n\"S. 21 ( l) Every person who is a settled raiyat of a village within the meaning of the last foregoing section shall have a right of occupancy in all land for the time bciniheld by him as a raiyat in that village.\" A settled raiyat of a village is defined in s. 20 as a person who for a period of 12 years continuously held land in that village ai a raiyat. It is conceded that the tenants were settled raiyats of village KOOnjadpur within the meaning of s. 20. The question then is whether they held the plots as raiyats. :U:er s. 5(2) a \"raiyat\" is a person who has acquired a right to ho~ land as a cultivating tenant either of the proprietor or of the tenure holder: Now the sub-lessees under Exs. A and A 1 were cultivating tenants cl the Bhikhanpur Kothi. Exs. A and Al provided that the tenants would cultivate plots 183 and 184, _get the same cultivated by others and appropriate the produce thereof. It is conceded that if Ex. 4 was a lease, the Bhikhanpur Kothi was a tenure holder.\n\nHowever, Ex. 4 stipulated that the Bhikhanpur Kothi should not execute a lease patta in favour of any tenant for any term extending beyond 1359 fasli when the Jenn of Ex. 4 would expire. It Is\n\nargued that in view of this stipulation, the tenants of the Bhikhaitpur Kothi could not acquire the right to hold the lands after 1359\n\nfasli. Now the settlements under Exs. A and Al did .not contravene Ex. 4. The term of the last settlement expired in 1356 fasli.\n\nThe tenancies were lawful at their inception. The tenants acquired the right to hold the lands as r(\\iyats.\n\nAs settledraiyats of the village they got rights of occupancy in the lands under s. 21 ( 1).\n\nThe general rule is that no one can confer on another a better title than he himself has. The Bhikhanpur Kothi could not make a grant of the right to occupy the lands after the expiry of the lease in their favour. Bl!t the right of occupancy is not the creation of any, grant from the Kothi. It is conferred by s. 21 ( 1). As the tenants are raiyats, the law steps in and protects them from eviction.\n\nThe decision in MahabirGope v. Harbans Narain Singh(') is distinguishable. In that case the mortgagee from the proprietor settled the lands with an ancestor of the defendant. The mortgage deed prohibited the mortgagee from inducting tenants on the li!Ilds.\n\nThe mortgagee was neither a proprietor nor a tenure holder. The tenant was not a settled raiyat of the village. In these circumstances the Court held that the defendant did not acquire occupancy rights in the Jand under secs. 20 and 21 and was liable to be ejected by the proprietor on redemption of the mortgage. In the present case the deendants are settled raiyats Of the village.\n\nThey held the lands as tenants of the tenure holder. There was no prohibition in the document creating the tenure agafust induct- E ing raiyats on the land. In Atal Chandra Rishi v. Lakhi Narain\n\nGhose(') the proprietor granted an ijara stipulating that the ilaradar would not be competent to grant a sub-lease which was 'to continue after the expiry of the ijara. The ijaradar settled the lands with a tenant. The possession of the tenant in its inception was lawful. The Calcutta High Court held that in spite of the\n\nstipulation in the ijara the tenant became a raiyat whose rights were regulated by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act and he could be ejected by the proprietor only on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 44.\n\nSimilarly in this case the tenancy in its inception was lawful. The tenants Became raiyats and as they were settled raiyats of the village they acquired rights of occupancy and could not be ejected except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sec. 25.\n\nIn our opinion, the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting defendants acquired occupancy rights in plots Nos. 183 and 184 and the courts below rightly dismissed the suit for recovery .of possession of those plots.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed,\n\n(I) [19S2J S. C.R. 77S.\n\n(2) 10 C. L 1: SS.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "2\n\nMAHESH BHAGAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHESH BHAGAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM BARAN MAHTO & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM BARAN MAHTO & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2083, "end_char": 2087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Pras@", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3296, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Pras@ and D. Goburdhun, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3313, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Pras@ and D. Goburdhun, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Hardev Singh."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Hardev Singh."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.-On July 15, 1912 Abdul Karim the predecessor-in-interest of the plai, ntilf executed in favour of the proprietors of an indigo concern collectively known as the Bhikhanpur Kothi a thika patta (Ex."}}, {"text": "Khanjadpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3700, "end_char": 3710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) in respect of village Khanjadpur for a term of 40 years from 1320 to 1339 fasli corresponding to 1913 to 1952."}}, {"text": "April 25, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A and Al) dated April 25, 1940 and May 23, 1944 the .Bhikhanpur Kothi settled plots Nos."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A and Al) dated April 25, 1940 and May 23, 1944 the .Bhikhanpur Kothi settled plots Nos."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on April 24, 1953 the plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the plots."}}, {"text": "Bhikhanpur Kothi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4594, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A and Al were settled E raiyats of the village, ( 3) the thika patta in favour of the Bhikhanpur Kothi was a lease, ( 4) the Kothi had tl1e authority to induct raiyats on the village and ( 5) tl1e tenants held tl1e plo1s as raiyat~ and they acquired occupancy rights under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4781, "end_char": 4788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff filed an appeal in the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5295, "end_char": 5308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this Court Mr. Sarjoo Prasad contended (1) that Ex.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Abdul Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5664, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit 4 was executed by Abdul Karim in favour of ihe Bbjkhanpur Kothi on July 15, 1912."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5713, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit 4 was executed by Abdul Karim in favour of ihe Bbjkhanpur Kothi on July 15, 1912."}}, {"text": "Section 21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7412, "end_char": 7425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7433, "end_char": 7455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7481, "end_char": 7486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7739, "end_char": 7744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "KOOnjadpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7902, "end_char": 7912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceded that the tenants were settled raiyats of village KOOnjadpur within the meaning of s. 20."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7935, "end_char": 7940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8009, "end_char": 8016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885", "statute": "the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885"}}, {"text": "Bhikhaitpur Kothi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It Is\n\nargued that in view of this stipulation, the tenants of the Bhikhaitpur Kothi could not acquire the right to hold the lands after 1359\n\nfasli."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9124, "end_char": 9129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9448, "end_char": 9453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10655, "end_char": 10674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court held that in spite of the\n\nstipulation in the ijara the tenant became a raiyat whose rights were regulated by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act and he could be ejected by the proprietor only on one or more of the grounds specified in s. 44."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10916, "end_char": 10921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_746_758_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. ETC. v.\n\nMEHBOOB KHAN USMAN KHAN .ETC.\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM\n\nAND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]\n\nJlombay Police Act 22 of 1951 ss. 56 and 59-Notice to show cause under s, 59 and order of externment under s. 56-validit, v of.-Whether notice n1ust contain detailed particullirs of allegations-if general nature of material allegations suffecint to provide a person w'1h reeironable opportunity of explaining his conduct.\n\n' -\"The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Ahrnedaba.d City served notice> on the respondents in the two appeals on August 13, 1964 and July 28, 1964 under s. 59 of Bombay Police Act XXII of 1951 informing them that various allegations had been made against them under s. 56 of the Act and th; it it was proposed to remove .them outside the District of Ahrnedabad City and cenain contiguous Districts. An opponunity was given to them of tendering their explanations in respect of the allegations on dates which werecommunicated to them in the noticea. Each of the notices contained allegations, inter alia, to the effect that the l'espondents consumed eatables f1'<J!ll place; of public entenainment without payment and when legal dues WWe demanded from them, they beat up the pe1'ons concerned; and that tbe'witnesses in. respect of the various incidents and allegalions were not willing to come forward to depose againat the respondents in public by reuon of apprehension on their PHI as regards the safety of their pewn and propeny. After the respondents had submitted their written explana• tiOlis and produced evidence in their defence, the Deputy Commissioner p-8sed Orders on November 9, 1964 and FebruHy 9, 1965 directing the retiik>ndents to remove themselves from ateas mentioned in the order for a period of two yeaJ> and not to enter the same without permission in writing obtained fro~ a competent authority.\n\nThe respondents thereafter challenged the orders of the Det,>uty Com missioner in writ petitions undr, r Ans. 226 and 227 of the Consti:ution and coiltended, .inter alia, that the notices on which the subseauent Orders of externment were passed were too vague both with regard to the time and plac.& of their alleged activities; the allegations made against them were so general that they could not effectively offer any \"\"planations or substantiate their defence:. and that in effect the material alleptions against them had not been set out in the notices -and there was therefore no proper compliance with the provisions of s. S9 so as to enable the Deputy Com milsJone'r to take action under s. 56 of the Act. The High Court allowed the petitions holding that the notices were invalid as they were too general and 'V!'t\"e It also held that the definition of \"a place of public entertainmeot\" m the Act would take in the numerous placea mentioned ins. 2(10) aud accordingly the espondents could not have sufficient opponunitv of explaining their conduct not knowing what particular places of public en- .tertainment they were supposed to have visited where they were alleged to have committed various acts alleged against them. The High Court therefore quashed the notices under s. 59 as well as the orders of extern met p:issed against the respondents.\n\nOn appeal to this Court,\n\nA HELD : The High Court was in error in holding that the notices uruler\n\ns. 59 and the orders of cxternmcnt under s. 56 were invalid.\n\nThe view that the allegations against the respondents should have contained all the particulars of places of public entertainment or establishments Ibey were supposed to have visilcd, was not warranted by the pnwisions of s. 59. The notices referred to the periods during which the acts were stated to have been committed, as well as the area where they were\n\nsaid to have been committed.\n\nThe mete fact that the definition of the expression 'place of public entertainment', in s. 2(10) of the Act takes in various types of places, dces not militate against the allegations in question being material allegations as contemplated under s. 59. [757 DE]\n\nWhen a person against whom an order of extemment is proposed to be passed has to tender an explanation to a notice under s. 59, he can only give an explanation of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence of the action being taken due to mala fides, malice or mislaken idenlity, or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the notice and the like. The allegations made in the notices issued under s. 59 as against the respective respondents conlained the general nature of the material allegations made against each of them in respect of which they had been given a reasonable opportunity of ten\\lering an explanation. [757 G, HJ\n\nHari Khernu Gawali v. The Depu(v Comntissioner of Police, Bombay, [J 956] S.C.R. 506 and Bhagubhai Du/labhabliai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana, (1956] S.C.R. 533; relied upon. ·\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 167 and 168 of 1965.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated April 8, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Criminal Applications Nos. 3 and 8 of 1965.\n\nG. L:Sanghi and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\n0. P. Malhotra and P. C. Bhartari, for respondents (in Cr. A.\n\nNo. 167 of 1965).\n\nArun H. Mehta and 1. N. Shroff, for respondents (in Cr. A.\n\nNo. 168 of 1965).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-In these criminal appeals, by special leave, the State of Gujarat and its officer, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, challenge the orders, dated April 8, 1965, passed by the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Applications Nos. 3 and 8 of 1965, quashing the orders of extemment, passed against the respective respondents, uader s. 56, of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Born. Act XXII of 1951), (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 1965 is directed against the order in Special Criminal Application No. 3 of 1965, and Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1965 is\n\n748 SUPR!lME COURT REPORTS [1968 j 3 s.c.R.\n\ndirected against the order in Special Criminal Application No. 8 A of 1965.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, served a notice, dated August 13, 1964, on the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 1965, under s. 59 read with s. 56, of the Act, in the following terms :\n\n\"Under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act (Bombay XXII of 1951) you are hereby informed that the following allegations are made against you in a proceeding under Section 56 of the said Act, and it is proposed that you should be removed outside the District of Ahmedabad City and the contiguous District of- Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana and you should not enter or return to the said Districts for a riod of two years from the date of order proposed to btlpassed against you under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act,\n\n1951. You are also informed that I have been empowered by the Dy. Commissioner of Police, Speciru Branch, Ahmedabad City under his No. 40 P.C.B. dated .12/8/1964 to proceed according to Section 59(1) of the said Act.\n\nIn order to give you an opportunity of tendering your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 11.00 hours on 21-8-1964 to receive your explanation and to' hear you and your witnesses, if any, in regard to the said allegations and hence require you to appear before me at my office situated in Old Nurses Hostel, Patharkuva, Relief Road, Ahmedabad City on the said date and time for the said purpose lind to pass a bond in the sum of Rs. 500 with one surety in like amount for your attendance during the enquiry of the said proceedings. In case you fail to appear on the diie date an ex parte hearing and decision will be taken, that is, the inquiry will proceed against \"you in normal 'Uanner and decision will be taken in your absence.\n\nTAKE NOTE:- A/legations\n\nIt is alleged against you that you are a dangerous and desperate person and i!ldulge in acts involving force and violence. You terrorise the residents of the localities known as Rentiawadi, Halimkhadki and round about areas under Karanj and Madhavpura Police Stations.\n\nSince the month of November 1963 till today you are engaged in the commission of the following offence in the above localities :- ·\n\nou.rARAT v. MllHBOOB KHAN (Vaidialingam, /.) 749\n\nA I. You way-lay, rob and extort money iroo'! the.\n\npersons at the point of knife and under thteats of violence;\n\n2. You demand money from the persons and on their refusal to pay you beat them;\n\n3. You consume eatables from the place of public entertainment without payment and when legal dues are demanded you beat the person.\n\nYou are engaged in several acts as mentioned in paras (I), (2) and (3) above and that the witn~ to. the above incidents are not Willing to come forward to c depose against you in public by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person and property.\n\nIt is proposed to extern you for a period of two years. It is also proposed to extern you out of the contiguous Districts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and\n\nD Mehsana as )ou are likely to operate and indulge in your violent activities from the contiguous Districts also through your associates and agents if not so extemed.\"\n\nThe said notice was served on the party on August 20, 1964.\n\nOn lhe date, fixed for hearing, i.e., August 21, 1964, the respon- ' dent Mebboob Khan appeared before the officer and, after making E a preliminary statement, at his fe<!Uest, the proceedings were adjourned, from time to time, for enabling him to file his written explanation and also a list of witnesses, piuposed to bC examined by him. Ultimately, on November 9, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, directing the said Mehboob Khan Usman Khan to remove himself, within two days of the service of the order, i F outside the district of Abmedabad City and the contiguous Dis- ., tricts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana. The order of f externment contains recitals that, after consiclering the evidence before him, and the explanation, furnished by the respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Police is satisfied that the responderii is a desperate and dangerous man, and is engaged in the commis-\n\n8lOn of acts involving force or violence, and acts punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code, within the localities known as Rantiawadi, Halimkhadki and round about areas, and that there are reliable materials to prove the allegatiiltts, c0ntained in paragraphs (I), (2) and (3), of the said order.\n\nThose allegations, it may be stated, are identical with the three .ollences, referred to, in the notice, dated August 13, 1964. The H Deputy Commissioner further states that, in his opinion, 'the 'Witnesses io the above incidents are nOt willing to come forward to give evidence in public against him by reason of apprehCnsion on \"\n\ntheir part as regards the safety of their person and t>fOpCrty'. .,\n\n750 SUPRE?d'.E COURT REPORTS [1968) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nFinally, the order concludes by reciting that in exercise of the poWers, vested in the Deputy Commissioner, under s. 56 of the Act, he directs the respandent to remove himseffootside the District of Ahmedabad City and the contiguous Districts of Afunedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana, within two days from the date of service of the order. The order also concludes, bysaying that\n\nthe respondent should not return to or re-enter the places mentioned therein, for a period of two years from the date of the ordec, without obtaining the permission, in writing, of the competent authority.\n\nThe respondent in Criminal Appeal 167 /65 filed Special Criminal Application No. 3 of 1965, in the Gujarat High Court, under Arts. 226 and 227, of the Constitution, for quashing this oider of extemment, passed against him. The main ground, on which the order was challenged, appears to be that the notice, dated August\n\n13, 1964, on. which the subsequent order of externment is based, was too vague and general, both with regard to the time and places of his alleged activities, and that the allegations made, therein, were so general that he could not offer, effectively, any explana tion; or substantiate his defence. In short, jJ: was th~ grievance of the respondent that, in the notice, issued under s. 59, the material allegations, had not been set out, and therefore, there had beCll no proper compliance with the provisiQ11li of that seetion, so as to enable the Deputy Commissioner, to !ake action, under s. 56 of the Act. The respondent raised certain other objectiOns, to the validity and legality of the order, Q1le of which wa.s that the order of externment, had not been passed, by the competent officer.\n\nIn the counter-affidavits, filed before the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner has stated that though the notice, under s. 59, was served on Augllb't 20, 1964, fixing the date of hearing as August 21, 1964, the resJX>ndent herein, appeared before the officer, on that date and, after making -a preliminary statement, at his request, the pi:iiceedings were adjourned to August 29. 1964, for submitting his writ\\en explanation and also a list of witnesses, proposed to be examined by him. On the said date also, at the request of the respondent, further adjournment\n\nwas granted and, on September 14, 1964, the respondent submitted his written statement, traversing the averments made, in G the notice, dated August 13, 1964. He further examined witnesses, in his defence. Therefore, according to the Deputy Commissioner, the respondent had reasonable opportunity of tenderil!S his expla nation, regarding the matters, mentioned in the notice.\n\nIt is further stated that the witnesses, examined by the respondent, claimed no knowledge of the criminal activities, mentioned in the notice, and that the entire material •. consisting of the evidence of the victims, who had suffered at the hands of the respondent, which were before the officer, was considered, and the officer was also\n\nsatisfied that the respondent was indulging in offences, punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code. The officer was further satisfied that those persons were not willing to depose against him, in public, by reason of apprehensio_n, on their part, as regards the safety of their person and property. The Deputy Commissioner has funher stated that, from the record and information available with him, the respondent was a wellknown bully, terrorizing law-abiding citizens, in the areas, mentioned in the notice, and that it was, after following the proeedure, indicated in s. 59, that an order was ultimately passed, under s. 56. It is further averred that the notice is explicit and contains the general nature of the material allegations, against the respondent, as is required, by s. 59 of the Act. The respondent, herein, it is further stated, has fully 'understood the nature of the allegations, made against him, as is clear from the nature of the defence, taken by him, and the evidence, adduced to support that plea. On these and other averments made, in the counter-affidavit, the Deputy Commissioner submitted that the order did not suffer from any infirmity, as alleged by the respondent.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Gujarat High Court, in the ordr under attack, have accepted the position that, under s. 59, the competent officer should inform the person, in writing, of the general nature of the material allegations against him. It is their view that the nature of the material allegations should not be so E general, as to make it vague, and not precise, and that it must be of such a character as to give the person, concerned, a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding the material allegations. Having held that this is the principle to be applied. the learned Judges held that ground No. 3, of the notice dated August 13, 1964, served on the respondent, was open to the objection of 'vaguertess'. In this connection, the learned Judges F refer to the definition of the expression 'place of public entertainment, as contained in s. 2 (10), of the Act. They further hold that to allege against any ini:tividual that he consumed, without payment, eatables, i.e., articles of food, from a place of public entertainment', which will take in the various places, mentioned in s. 2(10), of the Act, would not afford sufficient opportunity to G the respondent, as to what particular places of public entertainment, or what particular establishment he is rnpposed to have visited and consumed eatables, without payment, and had beaten persons, when legal dues were demanded. As a large number of establishments would fall within the definition of 'place of public entertainment', under s. 2 ( 10), of the Act, it is the further H view of the learned Judges that it would be impossible for the patty\n\nto find out as to which particular place or places of public entertainment, in the localities mentioned in the notice, he is supposed to have visited and consumed eatables, without payment, and beat-\n\n752 SuP:RBME COURT :RBPOllTS\n\n(19~) 3 S.C.R.\n\nen persons in charge of their management, when legal dues were A demanded from him. In this view, the learned Judges, ultimately held that und No. 3 of the notice dated August 13, 1964, wa; vague, as 1t could not have afforded a reasonable opportunity to the rpodent' herein, of offering his explanation, oi feading evidnce, m his defence. Inasmuch as this ground also, had been taken mto account, by the Deputy Commissioner, for passing the order of extemment, and as thi~ ground was held to be vague, the learned Judges ultimately quashed the notice, issued under s. 59, dated August 13, 1964, as well as the order of extemment, dated November 9, 1964, passed against the respondent.\n\nThis order, is the subject of attack, by !he State of Gujarat, in Crimin:i.lAppeal No. 167 of 1965.\n\nSimilarly, a notice, dated July 28, 1964, under s. 59 of tlae Act,. was served on Ahmed Noor Mohammad, respondent in Crim.inal Appeal No. 168 of 1965, by the Depury CommissiODl!C, Ahmed a bad City, stating that the said officer proposed to extmi the respondent, for a period of two years, under_s. 5\"6 of the Act.\n\nIn the allegations, contained in this notice, . it was mentioned that 1he respondent was a desperate man, indulging in acts of violence .and force, and that since September 1963, till the date of the notice, he was engaged in the commission of the three acts, mentioned therein, in the localities, known as Kazi-na-dhaba, Maruwas, J amalpur and round about those places. It is enough only to refer to the first allegation, contained in this notice, which is substantially similar to the third allegation, mentioned in tk notice, issued against Mahboob Khan Usman Khan; and that allegation was to the effect that the respondent visited placeli of public entertainment and refu.sed to pay foL' the aiticles, consumed by him, under threats of VIOience. The riotice further stated that the Witnesses to the incident; mentioned therein, were not willing to come forward and depose agafnst the respondent in public, by reason of apprehension, on thir part, as regards the safety of their person and property.\n\nIt was hence stated in the notice that it was proposed to extern the respondent, from the areas, mentioned therein, for a period of two years. The notice also intimated that 11 a.m., on August 6, 1964, was fixed for receiving the explanation of the respondent. as well as for hearing him and any of the witnesses that he might produce, with reference to'the allegations, made in the notice. It is seen from the records that the respondent appeared before the officer and filed written statements, examined witnesses in support of his defence and that ari advocate appeared for him.\n\nOn February 9, 1965, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, under s. 56 of the Act, directing the respondent to remove himself from the area8, mentioned in the order, for a period of two years and not to enter the same, without permission in writing, obtained from a cbnl-\n\nGUJARAT v. MAHBOOB KHAN (Vaidialingam, /.) 753'\n\nA petent authority.\n\nIn this order also the Deputy Commissioner has stated that, on the materials available before him and, after considering the explanation and thr. evidence, produced by the respondent, he was satisfied that the respondent was a desperate and dangerous person and was engaged in the commission of acts, involving violence and acts, punishable under Chapters XVI and B XVII, of the Indian Penal Code, in the areasL mentioned in the notice, and that the three allegations, mentioned therein, were established, and, in view of the fact that the witnes~ regarding the above incidents, were not willing .. to come forward to give evidence, the order of extemment was passed.\n\nc The respondent challenged this order of extemment, passed against him, as well as the notice, issued under s. 59, before the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal ApplfcatiOli No. 8 of 1965, under Arts. 226 and 227, of the Constitution. Here again, the stand, taken by the respondent, was that the allegations, contained in the notice issued under s. 59, were very vague and indefinite and inconclusive and, as such, it could not be said that he was given a reasonable opportunity, to offer his explanation, .as D contemplated under the said section. Certain other objections, regarding the legality of the order, were also raised.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit, filed by the Deputy Commissioner, it is stated that the order, dated .February 2, 1965, w~ passed by him, under s. 56 of the Act, after a careful consideration, of all materials placed before him, l:ncluding the wntten statement and the defence evidence, adduced by the respo!lcle)lt. It w:a5 further stated that the notice, issued under s. 59, was in strict c:ionformity with the provisions of that section, and the respondent had a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding the allegations, made against him. The learned Judges of the Gujarat High Court, adopting the reasoning given in Special Criminal Application No. 3 of 1965, held that the notice, under s. 59; was invalid and, in consequence, the order of extemment, also, must fall to the ground. The learned Judges have held that allegation No. 1, in the notice, dated July 28, 1964, is analogous to ground No. 3, in the connected application, and that gt\".lund had been heldto be vague. Jn consequence, the learned Judges struck down the order of externment, dated February 9, 1965, as well as the notice, dated July 28, 1964. This order is attacked, by the Deputy Commissioner, in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1965.\n\nMr. G. L. Sanghi, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, in these appeals, has raised two contentions : ( 1 ) that both the\n\nrespondnts had a right of appeal, as provided under s. 60 of the Act, to the State Government, against the orders, pilSsed under s. 56 of the Act, and, therefore, the writ .petitions, filed by them, in .the High Court, should not have been entertained; (2) that the striking down, of the orders of xtemment, as containing vague\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(19618) 3 S.C.R.\n\nallegations, was not justified, as the notices were strictly in accord- A ance with s. 59, of the Act.\n\nAt the outset, it may be stated that the period of two years, for which the respondents were sought to be extemed, has already expired and, in one sense, it now becomes purely academic, to consider the correctness of the orders of extemment. 'But, counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the State is anxious to have a decision, from this Court, regarding the legal position, under s. 59, and therefore the correctness of the views, expressed by the High Court, may be considered by this Court. It has been made clear before us that no action will be taken against the respective respondents, in these appeals, on the basis of the orders, which are the subject of consideration.\n\nNo doubt, Mr. Malhotra and Mr.\n\nI. N. Shroff, learned counsel, appearing for the re.spective respondents, tn the appeals, have urged that the views, expressed by th<.: High Court, are correct.\n\nRegarding the first contention, we see no merit, especially when the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, under Arts. 226 and 227, has not chosen to reject the applications, filed by the respondents, on the ground that they had not exhausted their remedy of appeal, under s. 60, of the Act. That leaves us with the more important question, arising for consideration, viz., as to whether a proper interpretation has been placed, under s. 59 of the Act, by the High Court.\n\n. Chapter V of the At deals with special measures ror maintenance of Public Order and Safety of the State.\n\nSections 55 to 63AA, occur in the said Chapter, under the second sub-heading : 'Dispersal of gangs and Removal of persons convicted of certain offences'. Section 56 relates to removal of persons about to commit offence.\n\nUnder s. 58, a direction, made under ss. 55, 56 or 57, shall, in no case, exceed a period of two years from the date on which it was made. Section 59 provides for hearing to be given, before an orderunder'ss. 55, 56 or 57, is passed. We may pause here for a moment and state that both the respondents, in response to the notice, .issued under this section, had filed written statements and also adduced evidence. In particular, the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1965, was also represented by an advocate, in those proceedings. ·\n\nSection 60 provides for an appeal, to the State Government, against an order passed under ss. 55, 56 or 57.\n\nNormally, we would have dealt with the scheme of these sec- H lions, and in particular, of s. 56 and 59, very elaborately; but, we are absolved from that task, in view of two decisions of this Court, in llari Khemu Gawali v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police\n\nBombay(') and Bhagubhai Dullabhabllai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana('). A writ petition, No. 272 of 1955; was filed, under Art. 32, challenging the Vires of the Act and, in particular the provisions of s. 57. Similarly, in two other writ petiUons, Nos. 439 and 440 of 1955, the provisions of s. 56,. of the Act, were challenged, and a particular attack was made, against tlie notice, B issued under s. 59, on the ground that the allegations, contained therein, were vague and too general. Though this Court delivered two separate judgments, which are reported, as above, one in respect of writ petition No. 272 of 1955 and the other in respect of writ petitions Nos. 439 and 440 of 1955, it is seen from the reports, that all these matters were heard together. We are referring to this aspect because the scheme of the Act and, in pariicular, of the provisions of ss. 55 to 57, have been dealt with in these judgments. c\n\nThe Act has been held to be valid and the sections, with which we are concerned, viz .• ss. 56 and 59, have also been held to be valid.\n\nWe do not find any reference, unfortunately, in the judgment of the High Court, to these two decisions of this Court.\n\nIn the first decision, it is stated at p. 518 of the Reports, that the Act is based on the principle that it is desirabfe, in the larger interests of society, that the freedom of movement, and residence of a comparatively fewer number of people, should be restrained, so th~ the majority of the community may move and live in peace and harmony, and carry on their.peaceful avocations untrammelled E by any fear or threat of violence to tlieir person or property. In particular, it is also stated that the individual's right to reside in and move fi:eely in any part of the territory of India, has to yield to the larger interests of the community. This Court further states that ss. 56 and 57 of the Act, broadly speaking, corresp0nd to s. 46 of Act IV of 1890 ands. 27 of Act IV of 1902. The scheme of\n\ns. 59 is dealt with at p. 521, and the criticism, levelled agaill$t that section, is rejected. It is further emphasized, at p. 522, that the proceedings, contemplated by s. 57, or for the matter of that, sections 55 or 56 •. are not prosecutions for olfel\\Ces or judicial proceedings, though the officer or authority, charged with the .duty aforesaid, has to examine the information, laid before him, by the police, and that the police force is charged with the duty, not only of dettion of offences and of bringing offenders to justice, but also of 1preventing the commission of offences, by persons With previous records of conviction, or with criminal propensities. ·\n\nIn particular, a contention appears to have been raised that as ·?nlY geneal 1_1ature of the material alleati?ns have to be given m the notice, 1SSUed under s. 59, and, as 1t did no~ flirther provide f~ particulars to be supj>li~ to such a person,. it would be very difficult for a party to urge, m appeal before the State Government\n\n(I) (1956] S. C.R.. S06.\n\n(2) (1956) S. C.R. 533.\n\n756 SUPRBMB COUllT REPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nunder s. 60, that there was no material, fore the authority con- A .cemed, upon which it could have based its order. This objection\n\nwas repelled by this Court, at p. 524, as follows :\n\n\"But in the very nature of things it cquld not have been otherwise. The grounds available to' an extemee had necessarily to be very limited in their SCope bCcause if evidence were available which could be adduced in B public, such a person could be dealt with unaer the preventive sections of .the Cede of Criminal Procooui't1, for example, under section 107 or section 110. But the special provisions now under examination proceed on the basis that the person dealt with under any of the sections 55, 56 or 57 is of such a character as not to permit C the ordinary laws of t)J.e land, bein~ put in, fuOfion in the ordinary was, namely, of examimn~ witnesses in open court wpo should be cross-examined Of. the party ainst whom they were deposing. The. prov1sfons we are now examining are plainly intended to be used fu special cases requiring special treatment, that is, cases which cannot be D dealt with under the preventive SllCtions of the Coile of Criminal Procedure.\"\n\nIn the second decision, .where this Court had to consider :specifically the scope of s. 56, it has been held that the common\n\narguments; regarding ss. 56 to 59, had already been.dealt with and -discussed in the first decon. The parties against whoin the order E -of externment had been passed, under s. 56, specifically challenged the notice, issued under s. 59, on the groiind that the particulars of 1he evidence, against them, and of their alleged activities, had not 'been mentioned and that amounted tonot giving a reasonable\n\noppoitunity to explain, as envisaged, under s. 59. 'l'hi! conten- 1ion was disposed of, by this Court, on the ground thiit' it had been F dealt with, in the judgment, given by it, in the earlier decision, to which we have already referred. Ultimately, s. 56 was held to be valid and the notice, issued under s. 59, was als<'> held to be valid.\n\nIn, our opinion, in considering as to wJ:tether the notices, issued in the present cases, um!er s. 59, suffer from any infirmity, the G observations of this Court, in Hari Khemu Gawali's case('), extracted above, will have to be borne in mind.\n\nDuring the course of the arguments, counsel for ilie respondent, have drawn our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in 1'1 re: Govtnd Pandurang(1) and that of the Gujarat High Court, in lawaher v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate('), inter- 11\n\n(I) [19'61 S. C. R. S06.\n\n(2) A. J. R. 19S6 Dom. 61.\n\n(3) (1962) 3 Guj. L R. 1041.\n\nGUJARAT v. MEHBOOB KHAN (Vaidialirtgam, J.) 757\n\npreting s. 59 of the Act.\n\nBut, we are not adverting to those decisions, in view of the decisions of this Court, referred to above.\n\nIn the instant case, the learned Jtidges of the Gujarat High Court, accept the position that under s. 59, of the Act, the notice should inform the person, in writing, of the general nature of the material allegations, against him, arid it need not contain particulars. But they have held that the allegations, regar\\iing the two respondents, consuming eatables, from places of public entertainment, without payment, and beating persons, when legal dues were demanded, contained in the two notices, are vague. The reasoning of the learned Judges that the said allegations should have contained all the particular places of public entertainment, or what particular establishment the respondents Were supposed to have visited, is not warranted, by the provisions of s. -59. In faot, if we may say so, with respect, there is a slight inconsistency in the reasoning of the learned Judges, because, in the later part of the judgment they say that a party is nOt entitled to be supplied with particulars of the allegations made against him. We are therefore. not inclined to accept the above reasoning of the Gujarat High Court . The notices, referred to the periods during which the acts are stated to have been committed, as well as the area where they are said to have been committed. No doubt, the expression 'place Of public entertainment', is defined ins. 2(10) of the Act; but the mere fact that the said definition takes in various types of places, does not militate against the allegation No. l, in Special Criminal E Application No. 3 of 1965, or allegation No. 3, in the connected application, being of a general nature of the material allegations. as contemplated, under s. 59. Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that when a person is stated to be a 'thief', that allegation is vague. Again, when it is said that 'A stole a watch from X on a particular day and at a particular place', the allegation can F be said to be particular. Again, when it is stated that 'X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks pockets' it is of a general nature of a material allegation. Under the last illustration, given above, will come the allegations, which, according to the Gujarat High Court, suffer from being too general, or vague. Considering it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of externment is proposed to be pased, it must be enipnasized that when he as to tender an explanation to a notice, under s. 59, he G\n\ncan only give an explanation, which can be of a general nature.\n\nIt may be 1open to him to take a defence, of the action being taken, dne to mala fides, malice or mistaken identity, or he may be able ; H to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the notice and the like. The alle.1:iiiions made in •the notices, issued under s. 59, aS against the re11pective respondents, in our opinion, contain the general nature of the material allegations made against each of\n\n758 Slll'IUIME COUllT llEPOllTS [1968] 3 S.CJt.\n\nthem, in respect of which the responileots had been. gi'Vlll & a reasonable opportunity of tendering an, on, regarding them. Therefere, it follows'that the view of the Gujarat lligb.\n\nColirt that the notices, under s. S9, and tho oolers of externment, passed under s. 5 6, are invalid, cannot be , mstaiMl. The orders of the Gujarat High Court are, accordingly, set aside, and thee criminal appeals, allowed. But, we may make it again clear, that B in spite of our decision, in favour of the appellantS, no action can be taken against the respondents, in these appeals, on the basis of the orders, which are now held to be valid.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 147, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHBOOB KHAN USMAN KHAN .ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHBOOB KHAN USMAN KHAN .ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1968\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM\n\nAND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jlombay Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 56 and 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlombay Police Act", "statute": "Jlombay Police Act"}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlombay Police Act", "statute": "Jlombay Police Act"}}, {"text": "28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' -\"The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Ahrnedaba.d City served notice> on the respondents in the two appeals on August 13, 1964 and July 28, 1964 under s. 59 of Bombay Police Act XXII of 1951 informing them that various allegations had been made against them under s. 56 of the Act and th; it it was proposed to remove .them outside the District of Ahrnedabad City and cenain contiguous Districts."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 626, "end_char": 631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jlombay Police Act", "statute": "Jlombay Police Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 635, "end_char": 652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Police Act", "statute": "Bombay Police Act"}}, {"text": "Ahrnedabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 823, "end_char": 838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' -\"The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Ahrnedaba.d City served notice> on the respondents in the two appeals on August 13, 1964 and July 28, 1964 under s. 59 of Bombay Police Act XXII of 1951 informing them that various allegations had been made against them under s. 56 of the Act and th; it it was proposed to remove .them outside the District of Ahrnedabad City and cenain contiguous Districts."}}, {"text": "November 9, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1653, "end_char": 1669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the respondents had submitted their written explana• tiOlis and produced evidence in their defence, the Deputy Commissioner p-8sed Orders on November 9, 1964 and FebruHy 9, 1965 directing the retiik>ndents to remove themselves from ateas mentioned in the order for a period of two yeaJ> and not to enter the same without permission in writing obtained fro~ a competent authority."}}, {"text": "FebruHy 9, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the respondents had submitted their written explana• tiOlis and produced evidence in their defence, the Deputy Commissioner p-8sed Orders on November 9, 1964 and FebruHy 9, 1965 directing the retiik>ndents to remove themselves from ateas mentioned in the order for a period of two yeaJ> and not to enter the same without permission in writing obtained fro~ a competent authority."}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2523, "end_char": 2525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2589, "end_char": 2594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3391, "end_char": 3396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3634, "end_char": 3639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4535, "end_char": 4540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. L:", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L:Sanghi and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L:Sanghi and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5271, "end_char": 5282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and P. C. Bhartari, for respondents (in Cr.", "canonical_name": "P. Malhotra"}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5287, "end_char": 5301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and P. C. Bhartari, for respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Arun H. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5350, "end_char": 5363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arun H. Mehta and 1."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5371, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Shroff, for respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-In these criminal appeals, by special leave, the State of Gujarat and its officer, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, challenge the orders, dated April 8, 1965, passed by the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Applications Nos."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5624, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-In these criminal appeals, by special leave, the State of Gujarat and its officer, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, challenge the orders, dated April 8, 1965, passed by the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Applications Nos."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5697, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVaidialingam, J.-In these criminal appeals, by special leave, the State of Gujarat and its officer, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, challenge the orders, dated April 8, 1965, passed by the Gujarat High Court, in Special Criminal Applications Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5869, "end_char": 5892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, served a notice, dated August 13, 1964, on the respondent in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Kaira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6781, "end_char": 6786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of 1965, under s. 59 read with s. 56, of the Act, in the following terms :\n\n\"Under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act (Bombay XXII of 1951) you are hereby informed that the following allegations are made against you in a proceeding under Section 56 of the said Act, and it is proposed that you should be removed outside the District of Ahmedabad City and the contiguous District of- Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana and you should not enter or return to the said Districts for a riod of two years from the date of order proposed to btlpassed against you under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 59(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act,\n\n1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act,\n\n1951"}}, {"text": "21-8-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7329, "end_char": 7338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to give you an opportunity of tendering your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 11.00 hours on 21-8-1964 to receive your explanation and to' hear you and your witnesses, if any, in regard to the said allegations and hence require you to appear before me at my office situated in Old Nurses Hostel, Patharkuva, Relief Road, Ahmedabad City on the said date and time for the said purpose lind to pass a bond in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to give you an opportunity of tendering your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 11.00 hours on 21-8-1964 to receive your explanation and to' hear you and your witnesses, if any, in regard to the said allegations and hence require you to appear before me at my office situated in Old Nurses Hostel, Patharkuva, Relief Road, Ahmedabad City on the said date and time for the said purpose lind to pass a bond in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad Rural", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9169, "end_char": 9184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also proposed to extern you out of the contiguous Districts of Ahmedabad Rural, Kaira and\n\nD Mehsana as )ou are likely to operate and indulge in your violent activities from the contiguous Districts also through your associates and agents if not so extemed.\""}}, {"text": "August 20, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9409, "end_char": 9424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said notice was served on the party on August 20, 1964."}}, {"text": "Mebboob Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On lhe date, fixed for hearing, i.e., August 21, 1964, the respon- ' dent Mebboob Khan appeared before the officer and, after making E a preliminary statement, at his fe<!Uest, the proceedings were adjourned, from time to time, for enabling him to file his written explanation and also a list of witnesses, piuposed to bC examined by him."}}, {"text": "Mehboob Khan Usman Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, on November 9, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, directing the said Mehboob Khan Usman Khan to remove himself, within two days of the service of the order, i F outside the district of Abmedabad City and the contiguous Dis- .,", "canonical_name": "MEHBOOB KHAN USMAN KHAN .ETC"}}, {"text": "Abmedabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, on November 9, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, directing the said Mehboob Khan Usman Khan to remove himself, within two days of the service of the order, i F outside the district of Abmedabad City and the contiguous Dis- .,"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10438, "end_char": 10455, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Halimkhadki", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10500, "end_char": 10511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of f externment contains recitals that, after consiclering the evidence before him, and the explanation, furnished by the respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Police is satisfied that the responderii is a desperate and dangerous man, and is engaged in the commis-\n\n8lOn of acts involving force or violence, and acts punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII, of the Indian Penal Code, within the localities known as Rantiawadi, Halimkhadki and round about areas, and that there are reliable materials to prove the allegatiiltts, c0ntained in paragraphs (I), (2) and (3), of the said order."}}, {"text": "August 13, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10774, "end_char": 10789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those allegations, it may be stated, are identical with the three .ollences, referred to, in the notice, dated August 13, 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Afunedabad Rural", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, the order concludes by reciting that in exercise of the poWers, vested in the Deputy Commissioner, under s. 56 of the Act, he directs the respandent to remove himseffootside the District of Ahmedabad City and the contiguous Districts of Afunedabad Rural, Kaira and Mehsana, within two days from the date of service of the order."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11823, "end_char": 11840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August\n\n13, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12010, "end_char": 12026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main ground, on which the order was challenged, appears to be that the notice, dated August\n\n13, 1964, on."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12402, "end_char": 12407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12611, "end_char": 12616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Augllb't 20, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12959, "end_char": 12976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavits, filed before the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner has stated that though the notice, under s. 59, was served on Augllb't 20, 1964, fixing the date of hearing as August 21, 1964, the resJX>ndent herein, appeared before the officer, on that date and, after making -a preliminary statement, at his request, the pi:iiceedings were adjourned to August 29."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13403, "end_char": 13421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the said date also, at the request of the respondent, further adjournment\n\nwas granted and, on September 14, 1964, the respondent submitted his written statement, traversing the averments made, in G the notice, dated August 13, 1964."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14205, "end_char": 14222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14695, "end_char": 14700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14906, "end_char": 14911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15434, "end_char": 15439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16189, "end_char": 16193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16430, "end_char": 16438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RBME COURT :RBPOllTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a large number of establishments would fall within the definition of 'place of public entertainment', under s. 2 ( 10), of the Act, it is the further H view of the learned Judges that it would be impossible for the patty\n\nto find out as to which particular place or places of public entertainment, in the localities mentioned in the notice, he is supposed to have visited and consumed eatables, without payment, and beat-\n\n752 SuP:RBME COURT :RBPOllTS\n\n(19~) 3 S.C.R.\n\nen persons in charge of their management, when legal dues were A demanded from him."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18034, "end_char": 18039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ahmed Noor Mohammad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18068, "end_char": 18087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was served on Ahmed Noor Mohammad, respondent in Crim.inal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Maruwas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18623, "end_char": 18630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was mentioned that 1he respondent was a desperate man, indulging in acts of violence .and force, and that since September 1963, till the date of the notice, he was engaged in the commission of the three acts, mentioned therein, in the localities, known as Kazi-na-dhaba, Maruwas, J amalpur and round about those places."}}, {"text": "amalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18634, "end_char": 18641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was mentioned that 1he respondent was a desperate man, indulging in acts of violence .and force, and that since September 1963, till the date of the notice, he was engaged in the commission of the three acts, mentioned therein, in the localities, known as Kazi-na-dhaba, Maruwas, J amalpur and round about those places."}}, {"text": "Mahboob Khan Usman Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18845, "end_char": 18868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough only to refer to the first allegation, contained in this notice, which is substantially similar to the third allegation, mentioned in tk notice, issued against Mahboob Khan Usman Khan; and that allegation was to the effect that the respondent visited placeli of public entertainment and refu.sed to pay foL' the aiticles, consumed by him, under threats of VIOience."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19491, "end_char": 19505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice also intimated that 11 a.m., on August 6, 1964, was fixed for receiving the explanation of the respondent."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19891, "end_char": 19907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 9, 1965, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order, under s. 56 of the Act, directing the respondent to remove himself from the area8, mentioned in the order, for a period of two years and not to enter the same, without permission in writing, obtained from a cbnl-\n\nGUJARAT v. MAHBOOB KHAN (Vaidialingam, /.) 753'\n\nA petent authority."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19956, "end_char": 19961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20613, "end_char": 20630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21012, "end_char": 21017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21104, "end_char": 21121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21255, "end_char": 21260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".February 2, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21635, "end_char": 21652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit, filed by the Deputy Commissioner, it is stated that the order, dated .February 2, 1965, w~ passed by him, under s. 56 of the Act, after a careful consideration, of all materials placed before him, l:ncluding the wntten statement and the defence evidence, adduced by the respo!lcle)lt."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21678, "end_char": 21683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21904, "end_char": 21909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22247, "end_char": 22252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22415, "end_char": 22428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, in the notice, dated July 28, 1964, is analogous to ground No."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22767, "end_char": 22779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. G. L. Sanghi, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, in these appeals, has raised two contentions : ( 1 ) that both the\n\nrespondnts had a right of appeal, as provided under s. 60 of the Act, to the State Government, against the orders, pilSsed under s. 56 of the Act, and, therefore, the writ .petitions, filed by them, in .the High Court, should not have been entertained; (2) that the striking down, of the orders of xtemment, as containing vague\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(19618) 3 S.C.R.\n\nallegations, was not justified, as the notices were strictly in accord- A ance with s. 59, of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22948, "end_char": 22953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23025, "end_char": 23030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23350, "end_char": 23355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23759, "end_char": 23764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24071, "end_char": 24079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, Mr. Malhotra and Mr.\n\nI. N. Shroff, learned counsel, appearing for the re.spective respondents, tn the appeals, have urged that the views, expressed by th<.:", "canonical_name": "P. Malhotra"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24089, "end_char": 24101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, Mr. Malhotra and Mr.\n\nI. N. 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respondent, have drawn our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in 1'1 re: Govtnd Pandurang(1) and that of the Gujarat High Court, in lawaher v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate('), inter- 11\n\n(I) [19'61 S. C. R. 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{"document_id": "1968_3_759_765_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "DHANKI MAHAJAN\n\nRANA CHANDUBHA WAKHATSING & ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. liEGDE, JJ.]\n\nSdurashrra Agricullurd Debtors' Relief Act 23 of 1954, •· 2(6)(i)- Debtor, definition of-Person with liability over Rs. 25,000 not a debtor- /oint liability of umfructury mortgagoro for an amount llD'.ger than Rs. 25.000-Whether each of them ccn be regarded as liable /or only hi• share of debt and rrta1ed as >debtor for purposes of Act.\n\nRespondents 1 to 3 executed in 1940 a usufructury mortgal!e of their land in favour of the al'l\"'llant and certain others. The liability under the mortgage was a joint bability and under the terms of the deed each one of the mortgagors was liable fo'r the entire debt due under the mortgage.\n\nThe respondents claiminB to be 'debtors' under the Satirashtra Agricultural\n\nDebtors' Relief Act 1954 prayed for a scaling down of their debts. The Debt adjustment Board and the B!>pellate court held that the respondents were not 'debtors'. under s. 2(6)(i) of the Act as their total liability ex• ceeded Rs. 25,000 and therefore they were not entitled to the benefit claimed. A learned Single Judge of the High Court however held that in computin' the debts due from the respondents each one of them should be held liable only for on&-tbird of the mrirtgage debt and in that event the total debt duo from each WClOlld not exc=I Rs. 25,000. The learned JUdge in bis judgment also considered the question as to bow far a Single Judge of a High Court is bound b)r earlier decloions of the COurt.\n\nHELD : (i) A Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as ccrrect judgments of courts of CO-Ordinate jurisdiction, of Division Benches and Fiil! Be:nches of bis Olurt. [762 DJ\n\nTribhovandas Purshottllmdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Alotlla/ P\"'e/, A.1:R. 1968 s.c. 372, re-affiimed. . .\n\n(ii) Thero could be no dispute that under the Ttansfer of Property Act each of tho respondents must be held to be liable fo'r the entire mOrtgag<i debt There was nothing in the special provisions of the Sau!ashtra Act which would justify a departure from the said rule. The High Court therefore erred in treating die respondents as 'debtors' under that Act. [763 A-Fl\n\nV. Rcma.rwaml Ayyangar v. T. N. V. Ka/Iara Thavar, [1951] S.C.R.\n\n291. distinguished.\n\nAmbu Rama Mhatro v. Bhau Halya Patel, A.l.R. 1957 Bom. 6 and Dave Sadashiv JayakrishM v. Rana Govubha, (1962) 3 Guj. L. R. 1007, approved.\n\n(iii) While aj, plying the provisions of the Saurashtra Act with the provisiom of the Transfer of Picperty Act or the Contract Act in cettain ca8es s0me difficulty may arille.\n\nAll these difflculties can be resolved by R reasonably -lnt\"preting the relevant provisions of the Act. (764 CJ\n\nCrvlL APPELLATE Ju11.1so1cT10N : Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1965. 8 Sap. Cl/6S-'J\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated Febf1:1al)'. 12, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 477 of 1960.\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the appellants.\n\nI. A. Baxi, K. L. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the decision of Raju, J. of the Gujarat High Court in an application under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That application was filed by respondets Nos. 1 to 3 herein. As they are the only contesting respondents m this appeal, they will hereinafter be referred to as the respondents.\n\nThe respondents are Bhayats and Girasdars of Dhanki village in Lakhtar Taluka of fre Saurashtra region of the Gujarat State.\n\nOn December 19, 1940, the respondents executed a joint usufraotury mortgage in favour of Thakker Jethalal Dosabha (the third appellant herein) and another for a sum of Rs. 17,725. The liability incurred under the mortgage was a joint liability and under the terms of the deed each of the mortgagers was liable for the entire debt due under the mortgage. Till January 25, 1950, Dhanki village was a part of the former State of Bombay. As from January 26, 1950, that village became a part of the State of Saurashtra in view of the provisions in the Provinces and States\n\n(Absorption of Enclaves) Order, 1950. Prior to that date, the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, 1939, (Bombay Act No . .XXVIlI of 1939), hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act, was in force in Dhanki village. As long back as 1945, respondent No. 2 had filed an application before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Viramgam both on his behalf as well as on behalf of his minor cousin, the third respondent, for adjustment of their debts.\n\nAt the same time, respondent No. 1 had also filed an application under the Bombay Act for adjustmt of his debts.\n\nThese applications were consolidated for the purpose of trial.\n\nUltimately they were dismissed as the debts due from each of those pers.ons were held to exceed Rs. 15,000 and that being so they could not be considered as \"debtors\" under the Bombay Act. In those proceedings it was further held that the debt due from the respondents under the mortgage is a joint debt and each one of them was liable for the entire debt. No appeal was preferred against that decision. At the time of the merger of Dhanki village in Saurashtra, in that State there was no statute similar to the Bombay Act. The Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act (Act No. XXIlI of 1954) came to be enacted in 1954.\n\nThis Act will hereinafter be referred to as \"the Act\". By and\n\nlarge the provisions of the Act are similar to those of the Bombay Act. In 1955, the respondents again made applications before the Debt Adjustment Board for scaling down their debfs under the provisions of the Act The appellants resisted those applications principally on two grounds, viz. : ( 1) The respondents cannot be considered as \"debtors\" under the Act as the total debts due from each of them exceeded Rs. 25,000 the limit fixed, under the Act, and ( 2) their applications are barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the decision given earlier under the Bombay Act.\n\nC Both the Board as well as the appellate court upheld the contentions of the appellants that the respondents were not \"dbtors\" as defined in the Act and that their present applications were barred by the principles of res judicata, in view of the earlier decision rendered under the Bombay Act.\n\nThey held that the debt due under the mortgage is a joint debt and each of the mort- D gagers is liable for !he entire debt. They repelled the plea of the respondents that the debt in question is liable to be split up under the provisions of the Act. But t11e High Court reversed the above findings. It held that in computing the total debts due from the respondents each one of the mortgagers should be held to be liable only for one-third of the mortgage debt and in E that event the total debt due from each of them does not exceed Rs. 25,000. It may be noted that under the Act, a person whose debts exceeded Rs. 25,000 cannot be considered as a \"debtor\".\n\nIt is admitted that if each of the respondents is held liable for the entire mortgage debt, the debts due from each of them would exceed Rs. 25 ,000 and in that event, they are not entitled to\n\n11 any relief under the Act. But it is equally true that if each one of them is liable only for one.third of the mortgage debt, then the total debts due from each of them do not exceed Rs. 25,000 and in that event their debts are liable to be scaled down and adjusted nuder the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the main question for decision is whether each one of the respondents can be held liable for the entire debt due under the mortgage. If G the answer is in the affirmative, as opined by the Board as well as the appellate court, then the decision of the High Court is incorrect. But on the other hand, if we agree with the High Court that each of the respondents is only liable for one-third of the mortgage debt then the respondents' applications1 should have been.\n\nH entertained by the Board and dealt with according to law. As, in our opinion, the decision of the Board and of !he appellate court that each of the respondents is liable for the entire mortgage debt is correct in law, it is not necessary for us to consider the other question whether the applications from which this appeal anses\n\n762 SUPl.EMB COUllT REPORTS [196ll] 3 S.C.R.\n\nare barred by the principles of res judicata. For the same reason A we are also not going into the question whether on the facts of this case it was competent for the High Court to revei:se the decision of the appellate court by having recourse to its powers under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nBefore going into the question whether the respondents can be considered.as \"debtors\" under the Act, it is necessary to disa pose of a subsidiary controversy which appears to have troubled Raju, J. unnecessarily. Major portion of his judgment was de voted to the question whether a Single Judge of a High Court is bound by an earlier decision of another Judge of that High Court and whether the opinion expressed by a Full Bench of that Court is binding on Single Judges and Division Benches of that court. c We think that matters so obvious as those should not have troubled any Judge of a High Court. His conclusions on. those questions are rather startling. But there is no need to go into them in view of the decision of this Court in T1 ibhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Pa:el. (') That case also arose from one of the decisions of Raju, J. wherein the learned Judge had reached conclusions similar to those reached by him in the pre- D sent case.\n\nThis Court over-ruled those conclusions and held that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, of Division Benches and Full Benches of bis Court. ·\n\n. Reverting back to the principal point in issue, i.e. whether each of the respondents is liable for the entire mortgage debt, it may be noted that the term \"debt\" is defined in s. ~\n\n5) of the Act as meaning any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from a debtor, whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or otherwise, and includes mortgage money the payment of which is secured by the usufractury mortgage, or by an amalous mortgage in the nature of pura chhoot Qf immovable property, but does not include arrears of wages payable in respect of agricultural or manual labour. \"Debtor\" is. defined in s. 2(6){i) and that definition to the extent material for this case says--\n\n\"6. 'Debtor' means an agriculturist- ( i) whose debts do not exceed Rs. 25 ,000 on the date of filing an application to the Board under section 4; and\n\n\" ,\n\n'The definition of \"debt'' takes in debts under usufractury mortgages as well. As mentioned earlier, the usufractwy mortgage in H question was executed by all the respondents jointly. The debt\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 372.\n\nA . borrowed under it was a joint debt; each one of th.!l mortgagors was Jointly liable for the entire debt. That being so, unde~ tbD provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, each of the respondents must be held to be liable for the entire mortgage debt, This position is not disputed. Therefore, we have to see whether there are any provisions in the Act which alter the position in law. As\n\n11 seen earlier, neither the definition of \"debt\" nor of \"debtor'' is of any assistance to the respondents in support of the conte1_1tion\n\nthat each of them is liable for one-third of the mortgage debt.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents invited our attentiQ_n to\n\nss. 7(1), 16, 19, 20(1)(a), 20(l)(c), 20(3), 21 and 29.\n\nSection 7 ( 1) provides that if the payment of debt due by a debtor is guarantel:d by surety or if a debtor is otherwise jointly and C severally liable for any debt along with other person, and if the surety or such other person is not a debtor, the delitor may make an application under s. 4 for relief in respect of such .debt and the Board after consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case proceed with the adjustment of debts under the Act in so far as such applicant is concerned.\n\nWe do not think that this D provision lends support to the contention of the respondents that a joint mortgage debt gets split up. It is not necessary fC)r us in this case to consider as to what would han in a case where some of the co-mortgagors are \"debtors\" allcl the others not \"debtors\". In the present case, all the respondents are held to be not \"debtors\". Section 16 merely provides that the question whether an applicant is debtor or not should be decided as a E preliminary issue.\n\nSection 19 provides for the examination of creditor and debtor.\n\nSection 20 provides for taking accounts.\n\nSection 21 prescribes that in certain cases rent may be charged in lieu of profits.\n\nSection 29 provides for scaling down debts of debtors.\n\nNone of these provisions lends anysupport to the contention that the debt due from the respondents under the mort- F gage is liable to be split up under the Act.\n\nIt was next urged by Shri Baxi, learned counsel for the respondents, that .s._ 7 of the ct permits one of the joint debtors to apply for adjustment of his debts, and if he so does the Board is ound to scale down his debts so far as he is condmed. That G bem~ so unless we old that for. th~ purpose of the Act joint debts\n\nre hab!e to be split up, complications would arise. He gave an tllustration of a debt owned by three joint debtors each of whom\n\ns a .\"debtor\" within. te meaning of the Act.\n\nAcording to him, m Vie~ of the prov1s1ons of the Act, if the total debt due from them 1s Rs. 30,000; the same may w scaled down in respect of one debtor to Rs. 18,000 another to Rs. 17,000 and the third to Rs. 16,000. As the awards against the several debtors are independent awards, each ?f those awards can be executed against\n\nthe concerned debtor; 1n that event the creditor will be entitled\n\nto realise, instead of Rs. 30,000 due to him, Rs. 51,000. We do not think that there is any basis for this apprehension. It is not necessary for our present purpose to find out the true scope of s. 7 or what would be the effect of scaling down a joint debt on the application of one of the debtors. One possibility is that the debt as a whole may be scaled down and the creditor not entitled to collect more than the scaled down debt from any of the debtors .\n\nAnother possibility is that thougli the creditor cannot collect more than what is due to him jointly from all debtors, his right to proceed against an individual debtor and his property has to be determined on the basis of the provisions of the Act. We do not think that there is any need to go into these complications in the present case. It is likely that while applying the provisions of the Act along with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 'or the , Contract Act, in certain cases, some difficulties may arise.\n\nAll these difficulties will be solved by reasonably interpreting the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nFor our present purposes, all that we have to see is whether on the basis of the _provisions of the Act, there is any justification for departing from the ordinary ntle that in the case of a joint debt, each one of the debtors is liable for the entire debt. We see no such justification.\n\nThe learned Judge in support of his conclusion that the mortgage debt in this case is liable to be split up has placed reliance on the decision of this -Court in V. Ramaswami Ayya11gar v.\n\nT. N. V. Kai/asa Thavar. (1) That was a case arising under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, No. IV of 1938. The facts of that case were these : In a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by defendent No. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, the defendant No. 1 remained ex parte and the others contested the suit. A decree for Rs. 1,08.098 was passed by the trial court.\n\nThe Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act was passed during the pendency of an appeal and cross appeal, and on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 under the said Act the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs. 49,255 so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned. So far as defendant No. 1 was concerned, the decree for the full amount remained as it was.\n\ndefendant No. 1 thereupon applied. for scaling down, but his application was rejected.\n\nDefendants Nos. 2 to 1 deposited certain amounts and got their properties released.\n\nDefendant No. 1 deposited the balance of the amount that remained due under the decree as scaled down on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 1 and prayed that full satisfaction of the decree may be recorded.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge rejected this application and the High Court, on appeal, held that defendant No. 1 was entitled to the benefit of the scaling down in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 as the mortgage debt was one and indivisible. On further\n\n(I) {1951] S. C.R. 292.\n\nappeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the gh Court and restored that of the Subordinate Judge. Mukheqea, J. (as be then was), speaking for the Court, observed in the course of judgment,,\"The learned Judges (of the High Court appear to have overlooked the fact that they were sitting only as an executing court and their duty was to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed and beyond which they could not go. It is true that they were to interpret the decree but under the guise of interpretation they cou)d not make a new decree for _the parties.\" From this observation, it is clear that the main consideration which influenced this Court to reverse the decree of the High Court was that whether the decree passed in the suit was correct or not, the executing court could not have gone behind it. This Court also noticed yet another reason for departing from the normal rule that each one of the joint debtors is liable for the entire joint debt.\n\nSection 14 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act provides for separation of debt incurred by a joint Hindu family, some of the members of which are agricqlturists while others are not.\n\nOur attention has not been drawn to any such provision in the Act, nor is it the case of the respondents that they belong to a joint Hindu family. Hence the ratio of the decision in V. Ramaswami Ayyangar's case(') is inapplicable to the facts of the present case.\n\nThe provisions of the Bombay Act in material particulars are similar to the provisions of the Act.\n\nInterpreting the provisions of the Bombay Act in Ambu Rama Mhatro v.\n\nBhau Ha/ya Patel(2 ), the Bombay High Court, speaking through Shah, J. (as then was) held that it cannot be disputed that when a mortgage is created jointly on property in which several persons are in terested each of the mortgagors is liable in the absence of a contract to the contrary to pay the entire debt, and the Jiabilitv of a mortgagor is not proportionate to the extent of his interest 'in the\n\nmort, gged property; and that position is not altered under the\n\nprovmos of the Bombay Act.\n\nThis decision was followed by Bhagwat1, J. (as he {hen was) of the Gujarat High Court in Dave Sadashiy J ayakrishna \".· Rana Govubha ('). We are in agree ment with that conclus10n .\n\n. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow the appeal, set aside the orer of the High Court and restore that of the appellate court with costs throughout.\n\nG.C.\n\n(I) [1951] S. C.R. 292.\n\n(2) A. I. R. (1957) Born. 6.\n\n(3) (1962) 3 Guj. L.R. 1007.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "DHANKI MAHAJAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHANKI MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANA CHANDUBHA WAKHATSING & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANA CHANDUBHA WAKHATSING & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1968\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. liEGDE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Relief Act 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act 1954", "statute": "Relief Act 1954"}}, {"text": "Thero could be no dispute that under the Ttansfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2575, "end_char": 2577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thero could be no dispute that under the Ttansfer of Property Act", "statute": "Thero could be no dispute that under the Ttansfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2950, "end_char": 2962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "I. A. Baxi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2985, "end_char": 2995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. A. Baxi, K. L. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. A. Baxi, K. L. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Atiqur Rehman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. A. Baxi, K. L. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the decision of Raju, J. of the Gujarat High Court in an application under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "Raju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the decision of Raju, J. of the Gujarat High Court in an application under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lakhtar Taluka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are Bhayats and Girasdars of Dhanki village in Lakhtar Taluka of fre Saurashtra region of the Gujarat State."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 19, 1940, the respondents executed a joint usufraotury mortgage in favour of Thakker Jethalal Dosabha (the third appellant herein) and another for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Thakker Jethalal Dosabha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3661, "end_char": 3685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 19, 1940, the respondents executed a joint usufraotury mortgage in favour of Thakker Jethalal Dosabha (the third appellant herein) and another for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "January 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Till January 25, 1950, Dhanki village was a part of the former State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Dhanki village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Till January 25, 1950, Dhanki village was a part of the former State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Till January 25, 1950, Dhanki village was a part of the former State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4014, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As from January 26, 1950, that village became a part of the State of Saurashtra in view of the provisions in the Provinces and States\n\n(Absorption of Enclaves) Order, 1950."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4075, "end_char": 4085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As from January 26, 1950, that village became a part of the State of Saurashtra in view of the provisions in the Provinces and States\n\n(Absorption of Enclaves) Order, 1950."}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Judge (Junior Division) Viramgam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 had filed an application before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Viramgam both on his behalf as well as on behalf of his minor cousin, the third respondent, for adjustment of their debts."}}, {"text": "State there was no statute similar to the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8619, "end_char": 8625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8629, "end_char": 8656, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10504, "end_char": 10511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10716, "end_char": 10725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11113, "end_char": 11137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11685, "end_char": 11694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11973, "end_char": 11977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12549, "end_char": 12559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12677, "end_char": 12687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12742, "end_char": 12752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12869, "end_char": 12879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baxi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13114, "end_char": 13118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next urged by Shri Baxi, learned counsel for the respondents, that .s._"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14177, "end_char": 14181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14876, "end_char": 14900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mukheqea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17077, "end_char": 17085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheqea, J. (as be then was), speaking for the Court, observed in the course of judgment,,\"The learned Judges (of the High Court appear to have overlooked the fact that they were sitting only as an executing court and their duty was to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed and beyond which they could not go."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17953, "end_char": 17963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. Ramaswami Ayyangar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence the ratio of the decision in V. Ramaswami Ayyangar's case(') is inapplicable to the facts of the present case."}}, {"text": "Interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18507, "end_char": 18552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18603, "end_char": 18620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Act in Ambu Rama Mhatro v.\n\nBhau Ha/ya Patel(2 ), the Bombay High Court, speaking through Shah, J. (as then was) held that it cannot be disputed that when a mortgage is created jointly on property in which several persons are in terested each of the mortgagors is liable in the absence of a contract to the contrary to pay the entire debt, and the Jiabilitv of a mortgagor is not proportionate to the extent of his interest 'in the\n\nmort, gged property; and that position is not altered under the\n\nprovmos of the Bombay Act."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18639, "end_char": 18643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Act in Ambu Rama Mhatro v.\n\nBhau Ha/ya Patel(2 ), the Bombay High Court, speaking through Shah, J. (as then was) held that it cannot be disputed that when a mortgage is created jointly on property in which several persons are in terested each of the mortgagors is liable in the absence of a contract to the contrary to pay the entire debt, and the Jiabilitv of a mortgagor is not proportionate to the extent of his interest 'in the\n\nmort, gged property; and that position is not altered under the\n\nprovmos of the Bombay Act."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19105, "end_char": 19113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was followed by Bhagwat1, J. (as he {hen was) of the Gujarat High Court in Dave Sadashiy J ayakrishna \".·"}}, {"text": "Dave Sadashiy J ayakrishna \".· Rana Govubha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19164, "end_char": 19207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was followed by Bhagwat1, J. (as he {hen was) of the Gujarat High Court in Dave Sadashiy J ayakrishna \".·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_766_773_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "BHALCHANDRA alias BAPU & ANR. v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n[M. IIIDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM\n\nAND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) ss. 304A and 331--Storage of e:tpl01ives of higher degree-Explosion-Whether licensus liable criminally.\n\nIn an explosion which took place, the persons who were working in the factory of the appellants where crackers were being manufactured died or were injured.\n\nThe appellants were convicted under ss. 304A and 337 I.P.C. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that criminal liability could not be imposed upon them under ss. 304A and 337 as it had not been established that the deaths cir injuries caused were the direct result of any rash or negligent act on the part of the appellants or that any such act had been proved which was the proximate and efficient cause of the explosion without the intervention of another's negligence. ·\n\nHEID : The appellants were rightly convicted. [773 CJ\n\nAlthough there was no direct evidence of the immediate cause of the eitplosion but the explosives the possession of which was prohibited under the notifications issued undel' the Indian Explosives Act were found in the shops or the premises where the appellants carried on their business and the substances which were of highly hazardous and dangerous nature were apparently being used in the manufacture of. the fire works, since thev wel'e found at the scene of the explosion.\n\nThese explosives had sensitive composition and even friction or percussion could came Ol<plosion.\n\nIn the factory itself where the explosion took place the per• sons who were employed were mostly women who brought their small children with them and young children below the age of 18 had been employed in the manufacture of fire works. It became therefc/re, all the more incumbent on all appellants to have completely avoided the use of highly sensitive compositions.\n\nThe appellants had, undoubtedly displayed a high degree of negligence by allowing or causing to be used dangerous and prohibited compositions and substances which must he held to have bees the efficient cause of the explosion. [771 A.C; 773 C]\n\nRustom Sharior Irani v. State of Maharashtra.\n\nCr. A. No. 72165; Balachandra Waman Pathe v. The State of Maharashtra, Cr. A. 62 of 1965 decided on 20-11-1967, followed.\n\nRegina v. David Dant., 169 English Reports (C.C.) 1517; Rex v.\n\nG Pittwood .. (1902) 19 T.L.R. 37, applied.\n\nKurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla v. State of Maharashtro. [1965] 2 S.C.R. 622; Suleman Rahiman Mulani & 'Another v. The State of Maharashtra Cr. A. 50 of 1965 decided on 1-12-1967, distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 1965.\n\nH Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 19, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 193 and 194 of 1965.\n\nK. Hingorani and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellants.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave in whic~ the main question for decision is whether the appellants were ngtly convicted for offences under ss. 304A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe facts lie within a narrow compass. The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884, hereinafter called the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to manufacture, possess and seli fire works and gun-powder not exceeding 200 pounds and to possess and sell safety fuses.\n\nIt appears that the appellants had a factory for manufacturing explosives in a house on Shad Road in Latur town.\n\nIt is said that an explosion occurred in that place on May 5, 1962 at about 12 O'clock as a result of which 11 persons died and 7 persons were injured. The appellants along with one B. G. Kamble were tried for offences under the various provisions of the Act and the Rules as also for offences under ss. 304A and 337 of the Code. The trial judge\n\nacquitted B. G. Kamble but convicted the appellants 'of the var10us charges framed against them and imposed fine for offences under the provisions of the Act and awarded a sentence of one year under s. 3-04A and three months under s. 337 of the Indian Penal Code with. a direction that they were to run concurrently. The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants against their conviction and sentence.\n\nThe appellants then moved the High Court on the revisional side.\n\nThe order of conviction was confirmed by the High Court as also the sentence on all the counts except. that under s. 304A the substantive sentence was reduced to one of rigorous imprisonment for six months but for the reasons mentioned in the judgment of the High Court the appellants were directed, in addition, to pay a fine of Rs. 1,500 each.\n\nNow there can be no manner of doubt and it has been so found that in the explosion which took place the persons who were working in the so called factory of the appellants where cracker;; et9. were being manufactured died or were injured.\n\nccordmg to t1!e courts Jx:low he appellants had, in their possession, unauthonsed explosives 1n contravention of the Act and the rules and had committed a number of breaches of those rules and the conditions of the licences issued to them. The principal contention on behalf of the appellants is that even on the facts found it is not possible to hold that they were responsible for the explosion or had done anything which could be regarded as a direct and immediate cause of the explosion.\n\nThus criminal\n\n768 SUPIU!MB COUllT RBPOl.TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nliability could not he imposed on them under ss. 304A and 33.7 of the Code as it has not been established that the deaths or in juries caused were the direct result of any rash or negligent act on the part of the appellants or that any such act had been prowd which was the proximate and efficient cause of the explosicin without the intervention of another's negligence. In the High Court emphasis was laid on the abnce of any positive evidence pointing to the presence of the appellants at the material time.\n\nThe High Court while holding that there was no direct evidence in respect of the immediate cause of the explosion referred to the conclusion of the courts below that the appellants had committed a number of hazardous breaches of the rules framed under the Act and the conditions of the licences issued to them, particularly the storage of prohibited explosives and employment of children below the age of 18. This, it was pointed out, showed a callom disregard for the safety of the employees.\n\nIt was noticed that the Assitant Inspector of Explosives had also attributed the explosion to the storage of prohibited explosives of a high degree.\n\nTherefore the appellants were found to have been rightly convicted under ss. 304A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOur attention has been invited by the learned Counsel for the appellants to certain decisions of this Olurt. In Kurban Hunrin Mohammedali Rangwa/la v. State of Maharashtra(') a factm::y was licensed on certain conditions to manufacture paints. 1be manager and the working partner did not have a license for manufacturing wet paints but nevertheless the factory manufactured them. Certain burners were used for the purpose of melting rosin or bitumen by heating them in barrels and adding turpentine thereto after the temperature cooled down to a certain degree.\n\nWhile this process was going on froth overflowed out of the barrel and because of heat, varnish and turpentine which were stored at a short distance caught fire and resulted in the death of seven persons working in the factory. The question was whether the manager and the working partner of the firm which ran the factory was guilty under ss. 304A and 285 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that the mere fact that the burnCllll were allowed to be used in the same room in which varnish and turpentine were stored even though it might be a negligent act would not be enough to make the appellant before this Court responsible for the fire which broke out. The cause of the fire, it was observed, was not merely the presence of burners in the room in which the varnish and turpentine were stored though this circumstance was indirectly responsible for the fire which bro:\\ce out. The requirement of s. 304A was the causing of death bv doing any rash or negligent act and this meant that the death must be the direct or -proximate result of the rash or negligent\n\n(I) (1965] 2 S. C. R. 622.\n\nA act. It was found that the direct or proximate cause of the fire which resulted in seven deathS was the act of a labourer who acted in a hurry and who did not wait until the bitumen or rosin cooled down and thus it was his negligence which was the direct and proximate cause of the fire breaking out The appellant, namely, the manager and the working partner of the firm could B not be held to have committed the offence under s. 304A of the Code.\n\nThe ratio of the above decision was . applied in Sman Rahiman Mulani & Another v.\n\nThe State of Maharashtra(').\n\nIn that case the question was whether the first appellant who had only a learner's licence and was driving a jeep which knocked down the deceased had been rightly convicted of an offence under s. 304A of the Code read with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. On the material on the record the court found it impossible to. discover under what circumstances the accident had taken place.\n\nThis Court held that it was not known what was the proximate cause of the accident and the possibility that it bad been caused due to the fault of the deceased could not be ruled out. The mere fact that the appellant in question held a learner's licence did not establish that he did not know driving. His proficiency might furnish a defence which the learner could not have but the absence of proficiency did not make him guilty.\n\nHis conviction under s. 304A was therefore set aside.\n\nThe fact' of the present case are somewhat different and distinguishable from those of the above two cases as will be clear from a close examination of the material evidence relating to the substances which were being used in the manufacture of the fire works etc. in the factory of the appellants.\n\nIt appears that soon after the explosion the Inspector of Explosives, West Circle, Bombay, proceeded to Latur for investigation.\n\nHe took into possession certain substances from the scene of the accident. By means of a letter, dated May 11, 1962 sent from the office of the Inspector of Explosives these substances were forwarded to the Chemical Examiner, Government of Maharashtra for examination, the samples were as follows :-\n\n1. A white substance in a packet suspected to. be potassium chlorate.\n\n2. An orange yellow substance suspected to be arsenic sulphide.\n\n3. A round stone piece containing smears with orange yellow chemical adhering to it. (This was to\n\n(I) Cr. A. 50 of 1965, decided on 1-12·67.\n\n770 SUPllBMB COURT llBPOP.TS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R•\n\nbe examined for the presence of arsenic sulphide and potassium chlorate).\n\n4. A contraption to test the explosibility of a mixture of potassium chlorate and sulphur.\n\nDindeshchandra P. W. 10 Assistant inspector of Explosives also went to the scene of the explosion along with the Inspector on May 9, 1962 and various samples were collected from the shops of the appellants as well.\n\nAll these were forwarded to the Chemical Examiner for examination. The report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. 87) which is to be found on the original record gives the following analysis in respect of the above substances :- , \"Exhibit ( 1 ) is potassium chlorate.\n\nExhibit (2) is arsenic sulphide.\n\nExhibit (3) has ediment containing arsenic sulphide and sulphur adhering to it.\n\nExlu'bit ( 4) has Potassium Chlorate and Sulphur in its cavity.\"\n\nApart from the origins: record these facts stand established from the evidence of Dindeshchandra P. W. 1 O and the report (Ex. 3 8) which he had submitted on November 2, 1962 which was duly proved by him when he appeared as a witness. He has further stated that when he inspected the premises of the factory on May 9, 1962 he noticed half burnt raw material like sulphur white powder the ingredients of which he coald not ascertain. There were grinding stones as also empty tubes for manufacturing exhibition fire works. As regards the cause of the explosion his opinion may be given in his own words :-\n\n\"Probable cause of the explosion must have been the large quantities of the raw materials gun powder and finished fireworks and the raw materials for the same were stored in the premises. At the time of the explosion there were large quantities of the fireworks, finished as well as in the process of prepartion, loose compositions and the gun-powder. There were being dried in the open court yard of the premises.\n\nSome of the items contained very sensitive explosive compositions which might have exploded due to the spark, percussion or friction or fire.\" Although there was no direct evidence of the immediate cause of the explosion but indisputably the explosives the possession of which was prohibited under the notifications issued under tl\\e Act were found in the shops or the premises where the appellants carried on their business and on the substances that have been mentioned which were of a highly hazardous and dangerous\n\nA nature were apparently being used in the manufacture of the fire works sinee they were found at the scene of the explosion, ( vide the evidence mentioned before and the finding o~ the trial court and the Additional Sessions Judge). As stated by Dindeshchandra P. W. 10 these explosives had sensitive compositions and even friction or percussion could cause explosion. It is further proved B that in the factory itself .where the explosion took place the persons who were employed were mostly women who brought their small children with them and young children below the age of 18 had been employed in the manufacture of the fire works etc.\n\nThe factory was situate in close proximity to residential quarters.\n\nIt became therefore all the more incumbent on the appellants C have completely avoided the use of highly sensitive compositions of the nature mentioned above.\n\n The decision which is apposite to the present case is the one recently delivered by this Court on April 3, 1968 in Rustom Sher/or Irani v. State of Maharashtra('). There the chimney of a bakery had collapsed and 11 persons were killed and certain persons were injured. The appellant had submitted no plan for the alteration of the chimney for the third time and had asked just a mason to temove the iron pipe which had corroded and to bring the height of the chimney to 65 feet. The mason had told him that while the work was being executed it was unnecessary to completly keep the bakery closed except during the period the repair work was being done.\n\nAfter the chimney fell down a number of officers visited the spot and inspeeted the bakery.\n\nThe Chief Inspector of Boilers was of the opinion that the cause of the collapse of the chimney was the explosion which occurred in it because of the products of combustion and gases not being permitted to escape. freely as a pipe of 6 inche~ diameter had been put instead of 12 inches diameter. It is unnecessary to refer to the detailed discussion of the evidence.\n\nIt was established that the construction of the new chimney had been done without the advice of a properly qualified person. The argument raised was on the lines similar to the one which had been advanced in Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwa/la v. State of Maharashtra('). It was maintained that no negligence on the part of the appellant had been estllb!ished and it was on account of the negligence of the mason that the chimney had fallen down. This Court was of the view that the proximate and efficient cause of the deaths was the negligence of the appellant in choosing a pipe of 6 inches diameter and asking a mason (who was apparently not a qualified person) to carry out the alterations and also continiuing working at least one oven there during the period while the alterations to the chimney were being made. ·\n\n(I) Cr. A. No. 72/65.\n\n(2) [196SJ 2 S. C.R. 622 ..\n\nSUPREME COURT R!!PORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nIn another recent decision, Balachandra Waman Pathe v. The State of Maharashtra, (1) this Court referred with approval to what was said by Straight, J. in Empress of India v. Indu Beg(\") that criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an indi vidual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. In Queen Empress v.\n\nBhutan(•) the lessee of a government ferry having the exclusive right of conveying passengers across a certain river was held to be guilty under s. 304A when he had committed the negligent act of putting a boat in the ferry which was in an unsafe condi tion and which sunk resulting in some of persons getting drowned.\n\nThe Punjab Chief Court found a person guilty under ss. 304A and 338 in Kamr-ud-din v. King Emperor(') when he had consigned two boxes containing fire works to the Railway falsely declaring them to contain iron locks with the result that in load ing one of the boxes exploded killing one coolie and injuring another.\n\nThe inadvertence to the results of concealing the true character of the contents of the box which was the failure of duty to the public at large and the knoW!edge of the dangerous nature of the contents which must be inevitably presumed coupled with the consequences were regarded as constituting a complete offence under the sections.\n\nAdverting to English law, the case of Regina v. David Dant(•) is highly instructive. This is what Erle, C.J. observed :\n\n''The defendant turned a dangerous anin\\al on to a common where there was a public footpath. This has been found by the jury to be culpable negligence, and the child's death was caused by it. Ordinarily speaking these are all the requisites of manslaughter. It is contended, however, that 1no offence was committed, because as we must take it, the child was not on the path. the jury having found that it was very near. but that they could not say whether it was on or off. In my opinion the defendant is responsible for having brought so great a danger on persons exercising their right to cross the common; and it is not a ground of acquittal that the child had strayed from the path.\"\n\nIn another case, Rex v. Pittwood(0) the prisoner was charged with\n\nmanslaughter on the ground that he had been negligent in not\n\n(I) Cr. A. 62 of 1965 decided on 2().11-67.\n\n(3) I. L. R. XVI All. 472. (S) 169 English Reports CC: C.) 1517.\n\n(2) I. L. R. III All. 776.\n\n(4) 1905 P. R. 22. (Cr.)\n\n(6) (1902) 19 .T. L. R. 37.\n\nclosing a gate when a train passed which it was his duty to do with the result that White who was in a hay cart was killed while the cart was struck by the train which came when it was crossing the line. Wright, J. was of the opinion that the prisoner had been\n\nguilty of gross and criminal negligence as he was paid to keep the gate shut when the train came and protect the public. It was\n\n11. clear case of misfeasance as the prisoner directly contributed to the accident and he was guilty of manslaughter.\n\nAll the above cases show that criminal negligence can be found on varying sets of circumstances.\n\nThe tests which have been applied appear to be fully applicable to the facts of the present case including the one of direct and efficient cause.\n\nThe appellants had, undoubtedly displayed a high degree of negligence by allowing or causing to be used dangerous and prohibited compositions and substan, es which must be held to have been the efficient cause of the explosion.\n\nThe appellants were therefore rightly convicted and sentenced under ss. 304A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code. As no other point has been pressed or arises for consideration, the appeal is dismissed. The appellants shall forthwith surrender to their bail bonds.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "BHALCHANDRA alias BAPU & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHALCHANDRA alias BAPU & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 11, 1968\n\n[M. IIIDAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VAIDIALINGAM\n\nAND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. N. GROVER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.N. GROVER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 331", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 487, "end_char": 492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 605, "end_char": 621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1163, "end_char": 1177, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 S.C.R. 622", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 19, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Applications Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Hingorani and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2898, "end_char": 2913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Hingorani and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2957, "end_char": 2969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave in whic~ the main question for decision is whether the appellants were ngtly convicted for offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3187, "end_char": 3203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3211, "end_char": 3228, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Latur town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the appellants had a factory for manufacturing explosives in a house on Shad Road in Latur town."}}, {"text": "May 5, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that an explosion occurred in that place on May 5, 1962 at about 12 O'clock as a result of which 11 persons died and 7 persons were injured."}}, {"text": "B. G. Kamble", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants along with one B. G. Kamble were tried for offences under the various provisions of the Act and the Rules as also for offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884", "statute": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4179, "end_char": 4183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884", "statute": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884"}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884", "statute": "The appellants held licences under the Indian Explosives Act 1884"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4242, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5676, "end_char": 5691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6861, "end_char": 6877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kurban Hunrin Mohammedali Rangwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kurban Hunrin Mohammedali Rangwa/la v. State of Maharashtra(') a factm::y was licensed on certain conditions to manufacture paints."}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7808, "end_char": 7824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7849, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8370, "end_char": 8377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1965] 2 S. C. R. 622", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9319, "end_char": 9326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9375, "end_char": 9393, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9977, "end_char": 9984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that soon after the explosion the Inspector of Explosives, West Circle, Bombay, proceeded to Latur for investigation."}}, {"text": "Latur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10415, "end_char": 10420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that soon after the explosion the Inspector of Explosives, West Circle, Bombay, proceeded to Latur for investigation."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10544, "end_char": 10556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By means of a letter, dated May 11, 1962 sent from the office of the Inspector of Explosives these substances were forwarded to the Chemical Examiner, Government of Maharashtra for examination, the samples were as follows :-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "1-12·67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 50 of 1965, decided on 1-12·67."}}, {"text": "Dindeshchandra P.", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11235, "end_char": 11252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dindeshchandra P. W. 10 Assistant inspector of Explosives also went to the scene of the explosion along with the Inspector on May 9, 1962 and various samples were collected from the shops of the appellants as well."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11361, "end_char": 11372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dindeshchandra P. W. 10 Assistant inspector of Explosives also went to the scene of the explosion along with the Inspector on May 9, 1962 and various samples were collected from the shops of the appellants as well."}}, {"text": "Dindeshchandra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11978, "end_char": 11992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the origins: record these facts stand established from the evidence of Dindeshchandra P. W. 1 O and the report (Ex."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 8) which he had submitted on November 2, 1962 which was duly proved by him when he appeared as a witness."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14408, "end_char": 14421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision which is apposite to the present case is the one recently delivered by this Court on April 3, 1968 in Rustom Sher/or Irani v. State of Maharashtra(')."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT R!!PORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16301, "end_char": 16339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [196SJ 2 S. C.R. 622 ..\n\nSUPREME COURT R!!PORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nIn another recent decision, Balachandra Waman Pathe v. The State of Maharashtra, (1) this Court referred with approval to what was said by Straight, J. in Empress of India v. Indu Beg(\") that criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an indi vidual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted."}}, {"text": "Straight", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16480, "end_char": 16488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [196SJ 2 S. C.R. 622 ..\n\nSUPREME COURT R!!PORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R\n\nIn another recent decision, Balachandra Waman Pathe v. The State of Maharashtra, (1) this Court referred with approval to what was said by Straight, J. in Empress of India v. Indu Beg(\") that criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an indi vidual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted."}}, {"text": "s. 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17061, "end_char": 17068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Chief Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17240, "end_char": 17258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab Chief Court found a person guilty under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 338", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17287, "end_char": 17303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Erle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17988, "end_char": 17992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is what Erle, C.J. observed :\n\n''The defendant turned a dangerous anin\\al on to a common where there was a public footpath."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19227, "end_char": 19233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wright, J. was of the opinion that the prisoner had been\n\nguilty of gross and criminal negligence as he was paid to keep the gate shut when the train came and protect the public."}}, {"text": "ss. 304A and 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20075, "end_char": 20091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20099, "end_char": 20116, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_774_783_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "KAR!'.'ESH KUMAR SINGH & ORS.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTfAR PRADESH\n\nApril 15, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 302, 201 and 149-Whether inconsistencies and discrepancies in evidence showed misca\"iage of justice-Four out of ten appellants sentenced to death a11d others to life imprisonment- Distinction bared on the four being anned with dangerous weapons-If sustainable on evidence.\n\nEvidence Act, 1872, s. 114(8)-Adver.ve inference when prosecution does not produce some of the eye .. witnesses--When may be drawn.\n\nThe ten appellants were convicted under ss. 302 and 20 I both read with s. 149 of the J.P.C. mainly on the evidence of four eye-witnesses who were members of the family di the two murdered persons. Four of the appellants Were sentenced to death and the rest to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences.\n\nIn appeal to this Court by s)'OCiaJ leave it was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the appellants that (1) there were various discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence showing miscarriage of justiC'e; (ii) though two iildepen• dent eye-witnesses were available they were purposely excluded and only the family members were examined as eye-witnesses; and the High Court had wrongly refused to draw !from therr non-examination an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act; and (iii) the sentences on the appellants were wrongly confirmed by the High Court.\n\nHELD : (i) There was no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that !he appellants were responsible for the deaths of the two deceased persons and were guilty di the offences they were charged with. [782 E]\n\n(ii) The prosecutor need not examine witnesses who, in his opinion, have not witnessed the incidem. Normally, he .ought to examine alt the eye-witnesses in support of his case. But in a case where a large number of persons have witnessed the incident, it is open to him to make a selec ti on which must, however, be fair and honest and not with a view to suppress inconvenient witnesses. If it is shown that persons who had witnessed the ino.ident have been deliberately kept back, the court may draw an adverse inference and in a proper case record such failure as constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution case. [781 G-H; 782 Al\n\nIn the present case, the prosecution had explained that the two independent eye-witnesses were not necessary. The defence remained content with that explanation and did not a.Sk the other concerned witnesses any questions to elicit why these two persons were considered unnecessary witnesses.\n\nFurthermore, there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that they were not produced because they would have turned out to be inconvenient witnesses.\n\nIt was not therefore possible to say that the prosetion had delibertely withheld these two persons for any oblique motrve or that the High Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference. (782 C-Dl .\n\n(iii) The sentence of death on four o[ the ten appellants must be set aside and the sentence _of rigorous life imprisonment substituted therefor.\n\nKARNESH KUMAR v. STATE (She/at, I.) 775\n\nJn imposing the sentence of death on four of the appellants the trial court made a distinction between them and the others as three of them \\v\\lre armed with firearms and the fourth with a hatchet This reason for imposing the extreme penalty on the four appellants could not be sustam ed on the evidence as the others were also armed with equally dangerous weapons. Jn the absence of evidence as to who inflicted the 'fatal blows, the same punishment should have been imposed on all of them. [783 C-Dl\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated May 19, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No, 118 of 1967 and capital sen tence No. 11 of 1967.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and A. K. Gupta, for the appellants.\n\n0. P. Rana, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J.-This appeal, by special leave , is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which confumed th.e convictions and sentences passed by the Sessions Judge, Hardru, in respect of the murders of Lal Singh and his father Harihar. The ten appellants on being convicted under ss. 302 and 201 read with s. 149 of the Penal Code were awarded various sentences. Four of them, namely, Karnesh Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Kaushal Kumar and Chhetrapal were awarded death sentence and the rest imprisonment for life.\n\nAt the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh. The evidence, however, shows a long-standing enmity between the members of the branch of Sobaran Singh, one of the sons of Jhabha Singh, on the one hand and the rest of the descendants of Jhabha Singh on the other. It also shows that since 1950, there has been intermittently civil and criminal litigation between the parties, the last of such litiaation before the incident in question being in respect of an inidcnt which took place on April 3, 1966 when appellant Ram Kumar' charged the deceased Harihar and Lal Singh, and witnesses Jiten dra an!i Virendra and two others with rioting and witness Virendra in tum; filed a cross complaint against the appellants and som~ otbers.\n\nAccording to the prosecution, at about 1 p.m. on June 5, 1966, Lal Singh was irrigating his field with canal water when appellants L8 Sup. C.1./68-10\n\n776 SUPRBMB COURT llBPOllTS•\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nKarnesh and A vdesh diverted the water into their field.\n\nThere was an exchange of abuses. between them in the course of which appellant Karnesh was said to have threatened that he would not rest until Lal Singb was done to de\\th. At about 5.30 that even ing, Jitendra, Virendra and Girendra, P. Ws. 1, 6 and 8 were in the main room of the Chaupal where Lal *ngb lived and Lal Singb was in a room nearby. Fifty paces awat from this house is the house where the deceased Haribar lived. Suddenly, a shout was heard to the effect that Lal Singh shoul~ be dragged out. On hearing the shout; these witnesses and Lal Singb came out. The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis. As soon as Lal Singh came out, appellants Krishna, Chhetrapal and Karnesh simultaneously fired at him whereupon Lal Singh fell on the ground, On being threatened that the witnosses would also be shot, they ran away and stood at some distance. Five of these appellants, namely, Chhetrapal, Kaushal, Mahendra, Kailash and Jugal Kishorc then ran to Hari bar's house where appellant Jugal Kishore struck Harihar with a spear in his face and then appelJants Kaushal an\\! 1 ugal Kish ore dragged him to where Lal Singh had fallen. Chhetrapal then fired at Harihar with his gun; J ugal Ki shore gave another blow with his spear in the chest and the rest beat him with bankas and lathis.\n\nHaribar also. died on the spot. Appellants Kailash, Juga) Kishore, Kaushal and Mahendra followed by. Chhetrapal with his gun, lifted Harihar's. body to the field of one Sita Ram where they set fire to it. The other five appellants took Lal Singh's body to the Bathis of P.W. 4, Abdul Bari, and burnt it there on a heap of\n\ncowdung cakes.\n\nHaving thus tried to do away with the dead bodies, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra scraped the blood stained earth whete Lal Singh had fallen as also the drops of blood which had fallen on the way.\n\nP. W. 1, Jiteridra, started on cycle to the Kotwali six miles \"way and lodged the F.l.R. at about 6.-45 P.M. Inspector Jaswant Singb, P. W. 17, started for the scene of offence f73Ch_!ng there at about 7.45 P, M. The fires were put out but \\al Smgb s body had practically been burnt out with the rei.ult that the Inspector could G collect only his bones and ashes. But he was able to recover the half burnt body of Harihar. That nigbt he recorded the statements of P. Ws. 1, 6, 7, 8, 14 an~ of certain other persons. On the 7th and 8th he recorded further statements. On June 20, he recorded the statments of Ragbubar, P. W. 9 and Gopali, P. W. 12. It appears that statements of these witnesses were recorded late 1!5 these and other residents, presumably on account of fear of repn\n\nSais or to avoid. having to figure as witnesses, had fled from the village.\n\nKARNESH KUMAR v. STATE (Shelat, /.) 777\n\nThe evidence on which the prosecution mainly reUed was that of the four eye witnesses. Of these, Jitendra, P. W. l, the son and brother of Harihar and Lal Singh respectively, Virendra, P. W. 6, his cousin, and Girendra, P. W. s, a boy of 14 years of age and the yoimger brother of Lal Singh deposed to the assault by the appellants on both the deceased. Santosh Kumari, P. W. 7, the daughter of Harihar, deposed only to the assault on Harihar in the house. Besides this evidence, the prosecution examined Raghubar, Jeet, Gopali and Surat Singh, P. Ws. 9, 11, 12 and 14, the neighboqrs of the d119eased, who in one part or the other corroborated the eye witnesses. Gopali's evidenee was, however, the only direct evidence as to the scrapping of the blood-stained earth by two of the appellants but that evidence was not relied upon by the High Court on the ground that his name was not mentioned in the F.I.R. and his statement was recorded late. There was, however, the evidence of the eye witnesses that blood had dropped where Lal Singh had fallen and of the Investigating Officer that when he inspected the site that night, though he found no blood\n\nmar~. he noti<:ed that the earth at that plaee had been scrapped.\n\nIt is clear that, no one except the assailants, who had burnt of the dead bodies of Harihar and Lal Singh to do away with evidence as to the two murders, would be interested also in doing away with an equally important evidence as to the place where Lal Singh had been killed by scrapping off the blood where he had fallen. Scrapping of blood from that place was thus in line with and part of the strategem of burning the bodies of the victims so as not to leave\n\nany evidence of the killing of the two men. This part of the evidence lends support to Jitendra's case that Lal Singh was fited at and fell at or near the intersection of the toads just outside his house.\n\nIt is true that only these four members of the family figured as eye-witnesses.. But that fact alone cannot mean that P. W. 1 or the investigating agency excluded other available independent witnesses. This is clear from the fact that fhe F.I.R. mentions a number of persons whom P. W. l thought to be eye-witnesses.\n\nThere is evidenee tha\\ the incident had created panic in the village and a number of residents. had lied and had stayed away possibly with a view to avoid having to figure as witnesses. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that only the members of the family came forward as eye-witnesses. But as . they were interested witnesses both by\n\nreas~ of their being .m7ffibers of the family and their g the hostility of the tw!> VIClims towards lhe appellants, thenevidence\n\nhad to be examined with care and caution. But there was circumstantial evidence to lend support to their account of the incident.\n\nThat evidence established the following facts : ( 1) the long standing enmity be!Wcen the parties, (2) the incident having taken place at about 5-~0 P.M., (3) the burning of the two bodies by the appel\n\n778 SUPUMJI COtlaT UtOl.TS\n\n[1968} 3 S.C.R.\n\nlants, ( 4) the scrapping of the earth to wipe out the blood-stains A\n\n(5) P. Ws. 6 and 8 having run to the house of Surat Singh, P. W. 14, the village Pradhan and having informed 1iim of the incidel).t,\n\n(6) P.W. 1 lodging the F.I.R. without any ay and giving themn the details of the incident, thenames of the appellants and of witnesses whom he thought to be eye witncases .and (7) the injuries on Harihar'& body which could still be seen by Dr.\n\nB Srivutava though it had been burnt, indicating three types ef Weapol!S having been deployed against him, namely, a fire-arm, a spear and. a sharp cutting instrument.\n\nThe trial court and the High Court found fro)ll this evidence that the account of the incident given by the witnesses was acceptable despite certain discrepancies therein, that it occurred at about C 5-30 P.M., that Lal Singh was shot at and killCJ!I just outside his house, that Harihar was first attacked inside his house and \"then dragged to where Lal Singh's body lay and was there killed, that the appellants were responsible for the assault and the consequent deaths of the two victims; that in order to leave no trace of the two assaults they burnt the bodies Of the victims and scrapped the earth D where blood had fallen, that they formed an unlawful assembly of which the common ol?iect was to murder the father and the son and that they attacked and killed both in furtherance of that common obiect and then tried t~ do away wi~ the evidence of t!ieir acts and burnt the two b<)cbes. These being COii.current findings of fact, we would not normally proceed to review tfie evidence unleu it is shown that the trial is vitiated by some illegalitY or irregularity of procedure or that it was held in a manner contrary to rule1 of natural justice or the judgment under appeal has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice : (cf. Kirpal Singh v. State of\n\nU.P.).(1)\n\nCounsel for the appellants, however, contended that such a miscarriago of justice has ted in the present case. He argued that\n\nthe trial court and the High Court failed to appiate from the evidence on record that the prosecution had dell'1erately. tried to shift the time of the incident at S-30 that eVeni!J.g though the incideat must have taken place subsequently, in Oider to enable the four witnesses to pose as eye witnesaes. The evidence of Jitendra G and the Investigating Olftcer was that the F.l.R. was lodged at 6-45 P.M. and that Jitendra had started from the village at 6 P.111.0ll cycle for the police station. The evi~ of _the Investi gatiag Officer also is that he reached the spot soon thereafter, that the body of Harihar was not fully burnt out and tliat he could manage to extract the half burnt body ham the lire. T!ie evidence of Dr. Srivastava .supp0rts this evidence in a large measure. It is manife&U that if the incident took place at nigh~ and P. W. 1 had\n\n. (I)· [\\964] 3 S.C.R. 992, 996.\n\nXARNESH l:UMA!l V. STATE (She/at, /.) 779\n\nA not seen it, he could not have reported it to the police officer in time to enable the police officer to arrive at the scene and m:act the half burnt body of Harihar from the fiie. ThiS fact clearly supports the prosecution that the incident took place that evening and not at night. But reliance was placed on the fact that postmortem examination on Harihar's body was made by Dr. Srivaatava 1 at 5 P.M. on June 6, 1966. The argument was that il' the~ had been despatched to the mortuary soon after i_t was recovered by the police officer, it would have reached the mortuary earr and the post-mortem examination would have been carried out earlier. But the evidence of Maqbool Khan, P. W. 15, shows that the body was given to him at 10 that night, tha~ he carried it in a C bullock cart, that be started at about 1 A.M. but on the way he\n\nfeared that the body might be taken away from him and, theore.\n\nhe stopped at an intervening village till sunrise and reached the mortuary at, 6-30 A.M. It is true that the doctor said that be performed the post-mortem examination at 5 P.M. and not at 1 P.M. as the constable deposed.\n\nObviously, the constable appears to have delayed in his mission and there was a gap Of time tict, reen D the body reaching the mortuary and the time when the postmortem examination was performed. But the delay in the postmortem examination does not mean that the Investigating Officer had not banded over th~ body to the constable that night or tilat the incident did not takt:1 place in the evening of _the 5th of June or that the F.I.R. was not lodged at 6-45 P.M. as testified by P. W.\n\nE I . Reliance was next placed on the evidence of the Magistrate at Hardoi that he received the special re_\\1?I_t about the incident on June 6, 1966. The contention was that if the Investigating Officer\n\nhad sent the special report before he started for the scene of the offence, as stated by him, the Magistrate was bound to receive it on the night of the 5th and not on the 6th of June. But the Magistrate admitted that he had not noted the time when he F received it on the 6th. He also adIµitted that he could not say whether he was in Hardoi on the 5th of June, it being a Sunday, and that it was possible that his peon might have received it in the evening of the 5th and placed it before him on the fith of June when he noted the date of its receipt There is also evidence of\n\nthe Reader to the Superintendent of Police, Hardoi that his office G had received the General Diary of the 5th ou the 6th and of the 6th on the 7th June. This controversy is set at rest by the evidence of the Head Constable, P.W. 13, that he had sent constable Abdul Hafi.2' at 7-30 P.M. on the 5th June to tl!e Magistrate with the special report and that Abdul Hafiz had returned to the police station at 9-30 that night after delivering 8 it and that this fact was noted by him in Ext. Ka-6. This evidence establishes that the Investigating Officer had sent the special report on the 5th of June and that that report was carried to Hardoi that very night. Consequently, it must be held that the incident took\n\n780 [1968] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nplace in the evening of the 5th of June and that P, W. 1 was right A when he claimed that he bad given the F.I.R. at 6-45 P.M'..\n\nThe next contention was that the place of attac_k on Lal Singh was not on the road but in Harihar's house. We find llO' basis for this contention. The evidence. of witnesses on the other hand, is clear and there no reason to disbelieve it. That eviilence is sup- B ported by the evidence of the Police Officer that he found signs of scrapping of the earth at the place where, according to tJi, c prosecution, Lal Singh bad fallen.\n\nThe next contention was that witnesses Jitendra and Smtosh Kumari bad tried to ml!ke improvements in their evidence, the former by stating that the three accused who were armed with fire. arms bad shot simultaneously at Lal Singh though in the F.I.R. he bad only said that three shots were fired without stating who had fired them, and the latter by stating that Jugal Kisbore bad struck his spear in the eye of Haribar, which allegation was not borne out by the medical testimony. These infirmities, no doubt, are in their evidence. But they were considered by the High Court and yet on an examination of the entire evidence, it accepted their evidence as reliable.\n\nThat three shots were fired was stated by witness Jitendra both in the F.I.R. and in evidence. It may be l!hat from that fact coupled with the fact that the three appellants were anned with fiN>-aims, he might have inferred that all the three had fired. For a witness like him, it was ible not to be able to distinguish between a fact seen by him and an inference drawn by him. Failure to appreciate such a distinction cannot mean that\n\nhe was deliberately improving upon his original version. As regards Santosh Kumari, a spear injury was inflicted on Harihar's face and that injury must have covered his face with blood. It is p06Sible that she mistook that injury to be one in the eye, especially as it in her evidence that appellant Jugal Kisbore had at that time F said that Harihar should be struck in his eyes. These infinnities, even if they can rightly be so tenned, cannot discredit their testimony so as to render it unacceptable.\n\nCounsel then argued that though P. Ws. 9 and 11 were referred to in the F.I.R. as eye witnesses, they did not come out in their G evidence as eye witnesses and that that fact showed that P. W; 1 had tried to introduce them falsely as eye witnesses. He forgets, b<>Wever, that there are two distinct alternatives, ( l) that be saw them at the scene of the offence after the incident and believed they had seen it and ( 2) that thoug!i the witnesses had seen it, like the other neighbours, they preferred not to figure as eye witnesses H and circumscribed the scope of thcir evidence to what . they had seen after the assault. In either event, P. W. 1 cannot be said to have falsely tried to usher them in the F.I.R. as eye witnesses.\n\nKARNESH KUMAR v. STATE (Shelat, J.) 781\n\nThe argument which counsel strenuously .urged was that though independent .eye witnesses were available, they were purposely excluded and only the family members were examined as eye witnesses. In this connection he relied on the F.I.R. where P. Ws. 9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses. In his evidence also P. W. 1 has mentioned that these persons and a few others were present at the time f the incident. And yet these persons were not examined. The prosecution, however, did explain that these persons were not examined either because they had been won over by the opposite side or because some of them had failed to identify the appellants from the identification parades held for them, which, according to the prosecution, indicated that they had been won over. The explanation, however, does not apply to two persons, viz., Parsadi and Paragu, for whose non-exrumnation the only explanation given was that they were not necessary witnesses. The High Court does not appear to have been satisfied with this explanation and, therefore, hasobserved that it would have been better if these twopersons\n\nhad been examined. At the same time it refused to draw from their non-examination an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act.\n\nCounsel argued that the High Court erred in declining to do so and relied on Habeeb Mohammed v. State of Hyderabad('), where it has been observed that it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine a material witness particularly when no allegation has been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. The decision further observes that not only does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution case from his nonproduction as a witness in view of illustration (g) to section 114, but that the circumstance of his being withheld from the court would cast a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab (2) also this Court has observed that a. prosecutor should never adopt the dvice of keeping back eye w1tnesse:\" only because their evidence is likely to go against the prosecution and that the duty of the prosecutor is to assist the\n\nCaurt in reaching a proper conclusion. It is open, however, to the secutor not. to. examine witnesses who in his opinion have not w1tnes.sed the !nc1dent, but nrmally, he ought to examine all the eye witnesses m support of his case. But in a case where a\n\nlrge number of perons have witnesed the incident, it is open to him to make a seltJon. The selection must, however, be fair and honest and. n.ot. with a view to suppress inconvenient witnesses.\n\nTherefore, 1f 1t 1s shown that persons who had witnessed the incident have been deliberately kept back, the court may draw an\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1'54 S.C. 51.\n\n\\2) {1964] 3 S.C.R. 397, 408.\n\n782 SUPJ.U!MB COU&T &BPOllTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nadverse inference and in a proper case record such failure as con- A stituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution cas~.\n\nAs stated earlier, it appears that the persons mentioned by P. W. I were not examined either because the prosecution believed that they had been won over by the opposite side or because in the parades held for them they had not identified the appellants or committed errors. If that was so, it is manifest that no useful pur- B pose would have been served by examining the persons who had failed to identify the appellants. But then neither Parsad nor Paragu falls in this category of persons for the explanation given in regard to them was that they were not necessary. For one reason or the other the defence seems to have remained content with that explanation, for they asked no question either to P.W. I • c or to the Investigating Officer to elicit why these two pe:i:sons were considered unnecessary witnesses. It may be that if a clarification had been demanded, they would have given some explanation.\n\nBesides, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that they were not produced because they would have turned out to be inconvenient witnesses. The High Coun on an examination of the evidence held that it was not possible to say that the prosecution had delibe- D rately withheld these two persons for any oblique motive. In these circumstances it is difficult to persuade ourselves to take the view pressed upon us by counsel that the High Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid, the contentions of Mr. Garg cannot be sustained. Consequently, we do not find any reason to inre_rfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellants were responsible for the deaths of Lal Singh and Harihar and were guilty of the offences charged against them.\n\nAs regards the sentence of death imposed on appellants Kamesh, Krishna, Kaushal and Clihetrapal, it is difficult for us to agree with that order passed by the trial court and confinned by the High Court. In imposing the sentence of death on these four appellants, the trial court made a distinction between them on the one hand and the rest of the appeliants on the other. The distinction was made on the ground that three of them were armed with fire-arms and that they all fired at Lal Singh simultaneously, that appellant Chhetrapal had shot at Harihar also and finally, that appellant Kaushal had given a hatchet blow to Harihar. In our view, the evidence on which this distinction was made cannot be said to be fully satisfactory. It is true that P. W. 1 while giving evidence stated that the three appellants had fired simultaneously at Lal Singh, that Chhetrapal had also fired at Harihar and that Kaushal had given a hatchet bl()W to him. But the F.I.R. merely\n\nstates that three shots were fired at Lal Singh but does not state that they were fired by the three appellants simultaneously, nor does it state that Chhetrapal had fired at Harihar after he had been\n\nKARNESH KUMAR v. STATE (She/at, /.) 78 3\n\ndragged out on the road. It is hardly conceivable that if P. W. l had seen these appellants firing either at Lal Singh or at Harihar. he would have forgotten 10 make a positive statement about it in the F.I.R. In view of this omission, it is difficult to build the conclusion with any certainty on his subsequent statement that the three appellants had simultaneously fired at Lal Singh and that Chhetrapal had shot at Harihar after he had been brought out of the house. The possibility of any one or two of them having fired the three shots in quick succession cannot, therefore, be ruled out.\n\nIn that case the distinction made on tlie basis that all the three of them. had fired at Lal Singh cannot be sustained. Therefore, the reason given by the trial judge for imposing the extreme penalty on four appellants as against the rest becomes difficult to sustain. It is true that these four appellants were armed with firearms and a hatchet. But the others also were armed with equally dangerous weapons, such as spears and bankas. The said distinction being not sustainable, the proper pWiishment that should have been awarded to the four appellants in the absence of clear evice as. to who inflicted the fatal blows, should have been the same punish- D ment as imposed on the rest. We have. therefore, to set aside the sentence of death imposed on the aforesaid four appellants and impose on them the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.\n\nExcept for this modification the appeal fails and is dismiss.ed.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed_", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "KAR!'.'ESH KUMAR SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARNESH KUMAR SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTfAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTfAR PRADESH\n\nApril 15, 1968\n\n[V. RAMASWAMI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 201 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 114(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 633, "end_char": 639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 114(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "May 19, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3856, "end_char": 3868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated May 19, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No, 118 of 1967 and capital sen tence No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated May 19, 1967 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No, 118 of 1967 and capital sen tence No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and A. K. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and A. K. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and A. K. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4042, "end_char": 4053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh and A. K. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4079, "end_char": 4086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sbelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4153, "end_char": 4159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J.-This appeal, by special leave , is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which confumed th.e convictions and sentences passed by the Sessions Judge, Hardru, in respect of the murders of Lal Singh and his father Harihar."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J.-This appeal, by special leave , is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which confumed th.e convictions and sentences passed by the Sessions Judge, Hardru, in respect of the murders of Lal Singh and his father Harihar."}}, {"text": "Lal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J.-This appeal, by special leave , is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which confumed th.e convictions and sentences passed by the Sessions Judge, Hardru, in respect of the murders of Lal Singh and his father Harihar.", "canonical_name": "Lal Singh"}}, {"text": "Harihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSbelat, J.-This appeal, by special leave , is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad which confumed th.e convictions and sentences passed by the Sessions Judge, Hardru, in respect of the murders of Lal Singh and his father Harihar.", "canonical_name": "Harihar"}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4501, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Karnesh Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4556, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of them, namely, Karnesh Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Kaushal Kumar and Chhetrapal were awarded death sentence and the rest imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Karnesh Kumar"}}, {"text": "Krishna Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of them, namely, Karnesh Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Kaushal Kumar and Chhetrapal were awarded death sentence and the rest imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Kumar"}}, {"text": "Kaushal Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4586, "end_char": 4599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of them, namely, Karnesh Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Kaushal Kumar and Chhetrapal were awarded death sentence and the rest imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Kaushal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Chhetrapal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of them, namely, Karnesh Kumar, Krishna Kumar, Kaushal Kumar and Chhetrapal were awarded death sentence and the rest imprisonment for life.", "canonical_name": "Clihetrapal"}}, {"text": "Nir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4798, "end_char": 4801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh."}}, {"text": "Hardoi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh."}}, {"text": "Jugal Kishore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh.", "canonical_name": "J ugal Ki shore"}}, {"text": "Kailash Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh.", "canonical_name": "Kailash Narain"}}, {"text": "Jhabha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the material time, the two deceased, along with the metn bers of their family, and the appellants lived in village Nir in District Hardoi, and, except for appellants Jugal Kishore and his brother Kailash Narain, they are close relations, their common ancestor being one Jhabha Singh."}}, {"text": "Sobaran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence, however, shows a long-standing enmity between the members of the branch of Sobaran Singh, one of the sons of Jhabha Singh, on the one hand and the rest of the descendants of Jhabha Singh on the other."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also shows that since 1950, there has been intermittently civil and criminal litigation between the parties, the last of such litiaation before the incident in question being in respect of an inidcnt which took place on April 3, 1966 when appellant Ram Kumar' charged the deceased Harihar and Lal Singh, and witnesses Jiten dra an!i Virendra and two others with rioting and witness Virendra in tum; filed a cross complaint against the appellants and som~ otbers."}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also shows that since 1950, there has been intermittently civil and criminal litigation between the parties, the last of such litiaation before the incident in question being in respect of an inidcnt which took place on April 3, 1966 when appellant Ram Kumar' charged the deceased Harihar and Lal Singh, and witnesses Jiten dra an!i Virendra and two others with rioting and witness Virendra in tum; filed a cross complaint against the appellants and som~ otbers.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar"}}, {"text": "Jiten", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5503, "end_char": 5508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also shows that since 1950, there has been intermittently civil and criminal litigation between the parties, the last of such litiaation before the incident in question being in respect of an inidcnt which took place on April 3, 1966 when appellant Ram Kumar' charged the deceased Harihar and Lal Singh, and witnesses Jiten dra an!i Virendra and two others with rioting and witness Virendra in tum; filed a cross complaint against the appellants and som~ otbers."}}, {"text": "Virendra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5518, "end_char": 5526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also shows that since 1950, there has been intermittently civil and criminal litigation between the parties, the last of such litiaation before the incident in question being in respect of an inidcnt which took place on April 3, 1966 when appellant Ram Kumar' charged the deceased Harihar and Lal Singh, and witnesses Jiten dra an!i Virendra and two others with rioting and witness Virendra in tum; filed a cross complaint against the appellants and som~ otbers."}}, {"text": "Karnesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.1./68-10\n\n776 SUPRBMB COURT llBPOllTS•\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nKarnesh and A vdesh diverted the water into their field.", "canonical_name": "Karnesh Kumar"}}, {"text": "Lal Singb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "between them in the course of which appellant Karnesh was said to have threatened that he would not rest until Lal Singb was done to de\\th.", "canonical_name": "Lal Singh"}}, {"text": "Jitendra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6107, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 5.30 that even ing, Jitendra, Virendra and Girendra, P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Girendra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 5.30 that even ing, Jitendra, Virendra and Girendra, P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Lal *ngb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6201, "end_char": 6209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 6 and 8 were in the main room of the Chaupal where Lal *ngb lived and Lal Singb was in a room nearby.", "canonical_name": "Lal Singh"}}, {"text": "Haribar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fifty paces awat from this house is the house where the deceased Haribar lived.", "canonical_name": "Harihar"}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Kumar"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6576, "end_char": 6585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar"}}, {"text": "Kaushal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis.", "canonical_name": "Kaushal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Mahendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis."}}, {"text": "Jathis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses saw appellants Krishna and Chhetrapal armed with guns, appellant Karnesh with a pistol, Ram Kumar and Jugal Kishore with spears, appellants Kaushal and Mahendra •with bankas and the rest with Jathis."}}, {"text": "Kailash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Five of these appellants, namely, Chhetrapal, Kaushal, Mahendra, Kailash and Jugal Kishorc then ran to Hari bar's house where appellant Jugal Kishore struck Harihar with a spear in his face and then appelJants Kaushal an\\!", "canonical_name": "Kailash Narain"}}, {"text": "Jugal Kishorc", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Five of these appellants, namely, Chhetrapal, Kaushal, Mahendra, Kailash and Jugal Kishorc then ran to Hari bar's house where appellant Jugal Kishore struck Harihar with a spear in his face and then appelJants Kaushal an\\!", "canonical_name": "J ugal Ki shore"}}, {"text": "Hari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7034, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Five of these appellants, namely, Chhetrapal, Kaushal, Mahendra, Kailash and Jugal Kishorc then ran to Hari bar's house where appellant Jugal Kishore struck Harihar with a spear in his face and then appelJants Kaushal an\\!", "canonical_name": "Harihar"}}, {"text": "Chhetrapal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7213, "end_char": 7223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhetrapal then fired at Harihar with his gun; J ugal Ki shore gave another blow with his spear in the chest and the rest beat him with bankas and lathis.", "canonical_name": "Clihetrapal"}}, {"text": "J ugal Ki shore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7260, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhetrapal then fired at Harihar with his gun; J ugal Ki shore gave another blow with his spear in the chest and the rest beat him with bankas and lathis.", "canonical_name": "J ugal Ki shore"}}, {"text": "Haribar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7369, "end_char": 7376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haribar also.", "canonical_name": "Harihar"}}, {"text": "Juga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7421, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellants Kailash, Juga) Kishore, Kaushal and Mahendra followed by."}}, {"text": "Kishore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellants Kailash, Juga) Kishore, Kaushal and Mahendra followed by."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7538, "end_char": 7546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "body to the field of one Sita Ram where they set fire to it."}}, {"text": "Abdul Bari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7647, "end_char": 7657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other five appellants took Lal Singh's body to the Bathis of P.W. 4, Abdul Bari, and burnt it there on a heap of\n\ncowdung cakes.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Hafiz"}}, {"text": "Jiteridra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 1, Jiteridra, started on cycle to the Kotwali six miles \"way and lodged the F.l."}}, {"text": "Kotwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7951, "end_char": 7958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 1, Jiteridra, started on cycle to the Kotwali six miles \"way and lodged the F.l."}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singb", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8026, "end_char": 8039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. at about 6.-45 P.M. Inspector Jaswant Singb, P. W. 17, started for the scene of offence f73Ch_!ng there at about 7.45 P, M. The fires were put out but \\al Smgb s body had practically been burnt out with the rei.ult that the Inspector could G collect only his bones and ashes."}}, {"text": "Ragbubar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8516, "end_char": 8524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, he recorded the statments of Ragbubar, P. W. 9 and Gopali, P. W. 12."}}, {"text": "Gopali", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8538, "end_char": 8544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 20, he recorded the statments of Ragbubar, P. W. 9 and Gopali, P. W. 12."}}, {"text": "Santosh Kumari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9163, "end_char": 9177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santosh Kumari, P. W. 7, the daughter of Harihar, deposed only to the assault on Harihar in the house."}}, {"text": "Raghubar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9314, "end_char": 9322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides this evidence, the prosecution examined Raghubar, Jeet, Gopali and Surat Singh, P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Jeet", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9324, "end_char": 9328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides this evidence, the prosecution examined Raghubar, Jeet, Gopali and Surat Singh, P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Surat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9341, "end_char": 9352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides this evidence, the prosecution examined Raghubar, Jeet, Gopali and Surat Singh, P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Jitendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10580, "end_char": 10588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the evidence lends support to Jitendra's case that Lal Singh was fited at and fell at or near the intersection of the toads just outside his house."}}, {"text": "B Srivutava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12314, "end_char": 12325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 and 8 having run to the house of Surat Singh, P. W. 14, the village Pradhan and having informed 1iim of the incidel).t,\n\n(6) P.W. 1 lodging the F.I.R. without any ay and giving themn the details of the incident, thenames of the appellants and of witnesses whom he thought to be eye witncases .and (7) the injuries on Harihar'& body which could still be seen by Dr.\n\nB Srivutava though it had been burnt, indicating three types ef Weapol!S having been deployed against him, namely, a fire-arm, a spear and."}}, {"text": "Jitendra G", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14202, "end_char": 14212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Jitendra G and the Investigating Olftcer was that the F.l."}}, {"text": "Srivastava", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14610, "end_char": 14620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T!ie evidence of Dr. Srivastava .supp0rts this evidence in a large measure."}}, {"text": "XARNESH l:UMA!l V. STATE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14772, "end_char": 14796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XARNESH l:UMA!l V. STATE (She/at, /.) 779\n\nA not seen it, he could not have reported it to the police officer in time to enable the police officer to arrive at the scene and m:act the half burnt body of Harihar from the fiie."}}, {"text": "Srivaatava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15199, "end_char": 15209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But reliance was placed on the fact that postmortem examination on Harihar's body was made by Dr. Srivaatava 1 at 5 P.M. on June 6, 1966."}}, {"text": "June 6, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15225, "end_char": 15237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But reliance was placed on the fact that postmortem examination on Harihar's body was made by Dr. Srivaatava 1 at 5 P.M. on June 6, 1966."}}, {"text": "Maqbool Khan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15487, "end_char": 15499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the evidence of Maqbool Khan, P. W. 15, shows that the body was given to him at 10 that night, tha~ he carried it in a C bullock cart, that be started at about 1 A.M. but on the way he\n\nfeared that the body might be taken away from him and, theore."}}, {"text": "Abdul Hafi.2", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17478, "end_char": 17490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This controversy is set at rest by the evidence of the Head Constable, P.W. 13, that he had sent constable Abdul Hafi.2' at 7-30 P.M. on the 5th June to tl!e Magistrate with the special report and that Abdul Hafiz had returned to the police station at 9-30 that night after delivering 8 it and that this fact was noted by him in Ext."}}, {"text": "Abdul Hafiz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17573, "end_char": 17584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This controversy is set at rest by the evidence of the Head Constable, P.W. 13, that he had sent constable Abdul Hafi.2' at 7-30 P.M. on the 5th June to tl!e Magistrate with the special report and that Abdul Hafiz had returned to the police station at 9-30 that night after delivering 8 it and that this fact was noted by him in Ext.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Hafiz"}}, {"text": "Smtosh Kumari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18565, "end_char": 18578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next contention was that witnesses Jitendra and Smtosh Kumari bad tried to ml!ke improvements in their evidence, the former by stating that the three accused who were armed with fire."}}, {"text": "Jugal Kisbore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18876, "end_char": 18889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arms bad shot simultaneously at Lal Singh though in the F.I.R. he bad only said that three shots were fired without stating who had fired them, and the latter by stating that Jugal Kisbore bad struck his spear in the eye of Haribar, which allegation was not borne out by the medical testimony.", "canonical_name": "J ugal Ki shore"}}, {"text": "Santosh Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19686, "end_char": 19700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Santosh Kumari, a spear injury was inflicted on Harihar's face and that injury must have covered his face with blood."}}, {"text": "Jugal Kisbore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19918, "end_char": 19931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is p06Sible that she mistook that injury to be one in the eye, especially as it in her evidence that appellant Jugal Kisbore had at that time F said that Harihar should be struck in his eyes.", "canonical_name": "J ugal Ki shore"}}, {"text": "Chhuta Bhurji", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21163, "end_char": 21176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Alha Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21178, "end_char": 21188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Lakhan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21190, "end_char": 21202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Paragu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21204, "end_char": 21210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Parsadi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21212, "end_char": 21219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Sishupal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "Girdhari Kachhi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21231, "end_char": 21246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 and 11, one Chhuta Bhurji, Alha Singh, Lakhan Singh, Paragu, Parsadi, Sishupal, Girdhari Kachhi and \"some other men\" were said to be witnesses."}}, {"text": "s. 114(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22220, "end_char": 22229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22742, "end_char": 22753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1964] 3 S.C.R. 397", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23759, "end_char": 23777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parsad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24411, "end_char": 24417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But then neither Parsad nor Paragu falls in this category of persons for the explanation given in regard to them was that they were not necessary."}}, {"text": "Paragu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24422, "end_char": 24428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But then neither Parsad nor Paragu falls in this category of persons for the explanation given in regard to them was that they were not necessary."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25424, "end_char": 25428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons aforesaid, the contentions of Mr. Garg cannot be sustained."}}, {"text": "Harihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, we do not find any reason to inre_rfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellants were responsible for the deaths of Lal Singh and Harihar and were guilty of the offences charged against them.", "canonical_name": "Harihar"}}, {"text": "Kamesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25758, "end_char": 25764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the sentence of death imposed on appellants Kamesh, Krishna, Kaushal and Clihetrapal, it is difficult for us to agree with that order passed by the trial court and confinned by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Clihetrapal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25787, "end_char": 25798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the sentence of death imposed on appellants Kamesh, Krishna, Kaushal and Clihetrapal, it is difficult for us to agree with that order passed by the trial court and confinned by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Clihetrapal"}}, {"text": "Kaushal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26608, "end_char": 26615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that P. W. 1 while giving evidence stated that the three appellants had fired simultaneously at Lal Singh, that Chhetrapal had also fired at Harihar and that Kaushal had given a hatchet bl()W to him.", "canonical_name": "Kaushal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Harihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26848, "end_char": 26855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the F.I.R. merely\n\nstates that three shots were fired at Lal Singh but does not state that they were fired by the three appellants simultaneously, nor does it state that Chhetrapal had fired at Harihar after he had been\n\nKARNESH KUMAR v. STATE (She/at, /.) 78 3\n\ndragged out on the road."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_784_788_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nMIS. KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD.\n\nApril 15, 1968\n\n;.,,_ [R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S.\" HEGDll, JJ.]\n\n• '.: 9\"< . CiiJlstitu:ion of India, 1950, Art. 226--Jurisdiction of court to deal .. With _-qUsiign not specifically raised in writ petition-Land of lesttl for\n\nwjnnfog-coo1 notified under s. 4(1) of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition .ami Development) Act (20 of 1957)-lf lessee aggriev.d-Wri• petition\n\nfiled; ifllltput 5 months after issue of notifiCation-lf amounts to /aches.\n\nTiit'¥espondent was a lessee of 1401 bighas of land and was carrying C -oil mining operations on the land for winning coal.\n\nOn 9th October 1963, the appellant-Government issued a notification under s. 4( 1) of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, giving notice of the Government's intention to prospect for coal in f200 bighas .<Jf the leasehold land. These 1200 bighas covered land, on which, amongst other buildings, a railway siding, boiler roos, office rooois1 fan house and air shaft premises were situate.\n\nOn 23rd March 1964, the D respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notification as contravening s. 4( 4) of the Act. and the High Court quashed the notification.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : (1) In the premises notified, processes ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result di the mining operations were being carried on, and therefore the impugned E notification violated the second limb of s. 4( 4) and was invalid.\n\n[787 D-EJ .\n\n(2) Though no specific case under the second part of. s. 4(4) was pleaded in the writ petition, all the facts neces5ary for determining the question were before the Court and the matter was fully argued in the High Court without any objection. Therefore, it could. not he urgood that it was open to this Court to consider that aspect of the case.\n\nF [787 F: 788 Al\n\n(3) Under s. 5 of the Act the effect of the notification was to require the respondent to bring to a halt all his operations in the notified area till action was taken under s. 7 or till the period prescribed in that section came to an end. Therefore, the respondent was aggrieved by the impugned notification. !787 BJ ( 4) The delay in filing the writ petition was not sufficient to refuse G relief to the respondent [786 Gl ( 5) J.lf the notification was invalid, it is not for this Court to decide whether any other area of the leasehold could have been notified. [788 Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 332 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree, dated October 30, 1964 H <Jf the Patna High Court in Misc. Judi. Case No. 643 of 1!164.\n\nSyed Mohammed and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.\n\n...\n\nUNION v. K: K. COLLIEllY (Htgde, !,) 785\n\nA A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee and A. K. Nag, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.-In this appeal by certificate the question for decision is whether the Higl]. Court of Patna was-correct in its conclusion that the notification No. S. 0. 29_91 issued by the Union B Government on October 9, 1963 under s. 4(1)* of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, (No.\n\n20 of 1957 )-hereinafter called \"the Act\" is violative of sub-s.\n\n(4) of that section.\n\nThe facts of the case fall within a narrow compass. The respondent, Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited, tooT on lease 1401 bighas of land in mouza sale in the district of Hazaribagh as per a registered lease deed of July 8, 1949, for the purpose of winning coal. Thereafter it commenced working the colliery in 1952.\n\nCertain seams were opened up. Electric transmission lines were put up, staff quarters, office quarters, houses for labourers, hospital,\n\nschool etc. were built. _ For the purpose of despatching the oal. a separate railway track was constructed and a railway siding 6uilt.\n\nThese works were completed long before the impugned notification was issued. Under the notification in question 1 ZOO bighas of land were notified with a view to acquisition, which included areas on which the railway siding, staff quarters, boiler house, houses for labourers etc. were constructed.\n\nThe respondent challenged the validity of the said notification in MJC No. 643 of 1964---'an application unaer _Art. 226 of the Constitution-before the High Court. The main contention taken in the writ petition was that the notification in question contravenes sub-s. ( 4) of s. 4. The High Court accepted that contention and quashed the notification.\n\n. The. aterial facts are more or less admitted. Along with its wnt petit10n the respondent produced a plan of the colliery showing therein the railway tr11_ck, the railway siding, labour quarters, office premises and various other buildini:s 'put up on the laad.\n\nI~- had also shwn therein the actual places where mining operations were earned on. The correctness of t!lls plan has not been !' \"4 (!) Wbe_, it appean to the Central Government that coal is likely to he ~10C4 from}aJ'!d in c_my locality, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, g1vc notice of rts 1ntcnt1on to prospect for coal therein. ,~\n\n(2) ., ............... _ ..... .\n\n(3) ...................... ..\n\n(4) In issuing a notificat!on under this section, the Central Government shall exclude from that portion of any land in which coal mining operations are\n\nctually being carried on in conformity with the provisions of any enactment rule or o~. for tbc. time being in force or any premises on which any process aiuarY to the dq <!r prepara!ion for sale of coal obtained as a result of such opera. tions is bc1nacarricd on are situate.\"\n\n786 SUPUMB eotJJ.T UPaa'll [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\ndisputed. From that plan it is seen tllat in a considerable po_rtion of the land notified under s. 4 ( I) there are prmiiises on wliich processes ancillary to the. getting, diessing or preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result of the mining operation arc beiDg carried on. There is. also no doubr that if the respondent is deprived of the benefit of those ses it would be. difficult, if not impossible for it, to continue to work the colliery.\n\nThe High Court has come to the conclusion tllat in determining the area in which coal mining operations is being actually carried on, one is not to take into consideration merely those spots where actual digging is going on, but also areas which are sufficient to constitute a commercial or economic urut, and if so viewed, the entire leasehold may be justifiably considered as areas on whidl coal mining operations are actually bci.Jlg carried on. Alternatively, it held that the entire notified area had to be excluded bccalllC in parts of that area mining operations arc actually being carried on and in the remainin~ parts there are j>remises on whfoh procesaes ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation fot''sale of coal obtained as a result of the mining operations are being carried. In other words the entire area is' exempt from being notified wider s. 4(1) either because it is protected by the first part of s. 4(4) or by its second part. These conclusions were ch8llenged before us.. It was urged on fiehalf of the appellant that the words \"any land in which coal mining operations are actually carried on\" found in the first part of s. 4 ( 4) do not permit of a liberal interpretation so as to bring in the conception of a commercial or economic unit; they merely mean the actual area where mining is talcing place. As regards tlfo alternative conclusion based on the second part of s. 4 ( 4) it wasi urged that on the pleadings. t)l6re was no occasion for the High Court to consider whether the requirements of that part are satisfied.\n\nJn additioo, two other contentions were advanced on behalf of the appellant. They are '\n\n( i) no relief under Art. 226 should have been given as - the rndent was guilty of !aches, and (ii) the writ petition was premature. We are in agreeriient with the High Court that there is no substance in the last twO contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant.\n\nAs seen earlier, the impugned notification was issued on October 9, 1963 and the writ petition was filed on March 23, 1964, well within Six months of the date of the notification.\n\nThis delay is not sufficient to refuse the relief prayed for.\n\nIn support of the contention that the petition was premature, Dr. Syed Mohemmad, learned counsel for the appellant, uraed that the respondent has no real grievance yet, as only a notification under s. 4(1) had been issued; further proceedings are yet to take place, and the respondent can be aggrieved only when a notifica-\n\n.__\n\n.. UNION v. K. K. COLLIERY (Hegde, l.) 787\n\n. tion under section 7t is issued.\n\nWe think'that ihis contention is misconceived. As soon as the notification under s. 4 ( 1) was issued, in view of s. S:j: the mining lease granted in favour of the respondent ceased to have effect for so long as that notification was in force._ Too effect of thaCiiotificatiOn was to require the respondent to bring to a halt all his operations in the area not!fied\n\ntill action was taken under s. 7 or till the-period prescribed in that section came to an end. Hence it cannot denied that the respondent was seriously aggrieved by the fmpiigneu notification. -\n\n___ This takes us to the remaining two conteiiuons noticed earlier. ---It was strenuollsly argued by Dr. Syed Mohammed _-that s. 4(1) empowers the Government to notify al! lands excepting those in c which coal mining operations are actually being carried_ on; the notification in question has excluded 201 bighas in which mining was actually carried on; hence there is nothing illegal in that notification. He wanted us to construe the words \"any land in which coal mining operations are being actulilly carried\" strictly. The High Court has rejected this contention after taking into considera- D tion the purposes of the Act, its preamble and the various provisions therein. But we have not thought it necessary to go into that controversy :is in our opinion the impugned notification definitely _ violates the second limb of s. 4 ( 4) and hence it is invalid. It covers land on. which amongst other buildings, railway siding, boiler-rooms, office room, fan house and air shaft premises are situate. It cannot be denied that in these premises processes ancil- E lary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result of the mining operations are being carried on. This conclusion of ours is resisted on the _plea that in the writ petition no .specific case is pleaded under the second part of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 4 and therefore it is not open for us to consider that aspect of\n\nthe case. We are unable to accept this contention. It is true that\n\n(t) .. 7. (1) If the Central Govemmfnt is satisfied that coal is obtainable in the whole or any part of the land notified under sub-section (1) of section 4, it may, within a period of two years from the date of the said notification or within such further period not exceeding one year in the aggreate as the Central_ Government may specify in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, give notice of its intention to acquire the v,.hole or any part of th~ 1and or of any : rights nor over such land, as the case may be. . ·\n\n(2) If no notice to acquire the land or any rights in or over such land is given under sub-section (1) \\\\i.thin the period allowed thereunder, the notification issued under sul:rsection (1) of section 4 shall cease to have effect on the expiration of three years from the date thereof.\"\n\nCt) \"'5. On the issue of a notific.ition under sub--section (1) of section 4 in respect of any land-\n\n(a) any prospecting licence which authorises any person to prospect for coal or any other mineral in the land shall cease to have effect; and ,\n\n(b) any mining lease in so far as it authorises the lessee or any person claiming through him to undertake any operation in the land, cease to have effect for so long as the notification under that sub-section is in force.\"\n\n788 SuPIUIMB COU&T IU!PO&TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe pleadings on this J, X>int are rath\"'r vague; but all thefacts necessary for determimng that question are before the court. That aspect of the case appear& to have been fully argued before the High Court without any objection. The High Court has considered\n\nand decided that question. Hence the appellant cannot now be pennitted to contend that for want of nessary pleadings . that q_uestion cannot be gone into. If areas in which those premises are situate could not have been notified under s. 4 ( 1 )-as in our judg ment they could not have been-it is not for us to decide whether any of the other areas included in the lease-hold could have been notified; we cannot make out a new notification for the appellant.\n\nOne other contention was vaguely touched at the hearing of the appeal, and that was that though there are ten seams m the colliery only four seams are at present worked after obtaining the necessary permission, the remaining sii seams are not yet opened up for the working; hence those seams cannot be said to-have been wiirked on the date of the notification. Mr. A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the _respondent, urged that ~I! the ten seams were being W<>rkoo. in contormity with the provisions . of law: According to him, once permission is obtained for grading the coal in a seam and he says that suh permission had been obtained in respect -Of ail the seams, in law it means that those seams are being actually worked. . We need not go inio this question in view of our earlier\n\noonclusion~ At the hearing reference was made to the decision of this Court in Messrs. B11rrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of lndia( 1).\n\nTherule laid down in that case does not bear on any of the issues arising for. decision in this appeal.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned alY>ve, this appeal fails and is dismissed . with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) (196211 s.c.R. 44.\n\n...", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MIS. KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th October 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 623, "end_char": 639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9th October 1963, the appellant-Government issued a notification under s. 4( 1) of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, giving notice of the Government's intention to prospect for coal in f200 bighas .<Jf the leasehold land."}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 694, "end_char": 702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 710, "end_char": 768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23rd March 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23rd March 1964, the D respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notification as contravening s. 4( 4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1158, "end_char": 1166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1598, "end_char": 1605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2084, "end_char": 2088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 30, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated October 30, 1964 H <Jf the Patna High Court in Misc."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2618, "end_char": 2634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated October 30, 1964 H <Jf the Patna High Court in Misc."}}, {"text": "Syed Mohammed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2674, "end_char": 2687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Mohammed and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Syed Mohammed"}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2692, "end_char": 2703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Mohammed and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2772, "end_char": 2783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "785\n\nA A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee and A. K. Nag, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. C. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2785, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "785\n\nA A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee and A. K. Nag, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2804, "end_char": 2813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "785\n\nA A. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee and A. K. Nag, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Nag"}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J.-In this appeal by certificate the question for decision is whether the Higl]."}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3039, "end_char": 3043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3109, "end_char": 3116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3183, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited, tooT on lease 1401 bighas of land in mouza sale in the district of Hazaribagh as per a registered lease deed of July 8, 1949, for the purpose of winning coal."}}, {"text": "Hazaribagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited, tooT on lease 1401 bighas of land in mouza sale in the district of Hazaribagh as per a registered lease deed of July 8, 1949, for the purpose of winning coal."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Khas Karanpura Colliery Limited, tooT on lease 1401 bighas of land in mouza sale in the district of Hazaribagh as per a registered lease deed of July 8, 1949, for the purpose of winning coal."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wbe, it appean to the Central Government that coal is likely to he ~10C4 from}aJ'!d in cmy locality, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, g1vc notice of rts 1ntcnt1on to prospect for coal therein. ,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6999, "end_char": 7006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7059, "end_char": 7066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7536, "end_char": 7540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7801, "end_char": 7809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 9, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8105, "end_char": 8120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As seen earlier, the impugned notification was issued on October 9, 1963 and the writ petition was filed on March 23, 1964, well within Six months of the date of the notification."}}, {"text": "Syed Mohemmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8358, "end_char": 8371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the contention that the petition was premature, Dr. Syed Mohemmad, learned counsel for the appellant, uraed that the respondent has no real grievance yet, as only a notification under s. 4(1) had been issued; further proceedings are yet to take place, and the respondent can be aggrieved only when a notifica-\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Syed Mohammed"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8490, "end_char": 8497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9097, "end_char": 9101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed Mohammed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9370, "end_char": 9383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "---It was strenuollsly argued by Dr. Syed Mohammed -that s. 4(1) empowers the Government to notify al!", "canonical_name": "Syed Mohammed"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9391, "end_char": 9398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10093, "end_char": 10097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central_ Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11050, "end_char": 11069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) If the Central Govemmfnt is satisfied that coal is obtainable in the whole or any part of the land notified under sub-section (1) of section 4, it may, within a period of two years from the date of the said notification or within such further period not exceeding one year in the aggreate as the Central_ Government may specify in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, give notice of its intention to acquire the v,.hole or any part of th~ 1and or of any : rights nor over such land, as the case may be. . ·"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11472, "end_char": 11481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12582, "end_char": 12586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13172, "end_char": 13181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the _respondent, urged that ~I!", "canonical_name": "A. K. Nag"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_789_809_EN", "year": 1968, "text": ". v.. .\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS.\n\nApril 16/30, 1968*\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER\n\nAND C. A: VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] Commission of Inquiries ict (60 of 1952), s. 3--Setting up of Com-· nJission for collection of facts for future action-:-Partly due ta political' rivlllry but dominant purpose bona fide--Va!idityome items in Notification appoinang Commission_ ubject to appeal in civil court-Setting. up of Comn1ission, if-constitutes contemp~ of court.\n\nThe appellants were Chief Ministers and Ministers of the respondent- State. Jn Parliament, the State Legislature and from public platforms, it was alleged that during their tenure of office the appellants were guilty of acts of serious misconduct. corrti:ption, abuse of power. misfeasanceand malfeasance. Therefore. the State Government, in exerci!e of its powers under s. 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952, issued a notification appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report on the matters,· 'so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in futur~ .. The appellants filed writ petitions for setting aside the Notification, but the High Court dismissed them. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : ( 1) An inquiry for mere collection of facts unrelated to any future course of Government action or legislative policy does not fall within the purview of s. 3 df the Act and it is not a valid exercise of statutory power to appoint such a Commission; (2) the Commission was set up for a purpose alien to the\n\nstatute, in that it was set up by the State Government not in the publicrinterest but for the collateral purpose of getting rid of political rivals by character assassination; and\n\n(3) the appointment of the Commission constituted contempt of court in that some of the items referred to in tbeimpugned notification were the subject matter of' a first appeal pending in the High O>urt.\n\nHELD : ( 1) The preamble to the notification shows that the object of setting up the Commission in the present case was to take approprlate- 1egislative or administrative measures 'for maintaining. high standards ofpublic conduct and purity of political administration in the State in future.\n\nTherefore, the notification falls within the ambit of s. 3 of the Act.\n\n[801 A-C .. 803 D-EI\n\nShri Ram Krishna Da/m; a v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1959] S.C.R. 279, explained. . '\n\n(2) It may be that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry in the present case was partly on account of political rivalry between the party in power and those against _whom the inquiry was ordered but the dominant purpose of setting up the Commission was to promote easures for maintaining p_urity and integrity of the administration in the po!iticar hfe of the State tn future and not the character assassination of rivals.\n\nTherefore, the impugned notification was issued bona fide and is le\"ally valid. (805 A-B; 807 R-E] ·\n\nThe King v. Minister of Health, [1929] 1 K.B. 619, referred to.\n\n*The order dismissing the appeals was pronounced on April 16, 1968 and the Judgment was delivered On April 30, 1968.\n\nSUPRE11E COURT REPORTS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nRex v. Brighton Corporation ex-parte Shoosmith, 96 -L.T. 762, Earl Ei:za•illiani's TVentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of To1vn and Country . Planning, [1951] 2 K.B. 284; applied.\n\n(3) To constitute contempt of court there must be involved some .. act done or writing pllblished calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to. lower his authority' or something 'calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the la\\vful -process. of the courts.' [808 HJ\n\nIn the prfient-c:ise,- the suits 'Were filed 'for damages for defamation -in relation to allegations of corruption.\n\nThere was no factual inquiry into the allegations and the suits were decided on the basis of burden of proof:\n\nTherefore, it could not be.Said-that the_inquiry ordered was in relation to the very matters which were the subject matter of the first appeal filed in the High Court again.st the' decision in the suits. [808 ~El . C\n\nFurther, the scope of the trial by courts of law and the scope o'f an inquiry by the Comission are altogether different, and _therefore, the in. quiry by the Commission would not amount toan usurpation of the function of courts of law. [808 E]\n\nIn any case, it cannot be said that the Commission wOUtd be-liable for -contempt of court, i'f it proceeded to inquire into matters , referred to it by_ the Government notification, because, in appointing the _Commission the 'State Government \\Vas exerci'.Sing a statutory power and in making the inquiry the Commission \\Vould be performing a statutoryduty. The res. pondents in this case have done nothing to obstruct or interfere v.rith the .la\\\\ful powers of ihe court by acting bona fide and by discharging statu\n\ntory functions under tho Act. [808 B-G]\n\nReg. v. Gra.v, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 and Arthur Reginald Perera v. The King, [1951] A.C. 482, 488, applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR1smcnoN: Civil Appeal Nos. 1148-· 1150 of 1968.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated February . 22, 1967 of the~Orissa High Court in 0.J.C. Nos. 396, 40S and 418 <Jf 1967.\n\nA. K. Sen, Rajendra Mohanty, K. R. Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Ashok Das, Advocate- General for the State of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee, B, B. Ratho and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4. Lal Narain Singh, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and R. K. Garg, for interv;:ner No. I.\n\nB. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.\n\nThese appeals were heard on April 15 and April 16, 1968 and at the close of the hearing we ordered that the appeals should be dismissed with costs and indicated that our reasons .would be pronounced later. Accordingly our present judgment gives our reasons for the order which has already been passed.\n\nThese appeals are brought against the commo.n judgment of the Orissa High Cqurt dated February 22 •. 19.68 m O.J.<;._ Nos. 396, 408 and 418 1967. By these applications the pelltmners therein prayed for an appropriate .direction or. order. under. Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing and settmg aside notification No. 813-EC dated October 26, 1967, issued by the Government of Orissa in exercise:· of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act (LX of 1952) and for othe1 reliefs. The Schedule to the Notification gives the names of 15 persons against whom inquiry is to be made. The petitioners in the three O.J.C.s have respectivelv been referred to in Items 6, 2 and 12 of the Schedule. In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos. 5 to 9. Shri Biju Patnaik filed an application in this case to be impleaded as an opposite party. As the other parties had no objection he was also imp leaded as opposite party No. 10. Rules were issued and except opposite parties Nos. 3 and 6 the other opposite parties showed cause.\n\nBy its judgment dated February 22, 1968 the High Court dismissed the applications, holding that the notification of the State Government dated October 26, 1967 appointing the Commission of Inquiry was legal • and valid.\n\nAgainst this judgment the petitioners in all the three O.J .C.s have preferred the present appeals by certificate of the Orissa High Court.\n\nShri Harekrushna Mahtab was the Chief Minister of Orissa from 1947 to 1949. Shri Nabakmshna Choudhury wits the Chief Minister from 1950 to 1956. In the 1957 General Election to the Orissa Legislative Assembly (hereinafter referred to as the 'Assembly'), out of 140 seats the Congress Party got only 56 seats.\n\nSri Harekrushna Mahtab formed the Ministry with the\n\nspport of other members but he had to resign in 1959 due to withdrawal of support by some of the groups in the Assembly.\n\nIn May, 1959, he formed a coalition ministry with the help of Ganatantra _Parishad of which Sri R. N. Singh Deo was the leader.\n\nSri Singh Deo became the Finance Minister and the Deputy Leader in the Coalition Government. During the coalition Ministry there developed acute difference of opinion in the Orissa Congres~ . Legislt!ve party over the condut and programme of the\n\noahtion Mm1stry.\n\nThe Congress Legislative party was divided mto two groups, one under the leadership of Sri Harekmshna M!111tab and the other under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik.\n\nSn Harekrushna Mahtab had to resign in February, 1961 as he lost the support of the majority of the Congress Legislative party. 8 Sup. CJ/68-11\n\n792 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe Assembly was dissolved and there was President's rule for sometime._ During the President's rule, a mid-term election was held in May, 1961. The Congress Party succeeded in capturing\n\n80 seats out of 140 under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik. At that time the Ganatantra Parishad had joined the Swatantra Party' of India. The dissident group of members under the leadership of Sri Harekrushna Mahtab defected from the Congress Party and formed a separate political party under the name of \"Jana Con~ gress''. The case of the appellants is that from 1961 till the end o( 1966 this group bad its secret alliance with the Swatantra Party and went on creating obstruction from within to the smooth administration by the Congress Party which had a superior numerical strength. Sri Biju Patnaik was the Chief Minister, Shri Biren Mitra was the Deputy Chief Minister.\n\nThere was a firm called \"Orissa Agents\" in the name of Mrs. Mitra which made supplies to some of the departments of the Orissa Government. A campaign was carried on by Sri Mahtab and Sri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan attacking the honesty of Sri Biren Mitra. There was a debate in the Assembly in which a direct attack was made on the honesty and integrity of Sri Mitra and there was a demand for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. The Government of Orissa did not agree to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but Sri Biju Patnaik referred the matter to Sri Singh Deo, leader of the Opposition and Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Sri\n\nSingh Deo initially accepted the responsibility, but later on expressed his unwillingness. The Orissa Government had a special audit of the allegations and sent the report to the Public Accounts Committee in the year 1964. While the matter was pending with the Public Accounts Committee, Sri Biju Patnaik resigned the Chief Ministership of Orissa on October l, 1963. He, however, continued to be the chairman .of the State Planning Board till January 29, 1965 when Sri Biren Mitra was the Chief Minister.\n\nSri Mitra dropped out Sri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan from the cabinet.\n\nDuring the tenure of the office of Sri Mitra as the Chief Minister of ()rjssa, some members of the Opposition in the Assembly, which included all the members of the Swatantra Party, filed a. memorandum before the President of India alleging misappropriation, misconduct and fraud against Sri Patnaik, Sri Mitra. and ain other Ministers and requested the President of India to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to inqUire into these allegations.\n\nThe President referred the Memorandum to his Council of Ministers. It is said the Central Government did not favour the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but decided to have the allegations enquired into by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the C.B.I.). After receiving the preliminary report of the C.B.I. the Central Government rejected the demand for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. A statement was\n\nmade in Parliament that certain improprieties were committed but the examination did not reveal any misconduct, misappropriation or fraud or abuse of power for personal gain. As a result of the statement in the Parliament Sri Biren Mitra who was then the Chief Minister submitted his resignation and Sri Sadasiv Tripathy was elected as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party and carried on administration as the Chief Minister of Orissa till the last General Election. Soon after the formation of the present Ministry, the Governor of the State announced in his address to the Legislature the decision to set u'p a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the charges of corruption and improprieties alleged to have been committed by the Ministers who were in office from 1961 to 1967.\n\nThe present. Commission was appointed in pursuance of the policy laid down in the address of the Governor.\n\nThe main ground of attack on behalf of the appellants was that the notification was illegal because the Government exercised the statutory power ma/a fide and for collateral purpose and that the object of appointing the Commission of Inquiry was to get rid of\n\nSri Biju Patnaik and Sri Biren Mitra and to drive thenf out of the political life of Orissa. The High Court held that the allegation of the appellants was not made out and upheld the legal validity ui the notiiicaiion dated October 26, 1967 issued by the Orissa Government.\n\nSub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', provides as follows:\n\n\"3. Appointment of COmmission.--{l) The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in die Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter <Of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly : • ........................................ \"\n\nSetion 4 vests in the COmmission the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure and reads as f~!!ow&;\n\n\"4. Powers of Commission.-The Commissionshall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908}. in respect of the following matters, namely :- ·\n\nSUPREME COURT .REPORTS . , . . (1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(a) summoning and enforcing.the-attendance of any . person and _examining him 011 oath; . • A\n\n(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; ·\n\n_ (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;\n\n. B\n\n(d) requisitioning any public record or_ copy thereof Jrom any cou, rt _ or_ofli:e; ·\n\n(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; ·\n\n(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.\" .\n\nSection 5 empowers the appropriate Government, by a notification . in the Official Gazette, to confer on the Commission additional powers as provided ill all or any of the sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and -\n\n(5) of that section. S_ection 6 states :\n\n, \"6. Statements made by persons to the Commission.-No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him . to, or be used against hini in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement :\n\nProvided that the statement-\n\n(a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or\n\n(b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry.\"\n\nBy s. 8 the Commission is empowered to regulate its own procedure including the time and place of its sittings and may act notwithstanding the. temporary absence of any member or the existence of any vacancy among its members. ·\n\nThe notification of the Orissa Government dated October 26, G 1967 is to the following ef!'ect: -\n\n\"HOME DEPARTMENT .\n\nNOTIFICATION . ' The 26th October, 1967.\n\nNo. 813-· EC.-WHEREAS pursuant to the midterm general election of the State Legislative Assembly. in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, . their partymen\n\n(Congressmen) and others in whom they were interested, .from out of e funds of the State exchequer and otherwise to the detriment of the interests of the State ' . (3) c:ommitted breach of trust and acts of impropnety with respect to the properties and assets of the State yn~ a view to further the interests of their party organiSll'tion, i.e., the Congress;\n\n796 SUP.RElll:B COU&T IU!POU'S\n\n£1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(4) entered into contracts and other monetary transactions for the supply of machinery, tools, equipmenis and execution of works, themselves, or permitted their family members, relittions, friends, partymen and others to enter into such contracts and transactions with the Government of Orissa, with different Departments of the Government of Orissa, with Corporations, Local Bodies, Statutory Bodies and with other Bodies with which Government of Orissa have or had interest, control or concern in utter disregard of the interests of the State in breach of the trust imposed on them by virtue of their Constitutional positions;\n\n(5) resorted to misuse of power, interfered in the processes of elections and administration of Local Bodies not only to help their friends, favourites and partymen but also at times for their own personal benefits;\n\n(6) acquired directly properties of the State either for themselves or for the benefit of the members of their families or relations or others in whom they were interested;\n\n(7) advanced money and Joans by way of favouritism out of the Statci exchequer in favour of themselves, members of their families, their relations and other persons in whom they were interested;\n\n(8) permitted wastage, misuse, misutilisation and misappropriation of the funds of the State in several ways to the detriment of the interests of the State in utter disregard of the canons of financial propriety and established rules and procedure from which a presumption of personal gains for themselves or for persons as aforesaid directly or indirectly arises; ·\n\n(9) caused wastage, misuse, misutilisation, misappropriation, illegal or irregular use of the funds of !he State through contracts or other monetary transactions entered into by the Government without following the rules of Jaw or the established procedure;\n\n(10) by way of favouritism and nepotism caused maladministration in matters of public services, namely, in the matter of appointments, transfers, promotions and dealing with corrupt officers;\n\n(11) interfered with the administration of Jaw and tried to pervert the course of justice by helping offenders to escape law;\n\n(12) caused to the State Government huge financial loss which has given rise to a great economic crisis, serious retardation in the progress of trade, industry and commerce, agricultural output, serious problems of unemployment and has also vitiated the moral and general character of the people;\n\n(13) acted in several cases against constitutional proprieties, public policies and proper social and political conduct;\n\n(14) amassed wealth themselves, through members of their family, relations and other persons or permitted the members of their family, relati9ns and other persons to amass wealth and their assets during the aforesaid period have increased disproportionate to the known sources of their income, by abuse of their constitutional positions.\n\nUnder such circumstances the people in general and the Government have expressed a desire that the matters aforesaid regarding the aforesaid persons should be enquired into through a Commission of Inquiry so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future.\n\nUnder such circumstances, the Government of the State of Orissa are of the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making a full inquiry into the aforesaid matters which are of definite public importance.\n\nNOW, THEREFORE,· the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952), hereby appoint a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Justice H. R. Khanna of the Delhi High Court to inquire into and report on and in respect of :-\n\nWHETHER THE PERSONS\n\nMENTIONED IN\n\nTHE SCHEDULE, DURING THE\n\nAFORESAID\n\nPERIOD:\n\n(I) committed various acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism, illegalities, irregillarities, improprieties and abuse of their power in matters of administration of the Stat11 in different cases ?\n\n798 SuPRl!MB COU.T Ul'Ol.TS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing A pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, the members of their families, their relations, their friends and their partymen (Congressmen) and others in whom they were interested, from out of the funds of the State exchequer and otherwise to the detriment of the interests of the State ?\n\nJI;\n\n(3) committed breach of trust and act~ of impropriety with respect to the properties and assets of the State with a view to further the interests of their party organisation, i.e. the Congress ?\n\n( 4) entered i!l'!o contracts and other monetary transactions for the supply of machinery, stores, equipment and execution of works or permitted their family members, relations, friends and others in whom they were interested, with the Government of Orissa, in utter disregard of the law, rules and administrative procedure relating thereto and in breach of the confidence reposed on them, by virtue of their constitutional position?\n\n(5) resorted to. misuse of power' interfered in the process cif election and administration of local bodillS not only to help their friends, favourites and partymen, but also at times for their own personal benefit?\n\n(6) acquired directly properties of the State either for themselves pr for the benefit of members of their families, relations or other persons in whom and organisations in which they were interested ?\n\n(7) advanced money and loans in favour cif themselves, members of their families, their relations and other persons in whom they were interested, out of the State Excheciuer ?\n\n(8) permitted wastage, misuse and expenditure in various ways to the detriment . of the interests of the State without following the established rules of procedure from which the presumption of personal gains for themselves directly or indirectly would arise?\n\n(9) by way of favouritism and nepotism have caused maladministration in matters of public services, namely, appointments, transfers, promotions and dealing with con11pt officers ?\n\n(10) interfered in the administration of law and tried to pervert the course of justice by helping offenders to escape law?\n\n(11) by their aforesaid conduct have put the 'State • Government to huge financial loss which has resulted in\n\nB a financial crisis for the State ?\n\n(12) by their aforesaid conduct have hampered the entire industrial development in the State ?\n\n(13) by iheir aforesaid conduct have given rise to serious problems of unemployment? c\n\n(14) by their aforesaid conduct have spread corruption in the Government machinery and have polluted the general public morale in the State and have also brought about a general demoralisation of the political, social, economic and moral aspects of the Society ?\n\n(15) by their aforesaid conduct have put the State to D financial loss which has developed into a great economic crisis and has resulted in rapid retardation of the progress of trade, industry and commerce, a deplorable fall in the agricultural output, spread of 9orruption in all wings of administration and a general breakdown in the morale and character of the people of the State ?\n\nE The Commission of Inquiry may also perform such\n\n?the~ functions as are necessary or incidental to the mqurry.\n\nThe Commission shall inquire into the detailed particulars pertaining to the aforesaid matters along with\n\nF such other incidental and ancillary matters thereto that shall be placed before them by the State Government.\n\nThe Commission shall inquire into the financial implications of the aforesaid matters. \"' The Commission shall make its report to the State '\n\nG Government on or before 30th Apvil, 1968.\n\nAND WHEREAS the State Government are of opinion that having regard to the nature of the inquiry to be made and other circumstances of the case all the provisions of sub-section (2), sub-section (3), sub-section (4), sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of section 5 of\n\nH the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 shall be made applicable to the said Commission, the State Government hereby directs that all the said provisions shall apply to the said Commission.\n\n800.\n\nSUPllDIE COUllT UPOl.TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe Commission shall have its headquarters at A J Bhubaneswar and may also visit such places as may be necessary in furtherance of the inquiry.\n\nBy order of the Governor B. B. Rath r Additional Secretary to Govt.\n\nSCHEDULE\n\nFrom To\n\n1. Sbri Biju Patnaik Chief Minister Planning Bd. 23-6-1961 1-1().1963 Chairman, State 4-1().1963 29-1-1965\n\n2. Shri Biren Mitra Minister 23-6-1961 1-1().1963 c\n\nChief Minister 2-1().1963 2().2-1965\n\n3. Sbri S . Tripathy Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965 Chief Minit11ter 21-2-1965 8-3-1967\n\n4. Sbri Hilamoni Routray Minister 23-6-1961 25-2-1967\n\n5. Sbri Satyapriya Mohanty Minister 2-1().1963 24-2-1967 D\n\n6. Sbri P. V. Jagannath Rao Minister 23-6-1961 8-3-1967\n\n7. Shri H.B. Singh Mardaraj Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965\n\n8. Shri R. P. Misra Minister 21·2-1965 25-2-1967\n\n9. Sbri Brundaban Nayak Deputy Minister 29-7-1962 1-1().1963 Minister 2-1().1963 28-6-1965\n\n10. Shri T. Sanganna Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 1-1().1963 E Minister 2-1().1963 27-2·1967\n\n11. Shri Prahallad Mallik Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 28-2-1967\n\nJ 2. Sbri S. K. Sahu Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 28-2-1967\n\n13. Shri Anup Singh Deo Dy. Minister 21-2-1965 8-2-1967\n\n14. Sbri Chittaranjan Naik Dy. Minister 21-2-1965 26-2-1967 F\n\n15. Shri Chandramohan Singh Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 24-2-1967 B.B. Rath Additional Secretary to Govt.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants Mr. Asoke Sen put forward the argument that the appointment of the Commission is not valid as the notification does not state what is the purpqse for which the enquiry was to be made. To put it differently, the argument of G the appellants was that the notification is not related to any future Government action or legislative policy and hence the notification was bad.\n\nThe contention of Mr. Asoke Sen was that an inquiry for mere collection of facts unrelated to any future course of Government action or legislative policy does not fall within the purview of s. 3 of the Act and it is not a valid exercise of H statutory power to appoint such a Commission. We are unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants .as correct. The purpose of the enquiry is stated in the preamble\n\nJAGANNATH lAO v. STATB (Ramaswami, /,) 801\n\nto the notification wJµch, states that \"the matters aforesaid regardinJ the afore.said persons should be enquired into through a Commission of Inquiry so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recummce of such la~ and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future\".\n\nIn other words, the object of the enquiry to be made by the Commission appointed under s. 3 of the Act was to take appropriate !eslative or administrative measures to maintain the purity and mtegrity of political administration in the State. In our opinion, the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry in the present case was in valid exercise of the statutory power by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act. Mr. Asoke Sen referred in this connection. to the decision of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(' ), in which the appellant challenged the validity of the notification of the Central Government dated December 11, 1956 appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report . in respect of certain companies mentioned in the Schedule attached to the notification and in respect of the nature and extent of the control and interest which certain persons named in the notification ex, ercised over these companies.. It was held by this, Court, in agreement with the Bombay High Court, that the notification was legal and valid except as to the last part of cl. 10 thereof which empowered the Commission to recommend the action which should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases. Clause 10 of the notification in that case stated :\n\n\"Any irregularities, frauds or breaches of trust or action in disregard of honest commercial practices or contravention of any law (except contraventions in respect of which .criminal proceedings are pending in a Gourt of Law) in respect of the companies and firms whose afiairs are investigated by the Commission which may come to the knowledge of the Commission and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases.\"\n\nThe portion of Cl. 1 O of the notification which was held i0 be ultra vires by this Court was the portion beginning with the words \"and the action\" and ending with the words \"in future cases\".\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the appellant in that case that While the Commission may find facts on which the Government may take action, legislative or executive, the Commission cannot be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to be taken by the appropriate Government. The argument was rejected by\n\n(!) [19591 S. C. R. 279.\n\n802 SUPUMB COUJ.T UPOaTS\n\n(11168) 3 S.C.ll,\n\nthis Court. n this oonnection, S. R. Das, C.J. speaking for tho Court. obServed at page 294 of the Report as follows : -\n\n\"We are unable to accept the proposition so widely enunciated. An inquiry necessarily involves investi~· tion into facts and necessitates the collection of material facts from the evidence adduced. before or brought to the notice of the person or body conducting the inquiry\n\nand the recording of its findings on those facts in its report cannot but be regarded as ancillary to the inquiry itself, for the inq_uiry becomes useless unless the findings of the inquiring body are made available to the Gov ernment which set up the inquiry. It is, in our judg ment, equally ancillary that the person or body conduct ing the inquiry should express its own view on the facts found by it for the consideration of the appropriate Government in order to enable it to take such measure as it .may think fit to do. The whole purpose of setting up of a CommiSsion of Inquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of inquiry will be deprived of its utility it-the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the. measures the situation disclosed calls for cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own. In our view the recommendations of a Com mission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Gov ernment in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objeets it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commis sion of . Inquiry recommending the. imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be suffi ciently deterrent to delinquents in future.\n\nBut seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprlo vlgore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under s. 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there can be no point in the Commission of Inquiry making rer.ommendations for taking any action 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment' which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context, to wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a court of. law properly constituted exercising 'its own discretion on the\n\nJAGANNATH .RAO V, STATB (Rama.swami, /,) 803\n\nfacts and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by !he view of any person or body, howsover august or high powered it may be. Having regard to all these considerations it appears to us that only that portion of the last part of cl. (10) which calls upon the Commission of Inquiry to make recommendations about the action to be taken 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment', cannot be said to be at all necessary for or ancillary to the purposes of the Commission. In our view the words in the latter part of the section, namely, 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment', clearly go outside the scope of the Act.\"\n\nIn our opinion, the ratio of this case has no application in the present case, because there is nothing corresponding to the im pugned part of cl. 10, in the notification of the Orissa Government dated October 26, 1967. On the contrary, we have already pointed out that the object to set up the Commission of Inquiry D in the present case was to take appropriate legislative or adminis\n\ntrative measures for maintaining h1~ standards of public conduct and purity of political administration in the State. It follows therefore that the notification of the Orissa Government falls within the ambit of s. 3 of the Act and must be held to be legally valid and intra virts.\n\nWe pass on to col!Sider the next question arising in these ap peals, namely, whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purposo alien to the statute. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the\n\nappellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harckrushna Mehtab, Shri Singh Deo and the other persons who F are at present in-charge of the Orissa administration. Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the State of Orissa from 1947 up to the General Elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Singh Deo who was the leader ofOpposition in the previous Government and a1sO to the internal rivalry between the two political groups G in the Congress Legislative, party, one led by Shri Harekrushna ' Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra; It was urged that the Commission was set up by the pre sent Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a .cc>llateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa.\n\nH Mr. Asoke Sen .said that the object of the enquiry was charaoter\n\nass•ssination of Slµi Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and so the Com missiQn was set up for a collateral purpose and the notification must bo struck down as illegal and llltra Vina. It is not poaalble,\n\n804 SUPIBMB COUl.T UJIO&TI\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nin our opinion, to accept this argnment as correct, It is admitted\n\nA that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the apants and the present Chief Minister of Orissa, Shri R. ~' Sing . and also as between the appellants and the group of \\,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik. But we do not think that the existence of a political rivalry is in itself sufficient. to hold that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry is illegal. Having perused the affi davits of the appellants and also those filed by the respondents in this case we are of opinion that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was not due merely to the existence of political rivalry of the parties but was impelled by the desire to set up and c maintain high standards of moral conduct in the political ad ministration of the State. As we have already pointed out, the object of appointing the Commission is stated in the notification itself as \"the rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses ll!id securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future\". In the affidavit of Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the 1ana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967. As a result of the popular mandate the Swatantra Party and the 1 ana Congress coalition took charge of the reins of Government and in accordance with the solemn promise made by those parties to the people of Orissa the Government decided' It to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in order to investigate the widespread corruption practised by the persons named in 'the Schedule to the impugned notification. The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the Governor to the Otissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elec tions. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party was \"to et up a clean administration, so that the State's resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State\". In para 6 of the affidavit Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan further states : G \"I have always believed and still believe that politics is not for the purp0se of serving the selfish ends and to satisfy the greed of any politician or any person or any group of persons. Politics is for the service of the people and involves sacrificing one's life and comforts for raising the living stsndard of the overwhelming poverty-stricken people of our State and our country so that they K may enjoy a good life and hold up their heads with pride.\" In para S he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Birea\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. STATB (Ramaswami, J.) 80$\n\nA Mitra and their group. It is true that the appointment of the Com~\n\nmission of Inquiry may have been made partly on account of the: political rivalry between the parties but having perused the aflb davits filed by the appellants and the respondents in this case,. we are satisfied that the main object of the appointment of the Com, mission of Inquiry was not to satisfy the political rivaJrY of the: B politicians at present in power in Orissa but to promote measures. for maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in future in the Orissa State. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr.\n\nAsoke. sen is unable to make good his argument that the impugned notification is a ma/a fide exercise of the statutory power and it. should be struck down as illegal. c\n\nIt is well-settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the stanitory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law; i.e., an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other than that. which the Legislature intended (See The King v. Minister of Health) (1). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In .uch a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper le.st to be applied in such a case is as. to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation ex parte Shoosmith(2) A Borough Corporation expended a large sum of money upon al, F tering and paving a road, which was thereby permanently improved, but they decided to do the work at the particular time when it was done in order to induce the Automobile Club to hold motor trials and motor races upan it. The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divis10nal Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher Moulton, L.J. at page 764 as follows : G\n\n\"It cannot be denied that the physical act of chang, ing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powm and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives. The case would be quite different if one came to the conclusion that under the guise of improvement of a road, certain moneys bad\n\n(I) [19291 I K. B. 619.\n\n(2) 96 Law Times 762 ..\n\n806 [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nbeen used really for diminishing the experu; es of the Automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit pur\n\nJ>05CS\" The principle 'was applied by Denning, 'L.J. in Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Etate Cc. Ltd. v. Minister 91 Town and Country Plan ing(1). It was a case concerning the validity o.f a compulsory purchase made by the Central Land Board, and confirmed by the Minister, under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Board's function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Board's policy of sales at existing use values. The majority (consisting of Somer well and Singleton, L.J.) held that, though the main purpose of the Board may well have been to induce landowners in general and the company, in particular, to adopt one of the methods of sale favoured by the Board, it was nevertheless in connection with their function as the authority operating the development charge scheme, and at any rate, \"the case was not one in which it could be said that powers were exercised for a purpose different from those spe cified in the statute.\" Denning, L.J. disagreed with the majority and held that the dominant purpose of the Board was not to assist in their proper function of collecting the development charge, but to enforce their policy of sales at existing use value only. '.J'he dominant purpose being unlawful, the order was invalid, and could not be cured by saying that there was also some other purpose which was lawful. The Board and the Minister had misunderstood the extent of their compulsory powers, and their affidavits showed that they had overlooked that their ultimate purpose in exercising their powers .should be connected with the performance of the Board's functions under the Act. At page 307 of the Report Denning, L.J. observed as follows :\n\n\"What is the legal position when the board have more than one purpose in mind? In the ordinary way, of course, the courts do not have regard to the 'pwpose' or 'motive' or 'reason' of an act but only to its mtrinsic validity. For instance, an employer who dismisses a servant for a bad reason may justify it for a good one, so long as he finds it at any time before the trial. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is do~ in the case of a conspiracy--and in .such a case, when there is more than one pUrpo6e, the law always has. regard to the dominant\n\n(I) (1951) 2 K. B. 284.\n\npurpose. If the dominant purpose of those concerned is unlawful, then the act done is invalid, and it is not to be cured by saying that they had some other. purpose in mind which was lawful : see what Lord S11Don, Lord Maugham and Lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Hattis Tweed Co. v. Veitch (1942 A.C. 445. 452-3, 469, 475).\n\nSo also the validity of government action often depends on the purpose with which it is done. There, too, the same principle applies. If Parliament grants a power to a government department to be used for an authorized pwj>ose, then the power is only vali<!Jy exercised when it is used by the department genumely for that purpose as its dominant purpose. If that. purpose is not the main purpose; but is subOrdinated to some other purpose which is not authorised by Jaw, then the department exceeds its powers and the action is invalid.\"\n\nApplying the test to the present. case, we are; of opinion that the dominant purpose of setting up the Commissloriof Inquiry was . to promote measures for maintaining purity an<l integrity of the administration in the political life of the State and not \"the char; icter assassination\" of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and their gioup.\n\nE It follows therefore that the impugned notifiqation of the Orissa Government, dated October 26, 1967 is legally valid.\n\nWe proceed to consider the next argument put forward on behalf.of the appellants, namely, that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was illegal because it constituted contempt of Court. It was pointed out tliat items with regard to Shri Biren Mitra referred to in the impugned notification were the subjectmatter of civil litigation and there was a First Appeal pending in the High Court. It appears that all the items of charges regarding Shr! Bi.ren Mia we~ included in the ¥emorandum submitted by Shn N1samon1 Khuntia, Secretary, San1ulcta Socialist Party to the President of India. The memorandum was published in the Daily newspaper \"The Eastern Times\" on its front page on August 2,\n\n19~4 with bald headlines .\"Money amassed through corruption\".\n\nShn Harendra Chandra Pradhan was the Printer .and publisher of that paper. Shri Birn. Mitra filed two suits-0.S. No. 266 and 267 of 1964 against the Prajatantra Prachar Samiti (defendruit No. 1), Shri Janaki Ballav Patnaik (Defendant No. 2 j, Shri Narendra Chandra Pradhan (Defendant No. 3) and Shri Nisairioni Khuntia (.Defendant No. 4). It was alleged that there was eollusion .between defendants 1 to 4 and other political opponents of LS sup. C. 1./68-12\n\nsos\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n\nShri Biren Mitra. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a common Written Statement saying that the assertions in the memorandum were true.\n\nThe 4th defendant filed a separate written statement to the same .effect. The suits were heard by the Subordinate Judges, Cuttack.\n\nHe held that the publication was on the face of it defamatory and libellous. No evidence was given on either side regaraing the truth -0f the imputations in the publications. Holding that the burden -Of proof reste<\\ on the defendants the subordinate Judge decreed the suit for damages for Rs. 200. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that the decision of the Sabordinate Judge was pending in the First Appeal in th_e High Court and so no Coriunisison of Inquiry could be appointed with regard to the same matters. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It should be noticed, in the first place, that none of the parties in the civil suit has adduced any evidence. Shri Biren Mifra did not choose to appear as a witness and present himself for cross-examination. The suits were decided purely on the basis of burden of proof. We do not wish to express any view as to whether these two suits were decided rightly or wrongly, but the fact remains that there was no factual enquiry into the allegations. It is also not possible to accept the argument that the present inquiry is in-relation to the\n\nvery matters which were the subject-matter of the civil suits and of the first appeal. It was pointed out by this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. J:endolkar( 1 ) that the inquiry cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry and the order ul'i mately passed cannot be enforced proprio vigore.\n\nThe inquiry and the investigation by the Commission do not therefore amount to usurpation of the function of the courts of law. The scope of the trial by the Courts of law and the Commission of Inquiry is altogether different. In any case, ft cannot be said that the Commission of Inquiry would be liable for contempt of Court if it proceeded to enquire into matters referred to if by the Government Notification. In appointing a Commission of Inquiry under s. 3 of the Act the Orissa Government is exercising a statutory power and in making the inquiry contemplated by the notification, the Commission is performing its statutory duty.\n\nWe have already held that in the appointment of the Commission of Inquitjr the Government was acting bona fide. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of the appellants that the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry by the State Government or the continuance of the inquiry by the Commission so constituted would be tantamount to contempt of Court. To constitute contempt of court, there must be involved some \"act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority\" or something \"calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the\n\n(I) [1959] S. C.R. 279.\n\n, A courts\" see Reg. v. Gray('), Arthur Reginald Perara v.\n\nThe King('). The respondents in this case have done nothing to obstruct or interfere with the lawful powers of the Court by acting bona fide and discharging statutory functions under the Commission of Inquiry Act. We therefore, see no justification for holding that the issue of the noiification under s. 3 of the Act or the conduct B of the Inquiry by respondents amount to contempt of Court. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Asoke Sen on this aspect of the case.\n\nIt is for these reasons that we have <; lismissed these Civil Appeals by our order, dated April 16, 1908. One set of hearing fee.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(I) [1900] 2 Q. B. 36.\n\n(2) [1951] A. C; 482, 488.", "total_entities": 163, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ORISSA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16/30, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 16/30, 1968*\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER\n\nAND C. A: VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 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Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Mohanty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Rajendra Mohanty, K. R. Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Rajendra Mohanty, K. R. Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K; Rajendra Chou_dhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5387, "end_char": 5409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Rajendra Mohanty, K. R. Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Ashok Das, Advocate- General for the State of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee, B, B. 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Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Ashok Das, Advocate- General for the State of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee, B, B. Ratho and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5605, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Singh, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and R. K. Garg, for interv;:ner No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Singh, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and R. K. Garg, for interv;:ner No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nB. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nB. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "s. K. Dholakia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nB. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nB. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5830, "end_char": 5839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.\n\nThese appeals were heard on April 15 and April 16, 1968 and at the close of the hearing we ordered that the appeals should be dismissed with costs and indicated that our reasons .would be pronounced later.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Orissa High Cqurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6210, "end_char": 6227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals are brought against the commo.n judgment of the Orissa High Cqurt dated February 22 •. 19.68 m O.J.<;._"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6515, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "813-EC dated October 26, 1967, issued by the Government of Orissa in exercise:· of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act (LX of 1952) and for othe1 reliefs."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harekrushna Mahtab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos.", "canonical_name": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab"}}, {"text": "Nabakrushna Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6912, "end_char": 6933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos.", "canonical_name": "Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury"}}, {"text": "Pabitra Mohan Pradhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos.", "canonical_name": "Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Santanu Kumar Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos.", "canonical_name": "Santanu Kumar Das"}}, {"text": "Surendranath Patnaik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 7015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos."}}, {"text": "Biju Patnaik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7080, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Biju Patnaik filed an application in this case to be impleaded as an opposite party."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7375, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated February 22, 1968 the High Court dismissed the applications, holding that the notification of the State Government dated October 26, 1967 appointing the Commission of Inquiry was legal • and valid."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated February 22, 1968 the High Court dismissed the applications, holding that the notification of the State Government dated October 26, 1967 appointing the Commission of Inquiry was legal • and valid."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment the petitioners in all the three O.J .C.s have preferred the present appeals by certificate of the Orissa High Court."}}, {"text": "Harekrushna Mahtab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7720, "end_char": 7738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Harekrushna Mahtab was the Chief Minister of Orissa from 1947 to 1949.", "canonical_name": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7765, "end_char": 7771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Harekrushna Mahtab was the Chief Minister of Orissa from 1947 to 1949."}}, {"text": "Nabakmshna Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Nabakmshna Choudhury wits the Chief Minister from 1950 to 1956.", "canonical_name": "Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury"}}, {"text": "Orissa Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7896, "end_char": 7923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the 1957 General Election to the Orissa Legislative Assembly (hereinafter referred to as the 'Assembly'), out of 140 seats the Congress Party got only 56 seats."}}, {"text": "Ganatantra _Parishad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May, 1959, he formed a coalition ministry with the help of Ganatantra _Parishad of which Sri R. N. Singh Deo was the leader."}}, {"text": "R. N. Singh Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8296, "end_char": 8311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May, 1959, he formed a coalition ministry with the help of Ganatantra _Parishad of which Sri R. N. Singh Deo was the leader."}}, {"text": "Singh Deo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8333, "end_char": 8342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Singh Deo became the Finance Minister and the Deputy Leader in the Coalition Government.", "canonical_name": "Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Orissa Congres~ . Legislt!ve party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8503, "end_char": 8537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the coalition Ministry there developed acute difference of opinion in the Orissa Congres~ ."}}, {"text": "Harekmshna M!111tab", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8685, "end_char": 8704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress Legislative party was divided mto two groups, one under the leadership of Sri Harekmshna M!111tab and the other under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik."}}, {"text": "Congress Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9101, "end_char": 9115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Congress Party succeeded in capturing\n\n80 seats out of 140 under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik."}}, {"text": "Ganatantra Parishad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9219, "end_char": 9238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time the Ganatantra Parishad had joined the Swatantra Party' of India."}}, {"text": "Swatantra Party' of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time the Ganatantra Parishad had joined the Swatantra Party' of India."}}, {"text": "Swatantra Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9578, "end_char": 9593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the appellants is that from 1961 till the end o( 1966 this group bad its secret alliance with the Swatantra Party and went on creating obstruction from within to the smooth administration by the Congress Party which had a superior numerical strength."}}, {"text": "Biren Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9777, "end_char": 9788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Biju Patnaik was the Chief Minister, Shri Biren Mitra was the Deputy Chief Minister.", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a firm called \"Orissa Agents\" in the name of Mrs. Mitra which made supplies to some of the departments of the Orissa Government.", "canonical_name": "A Mitra"}}, {"text": "Orissa Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a firm called \"Orissa Agents\" in the name of Mrs. Mitra which made supplies to some of the departments of the Orissa Government."}}, {"text": "Mahtab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9993, "end_char": 9999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A campaign was carried on by Sri Mahtab and Sri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan attacking the honesty of Sri Biren Mitra."}}, {"text": "October l, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10821, "end_char": 10836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the matter was pending with the Public Accounts Committee, Sri Biju Patnaik resigned the Chief Ministership of Orissa on October l, 1963."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10914, "end_char": 10930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, continued to be the chairman .of the State Planning Board till January 29, 1965 when Sri Biren Mitra was the Chief Minister."}}, {"text": "Patnaik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11336, "end_char": 11343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the tenure of the office of Sri Mitra as the Chief Minister of ()rjssa, some members of the Opposition in the Assembly, which included all the members of the Swatantra Party, filed a. memorandum before the President of India alleging misappropriation, misconduct and fraud against Sri Patnaik, Sri Mitra."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11411, "end_char": 11416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and ain other Ministers and requested the President of India to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to inqUire into these allegations."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11570, "end_char": 11588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said the Central Government did not favour the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but decided to have the allegations enquired into by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the C.B.I.)."}}, {"text": "Central Bureau of Intelligence", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11704, "end_char": 11734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said the Central Government did not favour the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but decided to have the allegations enquired into by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the C.B.I.)."}}, {"text": "C.B.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11767, "end_char": 11773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said the Central Government did not favour the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but decided to have the allegations enquired into by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the C.B.I.)."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11941, "end_char": 11951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A statement was\n\nmade in Parliament that certain improprieties were committed but the examination did not reveal any misconduct, misappropriation or fraud or abuse of power for personal gain."}}, {"text": "Sadasiv Tripathy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12237, "end_char": 12253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the statement in the Parliament Sri Biren Mitra who was then the Chief Minister submitted his resignation and Sri Sadasiv Tripathy was elected as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party and carried on administration as the Chief Minister of Orissa till the last General Election.", "canonical_name": "Sadasiva Tripathy"}}, {"text": "Congress Legislative Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12287, "end_char": 12313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the statement in the Parliament Sri Biren Mitra who was then the Chief Minister submitted his resignation and Sri Sadasiv Tripathy was elected as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party and carried on administration as the Chief Minister of Orissa till the last General Election."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13177, "end_char": 13183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main ground of attack on behalf of the appellants was that the notification was illegal because the Government exercised the statutory power ma/a fide and for collateral purpose and that the object of appointing the Commission of Inquiry was to get rid of\n\nSri Biju Patnaik and Sri Biren Mitra and to drive thenf out of the political life of Orissa."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13381, "end_char": 13385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13393, "end_char": 13425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14242, "end_char": 14269, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14403, "end_char": 14432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14963, "end_char": 14972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15674, "end_char": 15678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 26, G 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15949, "end_char": 15967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification of the Orissa Government dated October 26, G 1967 is to the following ef!'ect: -\n\n\"HOME DEPARTMENT ."}}, {"text": "Biju\n\nI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16206, "end_char": 16213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "Biren Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16278, "end_char": 16289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, .", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "Sadasiva Tripathy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16299, "end_char": 16316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, .", "canonical_name": "Sadasiva Tripathy"}}, {"text": "4th October, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "29th January 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16663, "end_char": 16680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16948, "end_char": 16963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "Central Bureau of Investigation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17359, "end_char": 17390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "Ceptral Cabinet", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17399, "end_char": 17414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju\n\nI ---\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795\n\nPatnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \\VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;\n\nAND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;\n\nAND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·\n\nTIIAT DURING\n\nTHE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED\n\nIN THE SCHEDULE:\n\n(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:\n\n(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, ."}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18790, "end_char": 18810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) c:ommitted breach of trust and acts of impropnety with respect to the properties and assets of the State yn~ a view to further the interests of their party organiSll'tion, i.e., the Congress;\n\n796 SUP.RElll:B COU&T IU!POU'S\n\n£1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(4) entered into contracts and other monetary transactions for the supply of machinery, tools, equipmenis and execution of works, themselves, or permitted their family members, relittions, friends, partymen and others to enter into such contracts and transactions with the Government of Orissa, with different Departments of the Government of Orissa, with Corporations, Local Bodies, Statutory Bodies and with other Bodies with which Government of Orissa have or had interest, control or concern in utter disregard of the interests of the State in breach of the trust imposed on them by virtue of their Constitutional positions;\n\n(5) resorted to misuse of power, interfered in the processes of elections and administration of Local Bodies not only to help their friends, favourites and partymen but also at times for their own personal benefits;\n\n(6) acquired directly properties of the State either for themselves or for the benefit of the members of their families or relations or others in whom they were interested;\n\n(7) advanced money and Joans by way of favouritism out of the Statci exchequer in favour of themselves, members of their families, their relations and other persons in whom they were interested;\n\n(8) permitted wastage, misuse, misutilisation and misappropriation of the funds of the State in several ways to the detriment of the interests of the State in utter disregard of the canons of financial propriety and established rules and procedure from which a presumption of personal gains for themselves or for persons as aforesaid directly or indirectly arises; ·\n\n(9) caused wastage, misuse, misutilisation, misappropriation, illegal or irregular use of the funds of !"}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21871, "end_char": 21904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under such circumstances, the Government of the State of Orissa are of the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making a full inquiry into the aforesaid matters which are of definite public importance."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22168, "end_char": 22177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22185, "end_char": 22218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22303, "end_char": 22315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NOW, THEREFORE,· the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952), hereby appoint a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Justice H. R. Khanna of the Delhi High Court to inquire into and report on and in respect of :-\n\nWHETHER THE PERSONS\n\nMENTIONED IN\n\nTHE SCHEDULE, DURING THE\n\nAFORESAID\n\nPERIOD:\n\n(I) committed various acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism, illegalities, irregillarities, improprieties and abuse of their power in matters of administration of the Stat11 in different cases ?"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22323, "end_char": 22339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NOW, THEREFORE,· the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952), hereby appoint a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Justice H. R. Khanna of the Delhi High Court to inquire into and report on and in respect of :-\n\nWHETHER THE PERSONS\n\nMENTIONED IN\n\nTHE SCHEDULE, DURING THE\n\nAFORESAID\n\nPERIOD:\n\n(I) committed various acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism, illegalities, irregillarities, improprieties and abuse of their power in matters of administration of the Stat11 in different cases ?"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26672, "end_char": 26681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26692, "end_char": 26723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. B. Rath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27092, "end_char": 27102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Governor B. B. Rath r Additional Secretary to Govt.", "canonical_name": "B. B. Rath"}}, {"text": "Sbri Biju Patnaik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27158, "end_char": 27175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Biju Patnaik Chief Minister Planning Bd."}}, {"text": "Biren Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27271, "end_char": 27282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Biren Mitra Minister 23-6-1961 1-1().1963 c\n\nChief Minister 2-1().1963 2().2-1965\n\n3.", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "Sbri S . Tripathy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27357, "end_char": 27374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri S ."}}, {"text": "Hilamoni Routray", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27450, "end_char": 27466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Hilamoni Routray Minister 23-6-1961 25-2-1967\n\n5."}}, {"text": "Satyapriya Mohanty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27505, "end_char": 27523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Satyapriya Mohanty Minister 2-1().1963 24-2-1967 D\n\n6."}}, {"text": "P. V. Jagannath Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27565, "end_char": 27584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri P. V. Jagannath Rao Minister 23-6-1961 8-3-1967\n\n7."}}, {"text": "H.B. Singh Mardaraj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27622, "end_char": 27641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H.B. Singh Mardaraj Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965\n\n8."}}, {"text": "R. P. Misra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27681, "end_char": 27692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. P. Misra Minister 21·2-1965 25-2-1967\n\n9."}}, {"text": "Brundaban Nayak", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27731, "end_char": 27746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Brundaban Nayak Deputy Minister 29-7-1962 1-1().1963 Minister 2-1().1963 28-6-1965\n\n10."}}, {"text": "T. Sanganna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27824, "end_char": 27835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T. Sanganna Dy."}}, {"text": "Prahallad Mallik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27912, "end_char": 27928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Prahallad Mallik Dy."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sahu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27973, "end_char": 27983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri S. K. Sahu Dy."}}, {"text": "Anup Singh Deo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28027, "end_char": 28041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anup Singh Deo Dy."}}, {"text": "Chittaranjan Naik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28084, "end_char": 28101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Chittaranjan Naik Dy."}}, {"text": "Chandramohan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28147, "end_char": 28165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Chandramohan Singh Dy."}}, {"text": "B.B. Rath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28199, "end_char": 28208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Minister 29-7-1962 24-2-1967 B.B. Rath Additional Secretary to Govt.", "canonical_name": "B. B. Rath"}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28272, "end_char": 28281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants Mr. Asoke Sen put forward the argument that the appointment of the Commission is not valid as the notification does not state what is the purpqse for which the enquiry was to be made.", "canonical_name": "Asoke. sen"}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28662, "end_char": 28671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Asoke Sen was that an inquiry for mere collection of facts unrelated to any future course of Government action or legislative policy does not fall within the purview of s. 3 of the Act and it is not a valid exercise of H statutory power to appoint such a Commission.", "canonical_name": "Asoke. sen"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28831, "end_char": 28835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29547, "end_char": 29551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29858, "end_char": 29862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 11, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30111, "end_char": 30128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the decision of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(' ), in which the appellant challenged the validity of the notification of the Central Government dated December 11, 1956 appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report ."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30481, "end_char": 30498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in respect of certain companies mentioned in the Schedule attached to the notification and in respect of the nature and extent of the control and interest which certain persons named in the notification ex, ercised over these companies.. It was held by this, Court, in agreement with the Bombay High Court, that the notification was legal and valid except as to the last part of cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30572, "end_char": 30578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30755, "end_char": 30764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31350, "end_char": 31355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31947, "end_char": 31956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n this oonnection, S. R. Das, C.J. speaking for tho Court."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34020, "end_char": 34024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35372, "end_char": 35378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35828, "end_char": 35832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harckrushna Mehtab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36221, "end_char": 36239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the\n\nappellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harckrushna Mehtab, Shri Singh Deo and the other persons who F are at present in-charge of the Orissa administration.", "canonical_name": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab"}}, {"text": "Singh Deo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36246, "end_char": 36255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the\n\nappellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harckrushna Mehtab, Shri Singh Deo and the other persons who F are at present in-charge of the Orissa administration.", "canonical_name": "Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36722, "end_char": 36742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the State of Orissa from 1947 up to the General Elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Singh Deo who was the leader ofOpposition in the previous Government and a1sO to the internal rivalry between the two political groups G in the Congress Legislative, party, one led by Shri Harekrushna ' Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra; It was urged that the Commission was set up by the pre sent Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a .cc>llateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa.", "canonical_name": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab"}}, {"text": "R. ~' Sing", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37553, "end_char": 37563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T UJIO&TI\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nin our opinion, to accept this argnment as correct, It is admitted\n\nA that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the apants and the present Chief Minister of Orissa, Shri R. ~' Sing ."}}, {"text": "Harekrushna Mahtab", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37651, "end_char": 37669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also as between the appellants and the group of \\,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik.", "canonical_name": "Harekrushna ' Mahtab"}}, {"text": "Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37676, "end_char": 37699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also as between the appellants and the group of \\,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik.", "canonical_name": "Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury"}}, {"text": "Pabitra Mohan Pradhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37706, "end_char": 37727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also as between the appellants and the group of \\,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik.", "canonical_name": "Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Santanu Kumar Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37734, "end_char": 37751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also as between the appellants and the group of \\,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik.", "canonical_name": "Santanu Kumar Das"}}, {"text": "Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38597, "end_char": 38625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit of Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the 1ana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967."}}, {"text": "1ana Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38747, "end_char": 38760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit of Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the 1ana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967."}}, {"text": "Otissa Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39331, "end_char": 39358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the Governor to the Otissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elec tions."}}, {"text": "Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39433, "end_char": 39456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party was \"to et up a clean administration, so that the State's resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State\".", "canonical_name": "Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Jana Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39497, "end_char": 39510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party was \"to et up a clean administration, so that the State's resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State\"."}}, {"text": "A Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40485, "end_char": 40492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para S he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Birea\n\nJAGANNATH RAO v. STATB (Ramaswami, J.) 80$\n\nA Mitra and their group.", "canonical_name": "A Mitra"}}, {"text": "Asoke. sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41091, "end_char": 41101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr.\n\nAsoke.", "canonical_name": "Asoke. sen"}}, {"text": "Divis10nal Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42798, "end_char": 42814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divis10nal Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher Moulton, L.J. at page 764 as follows : G\n\n\"It cannot be denied that the physical act of chang, ing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powm and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives."}}, {"text": "Fletcher Moulton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42862, "end_char": 42878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divis10nal Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher Moulton, L.J. at page 764 as follows : G\n\n\"It cannot be denied that the physical act of chang, ing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powm and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43635, "end_char": 43642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nbeen used really for diminishing the experu; es of the Automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit pur\n\nJ>05CS\" The principle 'was applied by Denning, 'L.J. in Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Etate Cc."}}, {"text": "Central Land Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43818, "end_char": 43836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was a case concerning the validity o.f a compulsory purchase made by the Central Land Board, and confirmed by the Minister, under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value."}}, {"text": "Town and Country Planning Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43897, "end_char": 43932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S11D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46346, "end_char": 46350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maugham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46359, "end_char": 46366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purpose in mind which was lawful : see what Lord S11Don, Lord Maugham and Lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Hattis Tweed Co. v. Veitch (1942 A.C. 445."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46376, "end_char": 46382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purpose in mind which was lawful : see what Lord S11Don, Lord Maugham and Lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Hattis Tweed Co. v. Veitch (1942 A.C. 445."}}, {"text": "N1samon1 Khuntia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47991, "end_char": 48007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bi.ren Mia we~ included in the ¥emorandum submitted by Shn N1samon1 Khuntia, Secretary, San1ulcta Socialist Party to the President of India."}}, {"text": "San1ulcta Socialist Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48020, "end_char": 48045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bi.ren Mia we~ included in the ¥emorandum submitted by Shn N1samon1 Khuntia, Secretary, San1ulcta Socialist Party to the President of India."}}, {"text": "August 2,\n\n19~4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48166, "end_char": 48181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The memorandum was published in the Daily newspaper \"The Eastern Times\" on its front page on August 2,\n\n19~4 with bald headlines .\"Money amassed through corruption\"."}}, {"text": "Harendra Chandra Pradhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48244, "end_char": 48268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shn Harendra Chandra Pradhan was the Printer .and publisher of that paper.", "canonical_name": "Harendra Chandra Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Birn. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48320, "end_char": 48331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Birn.", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "Prajatantra Prachar Samiti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48389, "end_char": 48415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "266 and 267 of 1964 against the Prajatantra Prachar Samiti (defendruit No."}}, {"text": "Janaki Ballav Patnaik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48441, "end_char": 48462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1), Shri Janaki Ballav Patnaik (Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Narendra Chandra Pradhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48488, "end_char": 48512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 j, Shri Narendra Chandra Pradhan (Defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Harendra Chandra Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Nisairioni Khuntia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48540, "end_char": 48558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) and Shri Nisairioni Khuntia (.Defendant No."}}, {"text": "Biren Mitra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48734, "end_char": 48745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. 1./68-12\n\nsos\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\nShri Biren Mitra.", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49310, "end_char": 49319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that the decision of the Sabordinate Judge was pending in the First Appeal in th_e High Court and so no Coriunisison of Inquiry could be appointed with regard to the same matters.", "canonical_name": "Asoke. sen"}}, {"text": "Biren Mifra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49672, "end_char": 49683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Biren Mifra did not choose to appear as a witness and present himself for cross-examination.", "canonical_name": "Biren Mitra"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50871, "end_char": 50875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52100, "end_char": 52104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_810_820_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF BIHAR, ETC.\n\nI',\n\nKAPIL SINGH, ETC.\n\nApril 18, 1968\n\n(S. M. SIKRI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nMimi.er charge-Evfdence. of child witrwss-Non-disclosure of names of culprlls-Confined 1n pollCe custody-Corroborative evidence, 8Uspici .. ous-Whether conviction can be sustained,\n\nAppellants D and R, and respondent K were charged for the murder of a lady. The deceased who waa sleeping with her niece-a child aged about 11 years, \\Voke up on hearing sounds while some miscreants were steal .. ing things in the house. She called out to the child. Two of the miscreants rushed at her and another killed her. The child pretended to be asleep, but did not cry out of fear, and continued lying on her cot till dawn. In the morning the child came out of the room and started weeping. On the enquiry of a passer-by, she told him aliout the mmdtt,\n\nand a report was lodged in the police station. Her statement was recorded but she refused to disclose the names of the culprits as her mother had forbidden her lest the persons named might kill her. D, K and R were apprehended. A chadar and quilt stained with human blood were seized from R's room, and eartops and its container rom a room in the house <ii D and his brother. The child was taken to police station, who 3 days thereafter at about midnight disclosed the names of the three culprits. She named K to be the actual killer and D and R as the attackers.\n\nSubsequently the child and her mother's statements were recorded under s. 164 Cr. P.C., and then the child was allowed to return home. D, K and R were convicted by the Sessions Judge under ss. 302 and 34 I.P.C.\n\nThe High Court, in appeal, acquitted K holding that it was not safe to base any conviction on the solita; y testimony of the child witness, but upheld the convictions of D and R, as the evidence of the child witness was corroborated by the recoveries. D and R appealed to this Court against the convictions and the State against K's acquittal.\n\nHELD : The convictions could not be sustained. [820 CJ\n\nThere were a number of circumstances indicating that it would not be quite safe to rely on the child witness' evidence. It was very unlikely that she could have continued or pretended to be asleep the whole of the time. In the morning she did not disclose the names of the culprits to the past.er-by. The conduct of the passer-by in not trying to find out the\n\naames from the child appeared to be quite unnatural. The explanation that her mother had warned her not to disclose the names lest she be killed by the persons named by her, was not convincing. At no stage the . suggestion wa• that the thieves themselves had threatened to kill the child if she disclosed their names. She could not, therefore, be under any fear at the time when she met the passer-by and others. Further the illegal\n\nconfinement by the police was reprehensive and very adversely . affected the value of the evidence obtained by the police. The very fact that she was questioned at the odd hour of midnight made it obvious that c.ompulsion was being used on her to disclose the names. Clearly the police was acting against law in keeping the child confined in t~ police statin wit~ a police constable posted all the time as her companion. The failure dr mother to appear as a witness at the Sessions Trial, was another example of the unsatisfactory or unreliable conduct of the investigation of the present case. U she had come in the witness-box, it seemed that she\n\ncould not have suppoi; ed the prosecution case, so the unconvincing excuse was put forward that she disappeared on the day fixed for her evidence, even though she was staying at the same place as her daughter and was lookin1 after her during the trial of the case. It is also significant that according to the child her mother had told the police that she had not forbidden the child to disclose the names of the culprits. [816 A-F;\n\n817 A-D; 818 A-C]\n\nEven the corroborative evidence adduced, was 'of very doubtful character.. No reasonable explanation was given by the prosecution of how blood came on the quilt and chadar n:covered from the house of R.\n\nDuring the season in which and at the place where the murder took place quilt would not be in use. The child did not state that any of the persons was carrying the quilt or chadar or was trying to conceal his features by wrapping in them. The explanation for these blood stains by R had not been accepted and was not very satisfactory; but the failure of an accused to give an adequate explanation does not lead to an inference that these blood stains must be those of the blood of the deceased.\n\n[818 D--HI\n\nSimilarly the recovery of the eartops and its container was highly suspicious. It WJIS not established that the room from which it was recovered waa of D. All the formalities for conducting the search were not complied, as a witness stated that the police inspector was already in the courtyard Qf the house, when the witness arrived. Further the prosecution made out that D W.. foolish enough to keep in his room an article connected with the murder about which there could be no difficulty <if identification, because the container had on it the name of the daughter-in-law of the deceased and it was kept in a manner to attract the. attention straightaway. [819 C-H]\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 1965 an<l 78 of 1968.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 23, 1964, February 9, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 545 of 1962.\n\nD. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and N. M. Ghatatate, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 141 of 1965) and respondent (in Cr. A.\n\nNo. 142 of 1965).\n\nR. C. Prasad, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 142 of 1965) .\n\n. R. C. Prasad, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 78 of 1968).\n\nU. P. Singh, for the respondent (in Cr. A. No. 141 of 1965).\n\n'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. These three appeals all arise out of a trial held by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patna in respect of a charge of murder of an old lady Rohini Kuer, wife of Munshi Chaudhary, residing in village Lohra, Police Station Biikhtiarpur, District Patna. The prosecution case was .that, on the night bet, ween 17th and 18th JUJ).e, 1961, Rohini Kuer, who was aged\n\n; ibout 60 years, wlis sleeping on a cot in the courtyard of her house and, nearby, on a smaller cot was sleeping her niece,\n\n812 SQNDIB COURT llBPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nManti, who was *mt 11 years of age.\n\nMunshi Chaudhary himself, his sons al daughter-in-law were at Ranchi where one of his sons had been posted as a Block Development Officer.\n\nDuring the night, Rohi.aj Kuer had closed all the doors and had put a lock from inside on the connecting door between the female apartment and tlie male apartment of the house.\n\nSome time during the night, three miscreants entered the female apartment by cutting a hole in the wall on the western side of the connecting door and began to ransack different rooms of the house. Rohini Kuer woke up on hearing the sounds, while the miscreants were breaking open the boxes and removing the articles.\n\nShe got up from her bed, accosted the thieves and also called out to Manti. Two of those persons rushed at her, threw her down on the verandah and inflicted several injuries on her body.\n\nOne of them brought out a sword which was kept in the southern room adjacent to the verandah and cut her neck in the light of the electric torch which had been lighted by the third person.\n\nThereafter, they took away cash, clothes and ornaments having broken open several boxes. They also took away an iron safe.\n\nManti pretended to be asleep and did not cry out due to fear.\n\nAt oiie stage, one of the thieves suggested that she should also be killed, but another one intervened and suggested that it was unnecessary to commit her murder.\n\nManti continued lying on her cot till dawn when she came out of the house through the hole which had been cut by the thieves and started weeping.\n\nWhile she was in the Baithak of Munshi Chaudhary, one Bhagwat Prasad, who was passing by, enquired what the matter was.\n\nShe told him that Daiya had been cut. 'Daiya' was the term by which she used to address Rohini Kuer who was her father's sister. Bhagwat Prasad then entered the female apartment through the same hole and found the dead body of Rohini Kuer lying in the verandah.\n\nAs he came out after seeing the dead bodv, Ramkishun Chaukidar also arrived.\n\nBoth of them then went to Harnaut Police outpost four miles away where Bhagwat Prasad lodged a First Information Report which was recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Jagdish Singh at about 8 a.m., the date being 18th June, 1961. He sent a copy of the Report to Bakhtiarpur Police Station for institution of a case and himself proceeded to the scene of occurrence at 10.30 a.m. It is said that, in the meantime, Manti's mother had arrived and she toJd Manti not to disclose the names of the offenders lest she should also be killed.\n\nJagdish Singh, A.S.I., inspected the place of occurrence, noticed the hole that had been cut in the wall and actually went in>ide through the same ogening.\n\nHe found the dead b<J4y lvinz in the verandah and also notice some footprints on the floor near the dead body.\n\nA blood-stained sword kept in a sheath was also found by him in a room adjacent to the verandah where he also found another foot print in blood stains. He\n\nBlHAR STATE v. KAPIL SINGH (Bhargava, I.) 813\n\nprepared the inquest repmt. an~ sent the .dead. y of Rohini Kuer for post-mortem exammatton. The mvest1gat10n was then taken over by Inspector of Police, Lakshmi Narain Pathak, who took statements of various witnesses. According to him, though he was able to record a detailed statement of Manti covering about two pages. Manti refused to disclose the names of the culprits and started weeping when she was asked to give out the names.\n\nHe sent a requisition to Patna for a police dog and a photographer. Three days later, on 21st June. the police dog and the photographer arrived in village Lohra, and the Investigating Officer, Pathak, on reaching the spot let loose the dog. The dog went to the house of Ramujagar appellant and entered a room from which one Dasuti Chadar and one quilt stained with blood were seized by the Investigating Officer Pathak.\n\nThereafter, the dog went to the house of Kapil Singh who, in the meantime, had left his aouse on seeing the police arriving. He was, however, arrested by the Dafadar. Subsequently. the dog led the police to the house of Deo Singh and his brother Singheshwar where, on a search having been made, a pair of gold eartops were recovered from a niche situated in a room facing east.\n\nThe eartops were kept in a cardboard case which bore the inscription \"Malti Singh, Women's College Ranchi, P.N.U.N.C.H.2\".\n\nIn the inner cover of the case \"M. Singh\" had been written in English and the names of the dealers were also printed on it.\n\nThe gold eartops and its covering box were seized by the investi- E gating officer.\n\nOn 22nd June, 1961, Jagdish Singh, A.S.I., Harnaut Police outpost, on searching a well situated about three quarters of a mile away from village Lohra, recovered a Godrej Iron Safe which was taken out and -was found to contain articles including Insurance Policies in the name of Nandkishore Singh son of Munshi Chaudhary.\n\nThe girl Manti was taken to the Police Station by the In- \\'estigating Officer on the 19th June, 1961, apparently because she had failed to disclose the names of the thieves whom she had seen inside the house and who had committed the murder of Rohini Kuer in her presence. Manti was kept at the Police Station and was repeatedly questioned.\n\nAccording to the In- Yestigating Officer, Lakshmi Narain Pathak. she was allowed to\n\nYiit her sister's place in between, but she was always provided with a police escort. . At about midnight on the night between 21st and 22nd June, 1961, she is alleged to have disclosed the names of the three culprits.\n\nThe names that she gave were those of Kapi! Singh alias Kapildeo Singh, Ramujagar Sinh and Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh.\n\nShe then amplified tlie statement by stating that it was Kapil Singh who had actunlly cut\n\nte neck of R, ohini Kuer and that Ramujagar Singh and Kapil Smgh were the two persons who had attacked her. Deo Singh,\n\n814 SUPlU!MB C:OUl.T llBPOr.TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\naccording to her, was the .person who was llashing the torch to give light to his two companions.\n\nShe added that Deo Singh had said that she also should be killed, whereupon Kapil Singh said that she was a child and they should leave her.\n\nSubsequently, on 28th June, 1961, Manti and her mother were both produced before a Magistrate who recorded their statements under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. Mllnti was allowed to go home after this statement of hers had been recorded by the Magistrate.\n\nSamples of the footprints of the three suspects were compared with the footprints in blood found at the scene of occurrence by the police Expert on Footprints and evidence was sought to be given by him to prove that one of the footprints tallied with the footprint of Deo Singh.\n\nThe Additional Sessions Judge accepted as true the evidence of Manti. He further held that there was corroboration of her evidence at least against two of the persons Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh. His finding was that the quilt and the chadar, which were pr1?ved stained with human blood, having been 'recovered from the house of Ramujagar Singh, provided very good corroboration of the case against him of participation in this murder. Similarly, the Additional Sessions Judge held that the recovery of the eartops with the cardboard box containing on it the name of the daughter-in-law of Rohini Kuer as well as the circumstance that the blood-stained footprint found on the spot tallied with that of Deo Singh appellant furnished very good corroboration of the case against Deo Singh. These circumstances indicated that Manti had given truthful evidence and, consequently, he convicted all the three persons for the offence under s. 302, I.P.C., read with s. 34, I.P.C. All the three persons were sentenced to imprisonment for life for this offence. Kapildeo was, in addition, found guilty of the substantive offence under s. 302, I.P.C. for committing the murder of Rohini Kuer and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life for that offence.\n\nDeo Singh was further found . guilty of an offence punishable under s. 411, I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Singheshwar, the brother of Deo Singh. who was also tried with the other three persons, was acquitted of all the charges.\n\nThe three conv1cu:o persons, Kapil Singh, Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh appealed to the High Court at Patna. The appeal came up before a Division Bench.\n\nBoth the learned Judges constituting the Bench held that it was not safe to base any conviction on the solitary testimony of Manti and, consequently, they gave Kapil Singh the benefit of doubt, set aside his conviction and sentences, and acquitted him.\n\nOn tlie learned Judges\n\nwas of the opinion that the conviction of the other two persons Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh should be upheld on the basis of the evidence of Manti as corroborated by recoveries, in the case of Ramujagar Singh, of the blood-stained chadar and quilt, ·\n\nand, in the case of Deo Singh, of the eartops and the cardboard box. Reliance was also placed •OD the circwnstance that the footprint of Deo Singh in blood was found close to the scene of occurrence. The other learned Judge was, however, of the opinion that, in the circwnstanees of this case, it was not safe to rely on the evidence of Man, ti at all' against any of the pecsons charged with the offence and, consequently, he expressed the opinion that Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh should also be given the benefit of doubt anti acquitted. Thereupon, the appeal of these two appellants was referred to a third Judge who agreed with the former and held that the conviction and sentences of these two persons must be' upheld.\n\nAs a res)llt, the appeal of Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh was dismissed.\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 141 of 1965 has been brought by special leave by the\n\nState of Bihar against the acquittal of Kapil Singh, while Criminal Appeal No. 142/1965, also by special leave, has been brought up by Ramujagar Singh against the judgment of the High Court upholding his conviction.\n\nIn adqition, Deo Singh has also come up to thi• Court by special leave. Special leave to him was granted at the time of hearing of the two Criminal Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 1965. All the three appeals are, therefore, being dealt with together in this one judgment.\n\nThe facts enumerated above . make it clear that the crucial question that has to be determined in this case is whether the evidence of Manti can be relied upon for the purpose of convicting Kapil Singh, or upholding the conviction of Ramujagar\n\nSingh and Deo Singh.\n\nShe is the only witness who, according to the prosecution, actually witnessed the murder and saw the assailants. It is, of course, clear that the fact that Rohini Kuer was murdered on the night between the 17th and 18th June, 1961 in her house by some thieves, who entered the house by breaking open a hole in a wall, is amply proved by the prosecution evidence. The point that needs to be examined is whether these three persons Were amongst the thieves who committed the crime.\n\nManti is a young. girl whi:ise age was recorded as 12 years at the time when she was examined in the Court of Session in July, 1962, so that, at the time of the incident, she was only 11 years of age.\n\nWhile such a child witness can often be expected to give out a true veion because of her innocence, there is always the danger in accepting the evidence of such a witness that, under influence, she. might have been coached to give out a version by persons who may have influence on her. In this case; there are a number of circumstances which, in our.\n\n81.6 SVPRBMB COUllT RBPOJ.lTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nopinion, indicate that it will not be quite safe to rely on her evidence. She stated that she.was lying on a cot close to the cot on which her aunt Rohini Kuer was sleeping; She actually saw her aunt J:>eing killed and, according to her, there was a threat to her life also when Deo Singh said that she should also be k.illed, though she esc!!ped .when Kapil Singh asked that\n\nsh~ should be spared because she was a 1:hild. It does not seem to be very likely that a child in such circumstances could have continued to pretend that she was asleep. In the morning, according 0to her, when she came out, she met Bhagwat Prasad before meeting her mother and she told Bhagwat Prasad that 'Daiya' had been killed. It -is surprising that she did not at that stage disclose the names of any o( these persons to Bhagwat Prasad. In fact, the conduct of Bhagwat Prasad is not trying to find out the names of the persons who had committed the murder from Manti when she told him about it appears to be quite unnatural.\n\nIt cannot be expected that, on hearing of the murder, he would quietly enter the house to discover the dead body without at all asking Manti whether she had seen the culprits and who they were. She even met others like the Chaukidar Ramkishun, and witnesses Shyam Ram and Gursahay before she met her mother. In her evidence, she tried to explain her failure to disclose the names by stating that her mother had warned her not to disclose the names lest she should also be killed by the persons named by her. This explanation sought to be advanced on behalf of the.prosecution will not at all explain why there was no disclosure of names by Manti to the. persons mentioned above whom she met before this warning was given to her by her mother. At no stage has any suggestion been put forward by the prosecution that the thieves themselves had put her in fear of life by threatening to kill her if she disclosed their names.\n\nShe could not, therefore, be under any fear at the time when she met Bhagwat Prasad, the Chaukidar and others and there was no explanation at all why their names were not ascertained from her or voluntarily disclosed by her at that stage.\n\nThe subsequent story put forward by the prosecution to explain the belated disclosure of the names is highly suspicious G and, in fact, indicates that, in this case, the investigation by the Police has not been honest.\n\nThe Investigating Officer, Lakshmi Narain Pathak, himself states that he arranged that the girl be taken to the Police Station on 19th June, 1961 and she was then kept confined there up to the 28th .Tune, 1961, until her statement was recorded by a Magistrate under s. 164, Cr.\n\nP.C.\n\nWe fail to understand under what law the police was authorised to keep this girl confined in the police station for so many days.\n\nPathak, of course, tried to convert this confine-\n\n- D\n\nB!HAR STATE V, KAPIL SINGH (Bhargava, /.} 817\n\nmeilt into protective custody, adding that she was allowed togo to her sister's house in between; but Manti herself. contradicts Pathak. According fo her, she was not allowed to leave the Police Station at all until the 28th June. Her statement is. that she was kept in a room in the Police Station along with a constable and the room was only opened when it was necessary for her to go out to ease herself. In the day-time, she was. allowed to come up to the door of the room, but was not allowed to move away from the door. Each night she was shut inside the room and was kept shut like that for five or six nights.\n\nIt is true that her mother was allowed to visit her, but this illegal confinement by_ the Police was reprehensive and very adversely affects the value of the evidence obtained by the police under these circumstances. In .this connection, it is significant to note that,' even according to Pathak, the names were disclosed to him for the first time by Manti at midnight on the night between 21st and 22nd June, 1961. The very fact. that she was questioned at the odd hour of 1J1idnight makes it obvious that compulsion was being used on her to make her state the names of these persons. If it was true, as alleged by Pathak, that she was being Kept there for her personal protection only, there was no reason at all why she should have been questioned during the night when a child of her age should certainly have been allowed to take undisturbed rest. Pathak has tried to justify the course adopted by him by saying that he thought it to be proper to keep a girl of tender age in police station even for weeks for taking a statement, because he wanted to know the truth.\n\nIt is surprising that a police officer should hold such views. Clearly. he was acting against law in keeping that girl confined. in the police station with a police constable posted all the time as her companion. The excuse that she needed protection is belied by the circumstance that at least for one day from 18th June to 19th June she was allowed to remain out of police custody and there is no suggestion that any protection was afforded to her during that time. It was only on 19th June that she was taken to the Police. Station obviously because she had refused to give the names as desired by the Police.\n\nThe Inspector of Police, Pathak, purported to give evidence as if, in Bihar, it is nothing extra-ordinary to keep such a witness in police custody. We hope that there is no such practice in that State. Manti, whose statement implicating these three persons was obtained in these cirsumstances, cannot, therefore, be held to be a reliable witness, particularly in view of the circumstance that she did not disdose their names even at the earlier stage when she had not been put in fear of her life by her mother.\n\nIn this connection, importance must attach to the circumtance tha.t her mother, wh~ is said to have put the fear of life m her, did not enter the witness-box at all when the case was\n\n\"I .\n\n818 SUP!lBMB COUll.T UPOllTS\n\n\ntried in the Court of Session. She was, no doubt, examined by the Police and her statement wllS abo obtained under s. 164, Cr.P.C., by producing her before the Magistrate. She was pre-\n\nnt in the Court of Session .when Manti was being examined, _\n\nbut, when her turn for examination came, she disappeared, The Public Prosecutor naturally came out with the explanation that she had been got. at by the accllfCd.\n\nWe are unable to accept this explanation for her non-appearance. It seems that, if she had come in the witness-box, she would not have supported the prosecution and, . consequently, the excuse was put forward that she disappeared on the day fixed for her evidence, even though she was staying at the same place as her daughter Manti and was looking after her during the trial of the case. In this connection, it is significant that, according to Manti herself, her mother had told the Inspector of Police that she had not forbidden her to disclose the names of the culprits. This seems to be another example of the unsatisfactory or unreliable conduct of the investigation in the present case.\n\nApart from these circuptstances, which throw considerable doubt on the evidence of Manti, even the corroborative evidence sought to be adduced jly the prosecution appears to us to be of a very doubtful character. As against Ramujagar Singh, the corroborative evidence put forward is that a quilt and a Dasuti chadar stained with human blood were recovered from his house; bu~ no reasonable explanation is sought to be given by the prosecution of how the blood came to be on these two articles, if it was the blood of the deceased Rohini Kuer. It is to be noted that the murder took place in June, 1961 and at least a quilt will not be in use at ail during that season in the plains of Bihar.\n\nA suggestion seems to have been put forward that Ramujagar Singh had taken both these articles to wrap himself in them in order to conceal his identity.\n\nThis suggestion is, however, clearly nullified by the evidence of Manti who does not state that any one of the persons, whom she saw in the house at the time of m11rder, was carrying a quilt or a chadar or was trying to conceal his features by wrapping himself in them. Even the alternative explanation that they may have become bloodstained when Ramujagar Singh came home with Rohini Kuer's blood on his body is, on the face of it, highly improbable. Manti herself says that au the culprits washaj their hands in the house where the murder was committed before leaving that house. The quilt and the Dasuti chadar had sprinkling of blood and not mere blood-smudges.\n\nObviously, such sprinkling of blood could not appear on the quilt and the Dasuti <:hadar by their coming merely in contact with Ramujagar Singh after his return to his house, even if some blood-stains remained en his body when he came home. It is true that the explanation for t.':lese blood stains put forward on behalf of Ramnjagar\n\nSingh that they were from some skin sor~ of one of the chil dren of his family has l}Ot been accepted and is not very satis factory; but the failure of an accused to give an adequate explanation does not lead to an inference that these blood stains must be those of the bloOd of the deceased. The circumstances seem to indicate that there is no connection at all between these blood stains and the murder of Rohini Kuer.\n\nSimilarly, the recovery of the gold eartops and the cardboard box, which contained them, is highly suspicious. For one thing, the prosecution have failed to establish that the room, from which they were recovered, was that of Deo Singh appellant.\n\nDeo Singh, even according to the prosecution witnesses, was employed outside this ;@age and had only come on a visit from his duty. The room, from which y w::ro recovered, is des cribed as a room for keeping cow-dung cakes. The Investigating Officer naturally could not know who in the family of Deo Singh was in actual occupation of this room, while the only recovery witness, Narsingh Mahto, had to admit that he did not ; ee Deo Singh eating or sleeping in that room, or keeping things in that room, or taking them out of that room. In fact, when further cross-examined, he admitted that he never saw how that room was used. Obviously, he was not in a position to estab Jish that this room ws in the occupation of Dea Singh appellant.\n\nThe circumstances of the recovery are also doubtful. According to Inspector of Police, Pathak, he observed all the formalities required to be observed when searching the house of Deo Singh.\n\nOne of the formalities that has to be observed is that the searching officer should give his personal search to the witnesses before entering the premises to be. searched and should similarly search the witnesses also in the presence of one another. If the Inspec tor means that this was done by stating that all formalities were observed, he is contradicted by Narsingh Mahto who says that, on his arrival, he found the Inspector in the inner courtyard of the house, which means that he had already entered the house without observing the formalit.ies.\n\nAt the time of-recovery, it is said that the cardboard box containing the eartops was kept in a corner of the room covered by 'a nµmber of tiles.\n\nThe\n\npro~.eution sto7 !hus pUf)XlrtS to make out that Deo Sinh was foo11s11 enough 1V At:Cj) in his roon1 an :irttcle connected with he murder about which there could be no difficultv of identification. because the cardboard box hrut on it the name of the daughter; in-law of Rohini Kuer and he kept that box in such a manner under the tiles in the cow-dung room that the attention of the Pofac wouid straightaway be attracted toy;; mls it. The whole story of recovery of this cardboard box with the eartop• thus sounds highly improbable.\n\nS20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nThe only other circumstance, which has been l\"eiied upon A by the prosecution, is>the identity of the blood-stained footprint with that of the sample footprint of Deo Singh appellant. We\n\ndo not think that it is necessary to discuss it in detail, because that evidence is, in its very nature, a very weak type of evi- .dence and, in fact, in the High Court even the third Judge, to whom the case was referred on difference of opinion, held that B it would not be safe to rely on this evidence at1P discarded it.\n\nIn these circumstances, .it is clear that it is not at all pos- :sible to. hold that the prosecution succeeds in proving the charge .against any of these three persons. As a result, Cr. Appeal No.\n\n141/ 1965 filed by the State is dismissed, while the appeals of C Ramujagar Singh and De<> Singh are allowed, their conviction and sentences are set .aside and they are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged.\n\nThey shall be released forthwith.\n\nY.P.\n\nAppeal 141/65 dismissed.\n\nAppeals 142/65 and 78/68 allowed.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF BIHAR, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAPIL SINGH, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAPIL SINGH, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1492, "end_char": 1498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1610, "end_char": 1624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1625, "end_char": 1630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5513, "end_char": 5529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 23, 1964, February 9, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5567, "end_char": 5578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and N. M. Ghatatate, for the appellant (in Cr.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and N. M. Ghatatate, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5598, "end_char": 5613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and N. M. Ghatatate, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh, for the respondent (in Cr.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. These three appeals all arise out of a trial held by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patna in respect of a charge of murder of an old lady Rohini Kuer, wife of Munshi Chaudhary, residing in village Lohra, Police Station Biikhtiarpur, District Patna."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. These three appeals all arise out of a trial held by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patna in respect of a charge of murder of an old lady Rohini Kuer, wife of Munshi Chaudhary, residing in village Lohra, Police Station Biikhtiarpur, District Patna."}}, {"text": "Rohini Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6093, "end_char": 6104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhargava, J. These three appeals all arise out of a trial held by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patna in respect of a charge of murder of an old lady Rohini Kuer, wife of Munshi Chaudhary, residing in village Lohra, Police Station Biikhtiarpur, District Patna.", "canonical_name": "Rohi.aj Kuer"}}, {"text": "Manti", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was .that, on the night bet, ween 17th and 18th JUJ).e, 1961, Rohini Kuer, who was aged\n\n; ibout 60 years, wlis sleeping on a cot in the courtyard of her house and, nearby, on a smaller cot was sleeping her niece,\n\n812 SQNDIB COURT llBPORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nManti, who was *mt 11 years of age."}}, {"text": "Munshi Chaudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munshi Chaudhary himself, his sons al daughter-in-law were at Ranchi where one of his sons had been posted as a Block Development Officer."}}, {"text": "Ranchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munshi Chaudhary himself, his sons al daughter-in-law were at Ranchi where one of his sons had been posted as a Block Development Officer."}}, {"text": "Rohi.aj Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6679, "end_char": 6691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the night, Rohi.aj Kuer had closed all the doors and had put a lock from inside on the connecting door between the female apartment and tlie male apartment of the house.", "canonical_name": "Rohi.aj Kuer"}}, {"text": "Manti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7227, "end_char": 7232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She got up from her bed, accosted the thieves and also called out to Manti.", "canonical_name": "Manti"}}, {"text": "Bhagwat Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8088, "end_char": 8102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While she was in the Baithak of Munshi Chaudhary, one Bhagwat Prasad, who was passing by, enquired what the matter was."}}, {"text": "Ramkishun Chaukidar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8461, "end_char": 8480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As he came out after seeing the dead bodv, Ramkishun Chaukidar also arrived."}}, {"text": "Harnaut Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them then went to Harnaut Police outpost four miles away where Bhagwat Prasad lodged a First Information Report which was recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Jagdish Singh at about 8 a.m., the date being 18th June, 1961."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them then went to Harnaut Police outpost four miles away where Bhagwat Prasad lodged a First Information Report which was recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Jagdish Singh at about 8 a.m., the date being 18th June, 1961."}}, {"text": "Bakhtiarpur Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sent a copy of the Report to Bakhtiarpur Police Station for institution of a case and himself proceeded to the scene of occurrence at 10.30 a.m. It is said that, in the meantime, Manti's mother had arrived and she toJd Manti not to disclose the names of the offenders lest she should also be killed."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain Pathak", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9655, "end_char": 9676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mvest1gat10n was then taken over by Inspector of Police, Lakshmi Narain Pathak, who took statements of various witnesses."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sent a requisition to Patna for a police dog and a photographer."}}, {"text": "Lohra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10093, "end_char": 10098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the police dog and the photographer arrived in village Lohra, and the Investigating Officer, Pathak, on reaching the spot let loose the dog."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the police dog and the photographer arrived in village Lohra, and the Investigating Officer, Pathak, on reaching the spot let loose the dog."}}, {"text": "Ramujagar appellant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10208, "end_char": 10227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dog went to the house of Ramujagar appellant and entered a room from which one Dasuti Chadar and one quilt stained with blood were seized by the Investigating Officer Pathak."}}, {"text": "Dasuti Chadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10262, "end_char": 10275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dog went to the house of Ramujagar appellant and entered a room from which one Dasuti Chadar and one quilt stained with blood were seized by the Investigating Officer Pathak."}}, {"text": "Kapil Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the dog went to the house of Kapil Singh who, in the meantime, had left his aouse on seeing the police arriving.", "canonical_name": "KAPIL SINGH, ETC"}}, {"text": "Deo Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dog led the police to the house of Deo Singh and his brother Singheshwar where, on a search having been made, a pair of gold eartops were recovered from a niche situated in a room facing east.", "canonical_name": "De<> Singh"}}, {"text": "Singheshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10605, "end_char": 10616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dog led the police to the house of Deo Singh and his brother Singheshwar where, on a search having been made, a pair of gold eartops were recovered from a niche situated in a room facing east."}}, {"text": "Malti Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10808, "end_char": 10819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eartops were kept in a cardboard case which bore the inscription \"Malti Singh, Women's College Ranchi, P.N.U.N.C.H.2\"."}}, {"text": "Women's College Ranchi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10821, "end_char": 10843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eartops were kept in a cardboard case which bore the inscription \"Malti Singh, Women's College Ranchi, P.N.U.N.C.H.2\"."}}, {"text": "P.N.U.N.C.H.2", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eartops were kept in a cardboard case which bore the inscription \"Malti Singh, Women's College Ranchi, P.N.U.N.C.H.2\"."}}, {"text": "M. Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10894, "end_char": 10902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the inner cover of the case \"M. Singh\" had been written in English and the names of the dealers were also printed on it."}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11075, "end_char": 11090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd June, 1961, Jagdish Singh, A.S.I., Harnaut Police outpost, on searching a well situated about three quarters of a mile away from village Lohra, recovered a Godrej Iron Safe which was taken out and -was found to contain articles including Insurance Policies in the name of Nandkishore Singh son of Munshi Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "Nandkishore Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11352, "end_char": 11369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd June, 1961, Jagdish Singh, A.S.I., Harnaut Police outpost, on searching a well situated about three quarters of a mile away from village Lohra, recovered a Godrej Iron Safe which was taken out and -was found to contain articles including Insurance Policies in the name of Nandkishore Singh son of Munshi Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "19th June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11482, "end_char": 11497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The girl Manti was taken to the Police Station by the In- \\'estigating Officer on the 19th June, 1961, apparently because she had failed to disclose the names of the thieves whom she had seen inside the house and who had committed the murder of Rohini Kuer in her presence."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11781, "end_char": 11802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the In- Yestigating Officer, Lakshmi Narain Pathak."}}, {"text": "21st and 22nd June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11951, "end_char": 11975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about midnight on the night between 21st and 22nd June, 1961, she is alleged to have disclosed the names of the three culprits."}}, {"text": "Kapi! Singh alias Kapildeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12082, "end_char": 12114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names that she gave were those of Kapi!"}}, {"text": "Ramujagar Sinh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12116, "end_char": 12130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh alias Kapildeo Singh, Ramujagar Sinh and Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh.", "canonical_name": "C Ramujagar Singh"}}, {"text": "Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12135, "end_char": 12165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh alias Kapildeo Singh, Ramujagar Sinh and Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh."}}, {"text": "Ramujagar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12293, "end_char": 12308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She then amplified tlie statement by stating that it was Kapil Singh who had actunlly cut\n\nte neck of R, ohini Kuer and that Ramujagar Singh and Kapil Smgh were the two persons who had attacked her.", "canonical_name": "C Ramujagar Singh"}}, {"text": "Kapil Smgh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She then amplified tlie statement by stating that it was Kapil Singh who had actunlly cut\n\nte neck of R, ohini Kuer and that Ramujagar Singh and Kapil Smgh were the two persons who had attacked her.", "canonical_name": "KAPIL SINGH, ETC"}}, {"text": "28th June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12686, "end_char": 12701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on 28th June, 1961, Manti and her mother were both produced before a Magistrate who recorded their statements under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12799, "end_char": 12810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12812, "end_char": 12835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mllnti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12837, "end_char": 12843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mllnti was allowed to go home after this statement of hers had been recorded by the Magistrate."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14148, "end_char": 14154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14156, "end_char": 14161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14174, "end_char": 14179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14181, "end_char": 14186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kapildeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14268, "end_char": 14276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapildeo was, in addition, found guilty of the substantive offence under s. 302, I.P.C. for committing the murder of Rohini Kuer and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life for that offence."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14341, "end_char": 14347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14349, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14530, "end_char": 14536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14538, "end_char": 14543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14871, "end_char": 14890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The three conv1cu:o persons, Kapil Singh, Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh appealed to the High Court at Patna."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16344, "end_char": 16358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141 of 1965 has been brought by special leave by the\n\nState of Bihar against the acquittal of Kapil Singh, while Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Manti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16965, "end_char": 16970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "make it clear that the crucial question that has to be determined in this case is whether the evidence of Manti can be relied upon for the purpose of convicting Kapil Singh, or upholding the conviction of Ramujagar\n\nSingh and Deo Singh.", "canonical_name": "Manti"}}, {"text": "Ramujagar\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17064, "end_char": 17080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "make it clear that the crucial question that has to be determined in this case is whether the evidence of Manti can be relied upon for the purpose of convicting Kapil Singh, or upholding the conviction of Ramujagar\n\nSingh and Deo Singh.", "canonical_name": "C Ramujagar Singh"}}, {"text": "17th and 18th June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17303, "end_char": 17327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, of course, clear that the fact that Rohini Kuer was murdered on the night between the 17th and 18th June, 1961 in her house by some thieves, who entered the house by breaking open a hole in a wall, is amply proved by the prosecution evidence."}}, {"text": "SVPRBMB COUllT RBPOJ.lTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18138, "end_char": 18179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81.6 SVPRBMB COUllT RBPOJ.lTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nopinion, indicate that it will not be quite safe to rely on her evidence."}}, {"text": "Daiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18865, "end_char": 18870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the morning, according 0to her, when she came out, she met Bhagwat Prasad before meeting her mother and she told Bhagwat Prasad that 'Daiya' had been killed."}}, {"text": "Chaukidar Ramkishun", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19412, "end_char": 19431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She even met others like the Chaukidar Ramkishun, and witnesses Shyam Ram and Gursahay before she met her mother."}}, {"text": "Shyam Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19447, "end_char": 19456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She even met others like the Chaukidar Ramkishun, and witnesses Shyam Ram and Gursahay before she met her mother."}}, {"text": "Gursahay", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19461, "end_char": 19469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She even met others like the Chaukidar Ramkishun, and witnesses Shyam Ram and Gursahay before she met her mother."}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20839, "end_char": 20845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23423, "end_char": 23429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector of Police, Pathak, purported to give evidence as if, in Bihar, it is nothing extra-ordinary to keep such a witness in police custody."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23468, "end_char": 23473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector of Police, Pathak, purported to give evidence as if, in Bihar, it is nothing extra-ordinary to keep such a witness in police custody."}}, {"text": "s. 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24247, "end_char": 24253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24255, "end_char": 24261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ramnjagar\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27077, "end_char": 27093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the explanation for t.':lese blood stains put forward on behalf of Ramnjagar\n\nSingh that they were from some skin sor~ of one of the chil dren of his family has l}Ot been accepted and is not very satis factory; but the failure of an accused to give an adequate explanation does not lead to an inference that these blood stains must be those of the bloOd of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "C Ramujagar Singh"}}, {"text": "Deo Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27758, "end_char": 27767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deo Singh, even according to the prosecution witnesses, was employed outside this ;@age and had only come on a visit from his duty.", "canonical_name": "De<> Singh"}}, {"text": "Narsingh Mahto", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28136, "end_char": 28150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Investigating Officer naturally could not know who in the family of Deo Singh was in actual occupation of this room, while the only recovery witness, Narsingh Mahto, had to admit that he did not ; ee Deo Singh eating or sleeping in that room, or keeping things in that room, or taking them out of that room."}}, {"text": "Dea Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28475, "end_char": 28484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Obviously, he was not in a position to estab Jish that this room ws in the occupation of Dea Singh appellant.", "canonical_name": "De<> Singh"}}, {"text": "Narsingh Mahto", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29050, "end_char": 29064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Inspec tor means that this was done by stating that all formalities were observed, he is contradicted by Narsingh Mahto who says that, on his arrival, he found the Inspector in the inner courtyard of the house, which means that he had already entered the house without observing the formalit.ies."}}, {"text": "Deo Sinh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29444, "end_char": 29452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hus pUf)XlrtS to make out that Deo Sinh was foo11s11 enough 1V At:Cj) in his roon1 an :irttcle connected with he murder about which there could be no difficultv of identification.", "canonical_name": "De<> Singh"}}, {"text": "S20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29930, "end_char": 29933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C Ramujagar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30734, "end_char": 30751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141/ 1965 filed by the State is dismissed, while the appeals of C Ramujagar Singh and De<> Singh are allowed, their conviction and sentences are set .aside and they are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged.", "canonical_name": "C Ramujagar Singh"}}, {"text": "De<> Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30756, "end_char": 30766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141/ 1965 filed by the State is dismissed, while the appeals of C Ramujagar Singh and De<> Singh are allowed, their conviction and sentences are set .aside and they are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged.", "canonical_name": "De<> Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_821_828_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "K. M. KANAVI\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE\n\nApril 18, 1968\n\n(S. M, Snau, J. M, Smil.AT AND V. BBARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nBombay Municipal Boroughs A.ct, (18 of 1925)-Section 23A.(2),\n\n(3) and s. 200(1)-Prosecution and conviction of miring President for disobeying orders of State Government to hand ovr charge--Procedure prescribed by s. 200( 1) mandatory.\n\nSection 23A(3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, makes it an offence if a retiring President to whom a direction has been issued by the Staie Goern'!'ent to hand over charge of his office does not com• ply \";!th such direct!on and under s. 200(1) the authorities who \"may direct any . prosecution for punishment of any person offending against the provisions of the Act are !he Standing Cominittee and the Chief Officer.\n\nThe appellant who was removed from the office of Presidentship re- 1fused to obey the order of the State Government directing him to hand over charge to the newly elected President.\n\nHe was prosecuted and Convicted for an offence under s . .23A(3 ), not on the direction of the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer as required by s. 200(1) but on a complaint filed at the instance of the State Government by the newly elected President. The High Court, dismissing revision application against the order of conviction, took the view that s. 200( 1) was only an enabling provision and it could not be held to be exhaustive of the authorities who could make directions for .initiation of such . proceedings. In appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The conviction must be set aside. The Scheme of the Act and the purpose of s. 200 ( 1) make it clear that if any proceeding for punishment of any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act is to be instituted, it must be instituted in the manner laid down in s. 200( 1) of the Act and in that manner only. The word \"may\" was intended to give a discretion to the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make directions for taking proceedings. only when they considered it appropriate that such a direction should be made and to avoid compelling the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make such directions in all cases. rl the interpretation of the High Court were to be accepted it would mean that this provision was totally unnecessary. because, there would. be no need to confer power on the Standing Com mittee or the Chief Officer to make such directions if such directions could be made or proceedings instituted at the instance of any private individual. 1826 C-D. Fl\n\nBallt.vdass A.garwala v. Shri 1. C, Chokravarty, [1960) 2 S.C.R. 739 Mangulal Chunilal v. Manilal Magan/al and Another, Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1965 decided on 23-11-1967, followed :\n\nThe State v. Monllal lethalal, (19S3) SS B.L.R. 377, referred to.\n\nSection 200(1), as it stands at present. is clearly applicable even to a proceeding for punishment i:Jf a retiring President under s. 23A( 3) even though it might look anomalous that the prosecution in such\n\ncircumstances bas to be ordered by the Chief Officer wbo was his subordi A nate at least during the time when he was working as the President. 1be\n\nremedy lies in suitable amendment of s. 200( I). (828 El\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 15, 1965 of the Mysore High Court in Cr. Revision B Petition 299 of 1964.\n\nH. R. Gokhale and R. B. Datar, for the appellant.\n\nR. Gopalakrishnan, and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargna, J. The appellant, K. M. Kanavi, was the President of the Municipal Borough of Gadag Betgeri froll) 11th January, 1960 to 15th March, 1963. He was removed from the President ship on i5th March, 1963 by an Order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity under section 21 (2) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (No. XVIH of 1925) (hereinafter xeferred to as \"the Act\") which was applicable to Gadag Betgeri, even though it was situated in the State of Mysore, because it was earlier a part of the State of Bombay.\n\nOn the next day, i.e., on 16th March, 1963, the Government passed an order superseding the Borough.\n\nThe appellant filed two writ petitions challenging these two orders of his removal and supersession of the Borough.\n\nThe order - of supersession was quashed by the High Court of Mysore by its judgment dated 10th April 1963 in Writ Petition No. 492/1963 reported in The President, Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough v. State of Mysore(').\n\nThereafter, elections were held for !he office of the President, because the appellant had ceased to be the President under the order of removal.\n\nOne Malashetti was elected as the President of the Borough on 22nd April, 1963. On 25th April, 1963, the new President asked the appellant to hand over all the papers, documents and property belonging to the Municipal Administration.\n\nOn 2nd May, 1963, the appellant sent three keys and two files of papers by registered parcel to the new President.\n\nThe new Pre.oident returned it on the ground that those articles had not been delivered to him in person by the appellant and he considered it unsafe to take delivery of the registered parcel. When sending this parcel, the appellant wrote an accompanying letter in which he specifically stated that he was retainin~ certain papers as they were needed by him for his writ petition which was pending against his order of removal.\n\nThereafter, on 20th June, 1963, the Slate Government made an order under sub-s. (2) oj s. 23A of the Act directing the appellant to hand over charge of all the paper•\n\n(1) [1964) !. M. L.J. 147.\n\nand properties which were in his possession to the new President.\n\nHe was also asked to hand over an iron cupboard with its keys and contents which were with him.\n\nThis Government Order was served on the appellant on 9th July, 1963. The appellant did not comply with the Order and, consequently, on 21st September, 1963, the Government of Mysore sent an order to the Divisional Ofmmissioner directing him to take necessary action under section 23A of the Act to prosecute the appellant, since he had dfied the Government Orders and had refused to hand over charge of the papers and properties of the Borough to the newly elected President.\n\nThe Divisional Commissioner, in turn, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner on 5th October, 1963, requesting him to take immediate action under s. 23A(3) of the Act tg prosecute the appellant.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner then passed an order authorising the nly elected President of the Borough to be the formal complainant in respect of this prosecution which had been ordered by the Government and to file a criminal complaint against the appellant.\n\nThis order was made by the Deputy Commissioner on 24th December, 1963.\n\nThe new President, Malashetti, thereupon filed a complaint against the appellant for an offence punishable under s. 23A(3) of the Act.\n\nThe complaint itself is dated as 3rd January, 1964, but the judgment of the High Court mentions that the complaint was actually presented in Court on 8th January, 1964.\n\nSince these dates are not very material for decision of the point on the basis of which this appeal is being decided, we have not tried to ascertain the exact date of presentation of the complaint in court.\n\nOn the basis of this complaint and the facts mentioned above, the appellant was convicted by a Magistrate for the offence under s. 23A ( 3) of the Act and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-, in default to suffer simpk imprisonment for seven days.\n\nThe appellant filed a revision against this order of conviction in the High Court of Mysore and challenged it on three grounds. One ground was that the com plaint filed by the new President Malashetti was incompetent as it was not filed in accordance with the procequre laid down in the Act, so that the proceedings taken by the Magistrate were without jurisdiction.\n\nThe second point was that, even if it be held that the complaint was validly filed the provisions of s. 23A of the Act were not attracted, as the appellant could not be held to b~ a retiring President and an order under s. 23A (2) can only be made against. a retiring President. The third plea was taken that the complamt was barred by, time.\n\nThe High Court did not accept any of these three pleas and dismissed the revision.\n\nThe appellant has, therefore, come up to this Court in appeal by special leave.\n\nIn this. cas.e, the facts, which have been enumerated above, WP, re not disputed even during the trial of the case, and the defence 8Sup Cl/68-tl\n\nof the appellant was confined to the three grounds mentioned above which were urged in the revision before the High Court.\n\nTo appreciate the first ground mentioned above, it is necessary to reproduce section 23A and sub-s. ( 1) of ection 200 of the Act which are as follows :-\n\n\"23A. (1) On the election of a new President or Vice-President, the retiring President or Vice-President in whose place the new President or Vice-President has been elected shall hand over charge of his office to such new President or Vice-President, as the case may be. ( 2) If the retiring President or Vice-President fails or refuses to hand over charge of his office as required under sub-section ( 1) the State Government or any authority empowered by the State Government in this behalf may, by order in writing, direct the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, to forthwith hand over charge of his office and all papers and property of the municipality, if any, in his possession as such President or Vice-President, to the new President or Vice- President.\n\n(3) If the retiring President or Vice-President to whom a direction has been issued under sub-section (2) does not comply with such direction, he shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine -which may extend to Rs. 500 or with both.\n\n200. (1) The standing committee and, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) the Chief Officer may direct any prosecntion for any public nuisance whatever and may order proceedings to be taken for the recovery of any penalties and for the punishment of any persons offending against the provisions of this Act or of any rule or by-law thereunder and may order the expenses of such prosecutions or other proceedings to be paid out of the municipal fund :\n\n Provided that no prosecution for an offence under this Act or by-laws framed thereunder shall be instituted except within six months next after the date of the commission of the offence or if such date is not known or the offence is a continuing one within six months next after the commission or discovery of such offence.\"\n\nSub-s, ( 1) of s. 23A casts the duty on the retiring President to hand over charge of his office to the new President, when a new President has been elected. It is obvious that, when handing over\n\nA charge, th~ retiring President must hand over to his successor. all the papers and property belong\\ng to the Borough. Sub-section\n\n(2) of s. 23A envisages a case where the retiring President fails or refuses to hand over charge of his olliee in that manner. This sub-section empowers the State Government or any authority emp<>Wered by the State Government in this behalf to make an B order in writing directing the retiring President to forthwith hand over charge of his office and all papers and pr11perty of the municipality to the new President. Sub-section (3) of s. 23A prescribes the punishment which can be awarded to a retiring President who is conyicted for not complying with a direction issued under sub-s. (2). It is clear that, in the present case, the appelc lant was not liable to conviction under s. 23A(3) merely because he refused to hand over complete charge to Malashetti when the latter asked him to do so by his letter dated 25th April, 1963 or even by the subsequent reminder dated 6th May, 1963.\n\nThe failure of the appellant to hand over the property, however, led the State Government to make a direction under s. 23A(2) on 20th June, 1963 and this Order of the Government was served D on the appellant on 9th July, 1963. This Order was not complied with by the appellant according to the case of the prosecution.\n\nIt was because of .the failure of the appellant to comply with this Order .that the complaint was filed by the new President under s. 23A(3). The complaint was, -therefore, clearly for initiating a proceeding for the punishment of the appellant who had offended against the provision under sub-s. (2) of s. 23A of the Act.\n\nUnder s. 200(1) of the Act, direction for taking such proceedings E\n\ncould be made either by the standing committee or by the Chief Officer: Admittedly, Malashetty was not the Chief Officer, nor\n\ndid he file the complaint under any direction made by the Standing Committee of the Borough. It is on this ground that the plea F has been put forward on behalf of the appel!ant that the complaint against him was incompetent and no conviction could be validlv recorded against him on its basis. ·\n\n. '!be High Court rejected th!s plea on the ground that, in its opmton, s. 200(1) of the Act 1s only an enabling section which giWI! the power to the Standing Committee and the Chief Officer G to . make directions for taking of proceedings of this nature and it cannot be held to be exhaustive of the authorities who could make directi~ for initiatiOn of such proceedings.\n\nThe High C®rt took notice of the fact that in the Act, there is no provision hf\\>idding cognizance f ; m. offence being taken ext on a com-\n\nJJ(l!llt made under a direct10n of the Standing Committee or the Chief Olllcer, and interpreted the expression \"may direct\" used in\n\n5. ~(.1) of the Ac! as indica!ing that it was an enabling section H\n\npebllltling the Standmg Committee and the Chief Officer to make liecmwy directions. In these circumstances, the High Court con-\n\nSUJ>RBMB COURT 11.BJ'ORTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\neluded that.this provision could not be held as laying down that the Standing Committee and theChief Officer were U.e exclusive authorities who could institute proceedjng.o of the nature mentioned in that sub-section. On this view, the High Court further proceeded to hold that a complaint could have been filed for an offence under the Act by even a private individual, so that the complaint fiJe4 by , Malashetty, who was interested in his capacitv as the newly elected President, was competent and valid.\n\nWe are unable to accept the interpretation put by the High Court on s. 200 ( 1) of the Act. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Act laying down that cognizanee of an ofience under the Act is not to be taken except on a complaint filed in accordance with a direction made under s. 200 ( 1), but the scheme of the Act and the purpose of this provision in s. 200 ( 1) makes it clear that the legislature intended that such proceedings should only be instituted in the manner laid down in that sub-section. The word \"may\" was used only because the legislature could not have enacted a mandatory provision requiring the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to mak.e a direction for institution of proceedings in all cases. This word was intended to give a discretion to the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make directions for taking proceedings only when they considered it appropriate that such a direction should be made and to avoid compelling the Standing Committee or the Chief Officer to make such directions in all cases. The use of this word \"may\" cannot be interpreted as laying down that, if a proceeding for punishment of any person for contravention .of any of the provisions of the Act is t() be instituted, it can be. instituted in any manner without complying with the requirements of s. 200(1) of the Act. If the interpretation put by the High Court on this provision is accepted, it would mean that this provision was totally l!nnecessary, because there would be no need to confer power on the standing committee or the Chief Officer to make such directions if such directions could be made or proceedings instituted at the instance of any private individual.\n\nWe cannot accept the submission that this provision was made in the Act simply by way of abundant caution.\n\nIn fact; if the provision had been made with such an object in view, there is no reason why the power should have been expressed to be conferred on the standing committee and the Chief Officer only and not on. the President of the Municipality. We, consequently, hold that, if any proceeding for punishment of any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act is to be instituted, it must be instituted in the manner laid down in s. 200( 1) of the Act and in that manner only.\n\nThis view of ours follows the principle laid down by this Court in Ballavillls Agarwala v. Shri 1. C. Chakravarty('). In that case,\n\n(I) (1%0) 2 S. C.R. 739.\n\nthe Court had to interpret a similar provision ins. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, under which it was laid down that the Commissioner may institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under that Act or under any rule or byela\\V made thereunder. The Court held that, though the word used was \"may'', this provision must be read as requiring that the institution or withdrawal from legal proceedings under that Act must be by the Commissioners and no other authority. The deeision was given on the basis that the scheme of the Act mape it clear that that section was intended to Confer exclusive power on the Commissioners. The interpretation that it was a mere enabling section because of the use of the word \"may\" was rejected and it was held that, if the other interpretation canvassed was accepted, the section would become clearly otiose. That principle clearly applies to the interpretation of s. 200( 1) of the Act with which we are concerned.\n\nIn Mangu/al Chunila/ v. Mani/al Magantal a11d Another('), a similar interpretation was put on section 481( 1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, which also used the word \"may\" when laying down that the Commissioner may take or withdraw from proceedings against any person who is charged with any offence against this Act or ...... This Court referred to the decision in Ballavdas Agarwala(2 ) and said:-\n\n\"Similarly, here it seems to us that only the authorities mentioned in s. 481, read with s. 69, can launch proceedings against persons charged with offences under the Act or the rules, regulations or by-laws made under it.\"\n\nJn the case before us, reliance was placed on the other side on a decision of the Bombay High Court in The State v. Manila! Jethalal(8). That decision has already been disapproved by this Court in the case of Mangulal Chunila/(1 ), and need not detain us. On this view, it must be held that the complaint in the present case, which was instituted by Malashetty, the newly elected President,\n\nwithout any order or direction by the standing committee or by the Chief Officer was not competent as it did not comply with the requirements of s. 200(1) of the Act.\n\n[n this connection, a new point that was raised was that, whenever an Order under s. 23A(2) of the Act is made and is disobeyed, only the State Government, which made the Order or the new President to whom the papers and property of the Borough have to be giv.en under the direction made by the Government will have the knowledge that the retiring President has failed to\n\n(I) Criminal Appeal No. 59of1965 decided on 23-11-1967.\n\n(2) (1960] 2 S. C. R. 739.\n\n(3) p953] SS B. L. R. 377.\n\ncomply with the direction and has, thus, committed an offence A punishable under s. 23A(2) of the Act and, consequently, it should be held that a complaint in respect<>f such an offcuce was not intended'to be covered by the provisions of s. 200(1) of the Act.\n\nOn the language of s. 200 ( 1) of the Act, however, we must reject this contention, because it clearly lays down that tae Standing Committee and. the Chief Officer are the authorities who can order proceedings to be t!lken for the punishment of any person offending against the provisions of the Act, and the present prosecution of the appellant is clearly for an offence of failing to comply with a direction under s. 23A(2) made punishable under s. 23A(3) of the'Act. It may, no doubt, appear anomalous that .the prosecution of even a retiring President in such circumstances has to be ordered by the Chief Officer, who was his subordinate at least during the time when he was working as the President.\n\nIt seems to us that this anomaly has arisen, because, when s. 23A in its present form was introduced fu the Act by the Bombay Act XL .of 1950 and for the first time a retiring President was made liable to conviction for failing to comply with a direction made under sub-section ( 2) of that section, the Legislature did not notice that s. 200 ( 1 ) of the Act would govern even such a proceeding.\n\nThe legislature left s. 200 (1) of the Act untouched.\n\nThat provision, as it stands at present, ls clearly applicable even to a proceeding for punishment of a retiring President under s. 23A(3) of the Act, so that the remedy may now lie in a suitable amendment of s. 200(1) of the Act.\n\nThe conviction of the appellant on the basis of the complaint filed by the new President Malashetty, in disregard of the provisions of s. 200(1) of the Act, must, therefore, be held to be invalid and set aside.\n\nSince the appeal succeeds on this one ground, we do not consider it necessary to discuss the other two grounds raised by the appellant for challenging his conviction. The appeal is allowed and the conviction andsentence of the appellant are set aside\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeQ/ allowed.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "K. M. KANAVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. M. KANAVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MYSORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. KANAVI\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE\n\nApril 18, 1968\n\n(S. M, Snau, J. M, Smil."}}, {"text": "Section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 200( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1310, "end_char": 1320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1586, "end_char": 1592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960) 2 S.C.R. 739", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2563, "end_char": 2582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23-11-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "59 of 1965 decided on 23-11-1967, followed :\n\nThe State v. Monllal lethalal, (19S3) SS B.L.R. 377, referred to."}}, {"text": "Section 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2898, "end_char": 2908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3160, "end_char": 3170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 15, 1965 of the Mysore High Court in Cr."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3331, "end_char": 3348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 15, 1965 of the Mysore High Court in Cr."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and R. B. Datar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3408, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and R. B. Datar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrishnan, and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrishnan, and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bhargna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3541, "end_char": 3548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargna, J. The appellant, K. M. Kanavi, was the President of the Municipal Borough of Gadag Betgeri froll) 11th January, 1960 to 15th March, 1963."}}, {"text": "K. M. Kanavi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargna, J. The appellant, K. M. Kanavi, was the President of the Municipal Borough of Gadag Betgeri froll) 11th January, 1960 to 15th March, 1963.", "canonical_name": "K. M. KANAVI"}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was removed from the President ship on i5th March, 1963 by an Order passed by the Government of Mysore for neglect of duty and incapacity under section 21 (2) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (No."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3836, "end_char": 3846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gadag Betgeri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVIH of 1925) (hereinafter xeferred to as \"the Act\") which was applicable to Gadag Betgeri, even though it was situated in the State of Mysore, because it was earlier a part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVIH of 1925) (hereinafter xeferred to as \"the Act\") which was applicable to Gadag Betgeri, even though it was situated in the State of Mysore, because it was earlier a part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVIH of 1925) (hereinafter xeferred to as \"the Act\") which was applicable to Gadag Betgeri, even though it was situated in the State of Mysore, because it was earlier a part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "16th March, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, i.e., on 16th March, 1963, the Government passed an order superseding the Borough."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order - of supersession was quashed by the High Court of Mysore by its judgment dated 10th April 1963 in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "10th April 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4406, "end_char": 4421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order - of supersession was quashed by the High Court of Mysore by its judgment dated 10th April 1963 in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Malashetti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Malashetti was elected as the President of the Borough on 22nd April, 1963.", "canonical_name": "Malashetti"}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Malashetti was elected as the President of the Borough on 22nd April, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th April, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th April, 1963, the new President asked the appellant to hand over all the papers, documents and property belonging to the Municipal Administration."}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4920, "end_char": 4933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd May, 1963, the appellant sent three keys and two files of papers by registered parcel to the new President."}}, {"text": "20th June, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on 20th June, 1963, the Slate Government made an order under sub-s. (2) oj s. 23A of the Act directing the appellant to hand over charge of all the paper•\n\n(1) [1964) !."}}, {"text": "Slate Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5498, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on 20th June, 1963, the Slate Government made an order under sub-s. (2) oj s. 23A of the Act directing the appellant to hand over charge of all the paper•\n\n(1) [1964) !."}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th October, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6373, "end_char": 6390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Divisional Commissioner, in turn, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner on 5th October, 1963, requesting him to take immediate action under s. 23A(3) of the Act tg prosecute the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th December, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6794, "end_char": 6813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was made by the Deputy Commissioner on 24th December, 1963."}}, {"text": "Malashetti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The new President, Malashetti, thereupon filed a complaint against the appellant for an offence punishable under s. 23A(3) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6929, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 7002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint itself is dated as 3rd January, 1964, but the judgment of the High Court mentions that the complaint was actually presented in Court on 8th January, 1964."}}, {"text": "8th January, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7102, "end_char": 7119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint itself is dated as 3rd January, 1964, but the judgment of the High Court mentions that the complaint was actually presented in Court on 8th January, 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7458, "end_char": 7464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8052, "end_char": 8058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8808, "end_char": 8819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10772, "end_char": 10778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11770, "end_char": 11779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12094, "end_char": 12103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12429, "end_char": 12438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12602, "end_char": 12608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malashetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12775, "end_char": 12785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 200(1) of the Act, direction for taking such proceedings E\n\ncould be made either by the standing committee or by the Chief Officer: Admittedly, Malashetty was not the Chief Officer, nor\n\ndid he file the complaint under any direction made by the Standing Committee of the Borough.", "canonical_name": "Malashetti"}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13188, "end_char": 13197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14583, "end_char": 14589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14810, "end_char": 14816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15842, "end_char": 15851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17043, "end_char": 17071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 200( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17895, "end_char": 17905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "section 481( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18041, "end_char": 18056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18064, "end_char": 18113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ballavdas Agarwala(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18340, "end_char": 18360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mangu/al Chunila/ v. Mani/al Magantal a11d Another('), a similar interpretation was put on section 481( 1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, which also used the word \"may\" when laying down that the Commissioner may take or withdraw from proceedings against any person who is charged with any offence against this Act or ...... This Court referred to the decision in Ballavdas Agarwala(2 ) and said:-\n\n\"Similarly, here it seems to us that only the authorities mentioned in s. 481, read with s. 69, can launch proceedings against persons charged with offences under the Act or the rules, regulations or by-laws made under it.\""}}, {"text": "s. 481", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18446, "end_char": 18452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18464, "end_char": 18469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "statute": "the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18682, "end_char": 18699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the case before us, reliance was placed on the other side on a decision of the Bombay High Court in The State v. Manila!"}}, {"text": "Mangulal Chunila/(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision has already been disapproved by this Court in the case of Mangulal Chunila/(1 ), and need not detain us."}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19137, "end_char": 19146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19242, "end_char": 19251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-11-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19579, "end_char": 19587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "59of1965 decided on 23-11-1967."}}, {"text": "(1960] 2 S. C. R. 739", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19594, "end_char": 19615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19884, "end_char": 19893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19926, "end_char": 19932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20323, "end_char": 20332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20355, "end_char": 20364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20672, "end_char": 20678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21032, "end_char": 21038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21195, "end_char": 21204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21275, "end_char": 21284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 200(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21433, "end_char": 21442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_829_856_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "STATE OF MADRAS\n\nN. K. NATARAJA MUDALIAR April 18, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE,.JJ.J\n\nCentral Sales Tax Act, 1956--Different rates bf tax in different States under s. 8 sub-els. (2), (2A) and (5)-These provisions whether void for contravention Arts. 301 and 303 of the Constitution-Computa'tion of turnover under s. 9(3) of Act-Mlist be in the same manner as under State law of sales tax-Excise Duty must be exclua•d if State law so provides.\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 301, 302, 303 and 304-Differential rates of Central Sales Ta::c in diff'erent States under s. 8, sub-els. (2), (2A) and\n\n(5) of Central Safes Tax Act, 1956-Freedom of trade and commerce whether hanzpered-Diw:rbnination between one State and another whether results.\n\nThe respondent claimed before the Commercial Tax Officer, Madras that some of his goods had been sent from Madras to his depot in A.lldhra Pradesh and that the sales of those goods were intra-State sales in Andhra Pradesh where they had been taxed as such. The Commercial Tax Officer however held that the goods had been moved from the State of Madras under contracts of sale and were therefore taxable as inter-State sales under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The respondent fild a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court did not determine the nature of the transactions, but held that sub-ss. (2), (2A) and\n\n(5) df s. 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act as they stood at the relevant time imposed or authorised the imposition of varying rates of tax in different States on similar inter-State transactions and the resultant inequality in the burden of tax affected and impeded inter-State trade, commerce and intercou'rse and thereby offended Arts. 301 and 303(1) of the Constitution. The application of s. 9(3) of the Act was also considered.\n\nAgainst the High Court's jud!ll11ent the State appealed.\n\nHELD: (i) Restrictions or impediments which directly and immediately impede or hamper the free flow Of trade, commerce and intercourse whether inter~State or intra~State fall within the prohibition imposed by Art. 301 ind subject to other provisions may be regarded as void. A tax may in certain cases direct1y and immediately restrict or hamper the :flo'v of trade but every imposition of tax does not do so.\n\n[840 DJ Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of A.rsam & Ors. [1961] I S.C.R. 809, Auto1nobi/e. Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajas:han & Ors .. [1963] I S.C.R. 491 and Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madm< & Anr. [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 435, relied on.\n\n(ii) 'fax. under the Central Sales Tax: Act on inter..State sales is in its essence a tax: which encumbers. movement of trade and commerce, since hy the definition in s. 3 of the Act a sale or purchase of the goods is deemed lo take place in the course of inter-State trade. if it-(a) occasions the: movement of goods 'from one. State to another; (b) is effected by a tr2 nsfer of documents of title to the goods during the movement from one State to anothCT. But the tax: in the present case was saved by the operation of Art. 302 of the Constitution whereby Parliament is, notwithstanding the protection conferrd by Art. 301 authorised to impose\n\nrestrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse bet\\veen one A Stale and another or within any part of the territory of India al.i may be required in the public interest. [841 C--EJ\n\nThe expression 'between one State and another' _does not imply that the power under Art. 302 can be exercised only in respect of trade between one State and another as two entities.\n\nThe Article expressly pro• vides that restrictions may be imposed not only as between one State and another but also within any part of the territory of India. There is also B no doubt that exercise of the power to tax may normally be presumed to be in the public interest. [841 F-H]\n\n(iii) The Central Sales Tax Act does not discriminate bet\"'een one State and another within the meaning of Art. 303.\n\nAn Act which is merely enacted for the purpose df imposing tax which is to be collected and to be retained by the State does not amount to law giving or authorising the giving of any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of any discrimination bet ween one State and another merely because of varying rate$ of tax between different States.\n\nBy leaving it to the States to levy sales tax ia respect of a commodity on intra..State transactions no discrimination is practised and by authorising the State from which the movement of goods commences to levy on transactions dl sale Central Sales Tax, at rates prevailing in the State, subject to certain limitations, no discrimination can be deemed to be practised. (843 C-D; 846 CJ .The flow of trade does not necessarily depend upon the rates of sales tax; it depends upon a variety of factors such llli the source of supply, place of consumption, existence Of trade channels, the rates of freight, trading 1facilities, availability of efficient transport and other facilities for carrying on trade. [843 GHl\n\nThe King v. Barger. [1908] 6 C.L.R. 41 and W. R. Moran Proprietar.v Ltd. v. The Deputy Federal Comn1issioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) & Ors., [1940] 63 C.L.R. 338. referred to.\n\nThe rate which a State Legislature imposes in respect of inter-Stale transactions in a particular commodity must depend on a variety of factors-political and economic.\n\nIf the rate is so high as to drive away prospective traders from purchasing a commodity and to resort to , other sources of supply, in its-own interest the State will adjust the rate to attract purchasers.\n\nAgain in a democratic constitution political forces \\\\o'Ould operate against the levy o'f an unduly high rate of tax.\n\nAttention must also be directed to sub-s. (5) of s. 8 which authorises the State Government, notwithstanding anything coritained in s. 8 in the pubJic interest to waive tax or impose tax on sales at a lower rate on inter-State trade ar commerce.\n\nIt is clear that the Legislature has contemplated that elasticity of rates consistent with economic forces mai be maintained. [845 B-El\n\n(iv) Article 304 (a) had no application to the present case because there was no imposition of rates of tax on imported goods different from rates of tax on goods manufactured or produoed in the State. (847 F]\n\nFinn A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Corltpany_ v. State of Madras and Another, (1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 435 and State of Mysore v.\n\nLakshminarasimhiah Setty & Sons, 16 S.T.C. 231, distinguished.\n\n(v) In the matter of determining the taxable turnover the same rules namely the rules under the State law will apply by virtue of s. 9(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, whether the tax is to be levied under the Central Snles Tax Act or the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Therefore in .calculating the turnover of inter-Stale transactions excise duty would\n\nSTATE V. NATARAJA (Shah, /.) 831\n\nA be excluded as provided in the Rules made under the Madras Act, although there was no such provision in the Central Act. [848 G-H]\n\nState of Mysore v. Lakshmil!llrasimhia/J Setty & Sons, 16 S.T.C. 231, re'ferred to.\n\nPer Bachawat J. (partly dissenting),-(i) It cannot be said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on inter-State sales as defined in s. 3 of the Act is in its essence a tax hampering movement of trade or commerce within the meaning of Art. 301. That Article makes no distinction between movement from one part of the State to another part of the same State and movement from one State to another. If a tax on iritra-State sales does not offend Art. 301, logically a tax on inter-State sales also cannot do so. Neither tax operates directly or immediately on tho frei> flow o'f trade or the free movement or the transport of goods from one part of the country to the other. The tax is on the sale.\n\nThe movement is incidental and a consequence of the sale. (851 F-1:{; 852 A]\n\nEven assuming that the Central Sales Tax is within the mischief of Art. 301, it is certainly a law made by Parliament in the public interest -and is saved by Art. 302. There is nothing in its provisions which offends.\n\nArt. 303 rs51 Fl\n\nPer Hegde, J.-(i) A taxing statute is not outside the scope of Art. 301 of the. (', onstitution.\n\nBut before a taxing statute is held to be viola~ tive of that article it must be shown that it has a direct or immediete impact on the freedom <if trade, _commerce and intercourse within the country. A mere remote or incidental impact is insufficient to hold that Art. 301 has been contravened. f852 BJ\n\n(ii) The power conferred on Parliament by Art. 302 is extremely wide and the only limitation placed on that power is that the law in question must be required in the public interest. Primarily it is for Parliament to determine the requirement as to public interest, and its decision is not easy to challenge.\n\nIn addition there is the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute. [852' DJ .. (iii) Mere difference in rates is neither showing preference nor making discrimination within the meaning of Art. 303 ( 1). But other things being equal the difference in rates would result in showing preference to some States and making discrimination against others. Hence difference in rates is a prima facie proo'f of the preference or discrimination complained of.\n\nOnce the difference in rates is shown it is for the State to show that the same has not resulted in showing preference to one or more States or making discrimination against one or more States over others in the matter of inter..state trade.\n\nNo interpretation should be placed on Art. 303(1). which would render that provision purposeless. The State must place before the Court its reasons for making the enactment and satisfy it that Art. 303(1) has not been contravened. [852 F-853 CJ\n\nOn an examination of the material placed be'fore the Court in the present case it was clear that the differences in the rates were in public intere5t and those differences did not materially affect the free flow oF trade in the. country. [853 Cl\n\n[The impugned sections of the Act having been held to be \\'ali<l, the case was remanded to. the High Court for determining the nature of the transactions.]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 763 of 1967.\n\n:8:i2 SUPJUIMB COURT llBPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 7, 1967 of ; the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 836 of 1966.\n\nBishan Narain and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant.\n\nM. R. M. Abdul Karim, K. Rajendra Choudhury and K. R.\n\nChoudhury, for the respOndents.\n\nR. Thiagarajan, for intervener No. 1.\n\nR. 6opalakrishnan, for intervener No. 2.\n\nA. N. Singh and D. N. Gupta, for intervener No. 3.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar, R. N .. Sachthey and S. P. Nayyar, for intervener No. 4. c\n\nB. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for intervener No. 5.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and 0. P. Rana, for intervener No. 6 .\n\n. Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No. 7.\n\nNaunit Lal, for intervener No. 8.\n\nK. Baldev Mehta, for intervener No. 9.\n\nM'. R. K. Pillai, for intervener No. 10.\n\nThe Judgment of SHAH, MITTER and V AJDIALINGAM, JJ. w3s E delivered by SHAH, J. BACHAWAT, J. pai:tly dissented.\n\nHEGDE, J. delivered a separate opinion.\n\nShah, J.-In a proceeding for assessment of tax for 1963-64 under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer rejected the contention of the assessee that a part of the turnover of his business in matches arose out of intra-State F l>ale transactions at the assessee's depot at Ongole (in the State of Andhra Pradesh) to which depot the goods were despatched by him from his place of business in the State of Madras.\n\nThe Deputy Commercial Tax Officer held that the goods were moved from \"the godown stock\" of the assessee in execution of contract> of sale with merchants outside the State of Madras, and on that G account the turnover from sales was liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe assessee moved the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari quashinp; the order of assessment, on the grounds, that the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act which permitted levy of taK at varying rates in different States were invalid. and that the trar.- H sactions brought to tax were not in truth inter-State transactions.\n\nThe High Court did not determine the nature of the transaction; but held that sub-s. (2), (2A) and (5) of s. 8 of the Central\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, J.) 833\n\nSales Tax Act, 1956, in operatioll at the relevant time imposed or authorised the imposition of varying rates of tax in dilferent States on similar inter-State transactions and the resultant inequality in the burden of tax affected and impeded jnter-State trade. commerce and intercourse, and thereby offended Arts. 301 and 303 (1) of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the plea of the assessee thats. 9(3) of the Act was ultra vires.\n\nThe State has appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High\n\nCourt against the order declaring sub-ss. (2), (2A) and (5) of s. 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, invalid.\n\nA brief review of the developments in the law relating to imposition of tax on transactions of sale and its inter-relation with the constitutional provisions leading to the enactment of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, will facilitate appreciation of the competing views put forward before us at the Bar.\n\nThe Government of India Act, 1935, by List II entry 48 of the Seventh Sche dule conferred power exclusively upon the Provinces to legislate on the subject of \"tax on the sale of goods and on advertisement\". In exercise of that power the Provincial Legislatures enacted sales tax laws for their respective Provinces acting on the principle of \"territorial nexus\", and picked out one or more ingre dients constituting a sale and made it or them the basis of imposing liability for tax.\n\nThis exercise of taxing power by the Provinces led to multiple taxation of the same transaction by many provinces, the burden of tax falling ultimately on the consuming public.\n\nIn order to remove this burden imposed upon the consumers.\n\nArt. 286 was incorporated in the Constitution inter alia for the regulation of inter-State sales transactions. This Court in The State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. (1) held that under the Bombay Sales Tax Act 24 of 1952 sales effected in Bombay in respect of goods exported from the State were not taxable by the State of Bombay, but the importing State was competent to levy tax on transactions of sale in the oourse of inter-State trade or commerce on persons who were resident outside its territory, provided that the goods were delivered in the importing State for the purpose of consumption therein.\n\nThis decision made the dealer carrying on business in the exporting State amenable to the sales tax law of the importing State.\n\nThe quesiion was reconsidere<I by this Court in Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar(2). The Court held that the sales or purchases made by an assessee which actually took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce could not be taxed by any State until by law it was otherwise provided by Parliament. The judgment in Bengal Immunity Co.'s case(2) removed, by making inter-State\n\n(l) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.\n\n(2) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 603 .\n\nsales immune from taxation, the difficulties till then experienced A by the trading community but the importing States which had imposed tax on inter-State sales by non-resident dealers, relying on the principle of the judgment in United Motors case(') were faced with innumerable claims for restitution of the tax reali?.ed.\n\nThe President then promulgated Ordinance No. IlI of 1956 which was later replaced by the \"Sales Tax Laws Validation Act VII of B 1956\" with the object of restoring for the period specified in the Act the decision in United Motors case(').\n\nThe problem of tax on inter-State sales was, in the meanwhile, • examined by the Taxation Enquiry Commission.\n\nThe report of the Commission led to the enactment of the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956.\n\nBy that amendment entry 92A was C added in Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution conferring power upon the Union to legislate in respect of \"taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce\"; and for entry 54 in the State List, the follo1, Ving entry was substituted : D ''Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newsf.apers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List .\" Explanation to cl. (1°) of Art. 286 was omitted, and els. (2) & ( 3) were substituted by fresh clauses: by the newly enacted cl.\n\n(2) the Parliament was authorised by law to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in cl. (1), and by cl. (3) it was enacted that any Iaw of a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions. in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.\n\nIn Art. 269(1) clause (g) was added authorising the Government of India to collecJ tax on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and making it obligatory upon the Government of India fo assign the tax to the States in the manner provided in cl. (2). By cl. (3) it was enacted that:\n\n\"Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\" Jn exercise of authority conferred by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, the Parliament enacted on\n\n(l) (1951) S.C.R. 1069.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, /.) 835\n\nDecember 21, 1956, the Central Sales Tax. Act, 1956, with a view to fonnulate principles (a) for detennining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or outside a State or in the course of import into or export from India; (b) providing for the levy, collection and distribution of taxes on sales of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; (c) declaring certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce and specifying the restrictions and conditions to which State laws imposing taxes on the sale or purchase of such goods of special importance shall be subject.\n\nBy s. 3 of the Act a definition of sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce was devised.\n\nBy s. 4 conditions in which a sale or purchase of goods was to be deemed to have taken place outside a State were specified.\n\nBy s. 5 the conditions in which a sale or purchase of goods taking place in the course of import or export were specified. By Ch. III ( ss. 6 to 13) provisions were enacted for declaring a charge of tax on inter-State sales and for setting up machinery for levy of tax and incidental matters. Section 6 imposed a charge on all sales effected by a dealer in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during any year.\n\nBy s. 7 provision was made for registration of dealers.\n\nSection 8, insofar as it is material, and as amended by Act 31 of 1958, read as follows:\n\n\"( 1) Every dealer, who in the course of inter-State trade or commerce--\n\n(a) sells to the Government any goods; or\n\n(b) sells to a registered dealer other than the Government goods of the description referred to in sub-section ( 3) :\n\nshall be liable to pay tax under this Act, which shall be two per cent. of his turnover.\n\n(2) The tax payable by any dealer on his turnover in so far as the turnover or any part thereof relates to the sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce not falling within sub-section (1 )-\n\n(a) in the case of declared goods, shall be calculated at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State; and ( b) in the case of goods other than declared goods shall be calculated at the rate of seven per cent., or at !he. rate applicable .to the sale or purchase of such goods .ms1de the appropnate State, whichever is higher; and for the purpose of making any such calculation any such dealer shall be deemed to be a dealer liable to pay\n\n$36 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS (!968 j 3 s.c.R.\n\ntax under the. sales tax Jaw of ¢he appropriate State, A notwithstan\\ling that he, in fact, may not be so liable under that. law.\n\n(2A) Notwithstanding anything Contained in subsection (1) or sub-section (2)', if under the sales tax law of the appropriate State the sale or purchase, as B the case may be, of any goods by a dealer is exempt from tax generally or is subject to tax generally at a\n\nI rate which is 1ower than two per cent. (whether called a tax or fee or by any other name), the tax payable under this Act on his turnover in so far as the turnover or any part thereof relates to the sale of such goods shall be nil, or, as the case may be, shall be calculated at the c lower rate. ·\n\nExplanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section a sale or purchase of goods shall not be deemed to be exempt from tax generally under the sales tax law of the appropriate State if under that law it is exempt only in specified circumstances or under specified conditions D or in relation to which the tax is levied at specified stages or otherwise than with reference to the turnover of the goods. (3)\n\n(4) E\n\n( 5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the State Government may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in respect of such goods or classes of goods as may be mentioned in the notification and subject to such conditions as it may think F fit to impose, no tax under this Act shall be payable by any dealer having his place of business in the State in respect of the sale by him from any such place of business of any such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or that the tax on such sales shall be calculated at such lower rates than those specified in G sub-section ( 1) or sub-section, (2) as may be mentioned in the notification.\" By s. 9 machinery was set up for levy and collection of tax and penalties.\n\nInsofar as it is material, it provided:\n\n \" ( 1 ) The tax payable by any dealer under this Act H , on sales of goods effected by him in the course of. inter- State trade or commerce whether such sales fall within clause (a) or clause (b) of section 3 shall be levied and\n\nSTATE V. NATARAJA (Shah, /.) 837\n\nA collected by the Government of India in the manner provided in sub-section ( 3) in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced :\n\nProvided (2)\n\n( 3) Tue authorities for the time being empowered to assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State shall, on behalf of the Government of India and subject to any r11les made under this Act, assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax, including any penalty, payable by a dealer under this Act in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the general sales tax law of the State is assessed, paid and collected; and for tbis purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers tbey have under the general sales tax law of the State, and the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, penalties and compounding of offences, shall apply accordini:Iy :\n\nProvided\n\n( 4) The proceeds in any financial year of any tax, including any penalty, levied and collected under this Act in any State (other than a Union territory) on behalf of the Government of India shall be assigned to that State and shall be retained by it; and the proceeds attributable to Union territories shall form part of the Consolidated Fund of India.\"\n\nBy Ch. IV ( ss. 14 & 15) provision was made for levy of tax at specially low rates on goods of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce.\n\nBy s. 14 certain goods were declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, and by s. 15, as amended by Act 31 of 1958, it was proVided: .\n\n\"Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so far as-it imp0ses or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely :-\n\n(a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such. goods inside the State shall not exceed two per cent. of the sale or purchase price thereof, and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stae;\n\n(b) where a tax has been levied under that Jaw in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax so levied shall not exceed two per cent of the sal.e or purchase subject to such conditions as may be provided in any Jaw in force in that State.\"\n\nThe scheme of the Act was first to devise definitions of 'inter- State sales' and 'sales outside the State', and then to declare inter-\n\nState sales subject to tax, and to set up machinery for levying and collecting tax on those sales. Transactions in goods which were made subject to tax in the course of inter-State trade or c01mnerce were classified into three broad categories-( 1) transactions falling within s. 8 (I) i.e. all sales .to Government, and sales to a registered dealer other than the Government of goods referred to in ub'-s. (3) of s. 8; (2) transactions fallin~ withins. 8(2)((l) i.e., sales in respect of declared goods; and (3) transactions falling within s. 8(2)(b) i.e. sales [not falling within (1)) in respect of goods other than declared goods.\n\nSales of goods in category ( 1) were declared liable at the relevant time to pay a tax of\n\ntwo per cent. on the turnover.\n\nOn sales of declared goods tax was to be calculated at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State. But by s. 15 the tax payable under a Statelaw in respect of any sale or purchase •)f dedared goods inside the State was not to exceed two per cent. of the sale or purchase price thereof, and was not Jeviable at more than one stage. On turnover from sale of goods not falling within categories (1) & (2) the rate was seven per cent. or the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods i11side the appropriate State, whichever was higher. But by sub-s. (2A) of s. 2 it was prqvided thal notwithstanding anything c.ontained in sub-s.\n\n(1) or sub-s. (2), if under the sales tax law of the approprkte State the sale or purchase, as the case may be, of any goods by a dealer is exempt from tax generally or is subject to tax generally at a rate which is lower than two per cent. the tax payable under the Act on the turnover insofar as the turnover or any part thereof relates to the sale of such goods shall be nil, or as the case may be shall be calculated at the lower rate.\n\nThere is a slight inconsistency betweens. 8(2) ands. 8(2A). If the rate of tax under the State law is less than two per cent. by virtue of s. 8(2A), even in respect of turnover falling withins. 8(2)(b), the ra~ of tax will not exceed the State rate : if the State rate exceeds two per cent. tax at the rate of seven per cent.- or of the State,. whicheYer is higher, shall prevail.\n\nBut that has no bearing on the question under discussion.\n\nTax under the Act is payable by the seller.\n\nThe State from which the movement of goods commences in the course of )nter-\n\nSTATE V. ~TARAJA (Shah, /,) 839\n\nState sale collects the tax as agent of the Central Government, and in the manner provic?ed in sub-s. (3) of s. 9. Jly sub-s. ( 4) of s. 9 the proceeds in any-financial year of any tax, including any penalty, levied and collected under the Act in any State (other than a Union territory) on behalf of the Government of India are to be assigned to that State and are to be retained by it, and the proceeds attributable to Union territories are to form part of the Consolidated Fund of Jncf4i.\n\nThe Act and the constitutional provisions were intended to restrict the imposition of multiple taxation on a single inter-State transaction by different States, each State relying upon some teritorial nexus between the State and the sale. The tax though collected by the State under the Central Sales Tax Act was as an agent of the Central Government, it was, by sub-s. ( 4) of ~. ' enacted in implementation of the principle of assignment of tax set out in cl. (2) of Art. 269, assigned to the State which collected it.\n\nThis somewhat tortuous scheme of levying tax on inter-State transactions and making it available to the State which levied it, in effect countenances levy of different rates of tax on inter-State transactions in similar goods. It is upon the prevalence of different rates of tax which, subject to adjustments, and incorporated in the Central Sales Tax Act, that the argument of the assessee is largely founded.\n\nHe contends-and his contention has found favour with the High Court-that the liability to pay tax on inter-\n\nState transactions, depending upon the rate of tax prevailing in the exporting. State, hampers trade and commerce, by giving or authorising the giving of preference to one State over another or by making or authorising the making of discrimination between one State and another, and thereby violates the guarantee of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse declared by Part XIII of the Constitution. The assessee primarily relies upon Arts. 301 and 303 (1) of the Constitution in support of his contention.\n\nArticle 301 provides :\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade; commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.\"\n\nThis Article is couched in terms of the widest amplitude, trade, commerce and intercourse are thereby declared free and unham-, pered throughout the territory of India. The freedom of trade so deolared is against the imposition of barriers or obstructions within the State as well as inter-State : all restrictions which directly \"if and immediately affect the movement of trade are declared by Art. 301 to be ineffective. The extent to which Art. 301 ope- . rates to make trade and commerce free has been considered by this Court in several cases. In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The Stste 8 Sup. c. 1./68-14\n\nI 1\n\nof Assam and others('), Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for himself A and Wanchoo & Das Gupta, JJ., observed at p. 860 :\n\n\" ..... we think -it would be reasonable and proper to hold that restrictiqns, freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301, would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or 8 movement of trade.''\n\nIn Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan and others('), the view expressed by Gajendragadkar, J., in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case(') was accepted by the majority. Subba Rao, J., who agreed with the majority observed that the freedom declared under Art. 301 of the Constitution of India referred to C the right of free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State or intra-State, or other impediments operating as such barriers. The same view \"{as expressed in Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid and Company v. State of Madras and Another(') by a unanimous Court. It must be taken as settled law that the restrictions or impediments which directly and )) immediately impede or hamper the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse fall within the prohibition imposed by Art. 301 and subject to the other provisions of the Constitution they may be regarded as void.\n\nBut it is said that by imposing tax on sales, no restriction hampering trade is imposed. In the Atiabari Tea Company's E case ('), Gajendragadkar, J., observed : ·\n\n\"Taxes may and do amount to restrictions; but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the purview of Art. 301.\n\nThe argument that all taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an extreme approach which cannot be upheld.\"\n\nIn a recent judgment of this Court in The Andhra Sugars Ltd. and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others('), Bachawat, J., speaking for the Court, after referring to the observattons made by Gajendragadkar, J., in Atiabari Tea Company's case(') observed:\n\n\"This interpretation of Article 301 was not dissented from in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd, v.\n\nState of Rajasthan-[1963] 1 S.C.R. 491. Normally, a taX on sale of goods does not directly impede the free\n\n(I) [1961]18.C.R.809.\n\n(3) [1963) I S. C. R. 491.\n\n(2) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 435.\n\n(4) 21 S. T. C. 212.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, /.)\n\nmovement or transport of goods.\n\nSection 21 is no exception. It does not impede the free movement or transport of goods and is not violative of Artilce 301.\"\n\nSection 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act which was referred to in the judgment authorised the State Government to levy a tax at such rate not exceeding five rupees per metric tonne as may be prescribe<l on . the purchase of cane required for use, consumption or sale in a factory. It must, therefore, be regarded as settled law that a tax may in certain cases directly and immediately restrict or hamper the flow of trade, but every imposition of tax does not do so.\n\nTax under the Central Sales Tax Act on inter-State sales, it must be noticed, is in its essence a tax which encumbers movement of trade or commerce, since by the definition in s. 3 of the Act a sale or purchase of goods is deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, if it-(a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; (b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.\n\nThe question which then falls to be determined is whether the tax imposed in the present case is saved by the operation of the other provisions of Part XIlI.\n\nArticle 302 of the Constitution provides that Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest.\n\nThereby the Parliament is, notwithstanding the protection conferred by Art. 301, authorised to impose restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse in the public interest. The expression \"between one State and another\" does not imply that it is only intended to confer upon the Union Parliament the power to remove the fetter upon legislative authority only so as to keep trade, commerce or intercourse free between one State Government and another.\n\nIt is intended to declare trade commerce and intercourse free between residents in one State and residents in another State. That is clear because Art. 302 expressly provides that on the freedom of trade restrictions may be imposed not only as between one State and another, but also within any part of the territory of India. As we have already observed, Art. 301 does not !lJerely protect inter-State trade or operate against inter-State barriers : all trade is protected whether it is intra-State or inter-\n\ntate by the prohibition imposed by Art. 301, and there is nothing m the language or the context for restricting the power of the Parliament which it otherwise possesses in the public interest to impose restricions on the freedom of trade, commerce or interco~e, operative only as between one State and another as two enttttes. There is also no doubt tliat exercise of the power to tax may normally be presumed to be in the public interest.\n\ni j\n\nI •\n\nArticle 303 provides, by the first lause :\n\n•Notwithstanding anything in article 3Q2, . neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State, shall have power to make any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of an entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule.•\n\nHaving conferred by Art 302 power upon the Parliament to impose restrictions upon freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse, the Constitution proceeds to impose certain restrictions upon the power so conferred. Referenee to the power of the State Legislatures in Art. 303 ( 1) creates a complication which we are not called upon in the present case to resolve. It is expressly declared that the Parliament shall not have the power to make any Jaw giving preference to one State over another, authorising the giving of any preference to one State over another, making any discrimination between one State and another, and authorising the making of any discrimination between one State and another, in exercise of or by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the State that the power under Art. 303 could only be exercised so as to restrict the authority of the Parliament which.arises by virtue of an entry relating to trade and commerce in the legislative lists and it was urged that an entry with respect to the levy of tax on trade and commerce and is not an en~ relating to trade and commerce and therefore there is no prohibition against the Parliament exercising power or authorising the giving of any preference to one State over another or malting or authorising the making of any discrimination between one Stat£> and another by the exercise of taxing power. Reliance in support of that contention was placed upon the judgment in Sundararamier and Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh(') in which Venkatarama Aiyar, J., pointed out that under he scheme of entries in List I & II of the Seventh Schedule the power of taxation exercisable in respect of any matter is a power distinct from the power to legislate in respect of that matter. It was also urged that the expression \"an entry relating to trade and. commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule\" was restricted to the entries which expressly deal with the power to legislate in. respect of trade and commerce i.e. entries 41 & 42 of List I, entries 26 & 27 of List II and entry 33 of List m in the Seventh Schedule, and\n\n(!) (19S8] s. c. R. 1422.\n\nSTATB v. NATARAJA (Shah, /.)\n\nextended to no others. On the other hand it was contended that all legislative entries which directly affect trade and commerce are also within the expression \"entry relating to trade and commerce\".\n\nWe need express no opinion on the two questions argued before us.\n\nThe question whether entries relating to trade and commerce in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule are restricted to entries 41 & 42 of List I, entries 26 & 27 of List II and entry 33 of List III, or relate to all general entries which affect trade and commerce, is academic .in the present case.\n\nNor do we think. it necessary to decide whether for the purpose of Art. 303 en'1'1es relating to tax on sale or purchase of goods i.e., entry 92A of List I, and entry 54 of List Il are entries relating to trade and commerce, for, in.our opinion, an Act which is merely enacted for the purpose of imposing tax which is to be collected and to be retained by the State does not amount to law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one\n\nState and another, merely because of varying rates of tax prevail in different States.\n\nIt was urged that the High Court was right in holding that rates of tax on the sale of the same or similar commodity by different States by itself was discriminatory, since it authorised placing of an unequal burden on inter-Stat.e trade and commerce affecting its free flow between the Stat.es.\n\nThe rates of tax prevailing in different States on transactions of sale in the diverse commodities are undoubtedly not uniform. According to the High Coun such a scheme was Mobviously quite discriminatory and considerably affected the freedom of trade, commerce and inter-course\", the differential rates or exemptions in various Stat.es imposing an unequal burden on the same or similar goods which\n\naffected their free movement or flow in inter-State trade and commerce, and that a higher rate of tax in a State worked as a barrier to the free movement of similar goods to another State wbtte there was no tax or a lower rate of tax, and for trade in particular goods declared or undeclared to be free throughout the tcrritmy of India, the rate of tax or exemption as the case may be must be\n\nuiform. We are unable to accept the view propounded by the High Court.\n\nThe flow of trade does not necessarily depend upon the rates of sales tax : it depends upon a variety of factors, such as the source of supply, place of consumption, existence of trade channels, the rates of freight, trading facilities, availability of efficient transport and other facilities for carrying on trade. Instances can easily be imagined of cases in which notwithstanding the lower rate of tax in a particular part of the country goods may be purchased from another part, where a higher rate of tax prevails. upJ)osing in a particular State respect Of a particular commodity, the rate of tax is 2% but if the benefit of that low\n\n844 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS\n\n[1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nrate is offset by the freight which a merchant in another State may have to pay for carrying that commodity over a long distance, the merchant would be willing to purchase the goods from a nearer State, even though the rate of tax in that State may be higher.\n\nExistence of long-standing business relations, availability of communications, credit facilities and a host of other factors-natural and business-enter into the maintenance of trade relations and the free flow of trade cannot necessarily be deemed to have been obstructed merely because in a particular State the rate of tax on sales is higher than the rates prevailing in o.ther States.\n\nIn The King v. Barger(') the Australian High Court was called upon to deal with the meaning of the expression \"discrimination between States or parts of States\" used in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution, Isaacs, J., observed at p. 108 :\n\n\" . . . . . the pervading idea is the preference of locality merely because it is locality, and becus_e it is a particular part of a particular State. It does not include a differentiation based on other considerations, which are dependent on natural or business circumstances, and may operate with more or less force in different localities; and there is nothing, in my opinion, to prevent the Australian Parliament, charged with the welfare of the people as a whole, from doing what every State\n\nin the Commonwealth has power to do for its own citi -zens, that is to say, from basing its taxation measures on considerations of fairness and justice, always observing the constitutional injunction not to prefer States or parts of States ....\n\nIn W. R. Moran Proprietary Ltd. v. The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) and others('), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recorded its approval to that exposition. It is true that the Judiciill Committee was interpreting s. 51(ii) of the Australian Constitution. It also appears from the provisions of the Australian Constitution that by virtue of s. 96 of the Constitution there is to be a uniform imposition of customs duties. But the observations made by Isaacs, J., in King\n\nv. Barge,(') and approved by the Judicial Committee are useful in the determination of the true principle applicable in the present case, that, it is where differentiation is '.Jased on consideration not dependent upon natural or business factors which operate with more or less force in different localities that the Parliament is prohibited from making a discrimination.\n\nThe rates of tax in force at the . date when the Central Sales Tax Act was enacted have again not become cryi:tallised. The\n\n(I) (1908) 6 C. L. R. 41.\n\n(2) (1940] 61 C. I,-· R. 338.\n\n... ..\n\n.A •\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, J.) 845\n\nrate which the State Legislature detennines, subject to the maximum prescribed for goods referred to in s. 8 ( 1 ) and ( 2) are the operative rates for those transactions : in respect of transactions falling withins. 8(2)(b) the rate is detennined by the State rate except where the State rate is between the range of two and seven per cent.\n\nTJie rate which a State Legislature imposes in respect of inter-State transactions in a particular commodity must depend upon a variety of factors.\n\nA State may be led to impose a high rate of tax on a commodity either when it is not consumed at all within the State, or if it feels that the burden which is falling on consumers within the State will be more than offset by the gain in revenue ultimately derived from outside consumers. The imposition of rates of sales tax is nonnally influenced by factors political and economic. If the _rate is so big~ as to drive away prospective traders from purchasmg a commodity and to resort to other sources of supply, in its own interest the State will adjust the rate to attract purchasers .............. Again, in a demo cratic constitution political forces would operate against the levy of an unduly high rate of tax.\n\nThe rate of tax on sales of a commodity may not ordinarily be based on arbitrary considerations but in the light of the facility of trade in a particular commodity, the market conditions-internal and external-and the likelihood of consumers not being scared away by the price which includes a high rate of tax. Attention must also be directed to sub-s. ( 5) of s. 8 which authorises the State Government, notwithstanding anything contained in s. 8, in the public interest to waive tax or impose tax on sales at a lower rate on inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nIt is clear that the legislature has contemplated that elasticity of rates consistent with economic forces may be maintained.\n\nPrevalence of differential rates of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as detrminative of the object to discriminate between one State and another.\n\nUnder the Constitntion as originally framed, revenue from sales-tax was reserved to the States. But since the power of taxation could be exercised i~ a manner prejudicial to the larger public interests by !he States it was found necessary to restrict the power of taxation m respect of transactions which had an inter-State content.\n\nAmendment of Art. 286 and the enactment of the Sales Tax Valiation Act 1956, and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, were all mtended to serve a dual purpose : to maintain the source of revenue from sales-tax .to the States and at the same time to prevent the States from subjecting transactions in the course of inter\n\nStat~ !J°ade so as to obstruct the free flow of trade by making com-\n\nJl!~Ues uduly expensive. The effect of the Constitutional prowmons achieved in a somewhat devious manner is still clear, viz.\n\nfo reserve sales-tax as a source of revenue for the States. The Central Sales Tax Act is enacted under the authority of the Union Parliament, but the tax is collected through the agency of , the State and is levied ultimately for the benefit of the States and is statutorily assigned to the States.\n\nThat is clear from the amendments made by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, in Art. 269, and the enactment of els. ( 1 ) & ( 4) of s. 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe Central sales-tax though levied for and collected in the name of the Central Government is a part of the sales-tax levy imposed for the benefit of the States.\n\nBy leaving it to the States to levy sales-tax in respect of a commodity on intra-State transactions no discrimination is practised: and by authorising the State from which the movement of goods commences to levy on transactions of sale Central sales-tax, at rates prevailing in the State, subject to the limitation .already set out, in our judgment, no discrimination can be deemed to be practised.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court was largely influenced by two cases decided by this Court on the interpretation of Art. 304(a). In Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co.'s case(') this Court struck down the levy of tax on sales of tanned hides and skins imported from outside the State of Madras at a rate higher than th!' rate of tax oo. sales of hides and skins tanned and sold within the State of Madras as infringing Art. 304(a). By r. 16 framed under s. 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, it was provided that in the case of untanned hides and skins the tax under s. 3 ( 1 ) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act shall be levied from the dealer who is the last purchaser in the State not exempt from tax under s. 3(3) on the amount for which they are brought by him. By r. 16(2) it was provided that-{i) in the case of hides or skins which had been tanned outside the State the tax under s. 3 ( 1) shall be levied from the dealer who in the State is the first dealer in such hides or skins not exempt from tax under s. 3(3) on the amount for which they are sold by him; and (ii) in the ca5e of tanned hides or skins which had been tanned within the State, the tax under s. 3 ( 1 ) shall be levied from a person who is the first dealer in such hides or skins not exempt from tax under s. 3(3) on the amount for which they are sold by him.\n\nThe taxpayer contended in Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid's case(') that the tanned bides and skins imported from outside and sold inside the State were under r. 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules subjected to a higher rate of tax than the rate imposed on bides and skins tanned and sold within the Slate and this discriminatory system of taxation offended ArI. 304 (a) of the Constitution: This Court accepted the contention and held that r. 16(2) discriminated against imported hides or skins which had been purchased or\n\n(I) (l ~31 Supp. 2 S. C. R. 435.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, /.) 847\n\ntanned outside and therefore it contravened Art. 304(a) of the Constitution.\n\nSimilarly in A. Hajee Abdul Shakoor and Co. v. State of Madras(') the assessees who were dealers in skins in the State of Madras, purchased raw skins from places both within and outside the State of Madras. They were assessed to sales-tax in accordance with the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax (Twnover and Assessment) Rules, on -the turnover of hides and skins purchased in the untanned condition outside the State and tanned within the State with respect to the assessment years 1955-56, 1956-57 and 1957-58. The tax was assessed at 3 pies per rupee on the price of tanned hides and skins for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and at the rate of 2 per cent on the turnover for the year 1957-58. In petitions filed by the assessees in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution it was held that s. 2(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Special Provisions) Act, 1963, discriminated against imported hides and skins which were sold upto August 1, 1957, upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee and was therefore void.\n\nIn the two cases the differential treatment violated Art. 304(a) of the Constitution, which authorises the Legislature of a State notwithstanding anything in Arts. 301 and 303 by law to \"impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so however, as not to discriminate betweeR goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced;\".\n\nImposition of differential rates of tax by the same State on goods manufactured or produced in the State and similar goods imported in the State is prohibited by that clause.\n\nBut where the taxing State is not imposing rates of tax on imported goods different from rates of tax on goods manufactured or produced, Art. 304 (a) has •\n\nno application. Article 303 prohibits the making of law which gives, or authorises the giving of, any preference to one State over\n\nanoher, or makes, or authorises the making of, and discrimination between one State and another. Prevalence of different rates of sales-tax in the State which have been adopted by the Central Sales Tax Act for the purpose of levy of tax under that Act is, as already mentioned, not determinative of the giving of preference or making a discrimination.\n\nThe view expressed by the High Court thats. 8(2), 8(2A) and 8(5) infringe Art. 301 and Art.\n\n303 ( 1) cannot be sustained.\n\nft was contended before the High Court that whereas excise duty was not liable to be included in the turnover of goods under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, it was liable to be included\n\n(I) [1964] 8 S. C. R. 217.\n\nin the turnover for the purpose of Central Sales True Act.\n\nThe High Court in making a general discussion on this questiOn observed, following the jucjgment of, this Court in State of Mysore v.\n\nLakshminarasimhiah Setty & Sons(') that by \"levied\" ins. 9(1) of the Central Act, -what was meant was \"levied as under the State Act\", that would include also the State Rules enabling deductions in the computation of the turnover.\n\nThe Court rejected the contention that \"to the extent the excise duty is not deductible from \"- taxable turnover under the Central Act unlike under the Madras\n\n'General Sales Tax Act, there is discrimination . . . . between one .State and another\". They observed that :\n\n\"In the matter of non-deductibility of excise duty from the turnover of inter-State sales, the Central Act has equal application and makes no .discrimination. The Central Act does not say that excise duty will be deductible in one State and not in another.\n\nIt is not deductible from the turnover \"of 'the inter-State sales and this rule is uniformly applied to all ilner., State sales.\n\nThere is, therefore, no question of inequality or discrimination forbidden by Art. 303(1) and there is no question of contravention of Art. 301 either.\"\n\nBut in dealing with the case of the assessee in the last'puragraph of the judgment, the Hi]5h Court observed that since no provision had been made for deduction of the excise duty from the turnover of inter-state sales or purchases under the Central Act whh the result that unequal burden will fall on differences in the quantum of turnover because of allowance in the one case and disallowance in nnother, of deduction of excise duty. This in the view of the High Court would impede ihe' freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of Art. 30 l of the Constitution and was not saved by Art. 303, The observations so made, somewhat blur the earlier discussion. If under the Madras General Sales Tax Act in computing the turnover the excise duty is not liable to be included and by virtue of s. 9 ( 1) of the Central Sales Tax Act has to be levied in the sme manner as the Madras General Sales Tax Act, the excise duty will not be liable to be included in the turnover, and the observations made in the last paragraph of the judgment under. appal that because no express provision was made for exclusion of the excise duty in the computation of turnover frQm inter-State sales or purchases there was discrimination cannot be accepted as correct.\n\nWe are of the view that in the matter of d-termining the taxable turn9ver the same rules will apPly by virtue of s. 9 ( 1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, whether the tax is to be levied under t!te Central Sales Tax Act or the Genera I Sales Tax Act. '\n\n(!) 16 S. T. C. 2lt.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Bachawat, !.) 8~9\n\nThe High Court proceeded to determine the case before them only on the plea that the impugned provisions of the Act were ultra vires.\n\nThey did not consider whether the transactions in dispute were inter-State transactions and liable to tax in the hands of the assessee in the Madras State.\n\nIt is the case of the assessee that h~ has been taxed in othe Andhra Pradesh State by the appropriate authority in respect of the transactions of sale of , g!Jods which are sought to be taxed, on the footing that the transaction, were intra-State transactions.\n\nThe question whether the transactions were intra-State and were liable to be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act has not been determined.\n\nThe case must therefore be remanded to the High Court. The High Court will proceed to decide the question.\n\nSince the assessee moved the High Court by a writ petition against the order of the sales-tax authorities without filing an appeal before the authority competent to deal with the questions of fact, it will be open to the High Cou n to require the assessee to have those questions determined by the competent departmental authority.\n\nThe appeal will be allowed and the order passed by the High Court declaring the provisions of ss. 8 ( 2) , 8 ( 2A). and\n\n8 ( 5 I ultra vires must be set aside.\n\nThe petition out of which this appeal arises was one of a group of petitions filed before the High Court.\n\nAgainst orders passed in favour of the other assessees the State has not preferred appeals.\n\nThe amount involved in the claim is small.\n\nThe State apparently has approached this Court with a view to obtain a final dete:mination of the important question which was raised in the petitions filed before the High Court.\n\nWe therefore direct that there will be no order as to costs in this Court and in the High Court.\n\nBachawat, J.\n\nI have read the draft judgment prepared hy our learned brother Justice Shah. He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on inter-State sales is in its essence a tax hampering movement of trade or commerce, since by the definition in sec. 3 of the Act a sale or purchase of goods is deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if it (a 1 occasions the movement 'of goods from one State to anothr; or (b) is ffected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.\n\nHe is of the view that the tax falls within the prohibition imposed under Art. 301 of the Constitution.\n\nIn Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam(1) Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the majority of the Court said:-\n\n\"We are, therefore, satisfied that in determining the limits of the width and amplitude of the freedom\n\n(I) [1961} I S. C. R. 809, 860-861.\n\n850 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.\n\nguaranteed by Article 301 a rational and workable test to apply would be: Does the impugned restriction operate directly or immediately on trade or its movement ....\n\nIt is tbe free movement of the transport of goods frcim one part of tbe country to the other that is intended to be saved, and if any Act imposes any direct restrictions on tbe very movement of such goods it attracts the provisions \"of Article 301, and its validity can be sustained only if it satisfies the requirements o( Art. 302 or Article 304 of Part XIII.\"\n\nThis interpretati9n of Article 361 was not dissented from in Automobile Transport ·(Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan(') In The Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. The State of Andl:ra Pradesh & Ors.(') this Court rejected the<:Ol!_tention that sec. 21 of the Andhta\n\nPradesh Sugarcne (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961 (Andhra Pradesh Act No, 45 of 1961) did not offend Article 301. 'The Court held :\n\n\"Normally, a tax on sale of goods does not directly impede .the free movement or transport of goods.\n\nSection 21 is no exception. Ir does not impede tbe free movement or transport of goods and is not violative of Article 301.'.' This Courtuistinguished the case of Firm A. J'. Mehtab Majid v.\n\nState of Madras(') which decided that a sales tax which discrimi nated against goods imported from other States might affect the free flow of trade and would then be invalid unless protected by Article 304(a). It is implied in Art. 304(a) that a discriminatory tax might a'lfect freedom of trade.\n\nOn principle:! see no distinction between a tax on intra-State and a tax on inter-State sales.\n\nAn intra-State sale may occasion the movement of. goods from one part of ihe State to another part of the same State.\n\nIndeed, normally, an intra-state sale would occasion such movement because the purchaser has to' move the goods from the seller's place to some other place. An intra-State sale may also be affected by a transfer of documents ot title to the goods during their moveinent from one part of the State to another part of tbe same Sta, te.\n\nBut, there can , be no doubt that a tax on such sales would not normally offend Article 301. That Article makes no distinction between movemen\\ from one pat! cif\".the State to another part of the same State and moveinent from one State to another.\n\nNow, if a tax on intra-State sale does not offend Article 301, logically, I do not see how., a tax on inter-State sale can do so.\n\nNeither .tax operate directly or immediately on the\n\n(I) [1963) (!) S. C.R. 491,533.\n\n(2) 21 S. T. C. 212.\n\n(3) [19631 Supp. 2 S. C. R. 435.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Hegde, /,) 851\n\nA free llow of trade or the free movement of the transport of goods from one part of the country to the other.\n\nThe tu is on the sale.\n\nThe movement is incidental to and a consequence of the sale.\n\nIn The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihm(') J agannadhadas, J. after referring to Art. 301 said :-\n\n\"Now it is not disputed that a tax on a p!Jrely internal sale which occurs as a result of the transportation of goods from a manufacturing centre within the State to a purchasing market within the same State is clearly permissible and not hit by anything in the Constitution.\n\nIf a sale in that kind of trade can bear the tax and is not a burden on the freedom of trade, it is difficult to see why a single point tax on the same kind of sale where a State boundary intervenes between the manufacturing centre and the consuming centres need be treated as a burden, especially where that tax is ultimately to come out of the residents of the very State by which such sale is taxable.\n\nFreedom of trade and commerce applies as much within a State as outside it.\n\nIt appears to me again,. with great respect, that there is no warrant for treating such a tax as in any way contrary either to the Jetter or the spirit of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse provided under Article 301.\"\n\nAs at present advised, I am inclined to agree with these observations.\n\nI am, therefore, inclined to think that normally a Jaw imposing a tax on intra-State sales does not offend Art. 301. It seems to me that the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is no exception to this rule.\n\nNone of its provisions directly impede the movement of goods or the free llow of trade.\n\nI may add that even assuming that the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is within the mischief of Art. 301, it is certainly a law made by Parliament in the public interest and is saved by Art. 302 J find nothing in the Act which offends Art ... 303 ( 1).\n\nThe decision of the High Court that sections 8(2), 8(2A). and 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 are ultra vires the Constitution must therefore be set aside.\n\nI agree to the order proposed by Shah J.\n\nHegde, J. Though I agree with the conclusions reached by my learned brother Shah, 1., namely, sections 8(2), 8(2-A) and 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (No. 74 of 1956}- hereinafter referred to as the Act-are intra vires the Constitution, my reasons for coming to that conclusion are not the s8111e as his. Hence this note.\n\n(I) [19SSJ 2 S. C. R. 603 at p. 7S4.\n\nThe facts of the case as well as the history of t!)e legislation are fn!ly\" set out in the majority judgment. It is settled by the decisions of this CQwt in Attabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam(') and the Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Limited v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthizn (') that a taxiilg statute is not outside the scope of Art. 301 of the Constitution. But before a taxing statute is held to be violative of that Article, it must be shown that it has a direct or immediate impact c:in the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the country. In other words, a mere remote or incidental impact is insufficient to hold that Art.\n\n301 has been. contravened.\n\nArticle 302 empowers Parliament\n\nby law to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one , State and another or within C any part of the territory of India';° as may be required in the public interest. The power C<)nferred on Parliament is extremely wide and the only limitation placed on that power by Art. 302 is that the law in question must be required in the public interest.\n\nPrimarily it is for Parliament to determine the requirements of public interest. The decision of Parliament in this regard is not easy 10 challenge.\n\nParliament is presumed to know the needs of the people, the reqments. of the time and the economic and political interests of the coll/1try as a whole. By its very composition it is unlikely that Parliament would have regional bias or would adopt a parochial approach. In addition, there is the presumption of the .constitutionality of a statute. therefore the State undoubtedly starts with an ad>1antage.\n\nBut once jt is shown -.that a measure prima facie gives preference to the -residents of one State over another State or it makes discrimination between the residents of a State ahd that of another because of the adoption of different rates of t3;\". in different Sta-\n\nIC!J, then the mattei:: assumes a different i:omplexion in view of Art. 303 (1). It should be witl)in the knowledge of the Union Government wJiy Parliament adopted different rates in different .Stlltes.\n\nI agree that mere difference in .. rates is neither showing preference nor -making discrimination. But other things being equal, the difference in rates would result in showjng preference to some States and making discrimination against others. Hence, in my opinion, difference in rates is a prima facie prooi of the preference or 'discrimination complained of. 'It is for the State to justify those differences.\n\nThe real question for decision is whether the impugned provisions have given or authorised the giving\" of any preference to one State over anotlier or made or authorised the making of any , disctimination bi; tween one State and another. The word \"State\" in Art. 301 is\"used in the sense of people residing in that\" State. It\" is impossible for any ordinary person to establish positively the preferenee or the\n\n(I) [1961] I S. C. R. 809.\n\n(2) [1963] I S. 'C. R. 491.\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Hegde, J.) 853\n\ndiscrimination complained of, apart from showing the difference in the rates. Once he shows the difference in the rates, it is for the State to show that the same has not resulted in showing pre ferences to one or more. States over others or making discrimination againsf one or more States over others in the matter of inter-State trade. I am not prepared to place an interpretation on Art. 303(1) which would render that provision purposeless.\n\nAfter all it is the State that had enacted the impugned provisions. It must have had good reasons for enacting those provisions.\n\nIt must place before court tliose reasons and satisfy it that Art. 303(1) has not been contravened. But on the material placed before us, I am satisfied that the differences in the rates are in public interest and those differences do not materially affect the free flow of trade in the country.\n\nFrom the history of the legislation, it is clear that the subject of taxing inter-State sales is a complicatl!d process.\n\nIt has various facets.\n\nSales-tax is one of the most important sources of revenue for the States. It was so even under the Government of India Act, 193 5.\n\nIt was not the intention of Parliament either to dry up that source or to divert the same. It wanted to retain that source for the States; but at the same time guard against States levying sales tax on inter-State sales in a manner which is likely to be prejudicial to the free flow of trade and commerce in the country.\n\nConstitutional amendments referred to in the judgment of Shah J. have an important purpose behind. them.\n\nSame is the case as regards the provisions in the Act.\n\nBefore Articles 269 and 286 were amended and the Act enacted, a Committee known as Taxation Enquiry Committee, had gone into the various aspects of inter-State trade and commerce and made recommendations to the Union Government on that subject.\n\nIt was largely on the basis of those recommendations that Articles 269 and 286 of the Constitution were amended and the Act enacted.\n\nTherefore it is clear .that the Act is not a haphazard legislation; it is the product of deep thinking and clear analysis of the various aspects of the matter. This Court will be slow to hold such a measure as being either not in public interest or is\n\nvioltive ?f ~· 3~3(1). The questio.n of giving preference or making d1scnmmation deJ>llnds on vanous facts and circumstances, the tax rate being only one of them.\n\nThe views of an expert committee on a subject so complicated as tax on inter-\n\nStte s~~ is. entitled to great weight.\n\nIn the very nature of thing;;, tt ts difficult for courts to ascertain the various factors tha.t J!llpede the free flow of trade or to assess their importance.\n\nThis .ts not te se thing as saying that this Court should abdicate tts functions m flllVoo; Q( an expert committee or should und~ exaggerate the illlpOrtatice of the collective knowledge and wisdom of thannembofS of Parliament. But the fact remains that\n\nin assessing the strength of economic forees in a given matter the views of persons who may be expected to be familiar with the subject is entitled to weight and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary or unless it is shown that their conclusions are obviously wrong, it will be proper for this Court to proceed on the basis that the conclusions reached by them on facts-not on questions of law-are correct.\n\nThe Taxation Enquiry Committee has given good reasons in .support of its recommendations.\n\nWe shall now examine the purposes behind s. 8 of the Act, which fixes rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse.\n\nThe Act divides inter-State sales into four categories, namely-(i) sales to Government, (ii) sales of goods which are declared to be of special importance in the inter-State trade and commerce, (iii) sales to registered dealers, and (iv) sales to others. Good many sales in the course of inter- State sales are made to Governments.\n\nIn a welfare State like ours, public sector is in-charge of various industries, which require raw material from various parts of the country. The Governments also require consumer goods of various types for its governmental functions as well as for its economic activities. A uniform rate is fixed for those sales under s. 8(1)(a). Hence in respect of an important segment of inter-State sales the rate is uniform, no doubt subject to s. 8(2-A), the scope of which I shall discuss a little later.\n\nSection 14 declares that goods enumerated therein are goods of special importance in the inter.State trade and commerce.\n\nSection 1 S prescribes the restrictions and conditions under which sales tax in respect of the turnover relating to those goods may be levied. One of the conditions prescribed at the relevant time was that tax should not be more than two percentum of the turn over. Further in respect of those goods only a single point taxation is permissible. The declared goods constitute a large portion of the goods sold in inter-State trade.\n\nThe incidence of taxation on those goods is such that it could not have had any serious repercusssion on inter-State trade.\n\nG Section 8(1)(b) regulates the sales tax leviable on sales to registered dealers in the course of inter-State sales. The maximum rate fixed at the relevant time was two percentum of the turnover.\n\nAll that the registered dealer has to do is to get in eluded in his certificate of registration goods of the class or classes which he proposes to purchase as being intended for 'l't- 8 sale by him or for use by him in the manufacture or processing goods for sale or in the mining or in the generation or distri hution of electricity or any other form of power. , Here again the\n\nStATE v. NATARAJA (Hegde, ).) 855\n\nA incidence of taxation is so low as ordinarily not to affect the free flow of trade.\n\nThis takes us to the remaining sales in the course of inter- State trade or commerce.\n\nBy and large these sales are made to unregistered dealers. Here again, so far as the declared goods are concerned, tax has to be levied at the rate applicable to local sales, as provided in s. 8(2)(a). Then we come to cl. (b) of s. 8(2), which deals with goods other than declared goods.\n\nHere the law at the relevant time was that the tax shall be calculated at the rate of seven percentum of the turnover or at the rate applicable to sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State, whichever is higher.\n\nAs could be seen from the report of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, the main reason for this provision was to prevent as far as possible the evasion of sales tax. The Parliament was anxious that inter-State trade should be canalised through registered dealers over whom the appropriate government has a great deal of control.\n\nIt is not very easy for them to evade tax. A measure which is intended to check the evasion o( tax is undoubtedly a valid measure. Further, inter-State trade carried on through dealers coming within s. 8(2), must be in the very •iure ot things very little. It is in public interest to see that in the guise of freedom of trade, they do not evade the payment of tax. Ii the sales tax they have to pay is as high or even higher than intra-State sales tax then they will be constrained to register themselves and pay the tax legitimately due.\n\nThe impact of this provision on inter-State trade is bound 10 be negligible, but at the same time it is an effective . safeguard against evasion of tax.\n\nSection 8(2-A) is incorporated with a view to see that the consumers in the States to which goods are imported are not placed at a disadvantage as compared to the cons\\Jmers in the\n\nStat~ from which the goods are imported. In fact this provision is bound to facilitate inter-State trade. The purpose behind the section is to see that the State Governments do not place the local consumers in a better position than the consumers outside.\n\nSub-section (5) of s. 8 provides for giving individual exemptions in public interest.\n\nSuch a power is there in all taxation 1veasures. It is to provide for unforeseen contingencies. Take for exan1ple, when there was famine in Bihar, if a dealer in Punjab had undertaken to sell goods to a charitable society in that State at a reasonable price for distribution to those who were H starving, it would have been in public interest if the Punjab Government had exempted that dealer from paying sales tax.\n\nSuch a power cannot immediately or directly affect the free flow 8 Sup C.1./68-!S\n\n85'6 SUPREME COURt llEl'ORtS l1968j 3 S.C.R.\n\nof trade. The power in question cannot be said to be bad. If A there is any misuse of that power, the same can be challenged.\n\nIt must be remembered that under the present conditions the power to tax is not merely used for the purpose of collecting revenue; jt is a powerful social instrument, in particular an instrument which can be effectively used for correcting economic maladjustments.\n\nWhile the legislature Diust provide in the law for all reasonably foreseeable contingencies, still some discretionary power has to be given to the executive to meet unexpected situations.\n\nIf we bear in mind the fact that sales tax on inter-State sales is levied for the benefit of the States and the further fact that each one of the State Governments in its own interest is bound to create the best possible condition for the growth of industry and commerce in that State, it is reasonable to assume that they will not be blind to economic forces. All that one has to guard against is to see that they do not, by having recourse to their taxation power, obstruct the flow of trade into their State. In the normal course they will be interested in seeing that goods produced in their States are sold outside. Reasonably sufficient safeguards against the free flow of trade into a State have been provided by the provisions of the Act, firstly, by providing for the levy of sales tax in the State in which the goods are produced, and, secondly, by placing various restrictions on the power of the States in fixing the rates.\n\nNone of the impugned provisions, in my opinion, has direct or immediate impact on inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppe\"/ at/owed and remanded.", "total_entities": 283, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. K. NATARAJA MUDALIAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. K. NATARAJA MUDALIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 18, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADRAS\n\nN. K. NATARAJA MUDALIAR April 18, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH, R. S. BACHAWAT, G. K. MITTER,\n\nC. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. S. HEGDE,."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. HEGDE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S. HEGDE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Arts. 301 and 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370, "end_char": 377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 501, "end_char": 522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 301, 302, 303 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 524, "end_char": 551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Safes Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 855, "end_char": 861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent claimed before the Commercial Tax Officer, Madras that some of his goods had been sent from Madras to his depot in A.lldhra Pradesh and that the sales of those goods were intra-State sales in Andhra Pradesh where they had been taxed as such."}}, {"text": "A.lldhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 927, "end_char": 943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent claimed before the Commercial Tax Officer, Madras that some of his goods had been sent from Madras to his depot in A.lldhra Pradesh and that the sales of those goods were intra-State sales in Andhra Pradesh where they had been taxed as such."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1004, "end_char": 1018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent claimed before the Commercial Tax Officer, Madras that some of his goods had been sent from Madras to his depot in A.lldhra Pradesh and that the sales of those goods were intra-State sales in Andhra Pradesh where they had been taxed as such."}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1258, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1297, "end_char": 1305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central 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{"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3160, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of the Constitution whereby Parliament is, notwithstanding the protection conferrd by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3218, "end_char": 3226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3383, "end_char": 3388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301 authorised to impose\n\nrestrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse bet\\veen one A Stale and another or within any part of the territory of India al.i may be required in the public interest. ["}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3945, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5843, "end_char": 5847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6705, "end_char": 6712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Bachawat J. (partly dissenting),-(i) It cannot be said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on inter-State sales as defined in s. 3 of the Act is in its essence a tax hampering movement of trade or commerce within the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "Bachawat"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7282, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7318, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7629, "end_char": 7637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8028, "end_char": 8036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8119, "end_char": 8127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8560, "end_char": 8568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9107, "end_char": 9115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9650, "end_char": 9661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9805, "end_char": 9816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPJUIMB COURT llBPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10329, "end_char": 10370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":8:i2 SUPJUIMB COURT llBPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 7, 1967 of ; the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10436, "end_char": 10453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":8:i2 SUPJUIMB COURT llBPO!lTS\n\n(1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 7, 1967 of ; the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10489, "end_char": 10502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10507, "end_char": 10519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. R. M. Abdul Karim", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10541, "end_char": 10561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. M. Abdul Karim, K. Rajendra Choudhury and K. R.\n\nChoudhury, for the respOndents."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10563, "end_char": 10584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. M. Abdul Karim, K. Rajendra Choudhury and K. R.\n\nChoudhury, for the respOndents."}}, {"text": "K. R.\n\nChoudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. M. Abdul Karim, K. Rajendra Choudhury and K. R.\n\nChoudhury, for the respOndents."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Thiagarajan, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "6opalakrishnan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10671, "end_char": 10685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. 6opalakrishnan, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "A. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10710, "end_char": 10721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Singh and D. N. Gupta, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10726, "end_char": 10737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Singh and D. N. Gupta, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10762, "end_char": 10778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar, R. N .. Sachthey and S. P. Nayyar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "R. N .. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar, R. N .. Sachthey and S. P. Nayyar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10801, "end_char": 10813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar, R. N .. Sachthey and S. P. Nayyar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10840, "end_char": 10846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nB. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10848, "end_char": 10864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nB. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10869, "end_char": 10879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nB. Sen, G. S. Chatterjee for P. K. Bose, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and 0.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10923, "end_char": 10933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and 0."}}, {"text": "Lql Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10961, "end_char": 10977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11020, "end_char": 11030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No.", "canonical_name": "C. B. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11048, "end_char": 11058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11063, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lql Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, Anil Kumar and S. P. Singh, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11099, "end_char": 11109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "K. Baldev Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11134, "end_char": 11149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Baldev Mehta, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "M'. R. K. 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("}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18838, "end_char": 18842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18979, "end_char": 18983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19105, "end_char": 19109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 to 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19238, "end_char": 19249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19395, "end_char": 19404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19524, "end_char": 19528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19578, "end_char": 19587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22913, "end_char": 22922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE V. 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(3) of s. 9."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28130, "end_char": 28134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28155, "end_char": 28159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28801, "end_char": 28822, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 269", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28983, "end_char": 28991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29370, "end_char": 29391, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 301 and 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29995, "end_char": 30012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30068, "end_char": 30079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30617, "end_char": 30625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30665, "end_char": 30673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30858, "end_char": 30872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. 1./68-14\n\nI 1\n\nof Assam and others('), Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for himself A and Wanchoo & Das Gupta, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30905, "end_char": 30912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. 1./68-14\n\nI 1\n\nof Assam and others('), Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for himself A and Wanchoo & Das Gupta, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30915, "end_char": 30924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. 1./68-14\n\nI 1\n\nof Assam and others('), Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for himself A and Wanchoo & Das Gupta, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31068, "end_char": 31076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atiabari Tea Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31320, "end_char": 31336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. 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State of Andhra Pradesh(') in which Venkatarama Aiyar, J., pointed out that under he scheme of entries in List I & II of the Seventh Schedule the power of taxation exercisable in respect of any matter is a power distinct from the power to legislate in respect of that matter."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38368, "end_char": 38384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38626, "end_char": 38642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38846, "end_char": 38862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39273, "end_char": 39289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39556, "end_char": 39564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Australian High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42648, "end_char": 42669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The King v. Barger(') the Australian High Court was called upon to deal with the meaning of the expression \"discrimination between States or parts of States\" used in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution, Isaacs, J., observed at p. 108 :\n\n\" . . . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42788, "end_char": 42793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42826, "end_char": 42832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The King v. Barger(') the Australian High Court was called upon to deal with the meaning of the expression \"discrimination between States or parts of States\" used in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution, Isaacs, J., observed at p. 108 :\n\n\" . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Australian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43255, "end_char": 43276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not include a differentiation based on other considerations, which are dependent on natural or business circumstances, and may operate with more or less force in different localities; and there is nothing, in my opinion, to prevent the Australian Parliament, charged with the welfare of the people as a whole, from doing what every State\n\nin the Commonwealth has power to do for its own citi -zens, that is to say, from basing its taxation measures on considerations of fairness and justice, always observing the constitutional injunction not to prefer States or parts of States ....\n\nIn W. R. Moran Proprietary Ltd. v. The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) and others('), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recorded its approval to that exposition."}}, {"text": "s. 51(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43850, "end_char": 43859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43977, "end_char": 43982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44531, "end_char": 44552, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "STATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44679, "end_char": 44684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "... ..\n\n.A •\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, J.) 845\n\nrate which the State Legislature detennines, subject to the maximum prescribed for goods referred to in s. 8 ( 1 ) and ( 2) are the operative rates for those transactions : in respect of transactions falling withins."}}, {"text": "NATARAJA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44688, "end_char": 44696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "... ..\n\n.A •\n\nSTATE v. NATARAJA (Shah, J.) 845\n\nrate which the State Legislature detennines, subject to the maximum prescribed for goods referred to in s. 8 ( 1 ) and ( 2) are the operative rates for those transactions : in respect of transactions falling withins."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44817, "end_char": 44821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46284, "end_char": 46288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46366, "end_char": 46370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47137, "end_char": 47145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Valiation Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47171, "end_char": 47199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47209, "end_char": 47236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47702, "end_char": 47723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 269", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48029, "end_char": 48037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48081, "end_char": 48085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48093, "end_char": 48114, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48797, "end_char": 48808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48818, "end_char": 48845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co.'s case(') this Court struck down the levy of tax on sales of tanned hides and skins imported from outside the State of Madras at a rate higher than th!'", "canonical_name": "A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co."}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49097, "end_char": 49108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49132, "end_char": 49137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49250, "end_char": 49254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49394, "end_char": 49401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49572, "end_char": 49576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49700, "end_char": 49707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49854, "end_char": 49858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49968, "end_char": 49975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. T. B. Mehtab Majid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50054, "end_char": 50075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The taxpayer contended in Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid's case(') that the tanned bides and skins imported from outside and sold inside the State were under r. 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules subjected to a higher rate of tax than the rate imposed on bides and skins tanned and sold within the Slate and this discriminatory system of taxation offended ArI. 304 (a) of the Constitution: This Court accepted the contention and held that r. 16(2) discriminated against imported hides or skins which had been purchased or\n\n(I) (l ~31 Supp.", "canonical_name": "A. T. B. Mehtab Majid & Co."}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50660, "end_char": 50671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51454, "end_char": 51461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51499, "end_char": 51506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51639, "end_char": 51653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution it was held that s. 2(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Special Provisions) Act, 1963, discriminated against imported hides and skins which were sold upto August 1, 1957, upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee and was therefore void."}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51824, "end_char": 51835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 301 and 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51929, "end_char": 51946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52525, "end_char": 52533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52561, "end_char": 52572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52861, "end_char": 52882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53104, "end_char": 53112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53117, "end_char": 53126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1964] 8 S. C. R. 217", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 53347, "end_char": 53368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Sales True Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53406, "end_char": 53428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53959, "end_char": 53980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 303(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54535, "end_char": 54546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54592, "end_char": 54600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55177, "end_char": 55184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55228, "end_char": 55236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55432, "end_char": 55436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55449, "end_char": 55470, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56000, "end_char": 56004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56017, "end_char": 56038, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act or the Genera I Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56083, "end_char": 56134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57436, "end_char": 57441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58120, "end_char": 58169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58283, "end_char": 58289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58661, "end_char": 58669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59007, "end_char": 59018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "He has said that tax under the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59396, "end_char": 59407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59484, "end_char": 59492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59496, "end_char": 59507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59547, "end_char": 59558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59759, "end_char": 59766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59846, "end_char": 59864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59896, "end_char": 59907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60030, "end_char": 60040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60141, "end_char": 60152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Article 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60416, "end_char": 60430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60449, "end_char": 60460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61150, "end_char": 61161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61369, "end_char": 61380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61919, "end_char": 61927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62914, "end_char": 62925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63108, "end_char": 63116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "seems to me that the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63121, "end_char": 63169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63328, "end_char": 63355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63382, "end_char": 63390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63472, "end_char": 63480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "sections 8(2), 8(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63576, "end_char": 63596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63614, "end_char": 63641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63747, "end_char": 63752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree to the order proposed by Shah J.\n\nHegde, J. Though I agree with the conclusions reached by my learned brother Shah, 1.,", "canonical_name": "HEGDE"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63823, "end_char": 63827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree to the order proposed by Shah J.\n\nHegde, J. Though I agree with the conclusions reached by my learned brother Shah, 1.,", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "sections 8(2), 8(2-A) and 8(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63841, "end_char": 63871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63879, "end_char": 63906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s8111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64047, "end_char": 64052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64454, "end_char": 64462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64763, "end_char": 64772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Article 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64797, "end_char": 64808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65141, "end_char": 65149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66112, "end_char": 66120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66921, "end_char": 66929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67554, "end_char": 67565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 303(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67806, "end_char": 67817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 269 and 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68810, "end_char": 68830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 269 and 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69107, "end_char": 69127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70682, "end_char": 70686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71449, "end_char": 71459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71564, "end_char": 71573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71627, "end_char": 71637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71749, "end_char": 71758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72308, "end_char": 72323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73283, "end_char": 73293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73322, "end_char": 73329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74138, "end_char": 74145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(2-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74634, "end_char": 74648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75092, "end_char": 75096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 75300, "end_char": 75305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take for exan1ple, when there was famine in Bihar, if a dealer in Punjab had undertaken to sell goods to a charitable society in that State at a reasonable price for distribution to those who were H starving, it would have been in public interest if the Punjab Government had exempted that dealer from paying sales tax."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 75322, "end_char": 75328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take for exan1ple, when there was famine in Bihar, if a dealer in Punjab had undertaken to sell goods to a charitable society in that State at a reasonable price for distribution to those who were H starving, it would have been in public interest if the Punjab Government had exempted that dealer from paying sales tax."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75510, "end_char": 75527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take for exan1ple, when there was famine in Bihar, if a dealer in Punjab had undertaken to sell goods to a charitable society in that State at a reasonable price for distribution to those who were H starving, it would have been in public interest if the Punjab Government had exempted that dealer from paying sales tax."}}, {"text": "S\n\n85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75657, "end_char": 75662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_857_861_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "RAJ KUMAR v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA April 18, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nPublic Servan:-Letters of resignation-Resignation accepted by appropriate authority-Acceptance not communicated to public servant-With drawa/ of resignation by public servant-Effect.\n\nBy letters dated 21st August 1964 and 30th August 1964 the appellant, submitted his resignation from the Indian Administrative Service and requested the State Government in which he was serving to forward his resignation to the Government of India. On 31st October 1964, the Government of India accepted the appellant's resignation and intimated acceptance to the State Government. On 27th November; the appellant wrote letter.; both to the State Government and Government of India withdraw\n\ning his resignation but, on 29th March 1965, the State Government passed an order accepting the appellant\"s resignation and directing the appellant to hand over char!!\".\n\nThe appellant filed a writ petition in . the High Court for quashing th.e orders o'f the State Government and the Government of India.\n\nThe petition was dismissed.\n\nIn appeal to this Court, it was contended that : ( 1) So long as the acceptance of the resignation was not communicated to him, the appellant could withdraw his resignation; and (2) the order.; accepting the resignation amounted to dismissal and were therefore violative of Art. 311 Of the Comtitution.\n\nHELD: (1) When a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation the determination of his employment, his service normally stands terminated frorD the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and, in the absence of any Jaw or statutory rule governing the conditions elf. his service, to the C:ontrary, it will not he open to the public servant to withdraw hi< resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Undue delay, in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation, may justify an inference that the resignat; on had not been accepted. [860 F-H]\n\nIn the present ease, on the plain terms of the resignation letter.; of the aopellant theresignation became effective as soon as it was accepted bv the aoprooriate authority. No rule has been framed under Art. 309 of the nstitution, nor is there any other rule having statutorv force which requ1rei, that tfor an order acceptin!l the resiation to be effective it must be. communicated to the oerson submitting his resignation. The circular rehed. upon by the appellant, according to which resignation becomes elfecbve when it is accepted and the officer is relieved of bis dutiea, merely !\"'nt'!ins instructions to be followed and has no statutory force. The resignation was accepted within a short time of its receipt by the Government of India and the delay of the State Government in implementing the order w.S not inordinate. [860 A-D, HJ .·\n\nSiate of Puniab v, Amar Sinh Hnrla. A.l.R'.\n\n0 1966 S.C. 1313. held\n\ninapplicahl~. ·\n\n(2) The orders were neither orders of dismissal nor of termination of service for any misconduct. (861 B-C]\n\nC1vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2429 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated May 28, 1966 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) Delhi in Civil Writ No. 170.D of 1965.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kusha/an, for the appellant.\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. I.\n\nA. K. Sen and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The appellant belonged to the Indian Administrative Service and was in August 1964 posted as Collector & District Magistrate, Kota. On August 21, 1964, he addressed a letter to the Chief Minister, Rajasthan, setting out several grievances and finally stated-\"In conclusion I would only request that the Government may do me the kindness of accepting my resignation from the service which I am submitting separately as I am convinced that it would be impossible to continue in such an atmosphere without being humiliated from time to time\". He also addressed a letter dated August 30, 1964, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan submitting his resignation \"from the Indian Administrative Service for early acceptance\", and requested that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with the remarks of the State Government. The State Government recommendi'.d that the resignation be accepted.\n\nOn October 31, 1964, the Government of India accepted the resignation of the appellant and requested the Chief Secretary to the Government of ajas than . \"to intimate the date on which the appellant was relieved of his duties so that a formal notification could be issued in that behalf'.\n\nAfter some time the appellant changed his mind and by letter dated November 27, 1964. the appellant requested the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to recommend \"acceptance of lhe withdrawal\" of his resination from the Indian Administrative Service. He also addressed a separate letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, intimating that he was \\vithdrawin~ his resination from the Indian Administrative Service. On March 29, 1965, an order acceptinl! the resignation of the appellant from the Indian Administrative Service was Issued and the apnellant was directed to hand over charee to the Additio.nal Collector. Kota. The appellant then moved a petition in the High Court of Punjab at Delhi for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling {or the record of the case and quashing the order pased by the\n\nH ,,\n\nGovernment of India accepting the resignation of the appellant, and also quashing the order dated March 29, 1965 issued by the State of Rajasthan. The High Court rejected the petition holding that the. resignation became effective on the date on which it was accepted by the Government of India, and a subsequent with drawal of the resignation was ineffective, even if acceptance of the resignation was not intimated to the appellant.\n\nIn tliis appeal, with certificate granted by the High Court, counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant could, so Icing as acceptance of the resignation was not communicated to him, withdraw the resignation submitted by him.\n\nCounsel invited our attention to a circular memorandum issued on May 6, 1958, under the signature of the Dputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, setting out the procedure to be followed in dealing with resignation from service. Clauses (c) & (d) of the circular stated :\n\n( c) \"The competent authority should decide the date with effect from which the resignation should become effective. In cases covered by (h)(i) above,· the date would be that with effect from which alternative arrangements can be made for filling the post. Where an office is on leave, the competent authority should decide whether he will accept the resignation with immediate effect or with effect from the date following the tern1ination of the leave. Where a period of notice is prescribed which a Government servant should give when he wis)les to resign from service, the competent authority may decide to count the period of leave towards the notice period. In other cases also, it is open to the competent authority to decide whether the resignation should become effective immediately or with effect from some prospective date. .\n\n(d) \"A resignation becomes effective when it is accepted and the officer is relieved of his duties. Where a resignation has not become effective and the officer wishes to withdraw it, it is open to the authority which accepted the resignation either to permit the officer to withdraw the resignation or to refuse the rquest for such withdrawal.\n\nWhere, however, a resignation has become effective, the officer is no longer in Government service and acceptance of the request for withdrawal of resignation would amount to re-employing him in service after condoning the period of break. . . . . . \"\n\nCounsel says that under the instructions issued by the Government of India resignation of an officer from service becomes effective\n\nafter it is accepted and the officer is relieved of his duties and not A till then. But the circular letter has no statutory force. It is not a rule made under .Art. 309 of the Constitution. It contains merely instructions set out by the Ministry of Home Affairs about the procedure to be followed in respect of resignation from service.\n\nOur attention has not been invited to any statutory rule or regulation relating to resignation by members of the Indian Administra- B tive Service, especially as to the date on which the resignation becomes effective.\n\nThe letters writen by the appellant on August 21, 1964, and August 30, 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptance thereof was intimated to the appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early acceptance. On the plain terms of the letters, the resignation was to become effective as soon as it was accepted by the appointing authoritv. Nci rule has been framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution which enacts that for an order accepting the resignation to be effective, it must be communicated to the person submitting his resignation.\n\nOur attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh llarika(') in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the Officer concerned or\n\nwa~ otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But when a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short ti111e after it was receive<! by\n\n(1) A. T. 1\\, 1966 S, C, R. 1m,\n\nthe Government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties.\n\nThe alternative ground raised by counsel that acceptance of the resignation amounts to dismissal from employment and failure to comply with the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution vitiates the order accepting the resigniition has no force.\n\nThe order complained of did not purport to be one of dismissal : the Government of India accepted the resignation submitted by the appellant, they did not purport to terminate the appointment for any misconduct on the part of the appellant, or as a measure of penalty.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as I to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 554, "end_char": 573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st October 1964, the Government of India accepted the appellant's resignation and intimated acceptance to the State Government."}}, {"text": "29th March 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 799, "end_char": 814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "both to the State Government and Government of India withdraw\n\ning his resignation but, on 29th March 1965, the State Government passed an order accepting the appellant\"s resignation and directing the appellant to hand over char!!\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1381, "end_char": 1389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2273, "end_char": 2281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3308, "end_char": 3319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kusha/an, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3321, "end_char": 3335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kusha/an, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Vishnu B. Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3337, "end_char": 3354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kusha/an, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Yogindra Kusha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3359, "end_char": 3373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Sardar Bahadur, Vishnu B. Saharya and Yogindra Kusha/an, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3398, "end_char": 3410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3435, "end_char": 3444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nA. K. Sen and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Baldev Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nA. K. Sen and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The appellant belonged to the Indian Administrative Service and was in August 1964 posted as Collector & District Magistrate, Kota."}}, {"text": "August 30, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also addressed a letter dated August 30, 1964, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan submitting his resignation \"from the Indian Administrative Service for early acceptance\", and requested that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with the remarks of the State Government."}}, {"text": "Government of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also addressed a letter dated August 30, 1964, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan submitting his resignation \"from the Indian Administrative Service for early acceptance\", and requested that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with the remarks of the State Government."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1964, the Government of India accepted the resignation of the appellant and requested the Chief Secretary to the Government of ajas than . \""}}, {"text": "November 27, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4810, "end_char": 4827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some time the appellant changed his mind and by letter dated November 27, 1964."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5087, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also addressed a separate letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, intimating that he was \\vithdrawin~ his resination from the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "Indian Administrative Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also addressed a separate letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, intimating that he was \\vithdrawin~ his resination from the Indian Administrative Service."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 29, 1965, an order acceptinl!"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved a petition in the High Court of Punjab at Delhi for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling {or the record of the case and quashing the order pased by the\n\nH ,,\n\nGovernment of India accepting the resignation of the appellant, and also quashing the order dated March 29, 1965 issued by the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5729, "end_char": 5747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved a petition in the High Court of Punjab at Delhi for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling {or the record of the case and quashing the order pased by the\n\nH ,,\n\nGovernment of India accepting the resignation of the appellant, and also quashing the order dated March 29, 1965 issued by the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8309, "end_char": 8317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 21, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letters writen by the appellant on August 21, 1964, and August 30, 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptance thereof was intimated to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11377, "end_char": 11385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_862_867_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "GOPAJ, KRISHNAJI KETKAR v.\n\nMAHOMED HAJI LAl'lt-' & ORS,\n\nApril 19, 1968\n\n[J. C. SHAH, V .. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nE'11icle11c.e-Jn1porlt111t docun1enlary e\\•frh•nce wi1hheld-Tcch'1icC1l plea of onus of proof ca11no1 prevent adverse inference.\n\nThe appellant claimed before th~ authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, i11ter alia, that a certain plot of land belonged to him and not to the Trust of which he was Manager. The High 'court when the matter went before it held that the plot hclonged to the Trust.\n\nJn appeal by certificate to this Court,\n\nHELD: On the evidence the plot in question must be held lo be the properly of the Trust. The failure of the appellmt to produce the account books admitted to he in his possession froht which it coul<l he .seen how the income from the plot was dealt with woul<l justify an atlverse inference against him. [865 E, 366 E, 867 El\n\nEven if the burden of proof <locs not lie on a party the court may D <lraw an adverse inference i'C he withholds important documents in his possessio11 which can throw light on the facts in issue.\n\nIt is not a sound practice ior those desiring to rely upon a certain state of affairs to with hold front the court the best evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the issµcs in controver1Ey and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. [866 F]\n\nMurugesani Pillai v. Manickcn•asaka Pandara, 44 I.A. 98, Biltu Rant &.\n\nE Or.r. v. Jofnandan Prasdd & Or.r. C.A. No. 941 of 1965 dt. 154-68 and\n\nBila.\\' Kunwar v. Dusraj Ranjit Singh & Ors. 42 I.A. 202, rehed on.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J UR!SDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 954 of 1965.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated March 8, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal Nos. 338 and 422 of\n\n1960.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, W. I'. Oka, S. W. Oka and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.\n\nDanial Latifi and Hardev Sin!Jh, for respondents Nos, 3 ~~ G\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and R. II. /Jhe/1ar, !or rcspot1<kn1 No. 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated March 8, 1963 in First Appeals Nos. 338 of 1960 and 422 of 1960.\n\nH On or about April 15, 1952 the appellant made an application to the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Greater Bombay Region\n\nI \\ \\\n\nA under s. 18 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act (Bombay Act XXIX of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for registration of the Peer Haji Malang Dargah near Kalyan in the Thana District (h\"e- Dafter referred to as the 'Dargah') without prejudice to his contel!tion that the Dargah was not a public trust to which the Act was applicable. n August 3, 1953 the Deputy Charity Com- B missioner made an order declaring that the Dargah was a public trust and directed its registration as such.\n\nTheDeputy Charity Commissioner further held that among the properties of the Dargah was the land bearing Survey No. 134 of village Wadi on a portion of which the Dargah is located.\n\nThe Deputy Charity\n\nCommissioner also directed that the appropriate court might be moved for framing a scheme and appointing Trustees. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Charity Commissioner, Bombay under s. 70 of the Act against the order of the Deputy Charity Commissioner. The appeal was registered as Appeal No. 66 of\n\n1953. Under orders of the Government the appeal was heard by the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad invested for that purpose with the powers of the Charity Commissioner. By his order dated September 11, 1954, the said Deputy Commissioner with appellate powers dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an application under s. 72 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Thana to set aside the order of the Deputy Charity Commisioner with appellate powers, contending tliat the Dargah was not a public trust, that Survey No. 134 was not the property of the Trust and that the appellant was a hereditary Trustee. The application was opposed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who had intervened during the proceedings before the Deputy Charity Commissioner and by the Charity Commissioner, respondent No. 5 who was also impleaded by the appellant in that application. The respondent contended that the Dargah was a public trust and the land bearing Survey No. 134 belonged to the !rust and the appellant was not a Trustee of the Dargah. By his Judgment dated April 26, 1955 the District Judge, Thana held that the Dargah was a public trust but he left the questions as to whether Survey plot No. 134 belonged to the Dargah or not and whether the appellant was a trustee or only a de facto Manager of the Dargah, open for decision in the suit which had been le~ by the Charity Commissioner.\n\nAgainst the order of\n\nth~ Dtstnct Jude the Charity Commissioner filed an appeal in the High <; ourt, bem~ Appeal No. 501 of 1955. The appellant also filed hH> cross ob1ecttons. The .said appeal and cross objections were heard together and the High Court by its judgment dated November 19, 1958 confirmed the finding of the District Judcre\n\naou~ the public nature of the trust and further held that the District Judge should have decided whether Snrv•v plot No 134 was the property of the Dargah or not and wh; ther the apllant\n\nwas a trustee or a Manager of the trust. The case was therefore remanded back to the District Judge for deciding these questions.\n\nAccordingly the District Judge reheard the matter and by his judgment dated February 29,. 1960 held, in the first place, that Survey plot No. 134 of village Wadi was not the property of the Public Trust Peer Haji Malang Saheb Dargah and that the appellant was the hereditary trustee of the Trust, his family being its hereditary trustee. . Against the judgment of the District Judge two appeals were filed in the High Court. First Appeal No. 338 of 1960 was filed by respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and First Appeal No. 422 of 1960 was filed by the Charity Commissioner, respondent No. 5. Both the appeals were heard together by the Higl:! Court.\n\nBy its judgment dated March 8, 1968, the High Court allowed both the appeals.\n\nThe High Court confirmed, in the first place, the finding of the District Jildge that the management of the Dargah has been in the family of the appellant. With regard to ownership of Survey plot No. 134 on which the Dargah is situated, the Higk Court held that the appellant was not the owner of that plot but that it was the property of the Dargah.\n\nThe main question presented for determination in this appeal is whether the land comprised in Survey plot No. 134 was the property of the Dargah or whether it belonged to the appellant.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to set out the origin and history of the Dargah. The Dargah has been in existence for over about 700 years. Its origin is lost in antiquity but the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency tells us that the tomb is that of a Muslim saint who came to India as an Arab missionary in the thirteenth century.\n\nAccording to tradition, there are two tombs in the Dargah in one of which is the dead-body of a Hindu princess and :in the other tomb the dead-body of the Muslim saint. The fame of the saint was at height when the English made their appearance at Kalyan in 1780. As they only stayed for two years, their departure in the year 1782 was ascribed to the power of the dead saint. The Peshwas were then in power in that region and after the departure of the English they sent a thanks offering under the charge of one Kashinath Pant Ketkar, a Kalyan Brahmin. It is said tl:!at the offering sent by the Peshwas was a pall of cloth of gold trimmed with pearls and supported on silver posr.. The tomb was in disrepair and Kashinath started to repair it and according to tradition was miraculously assisted by'the dead saint who, without human aid, quarried and dressed the large 111ocks of stone which now cover the tomb. It appears that Kashinath was not content to repair the tomb. He also wanted to manage it and this led to a dispute with Kalyan Muslims who resented Brahmin management of a Muslim shrine. Matters came to a head in 1817 and the dispute came before the Collector who declared that the\n\n' '\n\nA dead sint should settle the affair and that the only way of ascertaining the saint's wishes was by casting lots. This was done and three times the lot fell on the representative of Kashinath and so the matter ended and Kashinath's representative was proclaimed guardian of the tomb.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant reference was made to the Area Book, Ex. 66 of the year 1890. The entry shows the name of Laxmibai widow of Govind Gopal Ketkar under the heading\n\n\"if '!i<r'' (name of the person). Exhibit 67 is the entry from the Phalani Book for the year 1897 and shows the land as \"Kilyacha Dongar\" and under the column \"li:<fll'Rf\n\n'!'IT\" is shown the name of LaXffiibai widow of Govind Gopal. Exl1ibit 68 is of the same vear from the revision Phalani containing similar entry with the inap attached. In Exhibit 70 the name of Laxmibai is shown as \"Khatedar\" for the year 1906. In the remarks column there is an entry \"one built well, one pakka built masjid, one Dargah, one tomb\". Exhibit 71 is an entry for the year 1915 from Akar Phod Patrak and in the column of \"Kabjedar\" the naine of Rukminibai Hari appears with regard to plot\n\n134. Thereafter, in the record of rights for the year 1913, Ex. 76, the name of the predecessor of the appellant is shown. On the basis of these entries it was submitted by Mr. Gokhale that the ownership of the plot was with the appellant and not with the Dargah. But there are important circumstances in this case which indicate that the appellant is not the owner of Survey plot No. 134. Exhibits 64 and 65 are significant in this connection.\n\nExhibit 64 is an entry from the \"Sud\" in Marathi for the year 1858 in connection with Survey plot No. 134 (Revisional Survey Number). The original Survey number of this plot was 24 and it was known as \"Kilyacha Dongar\". The total area is shown to be 249 acres , and 24 Gunthas. It is shown as 'Khalsa' land. Klzaraba is shown as 89 acres 24 Gunthas and the balance of the area is shown as 160 acres. In the last column the name of the cultivator js not mentioned but it is shown as \"Khapachi\". It is significant that the name of the Ketkar family is absent fwm this record. No convincing reason was furnished on behalf of the appellant to show why h.is name was not entered in the \"Sud\". It is also important to notice that the appellant has furnished no documentary evidence to show how his family acquired tHle to the land from the earliest time; there is no sanad or grant produced by the appellant to show that he had acquired title to the land. It further appears that the appellant's family di? not assert any title to the land at the time of the survey made m 1858; otherwise there is no reason why its name was not entered in the \"Sud\" of the vear 1858. It is true that th.ere ar.e a number of entris subsequeni to the year 1890 and 1897 m which the Ketkar family is shown as the \"Khatedar\" or\n\nthe occupant but these entries are not of much significance since the Ketkar. family was in the fiduciary position of a Manager of the Dargah and was lawfully in possession of Survey plot 134 in that capacity. There is also another important circumstance that the appellant has no lands of his own near plot No. 134 and the nearest lands he owns are in Bandhanwadi which are admittedly 3i to 4 miles away from the top of the hill. There is also the important admission made by the appellant in the course of his evidence that there are 2 or 3 tombs behind the Musaferkhana. He stated further that \"there is no cemetery or burial ground in Survey No. 134\". But this evidence is in direct conflict with the statement of the appellant in the previous case that \"Round about the Dargah many people die every year ..... Anyone that died there, whether Hindu, Muslim or Parsee if he has no heirs is buried there\". He also conceded that there is one public tank known as \"Chasmyachi Vihir\" near the Dargah and there are 5 wells near the Dargah and five boundary 'Aranas' about one mile from the Dargah. Lastly, reference should be made to the important circumstance that the appellant has not produced the account of the Dargah income. In the course of his evidence the appellant admitted that he was enjoying the income of plot No. 134 but he did not produce any accounts to substantiate his contention. He also admitted that \"he had got record of the Dargah income and that account was kept. separately.\" But the appellant has not produced either his own accounts or the account of the Dargah to show as to how the income from plot No. 134 was dealt with.\n\nMr. Gokhale, however, argued that it was no part of the appellant's duty to produce the accounts unless he was called upon to do so and the onus was upon the respondents to prove the case and to show that the Dargah was the owner of plot No. 134. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence which is in their possession which couldo throw light. upon the issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof. In Murugesam Pillai v. Manichavasaka Pandora(') Lord Shaw observed as follows: ·\n\n\"A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof, and failing, accordingly, to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to\n\n(I) 44 I. A. 9q, at p • 103.\n\nj, ..\n\nthird parties, this may be right enough-they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships' opinion an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts . to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition.\" This passage was cited with approval by this Court in a rcent decision-Bi/tu Ram & Ors. v. Jainandan Pras<id & Ors.('). In that case, reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants upon the following passage from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bi/as Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh & Ors. (2) :\n\n\"But it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appears to him in such affidavit to he .relv?.nt end prcp:r. If h~ fail~ iiG to do, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents.\"\n\nBut Shah, J., speaking for the Court, stated:\n\n\"The observations of the Judicial Committee do not support the proposition that unless a party is caJled upon expressly to make an affidavit of documents and inspection and production of documents is demanded, the Court cannot raise an adverse inference against a party withholding evidence in his possession. Such a rule is inconsistentwith illustration (g) of s. 114 of the Evidence Act, and also an impressive body of authority.\"\n\nFor these reasons we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in reaching the conclusion that Survey plot No. 134\n\nelonged to the Dargah and must be shown as the property belonging to the Public Trust. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. One hearing fee\n\nG.C.\n\n(I) Civil Appeal 941 of 1965 decided on April IS, 1968.\n\n(2) 42 I. A. 202, at p. 206.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "GOPAJ, KRISHNAJI KETKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOPAL KRISHNAJI KETKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHOMED HAJI LAl'lt-' & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHOMED HAJI LATIF & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V .. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 311, "end_char": 341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE J UR!SDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1600, "end_char": 1629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE J UR!SDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, W. I'."}}, {"text": "W. I'. Oka", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, W. I'."}}, {"text": "S. W. Oka", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1815, "end_char": 1824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oka, S. W. Oka and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oka, S. W. Oka and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Danial Latifi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1861, "end_char": 1874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danial Latifi and Hardev Sin!Jh, for respondents Nos, 3 ~~ G\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and R. II."}}, {"text": "Hardev Sin!Jh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1879, "end_char": 1892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danial Latifi and Hardev Sin!Jh, for respondents Nos, 3 ~~ G\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and R. II."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1923, "end_char": 1938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danial Latifi and Hardev Sin!Jh, for respondents Nos, 3 ~~ G\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and R. II."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2027, "end_char": 2036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated March 8, 1963 in First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2333, "end_char": 2338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXIX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 3, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n August 3, 1953 the Deputy Charity Com- B missioner made an order declaring that the Dargah was a public trust and directed its registration as such."}}, {"text": "Wadi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 of village Wadi on a portion of which the Dargah is located."}}, {"text": "Charity Commissioner, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal to the Charity Commissioner, Bombay under s. 70 of the Act against the order of the Deputy Charity Commissioner."}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXIX of 1950", "statute": "Bombay Act XXIX of 1950"}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under orders of the Government the appeal was heard by the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad invested for that purpose with the powers of the Charity Commissioner."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated September 11, 1954, the said Deputy Commissioner with appellate powers dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of the District Judge, Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an application under s. 72 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Thana to set aside the order of the Deputy Charity Commisioner with appellate powers, contending tliat the Dargah was not a public trust, that Survey No."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his Judgment dated April 26, 1955 the District Judge, Thana held that the Dargah was a public trust but he left the questions as to whether Survey plot No."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his Judgment dated April 26, 1955 the District Judge, Thana held that the Dargah was a public trust but he left the questions as to whether Survey plot No."}}, {"text": "February 29,. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the District Judge reheard the matter and by his judgment dated February 29,."}}, {"text": "Haji Malang Saheb Dargah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5609, "end_char": 5633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 of village Wadi was not the property of the Public Trust Peer Haji Malang Saheb Dargah and that the appellant was the hereditary trustee of the Trust, his family being its hereditary trustee. ."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated March 8, 1968, the High Court allowed both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6855, "end_char": 6861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its origin is lost in antiquity but the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency tells us that the tomb is that of a Muslim saint who came to India as an Arab missionary in the thirteenth century."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its origin is lost in antiquity but the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency tells us that the tomb is that of a Muslim saint who came to India as an Arab missionary in the thirteenth century."}}, {"text": "Kalyan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fame of the saint was at height when the English made their appearance at Kalyan in 1780."}}, {"text": "Kashinath Pant Ketkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Peshwas were then in power in that region and after the departure of the English they sent a thanks offering under the charge of one Kashinath Pant Ketkar, a Kalyan Brahmin."}}, {"text": "Kashinath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said tl:!at the offering sent by the Peshwas was a pall of cloth of gold trimmed with pearls and supported on silver posr.. The tomb was in disrepair and Kashinath started to repair it and according to tradition was miraculously assisted by'the dead saint who, without human aid, quarried and dressed the large 111ocks of stone which now cover the tomb."}}, {"text": "Laxmibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entry shows the name of Laxmibai widow of Govind Gopal Ketkar under the heading\n\n\"if '!"}}, {"text": "Govind Gopal Ketkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8614, "end_char": 8633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entry shows the name of Laxmibai widow of Govind Gopal Ketkar under the heading\n\n\"if '!", "canonical_name": "Govind Gopal Ketkar"}}, {"text": "LaXffiibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IT\" is shown the name of LaXffiibai widow of Govind Gopal."}}, {"text": "Govind Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8873, "end_char": 8885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IT\" is shown the name of LaXffiibai widow of Govind Gopal.", "canonical_name": "Govind Gopal Ketkar"}}, {"text": "Rukminibai Hari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit 71 is an entry for the year 1915 from Akar Phod Patrak and in the column of \"Kabjedar\" the naine of Rukminibai Hari appears with regard to plot\n\n134."}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9505, "end_char": 9512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of these entries it was submitted by Mr. Gokhale that the ownership of the plot was with the appellant and not with the Dargah."}}, {"text": "Dargah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of these entries it was submitted by Mr. Gokhale that the ownership of the plot was with the appellant and not with the Dargah."}}, {"text": "Ketkar family", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that th.ere ar.e a number of entris subsequeni to the year 1890 and 1897 m which the Ketkar family is shown as the \"Khatedar\" or\n\nthe occupant but these entries are not of much significance since the Ketkar."}}, {"text": "Ketkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11147, "end_char": 11153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that th.ere ar.e a number of entris subsequeni to the year 1890 and 1897 m which the Ketkar family is shown as the \"Khatedar\" or\n\nthe occupant but these entries are not of much significance since the Ketkar."}}, {"text": "Bandhanwadi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11430, "end_char": 11441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 and the nearest lands he owns are in Bandhanwadi which are admittedly 3i to 4 miles away from the top of the hill."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15042, "end_char": 15046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Shah, J., speaking for the Court, stated:\n\n\"The observations of the Judicial Committee do not support the proposition that unless a party is caJled upon expressly to make an affidavit of documents and inspection and production of documents is demanded, the Court cannot raise an adverse inference against a party withholding evidence in his possession."}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15447, "end_char": 15453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April IS, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15841, "end_char": 15855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One hearing fee\n\nG.C.\n\n(I) Civil Appeal 941 of 1965 decided on April IS, 1968."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_868_878_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "BULCHAND CHANDmAM OF BOMBAY A\n\nBANK OF INDIA LTD., FORT, BOMBAY\n\nApril 19, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI and G. K. MITTER, JJ.J S\n\nThe Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act 70 of 1951, ss, 2(6), 17, 22, 29-'Renewal' of debt meaning of-lnSurance policies whether governed by s. 11-Apportionment of liabilities between joint debtors under s. 22-Award of interest under s. 29.\n\nThe appellant was a citizen of Pakistan and had come u; India on June 6, 1950 on a temporary permit. During his absence the Pakistan Government declared him to be an evacuee. In December 1950 he was granted a Domicile Certificate and since then he continued to reside in Bombay. On May 4, 1945 the appellant had opened an account with tho Bank of India (Hyderabad, Sind Branch) called the Cash Credit Account. Tho amount was secured by an assignment of life insurance policies on tho appellant's life and mortgage of certain immovable properties. In July 1949 the appellant took another loan of Rs. 1,25,()()() from tho Hyderabad Bank on the security of certain properties and the personal security of himself and his wife. On .July 22, 1952 the appellant made an application under s. 5 of the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjust-· ment) Act, 1951 for adjustment elf his debts against several creditors, but pressed it only against tho Bank. Against the trial court's judgment. both parties appealed to the High Court. The High Court's judgment was challenged by the appellant iri this Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia : (i) That no interest should have been allowed to the Bank from August 15, 1947 in view of the provisions of s. 29 of .the Act; (ii) That the liability on the Cash Credit Account and on the Loan Account was not the sole responsibility of the appellant but was a joint liability and the High Court should have apportioned the joint debt under s. 22, without construing that section with the aid of s. 43 rlf the Indian Contract Ac~ (iii) That the insurance policies did not fall under s. 17 of the Act and the appellant was entitled to a refund of the amount recovered from them; and (iv) That the High .Court erred in interpreting the word 'renewal' occurring in the definition of s. 2(6).\n\nHELD: (i) Proviso (b) to s. 29(1) of the Act confers a. dracretioo oo !00 Tribunal to allow interest not exceeding 4 per cent pe!r annum for the period from August IS, 1947 up to December 10, 1951, the date on which the Act came into force in Bombay after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor as defined in s. 32. In the present case the High Court had on the statement of the appellant himself found his pay.. ing capacity to be far in excess of the debts due •from him, and it was tlterefore a fit case in which interest at 4 per cent should be allowed to the Bank from August 15, 1947 to December 10, 1951. [876 A-DJ\n\n(ii) Even assuming that s. 43 of the contract is not relev'ant for tne construction of s. 22 of the Act the plea of the appellant •for apportionment of the debt must be rejected because from his own pleadings it was apparent that the liability both on the Loan Acoount and on the Cash Credit Account was undertaken solely by the appellant.\n\nThere was no justification for interfering with the finding of the High Court in !Iris respect. [876 E-Hl\n\nI A\n\n(iii) The insurance policies were 'movable property' as defined in s. 3 of the General Clauses Act. In the present case there was an absolllle assignment of the policies in favour of the Bank and the policies were also in its possession. Section 17 of the Act therefore applied and unle\"\"\n\nrealisation under the policies was in ex= of the debt due the appellant was not entitled to refund. [877 F-0]\n\n(iv) The confirmation or acknowledgement of indebtedness which includes both loan and interest and further advances l/ any, would not fall within the ambit of the expression 'renewal' in the proviso to s. 2(6) of 1he Act. The liability referred to in the proviso is the liabili!}'. solely by Way of renewal and the proviso to the section states that the onginal loan and not the one for which the renewal is made is the debt within the\n\nmeaning of the section. But the proviso does not apply if the confirmation or acknowledgement is not solely by way of re11; ewal on accou~ f\n\nloan or interest but includes further advance.\n\nThe High Court was JUStlfied in determining the appellant's debts on this view. [877 H; 878 AB]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 690 of 1967.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 16, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Cross Appeals Nos. 756 and 791 of 1957.\n\nM. C. Chagla and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, Bhuvnesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachan; i. 0. C.\n\nM11thur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated November 16, 1962 in Cross Appeals Nos. 756 and 791 of 1957.\n\nThe appellant, Bulchand Chandiram was a citizen of Pakistan and had come to India on June 6, 1950 on a temporary permit.\n\nDuring his absence the Pakistan Government declared him to be an evacuee. In December, 1950 he was granted a Domicile Certificate and since then he has been residing in Bombay. On May 4, 1945 the appellant had opened an account with the Bank ef India. (Hyderabad Sind Branch) called the Cash Credit Account.\n\nThe account was secured by an assignment of life insurance policies on the appellant's life of about Rs. 79,000 and mortgage of immoveable properties l to 5 in Sch. 'F'. Between March and April 194 7 properties 4 and 5 were sold and the appellant paid Rs. 35,000 to the Bank. In this account on December 31, 1949 the amount due to the Bank was Rs. 1,06,281-12-11 (Item No. 36) and on April 22, 1950 the amount due was Rs. 1,07,969/ 15/ ll (Item No. 44). In July 1949 , tl!~ appellant took a loan of Rs. 1,25,000 from the Hyderabad Branch on the security of properties mentioned in Sch. 'G' and the personal security of himself and his wife.\n\nIn early 1948 this Branch was closed and so the account was transferred to the Karachi Branch. In this account on December 31, 1949 the amount due was Rs. 1,33,655/11/- and\n\n870 SUPREME COUllT JUIPOllTS\n\n(1968) 3 S.C.R.\n\nas on April 22, 1950 the amount due was Rs. 1,35,735713/-\n\n(ltem No. 45). On July 22, 1952 the appellant made an application under s. 5 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (Act No. LXX of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the \"said Act\" for adjustment of his debts against several creditors.\n\nDuring the hearing of the app1ication the appellant only pressed the application against the Bank and not against his other creditots.\n\nThe appellant alleged that the Bank had realised two of the iasurance policies and had recovered some other amounts. It was also said that the Bank had received the rent of the properties from Pakistan after they were declared evacuee properties. The appellant claimed that the Bank was also not entitled to claim interest after August 15, 194 7. He further alleged that the additional security on property No. 6 in the Schedule was obtained by the Billk by undue influence and coercion and hence the security to that extent was illegal and inoperative. The Bank contested die application on several grounds. According to the Bank the preperties of the appellant left in Pakistan were worth only Rs. 4,00,000. The Bank also alleged that the value of the assets of the appellant was not correctly shown. It admitted the realisation of Rs. 24, 700 on the maturity of the policies and stated that it had credited the appellant_ with the converted value in Pakistan rupees since the amount was transferred to Karachi when the Bank received the assent of the Controller of Foreign Exchange. The Bank contended that on June 30, 1952 the amount due in rspect of the Cash Credit Account was Rs. 1,22,160/2/11 and in the loan account Rs. 1,52,622/12/- with interest at on~r cent O\\'er the Bank rate. It was contended for the Bank that if the appellant was held entitled to the protection of the said Act the Bank chose to act under s. 16 of the said Act to retain the security and will also be entitled to full amount of the insurance policies. Upon these rival contentions of the parties the trial court he!<! that the appellant was a displaced person, that he was entltled to dispubl the amount due even though acknowledgements were signed, that the debts were liable to be adjusted a& joint debts and apportioned between the debtors, that the insurance policies were moveable J>POPerties for the purpose of s. 22 of the said Act but not for the purpose of s. 17 and that the aepellant was entitled to a credit ol Rs. 17,126/9/4 in respect of tlie amount realised on the maturity of the insural\\CC policies. The trial Judge accordingly held as below in respect of the Cash Credit Account :\n\n.. Amount due as principal up to 10th Deoember 1951 Interest up to 10th December 1951 Expenses\n\nLess rent realised and amount of reversed entrie.s\n\nRs. a. p . 89.Wl-11-11 ::?0,496- 4- 0\n\n240-13- 0\n\nl, IO, lJ2-12-ll\n\n860-1()- 0\n\n1,0'J,472-- 2 11\"'\n\nA I\n\nA On apportionment the trial Judge held that a sum of Rs. 13,684/ 2/ 11 was recoverable out of life policies and Rs. 95;7~8/- from immoveable properties. The liability Of the appellant being 1/3rd, the trial Judge held him liable for Rs. 36,490/11/11. In respect Of the loan account the trial Judge held as follows :\n\n\"The amount due in that account up to 10th December 1951 Interest up to 10th December 1951 BKpenses\n\nLess rent received .\n\nRs. a. p. 1.20,704-11--0\n\n20,89~0\n\n38~6---0\n\n1,41,639-3--0\n\n1,621-15--0\n\n1,40,017--4--0\"\n\nThe trial Judge held that the appellant was liable for Rs. 70,008-10-0 there being two joint debtors. Against the decision of the trial Judge the Bank preferred Appeal No. 756 of 1957 and the appellant Bulchand Chandiram preferred Appeal No. 791 of 1957 in the Bombay High Court. The High Court held that D on June 30, 1948 there was due to the Bank in the Cash Credit Account a sum of Rs. 1,02,902/7/ll and after .the said date there were renewals only or confirmations of liabilitx and there was a Promissory Note in respect of the said liability dated November l 8, 1947 to the extent of Rs. 1,09,000/- and the High Court was not entitled to go behind that date. The High Court E further held that in respect of the lci:in account a loan to the extent\n\nof Rs. 1,25,000 was taken on July 12, 1947 and there was a Promissory Note in respect thereof dated June 19, 1947. The High Court held that the trial court was justified in awarding interest at 4 per cent from August 15, 1947 to December 10, 1951 which was the date of the commencement of the said Act, under F the proions of s. 29 '?f the said Act. Regarding the questfon of apportionment the High Court came to the conclusion, after atamining the evidence, that the appellant was alone liable fer the debts and no question therefore arose of apportionment of liability .. The High Court also examined the provisions of s. 17 of the satd Act and held that the insurance policies were moveable properties within the meaning of that section and there was a G valid. pledge in respect thereof. The High Court ultimately held that m respect of the Cash .Credit Account the Bank was entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,09,273.65 and in respect of the loan account the Bank was entitled to Rs. 1,47,068.49.\n\nH It is necessary at this stage to set out the material provisions of the said Act. Section 2(6) defines a \"debt'' as follows :\n\n\" 'debt' means any pecuniary liability, whether payable presently or in future, or under a decree or order of\n\nI t\n\na civil or revenue court or otherwise, or whether ascer- A tained or to be ascertained, which- .......... ·.· ......................... .\n\nand includes\n\nany pecuniary liability incurred before the commencement of this Act by any such person as is referred to in\n\nthis clause which is based on, and is solely by way of renewal of, any such liability as is referred to fn subclause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) :\n\nProvided that in the case of a foan, whether in cash or in kind, the amount originally advanced and not the amount for which !he liability has been renewed Shall be deemed to be the extent of the liability;\n\nSection 3 states :\n\n\"Over-riding effect of Act, rules and orders.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other Jaw for the time being in force, or in any decree or order of a court, or in any contract between the panies.\"\n\nSection 5 enables a displaced person to make an application for adjustment of debts to the proper Tribunal. Section 15 presc!1Des the consequences of an application by the displaced debtor and states that no proceedings can thereafter be taken against him for realisation of the debt. Section 16 gives an option to the creditor to elect as to whether he would retain the security in West Pakistan, and if he does so the section prescribes the consequences of such election on the part of the creditor.\n\nTh~ section gives a first charge to the secured creditor on the amount of the compensation to which the debtor would be entitled to be paid for .his properties left in Pakistan. But the amount in respect of which charge is given is in the same proportion of the debt as the actual compensation bears to the verified claim in respect of the properties. If property is given in exchange then charge is given in respect of the debt in the same proportion as the property given bears to .the verified claim. Section 17 relates to the debt secured by the pledge of moveable property and provides as follows :\n\n\"17. Debts secured on moveable property.-(1) Where in respect.of a debt incurred by a displaced debtor and secured by .the pledge of movable property belonging\n\nto him, the creditor had been placed in possession of such property at any time before the debtor became a displaced person, the following rules shall regulate the rights and liabilities of the creditor and the debtor, namely :·-\n\n(a) the creditor may, if he is still in possession of'\n\nthe pledged property, realise the sum due to him by the sale of such property after giving to the debtor reasonable notice of the sale;\n\n(b) the creditor shall not be entitled, in any case where the pledged property is no longer in his possession or is not available for redemption by the debtor, to recover from the debtor the debt or any part thereof for which the pledged property was security;\n\n(c) the debtor shall not be liable, in the case of a sale by the creditor of any pledged property, whether under clause (a) or otherwise, to pay the balance where the proceeds of such sale-are less than the amount of the debt due;\n\n(d) the creditor shall, in any case where the proceeds of the sale of the pledged property are greater than the amount of the debt due, pay over the surplus to the debtor. ·\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the creditor shall be entitled to receive, and to give a valid discharge in respect of, any sum due under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force from an insurance company in respect of any claim arising out of the loss or destruction of the pledged property, but the creditor shall, in any case where the sum received from the insurance company iS greater than the amount of the debt due to him, pay o\\ter the surplus to the debtor.\"\n\nSection 22 relates to apportionment of joint debts and reads as follows : i\n\n\"Where a debt is due from a displaced person jointly with another person, the Tribunal shall, for the purposes of this Act, apportion the liability between them according to the following rules, namely :-\n\n(a) if the liability of each debtor is defined, then according to the defined share of each;\n\n( b) if the debt. was taken for any trade or business of the joint debtors, then according to the shares held by each of the joint debtors in the trade or business;\n\n( c) if the debt was not taken in any defined shares or for any trade or business in which the partners have any defined share, the debt shall be apportioned into as. many parts as there are joint debtors, and each joint debtor shall be liable only for the part apportioned to him;\n\n( d) if one joint debtor is a displaced person and another is not, the sum apportioned to the nondisplaced person shall not be deemed to be a debt within the mefoing of this Act and the -creditor may in respect of such debt seek any reinedy open to him in a civil court or otherwise; ............................... • . '• .....\n\n(f) if the liability is secured by a mortgage of movable and immovable properties, the debt shall be apportioned between the two properties in the same proportion as the value of each property bears to the total value of the properties;\n\n(g) where the relationship between the joint debtors is that of principal and surety, nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the institution of a suit for the recovery of the debt against the surety but no decree shall be passed in such suit for an amount in excess of the amount decreed or which can be decreed against the principal debtor in accordance with the provisions of this Act :\n\nProvided that the total amount which may be recovered from the principal debtor and .the surety shall not exceed the amount decreed or which can be decreed by the Tribunal against the principal debtor in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nSection 29 makes provision for cesser of accrual of interest. It states :\n\n\"(1). On and from the 15th day of August, 1947, no interest shall accrue or be deemed to have accrued in respect of any debt owed by a displaced person, and no Tribunal shall allow any future interest in respect of any decree or order passed by it :\n\nA Provided that-\n\n(a) where the debt is secured by the pledge of shares, stocks, Government securities or secunties of a local authority, the Tribunal shall allow, for the period commencing from the 15th day of j\\ugust,\n\nB 194 7, and ending with the date of COil)Illence ment of this Act, interest to the creditor at the\n\nrate mutually agreed upon or at a ate at which any dividend or interest has been paid or is payable in respect thereof, whichever is less;\n\n(b) in any other case the Tribunal may, if it thinks it c just and proper to do so after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor as defined in section 32, allow, for the period ment tioned in clause (a), interest at a rate not exceeding four per cent. per annum simple.\n\n(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the interest D payable in respect of any monies advanced by a creditor, .. including an insurance company, on the security of a policy of life insurance of a displaced debtor in order to keep it alive.\"\n\nSection 49 reads as follows :\n\nE \"Past transactions not to be affected.-(!) If before\n\n~ the commencement of this Act a displaced debtor has satisfied or discharged any of his liabilities in any manner whatsoever, such transactions shall not be affected by anything contained in this Act.\n\n(2) Where the Tribunal has determined the amount due in respect of any debt in accordance with the provisions of this Act, any payments (including payments by way of interest) made by the . displaced debtor towards the debt prior to such determination shall be adjusted towards .the amount so determined :\n\nG Provided that no creditor shall be called upon to refund any amount paid to him if it is found that it is in excess of the amount determined as being due to him under this Act.\" In support of this appeal Mr. Chagla contended, in the first place, that no interest should have been allowed to the Bank from\n\nH August 15, 1947 in view of the provisions of s. 29 of the said\n\n~ Act. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Proviso\n\n(b) to s. 29(1) of the said Act confers a discretion on the Tri~ bunal to allow interest not exceeding 4 per cent. per annum for\n\nthe period from August 15, 1947 up to December 10, 1951, the date on which the said Act came into force in Bombay after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor as defined in s. 32 of the Act. The expression \"paying capacity of the debtor\" is defined in s. 32 of the said Act as follows :\n\n\"the aggregate of the mark.et value of all the attachable assets in India of the displaced debtor plus the income which is likely to accrue to him for the next three years succeeding, excluding from the computation of such income a sum calculated at the rate of two hundred and fifty rupees a month.\"\n\nThe High Court has observed, on the statement of the appellant himself, that his paying capacity far exceeded the aggregate debt due from him and it was therefore a fit case in which interest at 4 per cent, should be allowed to .the Bank from August 15, 1947 to December 10, 1951. In our opinion, the finding of the High Court on this point is supported by proper evidence. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.\n\nWe shall then proceed to consider the rtext co_ntention put forward on behalf of the appellant, namely, than the liability on the Cash Credit Account and on the Loan Account was not the sole liability of the appellant alone but was a joint liability and the High Court ought to have apportioned the joint debt under s. 22 of the said Act between the appellant and the joint debtors.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court fell into an error in construing the provisions of s, 22 in the context of s. 43 of the Indian Contract Act which states that \"when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary; compe~ any one or more of' such joint promisers to perform the whole of the promise\". Mr. Chagla contended that this section has no application in view of the over-riding effect of s. 3 of the said Act. It is not necessary, in our opinion, to decide this point in the present case.\n\nWe shall assume in favour of the appellant that s. 43 of the Indian Contract Act has no application.\n\nEven upon that assumption the plea of the appellant for apportionment of the debt must be rejected because tbe High Court has found, upon examination of the evidence, that the liability both on the Loan Account and on the Cash Credit Account was undertaken solely by the appellant. The finding of the High Court on this point is supported by paragraphs 12 and 15 of the petition of the appellant. In these two paragraphs the appellant admitted that he had opened the Cash Credit Account with the Bank and that he had taken the loan against mortgaged securities mentioned in Sch. G to the petition. We see no reason for differing from the finding\n\nBULCBAND v. BANK OF INDIA (Ramaswami, J.) 877\n\nof the. High Court. The liability on the Loan Account and on the Cash Credit Account was solely that of the appellant and therefore the question of apportionment of the debt under s. 22 of the said Act does not arise, The next question arising in this appeal is whether the appellant .is entitled to a refund of the amount recovered from the insurance policies.\n\nIt appears that there were 12 life policies menc tloned in Sch. 'E' of the application out of which two policjes matured in 1950 and 1951 and the rest matured during the pendency of the application of the appellant.\n\nThe Bank received Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 23,700 on January 22, 1951 and July 9, 1952.\n\nIn 1948 the appellant had executed absolute assignment in respect of all the policies in favour of the Bank. Since the amounts were due to the Karachi Branch, these were converted into Pakistan rupees and repatriated. In respect of the other policies the Bank recovered the additional amount of Rs. 25,684.56 P and Rs. 15,560.99 P.\n\nThe trial court held that as regards the first two policies, the appellant is not entitled to refund of excess amount over the apportioned debt of Rs. 13,684/2/ 11 but in respect of other policies the trial court held that the Bank was bound to refund the excess amount. In appeal the High Court has, however, taken the view that s. 17 of tl!e said Act applied and the appellant had no right to refund in respect of any of the in, surance policies unless it was shown that the realisation was in excess of the debt due. It was argued by Mr. Chagla that the insurance policies do not fall within s. 17 of the said Act. It is not possible to accept this contention as correct.\n\nClause 36 of s. 3 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) defines \"movable property\" to mean \"property of every description, except immovable property\". Clause 26 of s. 3 of the General Clauses Act defines \"immovable property\" to \"include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth\". In the present case there is the additional fact that the policies were assigned by the appellant and his wife to the Bank and thereafter the insurance policies remained in possession of the Bank. In the present case therefore there is an absolute assignment of the policies in favour of the Bank and the policies were also in its possession. In our opinion, s. 17 of the Act applies and unless realisation was in excess of the\n\ndbt due the appellant was not entitled to refund. We accordingly re1ect the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.\n\nIt was also contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had erred in interpreting the word \"renewal\" occurring in the definition of the word \"debt\" in the said Act. In our opinion there is no substance in this argument.\n\nIt is manifest that th~ confinnation or acknowledgement of indebtedness which includes both loan and interest and further advances, if any would not fall\n\nwithin the ambit of the expression \"renewal\" in the proviso to A s. 2 ( 6) of the said Act. The liability referred to in the proviso is the liability solely by way of renewal and the proviso to the sec1ioa states that the original loan and not the 0ne for which the renew.al is made is the debt within the meaning of the section. But the proviso does not apply if the confirmation or acknowledgement jg not solely by way of renewal on account of loan or interest but B includes further adv~. In our opinion, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the debts ascertained by it were the debts of the appellant within tile meaning of the said Act. The High Court found that . the promissory note dated November 18, 1947 for a sum of Rs. 1,09,000 represented the debt of Rs. 1,09,000 in the Cash Credit Account and that the Pl1> missory note dated June 19, 1947 fcir a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 C represented the debt of Rs. 1,25,000 in the Loan Account which was actually taken on July 12, 1947. As regards the Cash Credit Account, the High Court awarded simple interest up to December 10, 1951at4 per cent. which worked out to Rs. 17,702.79 P and held that an aggregate amount of Rs. 1,26,702.79 P as due by the appellant in the said Cash Credit Account. As regards the D Loan Account, the High Court awarded simple interest at 4 per cent. from July 12, 1947 up to December 10, 1951 and held that an aggregate amount of Rs. 1,47,068.49 P was due by the appellant.\n\nThe debt in the Cash Credit Account was rciluced by a deduction of Rs. 17,429.14 P (which represented the proportion of the verified claim to the surrender value of the pOJicies) to E Rs. 1,09,273.65 P.\n\nLastly, Mr. Chagla submittett that the appellant should have been given credit of the amount of Rs. 10,000 paid to the Bank as income of the mortgage properties in Pakistan. It wu pointed out that the amount was received as income of the mortgaged properties by the Custodian of Evacuee Properties in Pa\\.-is- F tan and the amount was paid by the Pakistan Government to the Bank. It was argued that there was no justification for not allowing credit to. the appellant in respect of this amount. It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of this question because Mr. S. T. Desai on behalf of the resPondent-Bank said that be had no objection if the amount of Rs. 10,000 was credited towards G the debt of the appellant as determined by the High Court. We accordingly direct tht the amount of Rs. 10,000 should be credited towards the amount, of debt ascertained according to the High Court judgment.\n\nSubject to this modification we affinn the judgment and decree of the Bombay High Court and dismiss this aopeal. There will H be no order as to costs of this appeal in this Court.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nL8S1JP.C.l./68-2,500-22-2-59-GTPF.", "total_entities": 99, "entities": [{"text": "BULCHAND CHANDmAM OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BULCHAND CHANDIRAM OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nBANK OF INDIA LTD., FORT, BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANK OF INDIA LTD., FORT, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 19, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FORT, BOMBAY\n\nApril 19, 1968\n\n[J. C, SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI and G. K. MITTER, JJ.J S\n\nThe Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act 70 of 1951, ss, 2(6), 17, 22, 29-'Renewal' of debt meaning of-lnSurance policies whether governed by s. 11-Apportionment of liabilities between joint debtors under s. 22-Award of interest under s. 29."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1950 he was granted a Domicile Certificate and since then he continued to reside in Bombay."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 661, "end_char": 672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1945 the appellant had opened an account with tho Bank of India (Hyderabad, Sind Branch) called the Cash Credit Account."}}, {"text": "Bank of India (Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 718, "end_char": 742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1945 the appellant had opened an account with tho Bank of India (Hyderabad, Sind Branch) called the Cash Credit Account."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,25,()()() from tho Hyderabad Bank on the security of certain properties and the personal security of himself and his wife."}}, {"text": ".July 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .July 22, 1952 the appellant made an application under s. 5 of the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjust-· ment) Act, 1951 for adjustment elf his debts against several creditors, but pressed it only against tho Bank."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia : (i) That no interest should have been allowed to the Bank from August 15, 1947 in view of the provisions of s. 29 of .the Act; (ii) That the liability on the Cash Credit Account and on the Loan Account was not the sole responsibility of the appellant but was a joint liability and the High Court should have apportioned the joint debt under s. 22, without construing that section with the aid of s. 43 rlf the Indian Contract Ac~ (iii) That the insurance policies did not fall under s. 17 of the Act and the appellant was entitled to a refund of the amount recovered from them; and (iv) That the High .Court erred in interpreting the word 'renewal' occurring in the definition of s. 2(6)."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1633, "end_char": 1638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1866, "end_char": 1871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1921, "end_char": 1926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2205, "end_char": 2212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2394, "end_char": 2411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "00 Tribunal to allow interest not exceeding 4 per cent pe!r annum for the period from August IS, 1947 up to December 10, 1951, the date on which the Act came into force in Bombay after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor as defined in s. 32."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3404, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "877 H; 878 AB]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Chagla and B. R. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4675, "end_char": 4686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Bhuvnesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachan; i. 0.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "Bhuvnesh Kumari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4688, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Bhuvnesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachan; i. 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Bhuvnesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachan; i. 0."}}, {"text": "M11thur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4731, "end_char": 4738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nM11thur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4743, "end_char": 4758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nM11thur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4824, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated November 16, 1962 in Cross Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4903, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated November 16, 1962 in Cross Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Bulchand Chandiram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Bulchand Chandiram was a citizen of Pakistan and had come to India on June 6, 1950 on a temporary permit."}}, {"text": "Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During his absence the Pakistan Government declared him to be an evacuee."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this account on December 31, 1949 the amount due to the Bank was Rs."}}, {"text": "April 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5804, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "36) and on April 22, 1950 the amount due was Rs."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,25,000 from the Hyderabad Branch on the security of properties mentioned in Sch. '"}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6141, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In early 1948 this Branch was closed and so the account was transferred to the Karachi Branch."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 22, 1952 the appellant made an application under s. 5 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (Act No."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6923, "end_char": 6931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also said that the Bank had received the rent of the properties from Pakistan after they were declared evacuee properties."}}, {"text": "August 15, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7059, "end_char": 7075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant claimed that the Bank was also not entitled to claim interest after August 15, 194 7."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bank contended that on June 30, 1952 the amount due in rspect of the Cash Credit Account was Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8153, "end_char": 8158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8631, "end_char": 8636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8680, "end_char": 8685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 12, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10483, "end_char": 10496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,25,000 was taken on July 12, 1947 and there was a Promissory Note in respect thereof dated June 19, 1947."}}, {"text": "June 19, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10554, "end_char": 10567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,25,000 was taken on July 12, 1947 and there was a Promissory Note in respect thereof dated June 19, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11075, "end_char": 11080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11532, "end_char": 11544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12324, "end_char": 12333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12713, "end_char": 12722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12821, "end_char": 12831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12998, "end_char": 13008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13096, "end_char": 13109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 16 gives an option to the creditor to elect as to whether he would retain the security in West Pakistan, and if he does so the section prescribes the consequences of such election on the part of the creditor."}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13720, "end_char": 13730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15587, "end_char": 15597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17626, "end_char": 17636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17723, "end_char": 17747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On and from the 15th day of August, 1947, no interest shall accrue or be deemed to have accrued in respect of any debt owed by a displaced person, and no Tribunal shall allow any future interest in respect of any decree or order passed by it :\n\nA Provided that-\n\n(a) where the debt is secured by the pledge of shares, stocks, Government securities or secunties of a local authority, the Tribunal shall allow, for the period commencing from the 15th day of j\\ugust,\n\nB 194 7, and ending with the date of COil)Illence ment of this Act, interest to the creditor at the\n\nrate mutually agreed upon or at a ate at which any dividend or interest has been paid or is payable in respect thereof, whichever is less;\n\n(b) in any other case the Tribunal may, if it thinks it c just and proper to do so after taking into account the paying capacity of the debtor as defined in section 32, allow, for the period ment tioned in clause (a), interest at a rate not exceeding four per cent."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18571, "end_char": 18581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18946, "end_char": 18956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19753, "end_char": 19759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this appeal Mr. Chagla contended, in the first place, that no interest should have been allowed to the Bank from\n\nH August 15, 1947 in view of the provisions of s. 29 of the said\n\n~ Act."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19898, "end_char": 19903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19990, "end_char": 19998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20301, "end_char": 20306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20380, "end_char": 20385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20484, "end_char": 20489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression \"paying capacity of the debtor\" is defined in s. 32 of the said Act as follows :\n\n\"the aggregate of the mark.et value of all the attachable assets in India of the displaced debtor plus the income which is likely to accrue to him for the next three years succeeding, excluding from the computation of such income a sum calculated at the rate of two hundred and fifty rupees a month.\""}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21489, "end_char": 21494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21693, "end_char": 21698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21706, "end_char": 21725, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22044, "end_char": 22048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22194, "end_char": 22199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22207, "end_char": 22226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23122, "end_char": 23127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 22, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23568, "end_char": 23584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23,700 on January 22, 1951 and July 9, 1952."}}, {"text": "July 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23589, "end_char": 23601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23,700 on January 22, 1951 and July 9, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24267, "end_char": 24272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24532, "end_char": 24537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24613, "end_char": 24622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24626, "end_char": 24630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24638, "end_char": 24657, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Clause 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24769, "end_char": 24778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24782, "end_char": 24786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24794, "end_char": 24813, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25345, "end_char": 25350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26000, "end_char": 26004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26133, "end_char": 26137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 18, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26656, "end_char": 26673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the promissory note dated November 18, 1947 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1951at4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27025, "end_char": 27045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the Cash Credit Account, the High Court awarded simple interest up to December 10, 1951at4 per cent."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28191, "end_char": 28202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of this question because Mr. S. T. Desai on behalf of the resPondent-Bank said that be had no objection if the amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "22-2-59-GTPF", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28756, "end_char": 28768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L8S1JP.C.l./68-2,500-22-2-59-GTPF."}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_8_12_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "MANAGEMENT, CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS LTD.\n\nA v.\n\nWORKMEN OF CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS\n\nFebruary 2, 1968\n\n(G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HJ!GDE, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Gratuity scheme framed by Ti-ibunal-Comiderations in framing scheme.\n\nThe appellant was a jute mill. The Industrial Tribunal framed a gra tuity scheme for its workers. It was challenged by tbe appellant before this Cou'rt in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Two contentions were urged, namely: (i) tbat the wage board was unable to recommend a gratuity scheme for the jute industry and hence tbere 'was no justi fication to frame the impugned scheme; (ii) in view of the losses incurred by tbe appellant during the years 1960-65, no additional burden should have been cast on it by introducing a gratuity scheme.\n\nHELD : (i) The Wage Board's recommendation pertained to the jute industry as a whole and not to anv individual industrial unit. It cannot be understood as recommending tbat there should be no gratuity scheme for the employees in any particular unit in that industry. What was re levant to find out was whetber tbe appellant could bear tb-, additional burden. [10 BJ\n\n(ii) The Tribunal recommended the gratuity scheme after taking into consideration the financial position of the appellant as well as the fact that in a sister concern such a scheme was in existence. The losses suffered by tbe appellant were considered by the Tribunal to he a passing phase.\n\nWhat is of essence is tbe profit makin~ capacity of the concern. In determining that question one has to take into consideration the paid up capital of the company, its reserves, its earnings in the past and its futlll'e prospects. .f>. practical view of the question has to he taken. [10 D, G]\n\nIn the light of these principles and on the ma!erial placed before the Tribunal it was not possible to hold that the Tribunal's conclusion was without any just basis. [12 A] ·\n\nNational Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Anr.\n\nF (1967] 2 S.C.R. 391 and Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1967] 2 S.C.R. 596, relied on.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1627 of 1967.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated March 31, 1967 of the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh in Industrial Dispute No. 55 of 1965.\n\nH. R. Gokhale and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal has been brought to this Court by special leave. It arises from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal,\n\nH •\n\nCIIlTAVALSAH MILLS v. WORKMEN (Hegde, J.) 9\n\nAndhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The only question that arises for decision is whether on the basis of the material on the record there was any justification for framing a gratuity scheme for appellant's staff.\n\nThe admitted facts are these : The appellant concern is having about 500 looms.\n\nIt has a subscribed capital of a little over 35 lakhs. Its built up reserve is over thirty lakhs. In three out of the six years during the period 1960-65 it has suffered substantial losses. Out of the \"remaining three years, in ooo year It made a profit of about Rs. 45,000 in another year about Rs. 13,000\n\nand in 1962 over rupees twelve lakhs. The annual expenses of the appellant's ncern under the head 'salaries, wages and bonus' are nearly 4 7 lakhs.\n\nIt was found by the tribunal that the appellant concern and the Nellimarla Jute Mills are sister concerns. Both of them are under a single management, viz.. M/ s. Mcleod and Company, Calcutta. They are located in the same region, the distance between the two being about 25 miles. In Nellimarla Jute Mills a gratuity scheme for the staff is in existence and that in addition to provident fund benefits. Our attention wa& not invited, to any material on record to show that these findings are not correct. In the appellant concern also there is a provident fund scheme for the staff.\n\nThe appellant iri its counter-affidavit filed before the tribunal admitted that it had always been the policy of the management to introduce identical terms of employment for the workmen at Nellimarla and Chitavalsah. From the material before us it is not possible to find out the financial position of the Nellimarla mills. We ascertained from the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant concern had made a profit of over a lakh F of rupees in 1966. The tribunal has found and that finding was not challenged before us that the additional burden to be borne by the appellant as a result of the gratuity scheme framed by it is about Rs. 3,000 per year.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant , two contentions were advanced in opposition to the pfOJXl\"ed gratuity scheme. They are ( 1 ) the wage board was unable to recommend a gratuity scheme for the jute industry and hence there was no justification to frame the impugned scheme, and (2) in view of the losses incurred by the appellant during the years 1960-65, no additional burden should have been cast on it by introducing a gratuity scheme.\n\nSo far as the Wage Board recommendations is concerned, it pertains to the jute indnstry as a whole. After taking into consideration the importance of the jute industry for the national IASup. CI/68-2.\n\n10 SUPllEMB COU'P.T lll!PO&TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\neoonomy and the difficulties currently experienced by that industry, the Wage Board thought that it would be inappropriate to oompel the industry to introduce a gratuity scheme for its employees. This recommendation relates to the industry as a wholo and not to any individual industrial unit. That recommendation\n\ncannot be understood as recommending that there should be no gratuity scheme for the employees in any particular unit in that industry. What is true of an industry as a whole need not necessarily be so in respect of a unit therein. That position in law was not disputed by Mr. Gokhale, learned counsel for the appellant.\n\nTherefore in considering the appropriateness or otherwise of the impugned scheme, we have to primarily consider its repercussion on the appellant. What is relevant to find out is whether the appellant can bear the additional burden and whether in the circumstances of the case there is justification for throwing that burden on it.\n\nThe tribunal has recontmended a gratuity scheme for the staff of the appellant after -taking into consideration its financial position as well as the fact that in the sister concern, i.e., the Nellimarla Mills such a scheme is in existence. It is n0 more in controversy that in determining the conditions of service of the industrial workers in any unit, it' is necessary to bear in mind the conditions prevailing in similar units in that region.\n\nGenerally speaking the basis for such a determination is industry-cum-region .\n\nThe appellant concern is an economic unit. Jute mills having 300 or more looms are considered as economic units. The appellant has 500 looms. Similarly the Nellimarla Mills have also got\n\n500 looms. As seen earlier, the appellant is a big concern. Its paid up capital is over Rs. 35 lakhs. Its reserve is nearly as much as its paid up capital. This shows that in the past the appellant was a prosperous concern. It is true that it did suffer losses in some years in the recent past. But the question is whe.ther it is a temporary phase or not, The tribunal has come to the conclusion\n\nthat it is a passing phase. It is well settled that in drawing up enduring schemes like gratuity schemes temporary losses or gains should not be taken into consideration. What is of the essence is the profit making capacity of the concern. In determining that G question one has to take into consideration the paid up capital of the company, its reserves, its earnings in the past alld its future prospects.\n\nA practical vew of the question has to be taken.\n\nIn National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and others v1 State of West Bengal and another(1 ), this Court speaking through one of H us (Mitter, J.) quoted with approval the following passage in\n\n\nCIUTAVALSAH MILLS V. WORKMEN (Hegde, ].) 11\n\nBurhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. v. B. T. Mills Mazdoor Sangh [(1965)\n\n1LU453]: ·\n\n\". . . there are two general methods of fixing . the terms of a gratuity scheme. It may be fixed on the basis of industry-cum-region or on the basis of units.\n\nBoth systems are admissible but regard must be had to the> surrounding circumstances to select the right basis Emphasis must always be laid upon the financial position of the employer and his profit-making capacity whichever method is selected\", and it must be further seen ''whether the industrial court was right in appraising the financial condition and the profitmaking capacity of the company. A scheme for gratuity no doubt imposes a burden on the finances of the concern but the pressure is ex facie distributed over the years for ii is limited to .the number of retirements each year. Tue employer is not required to provide the whole amount at once. He may create a fund, if he likes and pay from the interest which accrues on a capitalised sum determined actuari\n\nally. This is one of providing the money. Ordinaril~ the payment is made eachyear to those who retire. T• judge whether the financial position would bear th strain the average number of retirements per year mu be found out. This is one part of the inquiry. 'T' next part of the inquiry is to see whether the emploi\n\ncan be expected to bear the burden from year to yei.\n\nThe present condition of his finances, the past history and the future prospects all enter into the appraisal of his ability.\"\n\nIn Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), this Court observed :\n\n\"On the financial aspect of a gratuity scheme, we were referred to the case of Wenger & Co. v. Their workment [ (1963) II LU 403]. There it was observed by this Court that the problem of the burden imposed by the gratuity scheme could be looked at in two ways.\n\nOne was to capitalise the burden on actuarial basis which would show theoretically that the burden would be very heavy; and the other was to look at the scheme in its practical aspect and find out how many employ~\n\nretire every year on average.\n\nAccrdmg to this Court, it was this. practical approach which ought to be taken into account.\"\n\n(I) (1967] 2 S.C.R. 596.\n\n12 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS [1968j 3 S.C.R..1\n\nIn the light of the principles noted above and on the material A. placed before the tribunal it is not possible to hold that the tribunal's conclusion was without any just basis.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.\n\nG.C. 8 Appeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 23, "entities": [{"text": "MANAGEMENT, CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT, CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WORKMEN OF CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN OF CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 98, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A v.\n\nWORKMEN OF CHITAVALSAH JUTE MILLS\n\nFebruary 2, 1968\n\n(G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HJ!GDE, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1967] 2 S.C.R. 391", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 2007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1967] 2 S.C.R. 596", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2293, "end_char": 2306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal has been brought to this Court by special leave."}}, {"text": "Nellimarla Jute Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found by the tribunal that the appellant concern and the Nellimarla Jute Mills are sister concerns."}}, {"text": "Mcleod and Company, Calcutta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both of them are under a single management, viz.. M/ s. Mcleod and Company, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Nellimarla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant iri its counter-affidavit filed before the tribunal admitted that it had always been the policy of the management to introduce identical terms of employment for the workmen at Nellimarla and Chitavalsah."}}, {"text": "Chitavalsah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4171, "end_char": 4182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant iri its counter-affidavit filed before the tribunal admitted that it had always been the policy of the management to introduce identical terms of employment for the workmen at Nellimarla and Chitavalsah."}}, {"text": "Nellimarla mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the material before us it is not possible to find out the financial position of the Nellimarla mills."}}, {"text": "SUPllEMB COU'P.T lll!PO&TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 SUPllEMB COU'P.T lll!PO&TS\n\n[1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\neoonomy and the difficulties currently experienced by that industry, the Wage Board thought that it would be inappropriate to oompel the industry to introduce a gratuity scheme for its employees."}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That position in law was not disputed by Mr. Gokhale, learned counsel for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nellimarla Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal has recontmended a gratuity scheme for the staff of the appellant after -taking into consideration its financial position as well as the fact that in the sister concern, i.e., the Nellimarla Mills such a scheme is in existence."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7988, "end_char": 7994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and others v1 State of West Bengal and another(1 ), this Court speaking through one of H us (Mitter, J.) quoted with approval the following passage in\n\nCIUTAVALSAH MILLS V. WORKMEN (Hegde, ].)"}}, {"text": "(1967] 2 S.C.R. 596", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10284, "end_char": 10303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1968_3_91_101_EN", "year": 1968, "text": "P. D. SHARMA\n\nSTATE BANK OF •.NDlt\\\n\nFebruary 1, 1968\n\n(G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JI.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Ac1 1947 (14 of 1947) s. 33(3)-Application to disc.harge protected workman-Pending reference ov.er-Cmnpetence to entertain the ap.,,, lication.\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 136--Higli Court summarily dismissed writ petition against Jnduitrial Tribunal's order-Applicqtion for certificate under Arts. 132 and 133 pending--Special leave granted against Tribunal's order, whether to be revoked.\n\nDuring the pendency of an industrial dispute, before the Tribunal between the respondent-employer and its workmen, the respondent decided to dismiss the appellant a 'protected workman'.\n\nSo the respondent applied under • .33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act lo the Tribunal for permis sion to -discharge him.\n\nThe Tribunal made the award in the reference.\n\nThe Labour Court to which the application under s. 33(2) was transferred. held that the award in Reference having been made, it had no com petence to deal with the application under \" 33 (3). The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging this order of the Labour Court. The writ petition was summarily dismissed. Thereafter , the appellant applied to the High Court for certificate under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nDuring pendency of the applica'ion for certificatle, the appellant moV'ed this Court for Special Leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the order of the Labour Court, which was granted. In the petition for a special leave the fact of the filing of\n\nlhe writ petition_ and its dismissal was mentioned.\n\nLater the High Court re}:cted the application for certificate. The appellant contended that once an application under s. 33(3) is validly made, the Tribunal must decide whether permisson sought for should be granted of refused even though the industrial dispute had been cl::cided during the pendency of the application. The respOndent urged the revocation of the special leave as he had not appealed against the High Court's order made in the writ petition.\n\nHELD : No case was made out to revoke the special leave granted. The High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition.\n\nThe order dismissing the \\\\Tit petition was not a speaking order. Hence no question of resjudicata arose.\n\nThe 'respondent's contention is not correct, _that the order of the High Court not having been appealed against, it has become final and if the present appeal is allowed there will be two conflicting final orders. The scope of an appeal vnder Art. 136 is much wider than a petition under Art 226. In an appeal under Art. 136, this Court can go into ques1ions on facts as well as law whereas the High Court in the Writ petition could have only considered questions which would have been strictly relevant in an application for a writ of certiorari. [93 G-94 B]\n\nDar, vao and others v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1962] I\n\nS.C.R. 574, Management of Hindustan Co1nmercial Bank Ltd. Kanpur v. Bhagivan Das, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1142 and Charldi Prasad Clwkhani v. State of Bilwr,\n\n[1962] 2 S.C.R. 276, referred to.\n\nThe Labour Court \\\\.'as right. in. holding that it was incompetent to deal A with an application under. s. 33(3) after the industrial dispute was decided.\n\nAn 3.pplication under s. 33(3) fOr prior permission is different from an application for appnwal under s. 33(2) (b) in respect of matters not connected with the dispute.\n\nThe latter is an independent proceeding and the order for the approval of which the application has been made would remain incohate until the competent authority accords its approval.\n\nIhe sole reason for an application under s. 33(3) is the pendency of the indu.s- B trial dispute and once the dispute is decided the ban placed on the common law, statutory or contractual rights of the employer stands removed and it ls free to exercise those rights. [JOO D-E; 101 BJ\n\n\nStrawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gobind, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 618 c referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 785 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the order dated February 10 1965 of the Labour Court, Lucknow (Central) in Misc. Case No. 22 of 1963.\n\nA. K. Sen and Anand Prakash, for the appelJant.\n\nNiren De, Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte, and K. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of th~ Court was delivered by\n\nHegde, J. In the aforementioned appeal by special leave, the point for consideration is whether the Labour Court, Lucknow was right in its conclusion that it was not competent to deal with Misc. Case No. 22/63 on its jile, an application under s. 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nIn 1961, the appellant was a clerk working in the Dehradun branch of the State Bank of India, the respondent herein.\n\nJn connection with certain alleged misconduct the respondent held a departmental enquiry against him; came to the conclusion that he was guilty of the charge leve!Jed against him and for the said offence it proposed to dismiss him from its service. But as at that time an industrial dispute between the respondent and its workmen was pending before the National Industrial Tribunal in Ref. No. 1 of 1960 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the industrial dispute), and the appellant being one of the office bearers of a recognized trade union connected with the respondent and consequently a 'protected workman', it applied on April 27, 1962 under s. 33 (3) to the National Industrial Tribunal for pennission to discharge him from service. On the authority of an order made by the Central Government on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred\n\nthe said application to the Labour Court, Delhi.\n\nThe National Industrial Tribunal Bombay, made its award in the aforementioned Reference on June 7, 1962. The same was published in the official gazette on June 13, 1962 and it came into force on July 31,\n\n1962. Thereafter on February 23, 1963 the Government of India transferred the respondent's application under s. 33(3) pending before the Labour Court, Delhi, to the Labour Court, Lucknow.\n\nThat court dropped the said proceedings as per its order dated 10th February, 1965 holding that in view of the award in the Reference in question it had no competence to deal with that application.\n\nThis order of the Labour Court was challenged by the appellant in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 619 of 1965 on the fire of the Allahabad High Court. That petition was summarily dismissed. There after he applied to that court for a certificate under Articles 132( 1) and 133 (1) ( C) of the Constitution.\n\nDuring the pendency of that application, he moved this Court on July 17, 1965 for special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution to appeal against the order of the Tribunal.\n\nSpecial leave was granted by this Court on September 8, 1965. The application for certificate made before :he Allahabad High Court was rejected by that court by its order dated September 13, 1965. No application for special leave under Art. 136 was :filed against that order.\n\nWhen this appeal came up for hearing on a previous occasion, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the special leave granted should be revoked as the appellant had not appealed\n\ngains! the order made by the Allahabad High Court in his writ petition.\n\nThereafter, the appellant moved this Court for special leave against the order of the Allahabad High Court rejecting his writ petition.\n\nHe also filed an application for condonation of the delay in submitting that special leave application.\n\nWe are not satisfied that there is any force in the preliminary objection taken by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent. This case does not fall within the rule laid down by this Court in Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and Others(').\n\nAs seen earlier, the High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant.\n\nThe order dismissing the writ petition was not a speaking order.\n\nHence no question of res judicata arises.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General did not try to bring the pre\" sent case within the rule laid down in Daryao's case( 1 ). His contention was that the order of the High Court not having been appealed against the sam\" has become final and therefore it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant the relief prayed for by the appellant. According to him, if the present appeal is allowed there will be two conflicting final orders. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. The scope of an appeal under Art. 136 is\n\n(!) [1962] I S.C.R., 574.\n\nmuch wider than a petition under Art. 226. In an appeal under Art. 136, this Court can go into questions of facts as well as law whereas the High Court in the writ petition could have only considered questions which would have been strictly relevant in an application for a writ of certiorari. From the order of the High Court it is not possible to find out the reason or reasons that persuaded it to reject the appellant's petition. An appeal under Art. I 36 against an order can succeed even if no case is made out to issue a writ of certiorari.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Management of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., Kanpur v. Bhagwan Dass(') to which reference was made by the learned Solicitor General does not bear on the question under consideration. There the appellant had applied to the High Court for the issue of a certificate under Art. 132 against its order but without pursuing that application h!l applied for and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal against the very same order and that :without obtaining exemption from compliance with r. 2 of 0.13 of the rules of this Court. It was under those circumstances this Court held that special leave granted should be revoked. ·\n\nThe learned Solicitor General in support of his preliminary objection placed a great deal of reliance on the decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad C, hokhani v. State df Bihar( 2 ). That was a case under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The appellant's claim of certain deductions had been disallowed by the department He went up in revision to the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe Board of.\n\nRevenue dismissed his revision petition. TherC!lfter under s. 25 ( 1) of the Bihar Sales Tax. Act, he applied to the Board of Revenue by means. of three different applications to state a case to the High Court of Patna in each of those petitions on questions of law formulated by him in his applications.\n\nBut those applications were rejected. The appellant then moved the High Court to call upon the Board to submit to it for its opinions the questions of law set out by him in his applications.\n\nThe High Court dismissed his applications in respect of the first two periods of assessment but by its order dated November 17, 1954 it directed the Board to state a case in regard to the third period on one of tl1e questions of law mentioned in the petition which alone in its opinion arose for consideration. By its judgment dated January 21 .• 1957 the High Court answered that question against the appellant. On Februarv 17, 1955 the appellant made applications to this Court for special leave to appeal against the order of the Board of Revenue referred to earlier. The leave prayed for was granted. When the appeals came up for hearing. objection was raised as to their maintainability. This Court held that though the words of Art. 136 are\n\n(I) A.T.R. 1965 S.C.1142.\n\n(2) [19621 2 S.C.R. 276.\n\np. D. SHARMA v. STATE BANK (Hedxe. I.) 95\n\nwide this Court has uniformly held as a rule of practice that there\n\n111ust be exceptional and special circwnstances to justify the exercise oif the discretion under that article. In the circumstances of ttlat dase the Court opined that the appellant was not entitled to\n\nobtaiil special leave against the orders of the Board of Revenue and thus bypass the orders of the High Court. In the course of the judgment this Coun observed :\n\n\"The question before us is not wheliler we have the power; undoubtedly, we have the power, but the question is whether in the circumstances under present consideration, it is a proper exercise 'of discretion to allow the appellant to have resort to the power of this Court under A1t. 136. That question must be decided on the facts of each case, having regard to the practice of this Court and the limitations wliich this Court itself has laid down with regard to the exercise of i~, discretion under Art. 136.\"\n\nThe reasons that persuaded this Coun to revoke the special leave granted in those appeals are not available in this case.\n\nThis takes up to the question whether a case is made out to revoke the special leave granted. We shall presently see that an important question of law arises for decision in this case.\n\nThe High Coun sumniarily rejected the appellant's application under Art. 226.\n\nAt the time the appellant approached this Court for special leave, his application under Articles 132 and 133 ( 1 )(C) was pending in the High Court. Though in his special leave application the appellant mentioned the fact that his application under Art. 226 had been dismissed by the High Court, he failed to mention the fact that his application for a certificate under Articles 132 and 133 was pending before the High Court.\n\nWe were assured by Mr. A. K. Sen learned counsel for the appellant that. this omission was due to an erroneous impression of the law on the part of the Advocate on record and there was no intention to keep back that fact from this Court. As seen earlier the fact that the appellant's application under Art. 226 had been dismissed was mentioned in the special leave application. Hence the omission in question cannot be considered as a deliberate suppression of a fact. Under these circumstances, we do not think that a case is made out to revoke the special leave granted.\n\nWe now come to the merits of the appeal. As seen earlier the tribunal had concluded that it had no competence to pass orders on the application made by the respondent under s. 3 3 ( 3) as the industrial dispute had come to an end because of the award made by the National Tribunal.\n\nAccording to Mr. Sen the tribunal erred in taking that view. He urged that once an application\n\nunder s. 33(3) is validly. made, the tribunal must decide whether the permission sought for should be granted or refused even though the industrial dispute had been decided during the pendency of that application.\n\nHis contention was that if an application under sub-ss. 1, 2 or 3 of s. 33 is made during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the tribunal which considers that application has to make an order one way or the_ other. ltl support of this contention he placed strong reliance on the decision of this .. Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak(' ). That was a case nrising under s. 33(2)(b). The question that arose for decision therein was whether a proceeding validly commenced under that provision would automatically come to an end merely because the industrial dispute had in the meanwhile been finally detennined.\n\nThis Court upheld the view taken by the tribunal that s'uch an application wouid not automatieally come to an end. It was held therein that an application under s. 33(2)(b) is an independent proceeding and not an interlocutory proceeding; it' is a proceeding between an employer and -his eJilployee who was 11.0 do'ubt concerned with the industrial dispute along with the other employees: but it is nevertheless a proceeding between two parties in respect of a matter not covered by that dispute. It was further laid down therein that the order for the approval of which the application had been made would remain inchoate until thetribunal accords its approval; the said order cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and the employetl until an approval for that order is obtained from the tribunal. If the approval is n.ot accorded, the employer would be bound to treat the workman as his employee and pay him\"ful! wages for the period eve!) though the employer may subsequently proceed to terminate tli'e employee's service. In tliat case this Court confined its attention to the scope of s. 33(2)(b). It did not address itself to s. 33(3). Hence.\n\nMr. Sen is not right in his contention thatthe rule laid.down in that decision governs the controversy before us ..\n\nAlternatively, Mr. Seµ contended .that tl).e ratio of that .decision at any rate would support his contention. 1'.o find out whether the. ratio of tl; iat decisiop. has any bearing on the. questiQn .that is before us, we have to examine sub-ss. (2) and (3). of s. 33, They\n\nre~: G \"(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute, or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of. the contract, whether express or imtllied, between H him and the workman-(a) alter, in regard to any\n\n(I) (1965] 3 S.C.R. 4ll.\n\nP. D. SHARMA v. STAT!! BANK (Hedge, J.)\n\nmatter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or othwise, that work- 1nan; Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute-(a) by altering to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) by discharging or ounishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express perniission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.\n\nExp/anation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, a 'protected workman' in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being an officer of a registered trade union connected with the establishment is recog- nised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf.\"\n\nOne common condition precedent for an application to be made under both those p:ovisions is lhe pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer or a board or any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Jabour court or a tnbunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute. That apart die two provisions deal with different situations. Sub,.s. 2 of s. 33 concerns itself with actions that may be taken by an employer against his employees in respect of matters not connected with the moustriaJ dispute.\n\nIn those cases though the employer can take any of the actions mentioned in that provision in acco1dance with the standing orders or where there are no such standing orers, in accon; lance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workmen, on his own authority, he must . .in the case. of discharging or punishing whether by di; missal or otherwise •. a workman, 'pay him wages for one month and must al, o make an application to the authority before which the industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him ..\n\nSUPJ.U!MB COUllT IBPOllTS\n\n[ 1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nSub-s. 3 of s. 33 deals with 'protected workman' which expression\n\nin relation to an establishment means a workman who being an olllcer of a registered trade union connected with the establish ment,. is recognized as such in accordance with the rules made in that behalf. If the employer wan~ to take any action prejudicial to a protected workman concerned in an industrial dispute pending before one of the authorities mentioned earlier he can do so only witi1 the \"express permission in writing of the aulhority-befcr~ which the proceeding is pending\". On a comparison of sub-ss. (2) .& (3) of s. 33 it will be seen that the scope of the two provisions\n\nare wholly different. Taking the case of a worker's discharge or JlUnisbment by dismissal or otherwise. In the former the previous\n\npermission of the authority before which the industrial dispute is .Pending is necessary but under the latter only a subsequent approfa! from a competent authority is needed. Though the applica 1ion under that provision should be made to the authority before which the industrial dispute is pending the approval to be obtained need not be fi; om that authority. Once approval is given it goes back to the date on which the order in question was made. If 1he approval asked for is not accorded then the action taken by the employer becomes ab . initio void and the employee will continue in service and his conditions of service will also continue without any break as if the order in question had not been made at all.\n\nHence we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sen that the decision of this Court in Tata Iron and Stel Company's case (1) has any bearing on the. question to be decided in this case.\n\nThe purpose of those two sub-sections are wholly different.\n\nThis will be further clear if we refer to the history of s. 33. That section, since its incorpo•ation in the Act in 1947, has undergone several legislative changes. As it stood originally it read : \"No employer shall during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or proceedings before a tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, nor save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, board or tribunal, as the case may be shall he during the pendency of such proceedings, discharge, dismiss, or otherwise punish any such workmen, except for m.isconduct not connected with the dispute.\" The section was amended by Act 48 of 1950.\n\nThe amended section read : \"During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings Cir proceedings before a tribunal in respect of any\n\n\nindustrial dispute, no employer shall\n\n(a) alier to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; (b) discharge or punish, whether by disJnissal .or otbl'l!Wise, any workmen concerned in such dispute;\n\nsave with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, board or tnbunal, as the case may be.\"\n\nlfhe amended section dropped the exception made in respect of misconduct not connected with the dispute.\n\nThi~ change in the law prevented the employers from discharging or punishing their employees even , in respect of a misconduct .not connected wiih the industrial dispute. That was a serious inroad into the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. It-is possibly with a view to avoid unnecessary interference with the rights of the employers the section was amended by Act 36 of 1956.\n\nIn Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gov ind(') this Court observed:\n\n\"The plain .object of the section was to 1I1aintain the status quo as far as possible during the pendency of any industrial dispute before a tribunal.\n\nBut it seems to have been felt that s. 33, as it stood before the amendment of 1956, was too stringent for it completely took away the right of the employer to make any .alteration in the conditions of service or to make any order of discharge or dismissal without making any distinction as to whether such alteration or such an order of discharge or dismissal was in any manner connected with the dispute pending before an industrialauthority. It seems to have been felt therefore that the stringency of the provision should be softened and the employer should be permitted to make changes in conditions of service etc. which were not connected with the dispute pending before an industrial tribunal. For the same reason it was felt that the authority of the employer to dismis\"' or discharge a work - man should not be completely taken away where the dismissal or discharge was dependent on the matters unconnected with the dispute pending before any tribunal.\n\nAt the same time it seems to have been felt that some safeguards should be provided for a workman who may be discharged or dismissed during the pendency of a dispute on account of some matter unconnected with the dispute. Consequently s. 33 was re-drafted in 1956 and considerably, expanded.\"\n\n(ll [1962] Supp. 3 s.c.R. 61~. 623.\n\n100 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS\n\n\nBy enacting s. 33 the Parliament wanted to ensure a fair and satisfact?ry enquiry of an ind.ustrial dispute undisturbed by any action on the part of the employer which could create fresh cause for disharmony between him . and his employ~. The object of s. 33 is that durmg the pendency of an industrial dispute status quo should be maintained and no fui:ther element of discord should be introduced. But then distinction was made between matters connected with the industrial dispute and those unconnected with it.\n\nWhile construing the scope of sub-s. 3 of s. 33 we have to bear in mind the fact that under the common law the employer has a right to punish his employee for misconduct. Therefore all that we have to see is, to what extent that right is taken away by sub-s. 3 of s. 33. There is no doubt that at the time the application in question was made, an industrial dispute was pending between the respondent and its employees. It is admitted that the appellant is a 'protected workman'. He had not been discharged or punished before the industrial dispute was decided, though no doubt the respondent had proposed to dismiss him after obtaining the necessary permission from the tribunal.\n\nThe application for permission to dismiss him was made during the pendency of the principal dispute. No such permission would have been necessary if no industrial dis\\>ute between the respondent and its employees was pending.\n\nHence, the sole reason for that application was the pendency of the industrial dispute. Once the industrial dispute was decided, the ban placed on the common law, statutory or contractual rights of the resµondent stood removed and it was free to exercise those rights. Thereafter there was no need to take anybody's permission to exercise its rights. In other words, the limitation placed on the .rspondent's rights by sub-s. 3 of s. 33 disappeared the moment tlie industrial dispute was decided. We are in agreement with the tribunal that it had no competence to consider the application made by the respondent after the indus- trial dispute was decided.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General tried to support the conclusion of the tribunal on yet another ground. His contention was that the permission sought for could have been granted only by the authortiy before which the industrial dispute was pending. In the instant case that dispute was pending before the National Tribunal at Bombay.\n\nTherefore according to him, the Permission asked for could not have been given either by the Labour Court at Delhi or by the Labour Court at Lucknow. The language of sub-s. 3 of s. 3 3 prima facie lends support to this contention. But in resisting that contention Mr. Sen relied on s. 33B which confers power on the government and under certain conditions on the Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be to transfer any\n\nproceeding pending before them to a Labour Court. The language of this provision is not in harmony with that in sub-ss. ( 1) and\n\n(3) of s. 33.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General urged that to harmoniously construe these provisions we must confine the operation of s. 33B only to cases falling under sub-s. 2 of s. 33. It is not necessary to decide this controversy in this case in view of our conclusion that the Labour Court at Lucknow was right in its\n\nconclusion that it had no competence to grant the permission prayed for as the industrial dispute had come to an el)d ..\n\nFor the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is dhmissed but there will be no order as to costs: The special leave application as well as the ciyil miscellaneous petition have now become superfluous.\n\nThey are accordingly dismissed without costs.\n\nY. P.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "P. D. SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. D. SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. S. 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K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4200, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Anand Prakash, for the appelJant.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Anand Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Anand Prakash, for the appelJant."}}, {"text": "Niren De", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4249, "end_char": 4257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte, and K. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4278, "end_char": 4289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte, and K. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Baldev Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte, and K. 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In the aforementioned appeal by special leave, the point for consideration is whether the Labour Court, Lucknow was right in its conclusion that it was not competent to deal with Misc."}}, {"text": "s. 33(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Dehradun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4719, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1961, the appellant was a clerk working in the Dehradun branch of the State Bank of India, the respondent herein."}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4742, "end_char": 4761, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE BANK OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as at that time an industrial dispute between the respondent and its workmen was pending before the National Industrial Tribunal in Ref."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1960 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the industrial dispute), and the appellant being one of the office bearers of a recognized trade union connected with the respondent and consequently a 'protected workman', it applied on April 27, 1962 under s. 33 (3) to the National Industrial Tribunal for pennission to discharge him from service."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5441, "end_char": 5446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5574, "end_char": 5592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the authority of an order made by the Central Government on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred\n\nthe said application to the Labour Court, Delhi."}}, {"text": "23rd December, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the authority of an order made by the Central Government on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred\n\nthe said application to the Labour Court, Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5626, "end_char": 5630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5634, "end_char": 5639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5647, "end_char": 5683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the authority of an order made by the Central Government on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred\n\nthe said application to the Labour Court, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Labour Court, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the authority of an order made by the Central Government on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred\n\nthe said application to the Labour Court, Delhi."}}, {"text": "National Industrial Tribunal Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5751, "end_char": 5786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The National Industrial Tribunal Bombay, made its award in the aforementioned Reference on June 7, 1962."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5838, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The National Industrial Tribunal Bombay, made its award in the aforementioned Reference on June 7, 1962."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5902, "end_char": 5915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same was published in the official gazette on June 13, 1962 and it came into force on July 31,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "31,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same was published in the official gazette on June 13, 1962 and it came into force on July 31,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5972, "end_char": 5989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on February 23, 1963 the Government of India transferred the respondent's application under s. 33(3) 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1965 on the fire of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Articles 132( 1) and 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6709, "end_char": 6722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of that application, he moved this Court on July 17, 1965 for special leave under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6747, "end_char": 6755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave was granted by this Court on September 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6999, "end_char": 7017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for certificate made before :he Allahabad High Court was rejected by that court by its order dated September 13, 1965."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7058, "end_char": 7066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Daryao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Solicitor General did not try to bring the pre\" sent case within the rule laid down in Daryao's case( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8574, "end_char": 8582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8647, "end_char": 8655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9464, "end_char": 9472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10260, "end_char": 10265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of three different applications to state a case to the High Court of Patna in each of those petitions on questions of law formulated by him in his applications."}}, {"text": "November 17, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed his applications in respect of the first two periods of assessment but by its order dated November 17, 1954 it directed the Board to state a case in regard to the third period on one of tl1e questions of law mentioned in the petition which alone in its opinion arose for consideration."}}, {"text": "January 21 .• 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated January 21 .• 1957 the High Court answered that question against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Februarv 17, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11115, "end_char": 11132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Februarv 17, 1955 the appellant made applications to this Court for special leave to appeal against the order of the Board of Revenue referred to earlier."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11433, "end_char": 11441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13331, "end_char": 13340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were assured by Mr. A. K. Sen learned counsel for the appellant that.", "canonical_name": "A. K. 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missal or otherwise •. a workman, 'pay him wages for one month and must al, o make an application to the authority before which the industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him ..\n\nSUPJ.U!MB COUllT IBPOllTS\n\n[ 1968] 3 S.C.R.\n\nSub-s. 3 of s. 33 deals with 'protected workman' which expression\n\nin relation to an establishment means a workman who being an olllcer of a registered trade union connected with the establish ment,."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19684, "end_char": 19688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19692, "end_char": 19697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20276, "end_char": 20281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tata Iron and Stel Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21279, "end_char": 21305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sen that the decision of this Court in Tata Iron and Stel Company's case (1) has any bearing on the."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21497, "end_char": 21502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23576, "end_char": 23581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24739, "end_char": 24744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24876, "end_char": 24881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24886, "end_char": 24896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS\n\nBy enacting s. 33 the Parliament wanted to ensure a fair and satisfact?ry enquiry of an ind.ustrial dispute undisturbed by any action on the part of the employer which could create fresh cause for disharmony between him ."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25117, "end_char": 25122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25414, "end_char": 25418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25422, "end_char": 25427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25636, "end_char": 25640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25644, "end_char": 25649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26712, "end_char": 26716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26720, "end_char": 26725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Labour Court at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27371, "end_char": 27392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore according to him, the Permission asked for could not have been given either by the Labour Court at Delhi or by the Labour Court at Lucknow."}}, {"text": "Labour Court at Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27403, "end_char": 27426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore according to him, the Permission asked for could not have been given either by the Labour Court at Delhi or by the Labour Court at Lucknow."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27448, "end_char": 27452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27456, "end_char": 27460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27560, "end_char": 27566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27844, "end_char": 27849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27968, "end_char": 27974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28007, "end_char": 28011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28015, "end_char": 28020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}