. v.. .

STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.

April 16/30, 1968*

[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER

AND C. A: VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] Commission of Inquiries ict (60 of 1952), s. 3--Setting up of Com-· nJission for collection of facts for future action-:-Partly due ta political' rivlllry but dominant purpose bona fide--Va!idityome items in Notification appoinang Commission_ ubject to appeal in civil court-Setting. up of Comn1ission, if-constitutes contemp~ of court.

The appellants were Chief Ministers and Ministers of the respondent- State. Jn Parliament, the State Legislature and from public platforms, it was alleged that during their tenure of office the appellants were guilty of acts of serious misconduct. corrti:ption, abuse of power. misfeasanceand malfeasance. Therefore. the State Government, in exerci!e of its powers under s. 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952, issued a notification appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report on the matters,· 'so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in futur~ .. The appellants filed writ petitions for setting aside the Notification, but the High Court dismissed them. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : ( 1) An inquiry for mere collection of facts unrelated to any future course of Government action or legislative policy does not fall within the purview of s. 3 df the Act and it is not a valid exercise of statutory power to appoint such a Commission; (2) the Commission was set up for a purpose alien to the

statute, in that it was set up by the State Government not in the publicrinterest but for the collateral purpose of getting rid of political rivals by character assassination; and

(3) the appointment of the Commission constituted contempt of court in that some of the items referred to in tbeimpugned notification were the subject matter of' a first appeal pending in the High O>urt.

HELD : ( 1) The preamble to the notification shows that the object of setting up the Commission in the present case was to take approprlate- 1egislative or administrative measures 'for maintaining. high standards ofpublic conduct and purity of political administration in the State in future.

Therefore, the notification falls within the ambit of s. 3 of the Act.

[801 A-C .. 803 D-EI

Shri Ram Krishna Da/m; a v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1959] S.C.R. 279, explained. . '

(2) It may be that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry in the present case was partly on account of political rivalry between the party in power and those against _whom the inquiry was ordered but the dominant purpose of setting up the Commission was to promote easures for maintaining p_urity and integrity of the administration in the po!iticar hfe of the State tn future and not the character assassination of rivals.

Therefore, the impugned notification was issued bona fide and is le"ally valid. (805 A-B; 807 R-E] ·

The King v. Minister of Health, [1929] 1 K.B. 619, referred to.

*The order dismissing the appeals was pronounced on April 16, 1968 and the Judgment was delivered On April 30, 1968.

SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS

[1968] 3 S.C.R.

Rex v. Brighton Corporation ex-parte Shoosmith, 96 -L.T. 762, Earl Ei:za•illiani's TVentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of To1vn and Country . Planning, [1951] 2 K.B. 284; applied.

(3) To constitute contempt of court there must be involved some .. act done or writing pllblished calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to. lower his authority' or something 'calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the la\vful -process. of the courts.' [808 HJ

In the prfient-c:ise,- the suits 'Were filed 'for damages for defamation -in relation to allegations of corruption.

There was no factual inquiry into the allegations and the suits were decided on the basis of burden of proof:

Therefore, it could not be.Said-that the_inquiry ordered was in relation to the very matters which were the subject matter of the first appeal filed in the High Court again.st the' decision in the suits. [808 ~El . C

Further, the scope of the trial by courts of law and the scope o'f an inquiry by the Comission are altogether different, and _therefore, the in. quiry by the Commission would not amount toan usurpation of the function of courts of law. [808 E]

In any case, it cannot be said that the Commission wOUtd be-liable for -contempt of court, i'f it proceeded to inquire into matters , referred to it by_ the Government notification, because, in appointing the _Commission the 'State Government \Vas exerci'.Sing a statutory power and in making the inquiry the Commission \Vould be performing a statutoryduty. The res. pondents in this case have done nothing to obstruct or interfere v.rith the .la\\ful powers of ihe court by acting bona fide and by discharging statu

tory functions under tho Act. [808 B-G]

Reg. v. Gra.v, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 and Arthur Reginald Perera v. The King, [1951] A.C. 482, 488, applied.

CIVIL APPELLATE JUR1smcnoN: Civil Appeal Nos. 1148-· 1150 of 1968.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated February . 22, 1967 of the~Orissa High Court in 0.J.C. Nos. 396, 40S and 418 <Jf 1967.

A. K. Sen, Rajendra Mohanty, K. R. Chaudhury and K; Rajendra Chou_dhury, for the appellants.

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Ashok Das, Advocate- General for the State of Orissa, Santosh Chatterjee, B, B. Ratho and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4. Lal Narain Singh, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and R. K. Garg, for interv;:ner No. I.

B. Sen, M. K. Banerjee, s. K. Dholakia and J. B. Dadachanji, for intervener No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.

These appeals were heard on April 15 and April 16, 1968 and at the close of the hearing we ordered that the appeals should be dismissed with costs and indicated that our reasons .would be pronounced later. Accordingly our present judgment gives our reasons for the order which has already been passed.

These appeals are brought against the commo.n judgment of the Orissa High Cqurt dated February 22 •. 19.68 m O.J.<;._ Nos. 396, 408 and 418 1967. By these applications the pelltmners therein prayed for an appropriate .direction or. order. under. Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing and settmg aside notification No. 813-EC dated October 26, 1967, issued by the Government of Orissa in exercise:· of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act (LX of 1952) and for othe1 reliefs. The Schedule to the Notification gives the names of 15 persons against whom inquiry is to be made. The petitioners in the three O.J.C.s have respectivelv been referred to in Items 6, 2 and 12 of the Schedule. In O.J.C. 418, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik were originally impleaded as opposite parties Nos. 5 to 9. Shri Biju Patnaik filed an application in this case to be impleaded as an opposite party. As the other parties had no objection he was also imp leaded as opposite party No. 10. Rules were issued and except opposite parties Nos. 3 and 6 the other opposite parties showed cause.

By its judgment dated February 22, 1968 the High Court dismissed the applications, holding that the notification of the State Government dated October 26, 1967 appointing the Commission of Inquiry was legal • and valid.

Against this judgment the petitioners in all the three O.J .C.s have preferred the present appeals by certificate of the Orissa High Court.

Shri Harekrushna Mahtab was the Chief Minister of Orissa from 1947 to 1949. Shri Nabakmshna Choudhury wits the Chief Minister from 1950 to 1956. In the 1957 General Election to the Orissa Legislative Assembly (hereinafter referred to as the 'Assembly'), out of 140 seats the Congress Party got only 56 seats.

Sri Harekrushna Mahtab formed the Ministry with the

spport of other members but he had to resign in 1959 due to withdrawal of support by some of the groups in the Assembly.

In May, 1959, he formed a coalition ministry with the help of Ganatantra _Parishad of which Sri R. N. Singh Deo was the leader.

Sri Singh Deo became the Finance Minister and the Deputy Leader in the Coalition Government. During the coalition Ministry there developed acute difference of opinion in the Orissa Congres~ . Legislt!ve party over the condut and programme of the

oahtion Mm1stry.

The Congress Legislative party was divided mto two groups, one under the leadership of Sri Harekmshna M!111tab and the other under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik.

Sn Harekrushna Mahtab had to resign in February, 1961 as he lost the support of the majority of the Congress Legislative party. 8 Sup. CJ/68-11

792 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS

(1968) 3 S.C.R.

The Assembly was dissolved and there was President's rule for sometime._ During the President's rule, a mid-term election was held in May, 1961. The Congress Party succeeded in capturing

80 seats out of 140 under the leadership of Sri Biju Patnaik. At that time the Ganatantra Parishad had joined the Swatantra Party' of India. The dissident group of members under the leadership of Sri Harekrushna Mahtab defected from the Congress Party and formed a separate political party under the name of "Jana Con~ gress''. The case of the appellants is that from 1961 till the end o( 1966 this group bad its secret alliance with the Swatantra Party and went on creating obstruction from within to the smooth administration by the Congress Party which had a superior numerical strength. Sri Biju Patnaik was the Chief Minister, Shri Biren Mitra was the Deputy Chief Minister.

There was a firm called "Orissa Agents" in the name of Mrs. Mitra which made supplies to some of the departments of the Orissa Government. A campaign was carried on by Sri Mahtab and Sri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan attacking the honesty of Sri Biren Mitra. There was a debate in the Assembly in which a direct attack was made on the honesty and integrity of Sri Mitra and there was a demand for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. The Government of Orissa did not agree to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but Sri Biju Patnaik referred the matter to Sri Singh Deo, leader of the Opposition and Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Sri

Singh Deo initially accepted the responsibility, but later on expressed his unwillingness. The Orissa Government had a special audit of the allegations and sent the report to the Public Accounts Committee in the year 1964. While the matter was pending with the Public Accounts Committee, Sri Biju Patnaik resigned the Chief Ministership of Orissa on October l, 1963. He, however, continued to be the chairman .of the State Planning Board till January 29, 1965 when Sri Biren Mitra was the Chief Minister.

Sri Mitra dropped out Sri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan from the cabinet.

During the tenure of the office of Sri Mitra as the Chief Minister of ()rjssa, some members of the Opposition in the Assembly, which included all the members of the Swatantra Party, filed a. memorandum before the President of India alleging misappropriation, misconduct and fraud against Sri Patnaik, Sri Mitra. and ain other Ministers and requested the President of India to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to inqUire into these allegations.

The President referred the Memorandum to his Council of Ministers. It is said the Central Government did not favour the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry but decided to have the allegations enquired into by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the C.B.I.). After receiving the preliminary report of the C.B.I. the Central Government rejected the demand for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. A statement was

made in Parliament that certain improprieties were committed but the examination did not reveal any misconduct, misappropriation or fraud or abuse of power for personal gain. As a result of the statement in the Parliament Sri Biren Mitra who was then the Chief Minister submitted his resignation and Sri Sadasiv Tripathy was elected as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party and carried on administration as the Chief Minister of Orissa till the last General Election. Soon after the formation of the present Ministry, the Governor of the State announced in his address to the Legislature the decision to set u'p a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the charges of corruption and improprieties alleged to have been committed by the Ministers who were in office from 1961 to 1967.

The present. Commission was appointed in pursuance of the policy laid down in the address of the Governor.

The main ground of attack on behalf of the appellants was that the notification was illegal because the Government exercised the statutory power ma/a fide and for collateral purpose and that the object of appointing the Commission of Inquiry was to get rid of

Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Biren Mitra and to drive thenf out of the political life of Orissa. The High Court held that the allegation of the appellants was not made out and upheld the legal validity ui the notiiicaiion dated October 26, 1967 issued by the Orissa Government.

Sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', provides as follows:

"3. Appointment of COmmission.--{l) The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in die Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter <Of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly : • ........................................ "

Setion 4 vests in the COmmission the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure and reads as f~!!ow&;

"4. Powers of Commission.-The Commissionshall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908}. in respect of the following matters, namely :- ·

SUPREME COURT .REPORTS . , . . (1968] 3 s.c.R.

(a) summoning and enforcing.the-attendance of any . person and _examining him 011 oath; . • A

(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; ·

_ (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

. B

(d) requisitioning any public record or_ copy thereof Jrom any cou, rt _ or_ofli:e; ·

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; ·

(f) any other matter which may be prescribed." .

Section 5 empowers the appropriate Government, by a notification . in the Official Gazette, to confer on the Commission additional powers as provided ill all or any of the sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and -

(5) of that section. S_ection 6 states :

, "6. Statements made by persons to the Commission.-No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him . to, or be used against hini in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement :

Provided that the statement-

(a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or

(b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry."

By s. 8 the Commission is empowered to regulate its own procedure including the time and place of its sittings and may act notwithstanding the. temporary absence of any member or the existence of any vacancy among its members. ·

The notification of the Orissa Government dated October 26, G 1967 is to the following ef!'ect: -

"HOME DEPARTMENT .

NOTIFICATION . ' The 26th October, 1967.

No. 813-· EC.-WHEREAS pursuant to the midterm general election of the State Legislative Assembly. in 1961, Councils of Ministers headed by Shri Biju

I ---

JAGANNATH RAO v. ~TATF (Rama.swami, /.) 795

Patnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and Shri Sadasiva Tripathy \VCJ:e fonned in the State during different times during the period from the 23rd 1 une 1961 till the 8th March 1967 and Shri Biju Patnaik, after laying down his office as Chief Minister, declared himself to be the Chairman, Planning Board and continued to function as Chainnan, Planning Board during the period from the 4th October, 1963 to the 29th January 1965, during the Chief Ministership of Shri Biren Mitra;

AND WHEREAS during the tenure of office of the aforesaid persons as Chief Ministers there were various allegations against the conduct of the aforesaid persons and some of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the State of Orissa, as specified in the Schedule hereto, by politicians, the general public and others, and the allegations apart from being put forward from public platfonns by private persons and otherwise, have been the subjectmatter of active agitation all through in the State Legislature and in the Parliament and some of such allegations were of such a i:iature that an enquiry was conducted thereon by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Ceptral Cabinet also held deliberations over the same ;

AND WHEREAS on an active and careful consideration of all such allegations by the Government of Orissa, it appears to them :-·

TIIAT DURING

THE AFORESAID PERIOD, i.e., FROM THE 23RD JUNE 1961 TO THE 8111 MARCH 1967, THE SAID PERSON As NAMED

IN THE SCHEDULE:

(1) committed various acts of misconduct, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism illegalities, irregularities, improprieties and abuse of their power in the matters of administration of the State:

(2) abused their official positions for securing pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, members of their families, their relations, their friends, . their partymen

(Congressmen) and others in whom they were interested, .from out of e funds of the State exchequer and otherwise to the detriment of the interests of the State ' . (3) c:ommitted breach of trust and acts of impropnety with respect to the properties and assets of the State yn~ a view to further the interests of their party organiSll'tion, i.e., the Congress;

796 SUP.RElll:B COU&T IU!POU'S

£1968] 3 S.C.R.

(4) entered into contracts and other monetary transactions for the supply of machinery, tools, equipmenis and execution of works, themselves, or permitted their family members, relittions, friends, partymen and others to enter into such contracts and transactions with the Government of Orissa, with different Departments of the Government of Orissa, with Corporations, Local Bodies, Statutory Bodies and with other Bodies with which Government of Orissa have or had interest, control or concern in utter disregard of the interests of the State in breach of the trust imposed on them by virtue of their Constitutional positions;

(5) resorted to misuse of power, interfered in the processes of elections and administration of Local Bodies not only to help their friends, favourites and partymen but also at times for their own personal benefits;

(6) acquired directly properties of the State either for themselves or for the benefit of the members of their families or relations or others in whom they were interested;

(7) advanced money and Joans by way of favouritism out of the Statci exchequer in favour of themselves, members of their families, their relations and other persons in whom they were interested;

(8) permitted wastage, misuse, misutilisation and misappropriation of the funds of the State in several ways to the detriment of the interests of the State in utter disregard of the canons of financial propriety and established rules and procedure from which a presumption of personal gains for themselves or for persons as aforesaid directly or indirectly arises; ·

(9) caused wastage, misuse, misutilisation, misappropriation, illegal or irregular use of the funds of !he State through contracts or other monetary transactions entered into by the Government without following the rules of Jaw or the established procedure;

(10) by way of favouritism and nepotism caused maladministration in matters of public services, namely, in the matter of appointments, transfers, promotions and dealing with corrupt officers;

(11) interfered with the administration of Jaw and tried to pervert the course of justice by helping offenders to escape law;

(12) caused to the State Government huge financial loss which has given rise to a great economic crisis, serious retardation in the progress of trade, industry and commerce, agricultural output, serious problems of unemployment and has also vitiated the moral and general character of the people;

(13) acted in several cases against constitutional proprieties, public policies and proper social and political conduct;

(14) amassed wealth themselves, through members of their family, relations and other persons or permitted the members of their family, relati9ns and other persons to amass wealth and their assets during the aforesaid period have increased disproportionate to the known sources of their income, by abuse of their constitutional positions.

Under such circumstances the people in general and the Government have expressed a desire that the matters aforesaid regarding the aforesaid persons should be enquired into through a Commission of Inquiry so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future.

Under such circumstances, the Government of the State of Orissa are of the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making a full inquiry into the aforesaid matters which are of definite public importance.

NOW, THEREFORE,· the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 (Act 60 of 1952), hereby appoint a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Justice H. R. Khanna of the Delhi High Court to inquire into and report on and in respect of :-

WHETHER THE PERSONS

MENTIONED IN

THE SCHEDULE, DURING THE

AFORESAID

PERIOD:

(I) committed various acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, misappropriation, fraud, negligence, favouritism, nepotism, illegalities, irregillarities, improprieties and abuse of their power in matters of administration of the Stat11 in different cases ?

798 SuPRl!MB COU.T Ul'Ol.TS

[1968) 3 S.C.R.

(2) abused their official positions for securing A pecuniary and other benefits for themselves, the members of their families, their relations, their friends and their partymen (Congressmen) and others in whom they were interested, from out of the funds of the State exchequer and otherwise to the detriment of the interests of the State ?

JI;

(3) committed breach of trust and act~ of impropriety with respect to the properties and assets of the State with a view to further the interests of their party organisation, i.e. the Congress ?

( 4) entered i!l'!o contracts and other monetary transactions for the supply of machinery, stores, equipment and execution of works or permitted their family members, relations, friends and others in whom they were interested, with the Government of Orissa, in utter disregard of the law, rules and administrative procedure relating thereto and in breach of the confidence reposed on them, by virtue of their constitutional position?

(5) resorted to. misuse of power' interfered in the process cif election and administration of local bodillS not only to help their friends, favourites and partymen, but also at times for their own personal benefit?

(6) acquired directly properties of the State either for themselves pr for the benefit of members of their families, relations or other persons in whom and organisations in which they were interested ?

(7) advanced money and loans in favour cif themselves, members of their families, their relations and other persons in whom they were interested, out of the State Excheciuer ?

(8) permitted wastage, misuse and expenditure in various ways to the detriment . of the interests of the State without following the established rules of procedure from which the presumption of personal gains for themselves directly or indirectly would arise?

(9) by way of favouritism and nepotism have caused maladministration in matters of public services, namely, appointments, transfers, promotions and dealing with con11pt officers ?

(10) interfered in the administration of law and tried to pervert the course of justice by helping offenders to escape law?

(11) by their aforesaid conduct have put the 'State • Government to huge financial loss which has resulted in

B a financial crisis for the State ?

(12) by their aforesaid conduct have hampered the entire industrial development in the State ?

(13) by iheir aforesaid conduct have given rise to serious problems of unemployment? c

(14) by their aforesaid conduct have spread corruption in the Government machinery and have polluted the general public morale in the State and have also brought about a general demoralisation of the political, social, economic and moral aspects of the Society ?

(15) by their aforesaid conduct have put the State to D financial loss which has developed into a great economic crisis and has resulted in rapid retardation of the progress of trade, industry and commerce, a deplorable fall in the agricultural output, spread of 9orruption in all wings of administration and a general breakdown in the morale and character of the people of the State ?

E The Commission of Inquiry may also perform such

?the~ functions as are necessary or incidental to the mqurry.

The Commission shall inquire into the detailed particulars pertaining to the aforesaid matters along with

F such other incidental and ancillary matters thereto that shall be placed before them by the State Government.

The Commission shall inquire into the financial implications of the aforesaid matters. "' The Commission shall make its report to the State '

G Government on or before 30th Apvil, 1968.

AND WHEREAS the State Government are of opinion that having regard to the nature of the inquiry to be made and other circumstances of the case all the provisions of sub-section (2), sub-section (3), sub-section (4), sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of section 5 of

H the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 shall be made applicable to the said Commission, the State Government hereby directs that all the said provisions shall apply to the said Commission.

800.

SUPllDIE COUllT UPOl.TS [1968] 3 s.c.R.

The Commission shall have its headquarters at A J Bhubaneswar and may also visit such places as may be necessary in furtherance of the inquiry.

By order of the Governor B. B. Rath r Additional Secretary to Govt.

SCHEDULE

From To

1. Sbri Biju Patnaik Chief Minister Planning Bd. 23-6-1961 1-1().1963 Chairman, State 4-1().1963 29-1-1965

2. Shri Biren Mitra Minister 23-6-1961 1-1().1963 c

Chief Minister 2-1().1963 2().2-1965

3. Sbri S . Tripathy Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965 Chief Minit11ter 21-2-1965 8-3-1967

4. Sbri Hilamoni Routray Minister 23-6-1961 25-2-1967

5. Sbri Satyapriya Mohanty Minister 2-1().1963 24-2-1967 D

6. Sbri P. V. Jagannath Rao Minister 23-6-1961 8-3-1967

7. Shri H.B. Singh Mardaraj Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965

8. Shri R. P. Misra Minister 21·2-1965 25-2-1967

9. Sbri Brundaban Nayak Deputy Minister 29-7-1962 1-1().1963 Minister 2-1().1963 28-6-1965

10. Shri T. Sanganna Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 1-1().1963 E Minister 2-1().1963 27-2·1967

11. Shri Prahallad Mallik Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 28-2-1967

J 2. Sbri S. K. Sahu Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 28-2-1967

13. Shri Anup Singh Deo Dy. Minister 21-2-1965 8-2-1967

14. Sbri Chittaranjan Naik Dy. Minister 21-2-1965 26-2-1967 F

15. Shri Chandramohan Singh Dy. Minister 29-7-1962 24-2-1967 B.B. Rath Additional Secretary to Govt.

On behalf of the appellants Mr. Asoke Sen put forward the argument that the appointment of the Commission is not valid as the notification does not state what is the purpqse for which the enquiry was to be made. To put it differently, the argument of G the appellants was that the notification is not related to any future Government action or legislative policy and hence the notification was bad.

The contention of Mr. Asoke Sen was that an inquiry for mere collection of facts unrelated to any future course of Government action or legislative policy does not fall within the purview of s. 3 of the Act and it is not a valid exercise of H statutory power to appoint such a Commission. We are unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants .as correct. The purpose of the enquiry is stated in the preamble

JAGANNATH lAO v. STATB (Ramaswami, /,) 801

to the notification wJµch, states that "the matters aforesaid regardinJ the afore.said persons should be enquired into through a Commission of Inquiry so that facts may be found which alone will facilitate rectification and prevention of recummce of such la~ and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future".

In other words, the object of the enquiry to be made by the Commission appointed under s. 3 of the Act was to take appropriate !eslative or administrative measures to maintain the purity and mtegrity of political administration in the State. In our opinion, the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry in the present case was in valid exercise of the statutory power by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act. Mr. Asoke Sen referred in this connection. to the decision of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(' ), in which the appellant challenged the validity of the notification of the Central Government dated December 11, 1956 appointing a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report . in respect of certain companies mentioned in the Schedule attached to the notification and in respect of the nature and extent of the control and interest which certain persons named in the notification ex, ercised over these companies.. It was held by this, Court, in agreement with the Bombay High Court, that the notification was legal and valid except as to the last part of cl. 10 thereof which empowered the Commission to recommend the action which should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases. Clause 10 of the notification in that case stated :

"Any irregularities, frauds or breaches of trust or action in disregard of honest commercial practices or contravention of any law (except contraventions in respect of which .criminal proceedings are pending in a Gourt of Law) in respect of the companies and firms whose afiairs are investigated by the Commission which may come to the knowledge of the Commission and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases."

The portion of Cl. 1 O of the notification which was held i0 be ultra vires by this Court was the portion beginning with the words "and the action" and ending with the words "in future cases".

It was argued on behalf of the appellant in that case that While the Commission may find facts on which the Government may take action, legislative or executive, the Commission cannot be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to be taken by the appropriate Government. The argument was rejected by

(!) [19591 S. C. R. 279.

802 SUPUMB COUJ.T UPOaTS

(11168) 3 S.C.ll,

this Court. n this oonnection, S. R. Das, C.J. speaking for tho Court. obServed at page 294 of the Report as follows : -

"We are unable to accept the proposition so widely enunciated. An inquiry necessarily involves investi~· tion into facts and necessitates the collection of material facts from the evidence adduced. before or brought to the notice of the person or body conducting the inquiry

and the recording of its findings on those facts in its report cannot but be regarded as ancillary to the inquiry itself, for the inq_uiry becomes useless unless the findings of the inquiring body are made available to the Gov ernment which set up the inquiry. It is, in our judg ment, equally ancillary that the person or body conduct ing the inquiry should express its own view on the facts found by it for the consideration of the appropriate Government in order to enable it to take such measure as it .may think fit to do. The whole purpose of setting up of a CommiSsion of Inquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of inquiry will be deprived of its utility it-the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the. measures the situation disclosed calls for cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own. In our view the recommendations of a Com mission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Gov ernment in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objeets it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commis sion of . Inquiry recommending the. imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be suffi ciently deterrent to delinquents in future.

But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprlo vlgore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under s. 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there can be no point in the Commission of Inquiry making rer.ommendations for taking any action 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment' which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context, to wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a court of. law properly constituted exercising 'its own discretion on the

JAGANNATH .RAO V, STATB (Rama.swami, /,) 803

facts and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by !he view of any person or body, howsover august or high powered it may be. Having regard to all these considerations it appears to us that only that portion of the last part of cl. (10) which calls upon the Commission of Inquiry to make recommendations about the action to be taken 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment', cannot be said to be at all necessary for or ancillary to the purposes of the Commission. In our view the words in the latter part of the section, namely, 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment', clearly go outside the scope of the Act."

In our opinion, the ratio of this case has no application in the present case, because there is nothing corresponding to the im pugned part of cl. 10, in the notification of the Orissa Government dated October 26, 1967. On the contrary, we have already pointed out that the object to set up the Commission of Inquiry D in the present case was to take appropriate legislative or adminis

trative measures for maintaining h1~ standards of public conduct and purity of political administration in the State. It follows therefore that the notification of the Orissa Government falls within the ambit of s. 3 of the Act and must be held to be legally valid and intra virts.

We pass on to col!Sider the next question arising in these ap peals, namely, whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purposo alien to the statute. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the

appellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harckrushna Mehtab, Shri Singh Deo and the other persons who F are at present in-charge of the Orissa administration. Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the State of Orissa from 1947 up to the General Elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Singh Deo who was the leader ofOpposition in the previous Government and a1sO to the internal rivalry between the two political groups G in the Congress Legislative, party, one led by Shri Harekrushna ' Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra; It was urged that the Commission was set up by the pre sent Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a .cc>llateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa.

H Mr. Asoke Sen .said that the object of the enquiry was charaoter

ass•ssination of Slµi Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and so the Com missiQn was set up for a collateral purpose and the notification must bo struck down as illegal and llltra Vina. It is not poaalble,

804 SUPIBMB COUl.T UJIO&TI

[1968) 3 S.C.R.

in our opinion, to accept this argnment as correct, It is admitted

A that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the apants and the present Chief Minister of Orissa, Shri R. ~' Sing . and also as between the appellants and the group of \,; O!lgress idents' led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik. But we do not think that the existence of a political rivalry is in itself sufficient. to hold that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry is illegal. Having perused the affi davits of the appellants and also those filed by the respondents in this case we are of opinion that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was not due merely to the existence of political rivalry of the parties but was impelled by the desire to set up and c maintain high standards of moral conduct in the political ad ministration of the State. As we have already pointed out, the object of appointing the Commission is stated in the notification itself as "the rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses ll!id securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future". In the affidavit of Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the 1ana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967. As a result of the popular mandate the Swatantra Party and the 1 ana Congress coalition took charge of the reins of Government and in accordance with the solemn promise made by those parties to the people of Orissa the Government decided' It to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in order to investigate the widespread corruption practised by the persons named in 'the Schedule to the impugned notification. The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the Governor to the Otissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elec tions. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party was "to et up a clean administration, so that the State's resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State". In para 6 of the affidavit Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan further states : G "I have always believed and still believe that politics is not for the purp0se of serving the selfish ends and to satisfy the greed of any politician or any person or any group of persons. Politics is for the service of the people and involves sacrificing one's life and comforts for raising the living stsndard of the overwhelming poverty-stricken people of our State and our country so that they K may enjoy a good life and hold up their heads with pride." In para S he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Birea

JAGANNATH RAO v. STATB (Ramaswami, J.) 80$

A Mitra and their group. It is true that the appointment of the Com~

mission of Inquiry may have been made partly on account of the: political rivalry between the parties but having perused the aflb davits filed by the appellants and the respondents in this case,. we are satisfied that the main object of the appointment of the Com, mission of Inquiry was not to satisfy the political rivaJrY of the: B politicians at present in power in Orissa but to promote measures. for maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in future in the Orissa State. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr.

Asoke. sen is unable to make good his argument that the impugned notification is a ma/a fide exercise of the statutory power and it. should be struck down as illegal. c

It is well-settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the stanitory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law; i.e., an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other than that. which the Legislature intended (See The King v. Minister of Health) (1). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In .uch a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper le.st to be applied in such a case is as. to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation ex parte Shoosmith(2) A Borough Corporation expended a large sum of money upon al, F tering and paving a road, which was thereby permanently improved, but they decided to do the work at the particular time when it was done in order to induce the Automobile Club to hold motor trials and motor races upan it. The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divis10nal Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher Moulton, L.J. at page 764 as follows : G

"It cannot be denied that the physical act of chang, ing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powm and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives. The case would be quite different if one came to the conclusion that under the guise of improvement of a road, certain moneys bad

(I) [19291 I K. B. 619.

(2) 96 Law Times 762 ..

806 [1968] 3 s.c.R.

been used really for diminishing the experu; es of the Automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit pur

J>05CS" The principle 'was applied by Denning, 'L.J. in Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Etate Cc. Ltd. v. Minister 91 Town and Country Plan ing(1). It was a case concerning the validity o.f a compulsory purchase made by the Central Land Board, and confirmed by the Minister, under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Board's function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Board's policy of sales at existing use values. The majority (consisting of Somer well and Singleton, L.J.) held that, though the main purpose of the Board may well have been to induce landowners in general and the company, in particular, to adopt one of the methods of sale favoured by the Board, it was nevertheless in connection with their function as the authority operating the development charge scheme, and at any rate, "the case was not one in which it could be said that powers were exercised for a purpose different from those spe cified in the statute." Denning, L.J. disagreed with the majority and held that the dominant purpose of the Board was not to assist in their proper function of collecting the development charge, but to enforce their policy of sales at existing use value only. '.J'he dominant purpose being unlawful, the order was invalid, and could not be cured by saying that there was also some other purpose which was lawful. The Board and the Minister had misunderstood the extent of their compulsory powers, and their affidavits showed that they had overlooked that their ultimate purpose in exercising their powers .should be connected with the performance of the Board's functions under the Act. At page 307 of the Report Denning, L.J. observed as follows :

"What is the legal position when the board have more than one purpose in mind? In the ordinary way, of course, the courts do not have regard to the 'pwpose' or 'motive' or 'reason' of an act but only to its mtrinsic validity. For instance, an employer who dismisses a servant for a bad reason may justify it for a good one, so long as he finds it at any time before the trial. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is do~ in the case of a conspiracy--and in .such a case, when there is more than one pUrpo6e, the law always has. regard to the dominant

(I) (1951) 2 K. B. 284.

purpose. If the dominant purpose of those concerned is unlawful, then the act done is invalid, and it is not to be cured by saying that they had some other. purpose in mind which was lawful : see what Lord S11Don, Lord Maugham and Lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Hattis Tweed Co. v. Veitch (1942 A.C. 445. 452-3, 469, 475).

So also the validity of government action often depends on the purpose with which it is done. There, too, the same principle applies. If Parliament grants a power to a government department to be used for an authorized pwj>ose, then the power is only vali<!Jy exercised when it is used by the department genumely for that purpose as its dominant purpose. If that. purpose is not the main purpose; but is subOrdinated to some other purpose which is not authorised by Jaw, then the department exceeds its powers and the action is invalid."

Applying the test to the present. case, we are; of opinion that the dominant purpose of setting up the Commissloriof Inquiry was . to promote measures for maintaining purity an<l integrity of the administration in the political life of the State and not "the char; icter assassination" of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and their gioup.

E It follows therefore that the impugned notifiqation of the Orissa Government, dated October 26, 1967 is legally valid.

We proceed to consider the next argument put forward on behalf.of the appellants, namely, that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was illegal because it constituted contempt of Court. It was pointed out tliat items with regard to Shri Biren Mitra referred to in the impugned notification were the subjectmatter of civil litigation and there was a First Appeal pending in the High Court. It appears that all the items of charges regarding Shr! Bi.ren Mia we~ included in the ¥emorandum submitted by Shn N1samon1 Khuntia, Secretary, San1ulcta Socialist Party to the President of India. The memorandum was published in the Daily newspaper "The Eastern Times" on its front page on August 2,

19~4 with bald headlines ."Money amassed through corruption".

Shn Harendra Chandra Pradhan was the Printer .and publisher of that paper. Shri Birn. Mitra filed two suits-0.S. No. 266 and 267 of 1964 against the Prajatantra Prachar Samiti (defendruit No. 1), Shri Janaki Ballav Patnaik (Defendant No. 2 j, Shri Narendra Chandra Pradhan (Defendant No. 3) and Shri Nisairioni Khuntia (.Defendant No. 4). It was alleged that there was eollusion .between defendants 1 to 4 and other political opponents of LS sup. C. 1./68-12

sos

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

Shri Biren Mitra. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a common Written Statement saying that the assertions in the memorandum were true.

The 4th defendant filed a separate written statement to the same .effect. The suits were heard by the Subordinate Judges, Cuttack.

He held that the publication was on the face of it defamatory and libellous. No evidence was given on either side regaraing the truth -0f the imputations in the publications. Holding that the burden -Of proof reste<\ on the defendants the subordinate Judge decreed the suit for damages for Rs. 200. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that the decision of the Sabordinate Judge was pending in the First Appeal in th_e High Court and so no Coriunisison of Inquiry could be appointed with regard to the same matters. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It should be noticed, in the first place, that none of the parties in the civil suit has adduced any evidence. Shri Biren Mifra did not choose to appear as a witness and present himself for cross-examination. The suits were decided purely on the basis of burden of proof. We do not wish to express any view as to whether these two suits were decided rightly or wrongly, but the fact remains that there was no factual enquiry into the allegations. It is also not possible to accept the argument that the present inquiry is in-relation to the

very matters which were the subject-matter of the civil suits and of the first appeal. It was pointed out by this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. J:endolkar( 1 ) that the inquiry cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry and the order ul'i mately passed cannot be enforced proprio vigore.

The inquiry and the investigation by the Commission do not therefore amount to usurpation of the function of the courts of law. The scope of the trial by the Courts of law and the Commission of Inquiry is altogether different. In any case, ft cannot be said that the Commission of Inquiry would be liable for contempt of Court if it proceeded to enquire into matters referred to if by the Government Notification. In appointing a Commission of Inquiry under s. 3 of the Act the Orissa Government is exercising a statutory power and in making the inquiry contemplated by the notification, the Commission is performing its statutory duty.

We have already held that in the appointment of the Commission of Inquitjr the Government was acting bona fide. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of the appellants that the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry by the State Government or the continuance of the inquiry by the Commission so constituted would be tantamount to contempt of Court. To constitute contempt of court, there must be involved some "act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority" or something "calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the

(I) [1959] S. C.R. 279.

, A courts" see Reg. v. Gray('), Arthur Reginald Perara v.

The King('). The respondents in this case have done nothing to obstruct or interfere with the lawful powers of the Court by acting bona fide and discharging statutory functions under the Commission of Inquiry Act. We therefore, see no justification for holding that the issue of the noiification under s. 3 of the Act or the conduct B of the Inquiry by respondents amount to contempt of Court. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Asoke Sen on this aspect of the case.

It is for these reasons that we have <; lismissed these Civil Appeals by our order, dated April 16, 1908. One set of hearing fee.

V.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

(I) [1900] 2 Q. B. 36.

(2) [1951] A. C; 482, 488.

STATE OF ORISSA & ORS

April 16/30, 1968

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

V. BHARGAVA

G. K. MITTER

s. 3

s. 3

Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952

s. 3

s. 3

Ram Krishna Da

S. R. Tendolkar (1959] S.C.R. 279

April 16, 1968

April 30, 1968

A. K. Sen

Rajendra Mohanty

K. R. Chaudhury

K; Rajendra Chou_dhury

C. K. Daphtary

Ashok Das

Santosh Chatterjee

B, B. Ratho

R. N. Sachthey

Lal Narain Singh

R. K. Garg

B. Sen

M. K. Banerjee

s. K. Dholakia

J. B. Dadachanji

Ramaswami

Orissa High Cqurt

Art. 226

Government of Orissa

s. 3

Harekrushna Mahtab

Nabakrushna Choudhury

Pabitra Mohan Pradhan

Santanu Kumar Das

Surendranath Patnaik

Biju Patnaik

February 22, 1968

October 26, 1967

Orissa High Court

Harekrushna Mahtab

Orissa

Nabakmshna Choudhury

Orissa Legislative Assembly

Ganatantra _Parishad

R. N. Singh Deo

Singh Deo

Orissa Congres~ . Legislt!ve party

Harekmshna M!111tab

Congress Party

Ganatantra Parishad

Swatantra Party' of India

Swatantra Party

Biren Mitra

Mitra

Orissa Government

Mahtab

October l, 1963

January 29, 1965

Patnaik

India

Central Government

Central Bureau of Intelligence

C.B.I.

Parliament

Sadasiv Tripathy

Congress Legislative Party

Orissa

s. 3

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952

the Code of Civil Procedure

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 5

s. 8

October 26, G 1967

Biju

I

Biren Mitra

Sadasiva Tripathy

4th October, 1963

29th January 1965

State of Orissa

Central Bureau of Investigation

Ceptral Cabinet

Government of Orissa

Government of the State of Orissa

section 3

Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952

H. R. Khanna

Delhi High Court

section 5

Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952

B. B. Rath

By order of the Governor B. B. Rath r Additional Secretary to Govt.

Sbri Biju Patnaik

Sbri Biju Patnaik Chief Minister Planning Bd.

Biren Mitra

Sbri S . Tripathy

Hilamoni Routray

Sbri Hilamoni Routray Minister 23-6-1961 25-2-1967

5.

Satyapriya Mohanty

Sbri Satyapriya Mohanty Minister 2-1().1963 24-2-1967 D

6.

P. V. Jagannath Rao

Sbri P. V. Jagannath Rao Minister 23-6-1961 8-3-1967

7.

H.B. Singh Mardaraj

Shri H.B. Singh Mardaraj Minister 23-6-1961 2().2-1965

8.

R. P. Misra

Brundaban Nayak

T. Sanganna

Prahallad Mallik

S. K. Sahu

Anup Singh Deo

Chittaranjan Naik

Chandramohan Singh

B.B. Rath

Asoke Sen

Asoke Sen

s. 3

s. 3

s. 3

December 11, 1956

Bombay High Court

cl. 10

Clause 10

Cl. 1

S. R. Das

n this oonnection, S. R. Das, C.J. speaking for tho Court.

s. 6

cl. 10

s. 3

Harckrushna Mehtab

Singh Deo

Harekrushna ' Mahtab

R. ~' Sing

Harekrushna Mahtab

Nabakrusbha Ch<>udilury

Pabitra Mohan Pradhan

Santanu Kumar Das

Shti Pabitra Mohan D Pradhan

1ana Congress

Otissa Legislative Assembly

Pabitra Mohan P Pradhan

Jana Congress

A Mitra

Asoke. sen

We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr.

Asoke.

Divis10nal Court

Fletcher Moulton

Denning

Central Land Board

Town and Country Planning Act, 1947

Maugham

Wright

N1samon1 Khuntia

San1ulcta Socialist Party

August 2,

19~4

Harendra Chandra Pradhan

Birn. Mitra

Prajatantra Prachar Samiti

Janaki Ballav Patnaik

1), Shri Janaki Ballav Patnaik (Defendant No.

Narendra Chandra Pradhan

2 j, Shri Narendra Chandra Pradhan (Defendant No.

Nisairioni Khuntia

3) and Shri Nisairioni Khuntia (.Defendant No.

Biren Mitra

C. 1./68-12

sos

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

Shri Biren Mitra.

Asoke Sen

Biren Mifra

s. 3

s. 3


STATE OF BIHAR, ETC.

I',

KAPIL SINGH, ETC.

April 18, 1968

(S. M. SIKRI, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)

Mimi.er charge-Evfdence. of child witrwss-Non-disclosure of names of culprlls-Confined 1n pollCe custody-Corroborative evidence, 8Uspici .. ous-Whether conviction can be sustained,

Appellants D and R, and respondent K were charged for the murder of a lady. The deceased who waa sleeping with her niece-a child aged about 11 years, \Voke up on hearing sounds while some miscreants were steal .. ing things in the house. She called out to the child. Two of the miscreants rushed at her and another killed her. The child pretended to be asleep, but did not cry out of fear, and continued lying on her cot till dawn. In the morning the child came out of the room and started weeping. On the enquiry of a passer-by, she told him aliout the mmdtt,

and a report was lodged in the police station. Her statement was recorded but she refused to disclose the names of the culprits as her mother had forbidden her lest the persons named might kill her. D, K and R were apprehended. A chadar and quilt stained with human blood were seized from R's room, and eartops and its container rom a room in the house <ii D and his brother. The child was taken to police station, who 3 days thereafter at about midnight disclosed the names of the three culprits. She named K to be the actual killer and D and R as the attackers.

Subsequently the child and her mother's statements were recorded under s. 164 Cr. P.C., and then the child was allowed to return home. D, K and R were convicted by the Sessions Judge under ss. 302 and 34 I.P.C.

The High Court, in appeal, acquitted K holding that it was not safe to base any conviction on the solita; y testimony of the child witness, but upheld the convictions of D and R, as the evidence of the child witness was corroborated by the recoveries. D and R appealed to this Court against the convictions and the State against K's acquittal.

HELD : The convictions could not be sustained. [820 CJ

There were a number of circumstances indicating that it would not be quite safe to rely on the child witness' evidence. It was very unlikely that she could have continued or pretended to be asleep the whole of the time. In the morning she did not disclose the names of the culprits to the past.er-by. The conduct of the passer-by in not trying to find out the

aames from the child appeared to be quite unnatural. The explanation that her mother had warned her not to disclose the names lest she be killed by the persons named by her, was not convincing. At no stage the . suggestion wa• that the thieves themselves had threatened to kill the child if she disclosed their names. She could not, therefore, be under any fear at the time when she met the passer-by and others. Further the illegal

confinement by the police was reprehensive and very adversely . affected the value of the evidence obtained by the police. The very fact that she was questioned at the odd hour of midnight made it obvious that c.ompulsion was being used on her to disclose the names. Clearly the police was acting against law in keeping the child confined in t~ police statin wit~ a police constable posted all the time as her companion. The failure dr mother to appear as a witness at the Sessions Trial, was another example of the unsatisfactory or unreliable conduct of the investigation of the present case. U she had come in the witness-box, it seemed that she

could not have suppoi; ed the prosecution case, so the unconvincing excuse was put forward that she disappeared on the day fixed for her evidence, even though she was staying at the same place as her daughter and was lookin1 after her during the trial of the case. It is also significant that according to the child her mother had told the police that she had not forbidden the child to disclose the names of the culprits. [816 A-F;

817 A-D; 818 A-C]

Even the corroborative evidence adduced, was 'of very doubtful character.. No reasonable explanation was given by the prosecution of how blood came on the quilt and chadar n:covered from the house of R.

During the season in which and at the place where the murder took place quilt would not be in use. The child did not state that any of the persons was carrying the quilt or chadar or was trying to conceal his features by wrapping in them. The explanation for these blood stains by R had not been accepted and was not very satisfactory; but the failure of an accused to give an adequate explanation does not lead to an inference that these blood stains must be those of the blood of the deceased.

[818 D--HI

Similarly the recovery of the eartops and its container was highly suspicious. It WJIS not established that the room from which it was recovered waa of D. All the formalities for conducting the search were not complied, as a witness stated that the police inspector was already in the courtyard Qf the house, when the witness arrived. Further the prosecution made out that D W.. foolish enough to keep in his room an article connected with the murder about which there could be no difficulty <if identification, because the container had on it the name of the daughter-in-law of the deceased and it was kept in a manner to attract the. attention straightaway. [819 C-H]

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 1965 an<l 78 of 1968.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 23, 1964, February 9, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 545 of 1962.

D. P. Singh, K. M. K. Nair and N. M. Ghatatate, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 141 of 1965) and respondent (in Cr. A.

No. 142 of 1965).

R. C. Prasad, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 142 of 1965) .

. R. C. Prasad, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 78 of 1968).

U. P. Singh, for the respondent (in Cr. A. No. 141 of 1965).

'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bhargava, J. These three appeals all arise out of a trial held by the Additional Sessions Judge of Patna in respect of a charge of murder of an old lady Rohini Kuer, wife of Munshi Chaudhary, residing in village Lohra, Police Station Biikhtiarpur, District Patna. The prosecution case was .that, on the night bet, ween 17th and 18th JUJ).e, 1961, Rohini Kuer, who was aged

; ibout 60 years, wlis sleeping on a cot in the courtyard of her house and, nearby, on a smaller cot was sleeping her niece,

812 SQNDIB COURT llBPORTS

(1968] 3 S.C.R.

Manti, who was *mt 11 years of age.

Munshi Chaudhary himself, his sons al daughter-in-law were at Ranchi where one of his sons had been posted as a Block Development Officer.

During the night, Rohi.aj Kuer had closed all the doors and had put a lock from inside on the connecting door between the female apartment and tlie male apartment of the house.

Some time during the night, three miscreants entered the female apartment by cutting a hole in the wall on the western side of the connecting door and began to ransack different rooms of the house. Rohini Kuer woke up on hearing the sounds, while the miscreants were breaking open the boxes and removing the articles.

She got up from her bed, accosted the thieves and also called out to Manti. Two of those persons rushed at her, threw her down on the verandah and inflicted several injuries on her body.

One of them brought out a sword which was kept in the southern room adjacent to the verandah and cut her neck in the light of the electric torch which had been lighted by the third person.

Thereafter, they took away cash, clothes and ornaments having broken open several boxes. They also took away an iron safe.

Manti pretended to be asleep and did not cry out due to fear.

At oiie stage, one of the thieves suggested that she should also be killed, but another one intervened and suggested that it was unnecessary to commit her murder.

Manti continued lying on her cot till dawn when she came out of the house through the hole which had been cut by the thieves and started weeping.

While she was in the Baithak of Munshi Chaudhary, one Bhagwat Prasad, who was passing by, enquired what the matter was.

She told him that Daiya had been cut. 'Daiya' was the term by which she used to address Rohini Kuer who was her father's sister. Bhagwat Prasad then entered the female apartment through the same hole and found the dead body of Rohini Kuer lying in the verandah.

As he came out after seeing the dead bodv, Ramkishun Chaukidar also arrived.

Both of them then went to Harnaut Police outpost four miles away where Bhagwat Prasad lodged a First Information Report which was recorded by Assistant Sub-Inspector Jagdish Singh at about 8 a.m., the date being 18th June, 1961. He sent a copy of the Report to Bakhtiarpur Police Station for institution of a case and himself proceeded to the scene of occurrence at 10.30 a.m. It is said that, in the meantime, Manti's mother had arrived and she toJd Manti not to disclose the names of the offenders lest she should also be killed.

Jagdish Singh, A.S.I., inspected the place of occurrence, noticed the hole that had been cut in the wall and actually went in>ide through the same ogening.

He found the dead b<J4y lvinz in the verandah and also notice some footprints on the floor near the dead body.

A blood-stained sword kept in a sheath was also found by him in a room adjacent to the verandah where he also found another foot print in blood stains. He

BlHAR STATE v. KAPIL SINGH (Bhargava, I.) 813

prepared the inquest repmt. an~ sent the .dead. y of Rohini Kuer for post-mortem exammatton. The mvest1gat10n was then taken over by Inspector of Police, Lakshmi Narain Pathak, who took statements of various witnesses. According to him, though he was able to record a detailed statement of Manti covering about two pages. Manti refused to disclose the names of the culprits and started weeping when she was asked to give out the names.

He sent a requisition to Patna for a police dog and a photographer. Three days later, on 21st June. the police dog and the photographer arrived in village Lohra, and the Investigating Officer, Pathak, on reaching the spot let loose the dog. The dog went to the house of Ramujagar appellant and entered a room from which one Dasuti Chadar and one quilt stained with blood were seized by the Investigating Officer Pathak.

Thereafter, the dog went to the house of Kapil Singh who, in the meantime, had left his aouse on seeing the police arriving. He was, however, arrested by the Dafadar. Subsequently. the dog led the police to the house of Deo Singh and his brother Singheshwar where, on a search having been made, a pair of gold eartops were recovered from a niche situated in a room facing east.

The eartops were kept in a cardboard case which bore the inscription "Malti Singh, Women's College Ranchi, P.N.U.N.C.H.2".

In the inner cover of the case "M. Singh" had been written in English and the names of the dealers were also printed on it.

The gold eartops and its covering box were seized by the investi- E gating officer.

On 22nd June, 1961, Jagdish Singh, A.S.I., Harnaut Police outpost, on searching a well situated about three quarters of a mile away from village Lohra, recovered a Godrej Iron Safe which was taken out and -was found to contain articles including Insurance Policies in the name of Nandkishore Singh son of Munshi Chaudhary.

The girl Manti was taken to the Police Station by the In- \'estigating Officer on the 19th June, 1961, apparently because she had failed to disclose the names of the thieves whom she had seen inside the house and who had committed the murder of Rohini Kuer in her presence. Manti was kept at the Police Station and was repeatedly questioned.

According to the In- Yestigating Officer, Lakshmi Narain Pathak. she was allowed to

Yiit her sister's place in between, but she was always provided with a police escort. . At about midnight on the night between 21st and 22nd June, 1961, she is alleged to have disclosed the names of the three culprits.

The names that she gave were those of Kapi! Singh alias Kapildeo Singh, Ramujagar Sinh and Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh.

She then amplified tlie statement by stating that it was Kapil Singh who had actunlly cut

te neck of R, ohini Kuer and that Ramujagar Singh and Kapil Smgh were the two persons who had attacked her. Deo Singh,

814 SUPlU!MB C:OUl.T llBPOr.TS

[1968] 3 S.C.R.

according to her, was the .person who was llashing the torch to give light to his two companions.

She added that Deo Singh had said that she also should be killed, whereupon Kapil Singh said that she was a child and they should leave her.

Subsequently, on 28th June, 1961, Manti and her mother were both produced before a Magistrate who recorded their statements under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. Mllnti was allowed to go home after this statement of hers had been recorded by the Magistrate.

Samples of the footprints of the three suspects were compared with the footprints in blood found at the scene of occurrence by the police Expert on Footprints and evidence was sought to be given by him to prove that one of the footprints tallied with the footprint of Deo Singh.

The Additional Sessions Judge accepted as true the evidence of Manti. He further held that there was corroboration of her evidence at least against two of the persons Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh. His finding was that the quilt and the chadar, which were pr1?ved stained with human blood, having been 'recovered from the house of Ramujagar Singh, provided very good corroboration of the case against him of participation in this murder. Similarly, the Additional Sessions Judge held that the recovery of the eartops with the cardboard box containing on it the name of the daughter-in-law of Rohini Kuer as well as the circumstance that the blood-stained footprint found on the spot tallied with that of Deo Singh appellant furnished very good corroboration of the case against Deo Singh. These circumstances indicated that Manti had given truthful evidence and, consequently, he convicted all the three persons for the offence under s. 302, I.P.C., read with s. 34, I.P.C. All the three persons were sentenced to imprisonment for life for this offence. Kapildeo was, in addition, found guilty of the substantive offence under s. 302, I.P.C. for committing the murder of Rohini Kuer and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life for that offence.

Deo Singh was further found . guilty of an offence punishable under s. 411, I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Singheshwar, the brother of Deo Singh. who was also tried with the other three persons, was acquitted of all the charges.

The three conv1cu:o persons, Kapil Singh, Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh appealed to the High Court at Patna. The appeal came up before a Division Bench.

Both the learned Judges constituting the Bench held that it was not safe to base any conviction on the solitary testimony of Manti and, consequently, they gave Kapil Singh the benefit of doubt, set aside his conviction and sentences, and acquitted him.

On tlie learned Judges

was of the opinion that the conviction of the other two persons Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh should be upheld on the basis of the evidence of Manti as corroborated by recoveries, in the case of Ramujagar Singh, of the blood-stained chadar and quilt, ·

and, in the case of Deo Singh, of the eartops and the cardboard box. Reliance was also placed •OD the circwnstance that the footprint of Deo Singh in blood was found close to the scene of occurrence. The other learned Judge was, however, of the opinion that, in the circwnstanees of this case, it was not safe to rely on the evidence of Man, ti at all' against any of the pecsons charged with the offence and, consequently, he expressed the opinion that Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh should also be given the benefit of doubt anti acquitted. Thereupon, the appeal of these two appellants was referred to a third Judge who agreed with the former and held that the conviction and sentences of these two persons must be' upheld.

As a res)llt, the appeal of Ramujagar Singh and Deo Singh was dismissed.

Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1965 has been brought by special leave by the

State of Bihar against the acquittal of Kapil Singh, while Criminal Appeal No. 142/1965, also by special leave, has been brought up by Ramujagar Singh against the judgment of the High Court upholding his conviction.

In adqition, Deo Singh has also come up to thi• Court by special leave. Special leave to him was granted at the time of hearing of the two Criminal Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 1965. All the three appeals are, therefore, being dealt with together in this one judgment.

The facts enumerated above . make it clear that the crucial question that has to be determined in this case is whether the evidence of Manti can be relied upon for the purpose of convicting Kapil Singh, or upholding the conviction of Ramujagar

Singh and Deo Singh.

She is the only witness who, according to the prosecution, actually witnessed the murder and saw the assailants. It is, of course, clear that the fact that Rohini Kuer was murdered on the night between the 17th and 18th June, 1961 in her house by some thieves, who entered the house by breaking open a hole in a wall, is amply proved by the prosecution evidence. The point that needs to be examined is whether these three persons Were amongst the thieves who committed the crime.

Manti is a young. girl whi:ise age was recorded as 12 years at the time when she was examined in the Court of Session in July, 1962, so that, at the time of the incident, she was only 11 years of age.

While such a child witness can often be expected to give out a true veion because of her innocence, there is always the danger in accepting the evidence of such a witness that, under influence, she. might have been coached to give out a version by persons who may have influence on her. In this case; there are a number of circumstances which, in our.

81.6 SVPRBMB COUllT RBPOJ.lTS

(1968) 3 S.C.R.

opinion, indicate that it will not be quite safe to rely on her evidence. She stated that she.was lying on a cot close to the cot on which her aunt Rohini Kuer was sleeping; She actually saw her aunt J:>eing killed and, according to her, there was a threat to her life also when Deo Singh said that she should also be k.illed, though she esc!!ped .when Kapil Singh asked that

sh~ should be spared because she was a 1:hild. It does not seem to be very likely that a child in such circumstances could have continued to pretend that she was asleep. In the morning, according 0to her, when she came out, she met Bhagwat Prasad before meeting her mother and she told Bhagwat Prasad that 'Daiya' had been killed. It -is surprising that she did not at that stage disclose the names of any o( these persons to Bhagwat Prasad. In fact, the conduct of Bhagwat Prasad is not trying to find out the names of the persons who had committed the murder from Manti when she told him about it appears to be quite unnatural.

It cannot be expected that, on hearing of the murder, he would quietly enter the house to discover the dead body without at all asking Manti whether she had seen the culprits and who they were. She even met others like the Chaukidar Ramkishun, and witnesses Shyam Ram and Gursahay before she met her mother. In her evidence, she tried to explain her failure to disclose the names by stating that her mother had warned her not to disclose the names lest she should also be killed by the persons named by her. This explanation sought to be advanced on behalf of the.prosecution will not at all explain why there was no disclosure of names by Manti to the. persons mentioned above whom she met before this warning was given to her by her mother. At no stage has any suggestion been put forward by the prosecution that the thieves themselves had put her in fear of life by threatening to kill her if she disclosed their names.

She could not, therefore, be under any fear at the time when she met Bhagwat Prasad, the Chaukidar and others and there was no explanation at all why their names were not ascertained from her or voluntarily disclosed by her at that stage.

The subsequent story put forward by the prosecution to explain the belated disclosure of the names is highly suspicious G and, in fact, indicates that, in this case, the investigation by the Police has not been honest.

The Investigating Officer, Lakshmi Narain Pathak, himself states that he arranged that the girl be taken to the Police Station on 19th June, 1961 and she was then kept confined there up to the 28th .Tune, 1961, until her statement was recorded by a Magistrate under s. 164, Cr.

P.C.

We fail to understand under what law the police was authorised to keep this girl confined in the police station for so many days.

Pathak, of course, tried to convert this confine-

- D

B!HAR STATE V, KAPIL SINGH (Bhargava, /.} 817

meilt into protective custody, adding that she was allowed togo to her sister's house in between; but Manti herself. contradicts Pathak. According fo her, she was not allowed to leave the Police Station at all until the 28th June. Her statement is. that she was kept in a room in the Police Station along with a constable and the room was only opened when it was necessary for her to go out to ease herself. In the day-time, she was. allowed to come up to the door of the room, but was not allowed to move away from the door. Each night she was shut inside the room and was kept shut like that for five or six nights.

It is true that her mother was allowed to visit her, but this illegal confinement by_ the Police was reprehensive and very adversely affects the value of the evidence obtained by the police under these circumstances. In .this connection, it is significant to note that,' even according to Pathak, the names were disclosed to him for the first time by Manti at midnight on the night between 21st and 22nd June, 1961. The very fact. that she was questioned at the odd hour of 1J1idnight makes it obvious that compulsion was being used on her to make her state the names of these persons. If it was true, as alleged by Pathak, that she was being Kept there for her personal protection only, there was no reason at all why she should have been questioned during the night when a child of her age should certainly have been allowed to take undisturbed rest. Pathak has tried to justify the course adopted by him by saying that he thought it to be proper to keep a girl of tender age in police station even for weeks for taking a statement, because he wanted to know the truth.

It is surprising that a police officer should hold such views. Clearly. he was acting against law in keeping that girl confined. in the police station with a police constable posted all the time as her companion. The excuse that she needed protection is belied by the circumstance that at least for one day from 18th June to 19th June she was allowed to remain out of police custody and there is no suggestion that any protection was afforded to her during that time. It was only on 19th June that she was taken to the Police. Station obviously because she had refused to give the names as desired by the Police.

The Inspector of Police, Pathak, purported to give evidence as if, in Bihar, it is nothing extra-ordinary to keep such a witness in police custody. We hope that there is no such practice in that State. Manti, whose statement implicating these three persons was obtained in these cirsumstances, cannot, therefore, be held to be a reliable witness, particularly in view of the circumstance that she did not disdose their names even at the earlier stage when she had not been put in fear of her life by her mother.

In this connection, importance must attach to the circumtance tha.t her mother, wh~ is said to have put the fear of life m her, did not enter the witness-box at all when the case was

"I .

818 SUP!lBMB COUll.T UPOllTS

tried in the Court of Session. She was, no doubt, examined by the Police and her statement wllS abo obtained under s. 164, Cr.P.C., by producing her before the Magistrate. She was pre-

nt in the Court of Session .when Manti was being examined, _

but, when her turn for examination came, she disappeared, The Public Prosecutor naturally came out with the explanation that she had been got. at by the accllfCd.

We are unable to accept this explanation for her non-appearance. It seems that, if she had come in the witness-box, she would not have supported the prosecution and, . consequently, the excuse was put forward that she disappeared on the day fixed for her evidence, even though she was staying at the same place as her daughter Manti and was looking after her during the trial of the case. In this connection, it is significant that, according to Manti herself, her mother had told the Inspector of Police that she had not forbidden her to disclose the names of the culprits. This seems to be another example of the unsatisfactory or unreliable conduct of the investigation in the present case.

Apart from these circuptstances, which throw considerable doubt on the evidence of Manti, even the corroborative evidence sought to be adduced jly the prosecution appears to us to be of a very doubtful character. As against Ramujagar Singh, the corroborative evidence put forward is that a quilt and a Dasuti chadar stained with human blood were recovered from his house; bu~ no reasonable explanation is sought to be given by the prosecution of how the blood came to be on these two articles, if it was the blood of the deceased Rohini Kuer. It is to be noted that the murder took place in June, 1961 and at least a quilt will not be in use at ail during that season in the plains of Bihar.

A suggestion seems to have been put forward that Ramujagar Singh had taken both these articles to wrap himself in them in order to conceal his identity.

This suggestion is, however, clearly nullified by the evidence of Manti who does not state that any one of the persons, whom she saw in the house at the time of m11rder, was carrying a quilt or a chadar or was trying to conceal his features by wrapping himself in them. Even the alternative explanation that they may have become bloodstained when Ramujagar Singh came home with Rohini Kuer's blood on his body is, on the face of it, highly improbable. Manti herself says that au the culprits washaj their hands in the house where the murder was committed before leaving that house. The quilt and the Dasuti chadar had sprinkling of blood and not mere blood-smudges.

Obviously, such sprinkling of blood could not appear on the quilt and the Dasuti <:hadar by their coming merely in contact with Ramujagar Singh after his return to his house, even if some blood-stains remained en his body when he came home. It is true that the explanation for t.':lese blood stains put forward on behalf of Ramnjagar

Singh that they were from some skin sor~ of one of the chil dren of his family has l}Ot been accepted and is not very satis factory; but the failure of an accused to give an adequate explanation does not lead to an inference that these blood stains must be those of the bloOd of the deceased. The circumstances seem to indicate that there is no connection at all between these blood stains and the murder of Rohini Kuer.

Similarly, the recovery of the gold eartops and the cardboard box, which contained them, is highly suspicious. For one thing, the prosecution have failed to establish that the room, from which they were recovered, was that of Deo Singh appellant.

Deo Singh, even according to the prosecution witnesses, was employed outside this ;@age and had only come on a visit from his duty. The room, from which y w::ro recovered, is des cribed as a room for keeping cow-dung cakes. The Investigating Officer naturally could not know who in the family of Deo Singh was in actual occupation of this room, while the only recovery witness, Narsingh Mahto, had to admit that he did not ; ee Deo Singh eating or sleeping in that room, or keeping things in that room, or taking them out of that room. In fact, when further cross-examined, he admitted that he never saw how that room was used. Obviously, he was not in a position to estab Jish that this room ws in the occupation of Dea Singh appellant.

The circumstances of the recovery are also doubtful. According to Inspector of Police, Pathak, he observed all the formalities required to be observed when searching the house of Deo Singh.

One of the formalities that has to be observed is that the searching officer should give his personal search to the witnesses before entering the premises to be. searched and should similarly search the witnesses also in the presence of one another. If the Inspec tor means that this was done by stating that all formalities were observed, he is contradicted by Narsingh Mahto who says that, on his arrival, he found the Inspector in the inner courtyard of the house, which means that he had already entered the house without observing the formalit.ies.

At the time of-recovery, it is said that the cardboard box containing the eartops was kept in a corner of the room covered by 'a nµmber of tiles.

The

pro~.eution sto7 !hus pUf)XlrtS to make out that Deo Sinh was foo11s11 enough 1V At:Cj) in his roon1 an :irttcle connected with he murder about which there could be no difficultv of identification. because the cardboard box hrut on it the name of the daughter; in-law of Rohini Kuer and he kept that box in such a manner under the tiles in the cow-dung room that the attention of the Pofac wouid straightaway be attracted toy;; mls it. The whole story of recovery of this cardboard box with the eartop• thus sounds highly improbable.

S20

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

The only other circumstance, which has been l"eiied upon A by the prosecution, is>the identity of the blood-stained footprint with that of the sample footprint of Deo Singh appellant. We

do not think that it is necessary to discuss it in detail, because that evidence is, in its very nature, a very weak type of evi- .dence and, in fact, in the High Court even the third Judge, to whom the case was referred on difference of opinion, held that B it would not be safe to rely on this evidence at1P discarded it.

In these circumstances, .it is clear that it is not at all pos- :sible to. hold that the prosecution succeeds in proving the charge .against any of these three persons. As a result, Cr. Appeal No.

141/ 1965 filed by the State is dismissed, while the appeals of C Ramujagar Singh and De<> Singh are allowed, their conviction and sentences are set .aside and they are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged.

They shall be released forthwith.

Y.P.

Appeal 141/65 dismissed.

Appeals 142/65 and 78/68 allowed.

STATE OF BIHAR, ETC

KAPIL SINGH, ETC

S. M. SIKRI, J.

M. SHELAT

V. BHARGAVA, JJ.

s. 164

ss. 302 and 34

I.P.C

Patna High Court

D. P. Singh

K. M. K. Nair

N. M. Ghatatate

R. C. Prasad

U. P. Singh

Bhargava

Additional Sessions Judge of Patna

Rohini Kuer

Manti

Munshi Chaudhary

Ranchi

Rohi.aj Kuer

Manti

Bhagwat Prasad

Ramkishun Chaukidar

Harnaut Police

Jagdish Singh

Bakhtiarpur Police Station

Lakshmi Narain Pathak

Patna

Lohra

Pathak

Ramujagar appellant

Dasuti Chadar

Kapil Singh

Deo Singh

Singheshwar

Malti Singh

Women's College Ranchi

M. Singh

22nd June, 1961

Nandkishore Singh

19th June, 1961

Lakshmi Narain Pathak

21st and 22nd June, 1961

Kapi! Singh alias Kapildeo Singh

Ramujagar Sinh

Deo Singh alias Surajdeo Singh

Ramujagar Singh

Kapil Smgh

28th June, 1961

section 164

Criminal Procedure Code

Mllnti

s. 302

I.P.C

s. 34

I.P.C

Kapildeo

s. 302

I.P.C

s. 411

I.P.C

High Court at Patna

State of Bihar

Manti

Ramujagar

Singh

17th and 18th June, 1961

Daiya

Chaukidar Ramkishun

Shyam Ram

Gursahay

s. 164

Pathak

Bihar

s. 164

Cr.P.C

Ramnjagar

Singh

Deo Singh

Narsingh Mahto

Dea Singh

Narsingh Mahto

Deo Sinh

C Ramujagar Singh

De<> Singh