O. N. MOHINDROO

THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI & ORS.

January 8, 1968

[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT,

G. K. MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] Con:titution of India, 1950, Art. 138(1) and (2) Scope of.

Advocates Act (25 of 1961), s. 38-Right of appool to Supreme Court Riven to advocate in disciplinary proceedings-Whether right Jails undu c Entry 77 of List I or Entry 26 of List Ill.

Supreme Court Rules 1966, 0, 5, r. 1-Appeal under s. 38 Advoccies Act, rejected summarily-If rule curtails right of appeal-Rule, if valid.

Tho appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing, (al Ille order of suspension passed against him by the State Bar Council under •· 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, (b) the order of the Bar Council of India in appeal under s. 37 of the Act, confirming the order of suspension. aJld (c) the order of this Court summarily rejecting his appeal to this Court under s. 38, under O.V., r. 7 of the Supreme CoU!rt Rules, 1966.

He contended that : ( 1) the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by •· 31 related to a matter under Entry 26 of List III of the ConstitutiOB, that it therefore fell under Art. 138(2), and as there was no special agree- IM!lt between the Government of India and the Government of a State

.., required by Art. 138(2), s. 38 was not validly enacted; and (2) 0. 5, r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules under which the appeal was plaoed for preliminary hearing was ultra vires s. 38, as the rule cut down and impaired the right of appeal under the section.

The writ petition W3i dismitoed.

In appeal to this Court,

HELD : ( 1) While Entry 26 of List III deals with the legal, medical and other professions, Entry 77 of List I deals with the constitution, orpniu.tion, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court, and also with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court.

Sinee there is a oeeming conflict between the two entries they have to be hannoniaed by reading the general power in Entry 26 in a restrict"'1 sense. That i•, the power to legislate in regard ta persons entitled to practise befor~ the Supreme Court 11nder Entry 77 of List I should be held to be carveit out from the general power relating to the professions in Entry 26 of Liiit Ill, and made the exclusive field of Parliament. [715 E-, F, H; 716 A.CJ

The object of the Advocates AC'! is to constitute one common bar foe the whole country and to provide machinery for its regulated functioning.

Though the Act relates to Jegal practitioners, in its pith and substance it is an enactnient dealingwith the qualifications, enrolment. right to practise and discipline of Advocates.

Since the Act provides that once a person is enrolled by any State Bar Council he becomes entitled to pracb,, e in all courts including the Supreme Court, the Act is a piece of legisiatiOn dealing with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court. 11lcrefore, the Act, including the right of appeal to this Court under s. 38, deals with a matter relating to Entry 77 of List I and falls under Art. 138(1) and within the exclusive field of Parliament. The Act is not

a composite lcgislatian parrly falling under Entry 77 of List l and partly under Entry 26 of Lisr Ill. It does not fall under Art. !38(2) and a special agreement with a State Government. is therforc not necessary.

1717 E, F-H; 718 A-C]

State of Bomha..v v. Ba/sara, (19511 S.C.R. 682. State of Bombay v.

Narothamdas, [!9511 S.C.R. 51 and In re: Lily Isabel Thomas. (19.641 6 S.C.R. 229. followed.

C. P. & Brar Sales of ."Jotor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, l 938

(I 9381

F.C.R.

J 8. Citizens lns11ra11ce Co. of Canada v. Parsons. [18811 7 A.C. 96, Bhola Prasad v. Emperor, (19421 F.C.R. 17, G. G. i" Council v. Province of Madras, (1945) 72 I.A. 91 and Durgtshwar v.

Secretary. Bar Council. Allahabad, A.LR. 1954 All. 728. referred to.

(2) On the e>press terms of Art. 145(l)(h) of the Constitution, r. 7 of 0. 5 of the Supreme Coon Rules is within the rule-making power ol lhis Court, as it merely Jays down hov..· and in v.hal manner an appeal filed under s. 38 is to be dealt \\ith and does not deal with or affect the right of appeal.

The fact that under tho rule the appeal is placed for preliminary hearing and is liable to be diposcd of at that stage docs not mean that the content of the right of appeal under the section is in anv way curtailed, because, the party filing the appeal is heard on all poinb;

rai>cd by him even at that stage. (718 F-HJ

Prem Chand Garg v. I-:xcisc Commi.nioner. (1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 885. llistinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 240 of 1967

Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 22, 1966 of lhe Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. I of

I 966.

:' ; ipellant in person.

Avadh Behari, for respondents Nos. I and 2.

P. Ra/II Reddy, and A. V. Ra11gam, for respondent No. 3.

Purshottam Trikamdas and /. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 4.

Purshottam Trikamdas and S .. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Sbelat, J. This appeal by certificate raises the question as to G

th~ scope of entries 77 and 78 in List I and entry 26 in List IIl L'f the Sevenlh Schedule to the Constitution.

The question arises in the following manner :

On a complaint by the Subordinate Judge that the appellant, while taking inspection of the Court record in an arbitration mat- H ter periding before his Couri, had mutilated the copy of a notice in th; tt record by wilfully tearing a portion thereof. the District Judge, Delhi filed a report against the appellant before the Delhi

MOHJNDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (She/at, /.) 711

State Bar Council for taking action under the Advocats c.t, 25 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Disciplinary Committee of the said Council after hearing the appellant found him guilty of professional misconduct and ordered his suspension for one year under s. 35 ( 3 )( c) of the Act. An appeal filed by the appellant under s. 3 7 before the Bar Council of India failed.

Thereupon he filed an appeal against the said orer under s .. 38 in this Court.

The 1appcal was placed for prehmmary heanng and summarily rejected at that stage. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) for quashing the said order of suspension, the order of the appellate authority continuing the said order and the order of this Court dismissing the appeal. He thereafter filed a review petition against. the dismissal of his appeal contending, inter alia, that rule 7 of

0. 5 of the Supreme Court Rule~ was ultra vires s. 38 of the Act.

The review petition also was dismissed.

At the hearing of his writ petition, the appellant, inter alia, contended that s. 38 of the Act was ultra vires Art. 138(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the appellate jurisdiction conferred on this Court by s. 38 fell under entry 26 in List III and that there being no special agreement between the Government of India and the Government of any State as required by clause 2 of Art. 138 sec. 38 was invalidly enacted. He also contended that 0. 5 r. 7 of the Supreme Court Rules under which the appeal was placed for preliminary hearing was ultra vires s. 38 as the said rule cut down and impaired his right of appeal under s. 38. Lastly, he contended

1that the decision of the Bar Council of India was bad for the several grounds alleged by him in his writ petition. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition rejected these contentions and dismissed it.

As regards the first conten•ion he held that, clause 2 of Art. 13 8 did not apply and that it "'as clause

I of'thaliil\rticle which was applicable as the subject matter of the Advocate&· Act fell under entry 77 of the Union List. As to the other two contentions he held that rule 7 of the 0. 5 was valid and did not contravene s. 3 8; that the Bench before which the appeal came up for preliminary hearing had heard the appellant's counsel and in addition had called for production of a document desired by him.

There was no affidavit by Counsel appearing for him that he was not heard on any point which he desired to contend. He also held that the appellant had specifically raised the contention as to the vires of the said rule in his review petition and that that contention having been rejected, the appellant could not reagitate it in the writ petition. He also held that the. appellant was similarly not entitled to reagitate the question as to the merits of the said order of suspension. the same having been considered and rejected at the time of the preliminary hearing of his appeal.

Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge

SUPREMB COURT REPORTS

[1968] 2 S.CR.

the appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal.

At the hearing of that appeal the appellant's csel conceded that he could not raise any contention on the merits of the case in view of this Court having disposed of th.ose very contentions and that therefore he would confine his argument' only •to the question of the \lires of s. 38.

The learned Judges who heard that appeal were of the view ( 1) that the Act was a composite piece of legislation. that it did not, as held by the learned Single Judge, fall exclusively under entries 77 and 78 of List I but that it fell partly under tho.se entries and partly under entry 26 of List Ill; (2) that Art. 138 had no application as the jurisdiction to entertain and try appeals under s. 38 was not 'further jurisdiction' within the meaning of that Article; that the jurisdiction to hear such appeals was already vested in this Court under Art. 136 even without s. 38 as the Bar Councils of Delhi and of India were quasi-judicial tribunals and that therefore this Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try appeals against their orders; and (3) that the only effect of s. 38 was that by providing for an appeal Parliament removed the hurdle of an appellant having to obtai• special leave under Art. 136.

On this reasoning the learned Judges dismissed the rontention as to the vires of s. 38.

Dismissin~ the appeal the learned Judges observed :

"There is no bar to the Parliament legislating with respect to jurisdictiofl afld powers of the Supreme Court subject to the express provisions of the Constitution like Arts. 132 and 134.

When a provision for appeal to the Supreme Court is made in a statute, within the sphere covered by Arts. 132 to 136 it is not confermot

of further power and jurisdiction as envisageu by Art. 138, such power would be exercisable by reason of entry 77 of List I".

In this appeal the appellant challenges the correctness of thi~ view.

The question which falls for consideration is one of interpretation of entries 77 and 78 of List I and entry 26 of List III.

If it is held that it is entry 26 of List 111 under which the Act was enacted, clause 2 of Art. 138 would apply and in that case a special agreement with the State Governmeflt becomes a condition precedent to the enactment of s. 38 of the Act.

In that case the difficulty would be to reconcile entries 77 and 78 of List I with entry 26 of the List III.

It is a well recognised rule of construction that the Court while construing entries must asume that the distribution of legislative powers in the three Lists could not have been intended to be in conflict with one another.

A general power ought not to

MOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (She/at, J.) i 13

oe so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same instrument and operating in the same field when by reading the former in a more restricted sense, effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning. It is, therefore, right. to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of an entry in one List the meaning which, if less wide than it might in another coniext bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it and equally giving to the language of another entry in another List a meaning which it can properly bear. Where there is a seeming conflict between one entry in one List and another entry in another List, an attempt should always be made to avoid to see whether the two entries can be harmonised to avoid such a conflict of jurisdiction. (C.P.

& Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938( 1 ); Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons('); Rho/a Prasad v. Emperor('); Governor General in Council v.

Province of Madras('). and State of Bombay v. Balsara(•).

It is in the background of these principles of construction that we must proceed to examine the content of the various relevant entries dealing with the constitution and organisation of courts and their jurisdiction and powers and the scheme envisaged thereunder.

Entries 77 and 78 of Li>t I read as under :-

"77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court) ... persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court.''

"78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts ... , persons entitled to practice before the High Courts." Entry 95 of List I reads as follows :-

"95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court. with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction."

Entry 65 of List II reads :

"65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, exce:pt the Supreme Court. with respect to any of the matters in this List."

Entry 46 in List III reads :

"46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List."

(1) [1938] F.C.R. I 8.

(3) [1942] F.C.R. 17.

(5) [195t] S.C.R. 682.

(21 [1881] 7 A.C. 96.

(4) [1945] 72 I.A. 91.

The scheme for conferring jurisdiction and powers on courts is

(a) to avoid duplication of Courts, Federal and State Courts as in the Constitution of the United States, ( b) to enable Parliament and the State Legislatures to confer jurisdiction on courts in respect of matters in their respective lists except in the case of the Supreme Court where the legislative authority to confer jurisdiction and powers is exclusively vested in Parliament.

In the case of the Concurrent List both the legislatures can confer jurisdiction and powers on courts except of course the Supreme Court depending upon whethr the Act is enacted by one or the other. Entry 3 in List II confers legislative powers on the States in the matter of "Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court." It is clear that except for the constitution and the organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts the legislative power in the matter of administration of justice has been vested in the State Legislatures.

The Stale Legislatures can, therefore enact laws, providing fo[ the constitution and organisation of courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts and confer jurisdiction and powers on them in all m; i!lers. civil and criminal. except the admiralty jurisdiction.

It would, of course, be open to Parliament to bar the jurisdiction of any such court by special enactment in matters provided in Lists I and III where it has made a law but so Ion~ as th; H is not done the courts established by the State Legislatures would have jurisdiction to try all suits and proceedings relating even to matters in

Lis'.s I and Ill. Thus, so far as the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court <lnd the High Courts arc concerned. the power is with Parliamnt. As regards the other courts. Entry 3 of List II confers such a power on the State Legislatures.

As regards jurisdiction and powers. it is Parliament which can deal with the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and the admiralty jurisdiction.

Parliament can confer jurisdiction and powers on all courts in matters set out in List I and List III where it has passed any laws.

But under the power given to it under entry 3 in List II, a State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers on any of the courts except the Supreme Court in respect of any statute whether enacted by it or by Parforr.ent except where a Central Act dealing with matters in Lists T and Ill otherwise provides. That these entries contemplate such a scheme was brought out in State of Bombay v. Narorhamda'( 1 ). where it was contended that the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 40 of 1948, consti:uting the said Civil Court as an additional court :was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature as it conferred jurisdic-

(1) (195t] S.C.R. 51.

~OIDNDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 715

tion on the new court not only in respect of matters in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 but also in regard io matters in List I such as promissory notes in item 8 of List I. Rejecting the contention it was held that the impugned Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra vires as the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws with respect to "administration of justice" and "constitution and organisation of all courts" under item 1 of List Il was wide enough to include the power to make laws with regard to the jurisdiction of courts established by the Provincial Legislature; that the object of item 53 of List I. item 2 of List II and item 15 of List III was to confer such powers on the Central and the Provincial Legislatures to make laws relating to the jurisdiction of courts with respect to the particular matters that are referred to in List I and II respectively and the Concurrent List, and that these provisions did not in any way curtail the power of the Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II to

make laws with regard to jurisdiction of courts and to confer jurisdiction on courts established by it to try all causes of a civil nature subject to the power of the Central and Provincial Legislatures to make special provisions relating to particular subject~ referred to in the Lists.

It may be mentioned that item 53 in List I, items 1 and 2 in List II and item 15 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act more or less correspond to entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, entries 3 and 65 in List II and entry 46 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

This being the scheme with regard to the constitution and organisation of courts and their jurisdiction and powers let us next proceed to examine entry 26 in List III. Entry 26, which is analogous to Item- 16 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act, deals with legal, medical and other professions but is not concerned with the constitution and organ_isation of courts or their jurisdiction and powers. These, as already stated. are dealt with by entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, entries 3 and 65 in List II and entry 46 in List TIT.

Enactments such as the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, the Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947, the Dentists Act, 1948, the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 and the Pharmacy Act, 1948, all Central Acts, would fall under the power to deal with professions under entry 26 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and item 16 of List III of 1935 Act.

It will, however, be noticed that entries 77 and 78 in List I are composite entries and deal not only with the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts but also with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

The only difference between these two entries is that whereas the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court are dealt with in

entry 77, the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts are dealt with not by entry 78 of List I but by other entries. Entrioi; 77 and 78 in List I apart from dealing with the constitution and organisation of the Supreme Court and the High Courts also deal with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This part of the two entries shows that to the extent that the persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Court are concerned, the power to legislate in regard to them is carved out from the general power relating to the professions in entry 26 in List Ill and is made the exclusive field for Parliament. The power to legislate in regard to persons

entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts

i~ thus excluded from entry 26 in List III and is made the exclusive field for legislation by Parliament only [Re : Lily Isabel Tlroma.r( 1) and also Durgeshwar v. Secretary, Bar Council, Allahabad(')). Barring those entitled to practise in the Supreme Court and the High Com .s. the power to legislate with respect to the rest of the practitioners would still seem to he retained under entry 26 of List III.

To what extent the power to legislate in regard to the legal profession still remains within the field o{ entry 26 is not the question at present before us and therefore it is not necessary to go into it in this appeal.

The Aavocates Act was passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an All-India Bar.

Section 2(a) and

(i) define an 'advocate' and a 'legal practitioner'.

Chapter II deals with the establishment of Bar Councils and their functions,

viz .. to admit persons on its roll, to prepare and maintain such roll, to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll etc.

Section 7 lays down the functions of the Bar Council of India, that is, to prepare and maintain a common roll of advocates, to lay down the standards of professional conduct and etiquette, to lay down procedure to he followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of each State Bar Council, to exercise gene1 al supervision and control over State Bar Councils etc.

Chapter III deals with admission and enrolment of advocates. Section 16(1) provides that there shall be two classes of advocates. senior advocates and other advocates.

Chapter IV deals with the right to practise.

Section 29 provide.' that subject to the provisions of this- Act and the rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed day. be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law. namely. the advocates. Section 30 provides that subject to the provisions of this Act. every advocate wh05e name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise thro\lghout the terri-

(I) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 229, 236.

MOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 717

tories to whkh this Act extends in all courts including the Supreme Court and before any tribunal or any other authority before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise. Chapter V deals with the conduct of advocates.

Section 35 lays down that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refeu the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.

The' disciplinary committee has to fix a date for the hearing of the case and give a notice thereof to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State. Subs. ( 3) provides that such committee after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard, may make, inter alia, an order suspending the advocate

from practice as it may deem fit.

Similar powers are also conferred on the Bar Council of India under s. 36 in relation to an advocate on the common roll. Section 3 7 gives a right of appeal to the Bar Council of lndia by any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council. Section 38 confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court on any person aggrieved by an orde• by the disciplinary commi•tee of the Bar Council of lndia under s. 36 or s. 37 and empowers the Supreme Court to pass such orders thereon as it deems fit.

The object of the Act is thus to constitute one common Bar for the whole country and to provide machinery for its regulated functioning.

Since the Act sets up one Bar, autonomous in il~ character, the Bar Councils set up thereunder have been entrusted with the power to regulate the working of the profession and to prescribe rules of professional conduct and etiquette, and the power to punish those who commit breach of such rules.

The power of punishment is entrusted to the disciplinary committees ensuring a trial of an advocate by his peers.

Sections 35, 36 and 37 lay down the procedure for trying complaints, punishment and an appeal to the Bar Council of India from the orders passed by the State Bar Councils.

As an additional remedy s. 38 provides a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Though the :'-ct relates to the legal practitioners, in its 'pith and substance it 1s an enact?lent which c.oncerns itself with the qualifications, enrolmnt, nght to practise and discipline of the advocates.

As provided by the Act once. a person is enrolled by any one of the Stte Ba; Councils. he becomes entitled to practise in all courts mcludmg the Supreme Court. As aforesaid, the Act creates one common Bar, all its members being of one class. namely, advocates.

Smee all those who have been enrolled have a ricrht to pactise. in the Supreme Court and the High Courts, he Act 1.s a piece of legislation which deals with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. There- L3 Sup.Cl/68-2

fore the Act must be held to fall within entries 77 and 78 of List I.

As the power of legislation relating to those entitled to practise in the Supreme Court and the High Courts is carved out from the general power to legislate in relation to legal and other professions in entry 26 of List Ill, it is an error to say, as the High Court did, that the Act is a composite legislation partly

falling under entries 77 and 78 of List I and partly under entry 26 of List Ill.

In this view, the right of appeal to this Court under s. 38 of the Act creates a jurisdiction and power in relation to a ma, tter falling under entries 77 and 78 of the Union List and the Act would, therefore, fall under clause 1 and not clause 2 of Art. 138. The argument that s. 38 falls under Art. 138(2) and is invalid on account of its having been enacted without a special agreement with the State Government is, therefore, without merit.

As regards the valiuity of rule 7 of 0. 5 the contention, as already pointed out, was raised and rejected in the said review petition filed by the appellant. The contention having thus been concluded could not obviously be raised in the writ petition filed by the appellant. nor would he be entitled to any writ or order from the High Court as against the said decision.

The rule, in any event, merely provides for the placing of an appeal filed under s. 38 for a preliminary hearing and enables this Court to dismiss at that stage an appeal if it finds it has no substance. The appellant in such an appeal is heard; if the court finds that there is nothing in the appeal, the court declines to issue notice on the opposite side and disposes of the appeal there and then. Section 38 confers no doubt a right of an appeal on a person aggrieved by an order passed under ss. 36 and 37 and the appellant

does not have to obtain any special leave under Art. 136. But the fact that under rule 7 the appeal is placed for preliminary hearing and is liable to be disposed of at that stage does not mean that the content of the right of appeal under s. 38 is in any way curtailed as the party filing the appeal has to be heard on all points raised by him therein. There is, therefore, no substance id the argument that rule 7 contravenes s. 38, and is therefore ultra vires the section. On the express terms of Art. 145(1) (b), the rule is within the rule-making power of this Court as it merely lays down how and in what manner an appeal filed under s. 38 is to be dealt with and does not deal with or affect the right of appeal. The validity of the rule cannot, therefore,. be impeached.

The decision in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Cnmmissioner( 1 ) cannot assist the appellant. In that decision rule 12 -

(t) (1963) Supp. I S.C.R. 885.

MOHINDROO v. BAR COUNCIL (Shelat, J.) 719

A of 0. XXXV of ihe Supreme Court Rules was declared void in so far as it related to the furnishing of security on the ground that the right to move the Supreme Court under Art. 32 was absolute and the rule by providing security for costs impaired such an absolute right.

Furnishing of security in the case <if persons without means to do so would obviously obstruct 'such B persons from vindicating their rights under Art. 32 and would-, therefore, curtail the right under that Article.

That obviously is not so in the case of the rule with which we are concerned inthis appeal. The contention, therefore, that rule 7 curtails the right of appeal under s. 38 or contravenes that section must be rejected.

C The appellant cited a number of authorities but it is not necessary to deal with them as they have no bearing on the questions before us. He also tried to question the correctness of the order passed against him by the Bar Council of India but we did not allow him to reagitate it as it stood concluded on the dismissal of the appeal and the review petition filed by him in this D Court.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

V.P.S.

Appeal dilflllissed.

O. N. MOHINDROO

THE BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI & ORS

January 8, 1968

K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.

R. S. BACHAWAT, J.

G. K. MITTER

Art. 138(1)

Advocates Act

s. 38

Supreme Court Rules 1966

s. 38

Advocates Act, 1961

s. 37

s. 38

Art. 138(2)

Government of India

Government of a State

Art. 138(2)

s. 38

Supreme Court

s. 38

Parliament

s. 38

Art. 138(1)

Lily Isabel Thomas

Art. 145(l)(h)

s. 38

P. Ra/II Reddy

A. V. Ra11gam

Purshottam Trikamdas

N. Shroff

S .. P. Nayar

Sbelat

District Judge, Delhi

State Bar Council

s. 35

s. 3

Bar Council of India

High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench

s. 38

s. 38

Art. 138(2)

s. 38

clause 2

Art. 138

sec. 38

s. 38

s. 38

clause 2

Art. 13

s. 3

s. 38

Art. 138

s. 38

Art. 136

s. 38

Bar Councils of Delhi

India

s. 38

Art. 136

s. 38

Arts. 132 and 134

Arts. 132 to 136

Art. 138

clause 2

Art. 138

s. 38

[1942] F.C.R. 17

United States

Seventh Schedule

Seventh Schedule

Seventh Schedule

Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947

Dentists Act, 1948

Chartered Accountants Act, 1949

Pharmacy Act, 1948

Seventh Schedule

Lily Isabel Tlroma.r

Section 2(a)

Section 7

Section 16(1)

Section 29

Section 30

[1964] 6 S.C.R. 229

Section 35

s. 36

Section 3

Bar Council of lndia

Section 38

s. 36

s. 37

Sections 35, 36 and 37

s. 38

s. 38

clause 1

clause 2

Art. 138

s. 38

Art. 138(2)

s. 38

Section 38

ss. 36 and 37

Art. 136

s. 38

s. 38

Art. 145(1)

s. 38

XXXV of ihe Supreme Court Rules

Art. 32

Art. 32

s. 38


DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS.

U.A. BASRURKAR AND ORS.

January 8. 1968

(J. C. S!ll\11, V. RAMASWAMl AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), ss. 106, 107, 53A- Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877), s. 27A-Porrions of business premises given on sub-lease-Documents purportng to constitute sub-ltase not re11istered-Applicabi/ity of ss. 106, 107-Enforceability of agreement under s. 53A-Specific performanct of contract-Effect of s. 21A.

Certain documents were executed between the appellant firm and the respond.eat company in respect of premises df which the latter \\ra<; a tcnanl According to the appellant these documents were intended to effect a sub-

Jcase of hree portions of the premises in question though in order 10 avoid =equences ur.der lhe Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act 10 of I 94 7 they apparently purported to cre>te a partnership.

The finn wu actually given pos-:; cssion of two of the three portions thus given to it.

After some time the firm was dispossessed by the company of the pn>-

misrs occupied by it and it therefore filed a suit claiming delivery of possession.

Jn defence the company contended that the c.iocumcnts relied upon hy the firm did not evidence either a sub-lease or a partnership.

According to it there were negotiat:ons for a partnership \\'hich never fructified.

The tri•I court held that the documents executed by the par:ie) evidenced an agreement for a sub-lease and since the agreement did not require rcg:s1rafion the firm was entitled to the reliefs claimed by it on the basis of the agreemont.

In appeal by the company the High Court held 1hat the documents constitued a completed lease of at least an agreement to lease falling within s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act. and

sine~ the lease or the agreement to lease 1J.•as evidenced by documents in

Writin~ an<l they \\'ere unregistered. the lease or the areement to lease could net he enforced.

On this so'e ground. the High Court "llowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the firm, which thereupon, >ppealed to this Court.

HELD : (i) The three documents in qu.,.tion were relied on hv the appellant firm itself as eviden~ of the lease and the tenns thereof: the firm could not therefore be hea"rd to say that these documents did not represent the comoleted lease and did not, for tha .. reason, require regi'Jtrntion. [724 C-HJ

(ii) According to the firm's case based on the said document~ ren~ in the first inc; tance wac; paYablc to the comoanv in the shane of J Of7o of the profit, of the firm for th'c period 1st April 1950 to 30th June 1951. Therefore the leac; e that came into ·~~<i"-lcnce through thc.;;; c documentc; \\'as cer tainlv for more than a year.

Section 107 of the Tran'ifer of Proerty Act 'v.as thus clt>arlv applicahlc and q1ch a leac; c could not have hccn \'al'dJ\· m1dc cxccnt under a reei.;;;!ercd in..; trumcnt.

Admittedly there was no r-:(!i'itration ofthe documents \vhich constituled the lc; ise. and. conscquenlv. the finn cnu!d nor claim anv rir.:hto;; on the basis or this lease

evidnc~~ hy unrcgi<; tcred documents. f725 R-FJ

(iii) fercly hecauc; e the 1~:.isc was for an indefinite period and related to immovable property which vo:is not used for agricullural or manufac~ turing pllrposes it could not be held to be a lease from month to month

DELHI MOTOR co. v. BASRURKA!t (Bhargava, I.) 721

A to which s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable. There , was nothing in the terms of the lease which showed that it was from

month to month. {725 F-Hl

Rm Kumar Das v. Jagadish Chandra Deb Dhabal Deb & Anr. (1952] , S.C.R. 269, distinjlllisbed.

(iv) Section . 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of .property of which the lessee had already taken possession, hut does not

give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other -.right on the basis of an unregistered lease.

Section 53A is 'only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which 1be lessee can claim rights against the lessor. [726 C-E] ·

In the present case the claim which was put forward by the firm. in .the plaint. could by no means be construed as a mere defence of the firm's rights. What the firm. was actually' seeking to do was to enforce the :ri&ht• under the lease and, in such a case, s. 53A of the Transfer. of Property Act was clearly inapplicable. [727 H-728 A]

Probqdh Kumar Das & Ors. v. Dantmara Tea Company Ltd. <l Ors. 66 LA. 293, relied on.

Ram Chandtr v. Maharaj Kunwar & Ors., I.L.R. 1939 All. 809, listinguished.

(v) Specific performances of the lease could not be enforced because:

(a) In the 11Jaint no specific performance was claimed by the appellant,

(b) The appellant's own c""" was that the entire ccntract was not included in the three written documents, and s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act under which only the ccntract could be enforced requires the whole contract to be in writing; ( c) The difference between the words of s. 53A of the Transfer of Propelrty Act and s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act brings out clearly that the latter is applicable when the entire property under contract has been taken possession of by the lessee in part performance of the contract. In the present case only two out of the three portions of the premises leased out to it were taken possession of by the

appellant. [728 G-H, 729 H, 730 A-Bl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 495 Of 1965.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 22, 1959 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at

Delhi in Regular First Appeal No. 78-D of 1953.

Ramesliwar Dayal and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants.

Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for . respondent No. 6.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bhargava, J. The first appellant, Messrs. Delhi Motor Company, is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as "the firm"),

of which the other four appellants Nos .. 2 to 5 are partners. Respondent No. 6, New Garage Ltd., is a private limited company (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"), of which respondent

722 SUPREMB COURT REPOllTS [1968 J 2 s.c.R.

No. I was the Managing Director, and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were members of the Board of Directors.

The firm brought a suit against the Company for possession of part of the building known as "Scindia House" situated in Connaught Circus, New Delhi, on the basis of an agreement of sub-lease. Possession wa.s claimed of a portion of the Show-Room on the ground floor, of 1/2 portion of the Balcony, and another portion of the premises which were, in the year 19 50, in the possession of Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd.

The case put forward by the firm was that the Company was the tenant of Scindia House and was in occupation of the Show-Room and other parts of the building, while a part of it was occupied by Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. u sub-lessee of the Company. According to the firm, the agreement to sub-lease, or the sub-lease on the basis of which possesion was claimed l>y the firm from the Company, is evidenced by three documents, the first one of which is letter, Ext. P. l, dated 20th February, 1950, written by K. S. Bhatnagar, appellant No. 2, on behalf of the firm, to U. A. Basrurkar, respondent Ne.

I, who was the Managing Director of the Company. The second document is letter, Ext. P. 2, dated 22nd February, 1950. writ ten by respondent No. I Basrurkar to appellant No. 2 Bhatnagar; and the third document is Ext. P. 3, which purport~ to be nolell on agreement arrived at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950.

The case of the firm was that, though these document~ did not purport in so many words to be an agreement of sub-lease to be granted by the Company to the firm, in substance and in fact, the agreement arrived at was of a sub-lease in respect of the premises mentioned above. Since, under the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act 19 of 1947, if a sub-lease had been granted by the Company to the firm with out the consent of the landlord, the Company would have been liable to ejectment from the premises, the agreement was not made as directly evidencing 'a sub-lease, so that the landlord should not have an opportunity of suing the Company for ejectment.

In February, 1950, when the agreement evidenced by these three documents was arrived at, respondent No. 1, U. A.

Basrurkar as Managing Director did not have the authority to enter into this transaction on behalf of the Company with the firm and, consequently on 22nd March, 1950. the Board of Directors of the Company, by a resolution Ext. P. 9. authorised the Managing Director to enter into this transaction.

Thereafter, the firm came into possession of two portions of the leased property and started its business in them with effect from !st April, 1950.

The two portions of the leased property. which came into the posse, sion of the firm. were a portion of the Show- Room on the ground floor and a half portion of the Blcony on the first floor.

The agreement contained in these letters and

• F

documents also required parties to carry out some other obligations and, according to the firm, it complied with them.

In order to avoid the liability of th, e Company for ejectment under the Delhi and A jmer Mcrwara Rent Control Act, 194 7, the agreement was sought to be given the form of a partnership; and in order to enable the Company to enter into such a transaction, a special reso!Ution .Ext. P. 4 was passed on 24th November, 1950 at an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Share-holders of the Company amending the Memorandum of Association of the Company.

This amendment was subsequently approved by the District Judge and was registered with the Registrar of Companies.

So far as the landlord is concerned, he was not a party to these transactions, though, on 5th April, 1951, the landlord gave a letter Ext. P. 22 recognising .the possession of the firm, but he specifically stated In that letter that the firm would be a licensee

and not a sub-lessee.

One other term in tlie agreement arrived at was that appellant No. 2, K. S. Bhatnagar, was to be taken as a Director of the Company and he was in fact.included in the Directors of the Company thereafter.

The further case of the firm was that when Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. vacated the portion of the premises which was included in the sub-lease, the Company did not give possession of that portion of the leased property to the firm a11d also started obstructing the use of those portions of the property by the firm of which the firm had secured possession by I st April, 1950.

A stage came when the firm was completely dispossessed from the property leased and, ultimately, after giving notices, the firm instituted a suit on 18th June, 1952. The principal prayer in the suit was for delivery of possession in respect of all the three portions of the leased property.

Then, there was a claim for damages to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- in respect of loss incurred on account of dispossession and obstruction in use of the leased property at the instance of the Company.

Injunctions were also sought restraining the Company from interfering with the rights of the firm and with their uninterrupted use of the leased property. There were further prayers for other consequential injunctions which need not be described in detail.

On behalf of the Company and its Directors, the plea put forward was that there was no agreement of sub-lease or a completed sub-lease between. the Company and the firm and that. in fact, all that took place were negotiations for entering into a partnership. Even the agreement for partnership was .never completed, so that the firm was not entitled to any relief at all.

The trial Court held that the contract evidenced by these documents was an agreement for a sub-lease and, since this agreement did not require registration, the firm was entitled to the

724 SUPREM!l COURT REPORTS [I 968] 2 s.c.R.

reliefs claimed on the basis of this agreement.

The Company and its Directors appealed to the High Court of Punjab and that Court held that these documents constituted a completed lease or at least an agreement to lease falling within s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and, since the lease or the agreement to lease was evidenced by documents in writing and they were unregistered, the lease or the agreement to lease could not be enforced.

On this sole ground, the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the firm.

The firm has now come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

The iirst point urged on behalf of the firm was that, in this case, there was a completed sub-lease, but it did not rl!tjuire registration for .two reasons.

The first reason advanced was !hat the lease was not evidenced by the documents Exts. P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3 only, but was, in fact, completed subsequently when, .after the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company,

the Company gave possession of the leased property to the firm on or about the 1st April, 1950. The second reason was that, in any case, this lease was not a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, so that s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable and registration was not compulsory. These submissions fail, because the lease, as relied upon by L.e firm, has to be held to be a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year, and

such a lease is fully governed by s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The firm itself came forward with the case that the rights thac were being claimed were under a lease and the lease was in respect of immovable property consisting of the three portions of the Scindia }louse which have been mentioned above.

It was, however, urged that this lease was not for any fixed term at all and was for an indefinite period, so that it could not be held to be a lease from year to year either.

It was further submitted that yearly rent had not been reserved in respect of this lease.

Even these submissions were made on the basis that the terms of the le:; se have to be ascertained from the three documents Exl<. P. !, P. 2 and P. 3 which were relied upon by the firm to claim the relief in the suit. It appears to us that, if these documents are properly interpreted, an inference necessarily follows that the lease. if any, brought into existence by these documents was certainly for a period exceeding one year.

Since reliance was placed on these documents on behalf of the tirm to urge that there was a completed lease, learned counsel for the firm was asked to point out the provision which fixed the rent payable in re, pcct of the leased property.

The only provision, on which he relied to show that rent had, in fact,

been agreed upon the fixed, was para I of Ext.

P. 3 which

contains notes on agreement dated 22nd February, 1950. Thar paragraph is as follows ;-

"Profit share of party No. 1 would be 10% of net profit of New Delhi business only and will be settled at the end of the 1st closing of the financial year which would be 30th June, 1951."

Accepting this submission that this paragraph lays down the rent payable, it is clear that, under it, the rent payable for the first time would be 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in its New Delhi business up to 30th June, 1951. The period would naturaiiy begin on the date on which the lease commenced. That date, according to the firm itself, was 1st April, 1950.

From these facts. it follows that when the rent is to be paid for the first time, it would be an amount of 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in its New Delhi business between 1st April,

1950 and 30th June, 1951, and, naturally enough, the rent will be in respect of the same period.

This term, therefore, clearly laid down that the very first payment of rent was to be for a period of one year and three months, so that, even though no further period for he continuance of the . lease after 30th June, 1951 was laid down, the lease at least made. rent payable for the first period of fifteen months. The lease was, therefore, at least for a period of fifteen months and, consequently, for a period exceeding one year.

Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act was, thus, clearly applicable and such a lease could not have been validly made, except under a registered instrument.

Admittedly, there was no registration of the documents which constituted the lease and, copsequently, the firm could not claim any rights on the basis of this lease evidenced by unregistered documents.

Learned counsel tried to urge that, since in these documents no definite period for the lease was mentioned, we should hold that s. I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable and the lease being in respect of immovable property for purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing must be deemed to be a lease from month to month.

We are unable to accept this submission, because none of the documents, on which reliance bas been placed on behalf of the firm to prove the lease, contains any clause indicating that the tenancy was to be from month to month or the rent was payable monthly. In fact, the indication from para I of Ext.

P. 3 quoted above is that the rent was to be payable annually, so that the contract itself seems to give an indication that it was to be a lease from year to year and annual rent was payable.

These circumstances, however, are immaterial, because we have already. indicated earlier our

726 St:PREME COURT REPORTS

(1968] 2 S.C.R.

finding that this lease was at least for a minimum period of 15 months and, consequently, s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes applicable, irrespective of the question whether it was a lease from month to month or from year to year.

The High Court was, therefore, quite correct in holding that on the basis of this lease the reliefs claimed hy the firm could not be granted to it.

In these circumstances. an arugment was put forward on behalf of the firm that, though this contract to lease had not been registered, the firm could claim possession under it in view of the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, because, in this case, the Company would be debarred from enforcing against the firm any right in respect of that property of which the firm had already taken possession, viz., part of the Show-Room and a portion of the Balcony.

In our opinion, this argument proceeds on an incorrect interpretation of s. 53A, because that section is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of property of which the lessee had already taken possession, but does not give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other rights on the bsis of an unregistered lease.

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor.

This interpretation of

1>. 53A was clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das and Othas v. Da11rmar11 Tm Company Umited & Others(').

Learned counsel for the firm. ho"cver, relied on a decision

of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Cham/er v. Maharaj Kunwar and Others(').

In that case. the Jessee, under a registered lease which was defective and did not comply with the require- F ments of s. 107 of the Trnnsfcr of Property Act, brought a suit against a subsequent purchaser of te house. of th~ lessor on !h~ allegation that the purchaser had, m collus1on with the Mumctpal Board, procued the demolitio!1 .of a. portion of. the house, and claimed a relief of perpetual m1unct1on restrammg the purchaser from demolishing the house or othe.rwise interfering .with G the lessee's rights as such, and for restor:iuon of the .demohsed portion at the purchaser's cost.

The High Court, in allowing the claim of the lessee, held : -

"Now, in the present case, what is it that the plaintiff is attempting to do'?

He is not attempting to set up a transfer which .is invalid: he. h.as not instituted suit for the declaration of the vahd1ty of the transfer,

(I) 66 I.A. 29.1. (21 J.l..R. (19J9J All. 809.

he has not instituted a suit in which he claims an order against the defendant directing him to perform any on

venant of the transfer.

What he is seeking to do 1s to debar the defendants from interfering with his possession into which he has entered with the consent of his transferor after the execution of a transfer in his favour.

He is, in other words, seeking to defend the rights to which he is entitled under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in demolishing part of the property of which the plaintiff had obtained possession were acting suo motu with the aid of the Municipal Board of Moradabad. It is the defendants who are seeking to assert rights covered by the contract.

The plaintiff seeks merely to debar them from doing so; the plaintiff is seeking to protect his rights.

In a sense, in the proceedings he is really a defendant and we see nothing in the terms of section 5 3A of the Transfer of Property Act to disentitle him from maintaining tiJe present suit." Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of the view taken by th.e Allahabad High Court, we have to point out that the interpretation put on s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act even by that Court is of no assistance to the firm in the present case.

In this case, the firm is seeking to enforce rights under the unregistered lease and to seek a decree for possession against the lessor.

The Allahabad High Court in that case proceeded on the basi.s that the plaintiff of that suit was in the position of a defendant and was only seeking to protect his rights by resort to the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, so that no principle was laid down by the High Court that s. 53A is available to a lessee otherwise than as a defence. We are unable to accept the submission that the judgment in that case should be read as recognising a right of a lessee to enforce rights on the basis of an unregistered lease by resort to that provision: of law. In fact, if that case be interpreted as laying down such a principle, it must be held that it has been directly over-ruled by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Probodh Kumar Das and Others(') and is not correct.

That decision may be justified, if at all, on the basis that, :hough the \essee in that case was a plaintiff, he was actually seeking protection under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act by being in the real position of a defendant.

On the question whether a person. who sues as a plaintiff, may still be regarded as defending the rights sought to be conferred upon him by an unreg'stered deed, we need express no opinion. In the present case before us, the claim, which was put forward by the firm in the plaint, can by

(I) 66 I.A. 293.

SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS [1968] 2 s.c.R.

no means be construed as a mere defence of the firm's rights. What the firm is actually seeking to do is 10 enforce the rights under the lease and, in such a case, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is clearly inapplicable.

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the firm on the decision of this Court in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagadish Chandra Deb

Dhaba/ Deb and Another('), in which case also, a registered Kabuliyat executed by the lessee did not comply with the requiremenls of s. I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act, and on the facts of the case it was held that, though under the Kab1iyat the land was leased out for a period of ten years, the lease in fact must be presumed to be from menth to month under s. I 06 of that Ac!.

The facts of that case were, however. quite different. In that case, the terms of the lease were not ::scertaincd from the Kabuliyat in which the period of lease was fixed at I 0 years.

The terms of the lease were ascertained from <>ther documents, including receipts for rent paid by the lessee lo the lessor, and on the basis of that evidence it was found that a lease had come into existence under which rent was being paid monthly.

No such circumstances appear in the case before us.

In fact, it was at no stage pleaded and no evidence was led to show that, independently on the three documents Exts. P. I, P. 2 and P. 3, there was material from which it could be inferred that a !Clise from month to month had come into existence between the firm and the Company.

No such point was urged either in the trial Court or before the High Court and no such finding of fact exists.

In these circumstances, s. 106 of the Transfer <Jf Property Act would clearly be inapplicable, and the lease has to be held to be for a period exceeding one year for the reasons given by us above.

In the alternative, learned counsel for the firm urged that the firm was entitled to contend that these documents Exts. P. l to P. 3 constituted an agreement in writing to lease the property in suit and could claim specific performance of this contract.

There arc three reasons why we are unable to accept this submission.

The first is that, in the plaint itself, no specific performance of contract was claimed on behalf of the firm.

Though the pleadings included averments about this contract, the relief claimed was for a decree for possession, damages and injunctions.

These reliefs could only be claimed on the basis of a completed lease and could not be the reliefs in a suit for specific

performance of a contrac.t to lease. e second reason is th.at, as mentioned by us earlier, the firm itself came forward with the case that the entire contract was not included within these three documents Exts. P. I to P. 3, because, at the stage when ·--·---'-·

(I} (1952! S.C.R. 269.

D -

these documents came into existence, the Managing Director of the Company had no authority to enter into such. a contract on behalf of the Company and that the contract was only completed subsequently when the Board of Directors passed a resolution authorising the Managing Director to enter into such a contract and actual possession of part of the property was given on or about the 1st April, 1950.

The contract being a contract to lease immovable property and unregistered, specific performance of it could not be sought, except under s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act.

That section, however, applies only if th.e entire contract is made in writing, while, according to the case put forward on behalf of the firm itself, the entire contract was not in writing.

The third reason why specific performance of the contract cannot be claimed by the firm under s. 27 A of the Spe.- cific Relief Act is that such a claim under that provision of law is only available to a lessee, when the lessee, in part performance of the contract, has taken possession of the property, or, being already in possession, continues in possession in part petformance of the contract.

In the present case, the pleas put forward on behalf of the firm itself show that the firm never got possession of the ec1tire property to which the contract related.

Possession was taken by the firm of only two items of property, while the 1irm never obtained possession of the third item of property which was in possession of Messrs. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. Clause (b) of s. 27A can apply only if possession of the entire property, which is the subject-matter of the contract of lease, has been taken by the lessee. The pleadings in the plaint show that, even though the third item of property was vacated by M/s. Kanwar Brothers Ltd. in December, 1950, possession of that property was never obtained by the firm.

To meet this objection, it was urged by learned counsel on behalf of the firm that we should 'interpret s. 27 A of the specific Relief Act as being applicable even if possession of part of the property, which is the subject-matter of the contract, is obtained by the lessee; but we are unable to accept this submission.

The language used makes it clear that possession must be obtained of the entire property to which the contract relates.

In this connection, it is significant to note that under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, a transferor is barred from interfering with the rights of the transferee, even if the transferee gets possession of any part of the property sought to be transferred by the unregistered document of transfef.

That' section specifically uses the expression "taken possession of the property or any part thereof", whereas the words used in s. 27A of the Specific Relief Act are : "taken possession of the property". The omission of the words "any part thereof" in s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act when compared with the provision in s. 53A of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1968] 2 s.c.R.

Transfer of Property Act clearly brings out the position that the former section is only applicable when possession of the entire property, which is the subject-matter of the contract, has been taken, while the latter section is made applicable even if the lessee takes possession of any part of the property. Consequently, on the facts of the present case, the firm could not claim specific performance of the contract under s. 27 A of the Specific Relief Act, even if such a claim had been put forward in the plaint.

This alternative contention also, therefore, fails.

The appeal is, consequently. dismissed, but, in view of the cirucumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties relating to the contract, we direct parties to bear their own costi of the appeal.

G.C.

Appeal dismissed.

DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS

A. BASRURKAR AND ORS.

January 8. 1968

V. BHARGAVA, JJ.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

ss. 106, 107, 53A

Specific Relief Act, 1877

s. 27A

ss. 106, 107

s. 53A

s. 21A

s. 2(7)

Registration Act

Section 107

s. 106

Transfer of Property Act

Transfer of Property Act

Section 53A

s. 53A

s. 27

Specific Relief Act

s. 53A

s. 27

Specific Relief Act

Ramesliwar Dayal

A. D. Mathur

Veda Vyasa

K. K. Jain

H. K. Puri

Bhargava

Delhi Motor Company

New Garage Ltd.

New Delhi

Kanwar Brothers Ltd.

K. S. Bhatnagar

U. A. Basrurkar

Bhatnagar

Basrurkar

Bhatnagar

22nd February, 1950

22nd March, 1950

st April, 1950

24th November, 1950

5th April, 1951

K. S. Bhatnagar

18th June, 1952

High Court of Punjab

s. 2(7)

Registration Act

1st April, 1950

Transfer of Property Act

s. 107

Transfer of Property Act

30th June, 1951

1st April,

1950 and 30th June, 1951

Section 107

Transfer of Property Act

Transfer of Property Act

Transfer of Property Act

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

s. 53A

Section 53A

Transfer of Property Act

Allahabad High Court

Jessee

s. 107

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

Municipal Board of Moradabad

section 5

Transfer of Property Act

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

s. 53A

Probodh Kumar Das

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

SUPREME COURT

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

Transfer of Property Act

s. 106

Jf Property Act

s. 27

Specific Relief Act

s. 27

s. 27A

s. 27

specific Relief Act

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

s. 27A

Specific Relief Act

s. 27

Specific Relief Act

s. 53A

Transfer of Property Act

s. 27

Specific Relief Act


COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY v.

M/S. SHREE GOVERDHAN LTD. BOMBAY

January 9, 1968.

(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]

Indian Income-tax Act, ,1922, ss. 2(11) ood 23A-Accounting , vear of company ending on September 30, every year-Colnpany a partner in a firm-Accounting periods of firm for 1951-52 A.Y. ending on November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951-Company's annual general meeting held on May 17, 1951-Company's shore of income from partnership whether to be Included in its income for 1951-52 A.Y. for purpose of s. 23A.

The assessee-a public limited company, entered into a partnership on April 20, 1950 with another firm, and thus had 1wo sources of income,

(i) from its own business and (2) from the shares of the partnership business.

The Income-tax Officer included the shares of profit of the assessee from the partnership business up to November 30, 1950 and up to March 31, 1951 in the assessment of the assessment year 1951-52. The assessee objected, contending that this income accrued after the ccounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950, and at i~ general

m<:eting held on May 17, 1951, the assessee could not be expectetl to declare a dividend for the assessment year 1951-52 which related to the accounting year ending on September 30, 1950 out of its profits that accrued during subsequ-ent accounting period.

Tbe Revenue maintained' the assessment. which, on reference, the High Court answered in favour of the assessee. In appeal, this Court.

HELD : The assessable income of the assessee included the share of the assessee's profits in the partnership for the purpose of app1ication of

s. 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 so far as the a.Sessment year 1951-52 was concerned.

Under s. 2(11) of the Act an assessee may have different previous years in respect of different sources of income and under the scheme of the Act the income of the varying previous years from the different 'oOurces should be lumped together to arrive at the total income of the assessee. The provisions of s. 2(11) of the Act make it clear that, except in cases where a previous year is determined by the Department under

cl. (b), the varying previous years must all necessarily end with or within the financial years next preceding the assessment year.

In the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was cqncerned, was the previous year ended on Septen; i.ber 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the partnership the previous year was the period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed.

The provisions of s. 23 (I) must be construed in the context of s. 2(11) of the Act arid the expression 'previous year' of the company in s. 23A(I) must be interpreted as meaning two previous years where the company carries on two different businesses with different sources of income for which there are separate accounting periods. [736 F-737 BJ ·

The annual general meeting of the assessee was held on May 17, 1951 after the close of the accounting year of the firm. It is true that the actual profits of the -assessee from its partnership busins were\ ascertained after the close of the accounting period i.e., March 31, 19~. -. But the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1968] 2 S.C.R.

income may accrue to an a-sscsscc wi1hout actual receipt of the same and if the asscssee acquires a rtght to rcc; eivc the income. the income can be

6aid to have accrued to him though it may be rccciveJ later on on it~ being ascertained.

The le_gal positior:i is !hat a liab_ility dcpcning upon a contingency is not a debt 1n praesenll or 1n futuro till the contingency ap pens.

But if it is a debt the fact that_ the aou~~ hs to ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the ltabtllly 1s certain and what

rem:tins is only a quantification of the amount : Dehirum in praesenJi, Solve11dum in futuro. 1737 E-H)

Commissioner of Inland Re\enue v. Gardner hlountain &. D' Ambrumnil Ltd. 29 T.C. 69, applied.

C!\'IL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1967.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated Seplembcr I 8, I 962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Refctcnce No. 34 of I 96 I.

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Grneral, T. A. Ramachandrar. and R. N. Sachthey, for 1he appellant.

Radhey Lal Aggarwal, Bishambar Lal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 in Income>

Tax Reference No. 34 of 1961 whereby the High Court held thdt the order passed against the respondent, hereinafter referred lo as the 'as-; essee' under s. 23A of !he Indian Income Tax Ac1, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was not justified and v:ilid for the :issessment year 1951-52.

The asscssee is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act.

Its share capital con:; ists of 50,000 sh:ires subscribd and paid up. Out of these shares, 47,493 are hc!c.l by Shree R:ighunath Investment Trust Ltd., u compan~· incorr"irated as a privale company under the laws of Ja•.nmu and Kashmir (hereinafter rderred to as "The Jammu Co.") an'.l having ils registered office there.

Out of the remaining 2,507 shares, 2,500 shares were held by another private limitd company incorporated in India and having its registered office in New Delhi and ihe remaining 7 shares were -held by seven individuals.

The shares of the assesse<: are not quoted on the Stock Exchange any where in India.

There is nolhing, however. in ils Memorandum and Articles of Association placing any restric1ion on the free transfer of its shares. The assessce entered

G •

into a partnership on April 20, 1950 with a firm call~ 'The India Steel Syndicate'.

There was a reconstitution of this firm on December l, 1950. The shares of profit of the assessee from this firm (which was registered under s. 26-A of the Act) as up to November 30, 1950 and upto March 31, 1951 totalling Rs. !70,895/- were included in the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1951.52.

During the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52, for which the previous years ended on September 30, 1949 and September 30, 1950, the Income Tax Officer determined-the assessable income of the assessee at Rs. 60,350 and Rs. 93,884 respectively.

After deduction of the taxes payable, the balance was Rs. 35;834 in the first year and Rs. 53,103 in the second year.

As the assessee had not declared any dividend at its Annual General Meetings during either of the aforesaid two years or within six months thereafter, the Income Tax Officer issued notices to the assessee. to show cause why an order under s. 23-A(l) of the Act should not be passed for the two years, The assessee, however, contended that s. 23-A was not applicable inasmuch as the public were substantially internsted within the meaning of the Explanation appended to the third proviso to s. 23-A(l). Overruling this contention the Income Tax Officer made an order under s. 23-A against the assessee in respect of the undistributed profits for the said two years.

Againt these orders the asse ssee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. A further ground was taken in the appeal that the order under s. 23-A was unwarranted so far as assessinent year 1950-51 was concerned inasmuch as the assessable profits included a sum of Rs. 70,895/- being tbe share of the assessee's income which arose in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate as up to November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951, and that the income accrued after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeals and his order was affirmed by the Appe !late Trbunal on June 28, 1959 for both the assessment years.

At the instance of the assessee the Appellate Tribunal stated a, case to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act on the followin" ~cl~: a "Whether the order passed against the assessee for assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52 under section 23-A are justified ancl valid ?" By its judgment dated September 18, 1962, the High Court answered the question in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1950-51 in the affirmative; and in so far as it pertained to assessment year 1951-52 in the negative anCJ against the appellant.

L3 Sup. CT/68--'3

734 SUPllEMl!· COURT REPORTS [1968) 2 S.c.R.

Section 23-A of the Act, as it stood before its amendment A by the Finance Act, 1955 was to the following effect :

"23-A. Power to assess individual members of cenain companies.-( I) Where the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for that previous year are laid before the company in general meeting are less than sixty per cent of the assessable incwne of the company of that previous year, as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof he shall, unless he is satisfied that having regard to losses incurred by the company in earlier years or to the smallness of the profit made, the payment of a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared would be unreasonable, make with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner an order in writing that the undistributed portion of the assessable income of the company of that previous year as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as at the date of the general meeting aforesaid, and thereupon the proportionate share thereof of each shareholder shall be included in the total income of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income:

Provided that when the reserves representing r accumulations of pasi profits which have not been the subject of an order under this sub-section exceed the paid up capital of the company together with any Joan capital which is the .property of the shareholders, or the actual cost of the fixed assets of the company

whichever of these is greater. this section shall apply G

a~ if instead of the words 'sixty per cent' the words 'one hundred per cent' were substituted :

Provided further that no order under this sul>-section shall be made where the comoany has distributed not less than fifty-five per cent of the assessable income of the company as reduced by the amount of incometax and super-tax payable by the company in respect

thereof, unless the company, on receipt of a notice from the Income-tax Officer that he proposes to make

such an order, fails to make within three months of th.: receipt of such notice a further distribution of its profits and gains so that the total distribution made is not less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the company of the previous year concerned as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof : Provided further that this sub-section shall not apply to any company in whicl! the public .are substantially interested or to a subsidiary company of such a company if the whole of the share capital of such subsidiary company is held by the parent company or by the nominees thereof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "

Section 2 ( 11 ) of the Act states :

"2.

In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- ( 11) 'previous year' means- ( i) in respect of any separate source of income, profits and gains--

(a) the twelve months ending on the 31st day of March next preceding the year for which the assessment is to be made, or, if the accounts of the assessee have been made up to a date within the said twelve months in respect of a year ending on any date other than the said 31st day of March, then, at the option of the assessee, the year ending on the date to which his accounts have been so made up : ,

Provided that where in respect of a particular source of income, profits and gains an assessee has once been assessed, or where in respect of a business, profession or vocation newly set up an assessee has exercised the option under sub-clause ( c), he shall not, in respect of that source or, as the case may be, business, profession or vocation, exercise the option given by this sub-clause so as to vary the meaning of the expression 'previous year' as then applicable to him except with the consent of the Income-tax Officer and upon such . conditions. as the Income-tax Officer may think fit to impose; or . .... .... .... ....... ...... .... .... ... .

H (ii) in respect of the share of the income, profits and gains of a firm where the assessee is a partner in the firm and the firm has been asses5ed as such, the

736 SUPR.EME COURT REPOl.TS

[1968] 2 S.C.R.

period as detennined for the assessment of the income, A profits and gains of the firm;"

On behalf of the appellant the Attorney-General put forward the argument that the High" Coun was in error in holding that the sum of Rs .. 70,895 which was the assessee's share of income in its pannership with the Indian Steel Syndicate should be left out of consideration so far as the assessment year 1951-52 was concerned.

It was pointed out that the assessee had two different sources of income: ( 1) from its own business, and (2) from the share of the pannership business with the Indian Steel Syndicate and that under s. 2 ( 11) of the Act the

assessee must be deemed to have two previous years with regard to two different sources of income. It was therefore argued that the High Coun was in error in holding that the income from the pannership could not be included in the assessment income of the assessee for tlie assessment year 1951-52.

On behlllf of the assessu the conll'llly view-point was put forward by Mr.

Radhey Lal Aggarwal. It was submitted that the sum of Rs. 70,895 related to the share of the profits of the assessee from ou1 of the pannership for the period between November '30,

1950 to March 31, 1951 and this period was after the accounting year of the assessee which ended on September 30, 1950.

It was contended that at its general meeting held on May 17, I 951 the assessee could not be expected to declare a dividend for the assessment year 1951-52 which related to the accounting year ending on September 30, 1950 out of its profits that accrued durir.;; the subsequent accounting period. In our opinion, the argument put forward by the Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant i' well-founded and must be accepted as correct. It is true that the assessee had prepared a balance sheet on the basis that its accounting year ended on September 30, 1950. It is, however. admitted that the assessee had two sources of income: ( J) from its own business, and (2) from the share of the partnership business with Indian Steel Syndicate.

Under s. 2(11) of the Act an assessee may have different previous years in respect of different sources of income and under the scheme of the Act the income of the varying previous years from the different sources should be lumped together to arrive at the total income of the assessee.

The provisions of s. 2 (I I) of the Act make it clear thai, except in cases where a previous year is determined by the Department under cl. (b), the varying previous years must all necarily end with or within the financial year next preceding the as.essment year. In the present case, the previous year so far as the personal business of the assessee was concerned, was the previous year ended on September 30, 1950, but with regard to the income of the pannership the previous year was

the period between November 30, 1950 and March 31, 1951 when the accounts of the partnership were made up and closed.

In our opinion, the provisions of s. 23A ( 1) must be construed in the context of s. 2 ( 11) of the Act and the expression 'pr.:viqus year' of the company in s. 23A ( 1) must be interpreted as meaning two previous y.ears where the company carries on two different businesses with two different sources of income for which there are separate accounting periods.

It follows therefore in the. present case that the Income Tax Officr wa, s right in holding that the assessable income of the company includd the share. of the assessee's profits in its partnership with the Indian Steel Syndicate for the purpose of application of s. 23A of the Act so far as the asessment year 1951-52 was concerend.

The argument was, however, stressed on behalf of the res pondent that in any event the share of the profit of the a.sesee froru the partnership business for the period from October 1,

1950 to March 31, 1951 was not known to the assessee before its annual gene1al meeting on May 17, 1951.

It was pointtcl out that for the first time the Income Tax Officer was intimated on August 11, 1953 that the share of the profit cf the assessce in the partnership was to the extent of Rs. 70,895 and should be included in its assesment. After receipt of the intimatioo the Income Tax Officer rectified the original assessment made on February 29, 1952 and included the said amount of Rs. 70,895.

In our opinion, there is no warrant for the argument put forward on behalf of the respondent. It is conceded in this case that the aTtnual general meeting of the assessee was held on May 17, 1951 after the close of the accounti11g year of the Indian Steel Syndicate.

It is true that the actual profits of the assessee from its partnership busines; were ascertained after the close of the accounting period, i.e., March :'11, 1951. lt is, however, well-established that the income may accrue to an asses, ee without actual receipt of the same and if the asses.<ee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on on its being ascertained. The legal position is that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti or i'I

futuro till the contingency happens.

But if it is a debt the fact that the amount has to be ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the liability is certain and what remains is only a quantiCTcation of the amount : debitum in praese11t1, solvendum in futuro.

Reference may be made in this connection to the decision in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gardner Mountain & D' Ambrumenil, Ltd.(') The assessee in that case carried on the business of under-writing agents, and entered into agree-

(!) 29 T.<;. 69.

SUP.REMS COURT REPORTS [1%8) 2 S.C.lt.

ments with certain underwriters at Lloyds under which it was entitled to receive as remuneration for its services in conducting the agency, commissions on the net profits of each year's underwriting.

The agreements provided that "accounts should be kept for the period ending 31st December in each year and that each such account shall be made up and balanced at the end of the second clear year from the expiration of the period or year to which it relates and the amount then remaining to the credit of the account shall be taken to represent the amount of the net profit of the period or year to which it relates and the commiS!;:on payable to the company shall be calculated and paid therwu." The accounts for the underwriting done in the calendar ) <!a!

1936 were made up at the end of 193 8 and the questi.on t bat arose was whether the asscssee was liable to additional ass~-ss ment in respect of the commission on underwriters' profits from the policies underwritten in calendar year 1936 in the year in which the policies were underwritten or in the year when the accounts were thus made up.

The assessee contended that the contracts into which it entered were executory contracts. under which its services were not completed or paid for, as regards commission, until the conclusion of the relevant account; the profit in the form of commission was not ascertainable or earned, and did not arise, until that time and the additional assessment which was made in the year in which the policies were underwritten should accordingly be discharged.

The Special Com- 111issioners allowed the assessec's contention and discharged the additional assessment.

The decision of the Special Commissioners was confirmed on appeal by Macnaghten, J. in the King's Bench Division of the High Court. The Court of Appeal however reversed this decision and a further appeal was taken by lhe assessee to the House of Lords.

The House of Lords held ibat on the true construction of the agreements, the commissions in question were earned by the assessee in the year in which the policies were underwrirten, and must be brought into account accordingly and confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.

At page 96 of the Report Lord Wright observed :

"I agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking that the necessary conclusion from that must be that the right to the commission is treated as a vest~.d right which has accrued at the time when the risk was underwritten.

It has then been earned, though the profits resulting from the insurance cannot be then ascertained, but in practice are not ascertained until the end of two years beyond the date of underwriting. The right is vested, though ii!; valuation is postponed, and is not merely postponed but depends on all the contingencies

which are inevitable in any insurance risk losses

whic~ may or may not happen, returns of pemium, prenuums to be arranged for additional risks, reinsurance, and the whole catalogue of uncertain future factors.

All these have to be brought into account according to ordinary commercial practice and understanding. But the delays and difficulties which there may be in any particular case, however they may affect the profit do not affect the right for what it eventually proves to be worth."

Lord. Simonds also stated at page 110 of the Report as follows_:

"It i.s clear to me that the commission is wholly earned in year, 1 in respect of the profits of that year's underwriting. If so, I should have thought that it was not arguable that that commission did not accrue for Income Tax purposes in that same year, though it was not ascertainable until later."

It is admitted in the present case that the Indian Steel Syndicate closed the accounts of the partnership for the first time for the first set of partners on November 30, 1950 and for the other set of partners on March 31, 1951 and the assessee as a partner was therefore entitled to the share of the profits as on the last day of the accounting period of the partnership i.e., March 31, 1951.

For these reasons we hold that the income Tax Officer was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 70,895/- which was the share of the assessee's income from its partnership 'with Indian Steel Syndicate for the period ending March 31, 1951 should be included in the assessable profits of the company for the assessment year 1951-52 and should be treated as part of the distributable profits of the company for the purpose of s. 23-A ( 1 ) of the Act. In other words, the order made by the Income Tax Officer against the assessee under s. 23-A of the Act for the assessment year 1951-52 must be held to be justified and valid and the question of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income Tax Department for the year 1951-52 also. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated September 18, 1962 so far as the assessment year 1951-52 is. concerned and allow this appeal with costs.

Y.P.

Appeal allowed.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY

M/S. SHREE GOVERDHAN LTD. BOMBAY

January 9, 1968

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

V. BHARGAVA, JJ.

Indian Income-tax Act

ss. 2(11)

s. 23A

April 20, 1950

November 30, 1950

March 31, 1951

s. 23A

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 2(11)

s. 2(11)

Septen; i.ber 30, 1950

s. 23

s. 2(11)

s. 23A(I)

May 17, 1951

March 31, 19~.

Dehirum

C. K. Daphtary

T. A. Ramachandrar

R. N. Sachthey

Radhey Lal Aggarwal

Bishambar Lal

H. K. Puri

Ramaswami

s. 23A

asscssee

Companies Act

Shree R:ighunath Investment Trust Ltd.

India

New Delhi

India Steel Syndicate

December l, 1950

s. 26

s. 23

s. 23

s. 23

s. 23

s. 23

Indian Steel Syndicate

September 30, 1950

June 28, 1959

s. 66(1)

section 23

September 18, 1962

Section 23

Finance Act, 1955

Section 2

s. 2

Radhey Lal Aggarwal

May 17, I 951

s. 2(11)

s. 2

30, 1950

s. 23A

s. 2

s. 23A

s. 23A

October 1,

1950

August 11, 1953

February 29, 1952

March :'11, 1951

Lloyds

Macnaghten

Wright

Simonds

s. 23

s. 23

Income Tax Department

Bombay High Court