SOLANA RAMACHANDRA RAO & ORS.

MADDI KUTUMBA RAO & ANR.

April 19, 196-7

[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., V. BHARGAYA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), O.XXI, r. 89 (b)-Deposit of amounts to be paid to decree .. /tolder-U.'hen can be dispensed 1vith.

Properties belonging to a trust were sold in execution of a decree ob tained by the second respondent against the trust and were purchased by the first respondent. Thereafter, a suit was filed under •· 92, C.P.C. for the removal of the trustee> wherein it was prayed that the sale in favour of the first respondent may be set aside and adequate provision for discharging the decree of the •econd respondent be made in the scheme to be framed for managing the trust.

The second respondent agreed to such a course and thereupon, the appellant, who was appointed a receiver in the suit under s. 92, applied to the- Court under O.XXI, r. 89 C.P.C. for setting aside the sale.

He deposited certain amounts for payment to the first respondent purchaser. He did not, however, deposit the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for payment to the second respondent decree-holder, as required under O.XXI, r. 89(b), but instead, prayed that the Court may dispense with such deposit.

The Court allowed the application, but on appeal by the purchaser the High Court set aside the order.

In appeal, by the receiver, to this Court,

HELD : If at the time when the application under O.XXI, r. 89 is tnade by the judgment:debtor, the decree has been satisfied or adjusted, the deposit of any money for payment to the decree-holder is not called for.

But a mere promise on the part of the judgment-debtor to take steps to ensure payment of -the decretal amount, even if acceded to by the decree-holder would not have the same effect.

In the present case the decree w~ kept alive and the dec:ee-holder had merely aeed t~ postpone realising the decretal amount 10 case satisfactory provision for payment of hi! dues was made in the suit. There was no adjustment of the decree wh1c~ could be recorded under O.XXI, r. 2; neither had the deer~ been satISfied.

Therefore, the necessity for the judgment-debtor matng a deposit under the provisions of O.XXI, r. 89(b) was not obvtated. [706 B-C, E-H; 707 A-BJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 805 of 1964. .

Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 4 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal against order' No 4 of 1960. .

A. K. Sen, and T. Satyanarayana, for the appellants

Bishan Narain, A. Vedaval/i and A. V. Rangam, for re>pondent No. 1. ·

R. Thiagarajan, for respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J.

This is an appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court. of Andhra Pradesh against a judgment and order of that court dated March 4, 1963.

The appeal is by a receiver appointed in a suit under the provisions of s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the object of applying for setting aside a sale of certain properties belonging to a choultry.

The facts shortly are as follows :-The second respondent before this Court obtained a decree in 0. S. No. 116 of 1949 of Sub-Court, Vijayawada against Tammana Tatayya and Narayana Murty Annapurna Satram and put some property to execution sale. The properties of the Satram were sold in court auction on July !', 1957 and the first respondent, Maddi Kutumbarao became the purchaser for Rs. 24,600.

O.S. No. 60 of 1957 was instituted in the same court for the . removal of the two trustees on the ground of mismanagement. The decreeholder was made a party to this suit filed under s. 92, Civil Procedure Code and one of the reliefs prayed for in the suit was that the sale above-mentioned be set aside and provision be made for payment of the. decree amount in O.S. No. 116 of 1949 und.er the scheme to be settled by the court.

To quote from paragraph 11 of the plaint in that suit, the plaintiff asked that

"all proceedings in execution of the decree obtained by the 3rd defendant against the Satram be stayed pendmg the framing of the scheme and that the sale in favour of the 4th defendant held on 1-7-1957 by the Sub-Court, Gudivada in E.P. No. 37 of 1956 in O.S. 116/ 49 Sub-Court, Vijayawada, be set aside and that adequate provision for the discharge of the same be made." The plaint bears the date 22nd July 1957. The decree-holder. the third defendant, was a minor represented by his mother and guardian, Lakshmikantamma. lt appears that on July 30, 1957 a memorandum was filed on his behalf in the court of the Subordinate Judge. It was stated therein that

"As the plaintiff in 0. S. No. 60 of 1957 have filed that suit for framing a scheme for the management of the choultry, etc. and have asked in that suit for a proper provision to be made for the amount due to the third respondent in this petition, under the decree in O.S. No. 116/1949, thi1 third respondent agrees to the same.

Therefore, this 3rd respondent has no objecti?n, for allowing the petition that has been filed for setting

aside the sale held on 1-7-1957 in this suit without the necessity of depositing the sale warrant amount."

The receiver appointed in O.S. No. 60/ 1957 filed an application

under 0. XXI r. 89 in the court of the Subordinate Judge to set aside the court sale.

He deposited Rs. 1,230 representin'.! 5'/, of the purchase money for payment to the purchaser; Rs.

410-15-0 as poundage and Rs. 123 for interest.

No deposit

w~, made for payment to the decree-holder and it was stated i1~ parugraph 6 of the petition that:

"The 3rd respondent represented by his mother is impleaded as third respondent in the Scheme Suit O.S. No. 60 of 1957, Sub-Court, Vijayawada, wherein necessary provision for the discharge of the decree debt due to him from the choultry is prayed for and has to be made.

At the request of the petitioner to keep up the fair name and prestige of the founders of the choultry, the 3rd respondent's mother as guardian and executor agreed to the said course and is willing for an adequate provision for the discharge of the decree debt being made in the said suit and has agreed to postpon.~ realising the decree debt in O.S. 116 of 1949, Sub-Court, Vijayawada, till then in case the existing trustees, respondents 1 and 2 do not choose to discharge the same in the meanwhile.

Under the circumstances, the petitioner submits that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dispense with the deposit of the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for payment to the decree-holder as required by cl. (b) of r. 89 of 0. XXI C.P.C." The prayer in the petition was that the sale of the properties iR favour of the fourth respondent be set aside and that respondents

I and 2 d.o pay the expense~ to be incurred by the petitioner Tbe Subordinate Judge allowed the application observing:

"Where there is an arrangement between the

decce-holder and the judgment-debtor for the satisfaction of the decree and the decree-holder does not want any dep.osit to be made into court, it is perfectly open to the judgment-debtor to come forward with a

petition under 0. xxr. r. 89 without depositing the amount required to be deposited under cl. (b) ."

Ti' was up; et in appeul by the High Court. According 10 th~

_High Court, 0. XXf, r. 89 permits the decree-holder and the Judgment,-debtor to mutually cancel the. decree debt and thecancellaton of the debt may be either by an adjustment on ti C<?n>tructive payment or by waiver by the decree-holder.

The- Hlgh Court however found itself unable to agree with the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that on the facts of the case the decree-holder could be said to have received the amount

shown in the proclamation of sale for the purpose of 0. XXI, r. 89.

There can be no doubt that if at the time when an applica- 1ion under. 0. XXI, r. 89 is made by the judgment-debtor, the decree has been satisfied or adjusted, . the deposit of any money for payment to the decree-holder is not called for. It was .argued on behalf of the appellants that a mere promise on the part of the judgment-debtor to take steps to ensure payment of the decretal debt if acceded to by the decree-holder would have the same effect. Reliance was placed on a judgment of this -Court in The Union of India v. Kishori/al Gupta and Bros.(').

There it was pointed out that

"One of the modes by which a contract can be discharged is by the same process which created it, i.e. by mutual agreement; the parties to the original contract may enter in\o a new contract in substitution of the old one."

Reference was also made t~ the rule as stated by Cheshire and Fifpot in their Law of Contract, 3rd Edn. at p. 453: "if what the creditor has accepted in satisfaction is merely his debtor's promise to give consideration, and not the performance of that promise, the original cause of action is discharged from the date when the agreement is made." Relying on the above decision, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that even an exe- -cutory agreement between the decree-holder and the judgmentdebtor would have thd same effect as the adjustment of a decree.

It is necessary to bear in mind that a decree for payment of 1noney is not a contract between the parties although it is possible for the parties to agree upon a couri; e of payment or agree to have the decree satisfied otherwise than by payment of money.

For the purpose of this appeal,· it is not necessary to go into that question.

Assuming that the proposition put forward on behalf of the appellants is correct, it must be shown that there was an agreement between the parties by which the decree-holder .agreed to forego his rights under the decree. Paragraph 6 of the petition under 0. XXI, r. 89 which has been quoted above shows that the decree-holder had merely agreed to postpone realising the decretal amount in case respondents 1 and 2 did not choose to -discharge the same. That petition shows clearly that it was anticipated that the court would be in a position to make a provision for the discharge of the decretal debt.

The decree was kept alive and not touched upon in any manne£ muc~ less e~- 1inguished. The decree-holder was prepared to stay his. hands m

(I) [1960) I S.C.R. 493, 502.

case satisfactory provision for payment of his dues was made in the suit. There was no adjustment of the decree which could be

recorded under the provisions of 0. XXI, r. 2; neither had the decree been satisfied. The High Court was therefore right in its conclusion that the situation was not one which obviated the necessity for the judgment-debtor making a deposit under the provisions of 0. XXI, r. 89 (b). On behalf of .the appellants, reference was also made to the fact that the auction purchaser had been itted by the court to withdraw the sum of Rs. 24,60~ deposited in court. We were informed that such withdrawal had

been permitted but the auction purchaser had once more made the necessary deposit under the orders of the court. This cannot

affect the position in law under O. XXI, r. 89.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

V.P.S.

Appeal dismissed

SOLANA RAMACHANDRA RAO & ORS

MADDI KUTUMBA RAO & ANR

April 19, 196-

K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

Code of Civil Procedure

C.P.C

s. 92

C.P.C

A. K. Sen

T. Satyanarayana

Bishan Narain

A. Vedaval

A. V. Rangam

R. Thiagarajan

Mitter

March 4, 1963

s. 92

the Code of Civil Procedure

Tammana Tatayya

Narayana Murty Annapurna Satram

Maddi Kutumbarao

s. 92

Civil Procedure Code

S. 116

Lakshmikantamma

S. 116

C.P.C

Cheshire

Fifpot


STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v.

DR. R. B. CHOWDHARY & 2 ORS.

April 19, 1967

(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAJDIALJNGAM, JJ.] Press and Registration of Book.< Act (25 of 1967), s. 7-"Editor", ,.,,/Jo is_:_When presiunplion under the sectt'on could he drawn.

The respondents were members of the Editorial Board of a new.· paper. One M, who had made a declaration under s. 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, that he was the editor, printer and publisher of the newspaper, was shown in the newspaper also as its editor.

A complaint was filed again'! M and the respondents that they published a defamatory article in the newspaper.

The High Court, in revision, held that the respondents should be discharged, because, M had admitted in his statement under s. 342, Cr. P.C., that he wrote the article and be cause, there was no cogent evidence against the respondents that they were the editors of the newspaper.

Jn appeal by the State to this Court, HELD : (i) Though the statement of M under s. 342 Cr. P.C. was npt evidence j~ favour of the respondents, there was no evidence to !\how

that they had any concern with the publishing of the article. '17 If> B;

711 CJ

(ii) Since M alone was sho"!n to be the editor in the declaration under ' , 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, and in the new•pupcr it could be presumed under s. 7 that M was responsible for the selccuon of the material published, and his admission that ho wrote the ar.iclc could be taken into consideration against hirµ.

But no such pre•umption

c~1uld be drawn ngain.<t the respondents nn<l they were rightly <li•chargcd. [711 BJ.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE J!IRISD!CTION : Criminal Appeal No. !'I of 1965.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order datd April I 5, 1964 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revhion Application No. I 7 of 1964.

H. R. Khanna, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.

S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent.

The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, .l.

This is an appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay discharging the respondents in a criminal case in which they were made accused with one Sudhakar Gopal Madane.

The matter arises in this way.

The Public Prosecutor, We't Khandesh, Dhulia with the previous sanction of the State

Government filed a complaint against. four pesons who are members of the Editorial Board of a Maharath1 Weekly named

MAHARASHTRA v. CHOWDHARY (Hidayatu//ah, J.) 709

"'Maharashtra", under S. 500 of the Indian Penal Code.

The complaint was that in an issue of the Maharashtra dated October

30, 1959, they had published an article which tended to defame one M. A. Dcshmukh, I.A.S., Cdllector and District Magistrate, West Khandesh in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions.

We need not go into the facts of that article or the gravamen of the charge of defamation. This Weekly Maharashtra is registered as a newspaper and a declaration in Form I under Art. 3 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 has been filed by Sudhakar Gopal Madane who has described himself in the declaration as the editor, printer and publisher of the newspaper. The particular copy of the Maharashtra in which the alleged defamatory article appeared bore the name of Madane as the editor, printer and publisher of the newspaper.

It also showed on the front page the Editorial Board consisting of the three respondents and Madane the Editor.

The short question which has arisen in the present matter is whether the Members of the Editorial Board other than the Editor can be prosecuted for the defamatory article.

The Additional Sessions Judge Dhulia, who is trying the case, held by an order dated October 26, 1963, that the respondents 2, 3 and 4 could be charged with the Editor because they were Members of the Editorial Board. He held that there was no evidence so far adduced by the prosecution to establish that they were the Editors, Printers and Publishers of the Weekly yet in view of the admissions of the respondents that they were Members of the Editorial Board there was a prima

facie case proved against them that they were makers of the impugned article. The learned Additional Sessions Judge further said that the prosecution would have to lead satisfactory and cogent evidence to prove and establish that respondents 2, 3 and 4 were Editors, Printers and Publishers.

The present respondents 2, 3 and 4 thereupon filed an application for revision before .the Hih ourt and the impugned order came to be made on their application.

It was held by the learned Single Judne that the statement of the editor Madane made under S. 342 f the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly showed in unequivocal terms that the alleged defamatory article had been written by him.

The newspaper according to the learned Single Judge also showed a! the bottom of the last page the name of Madane as the Editor.

Smee there was no other cogent evidence against the present respondents, the learned Single Judge held that there was no good ground for framing a charge against the present respondents and they ought to be discharged. He made an order in that behalf.

The State of Maharashtra which appeals by special leave

contend.~ that qie learned Single Judge of the High Court wa~ wrong m treating the statement under S. 342 of the Code of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 3 S.C.R.

Criminal Procedure of Madane as accused No. 1 as evidence in the case tending to exonerate the present respondents.

The State also urges in addition that a presumption under S. 7 of the

Press and Registration of Books Act 1867 can be raised against the Editorial Board and they can therefore be held responsible fur the defamatory article.

We shall deal with these two questions.

The first argument is correct. No doubt under the Code of Criminal Procedure the statement of an accused may be taken into consideration in an inquiry or trial but it is not strictly evidence in the case.

An accused, when he makes his statement under S. 342, does not depose as a witness because no oath is administered to 'him, when he is examined under that section.

The recent amendment of the Code, however, enables an accused to give evidence on his own behalf under S. 342-A and this is only when an accused offers in writing to give evidence on his own behalf that his statement can be read as evidence proper.

However, the matter is not .to be decided on whether the statement of Madane could be read as evidence or not but who was the editor of the newspaper.

Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act allows a presumption to be raised under certain circumstances.

That section reads as follows:- "7. In any legal proceeding whatever, as well civil as criminal, the production of a copy of such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of some Court empowered by this Act to have the custody of such declaration (or, in the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper containing his name printed on it as that of the editor) shall be held (unless .the contrary be proved) to be sufficient evidence, as against the person whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration, (or printed on such newspaper, as the case may be) that the said person was printer or publisher, or printer and publisher (according as the words of the said declaration may be) of every portion of every

(newspaper) whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the (newspaper) mentioned in the declaration (or the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced.) The term 'editor' is defined in the Act to mean a person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper. Where there is mentioned an itor as a. person who is responsible for selection of the matenal s. 1 raises the presumption in respect of such a person. The name of that. person has to be printed on the copy of the newspaper and m the

' A iiii

MAHARASHTRo\ v. CHOWDHARY (Hldayatullah, /.) 711

present case the name of Madane admittedly was printed as the Editor of the Maharashtra in the copy of the Maharashtra which contained the defamatory article.

The declaration in Form I which has been. produced before us shows the name of Madane not only as the printer and publisher but also as the editor. In our opinion the presumption will attach to Madane as having selected the material for publication in the newspaper.

It may not be out of place to note that Madane admitted that he had written this article. In the circumstances. not only the presumption cannot be drawn against the others who had not declared themselves as editors of the newspaper but it is also fair to leave them out because they had no concern with the publishing of the artiCle in question. On the whole therefore the order of discharge made by the learned Single Judge appears to be proper in the circumstances of the case and we see no reason to interfere.

The appeal fails and iq dismissed.

V.P.S.

Appeal dismirsed-

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

R. B. CHOWDHARY & 2 ORS

April 19, 1967

M. HIDAYATULLAH

s. 7

s. 5

s. 342

s. 342

Press and Registration of Books Act

s. 7

H. R. Khanna

S. P. Nayyar

S. C. Agarwal

Hidayatullah

High Court of Bombay

Sudhakar Gopal Madane

S. 500

Indian Penal Code

October

30, 1959

M. A. Dcshmukh

Art. 3

Madane

Additional Sessions Judge Dhulia

October 26, 1963

S. 342

Code of Criminal Procedure

State of Maharashtra

S. 342

S. 7

Code of Criminal Procedure

S. 342

S. 342

Section 7

Press and Registration of Books Act

s. 1


RENTALA LATCHAIAH & ORS.

v. cmMMAPUDI SUBRAHMANYAM April 19, 1967

IK. N. WANCHOO, C.J., V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J B

Hyderabad Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, ss. 2(13) a11d 5-Persons put Into PO!sesslon of land by trespasser-Whether 'asami s/ilkml' under s. 2(13)-Whether can claim benefit of s. S as lawful cu/ti• valors of the land,

R died in 1941 leaving certain landed properties. His adopted son filed a suit for a declaration in favour of his adoption aainst R's widow C • as defendant. During the pendency of the suit the widow was put in ·:.,, possession of'.the lands by the revenue authorities. The plaintiff added a r prayer of possession to bis plaint. The court served the widow with an injunction not to deal with the lands in any way during the pendency <>f the suit. In 1951 the suit was decreed in favour of the adopted son but nevertheless in 1952 the widow leased the lands to the appellants.

In execution of the decree of the court possession of the lands was given in 1954 to the adopted son and the appellants were ejected. The appel- D Jan ts thereupon filed a claim under s. 32( 1) of the Hyderabad Tenancy .& Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 to be put back in possession of the lands <>n the plea tliat they had been lawfully cultivating the land as tenants.

The Tehsildat' and the Collec!Or held in their favour but the High Court in revision decided against them. They came to this CQ_urt by special leave.

HELD : The appellants were inducted on the land by R's widow after .I the decree in the suit for declaration of title and possession in favour • <>f the adopted son. After the passing of the decree the possession of the widow could only be that of a trespasser and it was not open to her to create any right in the land in favour of anybody.

The appellants could not get the benefit of s. 5 of the Act as they could not be said to <:, be lawfully cultivating the land. They could not call in aid the definition of 'asami shikmi' in s. 2(13) of the Act. When the person who induct- F ed the tenants-Ori the land was found to be a trespasser on the date of the induction, the tenants could not continue to have a right to be on the land against the will of the true owner. [714 G-H; 715 A-C; 719 G]

Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Hakim,

[1963] 3 S.C.R. 1, Mo/1ima Chunder Shafi•' v. Hazari Pramanik, I.L.R. 17 Calcutta 45 and Binad Lal Pakrashi' v. Kalli Pramanik, I.L.R. 20 Calcutta 708, distin- _-guished.

C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 611 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 10, 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1128 of 1959.

A. V. Rangam, for the appellants.

P. Ram Reddy, Triyambak Rao Deshmukh and R. Vasutlev Pillai, for the respondent.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mitter, J, This is an appeal by special leave, from a judgment in a batch of civil revision petitions decided_ by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in September, 1962.

Th.~ facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows.

One Ramalingayya died in the year 1941 possessed of considerable properties includin~ the lands which formed the subject matter of the above menlloned civil revision petitions.

Before his death, he had adop'.ed the petitioner before the High Court one Chimmapudi Subrahman¥am, tl.e respondent before this Court.

He came into possession of the l'roperties of his adoptive father after the latter's death. Ramahngayya's widow

howev.r raised a dispute about the facturn and validity of the adoption and claimed the properties as the heir of her husband.

Subrahmanyam filed a suit in the court of the Dis'.rict Munsif, Khanunam for a declaration that he was the adopted son of Ramalingayya.

Pending the disposal of the suit, however, Ramalingayya's widow. who was the. 4th respondent in C.R.P.

No. 36 of 1952 before the High Court, claimed, to have her name registered in the register maintained under the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act of 1317 F. by virtue of the provisions of s. 59 of that Act.

The land revenue authorities registered the widow Kaveramma as pattedar and dispossed the adopted son of all the lands putting Kaveramma in possession thereof.

The E . adopted son amended his plaint by including a prayer for pos- . session.

During the pendency of the suit, the widow Kaveramma was prohibited by an order of injunc'.ion from dealing with the lands in any way.

This was sometime in the year

1944. The suit of the adopted son was decreed by the trial court on March 24, 1951 both with regard to the declaration of the right of adoption and succession as also . -possession over the lands mentioned in the schedule to ihe plaint. Thereafter, some time in the year 1952 (the exact dafe aoes not appear from the records before us) Kaveramrna leased the lands which were the subject matter of the civil revision petitions to the appellants before this court. This is borne out by the judgment of the District Collector, Khammam dated March 19 1959 and the petition for special leave to this Court dated October 18 1962.

Kaveramma preferred an appeal from the deCree passed ' against 0

her and this was dismissed by the High Court in 1954. The adopted son put the decree in execution and got delivery of possession through the court in August 1954. It appears that very soon

tereafter, in September 1954 the appellants surrendered possession of the lands to him and executed a deed in respect thereof.

otwithstanding that, about a year afterwards, they filed a petition on October 7, 1955 for possession of the lands alleging that they had bf>.en in possession for "the last six years in the

capacity of tenants".

Their allegation further was that the A adopted son and his mother had dispossessed them from the suit lands and they therefore prayed for being put back into possession. This claim was preferred under s. 32 (1) of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.

The Tahsildar made an ord.er in favour of the appella11ts in July 1958 which was upheld in appeal to the Collector in March, 1959. This B led to the revision applications before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

The High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petitions "' and this has led to the appeal.

Under s. 32(1) of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') "a tenant or an agriculural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession." "Tenant" has been defined in s. 2_(v) of the Act as meaning an asami shikmi who holds lands on lease and includes a p.rson who is deemed to be .a tenant under the provisions of the Act.

The relevant portion of s. 5 of the Act provides as follows :-

"A person lawfully culti~Jting any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the land-holder if such person is not- ( a) a member of the landholder's family, or

(b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind, but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the landholder or any member of the landholder's family, or ( c) a mortgagee in possession :

The appellants before th.is Court never were the tnan!s of Ramalingayya.

They were mduc'.ed on the land by his widow -after the decree of the suit for declaration of title and possession in favour of the adopted son. After the pas_sing of the decree, G the possession of the widow could only be that of a trespasser and it was not open to her to create any right in the land in favour of anybody.

It was argued however hoth before th_e High Court and before this Cour! that the appellants were enutled to the benefit of s. 5, as they were lawfully cultivating the land and should therefore be deemed to be tenants of such la!ld. It H was contended that the word "lawfully" was to 1J<: taken 1.n conjunction i!h the words "cultivating" ad the eg1slature mtended to oro!Cdt-1he actual tillers of the sot! even 1f the person wh~

LATCHAL.\H v. SUBRAMANIAM (Mitter, 1.) 715

put them in possession was found not to have any title to the land. . This would indeed be a very strange provision of the law and would, if upheld, amount to encouraging trespass on the land by persons who had no shadow of title and creating rights in favour of others although they themselves had no title to the land. The meaning of the word 'asami shikmi' in the definition of the tenant in s. 2(v) does not appear from any provision of the Act but our attention was drawn to the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, s. 2 (13), according to which " 'asami shikmi' means a lessee, whether holding under an instrument or under an oral. agreement, and includes a mortgagee of an asami shikf!1.i's .rights with possession, but does not ~lude 8: lessee holding directly under Government". In our op1mon, this does not help the appellants for the definition shows that a person who claims to be an asami shikmi had to be a lessee either holding under a document of lease or under an oral agreement.

The position might have been different if the appellants had been inducted on the lands by the widow after her recognition as a pattedar by the revenue authorities and before the disposal of the suit against her; but, we are not concerned with that situation. The High Court had considered at some length the question whether she c.ould create any tenancy rights when there was an injunction restraining her from alienating any -property. We do not think it was necessary to go into tha~ question for normally the order of injunction which was passed as an interlocutory measure would not survive the decree of the trial court.

Learned counsel for the appellants cited the judgment of this Court in Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Hakim(') and it was argued that the object of the Hyderabad Act of 1950 was to afford similar protection as was given to the tenants inducted by mortgagees under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948. Under s. 2 (18) of the om bay Act of 1948 as the same stood at the material time, a tenant was defined as "an agriculturist who holds lands on lease and includes a person who is deemed to be tenant under the provisions of the Act." S. 1.4 of the Act provided that "notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a Court of Law, the tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall not be detern1ined unless the conditions specified in that section were fulfilled." In that case, it was common ground. that the tenancy of the respondent was ;11ot soght to determmed on any of the grounds in s. 14 but 1t was m execution of an award made by the Debt Relief Court that the respondent was dispossessed. The relevant portion of s. 4 of that Act provided:

"A person lawfully culth:ating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if

(I) (1963) 3 S.C.R. I.

such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such perso11 is not

(a) a member of the wner's family or ( b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivatinl!' the land under the personal supervision of the owner's family, or

(c) a mortgagee in possession."

It was found in that case that the respondent was cultivating the land which belonged to another peoon, that he was lawfully cultivating the land because he derived his right to. cultivate Jt ..

from the mortgagee of the land and did not fall within the ex C cepted categories.

In these circumstances, it was held by this Court that he was a "deemed tenant" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Act. This Court observed in that case:

"A mortgagee in possession is excluded from the class of deemed tenants on ground of public. policy: to confer that status upon a mortgagee in wssession would .be to invest him with rights inconsistent with his fiduciaiy character. A transferee of the totality of .the rights of a mortgage in possession may also be deem- ed to be a mortgagee in possession. But a tenant of the mortgagee in pQSsession is inducted o.n the land in the ordinary course o( lllj\nagement under authority derived from tfte mortgagor and so long as the mortgage subsists, even under the ordinary law he is not liable to be evicted by the mortgagor." According to this Court

" .... the Legislature by restricting the exclusion to mortgagees in possession from the class of deemed tenants intended that the tenant lawfully inducted by the mortgagee shall on redemption of the mortgage be deemed to be tenant of the mortgagor."

In Dahya Lal's case(') the ratio decidendi was that the mortgagee in possession had the right to induct tenants on the land: normally, the right of such tenants would come to an end with the extinction of the rights of the mortgagee but the object of the Act was to give proteetion to tenants who had been law fully inducted thereon, inter alia by the mortgagee and this class of tenants could be said to be lawfully cultivating the land. Such

is not the position in the case before us. Kaveramma did not induct the tenants on .the land in the normal course of manage

(1) {196313 S.C.R. I.

A ment of the property. She put them in possession when she had lost her right to be there and consequently the decision of this Court in Dahya Lat's case can be of no assistance to the appc; llants before us.

TM appellants however sought to rely on two decisions of the Calcutta High Court which turned on the interpretation of some provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In Mohima Chunder Saha v. Hawri Parmanik(') the plaintiff, appellant before the High Court sued to eject the defendants and recover possession of the land pertaining to the estate of Char Bantai, of which they stated that they and their predecessors had been for many years in possession as . proprietors. It was alleged by them that the land sued for was diluviated by the river in 1284 F. and subsequently re-formed on the old site when they re-took possession of it; that Government and other zarnindars of a neighbouring mouza had dispossessed them in 1284 F. and

the plaintiffs had, in a suit brought against those zarnindars, obtained a decree declaring their rights and got possession of the D land.

They had repeatedly asked the defendants to quit the land but the latter failed to do so. The Munsff found that the defendants had not acquired a right of occupancy, and were liable to be ejected. In appeal to the District Judge it was held that although the defendants had not proved their acquisition of a right of occupancy, they were non-occupancy ryots and not mere trespassers and as such they were not liable to be ejected except under s. 44 of the Bengal Tenancy Act on grounds which did not exist in the case. Before the High Court it was contended that the defendants were not non-occupancy ryots and as such could be ejected a~ trespassers. The High Court held that the defendants were cultivating ryots who were placed on the property

by the Collector and that they had held possession for many years but not for a period sufficient to create a right of occupancy. Accordingly they were within the cll!SS termed in the Bengal Tenancy Act as non-occupancy ryots.

Under s. 5(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a ryot means primarlly "a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family, or by hired servants, or with the ai'd of partners, and includes also the successors in interest of persons who have acquired such a right." S. 4 of the Act specified non-occupancy ryots as one of the classes of tenants under that Act. Under s. 3 (3) of the Act a

tenat means "a perso'! who holas land under another per; on and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that person." The High Court held that the defendants were clearly liable o pay for use and occupation of the land and in the light of the definition of "rent" in s. 3 ( S) it.

had to be held that the defendants were ryots and therefore nonoccupancy ryots within the terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

The High Court finally observed :

"It may seem anomalous that the defendants, who have no title from the plaintiffs directly, or through their predeco:ssors in estate, should thus be protected as non:occupancy ryots from ejectment as trespassers at the plaintiff's free will; but it seems to us that this is in accordance with the general spirit of the Bengal Tenancy Act, . which regards a landlord as a rent-receiver and as able to ject a tenant or cultivator of the soil, not an under-teilant, only for certain specified reasons and conditions, none of which here exist.

If the defendants had acquired a right of occupancy by occupation for twelve years, they would have been protected from ejectment, and as non-occupancy ryots they are also protected, except as specially provided."

It will therefore be noticed that the scheme of the Bengal Tenancy Act was entirely different from the provisions of the Act. we have to construe. There occupancy ryots were protected altogether from ejectment but so long as they were non-occupancy ryots they were also protected except under conditions mentioned in s. 44.

Here too the Act would have protected them if their original induction was lawful so that they could be said to be lawfully cultivating the lands. ·

The other decision of the Calcutta High Court is that in Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik(' ). In this case the plaintiffs who were proprietors sought to oust the defendants from certain lands which they were cultivating in Barakahali village.

Previously thereto, there was a dispute regarding these lands between the plaintiffs and the trustees of the late D. N. Tagore who claimed them as the re-formed I.ands of village Modhupur.

The plaintiffs were dispossessed of the lands in consequence of the order of a Magistrate who in a proceeding under s. 145 Cr.P.C. declared possession to be with the trustees.

The lower courts found that the. defendants were settled on the land by the. trustees but they had not acquired a right of occupancy at the time the suits were brought against them by the plaintiffs in January 1889. Meanwhile in 1878 the plaintiffs had sued the trustees and obtained decrees which were confirmed in appeal by the High Court.

In January 1886 the plaintiffs took possessipn of the .lands as against the trustees and then they brought suits to eject the defendants as trespassers.

They had not received rent from the defendants or in any way admitted their tenancy.

The trial court decreed the suits in favour of the

plaintiffs but these were upset in appeal by the District Court on the authority of Moh/ma Chunder Saha's(') case. According to the Full Bench:

"The possession of the land in question for the purpose of cultivating it was acquired a good many years ago by the defendants from the persons who at that tllllc were m actual possession of the zemindari within which it was situated and who were then the only persons who could give possession of the lands of the zemindari to cultivators."

The Full Bench held that although they had established their right to the zamindari the plaintiffs could not treat the cultivators as trespassers and obtain khas possession of the lands from them.

Referring to s. 5(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the learned Chief Justice aid:

"The possession and interest in the land which the defendants acquired from the persons in possession of the zemindari was a right io hold it for the purpose of cultivating it as against all the world except the true owners of the zemindari, and against them unless they proved a title to the zemindari paramount to that of the plaintiff's landlords.

This was, I think, a risJ!.t to hold the land for the purpose of cultivating it within the meaning of section 5, cl. 2 . . . . the defendants are ryots, and the only right of the person who has obtained possession of the zemindari is to the rent payable for the land, and not to the khas possession of the land itself, unless they

- can do so under the provisions of the Tenancy Act."

The facts in the Calcutta cases were different from the case

befre 1:1s and the Bc':1gal. Tenancy Act gave protection to persons cultivating the land m circumstances which do not obtain here.

t would therefor~ not be right to hold, on the basis of the decisions m the Calcutta High Court, that although the person who inducted the tena1:1ts on. the land was found. to be a trespasser on the date of such mduction, the tenantscontinued to have a right to be on the land against the will of the true owner.

1:he appeal therefore fails d is dismissed, but, on the facts of this "Case, we do not make any order as to costs.

G.C.

Appeal dismissed.

RENTALA LATCHAIAH & ORS

cmMMAPUDI SUBRAHMANYAM April

IK. N. WANCHOO, C.J.

V. BHARGAVA

G. K. MITTER, JJ

Agricultural Lands Act, 1950

ss. 2(13)

s. 2(13)

s. 32( 1)

Agricultural Lands Act, 1950

s. 5

s. 2(13)

[1963] 3 S.C.R. 1

A. V. Rangam

P. Ram Reddy

Triyambak Rao Deshmukh

R. Vasutlev Pillai

Mitter

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Ramalingayya

Chimmapudi Subrahman¥am

Ramahngayya

Subrahmanyam

court of the Dis'.rict Munsif, Khanunam

s. 59

Kaveramma

March 24, 1951

Kaveramrna

Khammam

October 7, 1955

s. 32

s. 32(1)

s. 2

s. 5

s. 5

s. 2(v)

s. 2

s. 2

S. 1

s. 14

s. 4

s. 4

Dahya Lal

Dahya Lat

Calcutta High Court

Char Bantai

s. 44

SS termed in the Bengal Tenancy Act

s. 5(2)

S. 4

s. 3

s. 3

s. 44

Barakahali village

D. N. Tagore

Modhupur

s. 145

Cr.P.C

Moh/ma Chunder Saha

s. 5(2)

section 5

cl. 2

Calcutta


YUSUFALLI ESMAIL NAGREE v.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

April 19, 1967

[M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND C. A. VAIDiALINGAM, JJ.]

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872) ss. 7 and 8-Tape re• cording-Value-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ( Act 5 of 1898) s. 162-Talk recorded on tape in seclusion with police decoy,-Pollce Officer in another room-If statement made to the police.

Constitution of India, Art. 20(3)-Police laid trap-Person makes incriminating statement not knowing the trap-If protected,

On report of S, that the appellant had offered a bribe to him, which S did not accept, the Police laid' a trap. S called the appellant at his residence and in the room where they alone were present, the appellant handed over the bribe to S.

In the room a microphone of a tape re corder was concealed and their conversation recorded. The Poliee offi

cers and the radio mechanic kept concealed in another room. S was tho only eye-witness to the offer of the bribe and the tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector but was not sealed. The appellant was convicted under s. 165A I.P.C., which the High Court upheld. In appeal, this Court :-

HELD : The conviction must be upheld.

The contemporaneous dialogue bet.ween the appellant and S formed part of the res gestae and is relevant and admissible under s. 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. The dialogue is proved by S.

The tape record of the dialogue corroborates his testimony. The process of tape record

ing offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds.

The imprint on the magnetic. tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a cont.:mporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. The time and place and accuracy of the recording must be proved by a competent witness and the voices must be properly identified. One of. the features of magnetic tape recording is the ability to erase and re-use the recording medium. Because of this facility of erasure and re-use, the evidence must be received with caution. The court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the

record has not been tampered with. [723 H-724 B, DJ

Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad and Anr. A.I.R. 1956 Punj. 173; Mahindra Nath v. Biswanath Kundu, 61 C.W.N. 191; approved.

S. Pratap Singh v. The Slate of Punjab,', (1964] 4 S.C.R, 733 and R. v. Maqs11d Ali, [1965] 2 All E.R. 464; .followed.

There. was other evidence showing thRt the tape recording ws not

tampred with. The fact that the defence did not sugant any tamper H

in~ lends assurance to the credibility of the other evidence. The courts

below rightly held that the tape recorder faithfully recorded and repro

duced the actual conversation. The use of the stateme11ts of both S and the appellant when the trap was laid. was not barred by s, 162 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was not making a state ment to the sub-inspector of police or to any other police officer. He was not even aware that any police officer was listening to him. He was talking to S.

No doubt S was a police decoy assisting the police in their investigation, but the statement of the appellant to S while making another offer of a bribe cannot be regarded as a statement by him to the police. Nor can the words uttered by S be regarded as a statement to the police.

S was talking to the appellant. He knew that what he said was being recorded for subsequent use by the police officers. But he was not speaking to any police officer. There was a dialogue in which S and the appellant took part, Each spoke to the other. but neither made

a statement to a police officer. [724 H; 725 DFJ

Ramkisha11 Mitlzan/al Sharma v.

The State of Bombay,

[1955) I S.C.R. 903, 922-23; referred to.

 The appellant was not right in claiming protection under Art. 20(3) ofthe Constitution against the use of the statement made by him on the ground that by the active deception of the police, he was compelled to be a . witness against himself. The appellant was not compelled to be a witness against himself. He was free to talk or not to talk. His conversation with S was voluntary.

There was no element of duress, coer4 cion or compulsion. His statements were not extracted from him in an oppressive manner or by force or against his wishes. The fact that the tape recording was done without his knowledge is not of itself an objection to its admissibility in evidence. [726 BD]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1963.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 2, 3, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1243 of 1962.

B. M. Mistry, Jatendra Mahajan, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appeUant.

S. G. Patwardhan, R. N. Sachthey, S. 1'. Nayyar for R. H.

Dhebar, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

chawa~, J.

I_n .this appeal, the appellant challenges the legahty of his conv1cuon under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code. . H_is ife Rukhanbiri was the owner of the two house properu.es. m F wad of the Bombay Municipal Corporation.

Te bml.dmgs were m a ruinous condi!ion and she was served "Ith noti~s under s. 354 .of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act requ1mg er to repair and secure them. The notices were not comphc:d with a!Jd prosecutions under s. 471 of the Act were started aga1st her 1n the Presidency magistrate's court.

The su!11monses issued to her wl!re s.erved by affixation and on her failure to ppear in court a bailable warrant for her arrest was 'Issued.

One Munir Ahmed Shaikh a notice clerk attached to 'F' ward building department of the Bombay Muni-

<:ipal Corporation, was entrusted with the duty of serving the warrant.. The charge against the appellant was that he offered to Shaikh on July 18, 1960, a sum of Rs. 25 and on August 2,

1960, a sum of Rs. 100 as a bribe for not executing the warrant.

The appellant started making approaches to Shaikh from July l, 1960.

Shaikh reported the .matter to the municipal -commissioner who directed N. W. Naik' to investigate into the matter.

Naik was the administrative officer of the corporation .in charge of investigation of complaints regarding corruption, bribery and other malpractices.

Over the telephone Shaikh .arranged a meeting with the appellant in the evening of July 18,

1960 at the office of the India Metal Co., of which one A. M.

Karachiwala was the proprietor. Naik under the assumed name Of C. J. Mehta went with Shaikh to the office of the India Metal Co. In the presence of Naik, the appellant offered a bribe' of Rs. 25 to Shaikh pn July 18, 1960 but Shaikh did not accept the bribe.

On August 2, 1960 the appellant had a telephone talk with .Shaikh and fixed an appointment at 'Shaikh's residep.ce in the -evening.

Shaikh lodged a complaint with the anti-corruption Bureau reporting the•offer of a bribe of Rs. 25 on July 18 and the appointment at his residence in the evening_ of August 2.

After the complaint was recorded, S. G. S. I. Mahajan obtained the necessary permission from the Chief Presidency magistrate to investigate into the offence.

Mahajan decided to lay a trap. •On a sofa in the outer room of Shaikh's residence he set up a microphone which was connected to a tape recorder in the inner room. The microphone was conce.aled behind books. Mahajan, a radio mechanic. and other members of his party remained in the inner room. Shaikh stayed in the outer room. Tlfe outer room and the person of Shaikh were searched and no cash was found.

At the appoin'.ed hour, the appellant came to Slfaikh's residence •and was received by Shaikh in the outer room. Shaikh and the appellant had an intimate conversation.

The appellant offered .a bribe to Shaikh, produced ten currency notes of Rs. 10 each and gave them to Shaikh.

When Shaikh gave the pre-arrange? signal "Salim pan lao", Mahajan and oth:r members. of ~1s party entered the outer room and found the curren!ly notes m Shaikh's short pocket.

The tape recorder was switched on as soon as the appellant arrived and was switched <?ff after the signal was given. 'D!e conversation between Shaikh and. the appellant was recorded m the tape recorder. The tape remamed in the custody of Mahajan. From the shorthand notes _mde after the tape was replayed one Yakub prepared. a . trscnpttn of the conversation. The accuracy of the transcnption 1s admt ted.

At the trial of the case, the tape recorder was played m -court.

YUSUFALLl v, MAHARASHTRA (Bachawat, /.) 723

The special judge for greater Bombay found the appellant guilty of the offence under s. 165-A of the Indian Peria! Code and sentenced him to simple . imprisonment for 18 months and a fine of Rs. 500, in default further imprisonment for six months with the recommendation that he should be treated as class 1 prisonpr. Karachiwalla, the proprietor of India Metal Co., at whose office the bribe of Rs. 25 was offered was charged at the trial with aiding and abetting the commission of the offence under s. 165-A, but was acquitted. The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court. At the commencement of the appeal he waived formal notice for enhancement of the sentence.

The High Court . convicted the appellant under s. 165-A on both counts of the charge separately and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year on each count, the sentences to run conourrently, and a fine of Rs. 250 or in default rigorous imprisonment for three months on each count. . Tli.e High Court declined to recommend class 1 to the appellant. Subject to this modification of the sentence, the appeal to the High Court was dismissed. The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

With regard to the incident of July 18, 1960 the High Court was not inclined to accept the evidence of Shaikh without independent corroboration. The High Court found that Shaikh was substantially corroborated by Naik who had played the role of a detective.

Mr. Mistry argued that Naik was an accomplice E and his evidence should not be accepted without corroboration.

It is not right to say that Naik was an accomplice. He did not provoke or participate in any crime. The defence counsel conceded in the High Court that Naik had no animus for giving false evidence.

The High Court found Naik to be a reliable witness and worthy of credit and we see no ground for reviewing F this conclusion and the concurrent finding of the courts below that the charge of the offer of a bribe by the. appellant to Shaikh on July 18, 1960 was proved.

Shaikh was the only eye-witness to the offer of the bribe on August. 2, 1960. Mahajan,, the radio mochanic and other persons who kept themselves concealed in the inner room of Shaikh's residence did not witness the offer of the bribe, nor did they har the conversation, be!Ween Shaikh and the appellant.

The High Court was not mchned to accept the evidence of Shaikh without corroboration. But the High Court found that his evidence was sufficiently corroborated by •he tape reoorder. The appellant handed over Rs. 100 to Shaikh on August 2, .1960.

The contemporaneous dialogue between them formed part of the res. gestae and is relevant and admissible under s. 8 of the Indi!I!\ Evidence Act.

The dialogue is proved .by Shaikh.

The tape record of th~.qla; logue corroborates his testimony.

The process

'1l

of tape recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds.

The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds.

Like a photograph of 11 relevant incident, a contemporaneous .tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.

In Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad and another('), a tape record of a fonner statemPnt of a witness was admitted in evidence to shake the credit of the witness under s. 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. The case was followed in Manindra Nath

v. Biswanath Kundu('). In S. Pratap Singh v;' The State of Pun jab ( 3), the tape re.cord of a conversation was admitted in evidence, to corroborate the evidence of witnesses who had stated ihat such a conversation had taken place. In R. v. Maqsud Ali(') a tape record of a conversation was admitted in evidence, though the only witness who overheard it was not conversant with the language and could not make out what was said. If a statement is relevant, an accurate tape record of the statement is also relevant and admissible. The time and place and accuracy of the recording must be proved by a competent witness and the voices must be properly identified.

One of the features of magc netic tape recording is the ability to erase and re-use the recording medium.

Because of this facility of erasure and re-use, the evidence must be received with caution. The court must .be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the record has not been tampered with.

The radio mechanic did not hear the conversation but he proved that the tape recorded all the sounds produced in the room where only Shaikh and the appellant were present. The voices of the appellant and Shaikh were properly identified. The tape was not sealed and was kept in the custody of Mahajan. The absence of sealing naturally gives rise to the argument that the recording medium might have been tampered with before it was r.played.

However, it was not suggested either in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses or in the answers under s. 342, Criminal

Procedure Code, that any tampering had ta!Cen place with the r.ecording. While admitting the accuracy of material parts of te conversation reproduced by the tape recorder, th~ appellant m his examination under s. 342 attempted to explain the conver sation and the object of his visit and said that he had goe to Shaikh's residence for obtaining repayment of a loan of Rs. 100 which he had advanced to Shaikh on JUiy 19, 1960. The High _ Court rejected the appellant's explantions. Mr. Mistir was right in saying that the Htgh Court coulif not accept the mculpatory part and reject the exculpatory part of the appellant's answers

fl) A.1.R.1956)'uni. I73. <'i>>

1%~5J~ii1l.~.464.

(3) [1964] 4 S.C:R. 733.

under s. 342. But there was other evidence showing , that the tape recording was not tampered with. The fact that the defence did not suggest any tampering lends assurance to the credibility of the other evidence. The courts below rightly held that the tape recorder faithfully recorded and reproduced the actual conversation.

The appellant had walked into a pre-arranged trap. Mahajan and other police officers had hidden themselves in the inner room.

Shaikh kiiew that the police officers were recording the conversation and was naturally on his guard while talking to the appellant.

The appellant was not aware of the presence of the police officers.

He was lulled into a sense of security and was off his guard. The offence of the attempt to bribe Shaikh on July 18, 1960 had already been committed and reported to the police and was under investigation on August 2, 1960 when Shaikh ,; md. the appellant met and talked. The evidence of the conversation was tendered at the trial of the offence committed on July 18, 1900 and of the connected offence committed on August 2, 1960. Mr. Mistry argued that in these circumstances, the use of the statements of both Shaikh and the appellant on August 2, 1960, was barred by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are not impressed with this argument.

The appellant was not making a statement to Mahajan or to any other police officer. He was not even aware that any police officer was listening to him. He was 'talking to Shaikh. No doubt Shaikh was a police decoy assisting the police in their investigation, but the statement of the appellant to Shaikh while making another offer of a bribe cannot be regarded as a statement by him to the police. Nor can the words uttered by Shaikh be regarded as a statement to the police. Shaikh was talking to the appellant. He knew that what he said was being recorded for subsequent use by the police officers. But he was not speaking to any police officer. There was a dialogue in which Shaikh and the appellant took part. Each spoke to the other, but neither made a sta:tement to a police officer. The case of Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay(') shows

tha~ where identification parades are directed and supervised . by pohce ocers and eld in their presence and the panch witnesses take a mmor part m the matter, the statements of the identifiers may be regarded .as statements to the police officers. In the present case, the pohce officers set the stage for the drama in which the acors we!e Shaikh and , the appellant. The officers hid themselves 11! the mner room and took no part in the drama. Neither of them can be regarded as having made a statement to a police officer as contemplated by s. 162.

Counsel claimed protection under Art. 20 ( 3) of the Constitu-

(1) (1955] S.C.R._903, 922-23.

726 :strPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 3 S.C.R.

tion against the use of the statements made by the appellant on August 2, 1960.

H~ argued that by the active deception of the police, the appellant was compelled to be. a witness against himself.

Had the appellant known that the police had arranged trap, he would not have talked as h~ did. Compulsion may take many forms. A person accused of an offence may be subject to physical or mental torture. He may be starved or bJlllten and a confession may be extorted from him. By deceitful means he may be induced to believe that his son is being tortured in.an adjoining room and by such inducement he may be compelled to make an incriminating statement. But we cannot say that in this case the appellant was compelled to be a witness against himself. He was free to talk or not td talk. His. conversation with Shaikh was voluntary. There was no element of duress, coercion or compulsion. His statements were not extracted from him in an oppressive manner or by force or against his wishes.. He catt

not claim the protection of Art. 20(3 ). The fact that tho tape recording was done without his knowledge is not of . itself . an objpction to its admissibility in evidence. In saying so, the Court does not lend its approval tO the police practice of tapping telephone wires and setting up hidden microphones for the purpose of tape recording.

The High Court rightly convicted the appellant of the offence under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel pleaded for reduction of the sentence. The appellant is sixty years old.

He is suffering from cardiac troubles. He was removed to jail from the hospital in an ambulance on July 29, 1963. He remained in jail until December 12, 1963 when he was released on bail. Havmg rard to these and other circumstances, we reduce the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him.

With this modification of he sentence, the appeal is dismissed.

Y.P.

Appeal dismissed.

YUSUFALLI ESMAIL NAGREE

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

April 19, 1967

M. HIDAYATULLAH

R. S. BACHAWAT

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

ss. 7 and 8

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 162

Constitution of India

Art. 20(3)

s. 165A

I.P.C

s. 8

Indian Evidence Act

s. 7

Indian Evidence Act

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 20(3)

July 2, 3, 1963

Bombay High Court

B. M. Mistry

Jatendra Mahajan

J. B. Dadachanji

S. G. Patwardhan

R. N. Sachthey

S. 1

R. H.

Dhebar

chawa~

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

chawa~, J.

In .this appeal, the appellant challenges the legahty of his conv1cuon under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code. .

s. 165

Indian Penal Code

s. 354

s. 471

Munir Ahmed Shaikh

N. W. Naik

Naik

A. M.

Karachiwala

C. J. Mehta

August 2, 1960

.Shaikh

S. G. S. I. Mahajan

Chief Presidency magistrate

Mahajan

Slfaikh

Yakub

s. 165

Karachiwalla

India Metal Co.

s. 165

s. 165

July 18, 1960

Mistry

Shaikh

Shaikh

August. 2, 1960

Mahajan

August 2, .1960

s. 8

s. 7

Indian Evidence Act

s. 155(3)

Indian Evidence Act

s. 342

Procedure Code

s. 342

Shaikh

Mistir

s. 342

July 18, 1900

s. 162

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 162

Art. 20

Art. 20(3 )

s. 165A

Indian Penal Code

July 29, 1963

December 12, 1963


COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA v.

GEMINI CASHEW SALES CORPORATION, QUILON

April 20, 1967

[J. c. SHAH, s. M. SIKRI AND v. R.i\MASWAMI, JJ.J

Income-Tax Act, 1922, s. 10(1) and 10(2) (xv)-Partnership dissolved on death of one pattnefr-Whether liability to pay retrenchment compensation under s. 25FF on transfer of business to surviving partner a permissible deduction as liability of a revenue nature.

A partnership of two partners was. dissolved on the death of ono .of them on August 24, 1957 and the busmess was taken over by the _... ing {'artner on his own account. The services of the employees were not interrupted and there was no alteration in their terms of employ ment. In proceedings for assessment to income-tax for the assessment year 1958-59 it was urged on behalf of the firm that an amount of Rs. 1,41,506 taken in.to account under the head "gratuity payable to workers of the business" in settlin_g the accounts of the firm till August 24, 1957 was a permissible out$01ng. The Income-tax Oftlcer rejected the claim and the Appellate Ass!Stant Commissioner confirmed his order.

However, the Tribunal, in a{'peal, held that on the dissolution of the firm, the workmen became en II tied to retrenchment 'compensation under s. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the firm was therefore entitled to the deduction. The High Court, upon a reference, confirmed this view.

On appeal to this Court,

HELD : The amount claimed by the assessee as a permissible allowance in his profit and loss account could not be regarded as properly admissible either under s. 10(1) or under s. 10(2)(x~) of the Income- Tax Act, 1922. [735 Bl

Under the proviso to s. 25FF the liability to pay retrenchment com pensation arose for the first time after the closure of . the business and F not before. It arose not in the carrying on of the business, but on account of the transfer of the business. It was not therefore a liability of a revenue nature and could not be treated as a permissible deduction under s. 10(1). [733 HJ

Alex A. Apcar (Jr.) & Company v. M. V. Gan and Othtr~ AJ.R, 1960 Cal. 14, referred to.

Anakpalia Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Society v. Its Wrmen & Others, [1962] 2 LL.J, 621, Calcutta Company Ltd, v. Commrssroner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 37 I.T.R. 1 and Owen (H. M.

Irispe_ctor of Taxes) v. Southern Railway of Peru Ltd., 36 T.C. 602. distinguished.

Where accounts are maintained on the mercantile system if liability to make a payment has arisen during the time the i9 carried on and the penditure is for .the purpose of carrying on the business, it may be deductible under Section 10(2) (xv) but where the liability is during the whole of the period that the business is carried on Wholly contingent and does not raise any definite obligation during that time it cannot fall L9Sup.Cl/67-3

128 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 3 S.C.R.

within the expression "expenditure laid out or expended wholly or ex A elusively" for the purpose of the business. (734 D-E]

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation, 51 I.T.R. 240 and Standard Mills Company Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay, 63 I.T.R. 470, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 702 of 1966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 30, 1964 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred Case No. 20 of 1963.

S . .T; Desai, S.1( ... Aiyar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.

C T. V. Viswanath. Iyer, S. K. Dho/akia, and 0. C. Mathur, for the respondent.

The Ju.dgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Two persons--Walter and Ramasubramqny- :-:arried. on business in ca5hewnuts as piirtners in the name and style of Messrs; Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation. The partnership wa5 .dissolved on the death of Ramasubramony on August 24, .1957, and the business was taken over and continued by Walter on his own account. The services of the employees were not interrupted and there was no alteration in the terms of employment of the employees of .the establishment.

In proeeedings for assessment of tax it was urged on behalf of the firm that an amount of Rs. 1,41,506 taken into account under the head "Gratuity payable to workers of the business" in

settg the accounts of the firm till August 24, 1957, was a permis- .sible outgoing. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed that order.

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that by the transfer of the undertaking to Walter, there was no interruption in the employment of the workmen of the establishment, that the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workmen were not altered to their detriment, that Walter bad not expressly agreed to take over the. liability for compensation payable. under s. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, and since there was dissolution of the parinership on August 24, 1957 and the undertaking was transferred, the workmen became entitled to retrenchment compensation, which the firm was liable to pay. The Tribunal accordingly .held that . the firm was entitled to deduct the sum of Rs . .l ,41 ;506 in the computation otincome in the assessment year 1958-59. . ..

. In recording their opinion on the following question submitted by the Tribunal,

"Whether the allowance of Rs. 1,41,506 constitutes an allowable expenditure in the assessment of the

72!>

firm for the year 1958-59", '- the High Cour; t of Kerala observed that in the determination of the taxable profits of the firm till its dissolution, considerations about the liability to pay retrenchment compensation devolving upon Walter as the assignee of the business for valuable con..<ideration were irrelevant, and since it was maintaining accounts on mercantile system, the firm could claim as a permissible outgoing the amount for which liability was incurred though no actual payment was made to the workmen. The Commissioner of Income-tax appeals with pecia\ leave, against the order of the High Court recording an answer in the affirmative.

The subject-matter of the claim was retrenchment compensation payable to workmen of the establishment under s. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides :

''No workman employed in any industry who has been in conti.nuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:

Provided that no such notice shalJ be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every

ompleted yr of service or any part thereof m excess of six months; and

( c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government."

Section 25FF, as substituted by Act 18 of 1957 with effect from November 28, 1956, provides :

"Where the ownership or management of an undert::iking is transferred, whether by agreement or by

operauo~ of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every workman who

has been in continuous service for not Jess than one A year in that undedaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F, as if the workman had been retrenched :

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a workman 8 in any case where there has been a change of employers by reasoil" of the transfer, if- •

(a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer;

(b) the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer; and

( c) the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer."

Under s. 25FF the right of. the workmen to retrenchment compensation arises on iransfer of ownership or management from the

empfoyer in relation to the undertaking to a new employer. But in the conditions set out in the proviso no such right accrues. It is common ground that the first and the second conditions in the proviso are satisfied.

Counsel for the Commissioner contended that the third condition of tl1e proviso was also satisfied, and no right to retrenchment compensaiion arose in favour of the workmen under s. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. Counsel for the Commissioner contended that the liability of the partners in a firm to pay retrenchment compensation being joint and several, when the undertaking carried on by a firm is continued by one of the partners after its dissolution, and the services of the workmen are not terminated and the terms and conditions of the service are not made less favourable, the partner continuing the business may appropriately be held liable to pay to ihe workmen retrench ment compensation on the footing that the service of the work men had been continuous.

Counsel relied upon , the view expressed' by the Calcutta High Court in Alex A. Apcar (Ir.) & Company v. M. N. Gan and Others(') in which it was observed that a change of partnership by inclusion or retirement of partner, which legally changes the constitution of the firm, does not result

--(OAJ~R. 1960 Cal. 14

in a "change of business or employer within the meaning of ss. 25F and 25FF".

Counsel for the assessee relied upon a judgment of this Court in Anakapa/ia Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society v.

Its Workmen & Others(') in support of the contention that on a bona fide transfer of an undertaking the workmen employed in the undertaking are entitled to retrenchment compensation under s. 25FF against , the transferor. That however was a case in which the transferee had declined to re-employ the workmen of the transferor and the first condition of the proviso was not fulfilled. That case can have no application to , the present case.

In the view we take, that the allowance claimed is not a proper outgoing, or allowance in computing the profits of the assessee, we do not express any opinion on the question whether. the workmen of the undertaking became entitled to retrenchment compensation on the transfer of the undertaking to Walter.

Liability to pay retrenchment compensation , arises under s. 25FF when there is a transfer of the ownership or management of an undertaking : it arises on the transfer of the undertaking aad not before. Transfer of ownership or management of an undertaking in law operates, except in the conditions sei. out in the proviso, as retrenchment of the workmen. But until there is a transfer of the undertaking resulting in determination of employment, the workmen do not become entitled to retrenchment compensation. . So long as the ownership of the business continues with the employer, the right of the workmen to claim compensation remains contingent. A workman ~, before the transfer Qf

owrship of the business, himself terminate the employment: he may die or he may become superannuated: in none of these cases the owner of the business is under any obligation .to pay retrenchment compensation to the workman. The obligation to pay compensation becomes definite only when there is retrenchment by .the employer, or when the ownership or management of the undertaking is, except in the cases contemelated by the proviso, transferred to a new employer, and not till then. The right therefore arises from determination of employment, or from transfer of the undertaking : it has no existence before these events take place.

The judgment of this Court in Calcutta Company Ltd v. Commt'ssioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(2 ) on which reliance was placed by. counsel for 0the assessee has no bearing on the present cas!'., for m that case, expenditure which it was estimated had to be mcurred t.o discharge an xisting and definite obligation enforceable agamst the .assessee m praesenti was held a permissible

(I} (1962) 2 L.L.J. 621.

(2) 37 I.T.R. t.

deduction in the compuiation of income.

The Calcutta Company Ltd had sold plots of land for building purposes undertaking to develop them within six months by laying out roads, providing drainage and installing lights, etc. In. the accounts of the Company maintained according to the mercantile system, the Company had credited the full sale price of the plots agreed to be paid by the purchasers, but not actually received, and against the price it debited an estimated sum as expenditure for the development it had undertaken to carry out, even though no part of the amount was actually spent. By the terms of sale, the Company had undertaken an unconditional obligation which was enforceable against it : the liability was not contingent upon the happening of a future event. It was held by this Court that the outgoing debited was properly admissible.

The decision of the House of Lords in Owen (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Southern Railway of Peru Ltd.(') on which counsel for the assessee relied also does not assist the the assessee.

In that case under the Peruvian law the Southern Railway of Peru

Ltd. was bound to pay its employees in Per~ prescribed compensation payments upon tennination of .their services, subject to the fulfilment by the employee of certain conditions. The amount to be paid depended on the length of service and rate of pay at the end of .the period of service. The Company set apart from the gross profits of each year sums prospectively payable under the Peruvian law as compensation on the termination of employment.

In proceedings for assessment to tax of the Company made under Case I of Sch. D of the Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. 5, Ch. 40), it was contended on behalf of the Company that upon proper principles of commercial accountancy compensation calculated to have accrued due to each employee from year to year as deferred remuneratien was properly allowable as a deduction.

The Special Commissioners upheld .the claim of the company on the ground that it was a matter of correct accountancy practice to make provision in the accounts for the sums in question. . The - matter reached .the House of Lords in appeal from an order on a reference under s. 64 of the Income-Tax Act, 1952. The House held that where a number of similar contingent obligations arise

from trading, there is no rule of 'law which prevents the deduction of a provision for hem in ascertaining annual prots,. if a sufficiently accurate eshmate can be made. But a ma1or1ty of the House held that the "provision claimed by the Company throughout the proceedings was not permissible by reason of the absence of discount and other factors".

Lord MacDermott observed at p. 635:

". . . . as a general, proposition it is, I think, right to say "that in computing his taxable profits for a

(I) 36 T.C. 602.

.It

particular year a trader who is under a definite obligation to pay his employees for their services in that year an immediate payment and also a future payment in some subsequent year, may properly deduct not only the immediate payment but the present value of the future payment provided such present value can be satisfactorily determined or fairly estimated.

Apart from special circumstances, such a procedure, if practicable, is justified because it brings the true costs of trading in the particular year into account for that year and thus promotes the -ascertainment of the "annual profits or gains arising or accruing from" the trade."

Lord MacDermott was of the view that the provision made by the Company led to anomalies, and was not admissible as made, and .the case should be remitted to the Special Commissioners whether it is practicable to arrive at satisfactory deductions .. Lord Radcliffe with whom the Lord Chancellor and Lord Tucker areed was of the view that there is no rule of law which forbids the introduction of a provision for future payme1,1ts in or payments out, if the right to receive them or the liability to make them, is in legal terms contingent at the closing of the relevant year.

The question which arises in the present case is not about the admissibility of a provision made by. a trader by the adoption of a reasonably satisfactory method estimating the present value of an obligation which may arise in future to pay a sum of money to his employees.

The question that falls to be determined is whether the liability which arises on transfer of the business is to be regarded as a permissible outgoing in the account of the business which is transferred. Broadly stated, the present value on commercial valuation of money to become due in future, under

~ definite .obligation, will be a permissible outgoing or deduction m computing the taxable profits of a trader, even if in certain conditions the obligation may cease to exist because of forfeiture of the ght. Where, h.owever, tJ:te oligtion of the trader is purely contingent, no questton of estimating tts present value may arise for to be a permissible outgoing or allowance, there must in th~ year f account be a present obligation capable of commercial valuatton.

As. already observed, the liability .to pay retrenchment compensation arose for the first time after the closure of the business and not before. It arose not in the carrying-on of the business but. on account of te transfer of e business. During the entir~ penod that the busmess was contmuing, there was no liability to pay retrenchment .compensation.

The liabllity which arose on

trasfer f the busmess was not of a revenue nature. Profits of a bus.mess mvolve comparison between the state of the business at

two specific dates. Nonnally the liability which occurs after the last date, unless its source is in a pre, existing definite obligation, cannot be regarded as a part of the outgoing of the business debitable in the profit & Joss account. A deduction which is proper and necessary for ascertaining the balance of profits and gains of the business is undoubtedly properly allowable, but. where a liability .to ma!ce a payment arises not in the course of the business, not for the purpose of carrying on the business, but springs from the transfer of the business, it is not, in our judgment, a properly debitable item in its profit & loss account as a revenue outgoing.

Thel claim of the finn to treat it as an item in the detennination of the profits of the finn under s. 10 (I) of the Income-tax Act cannot, therefore, be sustained.

Under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act in the computation of taxable profits (omitting parts of the clause not material) "any expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation'', i.e. business, profession or vocation carried on by tlte assessee, is a permissible allowance.

But to be a permissible allowance the expenditure must be for the purpose of carrying on the business.

Where accounts are maintained on the the mercantile system, if liability to make the payment has arisen during the time the business is carried on, it may appropriately be regarded as expenditure. But where the liability is, during the whole of the period that the business is carried on, wholly contingent and does not raise any definite obligation during the time that the business is carried on, it caruiot fall within the expression "expenditure laid

ot or expended wholly and exclusively" for the ptirpooe of. the business.

Two cases illustrative of the principle may be noticed. It was held by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation(') that a provision made in the annual accounts maintained by an employer setting apart by way of a reserve to meet the liability, if any, to which the employer may become subject in the event of retrenching workmen because of the necessity of retrenchment of the services of the staff, was not a liability in praesenti in the year of account, but was only a contingent liability which ip.ay arise on the happening of a particular continge; ny and '"'.as not. allo"'.able as a deduction in assessment of tax. This Court m dealmg with a case under the Wealth Tax Act in Standard Mills Company Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay( 2 ) held that .a liabty

under the award of the Industrial Court to pay gratuilty to its employees at certain rates on death while in service, or on :voluntary retirement or resignation after fifteen years' contmuous

(I) 511.T.R. 24J.

(2) 63 l.T.R.47J,

service, or on tennination of service after certain specified periods, but not if the employee was dismissed for dishonesty or misconduct, was a mere contingent liability which arose only when the employment of the employee was determined by death, incapacity, retirement or resignation : the liability did not exist in praesenti.

The amount of Rs. 1,41,506/- claimed as a permissible allowance by the assessee in its profit & loss account cannot, in our judgment, be regarded as properly admissible either under s. 10

(I) or s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The answer to the question must, therefore, be in the negative.

The appeal is allowe4 and the order passed by the High Court is set aside.

The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs in this Court.

R.K.P.S.

Appeal allowed.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA

GEMINI CASHEW SALES CORPORATION, QUILON

April 20, 1967

c. SHAH

s. M. SIKRI

Income-Tax Act, 1922

s. 10(1) and 10(2)

s. 25F

August 24, 1957

1,41,506 taken in.to account under the head "gratuity payable to workers of the business" in settling the accounts of the firm till August 24, 1957 was a permissible out$01ng.

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 10(1)

s. 10(2)(x~)

Income- Tax Act, 1922

s. 25F

s. 10(1)

Section 10(2)

Aiyar

R. N. Sachthey

T. V. Viswanath. Iyer

S. K. Dho

C. Mathur

Shah

Walter

Ramasubramqny-

Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation

Ramasubramony

August 24, .1957

Industrial Disputes Act

Industrial Disputes Act

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 25F

November 28, 1956

Section 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act

Calcutta High Court

ss. 25F and 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

Calcutta Company Ltd

Southern Railway of Peru

Ltd.

Income Tax Act, 1918

s. 64

Income-Tax Act, 1952

MacDermott

Radcliffe

Tucker

s. 10

Income-tax Act

s. 10(2)

Income-tax Act

Madras High Court

s. 10

s. 10(2)(xv)

Income-tax Act