B •

THE ANDHRA PRABHA LTD. & ORS ..

SECRETARY, MADRAS UNION OF JOURNALISTS & ORS . . May 4, 1967 .

[K. N. WAN'CHOO, C.J. AND G. K. MITTER, J.J

Industrial Disputes---Company publishing newspapers-Sale of rights of .publishing nelvspapers to oth!!r companies-When a1nounts to closure.

' On April 13, 1959', it was resolved by the Board of Directoni of the Express N_ewspapcrs (P) Ltd, that the company should sell the proprietary rig'hts of printing and publishing its daily and weekly newspapers to the Indian Exr... (Madurai) (P) Ltd., Madurai, and to Andbra Prabha (P) Ltd., Vijaxawada.

In the purchaser-companies, the chair mW! of the Board of Directors of the vendor-company nnd members of his family held 4-000 out of 4200 shares.

On April 22, 1959 there was an agreement between Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. and the Express Newspapers whereby it was agreed that all the employees employed by the vendor-company in connection with the publications purchased by the pufcbaser-company would be taken into th9 service of _the purchasercompany without any change in _their conditions of service. The workers of the Express Newspapers who were protesting against the sale to the company at Vijayawada, on the !lJ'Ound that at an earlier stage assurance bad been given that the publication of the papers would not be shifted from Madras to Vijayawada, were informed of the sale to and the agreement with the company at Vijayawada.

The).' were also informed that the services of those workC'rs who were not wdling to join the purchasercompany at Vijayawada would be terminated on the usual terms as the

Expess Newspar.rs had no work to offer to them.

The workers then gave a notice o strike and. struck work from April 27, 1959. On April 29, 1959 the management of Express Newspapers gave a notice of closure and closed the company, and on the next day, tl10 Government of Madras referred to the Indus)rial Tribunal the two questions namely, ( 1) whetb.-r the transfer of the publication of the news11aper and weekly to Vijayawada was justified, and (2) whether the strike and lock-out were 1ustified. Though the compan¥ closed its -undertaking of publishing !he ne)"spapers and weeklies on April 29 as it had very valuable property 1t retained some persons, one of whom was a reporter, to look after the

propertY, and the teleprinter service in Madras continued to be used till the end of October 1959 by the Madurai and Vijayawada compani~.

The Tribunal held that there. was no evidence of the alleged assurance

no~ to shift to Vijayawada and that the strike was unwarranted.

The

Tribnal how~er held, that the suspension of busiacss at the inception, that J.s on Apnl 29 was a lock out, but became a genuine closure only by the end of Ociober 1959. '"

The workers as well as .. the Management appeaied to this Court.

HELD : 'fhere was a genuine closure even on April '29 and the cheme of dispersal of the original undertaking "'as not 11utln fide. Even tf there had Been no strike there "'"Otlld have been a closure . to give effect to the scheme and the strike only precipitated matters. [9!2C-DJ

The nCw company which \Vas an independent legal entity could not be called a daughter COD]pany or benemidar of the older organisation,

rncrely because, there was in both companies a person or family \\:ho A could guide the destinies of the two companies.

Further, the fact that there was a reporter among the persons retained to look after the property c0uld not l.!ad to the inference that the company did not close

down its business but kept it going to take it u1> whenever it wanted.

Similarly, the failure to inform the competent authority under the Employees' Provident Filild Act of the termination of the employment of 700 workers was an omission, but that could not mean that the workers continued to be in the service of the company.

With regard B to the teleprinter ser\tice, it had been paid for opto October and the • fact that the Madurai and Vijayawada companies used it till the end of October, 1959 would not by itself or in conjunction with other circum stances of the case justify the conclusion that the company retained the teleprinter service for its own use. [914 B-F.l

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeals Nos. 1078 arid 1079 of 1965 and 9 of 1966.

Appeals by special leave from the Award dated July 31, 1963 i of the Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras in Industrial Dispute No. 1 of 1962.

N. C. Chatterjee and R. Gmwpathy Iyer, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1078 and 1079 of 1965) and the respondents (in C.A. No. 9 of 1966).

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, M; K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu, Nagaratnam and Madan Mohan, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 9 of 1966) and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.As.

Nos. 1078 and 1079 of 1965).

R. Thiagarajan, for respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 9 of 1966).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mittl'r, J.

These are three appeals from an award dated July 31, 1963 made by the Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras.

At th.e time when the reference was made, the parties to this dispute were on the one hand, the workers and the staff and the working journalists employed under the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and on the other hand, the private limited company called the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd.

The latter, hereinafter referred to as the Company, ownd and published .newspapers and periodicals from Madras.

These may be split into three groups.

The first group comprised of the Indian Express (daily), Sunday Standard (Weekly) and Screen (Weekly) ; all these were published in English.

The second group consisted of Andhra Prabha (daily l and the Andhra Prabha Illustrated We.ekly (weekly) : these were published in Telugu language. The third group consisted of IW<1 papers Dinamani (daily) and Dinamani Kadir (Weekly) : the; s0 were in Tamil langua';~. (One Ramnath Goenka was the Chair b • 1 . man of the Board of Directors of the company mcorporateu 111

1946.

He was also one of the directors of Express Newspc•:'c''

G -

• H

1---

A Ltd. which owned and controlled a press and paper at Delhi.

The group of newspapers at Madras does not seem to have prospered much before 1956. It started making sizable profits from that year.

The reference which was made by the Government of Madras on April 30, 1959 under s. lO(l)(d) of the Industrial Disputes B Act contained two questions : ( 1 ) Whether the transfer of _the publication of 'Andhra Prabha' and 'Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly' to 'Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd.', in Vi.iayawada is justified and to what relief the workers and the working journalists are entitled ?

(2) Whether the strike of the. workers and working journalists from 27th April, 1959 and the consequent lockout by the management of the Express Newspapers

(P) Ltd. are justified and to what relief the workers are entitled?

This was later transferred by an order dated November 3, 1962 D to the Special Industrial Tribunal which has made the award.

Before that date however the matter had come up to this Court in appeal from Writ Petitions filed in the Madras High Court on the 1st May, 1959 and 5th May, 1959 challenging the validity of the order made under s. 10 ( 3) and the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute on the ground E that there was no lockout but a closure of the company's business. This Court in the Management of Express Newspapers Ltd. v.

Workers and StafJ( 1 ) held that the preliminary enquiry as to jurisdiction should be made by the Industrial Tribunal itself taking into account all facts which are relevant and material.

On the application of the workmen for addition of parties, F the Andhra Prabha Ltd., the Indian Express Newspapers (Madurai) Ltd. and the Express Newspapers Ltd., a public company were added as parties before the Special Tribunal.

As the dispute which the Special Tribunal had to adjudicate upon was .. n?t the first of the kind between the company and its workers, 1t IS necessary to take note of a few facts which are to G be f<?und in the judent of !hls Court dated August 2, 1962 mention_ed above.

This narralion, according to the Court in the former Judgment, forms the background of the present dispute between. the parties.

In March 1957, a dispute arose between the _Parties. on crtin points i, nclding bonus. This was referred for mdustnal ad1ud1cation ending man award in 1957. In March , 8 1958 e company notified its intention to retrench 69 workmen 11;11d this led t<? another dispute which was referred for adjudication.

The umons made certain complaints to th!) State Govern- ·

(l) [1963] 3 S. C. R. 540.

L 9Sup,/67-14

ment which led to the intervention by the Home Minister of the A State but without any success. On October 30, 1958 the company gave notice to the workmen and working journalists that it was going) to close down its business at Madras with effect from December l, 1958 on the allegation inter alia that there were persistent labour troubles and indiscipline on the part of labour.

The Home Minister again intervened and this time with success.

B On November 6, 1958 a settlement was arrived at between the Management and the employees and journalists in the presence of the Labour Commissioner of Madras.

The terms of agreement were reduced into writing and the only ones which may be 11 noted are:

(1) All the employees retrenched on 30-4-1958 C would be reinstated with continuity of service.

( 10) In view of the settlement the Management would withdraw the notice of closure and announce the same on the notice board.

The settlement was to be operative for 2! years.

According to the workers, Mr. Goenka gave an assurance on 6-11-1958 that he would not shift the publication of any of the papers mentioned from Madras to Vijayawada during the said periQd.

On the former occasion, when the matter was before this E Court reference was made to thls assurance and this Court held • that this was a subject which the Industrial court would have IO go into.

According to the Management it was feh in November 1958 that the Telugu papers should be published from Vijayawada, an additional consideration for the same being the suggestion of the Press Commission in regard to 'the diffusion of control of newspapers. Leaving out of consideration the intention of Rarnnath Goenka at or about that time, we may proceed to note t(1e events which followed thereafter. On January 17, 1959 notice was given of an extraordinary general meetin11: of the shareholders of the company to consider certain resolutions. The meeting was actually held on February 11, 1959 and one of the resolutions passed was that the company should cease to carry on business as proprietors of the various newspapers and that in pursuance thereof the company would close or transfer and sell its various publications at Bombay, Madras, Madurai and Delhi to other parties and sell, hire out or otherwise dispose of its printing plant and machinery and equipment and also licence or lease out its premises at various places.

Another resolution authorised the directors to take all steps necessary for the closing or sale and

transfer of various publications -as they may think fit and at sucjl prices and on such terms as they might consider best. The

\ ..

workers must have got scent of this and the Secretary of the Express Newspapers Employees' Union (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) addressed a letter to the Chairman of the company on March '.lJ, 1959 to the effect that the employees had come to learn that four units of the rotary machine at Madras had been dismantled and removed to Vijayawada with a view to starting an edition of the Andhra Prabha there.

Reference was also made to the assurance alleged to have been given before the Home Minister to drop the proposal to shift the Andhra Prabha and a discussion with the addressee was asked for. It appears that there was a reply to this letter on 2nd April which is however not included in the record.

On April 13, 1959 the Board of Directors of the company passed certain resolutions. One of them was that the company would sell and transfer and the Indian Express (Madurai) (P) Ltd. would purchase as a going concern the proprietary rights of printing and publishin~ the Madurai edition of the English daily newspaper known as the Indian Express, the Madurai Edition of the English weekly known as the Sunday Standard and the Madurai edition of the Tamil daily known as Dinamani (inclusive of the Sunday edition). Another resolution passed was to !lie effect that the company would sell and the Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. Vijayawada would purchase as a going concern the proprietary rights of printing and publishing Andhra Prabha and Andhra Prabha IJlustrated Weekly together with the option to purchase from the company the right to print, edit and publish the English newspaper known as the Sunday Standard for circulation in the State of Andhra Pradesh only on 'tenns and conditions set out in the draft agreement. A third resolution was to the effect that the company would sell to the Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. Vijayawada the items of machinery set out in the schedule to the draft agreement for a price of Rs. 1, 75,000/- on the terms set out in the draft agreement. On

April 15, 1959 an agreement was actually entered into between the company and the Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. to the effect that the vendor had agreed to sell and the purchaser had agreed to buy the goods set out in the schedule thereto as soon as convenient andi the price payable would be Rs. 1,75,000/- within one week of the purchaser getting the machinery. On April 20, 1959 the General Secretary of the Madras Union of Journalists wrote to the Director of the company complaining that the writer had not heard in regard to the issue raised in the letter of 31st March.

The Jetter proceeded to record that the journalists had not been told exactly what the Management proposed to do but they had heard that a new company called the Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. had been registered at Vijayawada and arrangements were being made to split up the other two Madras papers, namely, the Indian Express and Dinamani into two separate companies.

Accordin!J to the writer, this had created a state of tension.

On the same

906 SUPRfil4E COURT REPORTS

[1967) 3 S.C.R.

.day, the Madras Union of Journalists at a meeting passed a resolution condemning the action of the Management in announcing and effecting the sale of the Andhra Prabha daily and the Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly to a new company at Vijayawada which had been done surreptitiously, and as a result thereof all the employees concerned might not be absorbed by the new company.

A complaint was also made that the sale was really benami and a threat was held out that unless the ManagemenL .desisted from the above cours.e of "ma/a fide closure and break-up

Of the Madras establishment and purported sales to benami companies the employees would be compelled to go on strike as and from a date to be fixed by the joint action committee set up under the resolution." On 21st April a letter was sent to the Director of the company from the Convener, Joint Action Committee in which it was said that unless a satisfactory reply was sent regarding the matters mentioned in the resolution within 72 hours, the joint action committee would be compelled to carry .out the mandate of the workers calling for a strike.

On April 22, 1959 there was an agreement in writing between Andhra Prabha (P} Ltd. and the company to the effect that the first named company had agreed to purchase and the company had agreed to sell as a going concern the proprietary rights as .editors, proprietors etc. of the Andhra Prabha (Telugu daily) and the Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly together with the option to purchase from the vendor the right to print, edit and publish the English newspapers, the Indian Express and the English weekly, the Sunday Standard.

The consideration for the sale of the proprietary rights in Andhra Prabha and Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly was fixed at Rs. 25,000/-. Clause 11 o.f the :agreement provided that :

"all employees now employed by the vendor in connection with the aforesaid two publications shall be taken over into the service of the purchaser company as and from the taking over date." Clause 12 provided that the transfer of the two undertakings would be on the terms that every workman and employee who had been in continuous service for not less than one year in the said undertaking of the vendor immediately before the taking over date woud be taken over by the purchaser as and from such date on the terms and conditions that the services of the workmen and the employees had not been and would not be deemed to be interrupted by such transfer and the terms and conditions appli cable to the workmen and the employees after such transfer would not in any way be less favourable to them than those applicable before the transfer and the purchaser would be legally liable to pay the worknien and employees, in the event of retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his or their services had been con ti

nuous and uninterrupted by such transfer.

On April 23, 1959 the Director of the company wrote a letter to the Joint Action Committee to the effect that the Management had sold their right of editing, publishing etc. the Andhra Prabha daily and the Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly to a new company in Vijayawada assigning the reason therefor that it was in the interest of the Telugu speaking people that it should be produced and published from a Telugu centre. The terms and conditions with regard to the absorption by the new company of all staff and workers connected with .the business of the two newspapers were also mentioned therein.

Lastly, it was said that with regard to such of the staff as were not willing to go to Vijayawada their services with the company would be terminated as the company had no work to offer to them but they would be paid all their dues.

On April 24, 1959 the Convener, Joint Action Committee, characterised the Director's reply of the 23rd as highly unsatisfactory and stated that a reso!Ution had been adopted to the effect that the workers would go on strike at any time after the expiry of 24 hours.

On the next day the Director informed the Union that the contemplated strike would be illegal and unjustified. On 27th April the Convener wrote to the Director stating that the Management had reJected their demand to maintain the status quo regarding the publication of the three newspapers from Madras, specially Andhra Prabha. In addition false charges of sabotage and threats and arrest had been made and consequently the workers were compelled to give effect to the decision of 24th April i.e. to go on strike. The watch and ward staff were however instructed to stay on duty.

It is necessary to note at this stage that according to the Management some acts of sabotage and gross indiscipline were committed on April 26, 1959, namely, the mutilation and des- F !ruction of one full page and two gallies of Dinamani matter and

removal of switch keys from three motor cars left in front of • the office building. According to the statement of Ramnath Goenka before the Tribunal :

"During the whole of the 28th of April the labourers demonstrated before the office and prevented ingress and egress of staff members from the office building. . . . . I then decided to close down and issued a statement through the Hindu informing every one of this-."

A notice to the above effect was published on the notice board of the company on the 27th and a copy of it was sent by the Director to the Convener.

The strike of the workers started at 4.30 p.m. on 27th April and publication of all papers was stopped.

Notice to the above

effect was given in the Hindu regarding the Indian Express.

A Dinamani and Andhra Prabha. On \he 29th of April the closure notice was published in the Hindu in which it was mentioned that the Management had intimated the workers by letter dated 23rij.

April that they had sold their right of editing, printing and publishing Andhra Prabha and Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly to the Vijayawada company.

The substance of the agreement B between the two companies with regard to the workers was also mentioned in this notice.

The workers had been notified that the Management had decided to close with immediate effect the undertaking and publication of all the seven newspapers at Madras and to dispense with the services of the workmen and the working journalists.

Notice was also given that they would be paid their wages for the period during which they had worked, C besides one month's salary in lieu of notice prcribed under s. 25F. and compensation as laid down under the Act.

Such compensation amounting to one of Rs. 7 lakhs wiu; actually paid ~~ r

On the 30th April the Management informed the Commis- sioner of Police with regard to the developments and published another notice in the Hindu regarding the closure stating that most of the machinery had already been sold for cash and the building of the company advertised for rent. On the same day. the Madras Government issued a notice under s. 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act prohibiting the continuance of the strike and the lockout.

This was followed by the two Writ Petitions in the Madras High Court already mentioned.

After the matter was decided by this Court in August 1962, the adjudication was taken up by the Special Industrial Tribunal before which some witnesses including Rarnnath Goenka were examined and a large number of documents tendered in evidence.

The central question with regard to the first issue was, whether Rarnnath Goenka had given a verbal assurance in November 1958 that there would be no shifting of the venue of the publication of any of "the papers from Madras to Vijayawada for 2t years. The Tribunal scrutinised the evidence both oral and documentary in great detail and observed that it was not satisfied that Ramnath Goenka had given any verbal assurance imputed to him.

The Tribunal further held that an assurance of the nature could not be inferred from the circumstances of the case with the result that the first part of the first issue was answered in the affirmative with the necessary consequence that the workers could not be held entitled to any relief because of the transfer of these two publications.

Of thei three appeals, the first two are by the Andhra Prabha Ltd. and Indian Express Newspapers (Madurai) Ltd. and the

second by the public company styled the Express Newspapers Ltd. while the third appeal is by the employees of the Express Newspapers Ltd. against its management.

No attempt was made before us to show that the Tribunal's conclusion about the absence of the verbal assurance or the inference to be drawn in respect thereof from the circumstances was wrong.

The substance of the argument on behalf of the employees was that there was really no closure but the transfer was in effect from a parent company to daughter companies and in this connection reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Kays Construction Co. v. Its Workers(') and the earlier decision in Wo1•kmen v.

Dahingeapar Tea Esta.te( 2 ). In the Kay's Construction Co.'s(') case a private limited company was incorporated to continue and carry on the business activities of a proprietary concern.

The former proprietor, his wife and the manager employed in the former business were three out of five directors of the new company.

The dispute in regard to the refusal by the new company to continue some former employees in service was referred for adjudication to an industrial tribunal.

It was contended on behalf of the workmen that the alleged closure by the proprietor was not genuine or real and that the new company was successor-in-interest of the proprietor and hence was bound to continue to employ the former workmen. It was also contended that there was in effect a lockout and the workmen concerned were entitled to reinstatement.

The tribunal found tha.t the closure of the former business on the alleged financial grounds was not genuine, and that the company, though in law a separate entity, was formed to carry on and continue the former business under a different name and the refusal by it to employ •ome of the old employees amounted to a lockout with the result that a reinstatement of the workmen was ordered. The appeal by the company to the Supreme Court was dismissed.

This Court held that a case like the one before it could not be decided principally on the consideration of the abstract point of law as to whether and when a successoc in business is baund to continue in employment the workmen employed by the former owner nd

hving regard to. t!te material findings of fact recorded by the tnbunal, the vahd1ty of the award could not be questioned on abstract legal grounds.

In the Dahingeapar Tea Estate case(2) there was an agr.:ement between Dah ingeapara Tea company (the vendor) and Nikhli Jute Baling Company Ltd. (the purchaser) whereby the vendo.r agreed to sell absolute!¥ and the purchaser to buy as and from January I, 1954 the en!ire tea estate known as Dahingeapar tea estate with all its gardens, bushes, machinery and appur-

(1) [1958] 2 L.L.J. 660,

(21 [1958] 2 L.L.J. 498.

tenances etc. at or for the sum of Rs. 9,50,000/-. The purchaser was to have the option of taking such members of the staff as it would in its absolute discretion consider useful and sufficient for running it.

The members of the staff as would be selected by the purchaser would be given fresh appointment and any liability whatsoever for their past services, including bonus, gratuity etc. would be on the vendor's account. The dispute which was referred for adjudication was, whether the transfer of the management could put an end to the services of the staff of the tea estate and whether the agreement of transfer would deprive the members of the staff of their rights of service under the original contracts of service and of continuity of their services. The second question was, whether the outgoing management was justified in proposing to terminate the services of the members of the staff from the time when the management of the tea estate had changed hands and whether the incoming management was justified in refusing to maintain the continuity of service.

The tribunal found that the garden was sold as a going concern, that the services of the staff continued up to January 4, 1954, that retrenchment had not been necssitated by or on account of reasons of trade. and that the transfer could not effect a change in the service conditions of the staff.

The result was that the purchaser was held to be not justified in refusing to maintain the continuity of service.

The award directed that those of the members of the former staff who had been kept out of service in the garden in question from the time the new management had taken over charge but who would be willing to be reinstated in their former posts on the previous terms anq conditions of their service be reinstated in their former posts and that those of the mempers of the old staff who had been kept out of service in the garden and had not since taken any employment elsewhere be paid their salaries for the period of their forced unemployment which was caused at the instance of the purchaser. The Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the award made by the tribunal.

This Court in appeal did not find it necessary to determine the larger question to whether, on a transfer of business as a going concern, the incoming management becomes a successor to the outgoing management and if so, to what extent the incoming management must recognise the right of Jabour already accrued as to gratuity bonus etc. and to continuity of service. It was further observed that it was not the function of the industrial tribunal to decide the abstract question of Jaw, whether on a transfer of management consequent on a sale, the services of workmen were automatically put an end to.

But it was held that there was a dispute which could be referred for adjudication and the reference being competent the tribunal had jurisdiction to go into it and there was no reason for the Appellate Tribunal displacing the findings of the Industrial tribunal.

ANDHRA fRABHA LTD. v. SECRETARY, M.U.J. (Mitter, /.) 911

It will be noticed that these two decisions were given before the amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act by the inclusion of s. 2SFF, and s. 25FFF. Now the two sections govern such cases.

Under s. 25FF where the ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every workman who has been in continuous ser- Yice for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of s. 25F as if the workman had been retrenched.

This section however is not to apply to a workman if his service had not been interrupted by such transfer, the terms and conditions of his service after transfer are not in any way less favourable to him than those appHcable to him immediately before the transfer and the new emvloyer is, under the terms of such transfer, legally liable to pay to the workman in the event of his retrenchment,· compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and had not been interrupted by

te transfer.

Under s. 25FFF ( 1) where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of s. 25F as if the workman had been retrenched.

We are not concerned with sub-s. (2) in this case.

The result is that if there is in fact a closure, s. 2SFFF will come into play.

In this case, however, it must be stated that the new company, Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. agreed to take over all employees at the time employed by the vendor in connection with the two publications as and from the date of taking over without any break in the continuity of their service and on the same terms and conditions as before.

It is in1possible to lay one's finger on the exact cause for Ramnath Goenka making up his mind to transfer a part of the undertaking to Vijayawada and another part to Madurai. It may be because he really felt that the Telugu papers would do better if printed and published at Vijayawada. It may also be that he wanted to circumvent the recommendation of the Press Commission with regrd to the wages payable by the bigger units ot newspapers.

Agam there can be no doubt that he did not like the agitation of the employees and probably thought that bv the dispersal of the units the scope for agitation would be minimised. . He was undoubtedly taking all steps in this regard as the res?lu!ions passed by the shareolders of the company in February

19:>9, followed by the resolution of the Board of Directors and the agreement for sale of some machinety to the Andhra Prabha

(P) Ltd. on the 15th of April 1959 would show.

The workers A probably were nettled by the fact that they had not been consulted jn regard to all this.

While it is not possible to say that the .alleged acts of sabotage and indiscipline said to have taken place

on April 26, 1959 were of a very serious nature, Goenka stated in his evidence before the tribunal that after the demonstration of the labourers before his office on the 28th of April and their B prevention of ingress and egress of the members of the staff to and from the office building he decided to close down his undertakin~ at Madras.

On the evidence before the tribunal to which our attention was drawn by counsel on both sides, it appears to us that while the Management might have taken into confidence the employees C and discussed with them the scheme for the dispersal of the undertaking the decision to go on strike was unwarranted and disastrous.

Even if there had been no strike on the 27th of April, it seems to us that the scheme of dispersal would have been given effect to afterwards although it was the strike which precipitated matters.

The Tribunal has found that there was a closure but that took place not in April 1959 but in November, 1959.

In arriving at this conclusion the tribunal relied on several factors.

The first of these is that Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly came to be printed at the Dinamani press by the Indian Express (Madurai) Ltd. and located in the block of buildings belonging to Express E Newspapers Ltd. situate in Mount Road Madras in pursuance of an agreement dated 30th September 1960 between the Indian Express Madurai (P) Ltd. and the Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. The Tribunal further found that it was on the 2nd of September 1960 that the offset rotary press and allied equipment belonging to Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and located in the Express Estate F Mount Road Madras were hired to the Indian Express Madurai

(P) Ltd.

From this the tribunal concluded that "the Andhra Prabha daily and the Andhra Prabha lliustrated Weekly as also the Indian Express Madurai edition and Dinamani daily edition could have made use of the off-set rotary press at the Express Estate Madras on occasions when the use of the off-set rotary press became necessary till the machines were hired to the Madurai G company under Ex. M-46". In our opinion the existence of the off-set rota1y press at the Express Estate Madras until they were hired out to the Indian Express Madurai (P) Ltd. does not warrant the conclusion that the company could have made use of the rotary press when it wanted to.

We have got to .iudge things by what was done and not by what could have been done.

Again the circumstance that some of these .iournals came to be published sometime after May 1959 under new declarations

made by publishers respectively on behalf of the Andhra Prabha

(P) Ltd. and the Endian Express Madurai (P) Ltd. cannot be taken into consideration for finding against the closure of the company's undertaking in April 1959.

The Tribunal appears to have placed some reliance on the fact that Ramnath Goenk~ admitted having advanced a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs to the Madurai Company as also diverse sums totalling Rs. 27 lakhs to other companies including the two daughter companies (at Vijayawada and Madurai) up to the end of December 1960. The Tribunal found that (a) ultimately the Indian Express Bombay Ltd. purchased all the shares of Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. and Indian Express Madurai (P) Ltd. and became a public company towards the end of 1960 : (b) Before the company became a public company, Ramnath Goenka and the members of his family held 4000 out of 4200 shares : ( c) till May 1959 the company which owned the entire group of newspapers published by the same Management at three branch offices one in Delhi, a second in Madurai and the third in Bombay.

As a result of the 5plitting up, the position was that the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. in Delhi took up the Delhi publications, the Indian Express Bombay (P) Ltd. took up the publications published by the company from Bombay, the Indian Express Madurai (P) Ltd. took up the publications issued from Madurai and Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. Vijayawada took up the two Telugu publications.

Accordin~ to the Tribunal "it was only the Madurai company and the Vijayawada company that relied upon the support of the parent company after May 1959 for printing and publishing the papers acquired by them." The Tribunal further found that this position continued for some time after May 1959 inasmuch as "(1) The teleprinter service installed in the Express Estate building Mount Road continued to be used till the end of October 1959 and out of nine circuits comprised in the teleprinter service, seven were routed throuch Madras and these were allotted to the Madurai company for - a period of three months commencing from 1st November 1959. (2 Potographic materials used in the processing department mamtamed y the company up to October 1959 were purchased by he public c_ompany for the benefit of the two daughter comli'ames: (3) Thirty-two of the former employees of the company

mcludmg_ a reporter wer~ rtaind in the service of the company after Apnl 1959; (4) No m!imat10n was sent to the Commissioner or other competent authority under the Employees' Provident Fund. Ac! of the. termination of employment of 700 workmen and ~rkmg 1ournahsts, and (5) After April 1959 a common advert1smg department for the two daughter companies was maintained

a~ the Epress _Estate building as could be seen from certain circulars issued m December 1959" .

. From all this the Tribunal inferred that the suspension of the busmess was a lockout at the inception and became a genuine

closure only in October-November, 1959. Before us, reliance was placed by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam on some of the above factors and the main plank of his argument was that in fact the parent company launched and financially helped the other companies which were really benamidars for the parent company.

We do not think that even in Industrial law a new company which is an independent legal entity can be called a benamidar for another older organisation because there was in both companies a person or family of persons who could guide the destinies of the two companies.

The Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. was later transformed into a public compa11y and it would not be proper to describe the relationship of the Vijayawada and the Madurai companies as daughter companies or as benamidars of the company. We have to bear in mind that the company I.e., Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. did not come to an end in April

1959. It only closed its undertaking of publishing several newspapers and weeklies.

It had very valuable property on its hands after April 19 5 9 and some persons had to be retained in service

to look after the property. The fact that one of. them was a reporter cannot lead to the inference that the company did not D close down its business but" could take it up whenever it wanted to.

Further, the failure to inform the Provident Fund authorities was an omission but that cannot mean that the workers continued to be in the service of the company or were meant to be taken back into its service as soon as they became submissive to Ramnath Goenka. With regard to the teleprinter service, we were told that it had been paid for up to a certain date and the fact that the Madurai and Vijayawada companies used the teleprinter service till the end of October 1959 would not either by itself or taken in conjunction with the other circumstances, justify 'the conclusion that the company retained the teleprinter service for its own use, if necessary.

To all intents and purposes, the business of the company was closed from the 29th of April 1959 and whatever might have been the motive behind the closure it was an effective one from April 1959 and we see no reason to hold with the Tribunal that the closure became effective sometime in November 1959.

On behalf of the employees an application has been made for leading additional evidence.

In this application events which took place after the publication of the award are relied on as going to show that the discontinuance of the publications from Madras was a mere ruse and a device adopted by the company to coerce and intimidate the employees and that publication of the newspapers had been commenced soon after the publication of the award.

We do not think it necessary to go into this matter at any length because a break of over four years had intervened in between and what the company does after the lapse of this long

period cannot and ought not to be taken into consideration in order to find out whether the closure was a real one or was a mere device as suggested by the employees.

The evidence on record shows that Ramnath Goenka's plan was not to give up the business of newspaper publications altogether but he wanted to distribute his business to difierent places.

Whater may be the motive behind such plan, he had only carried out that plan into effect after the publication of the award and this cannot lead us to the conclusion that the closure was an assumed one.

In our view, the strike was not justified and the Management was entitled to close the undertaking on 29th April, 1959.

In the result, there will be no order on this application. The appeals by the companies are allowed and the finding on the second issue and the award set aside.

Appeal No. 9 of 1966 by the workmen will have to be dismissed in view of the above. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.

V.P.S.

Appeal No. 9 of '66, dismissed and Nos. 1078 and 1079 of '65 allowed.

THE ANDHRA PRABHA LTD. & ORS

SECRETARY, MADRAS UNION OF JOURNALISTS & ORS

SECRETARY, MADRAS UNION OF JOURNALISTS & ORS

May 4, 1967

G. K. MITTER, J.J

Andbra Prabha

Vijaxawada

April 22, 1959

On April 22, 1959 there was an agreement between Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. and the Express Newspapers whereby it was agreed that all the employees employed by the vendor-company in connection with the publications purchased by the pufcbaser-company would be taken into th9 service of the purchasercompany without any change in their conditions of service.

Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd.

Vijayawada

Madras

April 27, 1959

April 29, 1959

Express Newspapers gave

Government of Madras

Indus)rial Tribunal

Vijayawada

Madurai and Vijayawada compani~.

Provident Filild Act

Madurai and Vijayawada companies

N. C. Chatterjee

R. Gmwpathy Iyer

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam

K. Ramamurthi

Shyamala Pappu

Nagaratnam

Madan Mohan

Mittl'r

Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras

Express Newspapers (P) Ltd.

Dinamani

Ramnath Goenka

Delhi

April 30, 1959

27th April, 1959

Express Newspapers

(P) Ltd.

November 3, 1962

Special Industrial Tribunal

1st May, 1959

5th May, 1959

s. 10

Andhra Prabha Ltd.

Indian Express Newspapers (Madurai) Ltd.

Express Newspapers Ltd.

August 2, 1962

hls Court dated August 2, 1962 mention_ed above.

[1963] 3 S. C. R. 540

October 30, 1958

November 6, 1958

Goenka

Rarnnath Goenka

January 17, 1959

February 11, 1959

Bombay

Madurai

Express Newspapers Employees' Union

March '.lJ, 1959

April 13, 1959

Indian Express (Madurai) (P) Ltd.

Andhra Prabha (P) Ltd. Vijayawada

Andhra Prabha IJlustrated Weekly

Andhra Pradesh

April 15, 1959

April 20, 1959

Indian Express

Dinamani

Madras Union of Journalists

Andhra Prabha (P} Ltd.

Andhra Prabha (Telugu daily)

Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly

Andhra

Clause 11

Clause 12

April 23, 1959

April 24, 1959

April 26, 1959

29th of April

Vijayawada company

s. 25F

Madras Government

s. 10(3)

Industrial Disputes Act

Madras High Court

Rarnnath Goenka

Kay's Construction Co.

Supreme Court

The appeal by the company to the Supreme Court was dismissed.

Dahingeapar Tea Estate

Dah ingeapara Tea company

Nikhli Jute Baling Company Ltd.

January 4, 1954

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 2S

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 2S

Madurai

Agam

Andhra Prabha

(P) Ltd.

15th of April 1959

27th of April

Indian Express (Madurai) Ltd.

Indian Express Madurai (P) Ltd.

2nd of September 1960

Indian Express Madurai

(P) Ltd.

Andhra Prabha daily

Andhra Prabha lliustrated Weekly

Madurai G company

Endian Express Madurai (P) Ltd.

Ramnath Goenk~

Madurai Company

3 lakhs to the Madurai Company as also diverse sums totalling Rs.

Indian Express Bombay Ltd.

Indian Express Bombay (P) Ltd.

Madurai company

1st November 1959

Mohan Kumaramangalam

Madurai companies

April 19 5 9

29th of April 1959

29th April, 1959


NARAIN LAL & ORS.

SUNDER LAL (DEAD) & ORS.

May 4, 1967 .

[R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.J lJ

Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), s. 92- Per111issio11 of Advocate-Ge11eral for fili11g suit-Permission give11 •fo four perso11s- 011e dies-Surviving three whether can file suit without obtalni11g fresh pennission.

Four persons obtained the consent of the Advocate-General of Rajasthan to institute a suit against the respondents under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shortly thereafter one of the said four persons died and the suit was instituted by the three survivors.

On the preliminary issue whether the suit filed by three persons, when the permission had been given to four, was maintainable, the trial court held that it was.

The High Court, however, in revision held the suit not to be maintainable.

Appeal was filed in this Court by special leave.

 HELD : An authority to sue given to several persons without more is a joint authority and must be exercised by all jointly, and a suit by some of them only i~ not competent. When sanction in the present case

was given to four peisons and one of them died before the institution of the suit, a suit by the remaining three was incompetent. Fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution ofthe suit. [918D-E,

~19Bl

Muddala Blianavan11araya11a \'.

Jladapa/li Perunwl/aclzaryulu, 29 M.LJ. 231, Pitclwyya & Anr, v. Venkarakris/111amacharlu & eleven Ors. 1.L.R. 5; Mad. 223, Sible Rasul v. Sibte Nabi & Ors. I.L.R. (1943) All 112 Venkc; tesha Malia v.

B. Ramaya Hegade and twelve Ors.

I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1192, Musammat Ali Begam v. Badr-11/-Js/am Ali Khan, L.R. 65 I.A. 198, Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Dad11ram, L.R. 48 I.A. 12 and Sheu Ram v. Ram C/iand & Ors., A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 356, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 767 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 14, 1961 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. P. Civil Misc. Application No. 128 of 1960.

Gopi Nath Kunzru, W. S. Barlingay and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.

C. B. Agar1m/a, K. K. Jain, H. K. Puri and Uma Mehta, for respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15-18, 71, 23 and 24.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bacbawat, J.

On September 10, 1955, Narain Lal, Moo!

Chand Mangilal and Kesharichan'd obtained the consent in writing of 'the Advocate General, Rajasthan to institute a suit against

r F

the respondents under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The consent was in these tenns :

"For the reasons detailed above I grant pennission to the applicants Sarvashri ( 1) Narainlal,

(2) Moo!

Chand, ( 3) Mangilal and < 4) Seth. Kesharihand !or filing suit against the opposite parttes Shri Malilal Kasliwal and 27 other members and office holders of the executive committee Jain Atishaya Kshetra Shri Mahabir Swami Temple Chandangaon, for the reliefs detailed in para 28 sub-paras 1 to S and 7 of the draft plaint filed by them before me."

Shortly thereafter Mangi Lal died.

On !Vlarch 6, ~956, _Narain Lal Moo! Chand and Kesari Chand instituted a suit agamst the respondents under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming a declaration that the temple of Shri Mahabirji at Naurangabad and the appertaining properties were a public caritable tru?t for the benefit of the Shwetambar Sangh of the Jam commumty or of the Jain community as a whole and for other reliefs. On March 9, 1958, Kesari Chand died.

The trial court raised and tried the foilowin_g preliminary issue :

"Whether the suit is not maintainable on the strength of the permission obtained by the plaintiffs along with Mangi Lal who died prior to the institution of the

suit ?"

The tria.1 court held that the suit was maintainable.

The High Court in its revisional jurisdiction set aside the order of the trial court and held that the suit was not maintainable.

The present appeal has been filed from the order of the High Court by special leave.

A suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-s. ( 1) of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedme in respect of a trust for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature may be institutd by te Advocate-General or "two or more persons having

a~ mterest m the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General", and sae as provided by the Religious Endown:ents. Act 1863 and certam other laws, no suit claiming ; uch reliefs. 111 espect of any such trust can be instituted except

111 conformity with sub-s. (I) of S. 92.

In the present case four persons obtai~d the necessary sanction of the Advocate General, one. of them died. before the suit was filed, .and the remaining three instituted te si.!H The question is whether the suit is brought n1 conformity with S. 92 (1).

The decided cases show that a suit under s. 92 must be b!ought by all the persons to whom the sanction of the Advocate General has been gi¥en, and a suit instituted by some of them

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967) 3 S.C.R.

only is not maintainable. In Muddala Bhagavannarayana v.

A V adapalli Perumallacharyulu(') where the sanction was given to four persons and two of them alone brought the sµit alleging that the other two had been won over by the defendants and had refused to join as plaintiffs, it was held that the suit was not maintainable.

In Pitchayya and another v. Venkatakrishnama charlu and eleven others('), where the sanction was given to B three persons, the court held that the suit instituted by two of them was invalidly brought and the defect could not be cured by im pleading the other person as a gefendant.

In Sibte Rasul v.

Sibte Nabi and others('), where four. persons obtained the sane

tion. and the suit was instituted by three of them, it was held that the suit was incompetent and the defect could not be cured by impleading the fourth as a plaintiff at the date of the delivery of C the judgment.

We may add that in Venkatesha Malia v.

Ramaya Hegade and twelve others(') where the sanction to sue under S. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act 1863 was given by the district judge to two persons, it was held that only one of them could not institute the suit.

We hold .that an authority to sue given to several persons without more is a joint authority and must be acted upon by all jointly, and a suit by some of them only is not competent.

As Sir George Rankin said in Musammat Ali Begam v.

Badr-ullslam Ali Khan("), "where the consent in writing of the Advocate General or Collector is given to a suit by three persons as plaintiffs, the suit cannot be validly instituted by two only.

The suit as instituted must conform to the consent." Once the representative suit is validly instituted, it is subject to all the incidents of such a suit; the subsequent death of a plaintiff will not render the suit incompetent, see Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram( 6), and an appeal by some of the plaintiffs impleading the remaining plaintiff as a respondent is not incompetent because all did not join as appellants, see Musammat Ali Begam v. Badr-ul-lslam Ali Khan(•).

In Shea Ram v. Ram Chand and others(1), the sanction of the Collector to bring a suit under S. 92 was given to twenty persons.

One of them died before the suit was brought and the remaining nineteen instituted the sutt. Skempg, J. held that in view of the two Privy Council rulings the suit was validly instituted.

But he erroneously as$Ullled that in Musammat Ali Begam v. Badr-ul I slam Ali -Khan ( •) it was held that where the sanction had been given to three persons, a suit by two of them only was validly

(I) 29 M.LJ. 231.

(2) I.LR. 53 Mad. 223. '.3) I.L.R. (1943) All. 112.

(4) I.LR. 38 Mad.1192.

(5) l.L.R. 65 I. A. tn::

(6) L.R. 48 I.A. 12.

(7) A.l.R. 1940 Lah. 356.

instituted.

From the report of Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram ( 1), it is not clear whether all the persons to whom the sanction was given brought the suit, and the wint raised and decided was that the death of one of the plaintiffs after the institution of the suit did not render the suit incompetent. We are unable to agree with the Lahore ruling.

Where sanction is given to four persons and one of them dies before the institution of the suit, a suit by theremaining three is incompetent.

Fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution of the suit.

We must hold that the suit brought by the appellants was incompetent.

The High Court rightly held that the suit was not maintainable.

This judgment will not bar the institution of a fresh suit in conformity with a fresh consent obtained from the Advocate-General or Collector.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed without costs.

G.C.

Appeal dismissed.

(I) LR. 48 l.A. 12~-- L9Sur.CI 167-1;

NARAIN LAL & ORS

SUNDER LAL (DEAD) & ORS

May 4, 1967

R. S. BACHAWAT, J.

M. SHELAT

V. BHARGAVA, JJ

Code of Civil Procedure

s. 92

s. 92

the Code of Civil Procedure

Muddala Blianavan11araya11a

L.R. 65 I.A. 198

L.R. 48 I.A. 12

August 14, 1961

Rajasthan High Court

Gopi Nath Kunzru

W. S. Barlingay

Ganpat Rai

C. B. Agar1m

K. K. Jain

H. K. Puri

Uma Mehta

Bacbawat

September 10, 1955

Narain Lal

Kesharichan'd

S. 92

the Code of Civil Procedure

Sarvashri

Narainlal

Moo

!

Chand

Mangilal

Seth. Kesharihand

Malilal Kasliwal

Jain Atishaya Kshetra

Mahabir Swami Temple Chandangaon

Mangi Lal

Narain Lal Moo! Chand

Kesari Chand

S. 92

the Code of Civil Procedure

Naurangabad

S. 92

S. 92

S. 92

s. 92

S. 18

Religious Endowments Act 1863

George Rankin

S. 92

Skempg

L.R. 48 I.A. 12

Lahore


THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD. v.

THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U.P.

May 4, 1967

(R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT AND V. BH>, RGAVA, JJ,)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (8 of 1870), S. 7 (Iv-A), (a) and S. 7 (iv-B) (b)-Acts impositing tax-Suit for injunction on the ground that Acts void-Court Jee pt>yab/e.

The appellant-company filed a suit against the State of U.P. and Union of India for a permanent injunction restraining the State from proceeding to realise cess and tax under the U .P. Sugar Cane Cess Act 1956 read with U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Acts were invalid and void. On its plaint, the appellant paid court-fees under subs, (iv-B) (b) of s. 7 on the footing that the relief sought was an injunction.

The respondent the Chief Inspector of Stamps objected, contmding that court-fees payable were under sub-11. (iv-A) of s. 7 on the ground that the suit was for a declaratory decree, where consequential relief prayed for was an injunction or Of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other property havina such value.

The trial Court rejected the respondent's objection, which the High Court revened.

In appeal, this Court,

HELD : The court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7 and neither cl. (a) of sub-5, (iv-A) of s. 7 nor

sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 applied.

The plaint when read as a whole showed that though the appellant alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeded on the footing that the said Acts were void and that therefore the State of U .P. or its authorities had no power to realise the tax and the cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts.

But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for.

If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a pr8fer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where in1unction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 7 and in that vw cl.

(b) of sub-I.

(iv) of s, 7 would be superfluous.

[924E-H!

Ramanbhal Ashabhal Patel v. Dabhl A/ltkumar Fulsln; I, [1965] 1 G S.C.R. 712 : referred to.

Ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case of Conveyancing Act, 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of s. 205 (I) (viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, tho statute crootes a settlement and such statute is for that reason trea.OOd as an instrument,

o. the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are not instruments within t '..he meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7. [923 G-H] H

Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner [1964] 3

S.C.R. 442, and Emperor v. Ravango11da Lingangouda Patil;

A.I.R. 1944 Born. 259. referred to.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1668 of

1966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 2, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1095 of 1965.

G. N. Dixit, for the appellant.

Bishan Narain and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J, The appellant-company filed suit No. 16 of 1963 against the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India, inter alia, praying for a permanent injunction restaining the State of Uttar Pradesh, its servants and agents from realising or from proceeding to realise sugarcane cess and purchase tax amounting to Rs. 33 lakhs and odd charged under the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956 read with the U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, IX of 1961. o In the said suit, the appellant-company, inter-a/ia, alleged that the Acts for the diverse reasons set out therein were invalid and void and therefore the State was not entitled to levy, collect or recover the said cess or the purchase tax and prayed, as aforesaid. that the State should be restrained from proceeding to realise the said cess or tax.

The appellant-company paid court-fees on its said plaint under sub-s. (iv-B)(b) of s. 7 on the footing that the relief sought in the suit was an injunction.

The Chief Inspector of Stamps objected to the court-fees being paid under cl. (b) of sub-s. ( iv-B) of s. 7 contending that the court-fees payable were as provided under sub-s. (iv) (a) of s. 7 or under sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7, that is to say, on the footing that the suit was for a

declaratory decree where consequential relief prayed for was an injunction or on the footing that the suit involved cancellation of .or of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other property having such value.

The trial Judge rejected the objections and eld that the court:fees payable were adequate as cl. (b) of sub-s. (1v-B) of s. 7 applied.

The Chief Inspector of Stamps thereupon filed a revision application before the High Court' reiterating the said objections.

The High Court rejected the con tention at s. 7(iv)(~) applied but. held that sub-s. (iv-A) of s .. 7. applted as .the said Acts were mstruments securing money w1thm the meanmg of that sub-section and that though the relief cled in the uit was injunction, in substance and effect the suit mvolved ad1udgment of the said Acts as void.

Hence this appeal by special leave.

Sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 reads as follows:-

"For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decree-In suits for or involving cancellation of or

adjudging void or voidable .......•.... an instrument securing money or other property having such value".

The question which falls for determination is whether an Act pas>ed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The Court-fees Act does not define the word 'instrument'. That being so we have to turn for the connotation of the word 'instrument' to its ordinary dictionary meaning.

According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Ed.

Vol. II, p. 1472, 'instrument' means 'a writing, and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind.

Semble, the word may include an Act of Parliament (see Deed of Settlement) so in the Trustee Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 18), s. 68 .......... .

(11) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Viet. c. 41) s. 2(xiii), " 'instrwnent' includes deed, will, inclosure, award, and Act of Parliament".

Thus, an 'instrument' may include a statute enacted by Parliament if the particular statute in its context includes it as an instrument.

According to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, p. 984 "instrument' means "a formal legal writing, e.g., a record, charter, deed of transfer or agreement". It is, however, observed that under the Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 205(1) (viii), 'instrument' for the purposes of this Act does not include a statute unless the statute creates a settlement. "An instrument is a writing and generally means a writing of a formal nature.

But where there is a power to appoint by any deed or instrument or by will, any writing, such as a letter, which refers to the power, or which can have effect only by operating on the fund (such as a cheque or other order for payment), is an instrument. A telegram is an instrument within the meaning of the Forgery Act, 1912, s. 7, and so is an envelope with a postmark falsified for the purposes of a betting fraud".

According to the same dictionary, the word 'enact' means to act, perform or effect; to establish by law; to decree and an 'enactment' means an Act of Parliament or statute or any part thereof.

A statute, according to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. p. 1 is the will of the Jeg.isJ.ature, i.e. an edict of the legislature.

A statute is. howe1er, different from a statutory instrument as defined by the Statutory Instruments Act (9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36) 1946 where power to make, confirm, or approve orders, rules, regulations or other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Ma.iesty in Council or on any Minister of the Crown, a document by which that power is exercised is a statutory instrument.

Similarly, where bv an Act passed before the enactment of the Statutory Instru- 1n'ents Act, 1946, power to make statutory-rules is conferred on

any rule-making authority, any document by which that power is exercised is a statutory instrument.

Thus, whereas a statute is an edict of the leislature, a statutory instrument as distinguished from such an edict is a document whereby the rule making power

VISHNU PRATAP LTD. v. ClllEF INSPECTOR (Shelat, J.) 9 23

is expressed. Jn Mohan Chowdhury v.

The Chief Commis .1icmer, Tripura('), the question arose whether the order dated November 3, 1962, passed by the President under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution suspending the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 during the Proclamation of Emergency was an instrument within the meaning of s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In considerin~ that question this Court approved the meaning of :he word 'instrument' given by Stroud and observed :-

"The expression is also used to signify a deed interpartes or a charter or a record or other writing of a formal nature.

But in the context of the General Clauses Act, it has to be understood as including reference to a formal legal writing like an Order made under a statute or subordinate legislation or any document of a fonnal character made under constitutional or statutory authority.

We have no doubt in our mind for the expression 'instrument' in s. 8 was meant to include reference to the Order made by the President in exercise of his constitutional powers".

The President's Order having been made under power conferred upon him by Art. 359 that Order would have the same connota tion as the Statutory instrument defined by the statutory Instru ments Act, 1946 and therefore was an instrument within the meaning, of s. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act.

That does not mean that a statute like the U.P. Court-fees Act which is an edict of the legislature is an instrument.

In Emperor v. Rayangouda Lingangouda Patil(") the High Court of Bombay considered whether an order of the Government delegating its power to Dis trict Magistrates under the Defence of India Rules was an instrument within the meaning of s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act.

The High Court held that an instrument, generally speaking, means a writing usually importing a document of a fonnal legal kind, but it does not include Acts of Parliament unless there is a statutory definition to that effect in any Act.

There is thus ample authority to hold that ordinarily a statute is not an instrument unless as in the case of Conveyancing Act of 1881, the definition includes it or as in the case of s. 205(1 )(viii) of the Law of Property Act, 1925, the stature creates a settlement and such statute is for that reason treated as an instrument. It would not therefore be correct to say that the Acts alleged in the plaint to be void are. insrumnts within the meaning of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7. In thts view, 1t does not become necessary to decide whe ther the Acts are instruments securing money or other property having such value.

Sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 would not therefore apply and the High Court was not right in calling 'upon th~

(1) [19641 3 S C.R. 442. (2} A.1.R. 1944 Bom. 159.

appellant-company to pay additional court-fees under that sub- A section.

Mr. Bishan Narain, however, argued that even if these Acts are not instruments, the plaint if read in substance rather than in form is for a declaratory decree with injunction as the consequential relief and therefore sub-s. (iv) (a) of s. 7 would apply and the court-fees paid merely on the footing of the suit being for an injunction would not be adequate. As stated earlier, the High Court rejected this contention as untenable. Mr. Bishan Narain, contended that he was nonetheless entitled to argue that the High Court was in error and that sub-s. (iv)(a) would apply and not cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B).

For this purpose he relied on some observations in Ramanbhal Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajit kumar Fulsinjl('), where it has been held that as soon as special leave is granted this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even In the absence of an express provision like 0. X:LI, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure it can devise appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing.

Assuming that Mr. Bishan' Narain can urge the contention that !',. 7(iv) (a) applies in the present case the contention still fails. It is true that for purposes of the Court

fees Act; it is the substance and not the form which has to be considered while deciding which particular proviion of the Act applies.

It cannot, however, be gainsaid that the actual relief prayed for in the plaint was an injunction restraining the State and its authorities to realise from the appellant-company the aforesaid cess and the purchase tax.

It is clear from the plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant-company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non-est for the reasons set out there

in, it did not seek any declaration that they were void.

The plaint proceeds on the footinp; that the said Acts were void and that therefore the State of U.P. or its authorities had no power r to realise the said tax and the said cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts.

But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 7 and in that view cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7 would be superfluous. The contention urged by Mr. Bishan Narain, therefore, cannot be accepted.

For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that neither

cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 nor sub-s. (iv-A) of s. 7 would

(I) [1965] 1 S.C.R 712.

A apply and the court-fees payable on the plaint were under cl.

(b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of s. 7.

The appeal, therefore, has to be allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the trial court is restored. The respondent will pay the appellant-company the costs of this appeal.

Y.P.

Appeal allowed.

THE VISHNU PRATAP SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD

THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS, U

May 4, 1967

R. S. BACHAWAT, J.

Court Fees Act, 1870

S. 7

S. 7

Sugar Cane Cess Act 1956

Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act, 1961

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

State of U

s. 7

s. 205

Law of Property Act, 1925

s. 7

[1964] 3

S.C.R. 442

Allahabad High Court

G. N. Dixit

Bishan Narain

0. P. Rana

Shelat

State of Uttar Pradesh

State of Uttar Pradesh

Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956

Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7(iv)(~)

s. 7

Court-fees Act

Stroud

Trustee Act, 1925

s. 68

Conveyancing Act, 1881

s. 2(xiii)

Parliament

Jowitt

Law of Property Act, 1925

s. 205(1)

Forgery Act, 1912

s. 7

Maxwell

Art. 359(1)

Arts. 21 and 22

s. 8(1)

General Clauses Act, 1897

context of the General Clauses Act

s. 8

Art. 359

s. 8

General Clauses Act

Court-fees Act

s. 8(1)

General Clauses Act

s. 205(1 )(viii)

Law of Property Act, 1925

s. 7

s. 7

Bishan Narain

s. 7

the Code of Civil Procedure

Bishan' Narain

State of U.P.

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

[1965] 1 S.C.R 712

s. 7


RATILAL BHANJI MITHANI v.

ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY & ANR.

May 4, 1967

[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., R. S, BACHAWAT, J. M. SHBLAT,

V. BHAROAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.)

Constitution of India, Arts. 21 and 225-Hlgh Court cance/Ung ball in exercise of inherent powers-Wheth1r such powers violative of Art. 21-0r whether 'law' within the meaning of A.rt. 21.

The appellant along with others was being tried for an offence under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Cede read with s. 167 (81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and s. S of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947.

Although he was at first released on bail by the Presidency Magistrate, the High Court, by an order dated March 6, 1967 in the exercise of its inherent powers cancelled the previous bail orders, as it found that the appellant was interfering and tampering with certain foreigners whom the prosecution intended to examine as witnesses.

The High Court, however, reserved liberty to the appellant to move the court on or after June 26, 1967 for a fresh order of bail as it was contemplated that within the time so fixed, the prosecution would examine the foreign witnesses.

In the appeal to this Court, the appellant challenged the order of the High Court on the ground that the inherent powers of the High Court were not conferred by any legislation or statute, and !he deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant by an order of the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers was violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

HELD : The High Court has the inherent power to cancel' bail granted to a person 3ccused of a bailable offence.

This jurisdiction should be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custodY. f928A-B]

The order of the High Court cancelling the bail and depriving the F appellant of his personal liberty was according to procedure established by law and was not violative of Art. 21.

[931C]

The existing powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, including its inherent powers, had been confirmed and continued by s. 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Art. 225 of the Constitution. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent power and the jurisdiction of the High Court which previously G existed, that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted 'law' within the meaning of Art. 21. f929H; .931A-B]

Case law discussed.

[On the facts the court noted that there had been unnecessary delay iu the examination of the foreign witnesses and directed that the appellant should be released on bail on June 26, 1967.] H

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISD)CTION : Crimi.nal Appeal No. 64 of 1967.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 3, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 24 of 1967.

A. K, Sen; S. G. Sheth and/, N. Shroff, for the appellant.

N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J, The appellant along with other persons is being tried for an offence under Sec. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and Sec. 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 194 7.

The offence is bailable.

The appellant was released on bail under orders of Magistrates dated May 11, 1960 and. April 1, 1961,.

A large number of 'Witnesses have been examined but the tnal has not yet been concluded.

By an order dated March 3 I 6, 1967, the High, Court of Maharashtra, Bombay, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction cancelled the bail orders and directed him to surrender to his bail. From this order, the present appeal has been filed by special leave.

In Talab Haji Hussain v.

Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and another('), this Court held that a High Court has the inherent power to cancel a bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence where such an order is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court, and this power is preserved by Sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On behalf of the appellant it was strenuously argued that this case was wrongly decided.

Having heard full arguments, we find no r.eason for departing from our earlier decision.

In the matter of admission to bail, the Code of Criminal Procedure makes a distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences.

The grant of bail to a person accused of a non-bailable offence is discretionary under Sec. 497 of the Code and the person released on bail may again be arrested and committed to custody by an order of the High Court, the Court of Session and the Court granting the bail.

Under Sec. 498 of the Code the Hh!h Court and the Court of Session may release any person on bail and by a subsequent order cause any person so admitted to bail to be arrested and committed to custody.

A person accused of a baila.ble oence is treated differently; at any time while under detention without a warra, nt and .at any stage of the proceedings before the Court before which he 1s brought, he has the right under Sec.

496 of the ~?de to be . released on bail.

The Code makes no express prov1s10n for the cancellation of a bail granted under ~- ~9~. Nevertheless, if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, 1t is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is

(I) [19581 S.C.R. 1226.

intimidating, bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond, the High Court has the power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit.

This jurisdiction springs from the over-riding inherent powers of the High Court and can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeate'd unless the accused is committed to custody.

For the reasons given in Ta/ab Haji Hussain's case( 1), we hold that this inherent power of the High Court exists and iS preserved by Sec. 561-A of the Code.

The person committed to custody under the orders of the High Court cannot ask for his release on bail under sec. 496, but the High Court may by a sub sequent order admit him to bail again.

Counsel for the appellant argued that the inherent power of the High Court is not conferred by any legislation or statute, and the deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant by an order of the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers is violative of the constitutional protection under Art. 21 of the Constitutfon.

Art. 21 is in these terms : ''No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

The tenn 'law' in Art. 21 was the subject .of an elaborate discussion in A. K. Gopala11 v. The. State of Madras( 2). Kania C.J. at pp. 111-113 said that the ti:rm 'law' in that Article must B mean the law of the State or enacted law, and not rules of natural

justice.

Faz! Ali J. who was In the minority, said at page 169 that 'law' must include certain principles of natural justice.

Patanjali Sastri J. at p. 199 said that 'lnw' in Art. 21 meana 'positive or State-made law'. .Mahajan J. at page 226 expressed no opinion on the point.

Mukherjea J. at p. 278 said that "ill f article 21 the word 'law' has been used in the sense of State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general sense embodying the principles of natural justice." Das J. said at page

309 that "there is no scope for introducing the principles of natural justice in Article 21 and 'procedure established by Jaw' must mean procedure established by law made by the State which, as defined, includes Parliament and the Leqislatures of the States." As explained by four of the learned Judges in A. K. Gopalan's case("), the expression 'Jew' in Art. 21 mans enacted or Statemade law, and not the general principles of natural justice.

In Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Si Krishna Sinha and others( 8 ), this Court held that a deprivation of personal liberty of any person by a Legislative Assembly of a State in exercise

(1)[1958] S.C.R. 1226.

(2) [1950] S.C.R. 88. (31 [1959] Supp. I .S.C.R.8 6.

RATILAL v. COI.LECTOR OF CUSTOMS (Bachawat, !.) 92&

of its power to punish for its contempt is according to a procedure established by law and does not contravene Art. 21. Art. 194 ( 3) of the Constitution provides that "the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall .be tho_se of the House .of Commons of the Parliament of the Umted Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution." Article 194(3) thus confers. on the Legislative Assemly of a State the existing inherent powers enjoyed by the British House of Commons including the power to punish for its contempt.

Art. 208 ( 1) empowers the Legislative Assembly to make rules regulating its procedure.

As explained in Pandit Sharma's case('), these powers and the procedure prescribed by the rules has the sanction of enacted law and an order of committal for contempt of the Assembly is according to procedure established by law.

Das C.J., speaking for four learned Judges said at page 861 : "Art. 194(3) confers on the Legislative Assembly those powers, privileges and immunities and Art. 208 confers power on it to frame rules.

The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in exercise of its powers under that Article.

It follows, therefore, that Art. 194(3) read with the rules so framed has laid down the procedure for enforcing its powers, privileges and immunities. If, therefore, the Legislative Assembly has the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived of his personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges, such deprivation will be in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioner cannot complain of the breach, actual or threatened, of his fundamental right under Art. 21." Subba Rao J. in his minority judgment in that case and the Court in Special Refer; nce .No. l of 1964(2), did not say anything to the contrary on this pomt.

Now the question is whether the inherent power of the High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law. Front !ts very inceptio~ the ~Iigh Court has possessed and enjoyed its mherent powers mcludmg the power to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court within its jurisdiction and to secure the ends

f jusice. These powers inherent in the High Court and spring to~ Its very nature and constitution as a court of superior jurisdictton.

All the existing powers of the High Courts were preserved and continued by legislation from time to time

~ .. 561-.A of the Criminal Procedure Code declared that unoth~· mg m this Coe shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent' power of the High or~ to make such orders as may be necessary

(I) [1959] Supp.I S.C.R. g,;6.

(2) [1965] 1 $.C.R. 413.

to give effect to any order passed under this Code, or to prevent .the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends Of justice." The sedon was inserted in the Code by Act XVIII of 1923 to obviate any doubt that these inherent powers have been taken away by the Code.

In terms, this section did not confer any power, it only declared that nothing in the Code all be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of the High Court, see King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad('). Then came other enactments which were framed differently.

Sec. 223 .of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided :

"Subject to the provisions of .this Part of this Act, to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the .appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of and the Jaw administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in division courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act." The Section enacted that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice "shall be" the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Act. The statute confirm. ed. a.nd re-veste~ in .the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers. Then came the Constitution.

Art. 225 of the Constitution provides :

"225. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the admistration of justice in the Court, Including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution." The proviso to the article is not material and need not be read.

The article enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to administration of justice "shall be" the same as ; mmediaiely before the com- mencement of the Constitution. The Constitution confirmed and ------

(!) LR. 61 I.A. 203, 213.

re-vested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to make rules. When the Constitution or. any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed, that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted "law" within the meaning of Art. 21 as explained in A. K. Gopalan's(') case.

The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by "law" within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution.

The rules previously in force were continued in force by Article 372 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court cancelling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personal liberty is according to procedure established by law and is not violative of Art. 21.

The High Court cancelled the previous bail orders, as it found that the appellant was intimidating and tampering with certain Gennan citizens whom the prosecution intended to examine as witnesses.

This finding is challenged by the appellant. Normally, it is not the practice of this Cou t to re-examine findings of fact in an appeal under Art. 136 of the- Constitution.

Having heard full arguments, we are not inclined to interfere with the findings of the High Court. The High Court reserved liberty to the appellant to move the High Court on or after June 26, 1967, for a fresh order of bail.

It was contemplated that within the time so fixed, the prosecution will examine the German witnesses. On March 13, 1967, the appellarrt surrendered to his bail and since then he is in jail custody.

The prosecution has been given ample opportunity to examine the witnesses before June 26, 1967. without any interference from the appellant.

From the correspondence placed before us, it appears that dnring the pendency of this appeal the prosecution has refrained from taking steps for the examination of the German witness.

This Court did not pass any order staying the proceedings or admitting the appellant to bail.

The delay in the examination of the witnesses is caused entirely by the faches of the prosecution.

Even if the prosecution cannot now examine the witnesses by June 26, 1967, we see no reason why the appellant should remain in custody after that date.

We direct that the appellant be released on bail on June 26, 1967. whether or not the prosecution witnesses are examined by that date.

The bail will be given to the satisfaction of the Presidency Magistrate, 23rd Court, Esplanade, Bombay before whom the case is pending.

Subject to this modificati; n the appeal is dismissed. '

R.K.P.S. (!) [l95i'] S.C.R. 88.

Order modified and Appeal dismissed.

RATILAL BHANJI MITHANI

K. N. WANCHOO, C.J.

BACHAWAT, J.

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

Constitution of India

Arts. 21 and 225

Art. 21

s. 120B

s. 167

Sea Customs Act, 1878

Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947

March 6, 1967

Art. 21

Art. 21

s. 223

Government of India Act, 1935

Art. 225

Art. 21

Bombay High Court

A. K, Sen

S. G. Sheth

, N. Shroff

N. S. Bindra

S. P. Nayyar

Bachawat

Sec. 120B

Indian Penal Code

Sec. 167(81)

Sea Customs Act, 1878

Sec. 5

May 11, 1960

April 1, 1961

March 3 I 6, 1967

High, Court of Maharashtra, Bombay

Sec. 561

Code of Criminal Procedure

Code of Criminal Procedure

Sec. 497

Sec. 498

Sec.

496

Ta/ab Haji Hussain

Sec. 561

sec. 496

Art. 21

Art. 21

Art. 21

Kania

Faz! Ali

Patanjali Sastri

Art. 21

.Mahajan

Mukherjea

article 21

Das

Article 21

Parliament

A. K. Gopalan

Art. 21

Art. 21

Art. 194

Parliament of the Umted Kingdom

Article 194(3)

Art. 208

Pandit Sharma

Das C.J.

Art. 194(3)

Art. 208

Bihar Legislative Assembly

Art. 194(3)

Art. 21

Subba Rao

Sec. 223

Government of India Act, 1935

Part III of this Act

Part III of the Act

Art. 225

LR. 61 I.A. 203

Art. 21

Sec. 561

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 21

Article 372

Art. 21

Art. 136

June 26, 1967

March 13, 1967