SITAJ. PARSHAD

KISHORILAL March 6, 1967 [K. N. WANCHOO, R. s. BACHAWAT AND v. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J B March 6, 1967

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Ace S of 1908), 0. XXXIV-Preli-- 1ninary decree nu1de final while appeal pending-Variation in appeal- Efject.

The respondent obtained a preliminary decree in 1952 against the appellant for the sale of the mortgaged property.

He appealed to the High Court for interest and costs which was not allowed in the l'reliminary decree. The appellants did not appeal against the prelimmary decree.

On respondent's application, the preliminary decree was made final in 1954. While execution proceedings were pending, the respondent's appeal was allowed in 1956 in respect of the interest and costs.

In 1960 the appellant objec'ed under s. 47 C.P.C., that as no final decree had been prayed for and passed after the judgment of the High Court in appeal and as more than three years had passed since tbe juda ment of the High Court, there was no final decree to be executed, u tlie final decree which had been prepared in 1954 on the basis of which execution was going on must be held to have no force and effect after the judgment of the High Court making a variance in the preliminary decree. The respondent contended that it was not necessary to apply for a fresh final decree after the judgment of the Hih Court in appeal and that the final decree already passed in 1954 rema10ed good and was executable. The appellant's objection was rejected.

In appeal, this Court.

HELD : The appeal must fail.

Where a p'rcliminary decree has been reversed in appeal, the final decree must fall to the ground for there is no preliminary decree there

after in support of it.

It is not necessary in such a case for the defen dant to go to the cou-rt passing the final decree and ask it to set aside the final decree. If an execution petition is made-on such a final decree even though more than three years after the decree in appeal has been reversed, the defendant has simply to ask the court where the execution petition is made to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the preliminary decree in support of it has been set aside. In such a case it is the duty of the executing court to take note of the fact that the preliminary decree in support of the final decree has been reversed and it should refuse to execute the final decree even though the fact is brought to its notice more than three years after the decree in appeal reverning the preliminary decree and no question of limitation arises.

(106 G-107 CJ Where the decree in appeal from the rreliminary decree confirms it in toto, the final decree already passed needs no change and must continue to stand. It h true that if no final decree has been passed before the appeal from the preliminary decree is dec; ded, the decree-h61de-r gets three years from the da'e of the decree in appeal from the rreliminary decree to apply for a final decree. That however is a question of limitation and in such a case three years run from the date of the decree in appeal from the preliminary c!ecree in order apparently not to compel the decree-holder to apply for a final decree if he does not wish to do

l 02

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

[1967] 3 S.C.R.

so and wants to await the result of the a11peal from the preliminary decree. But if the decree-holder does not wish to await the result of the appeal from the freliminary decree he can ask for a final decree in the mean time and i tho preliminary decree is confirmed In toto the final .decree will need no change and can be executed as it stands. The .decree holder in such a case need not apply for a fresh finnl decree and can execute the final decree already pa85ed in the meantime. In all cases where a final decree has been passed in the meantime while an appeal from the preliminary decree is pending, the existence of the final decree ought to bo brought to the notice of the appellate court and it is tho duty of the apllate court to give directions with respect to the final decree if it considers necessary.

Further in a case where an appeal from the preliminary decree is dismissed and the preliminary decree is confirmed In. toto, it. does not follow that the period of payment allowed in the ma! court's decree is extended automatically even though a final decree has been passed in the meantime. It is the duty of the appellate court to indicate, when dismissing the appeal from a preliminary decree in toto, whether the time for payment is to be extended and if it does not do ao, the original time granted for the purpose must tand. Where the appellate court, in an appeal from a preliminary decree .. says nothing al>out the time fixed for payment and confirms the preliminary decree In toto that time stands and does not automatically get extended for six months or such other period as miht have been fixed in the preliminary decree from the date of the decree 10 apr••l from the preliminary decree.

It is not obligatory on a court of appea to fix a .fresh date for redemp tion In a mortgagor's appeal' from a mortgage decree for sale even where there is aomo variation in the amount payable under the preliminsry decree. (110 Blll CJ

Where the amount decreed is increased, as in the present case, the matter stands on exactly the same footing as in the case where the appeal from the iireliminary decree by the defendant is dismissed in toto.

Where variation is in favour of the defendant and the amount fixed for redemption is reduced, it is the duty of the appellate court when it is reducing the amount payable. for redemption to fix aome time for the purpose in the interest of justice. But 11 is not bound to do so and if 1t does not do ao, the original time fixed in the preliminary decree stands even though the amount for redemption may have been reduced. There ;, no harm to the defendant mortgagor in such a case, for, under O.XXXIV r. S(l) the mortgagor would have time up to the date of c<infirmation of sale to deposit the amount and save the property. (1110-0J

Even where there has been a varfation in the decree, the final decree .. if passed in the meantime, requires no formal amendment in view of the fQrm in which a final decree for sale is prepared. All that happens is that where the preliminary decree is varied one way or the othr. the final decree which is entirely dependent on the preliminary decree stands varied by its 6wn terms in accordance with the terms of the preliminary decree passed in appeal. It is the duty of the executing court when it is .executing the final decree passed in the meantime to see that the execution is In accordance with the preliminary decree pa8'ed in appeal which is the support of the final decree.

Of course, if the appellate court when deciding the appeal gives n~ particular directio!' w!th res pect to the preparation of a fresh prehmmary deree . that direction has to be carried out. Where there are no specific d1recltons of the appellate court with respect to the preparation. of a new prel!m!nary . decree, arid all that the appellate court orders 1s merly a variation m the amount for redemption it is duty of the executmg court to see when ti is asked to execute a final decree prepared in the meantime that the

SITAL PARSHAD v. KISHORILAL (Wanchoo, J.) 103

IAOdifications made by the appellate C0!1rt in the aPI'""! from the J!relio

minary decree are given effect to durlJlll the execution proceed1•91o

(111 H-112 BJ

In the circumstances of the present caae it was the duty of the eJteCUting court, when variations made by the appellate court in appeal form 6 and all that the executing court had to do WM to take note ot account in executing the fin•! decree, which. had been prepred , in the meantime. The final de<.ree m terms reqmred no change m view of from the preliminary decree were brought to its notice, to take. them into the fact that the supporting preliminary decree had been vaned and to er.ecute the final decree in accordance therewith. [112 QHl

Perlkaruppan Ch.ettlar v. Venugopal PU/al, I.L.R. [1947] Mad. 132; Rukhmabai v. Krishnarao, I.L.R. [1952] Nag. 243 and Gandavaraup Ve11kata Subba Rao v. Vavl/al Kesavayya, A.I.R. [1955} A.P. 254; approved.

Ram Nath v. Deoki Nand Krish11a, I.L.R. (1947] All. 40; Abdul Jalil

v. Amar Chand Paul, (1913) XVIII Cal. L.J. 223 and Mewa Singh v.

Tara Singh, A.I.R. [193,3) Lah. 859; disapproved.

Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan, l.L.R. {1888] 11 All. 267; Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh, (1926) 53 I.A. 197 and D Flltlwlme1 v. Bank of Upper India; (1926) 54 I.A. 52; referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 855 of 1964.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 7, 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 334 of 1961.

Rameshwar Dial and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants.

B. C. Misra, M .. V. Goswami and S. S. Shukla, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Wanchoo, J.

This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab and raises a question of law on which there is some difference of opinion amongst the High Courts.

Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these.

The respondent obtaind a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit against the appellants on March 13, 1952.

The decree was for sale of the mortgaged property.

As the preliminary decrel'liid not allow interest to he respondent from the date of the suit to the date of the prelunmary decree, he filed an appeal to the High Court in that connection.

The appellants (Judgment-debtors) were apparently content with the preliminary decree for they filed no appeal.

As there was no stay order passed by the High Court, for the judgment-debtors had not appealed, the respondent applied for making the preliminary decree final and on August 16, 1954 the preliminary decree was made final under O.XXXIV r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On August 18, 1954, the resrondent took

out execution of the final decree.

On December 17, 1956, while the execution proceedings were pending, the respondent decree holder's appeal in the High Court was allowed and the High Court allowed interest to the respondent.

On April 2, 1960, the appel !ants objected under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure that as no final decree had been prayed for and passed after the judgment of the High Court in appeal and as more than three years had Pl!SSed since the judgment of the High Court, there was no final decree to be exec.uted, as the final decree which had been prepared on August 16, 1954 on the basis of which execution was going on must be held to have no force and effect after the judgment of the. High Court making a variance in the preliminary decree. The respondent however contended that it was not necessary to apply for a fresh final decree after the judgment of the High Court in appeal and that the final decree already passed on August 16 1954 remained good and was executable. '

The executing court rejected the contention of the appellants.

Thereupon the appellants went in appeal to the High Court and this appeal was dismissed by a learned Single Judge.

Then the appellants came in Letters Patent Appeal which has also been dismissed.

As however there was some difference of opinion amongst the High Courts on the question of law raised in the appeal, a ertificate was granted by the High Court; and that is how the matter has come before us.

We may indicate the two main lines of decisions in this matter.

The first, which is in favour of the appellants is represented by Ram Nath v. Deoki Nand Krishna(').

In that case a preliminary decree was passed in a suit on a mortgage.

Pending an appeal from the preliminary decree, the final decree was passed.

Thereafter the appeal was decided and the preliminary decree was modified and a fresh preliminary decree was directed to be pre pared which was done.

The decreholder however applied or the execution of the final decree which had been prepared earher and did not apply either for amendment of that final decree so as to bring it in conformity with the decree of the appeal court or for preparation of a fresh fin.al decree.

Later however, more than three years after the judgment in appeal, the decree-holder applied for amending the final decree so as to bring it in accord with the decree passed by the appeal court.

The High Court held that. as the preliminary decree passed by the trial court had been vaned by the appeal court, the Jina! decree which had already ?ei; n pre pared fell to the ground and could not be e1rncuted unul 1t was made consistent with the preliminary decree passed by the appellate court or a fresh final decree was prepared in accordance with it.

Further as the application for amendment was made more

(1) 1.L.R. [1947] All. 40.

SITAL PARSHAD v. KISHORILAL (Wanchoo, 1.) 105

A than three years after the judent of the appeal court it was barred by art. 181 of the Limitation Act.

The leading case on the other side is Perikaruppan Chettiar v.

Venugopal Pillai('). In that case a preliminary mortgage decree had been passed on May 4, 1929 and there was an appeal against it by one of the defendants.

Pending the appeal, as further proceedings in the suit had not been stayed, the trial court passed a final decree on September 23, 1933 on the basis of the preliminary decree passed on May 4, 1929.

On November 26, 1934, the appeal was allowed in part, which had the effect of reducing the amount decreed.

No fresh final decree was passed on the basis of the appellate decree.

After the decision of the High Court the decree-holder filed an execution petition on September 23, 1936 to execute the final decree passed on September 23, 1933 and again another execution petition in 1939 and finally another one on March 31, 1942. Along with the last execution petition he filed an. application for amendment of the execution petition by substituting the amount awarded by the appellate decree in place of the amount awarded by the final decree dated September 23, 1933. The amendment was allowed by the first court. Thereupon the judgment-debtor went in appeal to the High Court contending that the application for amendment filed in March 1942 was barred by time as it was more than three years after the decree of the High Court in appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the final decree already prepared can be executed with such modifications as may be necessary in the circumstances, whether the preliminary decree is affirmed in toto or is varied to any extent or in any particular in appeal The High Court further held that it was the duty of the Court which passed the final decree to carry out such modifications as might be necessary by reason of the decision of the appellate court in an appeal against the preliminary decree when its attention was drawn to tlie necessity for such alteration by the decree-holder.

So long as the decree was kept alive, there could be no bar of limitation to an application of this kind.

Such an application really called upon the court to carry out modifications which in law automatically took place in the final decree already prepared before the decree of the appellate court.

The questio.n bef?re us in the present appeal therefore is which of these two views is correct.

Before we consider this question

e .ma11y state certain well-ettled propositions with respect to prelnrunary and final decrees m mortgage suits and the effect of an appellate decree in general on the decree of the trial court.

Generally speaking, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court even when it confirms that decree and

(I) LL.R. (1947] Mad. 132.

M4 SupCI/67-8

therefore it is well-settled that only the appellate court can amend the decree thereafter : [see Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Muham- Mad Yar Khan(')].

It is equally well-settled that where an appeal has been taken from a preliminary mortgage decree and is decided, the time for preparation of final decree is three years from the date of the appellate decree even though the appellate court may not have extended the time for payment provided in the preliminary decree, where no final decree has been prepared in between : [see Jawad Hussain v. Gendan Singh(")].

This applies even to a case where the decree of the appellate eourt is made more than three years after the time fixed for payment in the preliminary decree : [see Fitzho/mes v. Bank of Upper India( 3 )].

Further it is well-settled that the mere fact that there is an appeal from a preliminary decree does not oust the jurisdiction of the trial court to prepare a final decree even while the appeal is pending unless there is a stay order : [see Sat Prakash v.

Bahal Rai (') ]. Even if a final decree has been passed and an appeal from a preliminary decree is not incompetent and it is not necessary for a party to appeal both from the preliminary decree and the final decree in order to maintain his appeal against the preliminary decree.

In such a case where the preliminary decree is set aside the final decree is superseded whether the appeal is brought before or after the passing of the final decree ; [see Talebali v. Abdul Aziz(')]. Further it was observed in the last case that where an appellate court sets aside or varies a preliminary decree it can, and indeed could, give direction for the setting aside or varying of the final decree, if the existence of the fi11al decree is brought to its notice as in all cases it ought to be.

Let us now turn to the problem before us keeping in mind the propositions indicated above.

Now in an appeal from a preliminary decree one of three things is possible.

Firstly, the appeal may be allowed and the preliminary decree reversed.

Secondly. the appeal may be dismissed and the preliminary decree confirmed in toto.

And thirdly, there may be modification of the preliminary decree in appeal and this modification may be one of two kinds : ( i) the amount decreed may be increased or (ii) the amount decreed may be reduced.

There can in our opinion be no doubt that if in appeal the preliminary decree is reversed, the final decree must fall to the ground for there is no preliminary decree thereafter in support of it. It is not necessary in such a case for the defendant to go to the court passing the final decree and ask it to set aside the final decree.

Even if the defendant does not make an application to

(21 [1926] 5J I.A. 197. (ll l.L.R. (1888) II All. 267.

(3) (1926) 54 I.A. 52. (41 I.LR. [1931] LlCTI ,.\ll 28J,

(5) I.LR. [19JO] LVll CII. lillJ,

• '

SIT AL PARSHAD v. KISHORILAL ( w anchoo' J.)

I 0 7

the court for setting aside the final decree within three years because the preliminary decree has been reversed, the decree-hoWer cannot get the right to execute the final decree which has no preliminary decree in support of it. If an execution petition is made on such a final decree even though more than three years after the decree in appeal has been reversed, the defendant has simply to ask the court where the execution petition is made to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the preliminary decree in support of it h_as been set aside. It seems to us that in such a case it is the duty of the executing court to take note of the fact that the preliminary decree in support of the final decree has been reiVersed and it should refuse to execute the final decree even though the fact is brought to its notice more than three years after the decree in appeal reversing the preliminary decree.

In such a case in our opinion no question of limitation arises.

Now ake the second case where the preliminary decree has been confirmed in toto and a final decree passed on such decree already existl.

It is contended on behalf of the appellants that in such a case the decree-holder must apply for preparation of a final decree within three years of the judgment of the appellate court confim1ing the preliminary decree in toto.

Reliance in this COill1ection is placed on an observation in the case of Fitzholmes (1) in these words :

"The mortgagors were right in their objection that these decrees should not be enforced till six months had elapsed from the judgment of the High Court."

In that case the preliminary decree had given six months tin1e for payment and this observation seems to suggest that where the prelin1inary decree is confirmed six months given therein begins from the date of the confirmation of the preliminary decree in appeal. With respect, the observation seems to be obiter for the point really in dispute in that case was whether a final decree eould be asked for within three years of the judgment of the appellate court confinning the preliminary decree and it was held that it could be so asked for, even though the time fixed in the preliminary decree for redemption had not been extended.

In that case no final decree had been passed in-between and no question arose as to what would be the effect of the decree passed in appeal from the preliminary decree on a final decree passed in the meantime.

This observation in that case is therefore in our opinion of no help to the appellants in deteffi1ining the question before us.

To determine this question we have to look to the provisions of 0. XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedura providing for preli-

(1} [1926) 54 I.A. 52.

minary and final decrees.

Preliminary decree in a suit for sale with which we are concerned in the present case is prepared under O. XXXN r. 4 read with O. XXXIV r. 1. It provides (a) for an account to be taken of what was due to the plaintiff at the date of such decree fof principal and interest .on the mortgage, the costs of the suit, if any, awarded to him, and other costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by hinI upto that date in respect of his mortgage security, together with interest thereon, (b) for declaring the amount so due at that date, and ( c) for directing that, if the defendant pays into court the amount so found or declared on or before such date as . the court may fix within six months from the date on which the court confirms and countersigns the account taken under cl. (a) or from the date on which such amount is declared in court under cl. (b), as the case may be, and thereafter pays such amount as may be adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges and expenses as provided in r. 10, together with subsequent interest on such sums respectively as provided in r. 11, the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant or to such person as the defendant appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required, re-transfer the property to the defendant at his cost free from the mortgage and from all incumbrances, and shall also, if necessary, put the defendant in possession of the property According to the rule, the decree shall further provide that in default of the payment by the defendant as directed the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and proceeds of the same (after deduction therefrom of the expenses of the sale) be paid into court and applied in payment of what has been found or declared under or by the preliminary decree due to the plaintiff, together with such amount as may have been adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expe.nses and interest, and the balance, if any, be paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same.

It will thus be seen that the preliminary decree in a suit for sale determines the amount due on the date thereof after accounting if necessary and directs the defendant to pay that aniount to- -gether with interest and subsequent costs, charges and expenses as provided in rr. 10. and 11.

Thus the preliminary decree is complete in itself and the amount due to the decree-holder right upto the time that the execution is complete is either provided therein or worked out from the directions contained therein.

Then follows the final decrees under 0. XXXIV r. 5(3) with which we are concerned in the present case.

That directs that where payment is not made on or before the date fixed in the preliminary decree the court shall on application made by the plaintiff in this behalf pass a final decree directing that the mortgaged

SITAL PARSHAD v. K!SHORILAL (Wanchoo, J.)

I 09

property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale be dealt with in the manner provided in sub-r. (I) of r. 4. Further under 0. XXXIV r. 5 (I) the defendant has a further right at any time before the confirmation of the sale made in pursuance of a final decree passed under sub-r. (3) of this rule, to pay the money in court, and if that is done the court has to make directions in accordance with this sub-rule.

It will be seen from these provisions that a final decree does not mention any amount and is merely based on the preliminary decree and in a sense caFries out that decree.

Form No. 6 of the final decree in the First Schedule, Appendix D also bears this out.

It says that as the payment has not been made as directed by the preliminary decree, ir is hereby ordered and decreed that the mortgaged property mentioned in the aforesaid preliminary decree or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and that for the purposes of such sale the plaintiff shall produce before the court or such officer as it appoints all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property.

The final decree further directs as follows:-

"And it is hereby further ordered and decreed that the money realised by such sale shall be paid into the court and shall be only applied (after deduction therefrom of the expenses of the sale) in payment of the amount payable to the plaintiff under the aforesaid preliminary decree and under any further orders that may have been passed in this suit and in payment of any amount which the court may have adjudged due to the plaintiff for such costs of the suit including the costs of this application and such costs, charges and expenses as may be payable under r. I 0, together with such subsequent interest as may be payable under r. 11 of

0. XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and that the balance if any shall be paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the

same."

It will be seen from this form of the final decree that it is entirely dependant upon the preliminary decree.

Therefore where the preliminary decree has been confirmed in toto and the appeal

therefrm has been dismissed, there is no change whatever to be made m the final decree, for that decree already provides for subsequent interest after the date of the preliminary decree and for subsequent costs, charges and expenses.

Therefore, in such circumstances if the final decree has already been prepared before the judgment in appeal from the preliminary decree, there is nothing more to be done and the final decree as it stands needs no amendment.

It is true that there is a general principle that a decree passed in appeal even where it confirms the trial court's

decree supersedes that decree.

But where we are dealing with a decree passed in appeal from a prelin!inary decree and the final decree has already been passed in the meantime, the decree of the appellate court on apeal from the. preliminary decree only supersedes the prelin!inary decree; it cannot and does not supersede the final decree which was not taken in appeal.

Therefore if the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree confirms it in toto, the final decree already passed needs no change and must continue to stand. It is true that if no final decree has been passed before the appeal from the preliminary decree is decided, the decree-holder gets three years from the date of the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree to apply for a final decree.

That however is a question of !imitation and courts have held that in such a case three years run from the date of the decree in appeal from the prelinJinary decree in order apparently not to compel the decree-holder to apply for a final decree if. he does not wish to do so and wants to await the result of the appeal from the preliminary decree.

But if the decree-holder does not wish to await the result of the appeal from the preliminary decree he can ask for a final. decree in the meantime, and if the prelin!inary decree is confirmed in toto the final decree will need no change and can be executed as it stands.

The decree holder in such a case need not apply for a fresh final decree and can execute the final decree already passed in the meantime.

In such cases where a final decree has been passed in the meantime while an. appeal from the preliminary decree is pending, it is well to remember the observations of Rankin C. J. in Talabali's case(') that the existence of the final decree ought to be brought to the notice of the appellate court in all cases and that it is the duty of the appellate court to give directions with respect to the final decree if it considers necessary.

Further we are of opinion that in a case where an appeal from the preliminary decree is dismissed and the preliminary decree is confirmed in toto, it does not follow that the period of payment allowed in the trial court's decree is extended automatically even though a final decree has been passed in the meantime.

It seems to us that it is the duty of the appellate court to indicate when dismissing the appeal from a preliminary decree in toto whether the time for payment is to be extended and if it does not do so, the original time granted for the purpose must stand. In the present case the decree passed in appeal from prelin!inary decree shows that after setting out the decree of the trial court, all that the appellate court did was to say that the preliminary. decree passed by the trial court was amended to this extent that the plaintiff would also be entitled to interest at Rs. 6 per cent on the principal amount from the date of the suit till the date of the decree and

(!) I.L.R. [193<! LVII Cal. 1013.

, I c

SITAL PARSHAD v. KISHOR!LAL (Wanchoo, J.) 111

also gave the plaintiff costs of the appeal.

There was no direction for preparation of any fresh preliminary decree; nor was there any direction of changing the period fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of the amount.

Where therefore the appellate court in an appeal from a preliminary decree says nothing about the time fixed for payment and confirms the preliminary decree in toto that time in our opinion stands and does not automatically get extended for six months or such other period as might have been fixed in the preliminary decree from the date of the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree.

We agree with the view taken in Rukhmabai v. Krishnarao(1) that it is not obligatory on a court of appeal to fo.. a fresh date for redemption in a mortgagor's appeal from a mortgage decree for sale even where there is some variation in the amount payable under the preliminary decree.

Then we come to the third class of cases where there has been variation by the appellate court in appeal from the preliminary decree.

This variation can be of two kinds; firstly, the amount fixed for redemption may be increased as happened in the present case, or secondly, it may be reduced.

In the first case we are of opinion that the matter stands on exactly the same footing as in the case where the appeal from the preliminary decree by the defendant is dismissed in toto.

However, in the second case, where variation is in favour of the defendant and the amount fixed for redemption is reduced, a question may arise whether the period for redemptio!) can be said to have been extended for six months or such other time as may be provided in the preliminary decree under appeal but beginning from the date of the decree in appeal.

In such a case we are of opinion that it is the duty of the appellate court when it is reducing the amount payable for redemption to fix some time for the purpose in the interest of justice.

But it is not bound to do so and if it does not do so, ihe original time fixed in the preliminary decree stands even though the amount for redemption may have been reduced: [see Rikhmabai's case(')].

Nor do we think that any serious harm is done to the defendantmortgagor in such a case for under 0. XXXIV r. 5 (1) even though no fresh time may have been fixed by the appellat~ court where the amount for redemption is reduced, the mortgagor-defendant would have time upto the date of the confirmation of sale to deposit the amount and save the property.

In these circumstances we see no reason to distinguish even this case where variation results in reduction of the amount of redemption from the case where the decree of the appellate court affirms the preliminary decree in appeal in toto.

We are further of opinion that even where there has been a variation in the decree, the final decree, if passed in the meantime,

(!) l.L.R. [1952] Nag. 24J.

requires no formal amendment in view of the form in which a final decree for sale is prepared.

All that happens is that where the. preliminary decree is varied one way or the other, the final decree which is entirely depending on the preliminary decree stands varied by its own terms in accordance with the terms of the preliminary decree passed in appeal.

It is the duty of the executing court when it is executing the final decree passed in the meantime to see that the execution is in accordance with the preliminary decree passed in appeal which is the support of the final decree.

Of course, if the appeallate court when deciding the. appeal gives any particular direction with respect to the preparation of a fresh preliminary decree that direction has to be carried out. . Ramnath's case(') was of this latter kind.

There the appellate court directed the preparation of a fresh preliminary decree in accordance with its judgment.

In such a case it may be said that as there had to be a new preliminary decree in accordance with the direction of the appellate court, a new final decree in accordance with the new preliminary decree might have to be prepared.

But where there are no specific directions of the appellate court with respect to the preparation of a new preliminary decree, and all that the appellate court orders is merely a variation in the amount for redemption-be it more or less than that provided in the preliminary decree--, it is in our opinion the duty of the executing court to see when it is asked to execute a final decree prepared in the meantime that the modifications made by the appellate court in the allpeal from the preliminary decree are given effect to during the execution proceedings.

As we have said already, the language of the final decree in form 6 is such that it requires no modification even though there might be modifications in the preliminary decree by the appellate court, and all that is required is that the executing court should in executing the final decree prepared in the meantime give effect to the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree, if it is a case of variation one way or the other.

The only exception to this principle is a case where the appellate court gives specific direction for the preparation of a fresh preliminary decree or gives further time after the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree.

In such a case a fresh preliminary decree may have to be drawn up to be followed

bya fresh final decree.

The present however is not a case of this kmd as already indicated, and in the circumstances it was the duty of the executing court, when variations made by the appellate court in appeal from the preliminary decree were brought to its notice, to take them into account in executing the final decree, which had been prepared in the meantime.

The final decree in terms required no change in view of form 6 already referred to and all that the executing court had to do was to take note of the fact that the supporting preliminary decree had been varied and

I) .. L.R. [1947] All. 40,

SJTAL PARSHAD v. KISHORlLAL (Wanchoo, J.) 113

to execute the final decree in accordance therewith.

In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the view taken in Periakaruppan Chettiar's case(') is correct subject to what we have said with respect to the case where there are specific directions by the appellate court in an appeal from the preliminary decree for preparation of a fresh preliminary decree or for fixing a fresh time for payment.

We do not think it necessary to refer in detail to other cases cited before u~. It is enough to say that the Andhra Pradesh High Court has followed the Madras High Court : [see Gandavaraup Venkata Subba Rao v. Vavilal Kesavayya( 2)] while the Calcutta High Court in Abdul Jalil v. Amar Chand Paul( 8 ) and the Lahore High Court in Mewa Singh v. Tara Singh(') seem to take the view that a fresh final decree is necessary within three years of the appellate decree in an appeal from the preliminary decree in a case of modification.

In the view we have taken the apepal fails and is hereby dis• missed with costs.

Y.P.

(I) l.L.R. (1947) Mad . .132.

(3) (1913] XVIII Cal. L. J. 223

Appeal dismissed.

(2) A.J.R. [1955) A.P. 254.

(4) A.l.R. [1933] Lah, 859.

SITAJ. PARSHAD

KISHORILAL

March 6, 1967

K. N. WANCHOO

R. s. BACHAWAT

v. RAMASWAMI, JJ

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

s. 47

C.P.C

Rameshwar Dial

A. D. Mathur

B. C. Misra

M .. V. Goswami

S. S. Shukla

Wanchoo

August 16, 1954

the Code of Civil Procedure

August 18, 1954

December 17, 1956

April 2, 1960

s. 4

the Code of Civil Procedure

August 16 1954

art. 181

Limitation Act

May 4, 1929

September 23, 1933

November 26, 1934

September 23, 1936

March 31, 1942

Fitzholmes

First Schedule

XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code

Rankin

Talabali

Rikhmabai

Ramnath

Periakaruppan Chettiar

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Madras High Court

Calcutta High Court

Lahore High Court


STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

M/S. TARA CHAND LAJPAT RAI

February 28, 1967

[J.M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, 1J.J

Punjab General Sales Tax Act (46 of 1948), s. 11(2) and (4)-Re turn by assessee-Noti•e under s. 11(2) within the prescribed perlod-

Complianc• wirh notice by assessee-Order by Assessing Authority on the basis of bl!si' judgment-Order pasStll after prescribed period-Order If falls under s. 11 ( 4 )-Order, if barred by limitation.

The respondent firm, was a registered dealer and furnished quarterly returns of its turnover as required by the Rules under the Punjab Gene ral Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Assessing Authority was not satisfied with the returns and issued a notice, undr s. 11 ( 2) of the Act asking the firm to praduce evidence to establish that the returns were full and com plete. The notice was served on the firm before the expiry of three y01trs from the respective dat.. for furnishing the returns.

A 11artner of the firm complied with the notice by appearing and producing its account books. The officer held an enquiry, and passed an order stat illg that he was assessing the firm to the best of his judgment. The order was passed after the expiry of three years from the dates when the quarterly returns had to be filed.

The firm chaUenged its validity by a writ petition, and the High Court held that the order feU under s. 11 ( 4) of the Act and that it was barred by limitation.

In appeal to this Court,

HELD : The impugned order could not be said to be under s. 11 ( 4) even though it was stated that the assessment was made to the best of the officer's judgment, because, the condition precedent under that subsectioa is that a registered dealer who has furnished returns should fail to comply with the terms of the.notice issued under s. 11(2). But assuming it was made under s. 11 ( 4), the order could not be attacked on the grouRd of its being beyond limitation. Under s. 11 ( 4), if a re gistered dealer having furnished returns in respect of a period, fails to comply with the terms of a notice under 1. 11 (2), the Asse.sing Autho rity shall, within three years after the expiry of such period, proceed to assess, to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer. "Such period",, refers to the period mentioned earlier in the sub-section, that is, in the present case, to the quarters in respect of whith the firm had to submit returns. The assessment proceedin~ commence, in the case of a registered dealer, either when he furnishes a return or when a otice is issued to him undor s. 11(2), and would be pending ftom the time they are initiated until they are terminated by a final order of as,,.ssment. Therefore, if such proceedin!l' were taken ""ithin the pr"'°ribed time, thougll the assessment was made final subeeuently, even after the expiry of the prescribed time, no question of limlla!ion would ari..e. [14 H; 15 A, F, G; 17 G; 18 B-F) ·

Madan Lal Arora v. Excise and Taxation O{fiur, Amritsar, [1962) I S.C.R., 823 and Ghanshyam Dasv. Regional Assistant Commissl•n•r o-f Sales Tax, Nagpur, 0964] 4 S.C.R. 436, followed.

PUNJAB v. M/S, TARACHA1'0 (Shelat, J,) 11

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1080 of

1965.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 25, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 1088 of 1961.

Dipak Dutta Chaudhuri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants.

C. D. Garg, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shelat, J. This appeal by certificate granted by the Punjab High Court raises the following question :-

"Where the sales tax authority is not satisfied with the returns filed by a registered dealer and issues a notice under s. 11 ( 2) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 before the expiry of three years from the termination of the period for furnishing returns but finalises the assessment order after three years from the aforesaid date, whether such an assessment order can be said to be time barred and, therefore, without jurisdiction".

A few facts for understanding this question may first bt stated.

The respondent is a partnership firm registered under the Act and was at the material time carrying on business in vegetable ghee, sugar and other commodities.

The assessment year in question commenced from Aoril 1, 1955 and ended on March 31,

1956. The dealer furnished four quarterly returns as required by the Rules framed under the Act. viz., for the period April to June, 1954 on October 1, 1954; July to September, 1954 on December 16, 1954; October to December, 1954 on March 12, 1955 and for January to March, 1955 on June 16, 1956. Though these returns were not filed within !10 days after expiry of each of the quarters as required by the Rules, no objection was taken by the Assessing Authority.

The firm deposited three sums at the time of filing the retu, ns aggregating to Rs. 10,649-4-0.

Subsequently, it paid a further sum of Rs. 14,477 on the basis of those returns,

Not satisfied with these returns, the Assessig Authority issued a notice under s. 11(2) in form S.T. XIV which is a comprehensive form and which admittedly was served on the dealer on January 11, 1957, i.e., before three years expired from each of the respective dates for filing of the said returns.

This is clear from the fact that the date for filing the first return would be July 30, 1954 and the date for filing the last return would be April 30, 1955. On July 5, 1960, the Assesing Authority examined Tara Chand, a partner in the firm but did not finalise the

assessment order on that day as he wanted to make further enquiries and passed the assessment order impugned in this appeal on August 11, 1960. The Assessing Authority disbelieved the accounts produced by Tara Chand and added sales of Rs. 4,00,000 in the gross turnover shown in the returns and assessed the firm on the turnover of Rs. 16,92,148-1-0 to a tax of Rs. 33,127-1-6.

After giving credit of the said two sums deposited by the dealer the balance of Rs. 8,000 and odd remained payable by the fian.

The fian filed a writ petition in the High CoUrt challenging the validity of the assessment order on the ground that as it was made after three years from the dates when the said returns had to be furnished, it was without jurisdiction.

The department on the other hand urged ( 1) that the order was made under s. 11 ( 3 ) which provided no limitation and (2) that assuming that the order was passed under s. 11 ( 4) or s. 11 ( 5) proceedings in respect thereof havinJ!: commenced on the issuance of the said notice dated January 11, 1957 which was within time, no question of the order being time barred would arise.

These were the only contentions raised before the High Court and as no contention. regarding the merits of the order was raised, the High Court did not enter into that question.

We need not also go into the merits of the assessment and we will consider only the question whether the order was invalid on the ground taken by the dealer in the High Court.

The High Court following its earlier decision in M/ s; Rameshwar Lal Sarup Chand v. The Excise. and Taxation Officer('), held that the order was an assessment on best judgment basis under s. 11 ( 4) and as it was made after three years after the close of the assessment year it was without jurisdiction.

For the reasons which we shall presentiy set out, the question whether the assessment order was passed under s. 11 ( 3) or s. 11 ( 4) or ( 5) does not need any answer as it makes no difference so far as this case is concerned whether it was made under one or the other susection. However, the mere fact that the.Assessing Authority mentioned that he made the order on the best judgment basis cannot be conclusive, for, by merely calling it as the best judgmel)t assessment, the order does not become one.

Section 10 of the Act provides that the tax payable shall be paid in the manner !hereinafter provided and at such intervals as may be prescribed. Rule 20 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1949 provides that every registered dealer, other than those referred to in rules 17, 18 and 19 (with whom we are not presently concerned) shall furnish returns quarterly within 30 days from the expiry of each quarter. Rule 25 provides that all returns which are required to be furnished under these rules,

(I) [1963] P. LR. 768.

shall be signed by the registered dealer or his agent and shall be sent to the appropriate Assessing Authority together with the Treasury or the Hank receipt as proof of the payment of the tax due.

Rule 40 provides that a dealer and his partner or partners shall be jointly and severally responsible for payment of the tax, and that every dealer liable to pay the tax shall pay it quarterly unless directed otherwise by the appropriate Assessing Authority. Sub-rule (3) provides that the tax due for any quarter shall be paid before furnishing the return for that quarter. Rule 32 provides that every assessment order shall be recorded in writing and, where the Assessing Authority <letennines the turnover of a dealer at a figure different from that shown in the return submitted under the provisions of these rules, the order shall state briefly the reasons therefor.

Rule 33 provides that when it appears to the appropriate Assessing Authority to be necessary to make an assessment under s. 1 lin respect of a dealer, he shall serve a notice in fom1 S. T. XIV on him calling upon him to produce books of accounts and other documents and stating the period or the return period or periods in respect of wMch

assessment is proposed.· He shall fix a date ordinarily not less than after 10 days from the date of the notice for considering any objection which the dealer may prefer.

Section 11 ( 1) provides that if the Assessing Authority is satisfied without requiring the presence of the registered dealer or the production by him of any evidence that the returns furnished in respect of any period are correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax due from the dealer on the basis of such returns.

Sub-section (2) provides that if the Assessing Authority is not satisfied without requiring the presence of the registered dealer wh<> furnished the returns or production of evidence that the returns furnished in respect of any period are correct or complete, he shall serve on such dealer a notice in the prescribed manner requiring him at a date and at place specified thereunder either to attend in person or to produce or to cause to be produced any evidence on which such dealer may rely in support of such returns.

Sub-section (3) provides that on the day specified in the notice or as soon afterwards as may be, the Assessing Authority shall, after hearing such evidence as the Assessing Authority may require on specified points assess the amount of tax due from the dealer.

Sub-section ( 4) provides that if a registered dealer having furnished returns in respect of a period, fails to comply with the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2), the Assessing Authority shall within three years after the expiry of such period, proceed to assess to the best of his judgment the amount of the tax due from the dealer.

Sub-section ( 5) provides that if a registered dealer does not furnish returns in respect of anv oeriod by the prescribed date, the Assessin~ Authority shall within three years after the c.xpiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard,

14 ltlPl.EMB COtl& T llPOll TS

(1967] 3 S.C.R.

proceed to assess to the best of his judgment, amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer. Sub-section (6) deals with a case where a dealer has failed to apply for registration, in which case the Assessing Authority is empowered within the prescribed period to assess such a dealer to the best of his judgment. Since the firm in the instant case was duly registered, the question of application of sub-section ( 6) does not arise.

Section 11 envisages the following case:. :--

(a) Where the dealer duly files returns and the Authority is satisfied with such returns and accepts them and formally passes an order of assessment which means no more than that he appropriates the amount deposited by the dealer towards the tax.

(b) Where the Authority is not &atisfied with the returns, and issues a notice calling upon the dealer to appear and produce evidence in support of the returns, the Authority holds an enquiry under sub-section (3) and then makes an order of assessment.

( c) Where the registered dealer having furnished returns fails to comply with the terms of the notice issued under sub-section (2) the Assessing Authority is empowered within three years after the expiry of the period in respect of which the returns.arc filed to proceed to assess to the best of his judgment the tax due from the dealer.

( d) Where the registered dealer has failed to furnish returns in respect of any period by the prescribed date, the Assessing Authority is empowered to assess to the best of his judgment within three years after the expiry of the period in respect of which the returns have not been filed, and

( e) Where the dealer has failed to apply for registration in respect of the period for which he is liable to pay tax, the Assessing Authority is emoowered within three years after the expiry of such period to assess him to the best of his judgment.

Sub-sections ( 4), ( 5) and ( 6) lay down the conditions precedent which must be satisfied before the power to make an assessment to the best of his judgment can be exercise, d. Under sub-section ( 4) the condition is that though the registered dealer has furnished returns he fails to comply with the terms of the notice issued under sub-section (2). Under sub-section ( 5) the condition is that the registered dealer has failed to furnish returns and under subsection ( 6) the condition is that the dealer has failed to apply

for registration.

Prima facie, none of these conditions existed in the present case and therefore though the Assessing Authority states that he had to assess the firm to the best of his judgment, the impugned order cannot be said to be either un<!er sub-section

(4) or sub-section (5) or sub-1JCCtion (6). But as we have stated earlier this question need not be gone into in the present case and we do not, therefore, have to decide whether the order was one under sub-section (3) or sub-section ( 4) or sub-section (5).

The question that falls for determination is whether it was one under sub-section ( 3) or sub-section ( 4), is it one which can be said to be time barred ?

So far as sub-section ( 4) is concerned the question as to when an assessment order thereunder becomes barred arose in Madan Lal Arora v. Excise and Taxation Officer,

Amritsar('). The petitioner, a registered dealer, filed his returns for the four quarters of the financial year ending on March 31, 1955, and likewise, for the four quarters of the financial year ending on March 31, 1956. In respect of each year the Sales Tax

Assessing Authority served three successive notices on him on March 7, 1958, April 4, 1958 and August 18, 1959, requiring him to attend with the documents and other evidence in support of his returns. It was, however, only in the last of the said notices that he stated that on failure to produce the documents and other evidence mentioned therein, the case would be decided on "best judgment assessment basis".

The petitioner did not comply with any of the notices, but on receiving the last notice he filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the right of the Authority to make the best judgment assessment.

Sarkar, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Court, posing the question as how to compute the three years mentioned in sub-section ( 4) observed : 'The sub-section says "within three years after the expiry of such period"

So the three years have to be counted from the expiry of the period mentioned.

What then is that period ? The period referred, therefore, is the period mentioned earlier in the subsection, and that is the period in respect of which returns had been furnished by the dealer'.

After considering s. 11 ( 1) and Rule 20 of the Rules, he further observed : 'It would, therefore, appear that when sub-section ( 4) of s. 11 talks of "returns

in respect of a period" that refers in the case of the petitioner to the quarters in respect of which he submitted the returns.

We then come to this that the three years within which the authority could proceed to make the best judgment assessment had to be counted from the end of each quarter in respect of which returns had been filed'.

The Court held that the last of the quarters in respect of which the . petitioner filed his returns having ended on March 31, 1956 the Assessing Authority could not proceed

(!) [1962) I S.C.R. 823.

16 SVPl.BMB

OOVJ.T llBPOllTI

(1967] 3 S.C.R.

to. make the best judgment assessment in respect of that quarter after March 31, 1959. In the case of the earlier quarters the three years had expired even prior to that date, There was no dispute that the Assessing Officer had not proceeded to make any assessment on the petitioner at the date of any of the notices.

The notices given on August 18, 1959 that best judgment assessment would be made in respect of the quarters constituting the financial years 1955 and 1956 the last of which expired on March 31, 1956, were futile as no such assessment could be made in respect of any of the quarters after March 31, 1959. The question as to the effect of the two earlier notices was not canvassed.

What this decision laid down was that the notice dated August 18, 1959 under which the authority proposed to proceed under s. 11 ( 4) having been served after expiry of three years from the respective dates when the said returns had to .be furnished, the notice was futile and the authority not having proceeded to assess within time any action taken by him would be without jurisdiction.

The question as to the legal effect of such a notice was considered in Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur('). The points which fell for determination there were : (1 ) when can a proceeding be said to commence and ( 2) if a proceeding hall commenced within the prescribed period but is pending when such period expires and an order is finalised thereafter, whether such an order is invalid on the ground of its being time-barred.

The appellant there was a registered dealer.

For the year 1949-50 he submitted only one return for one quarter and defaulted in respect of the other quarters.

A notice was served on him on August 13, 1954 under s. 11(1) and (2) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 in respect of the turnover of the firm for the said period He filed the returns subsequently but contended that the proceedings before the Sales Tax Commissioner were barred by time.

He then filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the said proceedings. For the year 1950-51, he had filed no returns at all and was served with a notice on October 15, 1954 under s. 11 ( 4) of the Act.

That notice was within three years from October 16, 1951 which fell within the fourth quarter of .the year in question. He also filed another writ petition for a similar relief in respect of that year.

The contention was that whatever may be said in the case of an unregistered dealer, in the case of a registered dealer, the proceedings commence from the date of the registration certificate within which he has a statutory obligation to furnish his returns. This Court held that assessment proceedings under the Act must be held to be pending from the time they are initiated until they are terminated by a final order of assess- -Tl(• 9641 4 S. C.R. 436.

B ..

ment. It was then stated that in the case of a registered dealer there would be four variations in the matter of assessment of his turnover : (1) he submits a return by the date prescribed and pays the tax due in terms of the said return, the Commissioner accepts the correctness of the return and appropriates the amount paid towards the tax due for the period covered by the return;

(2) the Commissioner is not satisfied with the correctness of the return, he issues a notice to him under s. 11 (2),. but does not finalise the assessment; (3) the registered dealer does not submit a return, the Commissioner issues a notice under s. 10 ( 3) and s. 11 ( 4) of the Act, and ( 4) the registered dealer does not submit any return for any period and the Commissioner issues a notice to him beyond three years.

The Court held that in the case of a registered dealer the proceedings before the Commissioner start factually when a return is made or when a notice is issued to him either under s. 10(3) or under s. 11(2) of the Act.

Since the proceedings commenced after the return was submitted and continued till a final order of assessment was made in regard to the return, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to issue a notice under s. 11-A with respect to the quarters other than that covered by the return made by the appellant.

As regards the second case it held that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to assess the turnover in respect of the entire fourth quarter. At page 450, the Court observed that in a case where a return has been made, but the Commissioner has not accepted it and has issued a notice for enquiry, the assessment proceedings would be pending till the final assessment is made.

Even in a case where no return has been made, but the Commissioner initiates proceedings by issuing the notice either under s. 10(3) or under s. 11 ( 4), the proceedings would be pending till the final assessment is made.

But where no return has been made and the Commissioner has not issued any notice under the Act, it cannot be held that any proceedings are pending before the Commissioner.

In the case of a registered dealer the proceedings before the Commissioner start factually when a return is made or a notice is issued and no ques tion of limitation would arise where such proceedings are taken before the expiry of the prescribed period though an assessment order is finalised after the expiry of such period.

This decision is, therefore, a clear authority for the proposition that assessment proceedings commence in the case of a registered dealer either when he furnishes a return or when a notice is issued to him under s. 11 ~) of the present Act, and that if such proceedings are taken within the prescribed time though the assessment is finalised subsequentlv even after the expiry of the prescribed period no question of limitation would arise. '

In the instant case the dealer filed returns.

Though thev were filed after the expiry of 30 days from the relevant date, they were

11.ot rejected by tho departllient on that ground. In fact the notice dated January 11, 1957 issued under s. 11(2) was on tho footing that returns were filed, but the Assessing Authority was not satis tied with them and desired evidence to establish that tho returns were full and complete. It is also an admitted fact that the dealer appeared and produced books of accounts in answer to the said notice and thereupon the Officer held an enquiry.

The notice dated January 11, 1957 was within time though the assessment order was made much after the expiry of three years from the respective dates when the returns had to be filed.

But on the authority of Ghanshyam Das's case('), the assessment proceedings commenced either when the respondent firm filed the returns or in any event from the date of the said notice. Both the events, there fore, were within prescribed time.

Reliance, however, was placed on two decisiOns of the 'High Court of Punjab: M/s. Rameshwar Lal Sarup Chand v. Excise and Taxation Officer(') and Jagat Ram Om Parkash v. Excise and

Taxation Officer, Assessing Authority, Amritsar('). Neither of these decisions would be of assistance as the question which was canvassed in Ghanshyam Das's case (') regarding assessment pro ceedings having commenced within time and then remaining pending did not come up for consideration. Since the said notice dated January 11, 1957 was served on the respondent firm before the expiry of three years from the respective dates for furnishing the returns, the assessment proceedings must be held to have commenced from that date which was within time and thus the assessment proceedings remained pending until they were terminated by the assessment order.

Though that order was finalised after the expiry of three years from the said period, it could not be attacked on the ground of its being beyond limitation and therefore without jurisdiction. The order passed by the High Court allowing the respondent's writ petition has, therefore, to be set aside.

The appeal succeeds and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we do not propose to pass any order as to costs.

V.P.S.

Appeal. aliowed.

(i} (1964] 4 S. C.R. 436. (2i (1963] P.L.R. 768.

(3) (1965] 16 P.L.R. lc7.

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS

S. TARA CHAND LAJPAT RAI

February 28, 1967

M. SHELAT

G. K. MITTER

Punjab General Sales Tax Act

s. 11(2)

s. 11(2)

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11(2)

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11(2)

Dipak Dutta Chaudhuri

R. N. Sachthey

C. D. Garg

Shelat

s. 11

Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948

Aoril 1, 1955

March 31,

1956

s. 11(2)

January 11, 1957

July 5, 1960

Tara Chand

August 11, 1960

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

Section 10

Punjab General Sales Tax Rules, 1949

s. 1

Section 11

Section 11

March 31, 1955

March 31, 1956

March 7, 1958

April 4, 1958

August 18, 1959

Sarkar

s. 11

s. 11

March 31, 1959

s. 11

August 13, 1954

s. 11(1)

Berar Sales Tax Act

October 15, 1954

s. 11

October 16, 1951

s. 11

s. 10

s. 11

s. 10(3)

s. 11(2)

s. 11

s. 10(3)

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11(2)

Ghanshyam Das

High Court of Punjab

(1964] 4 S. C.R. 436


P.L.LAKHANPAL A

THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

[M. H!DAYATULLAH, J. M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] March 7, 1967 B

Defence of India Rules, 1962, Rules 30(1)(b) and 30A(9)-Review of detention order-if quasi-judicial function-opportunity to detenu to niake representation.

The petitioner was arrested and detained by an order dated December 10, 1965 under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962.

On June 11, 1966, he was served with an order of the Central Govern- C ment under Rule 30A(9) to the effect that after a review of the detention order, it had been decided to continue his detention. Writ petitions filed b}' the petitioner challenging these two orders on various grounds were dismissed.

On December 2, 1966, he was served with another order der Rule 30A(9) statinl! that the detention order hd been further reVIewed and upon such reVIew the Government had decided that the detention should continue. The petitioner challenged this order by the present writ petition on the ground, i'nter alia, that it was passed in dis- D regard of the duty of the Government to act judicially, implicit in the power conferred on it under Rule 30A(9) to continue detention, both the function to review and the decision thereon being judicial or quasijudicial.

It was contended on behalf of the respondent (i) that the order of detention being a purely executive order, an order of review under Rule

30A(9) of the very circums•ances on which the detention order was E made and subsequent circumstances would also be an executive order; and (ii) that the impugned order was passed after considering various materials against the petitioner.

HELD, allowing the pe'ition : (i) The function entrusted to the authority under Rule 30A(9), as distinguished from the power under Rule 30( I) (b), is quasi-judicial and the decision which it has to anive at is a quasi-judicial decision.

To say that because a function is in its inception executive in character, it retains the executive character throughout would not be correct.

Besides, the function under Rule 30(1) (b) and that under Rule 30A(9) is not one and the same.

The former is completed as soon as an order of detention is made; the .latter is independent of the former and is to be exercised after detention has gone on for a period of six months. Whereas the function under Rule 30( I) (b) is executive, the one under Rule G 30A(9) is quasi-judicial and therefore in exercising it the rules of natural justice have to be complied with. [123 D-FJ

(ii) It was admitted that the pe•itioner was not given any opportunity of representing his cas.e or to coi; rect or contradi9t the evidence on which the Government admittedly rehed before passing the order of December 2, 1966. There was therefore a breach of principles of natural justice and the order of continuation of detention was illegal H and must be quashed. [123 F-0; 124 C-DJ

Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Admlnistratio11, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 243, dissented from.

. II

Kusaldas S. Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621, 725; Nagendra Nath Bora, v.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 258 of 1966.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.

The petitioner appeared in person.

R. H. Dhebar, R. N. Sachthey, and S. S. Javali, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. The petitioner was arrested by an order dated December 10, 1965 under Rule 30\l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and was detained in Central Jail, Tebar, New Delhi. On the 24th December, 1965, he filed writ petition No. 47 of 1966 in this Court challenging his detention, inter a/ia; on the grounds that (1) Rule 30(I)(b) was ultra vires s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, (2) that rule 23 of the Defence of India (Delhi Detenues) Rules, 1964 gave him a right to .make a representation by providing review of the said detention order and that his said right was disregarded by his having been prevented from making such representation, ( 3) that the said order was in breach of s. 44 of the Act, and ( 4) that it was made in ma/a fide exercise of power. That petition was dismissed on April 19, 1966.

The petitioner was thereafter served with an order dated June 11, 1966 passed by the Central Government under Rule 30A(9) of the said Rules. The said order, inter alia, stated that "the said detention order has been reviewed by the Central Government-and upon such review the Central Government hereby decides that Shri P. L. Lakhanpal-should continue to be detained .wih. a view to preventing hi~ from acting in any manner pre-1ud1c1al to the Defence of India and Civil Defence".

The ptiioner filed rit .Petition No. 137 of 1966 challenging the validity of the said angina! order of detention and the order dated June II, 1966. Rule 30A(9) provides as follows:-

"Every detention order made by the Central Government or the State Government shall be reviewed at

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 3 S.C, R.

intervals of not more than six months by the Govern ment who made the order and upon such review that Government shall decide whether the order should be continued or cancelled".

That petition also was dismissed by judgment dated September .21, 1966. It appears that the petitioner thereafter addressed certain letters and sent representations to the Home Ministry stating therein that he was now clearly of the opinion that the demand for plebiscite in Kashmir by Pakistan had become untenable as a result of certain events having taken place, that the Tashkent declaration had altered relations between Pakistan and India, that the said declaration and other events which had since taken place had completely changed the complexion of Pakistan's stand 011 Kashmir and that he was also now of the opinion that the application of some of the provisions of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir was correct. He also represented that there were more pressing problems in the country requiring his attention than the question of Kashmir and the relations between the two countries on that question.

By an order dated the 2nd December, 1966, the Government of India directed the further detention of the peti tioner stating therein that "the said detention order has been further reviewed by the Central Government and upon such review the Central Government hereby decides that , the order for the detention of the said Shri P. L. Lakhanpal shou1d be continued".

The present petition challenges the validity of this order.

The petitioner contended :- ( i) that the said order is a mechanical and casual order passed without taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances relevant under Rule 30 (1) (b) and Rule 30A(9).

(ii) That it is passed in utter disregard of the duty of the Government to act judicially, implicit in the power conferred on it under Rule 30A ( 9) to continue detention, both the function to review and the decision thereon being judicial or quasi-judicial.

(iii) That the said order is ultra vires s. 44 of the Act whereunder the Government is required to decide whether detention is the minimum action necessary on the facts and circumstances of the case.

(iv) That the said order is ma/a fide and illegal being contrary to the policy statements made on behalf of the Government in Parliament from time to time to restrict the operation of the Act and the Rules :

(a) for purposes of defence only, and ( b) in border States; and ( v) That the said order is ma/a fide as it is motivated by punitive rather than preventive considerations.

In reply to these contentions the counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs states that between the 10th of December, 1965 and the 2nd of December, 1966, the petitioner had made representations either di!tly r through certain persons and had addressed ltters explarnmg his position, that on the basis of those representations and letters and the report about his past activities called for from the police and after considering those materials the Central Government felt satisfied that it the petitioner were to be released, he was likely to resume his prejudicial activities and, therefore, his detention should be continued.

The affidavit further alleged that at the time of the review of his case on Decemfier 2, 1966 "the said letters, papers, representations and the report from the police were placed before the Minister who had considered the same and he was satisfied that it was necessary to continue the detention of the petitioner''. It also stated that it was not possible to disclose to the detenu the material on the basis of which the Central Government came to the said conclusion, that the order of detention was to prevent the petitioner from indulging in prejudicial activities mentioned in Rule 30(1 )(b) and that the apprehension of E his indulging in such activities would have to be judged and was judged from representations made by him.

It is thus clear from the counter-affidavit that the detaining authority considered ( 1) the representations and letters made and written by the petitioner, ( 2) the report of the police authorities in regard to the past activities of the petitioner (there being no question of any present activities as he was in jail since the 2nd of December, 1965) and ( 3) the events which had since his detention taken place. Accor- F

ding to the Central Government, it came to the decision that continuation of his detention was necessary as it was satisfied that if he were to be released he would continue the same antinational activities for which he was detained and that his professions that there was a change in his view was only a ruse to get himself released from detention.

Now, there is no doubt that under the Act as also under the

sid Ru_les tle Government is the special forum on whose subjecuve sat1sfact10n an order of detention for the considerations set out in Rule 30(l)(b) can be made and on whose decision arrived at on the considerations and in the manner prescribed by Rule 30A(9) such detention can be continued. However, as held in P. L. Lakhanpal v. The Union of India and Anr .. (') there is a

(I) [196711 S.C.R. 433.

111 SUPUMll COUJ.T RJIPOltTS [f967J 3 S.C.K.

<lifference in the power to detain and the power to continue such <letention beyond a period of six months in that whereas the former depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, the latter has in express terms been made dependent on the existence of facts and circumstances necessitating such continuance.

This Court held in that petition :

"It follows that where the exercise of power is not conditioned on a mere opinion or satisfaction but on the existence of a set of facts or circumstances that power can be exercised where they exist.

The .authority in such a case is required to exercise the power in the manner and within the limits authorised by the Legislature.

The existence of such facts which is the determinant for the exercise of the power is demonstrable''.

The Court further observed :-

"Unlike Rule 30(1 )(b) the power to continue the detention after review is not dependent on the satisfaction of the Government. Rule 30A postulates that ordi narily detention should not be for more than six months unless found necessary. It is for that reason that under the Rules when the period of six months expires the Government is enjoined upon to decide whether it should be continued or cancelled. Though the legislature has made the Government the exclusive forum for such a decision, its decision has to be founded on facts and circumstances which make the continuation necessary in order to prevent the detenu acting in a manner prejudicial to the matters set out therein. The substitution of decision instead of satisfaction is a clear indication that the criterion for continuing the detention is the existence of those facts and circumstances which necessitate it. It is not unreasonable to think that the legislature decided to confer power the exercise of which was made dependent upon the subjective satisfaction at the initial stage but where continuation of detention was concerned, it thought that there should be different considerations.

At that stage there would be ample time and opportunity for the Government to scrutinise the case fully and ascertain whether facts and circumstances exist demanding continuation and therefore deliherately used the word 'decide' instead of the words 'is satisfied'.

Therefore, where such circumstanes do not exist there would be no necessity for contimiation and yet if the Government decides to continue the detention, such a decision would be beyond the scope of Rule 30A and would not be a decision within the meaning of or under

. c

LAKHANPAL V. UNION (Shtlat, /,)

that Rule.

Cases may arise where circumstances exist leading to the authonty's satisfaction that a particular person should be detained but those circumstances may not exist at the time when the review is made. In the latter case it is impossible to say that the Government can still decide to cont.inue the detention nor is it possible to say that it is the Government's opinion or satisfaction that such facts and circumstances exist which is the criterion. The decision on a review has to be arrived at from the factS and circumstances which actually subsisted at the time when the original order was made in the light of subsequent developments and not merely those existing at the time when the order was made. In such a case the decision can be challenged as one not within the scope of or under the Rule and therefore unauthorised or as one based on considerations irrelevant to the power".

The position reslllting from this decision is that the decision to continue detention has to be arrived at not su; jectively but on an objective standard, i.e. on a decision on materials relevant to the purposes under Rule 30(1)(b) and R•le 30A(9) gathered by or placed before the detaining authority which, according to that authority, necessitates continuation. Though it is the detainin& authority which has. to decide and its order is not subject to appeal or revision by a .. court of law such an order is liable to a challenge where either such facts and circumstances do not exist or where it is made on the basis of facts or circumstances not relevant or extraneous to the said purposes.

On the contentions raised by the petitioner, the question that falls for determination is whether the function entrusted by Rule 30A(9) to the Government and its decision thereunder are judiial or qusi-judicial. This question was le~ open in the. earlier

Judgment m P .. L. Lakhanpal v.

The Union of India and Anothtr(1 ) as the petitioner had then not raised it.

As ta what is a quasi-judicial as against an administrative or ministerial function, it is no longer necessary to go in any detailed search for the principles governing the distinction b11tween the two.

Lord Loreburn, L. C. in Board of Education v. Rice(2 ) stated, "Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of Stall:: the duty of deciding or determining the questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in maay others, what comes for determination is sbmetimes a matter to be settled by discretioa, involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve a matter of law

(I) [1'66] Supp S.C.R. 209.

(2) [1911] A.C. 182.

120 SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS

as well as a matter of fact, or even depend upon a matter of law alone.

In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I do not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying up0n every one who decides anything.

But I do not think that they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial .... They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view". Similar sentiments were also expressed by Lord Haldane in Local Gcwernment Board v. ArUdge(').

The Lord Chancellor there stated, "When the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, . and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal wilose duty it is tq

mete out justice".

The principles distinguishing a quasi-judicial function from one which is ministeral were more precisely set out by Das, J. (as he then was) in the Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas

S. Advani(2 ). He observed

(1) where is a Us, there is prima facie in the absence of anything in the st(l.tute to the contrary the duty of the authority to act judicially _and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (2) even if there is no

Us inter-parties and the contest between the party proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. "In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any otqer factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially". These principles have since been acted upon by this Court in subsequent decisions such as Nagendra Nath Bora, v. The Commissioner of Hills Division(•) Radheshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('), Gullapal/i Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation("), and Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India ('). In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v.

Ghanshyam (1) the question again was whether the power entrusted to the Examination Committee under s. 15 of U.P.

(ll [1915] A.C. 120 at p. 132.

(2) [1950] S.C.R. 621, 725.

(3) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.

(4) [1959] S.C.R. 1440.

(5) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319.

(6) [1960J 2 S.C.R. 775.

(7) [1962] Spp. 3 S.C.R. 36.

LAKHANPAL V, UNIO~ (She/at, J.) 121

It Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and Chapter VI, r. ( 1) of the Regulations made thereunder was a quasi-judicial power.

Wanchoo, J., who spoke for the court said at page 43 as follows:-

"Now it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in many words that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other in die fa afforded by the statute".

The Coun there held that it was obvious that the Committee when it proceeded to decide matters covered by r. 1 ( 1) will have to depend upon materials placed before it and before it decided to award any penalty it had to come to an objective determination on certain facts and this was the only manner in which it could carry out the duties imposed on it. Even though there was no /is in the present case in the sense that there were not two contend- 11: ing parties before it the Committee should hear the examinees whose lives might be seriously affected by its decision even subjecting them in some cases to criminal prosecution on charges of impersonation, fraud and perjury.

Though, therefore, there was nothing express one way or other in the act or the Regulation easting a durv on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of II the disposal anli the serious effects of the decision of the Committee would li:ad to the conclusion that a duty to act judicially was cast on the Committee and the Committee when it acted under r. 1 ( 1) was acting quasi-judicially and the principles of natural justice would apply to its proceedings.

Let us now proceed to consider the nature of the function of G review and the decision thereon in the light of the principles laid down in these decisions.

There can hardly be any doubt that in case of the lcind y; e have before us there must always occur a dilemma or a conflict between the claims on the one hand of personal liberty of an individual and these of national interests on the other. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that in such H cases, the only remedy that a person detained has lies in the procedural safeguards that the legislature deliberately lays down.

Wher~ suii~ procedural safeguards have been fully and properly complied with, the Coun would have no power or would in any

UllupCI/67-9 .

SUP:UMB COU&T RBPORTS

(1967) 3 S.C.R.

event be reluctant, even if it has, to interfere. That is because of the consideration that national interest and security should hliVe a prior claim than even the personal liberty of an individual who has acted or is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to them.

In such cases, however, utmost care has to be taken to comply with such few safeguards which the law justifying the loss of liberty provides.

That the impugned decision involves the right of personal liberty, a more cherished right than that one cannot conceive in our democratic State is obvious. It is equally obvious that the manner in which the question of continuation of dete~

tion enjoined upon by Rule 30A(9) has to be determined is by applying the objective standard as against the subjective opinion or the belief of the detaining authority i.e. by weighing evidence brought before or collected by such authority relevant to the purposes under Rule 30(l)(b) and Rule 30A(9) and then coming to a decision whether the order of detention needs continuation or not. ijow can such an authority come to its decision honestly and properly unless it is certain that the materials before it are true and dependable. How is that certainty to be derived unless the person concerned is given an opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence either by explanation or through other materials which he can place before the authority. Keeping in mind the five factors laid down in the case of The Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P.( 1), the conclusion that we must come to is that the function entrusted to the authority under Rule 30A(9) as dintinguished from the power under Rule 30(l)(b) is quasi, judicial and the decision which it has to arrive at cannot be anything other than a quasi-judicial decision.

Mr. Dhebar, however, relied on the judgment of Shah, J. in Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration(') and especially the observations therein that "if the order of detention is purely executive and not open to review by .the court, a review of those very circumstances on which the order was made in the light of circumstances since the date of the order cannot but be regarded as an executive order". The question is: Does it follow that because the first order is purely executive, the subsequent order is necessarily also exec, utive?

While making the subsequent order, the authority is called upon to decide whether further detention is necessary for the purposes set out in the Rules. That decision has to be arrived at, firstly, on the assessment of the evidence placed before the authority and not on its subjective satisfaction and secondly, in the light of the facts which existed at the date of the original order and the facts and circumstances which have occurred or developed since then. It. is well-recognised that a function or power which in its inception is purely ministerial may some-

(I) [)962] Supp. 3 S, C, R.-36.

(2) (1966] I S.C.R. 243.

A l

A times become quasi-judicial at a latte. r or some intermediate stage during the course of its exercise. At the stage at which it. attains the nature of a quasi-judicial function, the authority entrusted

with that function has to comply with the rules of natural justice and give an opportunity to the party. concerned of representing his case.

An illustration can be found in R. Johnson & Co.

B (Builders) Ltd.· v. Minister of Health('), where Lord Greene, M.R. at. p. 401 of the Report points out that the function entrusted to the Minister there was of such a composite character.

It started as an administrative function but at the second stage it was quasi-judicial where he had to consider the objections of parties, that is, the objectors and the local authority and then C ended as an administrative function when the Minister decided whether to confirm or not to confirm the report of the local authority.

Regarding the second stage, he characterised that as a quasi-lis and the parties i.e. objectors and the local authority as quasi-parties and said that while that stage was pending statements made by or obtained through either of the quasi-parties would have to be disclosed to the other quasi-party.

D To say therefore that because a function is in its inception executive in character, it retains the executive character throughout would not, with respect; be correct.

Besides, the function under Rule 30(1)(b) and that under Rule 30A(9) is net one and the same. The former is completed as soon as an order of E detention is made; the latter is independent of the former and is to be exercised after detention has gone on for a period of six months. . In our view, whereas the function under Rille 30( l )(b) is executive, the one under Rule 30A ( 9) is quasi-judicial and therefore in exercising it the rules of natural justice have to be complied with.

F . It is admitt~ that. the petitioner was not given any opporturuty of representing his case or to correct or contradict the evience n which !he Government was going to rely on and which !t admittedly rehed on.

But Mr. Dhebar's contention was that !£ ~~ poy; er of decision under Rule 30A(9) were held to be quasi J.ud1c1al m character a person detained would be entitled to dis- G closure of the materials in possession of the Government and on the basis of which the order would be made that such disclosure would not only be prejudicial to the very puiJ, oses of the Act and the Rules but also to national interest and, therefore, the legislature cod ot ve intended such disclosure. The answer to this contention 1s le. In some cases, though such cases would

b~ few, such dis7losure would perhaps be embarrassing and, we H will assume, detrimental to, the larger interests of the country.

But the proper remedy agamst such a consequence is not to deny

(I) [1947] 2 All E. R. 39S.

124 SUPllBMB COU.T llBPOl.TS [1967] 3 s.c.

the elemental right of representing his case to the person whose liberty is being deprived but by providing a rule wherellllder the authority in suitable cases can claim privilege against such disclosure.

Such a provision is in Jact provided for under Art. 22 of the Constitution under the Prevention of Detention Act. There does not appear . to be any reason why such a rule ca)lnot be made under the Defence of India Act or the Rules made thereunder.

It may be that in the present case the Government had materials before it which might justify the petitioner's detention.

We do not know whether it had or not for the only thing that was .said in the counter-affidavit was that there were materials on the consideration of which the Minister based his decision. If that be so, the proper thing to do was tG give a chance to the petitioner to explain them.

This not having been done the order of continuation of detention wai; illegal, it being in breach of the prindples of natural justice and has, therefore, to be quashed.

In this view, it is not necessary to deal with the rest cf the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petition is allowed.

The order dated December 2, 1966 is quashed and the petitioner ; s directed to be set free forthwith.

R.K.P.S.

Petition allmved.

P.L.LAKHANPAL

A

THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

M. SHELAT

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

March 7, 1967

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Defence of India Rules, 1962

December 2, 1966

[1966] 1 S.C.R. 243

Art. 32

Constitution of India

R. H. Dhebar

R. N. Sachthey

S. S. Javali

Shelat

Defence of India Rules, 1962

s. 3(2)(15)(i)

s. 44

April 19, 1966

June 11, 1966

Central Government

P. L. Lakhanpal

Defence of India

September .21, 1966

Kashmir

Pakistan

India

2nd December, 1966

Government of India

s. 44

Parliament

Ministry of Home Affairs

10th of December, 1965

of December, 1966

Decemfier 2, 1966

2nd of December, 1965

sid Ru_les tle Government

Loreburn

Haldane

Das

s. 15

LAKHANPAL V

Intermediate Education Act, 1921

Wanchoo

Dhebar

Shah

Greene

Art. 22