DALPAT SINGH & ANR. v.

STA'IE OF RAJASTHAN

February 13, 1968

[G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (4S of 1860), ss. 120B and 161-Public servants threaten ill-treatment and harassment unle.rs money paid to them- JVhetht-r C<o'li be convicted under. s. 161.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 o/ 1947), ss. S(l)(a), S(I) C (d) and S(2)--0ffence not under s. 161 IP.C.-1/ conviction under s.

S(l)(a) possible-Scope of s. S(l)(d).

On the allegation that the first appellant•Havaldar and the second appellant-a Subedar in the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, were demanding certain amount from a perron accusing him of indulging in blackmarketing and constandy visiting Pakistan and unless he paid the amount demanded he would be beaten and prcoecuted. a police trap was successfully laid, and the appellants convicted under ss. 161 and !20B I.P.C.

D and under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(a) ands. 5°(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In appeal, this Court.

HELD: The conviction of the appellants under s. 120B and 161 as well as under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Co<Tuption Act must be set aside.

The second appellant"s wnviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1}(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act must be sustained. The first appellant's conviction be altered to one under s. 5(2) of E the Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 114 I.P.C.

The first appellant was a subordinate of second appellant. From the evidence it is clear that both the appellants were acting togetl::er. It is obvious that tho second appellant was mainlv responsible for the exto'rtions complained of and the first appellant was aiding him in his activities.

Hence there was no need to charge the appelllll& under s. 120 B. I.P.C.

F The evidence clearly showed that neither the appellants intended to show any official favour to the-persoos from whom they exlll<ted money nor those persons expected any official favour from them. The amounts in question were paid solely with a view to avoid being ill-treated or harassed. Therefore, it is diflicult to hold that the acts complained can be held to constitute offences under s. 161 I.P.C.

State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lal, [1959] !!opp. 2 S.C.R. 739 and State of C Uttar Pradesh v. Kuljas Rai. Cr. A. No. 177 of 1960 dated 22-8-62, referred to.

Before an offente can be held to come within s. 5 (I)( a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the requirements of s. 161 I.P.C., have to be satisfied. If an offence does not fall under s .• 161 l.P.C. it cannot come -.ithin s. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [196 CJ

I • But so far as s. 5 (I)( d) . of the Prevention of Corruption Act is con- H cerned, that stands on a different footing.

To bring home an offence Wider s. S(l)(d), it is not necessary to prove that the acts complained of were done by the appellants in the discharge of their official duties. Oause 5(l)(d) is much wider in scope than cl. S(IHa). (196 D-197 BJ

190 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS (1968 j 3 S.C.R.

State of Ut1ar Pradesh v. K11/ja5 Rai, Cr, A. No. 177 of 1960 dated A 22-8--62 a11d Dhanesh1var Narain S(L\"ena v.

Tlte Dellri Adniinistration, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 195, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1965.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 1 December 14, 1964 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal Appeal No. 656 of 1963.

K. R. Chaudlmri, for the appellants.

K. Balde" Mehta, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c

Degele, J. The two appellants were convicted by the High Court of Rajasthan under ss. 120 B and 161, IPC, and under ss. 5 ( 1) (a) and 5 ( 1 )( d) read with s. 5 ( 2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They have come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

D The first appellant was a Havaldar and the second appellant a Subedar in the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary.

At the relevant point of time they were serving in the outpost at Sajan- Ka-Par in Barmer district of Rajasthan State, which was a border outpost.

That post was within two miles from the Pakistan border.

The prosecution case is that the two appellants cons- E pircd to extort money as well as other valuable things from the villagers by using force or threat of force or by harassment.

Though they were indulging in these activities for quite some time, the matter came to a head when they tried to compel PW 1 Mohammad to give them Rs 100.

It was said that about. the middle of September 1962, the first appellant came to the field of Mohammad ; md took him to the outpost saying that the F second appellant wanted him to go over there. At the outpost the seeond appellant told him that he was constantly visiting Pakistan; he was also blackrnarketitig; hence unless he gave him (2nd appellant) Rs. 200 he would send him to prison. PW I pleaded that he was innocent He also pleaded that he was a poor man and hence he was unable to pay the amount demand- G ed. As the second appellant insisted on the payment he agreed to pay him Rs. I 00 but as he had no money at that time PW 3 Kalla stood surety for him. After a few days when PW 1 was sitting in the shop of PW 5 Bhoja, he happened to talk about the illegal activities of the appellants. It so happened that a CID officer was th, ere who evidently passed on that information to H PW 17 Kaneihalal the puty Superintendent of Police in the Special Police Establishment. On getting that information .PW 17 came to the village on September 30, 1962 and checked up the

l>ALPAT SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Hegde, J.) 191

facts \\'ith PW 1.

On the morning of October 1, 1962 PW 1 was ain called to the outpost by the 2nd appellant. and told that the amount should be paid iu, unediately.

He promised to pay rhe same that afternoon and asked the appellants to come to hiti house that afternoon to which they agreed. Thereafter he passed on that information to PW 17 and gave him the complaint Exh. Pl. Then a trap was arranged. PW 1 produced before PW

17, Rs. 100 in ten rupee currency notes. PW 17 noted down their numbers in the presence of panch witnesses PW 2 Bhakha and PW 4 Ballu and returned the amount to PW 1 with instructions to give the same to the appellants if they again demilnded money. At the same time he instructed PWs 2 and 4 to be with PW 1 so that they may witness the payment of the money. Then PW 17 posted himself in a house near the house of PW 1. On the evening of that day the first appellant came to the house of PW 1 and demanded the money. He told PW 1 that the second

appl>llant could not come as he was not well. Then PW 1 took out il\e currency notes whose numbers had been noted down earlier and paid the same to the first appellant. The first appellant rlut them in his pocket. On receipt of that information, PW

17 0ame to the place and asked the first appellant to produce

thos~ currency notes.

On seeing PW 17, the first appellant

beclne pale and nervous.

After some hesitation he took out the notes in question from his pocket and gave them to PW 17 On examining their numbers it was found that they were the very notes which had been returned to PW 1 after noting their numbers.

As soon as the villagers came to know of the trap,· several of them came forward with complaints against the appellants.

After investigating all those complaints this case was launched. It was tried by the special judge, Balotra, who accepted the prosecution case in full and convicted the appellants under ss. 161 and 120B. IPC and under s. 5(2) read withs. 5(1)(a) and 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In appeal

the~ High Court of Rajasthan affirmed the convictions of the

aplants in respect of all the charges levelled against them. It did not award any separate sentence in respect of the offence undcls. 161 or s. 120 B, !PC. As regards the other offeriCe.' it G :edul:ed the sentence .awarded by the trial court.

,1We shall IJOW proceed to consider the evidence relating to the various charges levelled against the appellants. It is' not disputed that both the appellants were public servants.

So far a.' the evidence relating to the trap is concerned, we have the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4 and

17. Their evidence ha' been believed by the trial court as well as the High Court. The plea of the 1st appellant was that on that evening

when he was. j!Oing in front of the house of PW 1, PWs 1 and

192 SuPRBMll CotlllT UPOllTS [1968] 3 s.c.R. ,

2 and others caught hold of him and struggled with him; lit that " time his note book fell down; thereafter he saw them pucing the currency notes in question before PW 17. This is a : very artificial story. The same has been disbelieved by the .trial court as well as the appellate court. No case is made out to intC:ifere with ··.their findings.

The evidence relating to the trap does not by itself collllect

the second appellant with that incident, but then the evidence of PWs 1. and 3, which has .been accepted by the trial. court as well as the '.High Court; shows that it was .the 2nd appellant who compe!Led PW 1 to give that amount.

The contention of the st:CC)nd. appellant that he had incurred the displeasure of the C vil, lagers because he was a strict officer and because he came in their way of smuggling goods from Pakistan .to India and from India to Pakistan and therefore he was victimised, was ,. not accepted either by the trial court or the High Court. lfhose courts also did not accept his version that several days before the trap was laid he had reported against most of the prosecution D witnesses in this case. The defence evidence led by him ; was disbelieved by those courts d even the documents produce\i by him were rejected either on the ground that they were 11ot u~ for the purpose of this case or as having been tampered with. 'This court being a court of special jurisdiction, does not interfere with findings of facts reached by the High Court except under E exceptional circumstances.

No such circumstance is available in .this case.

We are unable to accept the contentiori of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and other proseeution witneiises to whose evidence we shall presently refer, F should be consiOered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars bcjore being accepted.· On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants . cannot be considered as accomplices as the same was extorted from them.

Tliough PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be considered as interested witnesst'5 as• regards their evidence relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is C not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see the State of Bihar v. Baswan Singh(').'

The next incident is that spoken to by Bhoja PW 5 and Hussain, PW 6, Their evidence was that on June 22, 1962 the second appellant along with the first appellant visited the shop of PW 5 and told him that he was blackmarketing and that people

[1959] S.C.R. 195.

I:.

' from Pakistan were visiting him. , He denied those charges. Then the sec()'nd appellant told him that unless he (PW 5) paid him Rs. 50 he would involve him in some case some day. But still PW 5 did not give any money to the second appellant.

Then the second appellant insisted that he should give at least the wrist watch that he was wearing.

Finding no alternative he gave him the watch, article 3. According to him when all these things happened PW 6 was in his shop. PW 6 fully corroborated PW 5. It was not denied that PW 17 Seized the watch in question from the second appellant. But his explanation was that that watch had been pledged by PW 5 with Shriram PW 4 for Rs. 50 but that amount had been advanced to DW 4 'by him (appellant No. 2); DW 4 left the watch with him and that is how he happened to be in possession of the watch. Neither the trial court ngr the appellant court accepted this version. On the orher hand they relied on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 coupled with the

circumst$ce that the watch was seized from the second appellant. We see no reason to disturb the findings reached by those courts. ·

PW '18 Ukaram spoke to the fact of having paid a sum of Rs. I 01'. to the second appellant in the presence of the first appellant on August 13, 1962. Though his evidence was believed by

the trial court, the same was not relied on by the High Court.

Therefore we exclude that evidence from consideration.

We next co1ne to the evidence of PWs 8, 11 and 12. PW 8 is one Kastura.

His evidence is that some days prior to October I, 1962 the first appeilant came and took him to the outpost.

There the second appellant accused him of being in the habit of visiting Pakistan.

When be denied that charge he was asked to kneel down. Sometimes thereafter he was asked to pay Rs. 100. As he had no money he was kept in the outpost during the nignt. On the next mommg Imam PW 11 and Bhakha PW

2 happ.el; ed to come to the post. PWs. 8, 11 and 12 pleaded with 1 he second appellant to accept a lesser sum. Ultimately the second appellant agreed to receive Rs. 50.

Thereafter PW 11 was s.ent to the house of PW 8 tc;>,8ell his goats and getRs. 50.

He accoitlingly went to the age, sold some goats of PW 8 and got Rs .. 50. During this incident, according to the evidence of the abOlve witnesses, the fitst appellant was also present in the outpost.

Sadiq PW 13 speaks to the fact that about nine days prior to his arrest the first appellant . went to his house and took him tO

the outpost saying that he was wanted by the second appell'ant.

There he was faliely acc1111ed of -selling goats in Pakistan; then he was beaten by the second appellant. and. theteafter he: was told by .the second appellant that he should pay him Rs. 100. As

194 SUPlllMl! COlJl.T UP91lTS [196f 3 S.C.R.

I ' .he could not make t.he payment in q11estion he was kept .in the A outpost that night.

Next day his brot.her Gafoor came there and paid a sum of Rs. 80 to the sec0nd appellant.

Ii. is only thereafter he was allowed to go back. At about the time when money was extorted from PW 13, Alladin PW 14 was aid to have been in the outpost. PW 14 corroborated the testimony of PW 13. PW 14 has his own grievance against the appellants. His B case was I.hat about 25 days prior his 'arrest, the first appellant

ame to his field and demanded his camel for cultivation of his field.

But as he himself required the camel he refused to give it. After about 8 or 9 days both the appellants came to his field .and forcibly took him to the outpost and beat him. Thereafter I.hey demanded from him a sum of Rs. 60 and he was told c that •if he did not pay that amount, he would be prosecuted in some folSl" case.

Next we come to the evidence of Murad PW 7 an{ Subhan PW 9. The evidence of these two witnesses was that about seven or eight days before the first appellant was arrested , tloth the appellants came to their houses in the village Talab-Ka-Par and D took them to the outpost. There they were made to kneeL down'.

Further they were falsely accused of indulging in smi; ggling of goods and visiting Pakistan without valid permits. Thereafter Rs. 80 were demanded from PW 7 and Rs. 200 from PW 9. Ultimately it was settled that PW 7 should pay Rs. 50 and PW 9 Rs. 150.

By that time Kalla PW 3 came there. He was sent to E the house of those witnesses to get money. He got Rs. 40 for PW

7 and Rs. 130 for PW 9.

ThOSe amounts were paid to the second appellant.

Next we come to the .evidence of Miriimal PW 10. His version was that in July or August 1962 his brother-in-law died and in that connection a feast had been arranged. w, hen the F feast was about to commence the first appe!lant came .there and told him that unless he paid a sum of Rs. 100 he would not be allowed to have the feast.

As he refused to pay that money be was taken to the outpost. There the second appellnt again demanded from him Rs. 100. Ultimately PW 10 P!lid the

seeond appellant Rs. 30.

G • Lastly we come to the evidence of Nemichand PW 15. His case was that about a month before the first appellant was trapped he had come to his shop and told him that he should go an~ meet the second appellant at the <>utpost.

Accordingly he went to the outpost. There lhe second appellant accused him of H indulging in black-marketing and demanded from him Rs. 100. and he was told that -if he did not pay that amount Ke would be beaten and prosecuted. Ultimately it was settled that be should

pay Rs.; 50. Thereafter he was allowed to go home and get tlie money.: On the next day he went to the outpost and paid Rs. 50 o the second appellant.

The evidence of all the witnesses mentioned above excepting PW 18 has been accepted by the \rial court .as well as by the appellate court, and we see no reason to differ from them.

This takes . us to the question whether on the basis of the evidence accepted by the High Court both or any of .the appel Jants could in law have been convited for any of the offences with which they were charged. .

The first appellant was a subordinate of the second appellant.

From the evidence referred to earlier it is clear that both the apJ!CllaiJ.ls were acting together.

It is obvious that the second appellant was mainly responsible for )he extortions complained of and tfie first appellant was aiding him in his activities. Hence there ws no need to charge the appellants under s. 120 B, lPC even in:respect of the amount received from PW 1. The evidence adduceil by ihe prosecution shows that eveiy single act. com plainecf of amounts to an extortion in Jaw. ·

Before an offence is held to faJI under s. 161 IPC, the following requirements have. to be satisfied: ( 1) the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to. be, a public servant, (2) that he accepted, or obtained, or areed to accept,. or attempted to obtain from some person a gratdication, (3) .that such gratification was not a legal remuneration due to him, and ( 4) that he accepted the gratification in question as a motive or reward, for (a) doing or forbearing to do an official act; or (b) showing, or forbearing to show favour or djsfavour 'to some one in the exercise of his official functions: or ( c) rendering, or attempting to\ render,. any service or disservice to .. some one, with .the Centrafor any State Government or Parliament or the .Legislature of any State, or with any public . servant As mentioned earlier dmtttedly the appellants were public servants. It is also estab!islied that they obtained from the . several witnesses examined in this case illegal gratification. 1be word 'obtain' is a strong word. It includes also things. received by extortion. But can it be .said that they obtained the gratifications in question as a motive or reward for doing or for forbearing to do an official act or for showing or for forbe:lring to show favour or disfavour to the persons in question in the exercise of their official fu11Ctions.

The evidence .on record clearly shows that neither the appellants intended to show any official favi>ur to the persons from whom they extorted money or valuable things, nor those persons expected any official favour from them. They 'paid the amounts in question solely with a View to 'avoid being ill-treated

SUPREME COURT REPORTS • [1968:] 3 s.c.R.

or harassed. The scope of s. 161, IPC had been considered by this Court in State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lal(') as well as in State of Uttar Pradesh v. K:tlias Rai('). Though the fonner decision was overruled in certain respects by a later decision of thi~ Court

to which reference will be made hereinafter, that part of the decision which considered the requirements of s. 161 I.P.C. was not differed from. Therefore it is difficult to hold that the acts complained against the appellants can be held to constitute offences under s. 161, IPC.

Before an offence can be held to come within cl. (a) of subs. I of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the requirements of s. 161, IPC have to be satisfied. If an offence does not fall under s. 161, IPC, it cannot come withins. S(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. f

But so far as cl. ( d) of sub-s. 1 of s. 5 of the Prevtion of Corruption Act is coneerned, that stands on a different footing.

At the relevant time thai sub-section read : l

"A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty-1

( d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or f.or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage."

Therefore if it is proved that the appellants had by illegal means or by otherwise abusing their position as public servants obtained for themselves money or other valuable things, then, they can be said to have committed the offence of criminal mis<; onduct in the discharge of their official duties. To bring home an'offence under s. 5 ( 1 )( d), it is not necessary to prove that the acts complained of were done by the appellants in the discharge \Of their official duties.

The contrary view taken by this Court in State of Ajmer v. Shivji Lm(') was over-ruled by this Cm1rt in

Dhaneshwar Nal'ain Saxena v. The Delhi Administration('). In that case it was observed that tho words occurring in s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act "in the discharge of his duty" do not constitute an essential ingredient of the offence under s. 5

(1 )( d), the ingredients of that offence being (1 ) that the accused should be a public servant, (2) that he should use some corrupt or illegal means or othernise abuse his position as a

(I) [1959) SUPI" 2 S.C.R. 739.

(2) Cr. Appcal 177of1961, decided on 22-8-412.

(3) A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 195.

F •(

...

public~ servant; ( 3) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, and ( 4) for himself or any other persol). That decision was followed in State of Uttar Pradesh v.

Kuljas Rai('). It must be noted that clause 5(1)(d) is much wider in scope than clause 5(1)(a).

Therefore, the conviction of the appellants under s. 5 (1 )

(d) read with s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act

ands on a firm ground.

It was contended on behalf of the State that if this Court holds that the conviction of the appellants under s. 161, IPC and under s. 5(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not sustain- C able, their conviction may be altered to one under s. 384, IPC.

It was, said that such an alteration cannot be said to prejudice the appellants though they were no charged and tried for that offence.' We have not thought it necessary to examine that question as in any event the appellants are liable to be convicted under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5 ( 1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruptio!'- Act.

In the result we partly allow the appeal and . acquit the appellants under ss. 120 B and 161, IPC, as well as under s. 5

(2) read withs. 5(1) (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The second appellant's conviction under s. 5(2) read with s. 5 (1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is sustained and for that offence the sentence of 18. moriths rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, in default further imprisonment of two months imposed by the High Court is affirmed. The conviction of the first appellant is altered to one under s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 114, IPC and for that offence he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.

Y.P.

Appeal partly allowed.

(I) Cr. Appeal 177 of 196J, deciJeJ on 22-8-62.

DALPAT SINGH & ANR

STA'IE OF RAJASTHAN

February 13, 1968

G. K. MITTER

K. S. HEGDE, JJ.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

ss. 120B and 161

s. 161

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 161

IP.C

Pakistan

ss. 161

I.P.C

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 120B and 161

s. 5(2)

s. 5(2)

s. 5(1}(d)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 114

I.P.C

s. 120

I.P.C

s. 161

I.P.C

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

I.P.C

s. 5(l)(a)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

K. R. Chaudlmri

K. Balde" Mehta

Degele

High Court of Rajasthan

ss. 120

IPC

ss. 5

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

Mohammad

Mohammad

Kalla

Bhoja

Kaneihalal

Bhakha

Ballu

Balotra

ss. 161 and 120B

IPC

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 120

SuPRBMll CotlllT UPOllTS

India

Hussain

June 22, 1962

article 3

Shriram

Ukaram

August 13, 1962

Kastura

Sadiq

Alladin

Murad

Subhan

Talab-Ka-Par

Miriimal

P!lid

Nemichand

s. 120

s. 161

IPC

s. 161

IPC

s. 161

I.P.C

s. 161

IPC

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

IPC

s. 161

IPC

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 1

s. 5

s. 5

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

clause 5(1)(d)

clause 5(1)(a)

s. 5

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

IPC

s. 5(l)(a)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 384

IPC

s. 5

s. 5

ss. 120

IPC

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5(2)

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 114

IPC


A. VISHWANATII RAO ETC. v.

THE STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.

February 16, 1968

• '

(J. C. SHAH, V. RAM~SWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)

Motor Vehicles Act 1939, ss. 68•8, 68.C, 68-D, awd 68-E; Rood Tramport Act 1950, s. 20; Constitution of Jndia, Art, 14;-Mysore State Transport Corporation preparing sclle1ne to take over route partly in Mysor~ nnd partly in A11dhra Pradesh-Both State Governments and Centrcl

Government approving final schemt-failure to prepare scheme accordiFlg to s. 20 of 1950 Act if mere irregu/arity.-Scheme prescribing wide dispa; ity between nwximuni and 1ni11im&1m n11mber of vehicles and servicesif fraud on ss. 68.C and 68-E-Exclusion only of Mysore and not~Andhra Pradish pr; vate operators-if discrbninatory.

The appellants were tralisport operators plying a stage carriag.e on an inter-State route 28 mile. Ion~ oi which a portion of 5 miles is situated in the State of Andhra Prade.h and the rest in the State of Mysore. A draft scheme was prepared and published by the second respondent Mre State Road Transport Corporation under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, proposing to take over the Stage Carria&e Services oil tho route to the complete exclusion of othe'r operators. After objections against the scheme had been heard by the Chief Minister of the State of Mysore under s. 68B of the Act, tbe draft scheme was. approved by his order dated March 7, 1964 with two modifications whereby, firstly, it specified the mini mum number_ of vehicles and daily servioes and, secondlf, it res!rictcd the exclusion of other operators only to that part of the route which was in the State of Mysore. The approval of the Central Government was accorded to the scheme under the proviso to s. 6l!-D(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the final scheme was published by the Mysore Government in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964.

1be appellants challenged the notification of the Mysore Government approving tho final scheme by. a writ petition under Art. 226 .., f the Constitution but the petition was dismissed by the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellants (i) that the provisions or s; 20 of. the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, were not l:Omplied with and the final scheme published by the first respondent w..S ull.ra vin'.s:

(ii) that whereas in the draft scheme the maximum number of vehicles and daily services were specified and not the minimum number, the final scl1eme provided the maximum number of vehicles a.\ 18 and the( mini mum as one, and the maximum number of daily services as 10 and the minimum as 3; it was contended that by permitting such a great disparity between the maximum and minimum number of vehicles and daily .services there was a virtual modification of the draft scheme and therefore the procedure prescribed by s. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act should have been followed; and (iii) that the approved scheme violated Art, 14 of the Constitution as there was a complete exclusion of the private Operators on the portion of the route located in the M}'IOre State. while permitting those. who were plying their vehicles on the portion of the route lying in the Slate of Andbra Pradesh.

HELD : dismissing the appeal :

V~WANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Rama.nvami, I.) 199

(i) Even assuming !hat the reqoirements of s. 20 of the Road T r•nsp<)rt Corporations Act should also be followed in a case where the Central Government has given its sanction mder s. 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, it must be held that there had been sufficient compliance with the '.requirements of the Road Transport Corporations Act in the present case. It was not disputed that .the concurrence of the Sta•c of Andhra Pradesh was secured for the final acheme and the Gowrnment of the State of Mysore bad also accorded its approval to it. Jn these circumbtances the omission of -the first respondent to make the scheme in the precise manner in which " 20 of the Road Transport Corporation Act directs the prepai'ation of the scheme was ii mere irregularity which could not lead to the nullification of the final acheme. (203 H-204 BJ

(ii) In the present case the distance of the route in question was a >hort distance of 28 miles, and the order of the Chief Minister shows that there was seasonal variation of traffic density nnd during marriage and other seasons it was ncce."!.sary to operate extra services. There was also variation on account of auspicious nd inauspicious days .. It was felt by the Chief Minister that the scheme would have to be 5ufficicntly flexible to enable adjustment of services and vehicles to cater for the actual traffic needs. Jn the context of the particular facts of the case the gap between

the minimum -and maximttm number of vehicles and services was not w great as to amount to a fraud on 5. 68.C and 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act. [205 F-H] .

B. H. A.<wathanarayan Singh and Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1966] 1 S.C.R. 87, di•tinguisbed.

(iii) It is manifest tha! operator. plying in the Slate of Mysore and those plying in the Slate of Andhra Pradesh constitute two different classes of persons and therefore no question of discrimination (%1.n arise if there is complete exclusion of the operatOrs within the State of Mysore and if there is relaxation with regard to those ope'rating in the State of Andbra Pradesh. [206 A-BJ CIVIL APPE.LLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 8 and 9 of 1968.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 27, 19~( o( the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1720 and 1722 of 1964.

P. Babula Reddy and K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in both the appeals).

Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramaniurthi and Vi11eet Kumar, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).

R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 3 (in both the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave from the judgment of the Mysore High-Court dated October 27, 1967 dismissing Writ Petitions Nos. 1720 and 1722._of 1964;

The appellants are transport operators plying a stage carriage on the .route Yadgir to Narayanapet on the strength of permits issued by the Regional Transport A11thority, Gulbarga. The route

.200 SVPREMB COUllT REPORTS

(1968] 3 S.C.R.

Yadgir to Narayanapet is an inter.State route of a distance of 28 miles out of which a portion of 5 miles is situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh ana the rest is in the State of Mysore. A draft scheme was prepared by the second respondent, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, proposing to take over the Stage Carriage Services on the inter-State route Yadgir to Narayanapet to the complete exclusion of other operators.

The draft scheme was published in the Gazette on June 21, 1962. The appellants and some others filed their objections against the proposed scheme. The objections were heard by the Chief Minister of the State of Mysore under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and the draft scheme was approved with certain modifications by his order dated March 7, 1964. The approval of the Central Government was later on accorded under the proviso to sub-section (3) of s. 68- D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Tue approved scheme made two modifications to the draft scheme.

The first was that it specified the minimum number of vehicles and daily services. The second modification was that it restricted the exclusion of other operators only to that part of the route which was in the State of Mysore.

The approved scheme was published by the Government of Mysore in its Gazette dated July 16, 1964. The appellants moved the High Court of Mysore for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification of the Mysore Government dated July 16, 1964 approving the final scheme. The main ground of challenge was lhat the approved scheme violated E the provisions of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act,

1950 (Act 64 of 1950). It was also contended that there was an infringement of the requirements of s. 68-C and s. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act 4 of 1939) as modified by Act

100 of 1956, but the writ applications were dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated October 27, 1967.

•• Chapter IV A was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939) by the Amending Act 100 of 1956 with effect from February 16, 1957. Section 68-C which is incorporated in Ch. IV A reads :

"Where any State transport underlaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing at• efficient, adequate, economical and proper! y co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme

VISllWANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Ramaswami, J.) 201

giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed 10 be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be' prescribed, and shall cause very such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct." Section 68-D provides as foll()ws :

" ( 1 ) Any . person affected by the scheme published . under section 68C may, within thirty days frO)ll the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official

Gazette, file objections thereto before the State Government.

(2) The State Government may, after censidering the objections and• after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire; approve or modify the scheme. ( 3) The scheme as approved or modified under sub-seetion (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon becO)lle final and shall be called the approve" scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route :

Provided that no such scheme which relates •to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheine unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previoiis approval of the Central

Government."

F Section 68-E stara :

"Ariy sce published under sub-section (3) of section 68D may at any time be cancelled or modified by . the State .transport undertaking; and the procedure laid down in section 68C and section 68D shall, G so far as it can be made applicable, be followed in every .case whete the scheme is pi:oposed to be modified as if the modification proposed were a separate scheme;"

Section 3 of the 'Road Transport Corporations Act, 19~0 provides for establishment of Road Tr11nsport Corporations arid reads as follows :

"The State Government, having regard to--

(a) the' advantages offered to the public, traile and

industI'y by the development' of road transport; L4Sup.Cl/68-14

202 SUPREME eotlaT REPORTS

(1968) 3 S.CR.

(b) the desirability of co-ordinating 811.Y form of road transport with any other form of transport;

( c) the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and economical system of road transport service therein;

may, by notification in the Officiat Gazette, establish a Road Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the State under such name as may be specified in the notification. ff

Section 4 states :

"Every Corporation shall be body corporate by the name notified under section 3 having perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall by the said name sue and be sued."

Section 18 is to the following effect :

"It shall be the general duty of a Corporation so to exercise its powers as progressively to provide or secure or promote the provision of, an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services in the State or part of the State for which it is established and in any extended area:

provided that nothing in this section shall be, construed as imposing on a Corporation, either directly or indirectly, any form of duty or liability enforceable by proceedings before any court. or tribunal to which it would not otherwise be subject. ff ·

Section 19 ( 1) provides as follows:

" ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corporation shall have power-

( a) to operate road transport services in the State

and in any tended area;

" •.

Section 20 deals with extension of the operation of the road transport service of a Corporation to areas within another State.

Section 20 reads as follows :

"20. ( 1) If a Corporation considers it to be expedient in the public intereSt to extend the operation of any of its road transport servi~ to any route or area 'situated within another State, it may, with the permis-

VISHWANATII llAO v. :MYSORP. (Ramaswami, J.) 203

sion of the State Government, negotiate with the Government of the other State regarding the proposed extension.

( 2) If the Government of the other State approves the proposed extension, the Corporation shall prepare a scheme for the purpose and forward the same to the other Government for its consent, and after such consent has been received, the Corporation may, with the previous approval of the State Government, sanction the scheme.

( 3) After the scheme has been so sanctioned, it shall be competent for the Corporation to extend the operation of its road transport service to such route or area and when the operation of such service is so extended, the Corporation shalt operate the service on that roilte or in that area subject to the provisions of any Jaw in force in the other State within which such route or area is situated.

" Section 2 ( c) defines an "extended area" to mean "any area or route to which the operation of any road transport service of a Corporation has been extended in the manner provided in section 20."

On behalf of the appellants it was• contended; in the first place, !hat the provisions of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 were not complied with and the final scheme published by respondent No. 1 was ultra vires. We are unable to accept this argument as correct: It is not necessary to examine in this case, whether there is any inconsistency between the pro- F visions of s. 20 of the RoS!i Transport COrporations Act,.1950. and the proviso to s. 68-D 'of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is li!so not necessary to express any _opinion as to whether the requirements of s. 2o of the Road Transport, Corporations Act should be complied witli even in the case of a scheme relating to inter-

State route to which the Central Government has accorded approval under the proviso to• s. 68-D of the Motor Vehiclles Act. We shall assume in favour of the appellants that the requirements of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act should also be followed in a case where the Central Government has given sanction under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Even upon that asumption we hold that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act in the present case. It is not disputed that the concurrence of the State of Andhra Pradesh wa~ secured for the final scheme and .fue Government of the State of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.c.R.

Mysore had also accorded its approval to it.

In these circumstances the omission of respondent No. 1 to make the scheme in the precise manner in which s. 20 of the Road Transport Corporations Act directs the preparation of the scheme is a mere irregularity which cannot lead to the nullification of the final scheme published on July 16, 1964.

We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants that in the draft scheme the maximum number of vehicles and daily services was specified and not the minimum,. but in the final scheme approved under s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act there was specification of the minimum number of vehicles and daily services in respect of the route in question. The approved scheme stated that the maximum number of vehicles was 18 and the minimum was 1. It was, also, stated that the maximum number of daily services was 10 and the minimum was 3. It waS maintained on behalf of the appellants that by prescribing the maximum and minimwn n11mber of vehicles and daily services and by pennitting such a great disparity between the maximum and minimum number of vehicles and daily services there was a virtual modification of the draft scheme and the procedure prescribed bys. 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act should have been followed. In our opinion, there is no justification for this argument. It is true that in B. H. Aswathanarayan Singh and Ors. v.

State of Mysore and Ors.('), it was pointed out by this Court that if the proportion which the minimum bears to the maximum is so great, and the gap between the two, is so wide as to make the prescription of the maximum and the minimum amount to a fraud on ss. 68-C and 68-E, the scheme will stand vitiated. But at the same time it was explained that it was not possible to Jay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum and maximum would turn into frau_d; but it is only when the gap between the minimum and maximum is so great that it amounts •to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a court to hold that the scheme is not in compliance with s. 68-C and is hit by s. 68-E.

The gap between the minimum and maximum would depend upon a number of factors, particularly on the variation in the demand for tranport at different seasons of the year. At page 97 of the Repott, Wanchoo, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as follows:

"There is no doubt that though fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips with respect to each route is pennissible under s. 68-C and would not be hit by s. 68-E, the proportion between the minimum aµd maximum should not be so great as to make the fixing of minimum and maximum a fraud on

/1) [!966] t S.C.R. 87.

VISHWANATH RAO v. MYSORE (Ramaswami, J.) 205

ss. 68-C and 68-E of the Act. It is not possible to lay down specifically at what stage the fixing of minimum and maximum would turn into fraud; but it is only when the gap between the minimum and maximum is so great that it amounts to fraud on the Act that it will be open to a coun to hold that the scheme is not in compliance with s. 68-C and is hit by s. 68-E. The gap between the minimum and maximum would depend upon a number of factors, particularly on the variation in the demand for transpon at different seasons of the year. Even so if the approved scheme were to fix minimum and maximum with very wide disparity between the two, it may be possible for the coun to hold after examining the facts of the case that such fixation is not in accordance with s. 68-C and is a fraud on s. 68-E.

But, with respect, it seems to us that a variation in minimum and maximum from 6 to 12 or 5 to 9 can hardly be pf such an order as to amount to fraud on the Act. The observations with respect to fixing of minimum and maximum number of vehicles and trips in the scheme made in Rowjee's case [(1964) 6 S.C.R.

330] must therefore be treated as obiter as in that case they did not require determination. In the present case the gap is not of such a wide nature."

In the present case, the distance between Yadgir and Naray; urnpeUs a short distance of twenty-eight miles and the order of the Chief Minister shows that there was seasonal variation of traffic density and during marriage and other seasons it was necessary to operate extra services. There was also variation on account of auspicious and inauspicious days. The scheme had to provide for operating extra services during J athras, Car festivals and other occasions like Dasara fair at Mysore, Ulvi fair at Ulvi, Shivrarathri fair at Gokarn etc. It was felt by the Chief Minister that the scheine will have to be sufficiently flexible to enable the State Transport Undertaking to adjust its services and vehicles to cater to Shandy or weekly Bazar traffic to various places. In the context of the panicular facts of this case we are of opinion that the gap between the fixation of minimum and the maximum number of vehicles and of daily services is not so great as to amount to a fraud on s. 68-C and 68-E of the Motor Vehicles Act.

We accordingly reject the argument of the appellants on this aspect of the case.

Lastly, it was contended that the approved scheme violated Art. 14 of the Constitiition as there was a complete exclusion of the private operators on the portion of the route located in the Mysore State while permitting those who are plying their

206 SUPaEMB COURT aEPOllTS

[1968) 3 S.C.R.

vehicles on the portion of the route lying in Andllra Pradesh State.

We do not consider there is any substance in this argument. It is manifest that operators plying in the State of Mysore and those plying in the State of Andhra Pradesh constitute two different classes of persons and therefore no question of discrimination can arise if there is complete exclusion of the operators within the State of Mysore and if there is relaxation with regard to those operating in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

For the reasons expressed we hold that there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed with costs-there will be one set of hearing fees for both the appeals.

R.K.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

B , c

A. VISHWANATII RAO ETC

THE STATE OF MYSORE & ORS

February 16, 1968

C. SHAH

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

Motor Vehicles Act 1939

ss. 68

Rood Tramport Act 1950

s. 20

s. 20

ss. 68

Andhra Pradish

Mysore

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

State of Mysore

s. 68B

March 7, 1964

Central Government

s. 6

Motor Vehicles Act

Mysore Government

July 16, 1964

Art. 226

Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

Andbra Pradesh

s. 20

s. 68D

Motor Vehicles Act

Road Transport Corporations Act

Andhra Pradesh

5. 68.C and 68-E

Motor Vehicles Act

[1966] 1 S.C.R. 87

P. Babula Reddy

K. Rajendr11 Chaudhuri

Shyama

M. K. Ramaniurthi

Vi11eet Kumar

R. N. Sachthey

S. P. Nayar

Ramaswami

Mysore High-Court

Yadgir

Narayanapet

Mysore State Road Transport Corporation

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

June 21, 1962

State of Mysore

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

Government of Mysore

High Court of Mysore

Art. 226

s. 20

Road Transport Corporations Act

s. 68

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

October 27, 1967

February 16, 1957

Section 68

Section 68

section 68C

Section 68

section 68D

section 68C

section 68D

Section 3

Road Transport Corporations Act

Section 4

section 3

Section 18

Section 19

Section 20

Section 20

Section 2

section 20

s. 20

Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950

s. 20

Transport COrporations Act

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 2

s. 68

s. 20

Road Transport Corporations Act

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

s. 20

Road Transport Corporations Act

State of Andhra Pradesh

s. 20

Road Transport Corporations Act

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

Motor Vehicles Act

ss. 68

s. 68

s. 68

Wanchoo

s. 68

s. 68

ss. 68

s. 68

s. 68

s. 68

s. 68

Rowjee

(1964) 6 S.C.R.

330

Naray

Ulvi

Gokarn

s. 68

Motor Vehicles Act

Art. 14

Andllra Pradesh


STATE OF PUNJAB

DHARAM SINGH

February, 2, 1968

(K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT,

G. K: MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, 11.)

Punjab Educational S•rv/ce (Provinciali.red Cadre) Class Ill, Rules, 1961, r. 6(3)-Prohationer a.flainst permanent post allowed to continue after period of probation-Effect-When amounts to confirmation.

The resPondents, who were teachers in District Board Schools were taken over by the State of Punjab with effect from !st October 1957 when the Local Dodies Schools in the State were provincialised. The Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class l!l Rules were framed in 1961 but wore deemed to ha\'e come into force on !st October 1957.

Under r. 6(1) of the Rules the respondents, who were officiating in per- """'"11t posts against permanent vacancies were deemed to have held their

posts on probation, in the first instance, for one year from ls.t October

1957. On the completion of this initial period of probation on !st October 1958, tour courses of action were open ro the appointing authority under r. 6(3), namely, (a) to extend the period of probation, provided the total period of probation, incl ud!ng extensions, would not exceed three years, or (b) to reven the employee t<f his former post if he was promoted from some lower pest. or (c) to. dispense with his services if bis work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or .(d) to conflnn him in his appointment. As the respondents were not promoted from lower posts there was no question of their reversion. No other order was however passed. but the authority continued them in their posts for three years, that is, ur.to lsit October 1960 and even thereafter; allowed them to draw nnnual increments of sa!ary including the increment which fell due on 1st October 1962; and some time in 1963, termina~ their services. The orders of termination were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opponity to make any tcpresentation.

The writ petitions filed by the respondel>!s challenging the orders were allowed by the High Court.

The High Coun held that the respondents were not temporary employees that on the expiry of three years' period of probation they must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts, that the impugned ordel'S having deprived them of their right to those posts, amounted to removal from service by way of punishment and were in violation of Art. 311 and the Punjab CiVI1 Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952.

In appeal to this Court, HELD : The impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court. [7 El

Where on the completion of the specified period of probation an employeo is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the Service Rules, the initial period of probation is deaned to be extended by necessary ii:tplica!ion. J!ut, where, as _in the present case, the Service Rules fix a certain penOd of time beyond which the

probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed. to CC!Dtinue in that post after the completion of the maximum periOd of probat!on ~out an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to contm.ue. tn that -post as a prohationer. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period .beyond the aximum period fixed by it. In sueb a case, it is permissible to draw the mfeNncc that the cn1ployee allowed to continue in the p<_lSt on comple.tion.of, thl! maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by 1mphcation.

[5 C, G; 6 A-BJ

Case law rcferrd to.

Narain Singh Ahluwc.lia v. Sltlte of P1mj<1b, C.A. No. 492 of 1963 dated 29th January 1964; explained and followed.

C!VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 787 of 1966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 26, 1964 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 354 of 1963 and Civil Appeal No. 1017 of 1966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dutd D January 7, 1965 oi ilie Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 162 of 1964.

Vikram Mahajan and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A.

No. 787 of 1966). •

R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in C.A.

No. 1017 of E 1966).

Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondent (in both the appea19

The Judgment. of the Court was delivered by

Bachawat, J. These two connected appeals raise a common question of construction of r. 6 of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961. .Before October 1, 1957, Dharam Singh and Dev Raj, the respondents to these appeals, were junior teachers in District Board schools. The District Board schools were provincialised, and the services of the respondents were taken over by the Punjab State with effect from October 1, 1957 in pursuance of a scheme of provincialisation of Local Bodies schools in the State. On February 13, 1961, the Governor of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution framed the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class HI Rules, 1961 regulatiug the conditions of service of the teaching staff taken over by the State Government from the local authorities. Rule 1 provides that the rules will be deemed 10 have come into force with effect frnm October 1, 1957. Rule 3 created the Punjab Educa-

PUNJAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bacltawat, I.) 3

tional (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Service consisting of .the posts shown in Ap;; endix .A. ; It i< co1; llmon cas~ that the posts held by the respondents are mcluded m AppcndL--:: A n::! crry time scales of pay. Rule 6 is in these terms:

"6(1). Members of the Service, officiating or to be promoted against permanent posts, shall be on probation in the first instance for one year.

(2) Officiating service shall be reckoned as period spent on probation, but no member who has officiated in any appointment for one year shall be entitled to be confirmed unless he is appointed against a permanent vacancy.

(3) On the completion of the period of probation the authority competent to make appointment may confirn1 the member in his appointment or if his work or conduct during the period of probation has been in his opinion unsatisfactory he may dispense with his services or may extend his per!od of prob.:.!tion hy suc; h period !!~ he may deem fit or revert him to his fonner post if he was promoted from some lower post.

Provided that the total period of probation including extensions, if any, shall not exceed three years.

( 4) Service spent on deputation to a corresponding or higher post may be allowed to count towards the period of probation, if there is a permanent vacancy against which such member can be confirmed."

The respondents were officiating in permanent posts and under r. 6(3) they continued to hold those posts on probation in the first instance for one year. The maximwn period of probation fixed by the rules was three years which expired on October 1, 1960.

The respondents continued to hold their posts after October 1,

1960, but formal orders confirming them in their posts were not passed. Under r. 7, the Director of Public 1nstruction, Punjab was the appointing authority. By two separate orders passed on February 10, 1963 and April 4, 1963, the Director terminated their services. The order in each case stated that the services of the respondent concerned "are hereby terminated in accordance with the terms of his employment. The order shall take effect after one month from the date it is served on him." Rule 12 provides that in matters relating to discipline, punishment and appeals, members of the service shall be governed by the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The orders dated February 10 and April 4, 1963 were passed without holding any departmental enquiry and without giving the respondents any opportunity •of making representations against the action

taken against them. The respondents filed separate writ petitions in the Punjab High Court challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground that they had acquired sulistantive rights to their posts, and that the orders amounted to removal from service, and were passed in violation of Art. 3 ll of the Constitution. The appeliants pleaded that the respondents were temporary employees, that their services were terminated in accordance with the terms of their employment, and that the impugned orders did not aJ!IOUnt to removal from service and were not in violation of Art. 311.

Learned single Judges of the High.Court rejected the respondents' contentions. and dismissed the writ petitions.

The respondents filed separate Letters Patent appeals against these judgments. The appellate Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. The appellate Court held that the respondents were not temporary employees, that they held the posts on probation, that on the expiry of three years' period of probation they must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts, that the impugned orders having deprived them of their right to those posts amounted

.to removal from service by way of punishment and were passed in ;-iolation of. Art. 311 and the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment D and Appeal) Rules, 1952. It is against these appellate orders that the present appeals have been filed after obtaining special leave.

The High Court found that the respondents were officiating in permanent posts against permanent vacancies as contemplated by r. 6 ( 1), and that on the coming into force of the rules, they must be deemed to have held their posts under r. 6 ( 1) on probation in the first instance for one year from October 1, 1957. The correctness of these fiodings is not disputed by the appellants.

The High Court also held that in the circumstances of these cases, on the completion of three years' period of probation on October

l, 1960, the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their appointments. The appellants attack this finding. They submit that in the absence of formal orders of confirmation tlJl respondents must be deemed to have continued in their posts as probatipners. In the alternative, they submit that on completion of three years' period of probation, the respondents must be deemed to have been discharged from service and re-employed as temporary employees. We are unable to accept these contentions.

This Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the em, eloyee is allowed to con!inue in the post after the expiry of the penod without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the servlce rules. In such a case,

PUN.TAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bachawat, I.) 5

an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post, and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed. . Th.is view was taken in Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab('), G. S. Ramaswamy v.

The Inspector-General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore('), The Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior v. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar('), D. A. Lyall v. The Chief Conservator of Forests, U.P. and others(') and State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali(').

The reason for this conclusion is that where on the completion of the specified period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take in the absence of anything fo the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules, is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implication. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an {ndefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period.

The same view was taken in Narain Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab and another(').

It was suggested before us that the service rules in that case provided for a maximum period of pro: bation of two years beyond which the probationary period could not be extended. The judgment in that case does not refer to such a rule, nor does it appear from the judgment that before the appellant was reverted to his substantive post, the maximum period of probation in the post to which he had been promoted had expired. A reference to the paper book in that case shows that in November, 1957 the appellant was promoted as a superintendent and on June 26, 1959 before the expiry of the maximum period of probation he was reverted to his substantive post.

He thus continued to hold the post of superintendent as a probationer when the. order of reversion was passed.

In the present case, r. 6(3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be ex'.ended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after , completion of the mximum period of probation without an express order of confirmatmn, he cannot be deemed to

(1) [1963) (I) S.C.R. 416, 424-426

(2) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 278, 288-289

(3) C.A. No. 548 of 1962 decided on Janua,.y 23, 1964.

(4) C.A. No. 259 or 1963 decided OD l'ebruary 24, 1965.

(5} (1966] 3 S.C.R. 821, 825-826. !6) C.A. No. 492 of 1963 decided on Janua,.y 29, 1964.

continue in thal post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negativ~ by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum od fix.ed by it. In such a case,___it is permissible to dra~ the inference that the employee allowed fo continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been c, 1firmed in the post by implication.

The employees referred to in r. 6( 1) held tb.eir posts in the first instance on probation for one year commencing from October 1.

1957. On completion of the one year period of probation of the employee, four courses of action were open to the appointing authority under r. 6(3). Tb.e authority could either (a) extend the period of probation prf?vided the total period of probation including extensions would not exceed three years, or (b) revert the employee to .his former post if he was promotec; I from some lower post, or ( c) dispense with his services if his work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or (d) confirm him in his appointment. It could pass one of these orders in respect of the respondents on completion of their one year period of probation. But the authority allowed them to continue in their posts thereafter without passing any order in writing under r .. 6(3). In the absence of any formal order, the question is whether by necessary implication from the proved facts of these cases, the authority should be presumed to have passed some order under r. 6 (3) in respect of the respondent,, aad if so, what order hould be presumed to have been passed.

The respondents were not promoted from lower posts and there was no question of their reversion to such posts at any time under r. 6(3).

The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October !, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation. the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation up to October l, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to r. 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso tor. 6'(3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960. or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers.

Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on com-

PUN.JAB v. DHARAM SINGH (Bachawat. J.)

A pletion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass all)'. test or to fulfil any other condition before con• firmation.

There was I!_O compelling .reason for dispensing with 6 their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they wer_e so discarged fr?m service . and reemployed. In these circumstances, tJ.ie High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal c orders of confirmation in writing, it. should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue . in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under r. 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows , that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to D hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming .to the constitutional requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitutiol). As the E procedure laid down Jn the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Art. 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court.

In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee.

V.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

STATE OF PUNJAB

DHARAM SINGH

February, 2, 1968

K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.

R. S. BACHAWAT, J.

M. SHELAT

G. K: MITTER

1st October 1962

Art. 311

Vikram Mahajan

S. P. Nayar

R. N. Sachthey

Mohan Behari Lal

Bachawat

Class III Rules, 1961

Dharam Singh

Dev Raj

October 1, 1957

February 13, 1961

Punjab

Art. 309

Class HI Rules, 1961

October 1, 1960

October 1,

1960

February 10, 1963

April 4, 1963

February 10 and April 4, 1963

Punjab High Court

Art. 3

Art. 311

Art. 311

October

l, 1960

June 26, 1959

[1964] 6 S.C.R. 278

(1966] 3 S.C.R. 821

October 1.

1957

October 1, 1962

Art. 311

Art. 311


AMBALAL PURSHOTIAM ETC.

11.

AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.

February 19, 1968

B [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MlTTEll, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act--Slruclures made after s. 4 notice, on urtderta/...- ing b, v owners not to claim conipensation-TenGnts, if can choUengc- Acquisition for Municipality, if any restrictions.

Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (Born. Act 18 of 1925) ss. 52, 114--Powers of Municipality to acquire-Whet/1er attentpt to purchase by private treaty prerequisite.

For widening a street, the respondent-municipality requested the State Government to acquire the lands within the "line of the street" prescribed by the Municipality.· After the State Government issued notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the owners of the lands put up temporary structures upon the lands with the pormission of'the Municipality on giving an undertaking that they would not claim compensation for those structures in the land acquisition proceedings. The structures were let out t.o the appellants. Notifications were issued under s. 6 and compensation payable de!ermiued.

When attempts were made to take possession of the land acquired, the tenants-appellants, moved writ petitions in the High Court The High Court rejected the petitions. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD : By the compulsory acquisition for a public purpose, subject to payment of compensation, no fundameutat rights guaranteed under Arts~ 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution were infringed. The lands were properly notified for acquisition. The compensation payable in respect of the lands was determi~. If there was any grievance which the appellants were entitled to raise in respect of the compensation determined as payable, their remedy lay in approaching the Courts competent to determine that question~

[210 D-E]

For the purpose of widening the street, th~ Municipality had the pawcr under s. 114 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 to purchase land, and under s. 52 of the Act the Municipality could request the local Government to take action for compulsory acquisition of the land and for

vesting the same in the Municipality.

The power of the appropriate Government under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to notify land needed or likely to he needed for a public purpose is not subject to the restriction that when the public purpose is of a municipality the municipality h'"' attempted to purchase the land by private treaty and has failed in thot attempt. [211 G, 212 B.C]

The appellants as lessees of the structures had no right in the land on. which the structures stood. The structures belonged to the owners of the land, and were allowed to be put up after the date of the notification ur.der s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on the undertaking that no compensation shall be claimed in resP"..ct of the structures. The appellats were not on the lands al the date of the notification under s. 4, and bemg tenants of the structures they acquired, prima facie, no intemit in

the lands. Even assunung that they had acquired, by virtue of their respective tenancies, an interest in the lands, their remedy was to approachi

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1968]3 5.C.R.

the Land Acquisiti'on Authorities for claiming apportionment of compen sation. [212 G, HJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1369 to 1407 and 1564 to 1578 of 1967.

Appeals by Certificates/Special leave from the judgment and order dated February 1966 of the Gujarat High Court, in Special Civil Application Nos. 912, 916, 918, 920, 922, 923, 925, 929,

930, 931, 938 and 941 of 1964, and 917, 926, 927, 928, 932. 933, 934, 921, 935, 942, 924, 939 and 940 of 1964 respective!)-.

Vlthalbhai Patel and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants (in all the appeals).

I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 1396 to 1407 of 1967).

Purshottam Trikamdas and /, N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1 (in C.As. Nos. 1564 to 1578 of 1967).

 R. H. Dhebar, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayyar, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 , in all the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shah, 1. On June 6, 1941, the Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad prescribed a "line of the street" along an important thoroughfare in the town of Ahmedabad and resqlved that steps be taken for compulsory acquisition of lands falling "within the line." On June 9, 1941 a notification was issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. that the lands set out .in the Schedule "were likely to be needed for the public purpose set out in column 6 of the Schedule thereto, viz., for road widening", and that "any contracts for the disposal of any of the said lands by sale, lease, mortgage, assignment, exchange or otherwise, or any outlay or improvements made therein without the sanction of the Collector, . • . . . after the date of this notification will, under section 24 ( seventhly) of the said Act, be disregarded by the officer assessing compensation for such parts of-the said lands as may be finally acquired." The Government of Bombay issued a notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act sometime in 1943, and als() appointed the Special Land Acquisition Officer to take order for acquisition of the lands.

After the publication of the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, structures on the lands notified were burnt down H by rioters. The owners of the lands put up temporary structures upOn the. lands with the permission of the Municipal Borough ¢Ying an undertaking that they will not claim compensation for

AMBi; LAL v. MUNICIPAL .. COOPERAT!ON (S/tah, /.) 209

A these structures in the land acquis"ion prorudings. The struc

tures were let out to different tenants.

Proceedings for assessment of compensation were not immediately taken in hand, but negotiations were started by the Municipal Borough with the owners of the lands, and between the years 1944 and 1952 some lands were purchased by the Municipal Borough by private treaty and the lands so purchased were withdrawn from the notification for acquisition. Finding that it was not possible to persuade the other owners to sell their lands, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was moved to make his

award.• The Special Land Acquisition Officer made a common award on August 13, 1960. When the Special Land Acquisition Officer attempted to take possession of the lands acquired, the tenants of the structures moved petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat for writs quashing or setting aside the notifications under S$. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the awards and the notices issued for obtaining possession from the petitioners.

The High Court rejected the petitions. Against the orders rejecting the petitions, these appeals have been filed with special leave.

In these appeals counsel for the appellants contended that- ( 1) the notification issued by the Government of Bombay, the E award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and the proceedings subsequent to the award were invalid as infringing Arts. 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution in that the appellants were deprived of their right to property otherwise than in accordance with law; (2) that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to acquire the lands under the ; Land Acquisition F Act being absent, alt the proceedings including the notillcation under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were invalid; (3) that the rights of the appellants in the structures occupied by them as tenants were not affected by the award as no notices were served upon them by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under s. 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, and they could not be deprived of G their right in the structures; and ( 4) that the notifications under ss. 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were without jurisdiction because there was "no possible need" of the lands by the Municipal Corporation, and the proceedings were commenced not fore

the purpose for which they may under the law be commenced. but for a collateral purpose, viz., to acquire the !and in future -H at rates pegged down to the date on wich the notification under s. i was issued.

. In o~ judgment mere is no substance in any of the contenuons ra1Sed. lit may be recalled that the appellants in these

210 SUPJU!MB COUR.T llBPOl.TS

(1968) 3 S.C.R,

appeals are not the owners of the lands acquired : they are tenants in occupation of structures pennitted to be constructed upon the lands after the date of the notification under s. 4 of the La.'ld Acquisition Act, on condition that the owners of the lands will not claim compensation for those structures. If the land owners

are not entitled to claim compensation for the structures, evidently the persons who occupy tliose structures and who have come to B occupy the same after the notification, have, no interest in the lands or the compensation and they cannot bold up the acquisition proceedings by preventing the Special Land Acquisition Officer from taking over possession of the lands.

The Land Acquisition Act authorises the appropriate Government to notify land for acquisition which is or is likely to be needed for a public purpose : and road widening in a town is undoubtedly a public purpose.

After considering the report of the Collector under s. s:A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government of Bbmbay published a notification under ~. 6( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act that the lands were needed for a public purpose. That declaration was, by virtue of s. 6(3) of the Act, conclusive evidence that the lands were needed for a public purpose.

By the compulsory acquisition for a public purpose, subject to payment of compensation, no fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 & 31(2) of the Constitution were infringed.

The lands were properly notified for acquisition.

The compensation payable in respect of the lands .has been determined. If there is any grievance which the appellants are entitled to raise E in respect of the compensation determined as payable, their remedy lies in approaching the courts competent to determine that question. The plea of infringement of fundaµiental rights of the appellants is wholly unsubstantial and was rightly not raised before the High Court in the writ petitions out of which these appeals arise.

In considering the second contention that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to acquire lands have not been fulfilled, it is necessary (irst to refer to certain provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 18 of 1925.

S. 52 "When there is any hindrance to the perma- G nent or temporary acquisition by a municipality! upon payment of any land or building required for the pur .. poses of this Act, the Provincial Government may, after obtaining possession of the same for itself under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or other existing law, vest such land or building in the municipality on its H paying the compensation awarded, and on its repaying to the Provincial Government all costs incurred by the Provincial Government on account of the acquisition."

Section 63 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act by the first sub-section authorises the Municipal Borough to acquire and. hold property both movaltle and immovable, whether within or without its limits.

Section 118 authorises the Chief Officer of the municipality, subject to the approval of the municipality, to prescribe a line. on each side of every public street within the: municipal borough and from time to time to prescribe a fresh line in substitution of any line so prescribed or for any part thereof.

By cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 118, except under the provisions. of s. 143 no person shall construct or reconstruct any portion. of any building within the regular line of the public street without the permission of the Chief Officer under s. 123. Clause (b) of sub-s .. ( 3) of s. 118 provides that when the Chief Officer refuses permission to construct or reconstruct any building in any area within the regular line of the public street, such area shall with the approval of the municipality be added to the street and shall'

thenceforth be deemed part of the public street and shall be vested in the municipality.

Clause (c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 118' provides that the amount of compensation shall be determined in- D the manner provided by s. 198 which shall be paid by the muni-- cipality to the owner of any land added to a street under cl. (b) of sub-s. ( 3). Section 114 ( 1) of the Act provides that it shall' be lawful for a municipality to Jay out and make new pubJic streets to construct tunnels and other works subsidiary to publicstreets; to widen, open, enlarge or otherwise improve, and to tum. divert, discontinue or stop up any public street. '

On a review of these provisions it is dear that the municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, had the power to acquire land needed for municipal purposes including widening, opening, enlarging or otherwise improving any public street or municipal road. The municipality laid down a line of the street : after the line of the street was laid down, it was open to the municipality to decline permission to construct or reconstruct any building on the land and the lands were to be deemed added to the street. But the municipality did permit construction on the lands. The provisions of cl. (b) of s. 118(3) were therefore not a_ttracted. For the purpose of widen-ing the street, the municipality had the power under s. 114 to purchase the land, and under s. 52 the municipality could request the local Government to take action for compulsory acquisition of the land and for vesting the same in the municipality.

Counsel for the appellants urged that the power confe.ued upon the municipality could only be exercised when there was any ''hindrance to the permanent or temporary acquisition" by the municipality of any land required

fr the purposes of the Act, and since there is no proof of such

h1drance, all the proceedings for acquisition must be deemed void. In our judgment, the argument is misconceived.

Section

212 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS

(1968] 3 S.C.R.

52 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, authorises the municipality to purchase property required for th~ purpose of the Act by private treaty or to approach the Government for compulsory acquisition of the land for a v.ublic purpose.

Section 52 merely sets out alternative modes of acquiring property : it does not provide that before a Municipal Borough may move the Government to acquire land under the Land Acquisi. ti on Act, the Borough should have made attempts , to purchase .the land by private treaty and have failed in that attempt.

In .any case, the power of the appropriate Government under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to notify land needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose is not subject to the restriction that when the public purpose is of the municipality, the municipality has attempted to purchase the land by private treaty and has fa.iled in that attempt. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that whenever the land is needed for a public purpose or is likely to be needed for a public purpose, the Government may resort to the machinery provided under the Act for acquiring the land. Where the public purpose is the purpose of a local authority and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are put in force for acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority, s. 50 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from.such fund. There is no other bar statutory or otherwise to the acquisition of the land for purposes of a municil'ality. In issuing the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate Government is therefore not prevented, merely because the municipality has not attempted to acquire the land by private treaty. There wa.s, therefore, no condition precedent to the acquisition of the land before a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued which was not romplied with.

The contention that the proceeding for making of his award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was invalid has also no substance.

The appellants as lessees of the structures had no right in the land on which the structures stood. The structures 'belonged to the owners of the land, and were allowed to be put up after the date of the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acqui- sition Act was issued, on the undertaking that no compensation shall be claimed in respect of the structures. The appellants were not on the lands at the date of the notifica!ion under s. 4, and being tenants of the structures they acquired, prima facie, no 'interest in the lands. Even assuming that they had acquired, by virtue of their respective tenancies, any interest in the lands, their remedy was to approach the Land Acquisition authorities for -claiming apportionment of compensation. It may be pointed .out

that this contention was not raised beforethe High Court and has been raised for the first time in this Court.

The last argument raised by counsel for the appellants is, in our judgment futile. The notification issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was by operation of sub-s. ( 3) conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose. No inquiry was thereafter permissible that the land was not needed for a public purpose. It is true that no stegs were immediately taken by the Land Acquisition Officer authorities to make awards of compensation and to take possession of the lands. But the reason apparently was that tlie municipality was still trying to purchase the land by private treaty and when it was found that it could not purchase the lands, the Land Acquisition Officer was requested to expedite the determination of compensation.

We are unable to bold that there is any evidence that the Government of Bombay issued the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, not for the bona fide purpose of acquisition, but with the object of pegging down prices so that the lands may when needed be obtained at those rates in future.

The land was within the line of the street and could not without the sanction of the municipality be put to any profitable use. If either the land owners or the tenants were aggrieved by the delay. it was open to them to claim writs or orders compelling the State Government to complete the assessment and payment of compensation.

We are not hereby to be understood as suggesting that after issue of the notifications under ss. 4 & 6 the appropriate Government would be justified in allowing the matters to drift and to take in hand the proceeding for assessment of compensation whenever they think it proper to do. It is intended by the scheme of the Act that the notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any unreasonable delay.

But on the facts of the present case, it does not appear that there was any scope for holding that with a view to prevent the land owners or the persons claiming derivative title from them from getting the benefit of the rise in prices, notifications under ss. 4 and 6 were.issued without any intention to take steps for acquisition of the lands.

The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearina fee in all the appeals. Separate costs will be paid by the appellant~ to the Corporation and to the State Government.

Y.P.

Appeals dismissed_

AMBALAL PURSHOTIAM ETC

AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS

February 19, 1968

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

Land Acquisition Act

s. 4

Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925

ss. 52, 114

s. 4

s. 6

s. 114

Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925

s. 52

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Vlthalbhai Patel

S. S. Shukla

I. N. Shroff

Purshottam Trikamdas

N. Shroff

R. H. Dhebar

S. K. Dholakia

S. P. Nayyar

Municipal Borough of Ahmcdabad

Ahmedabad

June 9, 1941

Government of Bombay

s. 4

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

section 24

s. 6

s. 4

August 13, 1960

Art. 226

High Court of Gujarat

Arts. 19 and 31(2)

Land Acquisition F Act

s. 4

s. 9(3)

ss. 4 & 6

s. 4

Government of Bbmbay

s. 6(3)

Arts. 19 & 31(2)

S. 52

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Section 63

Section 118

s. 118

s. 143

s. 123

s. 118

s. 118

s. 198

Section 114

s. 118(3)

s. 114

s. 52

Section

212

(1968] 3 S.C.R.

52

Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925

Section 52

s. 4

s. 50

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4

s. 6

s. 4

ss. 4 & 6

s. 6

ss. 4 and 6