{"document_id": "1967_3_186_198_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "PREM NATH & ORS.\n\nv.·\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTIIAN & ORS.\n\nMarch 15, 1967\n\n[K, SUBBA R.Ao, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J •. M. SHBLAT, V. BHAROAVA\n\nAND 0. K. MITTER, JJ.] Constitmion of India Art. 233-Selection Committe.f consisting of Chief Justice and two other Judges only-List of eligible candidates prepared by\n\nth_e Committee transmitted by the High Court-I/ proper consultation.\n\nArt. 233A-Appointments of Civil and Additional Sessions Juda• to thR Rajasthan Higher Jw#cial Service if v\"lidated.\n\nArt. 236-Civil Judge appointed as Additional Sessions Judge rmdor tire Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1955-I/ \"District Judge\" within tire definition of fhe Article.\n\nThe Rnjas•han Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1955, provided that recruitment to the Hiher lud'.cial Service had to be made by the Governor from out of the lists of eli&ible candidates sent up by the Hi1!11 Court but prepared by a Selection Committee of the Hi&h Court cons11ting of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judae and another Judae of the High Court nominated )>y the Chief Justice.\n\nWhen recruitments to the posts of Civil and Additional Sessions Judge were made in accordance wit'h this procedure they were challen_ged on the JP:OUnd that the Rulea contravened Art. 233 _of the Constitutron. The Hrgh Court upheld the validity of the Rules and the appointments made thereunder. In this Court it was contended that (i) the Rules were ultra vires Art. 233, and (ii) the post of a, Civil and Additional Sessions Judge is not included in the definition of a \"District Judge\" in Article 236 and therefore the appoint ments were not validated by Article 233A introduced by the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966.\n\nHeld : The Rules contravened Article 233 and therefore the appointments were illegal; but tbe appointments were validated by Article 233A.\n\n( i) Consultation as provided in Art. 233 is consultation with the High Court and n.ot with any other authority such as the Selection Committee appointed under the Rules. The Committee, though composed of Judges of the High Court, is not the High Court. The only function entrusted 10 the High Court under the Rules is to transmit the lists prepared by the Committee and there is nothing in the Rules empowering the High Court. before submitting the lists to vary those lists if tbe High Court were tr disagree with the Committee. [190 A-CJ\n\nChandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1967] I S.C.R: 77, followed\n\n(ii) When a Civil Judge is appointed as an Additional Sessions Judge, which is precisely what has happened in the instant case, such an appointment is made in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Civil Judge exercises the powers of an Additional Sessions Judge not because he is a Civil Judge but because he is appointed as an Additionµ! Sessions Judge .• The two posts, therefore, cannot be said to have been clubbed together. So, when a person appointed as a Civil Judge is also intended to work as an Additional Sessions Judg~ an\n\nappointment has to be made under s. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as an Additional Sesoions Judge. Such an appointment has to be COii sidered u an ap, POintment fallina under the deflnltlon of \"District Judie\" within the meanma of Art. 236, Therefore Article 233 and the RajastD&n Higher Judicial Service Rules 1955 apply to such a post and not Article 234 or the R•jasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955. [195 E-Hl\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuR1so1CTION : Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1966.\n\n Appeal from the judgment und order dated November 27, 1964 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Writ :Petition No. 803 <>f 1964.\n\nM. B. L. Bhargavu and Naunlt Lal, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, G. C. Ka.r//wal, Jtdvocate-G1111ral for the State of Ra/asthan and K. Bcildev Mehta, for respon dents Nos. k~·\n\nSarjoo Prasad, S. N. Prasad, and 0. C. Mathur, for respondents Nos. 6 and 7 and Interveners Nos. I and 2.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for intervener No. 3.\n\nSami Bhushan, Addi. Advocate-General, State of U.P. and\n\n0. P. Rana, for intervener No. 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was de\\lvered by\n\nSbelat, J. This appeal, by certificate, mises two questions : ( l) whether the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1955 are ultra vircs Art. 2.33 and, therefore, the selections made by the Selection Committee appointed thereunder and appointments made on the 1'asis of such selections are invalid, and (2) if so, whether the appointments are validated by the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966 which introduces Art. 233/\\ in the Constitution.\n\nOn May 9, 1955, the Rajpramukh of the then (Part Bl State of Rajasthan, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, promulgated the Rajasthan Hiohcr Judicial Service Rules, 1955. In pursuance of the said Rules,\" the High Court of Rajasthan published a notice dated November 20.\n\n1963, inviting applications for direct recruitment to four posts of Civil and Additional Sessions Judge.\n\nA number of applica tions were received by the High Court and after scrutiny thereof and interviews granted to the applicants, the Selection Committee. appointed under the said Rules and consisting of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge and another Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice, selected four candidates.\n\nBesides these four posts, there were fourteen posts to be filled up from amongst the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service by\n\npromotion. The 5aid Committee selected eligible candidates from amongst those members and prepared another list.\n\nThe High Court submitted the two lists prepared by the Committee to the Governor for appointments.\n\nThe appellants who are members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service filed a writ petition in the High Court of Rajasthan challenging the validity of the selection done, the lists prepared by the Selection Committee and the appointments made on the basis of those lists on the ground that they were done in contravention of Art. 233. The High Court dismissed the writ pe\\ition holding that the said Rules were valid, and, therefore, the proceedings of the said Committee, the lists prepared by it and submitted to the Governor by the High Court and the appointments made were all valid. Hence this appeal.\n\nRule 1 (2) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules provides that the said Rules shall apply to the members of the Service consisting of District and Sessions Judges and Civil and Additional Sessions Judges. Rule 6 provides that the strength of the Service and of each class of posts therein shall be determined by the Governor from time to time in consultation with the High Court and the permanent strength of the Service and of each class of posts therein shall be as specified in Schedule I. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 empowers the Governor, from time to time and in consultation with the High Court, to leave unfilled or hold in abeyance any post in the Service or create such additional temporary or permanent posts in the Service as may be found necessary. Schedule I provides the strength of District and Sessions Judges at 18, i.e., 15 judgeships, one post of Legal Remembrancer, one post of Registrar of the High Court, and one post of Joint Legal Remembrancer and that of the Civil and Additional District Judges\n\nat 20. Rule 7 provides sources of recruitment, viz., by promotion from among the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service and by direct recruitment in consultation with the High Court.\n\nThe persons eligible for direct recruitment are Advocates or Pleaders of more than seven years' standing.\n\nRule 10 reads as under:-\n\n\"(l) Subject to the provisions of these rules, the number of persons to be recruited at each recruitment from each of the two sources specified in rule 7 and the period (not exceeding three years) for which such recruitment is to be made shall be determined by the Governor.\n\nProvided that the number of persons appointed to the Service by direct recruitment shall at no time exceed one-fourth of the total strength of the Service and the number of persons so appointed during any one period\n\nof recruitment shall not exceed one-fourth of the total number of vacancies occurring during that period\".\n\nRule 13 provides that after a decision is taken under Rule 10 as to the number of persons to be recruited by promotion, selection shall be made from among the eligible members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service by a Selection Committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge and a Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice. It also provides that the Cororoittee shall select from among the eligible officers those whom they consider suitable for appointment to the Service.\n\nA list of the officers selected shall theu be made in the order of their inter se seniority in the Rajasthan Judicial Service. As regards direct recruitment, Rule 17 provides that applications shall be invited by the High Court. Rule 21 provides that the Selection Committee shall scrutinise such app1ications and require such of the eligible candidates as seem best qualified for appointment to the Service under these Rules to appear before the Committee for interview.\n\nUnder Rule 22 the Selection Committee have to prepare a list of candidates whom they consider suitable for appointment to the Service.\n\nUnder Rule 21 the High Court has to submit to the Governor two copies each of the two lists of candidates considered suitable for appointment to the Service from the two sources. of recruitment as prepared in accordance with Rules 13 and 22.\n\nRule 24 provides that all appointments to posts in the Service shall be made by the Governor on the occurrence of substantive vacancies by taking candidates from the lists prepared under Rule 13 and Rule 22 in the order in which they stand in the respective lists.\n\nThe first three vacancies shall be filled from the list prepared under Rule 13 and the fourth vacancy shall be filled from the list prepared under Rule 22 and so on.\n\nIt is clear from Rule 13(2) that the selection from amongst the eligible officers for appointment to the Higher Service is made by the Selection Committee and not by the High Court as a whole though the list prepared thereunder by the Committee is forwarded by the !figh Court to the Governor. There is no provision in Rule 13 o: m any other Rule empowering the High Court to modify !he hsts prepared by the Committee either by substituting others m the lists whom the High Court considers more suitable or by withdrawing or deleting any one of those selected bv the Committee-and named in the lists. So far as direct recruitment is concerned, under Rule 21 it is the Comm; ttee which scrutinise the applications and it is again the Committee which decide whom to reject and whom to call for interview.\n\nThe Hieh Court has nothing to do with the scrutiny of applications. It is again the Selection Committee which interview the candidates considered eligible for appointment and not the High Court. It is also the\n\nSelection Committee which prepare the lists of eligible candidates selected by them. The only function entrusted to the High Court under the Rules is, therefore, to transmit the two lists prepared by the Committee under Rules 13 and 22.\n\nAs aforesaid, there is no provision in the Rules empowering the High Court before submitting the lists to the Governor to vary those lists even if the High Court were to disagree with the selections made by the Committee.\n\nObviously, the Committee is not the High Court. 'the High Court thus is only a transmitting authority. The con\n\nsultation as provided in Article 233 is consultation with the High Court and not with any other authority such as the Selection Committee appointed under the Rules. The Rules, therefore, are clearly inconsistent with the nuuidate provided for in Art. 233 and are, therefore, invalid. Consequently, the selections made by the Committee, the lists prepared by them and appointments made thereunder would be invalid. ·\n\nRecently, the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules for recruit ment of District Judges, which were similar, if not almost idcnti cal, with the Rules in this appeal, came up for consideration by tliis Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh('). After an analysis of the said Rules, this Court held that the said Rules were not in consonance with and contravened Art. 233 and further held that the appointments made thereunder were illegal.\n\nThe Court observed :-\n\n\"The Constitutional mandate of Art. 233 is clear.\n\nThe exercise of the power of appointment by the Governor is conditioned by his consultation with the High Court, that is to say, he can only appoint a son to the post of District Judge in consultation with the High Court.\n\nThe object of consultation is apparent.\n\nThe High Court is expected to know better than the Governor in regard to the suitability or otherwise of a person, belonging either to the Judicial Service or to the Bar, to be appointed as a District Judge. This mandate can be disobeyed by the Governor in two ways; directly, by not consulting the High Court at all, and indirectly by consulting the High Court and also other persons.\n\nThat this constitutional mandate has both a negative and positive significance is made clear by the other provisions of the Constitution. See Articles 124(2) and 217(2) and\n\n222. These provisions indicate that the duty to consult is so integrated with the exercise of the power that the power can be exercised only in consultation with the person or persons designated therein\". ----···----\n\n(!) )1967] I S.C.R. 77.\n\nThe Court also observed that :\n\n\"the U .P. Higher Judicial Service Rules were consti tutionally void as they clearly contravened the constitu tional mandate of Art. 233(1) and (2). Under the Rules the consultation of the High Court is an empty formality.\n\nThe Governor prescribes the qualifications, the Selection .\n\nCommittee appointed by him selects the candidates and the High Court has to recommend from the lists prepared by the Committee. This is a travesty of the Constitutional provision. The Governor in effect and substance does neither consult the High Court nor act on its re\n\ncommendations\".\n\nIt is obvious that under the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules the entire work of scrutinisfng the applications, interviewing the applicants, selection of eligible candidates from both the llOUl'CCS and preparation of the two lists is done by the Selection Committee and not by the High Court. The only function en trusted under the Rules to the High Court is that of transmitting to the Governor the two lists prepared by the Committee. The Rules, therefore, do not provide for consultation of the High Court and, therefore, contravene Art. 233 which envisages con~\n\nBultation with the High Court and not with any other body such as the Selection Committee which cannot substitute the High Court even though the members thereof happen to be three Judges of the High Court. The learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the :I State frankly conceded that it was not possible for him to dis\n\nliilguish these Rules from the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules and, therefore, the decision in Chandra Mohan's case(') would apply to the present Rules. Consequently, the said Rules cannot be sustained and have to be declared invalid. The proceedings taken by the Selection Committee and following them the action r talcen must also be held to be invalid.\n\nThe next question is : whether appointments made by the Governor from amongst those in the said lists are validated by the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 1966.\n\nArticle 233A introduced. by the said Act, inler alia, provides .\n\n\"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court (a)(i) no appointment of any person already in .the judicial service of a State or of any person who has been for not less than seven years an Advocate or a Pleader, to be a District Judge in that State, and (ii) no posting, promotion or transfer of any such person as a . District Judge, made at any time before the commencement of the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act,\n\n11)(1967] I S.C.R, 77.\n\n1966, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Art. 23 3 or Art. 23 5 shall be deemed to be illegal or void or ever to have become illegal or void by reason only of the fact that such appointment, posting, promotion or transfer was not made in accordance with the said provisions\".\n\nThe amendment thus validates the appointment, posting or promotion of a person as a District Judge if such appointment, by reason of its not being in accordance with Art. 233 or Art. 235, would have been illegal or void. The question raised by counsel is whether appointment to the post of a Civil and Additional Sessions Judge can be said to be one of a District Judge.\n\nArticle 236{a) defines a 'District Judge' as including Judge of a City Civil Court, Additional District Judge, Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge. A Civil and Additional Sessions Judge does not apparently find place in thedifferent categories of judicial officers included in this definition. Mr. Bhargava for the appellants, therefore, argued that Art. 236, while defining a District Judge, does not include a Civil and Additional Sessions Judge; therefore,\n\na person appointed as a Civil and Sessions Judge is not a District Judge and consequently Art. 233A does not validate the appointment of a person to the post of a Civil and Additional Sessions\n\nJudge if that appointment was invalid. In order to make good his submission, he relied on the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, section 6 of which provides for four categories of C:::ivil Courts, viz., ( 1) the Court of the District Judge, (2) the Court of the Additional District Judge, (3) the Court of the Civil Judge, and (4) the Court of the Munsif. Section 13 of the F Ordinance provides that appointments of persons to be Civil Jtidges and Munsifs shall be made by the Rajpramukh in accordance with the Rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and the High Court. Section 19 provides that the Court of a Civil Judge shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature and the Court of a Munsif shall havjurisdiction to hear and determine all original suits and proceedmgs of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees.\n\nSections 16 and 17 provide for the place of sitting and seals of the Courts. On May 9, 1955, the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules in exercise of powers under Art. 234 read with Art. 238 and the proviso to Art. 309.\n\nRule 4 defines a 'member of the service' as meaning a person appointed in a substantive capacity to a post in .the cadre of the\n\nService under the provisions of these Rules or of any Rules or orders superseded by Rule 2. Clause (f) of that Rule defines 'service' as meaning the Rajasthan Judicial Service. Rule 6 lays down the \"strength of the Service and provides that such strength of the Service and of each class of posts therein shall be determined by the Rajpramukh from time to time in consultation with the High Court. Sub-rule (2) provides that the permanent strength of the Service and of each class of posts therein shall be as specified in Schedule I. According to that Schedule, the number of posts of Civil Judges was determined at 30 and that of the Munsifs at 80.\n\nMr. Bhargava's contention was that neither under the Rajasthan Higher Judicial service Rules nor under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, there is any provision for appointment as an Additional Sessions Judge of a person who holds the post of a Civil Judge, that when respondents 6 and 7 were appointed they were appointed as Civil Judges with additional powers of an Additional Sessions Judge, that, therefore, as Civil Judges they would be amenal;>le to the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955 and not to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules and consequently Art. 233A would not apply to their appointments. He also contended that before Art. 233A can apply, the appointment must be to the post of a District Judge and that it is not so as the post of a Civil and Additional Sessions Judge is not included in the de- \"linition of a 'District Judge' in Art. 236. Mr. Garg appearing tor the interveners argued that the appointments as Civil and Additional Sessions Judges club together the post of a Civil Judge and that of an Additional Sessions Judge, that though these posts are so clubbed together, such appointments would be governed by Art. 234 and not by Art. 233 and therefore Art. 233A would neither apply nor validate such appointments. Such appointments, according to him, would have to be made in accordance with the provisions of Art. 234.\n\nHe also sou!!ht to arP.:ue that since the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Riiles were \"not distinguishable from those of Uttar Pradesh. the Rules are invalid, that Art. 233A does not validate such invalid Rules and that as the said appointments have been made under invalid Rules, they were not cured by Art .. 233A. w~ mav at thi< stage make it clear that the qnestion of constitutional validity of Art. 233A has not been raie, and th\\'!refore the decretal amount could not be reduced.\n\nSec!ion 3 of the Act provides for the reduction of debt at the time of the passing the decree in \"a suit ... :relating to secured debt\", and s. 4 provides for reduction of the debt'S after the passing of ''a decree ...•.. relating to a secured debt\".\n\nWhether the debt was secured or not is .i matter that has to be tested, both for s. 4 as well as for s. 3, on the date the suit \\Vas filellid that lhe decree related to a secured debt 9imply bec::i.use the dcree cr.:atcd a charge.\n\nThe legislature could not hav~ in:cnded, that the fact th:u th!! decree created a charge should result in converting what was an unsecured debt into a secured debt for the purpose of s. 4. [202 A; C-G; 20J\n\nE, H; 204 AB]\n\nCIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 952 and 953 of 1964.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 24, l 961 of the Allahabad High Court in Execution First Appeal No. 440 of 1953 and Civil Revision No. l 402 of 195'.l.\n\nC. B. Aganvala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant (in both ff the appeals).\n\nS. P. Sinha and S. Shaukm Hussa[n, for respondent No. l ! in both the appeals)\n\nSUPR.BMB COURT REPORTS (1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. These are two connected appeals by special leave from a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court.\n\nThe facts necessary for present purposes may be briefly indicated. The appellant borrowed some money on a promissory note from the respondents' predecessors.\n\nThe suit was filed by the respondents on the basis of the promissory note and a decree for Rs. 2,71,000/· and odd was passed against the appellant. The decree provided for 20 instalments payable half-yearly. The decree also provided for one or more instalments for pendente lite and future interest beyond the twentieth instalment. The first instalment was payable in November 1938 and thereafter each instalment was payable on or before July 31 and December 31 each year. There was also a default clause providing that in case there were three defaults in the payment of instalments, the whole decree could be executed.\n\nFinally the decree created a charge on 18 villages belonging to the appellant. It may be added that the charge was created under s. 3 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, No. XXVII of 1934.\n\nThe appellant paid the first 17 instalments in time. He paid the eighteenth instalment on July 31, 1948 but this was late as by then the 20th instalment had also fallen due. As the 19th and 20th instalments as well as pendente lite and future interest had not been paid the decree was put in execution by the respondents on April 26, 1951 for recovery of Rs. 49,000/- and odd by the sale of a kothi and an Ahata belonging to the appellant. The decree-holder respondent also prayed that in case the whole amount was not realised from the sale of the above property, zamidari property on which a charge had been created might be put to sale.\n\nThe appellant raised objections under s. 47 of the Cooe of Civil Procedure against the execution. He also filed an application under ss. 4 and 8 of the U.P. Zarnindar's Debt Reduction Act, No. XV of 1963, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is unnecessary to refer to the objections in detail, for in the present appeals we are concerned only with one point, namely, whether s. 4 of the Act applies to the present case.\n\nUnder that section the appellant had applied to the court which passed the decree to reduce the amount as provided therein. Further in his objection under s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant claimed the same relief.\n\nThat is how there were two proceedings in the first court, one und_er s. 4 of the Act and the other an objection under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe first court held that s. 4 of the Act did not apply.\n\nIn consequence it held that the amount for which execution had been taken out was not .liable to reduction.\n\nIt therefore dismissed both the' application under s. 4 as well as the objection under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was also a question\n\n:aAGHTJRAJ SINGH v. MlJRAill LAL (Wanchoo, /.) 201\n\nA of limi'atiOn, but we are not concerned in the present appeals with that question.\n\nThis gave rise to two proceeding1 before the High Court.\n\nThe appellant went in appeal against th.e dismissal of his objection under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nHe also filed B 11 civil revision against the dismissal of his application under s. 4 of the Act. Pie two matters we1e heard together by the High Cour!, which held that s. 4 did not apply and therefore the amount could not be reduced.\n\nThe High Court having refused to grant leave to the appellant, he secured special leave from this Court; and that is how the matter arises before us.\n\nC The Act was passed in 1953 to give relief to zamindars whose lands had been acquired by the State under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, No. l of 1951.\n\nSection 2 defines certain terms out of which it is necessary to refer to the following :-\n\nD \"(m) 'secured debt' means a debt secured by mortgage of an estate and other immovable property;\n\n( i) 'mortgage' with its cognate expressions shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Transfer of Property Act, 18 82 and includes a charge as defined in sec- E tion 100 of that Act;\n\n( o) 'suit to which this Act applies' means any suit or proceeding relating to a debt whether secured or otherwise;\n\n( e) 'decree to which this Act applies' means a decree passed either before or after the commencement of this Act in a suit to which this Act applies;\n\n( f) 'debt' mea1JS an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or before the first day of July 1952 ........ \"\n\nCertain debts are exempt from this definition but we are not concerned with them in the present appeals.\n\nIt will be seen from these definitions that a decree in a suit based on any debt is a decree to which the Act applies and such decrees can be of two kinds, namely, (i) those based on a secured 8 debt, and (ii) those based on an unsecured debt. A secured debt is a debt secured by a mortgage and includes a debt secured by a charge under s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\n202 SUPJ.EMB COUJ.T l.EPOllTS.\n\n(1967] 3 S.C.K.\n\nThen comes s. 3 which provides for reduction of debt at the time of passing of decree. Sub-section (1) thereof lays down that \"notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement or document, in any suit to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, the court shall, after the amount due has been ascertained, but before passing a decree, proceed as heremafter stated.\" Then follow provisions as to the manner in which the debt, would be reduced, but we are not concerned with the details thereof. Section 3 therefore applies to a case where a decree relating to a secured debt had not been passed before the Act came into force. In such a case the court passing the decree has to reduce the amount in the manner provided in that section. It is however clear that before the court can act under. s. 3, it has to come to the conclusion that the debt in question is a secured debt i.e. a debt secured by a mortgage or a charge under s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. The mortgage or the charge must be there on the date ot the suit and the suit must be with respect to a secured debt. The date therefore on which the court has to see whether the debt in the suit before it is a secured debt or not is the date on which the suit is filed.\n\nThe High Court seeins to be in error when it held that under the definition of \"'secured debt\" only such debts as are secured by a mortgage come in and not debts which are secured by a charge. It seems to have overlooked that part of the definition of the word \"mortgage\" which lays down that a mortgage will include a charge as defined in s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, even though a debt may be secured by a charge it will be a secured debt for the purpose of s. 3 provided the charge was there before the date of the suit. We have referred to s. 3 in some detail because we are of opinion that the interpretation to be put on s. 3 will have a direct bearing on the interpretation of the words of s. 4 where also the material words are the same as in s. 3.\n\nSection 4 provides for reduction of debts after passing of decrees, and sub-s. (i) thereof reads thus;\n\n\"(I) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any other law-the court which passed a decree to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, shall, on the application either of the decree-holder or judgment-debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated.\"\n\nThen come provisions as to the reduction of debt; but we are not concerned with the details thereof.\n\nThe question that has been posed before us is the meaning of the words \"a decree ...... relating to a secured debt\".\n\nThe\n\nRAGHURAJ SINGH v. MURARI LAL (Wanchoo, J.)\n\n20J.\n\ncomparable words in s. 3 are \"a suit ...... relating to a secured debt\". As we have already said, so far as s. 3 is concerned itis the date on which the suit is filed which has to be seen to determine whether the suit relates to a secured debt as defined in the Act. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that s. 4 applies undoubtedly to a case where the debt was a secured debt at the time the suit was filed. But it is further urged that in an application under s. 4, the court may also take into account the fact that though the debt may not have been a secured debt on the date the suit was filed in which the decree was passed, the decree having created a charge the debt becomes secured and the decree relates to a secured debt, the relevant date in such a case being the date on which the application under s. 4 has been made to the court.\n\nIt is said that the words \"a decree ...... relating to secured debt\" means a decree which has secured a debt whether the debt was secured before the suit. was filed or not.\n\nWe are of opinion that this meaning cannot be given to the words \"a decree ...... relating to a secured debt\". We have already indicated that the comparable words in s. 3 are the same and there the words \"a suit ...... relating to a secured debt\" clearly mean a suit which is based on a debt which was secured before the suit was filed.\n\nOn the same reasoning when s. 4 speaks of \"a decree ...... relatin11: to a secured debt\" it means a decree passed in a suit which was based on a secured debt as on the date of the suit. The legislature could not have intended by using these words in s. 4 that the fact that the decree created a charge should result in converting what was an unsecured debt into a secured debt for the purpose of s. 4. It seems to us that if one were to ask in a case of this kind whether the decree related to a secured debt or not, the answer would clearly be that the decree does not relate to a secured debt but to an unsecured debt based on a promissory note. It is true that the decree itself created a charge but that is very different from saying that the decree relates to a secured debt. We have no doubt that if the legislature intended that a decree which relates to an unsecured debt but which itself creates a charge for any reason would also be covered by s. 4, it\n\nould have used different and appropriate words to convey that idea. Thus to our mind, as the words \"suit relating to a secured debt\" mean a suit relating to a debt which was secured on the date the suit was filed, a decree relating to secured debt must also mean the same thing i.e. decree in respect of a debt which was secured when the suit in which the decree was passed was filed.\n\nThe mere fact that the decree created a charge for certain reasons, as in this case, under the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, is no reason for holding that the decree relates to a secured debt. Whether the debt was secured or otherwise is a matter which in our opinion bas t-0 be tested both for s. 4 as well as for s. 3 on the\n\n204 SUPllEMR 'CO'lll!.T 1!.EPOll.TS\n\n(1967) 3 B.C.R.\n\ndate the suit is tiled. If on that date the debt was secured, the f. suit would be relating to a secured debt and so would be the decree which might later be passed in that suit. But if on the date of the suit the debt was not secured it cannot be said that the decree related to a secured debt simply because the decree created a charge for some re11son or other. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took that this case B was not covered by s. 4 of the Act.\n\nThe , appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with costs-one hearing fee.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nApptals dlsmlsud.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "R. B. CHAUDHARY RAGHURAJ SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. B. CHAUDHARY RAGHURAJ SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MURARI LAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MURARI LAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1967\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.J\n\nU.P. Zamindar's D.ebt Reduction Act (15 of 1953), ss."}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(m), 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 847, "end_char": 871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1281, "end_char": 1285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1493, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1670, "end_char": 1676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1685, "end_char": 1709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "C. B. Aganvala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2464, "end_char": 2478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aganvala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant (in both ff the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2483, "end_char": 2494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aganvala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellant (in both ff the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and S. Shaukm Hussa[n, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Shaukm Hussa[n", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2557, "end_char": 2574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and S. Shaukm Hussa[n, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. These are two connected appeals by special leave from a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. These are two connected appeals by special leave from a common judgment of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "July 31 and December 31 each year", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first instalment was payable in November 1938 and thereafter each instalment was payable on or before July 31 and December 31 each year."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He paid the eighteenth instalment on July 31, 1948 but this was late as by then the 20th instalment had also fallen due."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the 19th and 20th instalments as well as pendente lite and future interest had not been paid the decree was put in execution by the respondents on April 26, 1951 for recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4603, "end_char": 4621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5024, "end_char": 5051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5211, "end_char": 5215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5221, "end_char": 5248, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5277, "end_char": 5281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5469, "end_char": 5473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5542, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5842, "end_char": 5846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5879, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6051, "end_char": 6055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6384, "end_char": 6424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6442, "end_char": 6451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6746, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7741, "end_char": 7747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7755, "end_char": 7779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7842, "end_char": 7846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8765, "end_char": 8771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8803, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9431, "end_char": 9455, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9559, "end_char": 9563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9726, "end_char": 9730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9857, "end_char": 9866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9998, "end_char": 10027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10622, "end_char": 10626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10831, "end_char": 10835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10985, "end_char": 10989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11335, "end_char": 11339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11709, "end_char": 11713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11908, "end_char": 11912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12131, "end_char": 12135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12835, "end_char": 12839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13331, "end_char": 13356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13528, "end_char": 13532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "statute": "Agriculturists Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13548, "end_char": 13552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "statute": "Agriculturists Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14094, "end_char": 14098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "statute": "Agriculturists Relief Act"}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_19_27_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN\n\nSHEEL BHADRA Y AJEE & ORS.\n\nFebruary 28, 1967\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.J\n\nElection Petition-Bribery and offer of bribery alleged-Facts which court can take into consideration-Offer of bribe whether must be of specific aniount to be corrupl practice.\n\nLetters J'atent.--Difference among Judges constituting Dlvi.rion Bench-Reference , whether can be made to a single Judge-'Bench' whether includes single Judge.\n\nRespondent No. 1 challenged the election of the .appellant. t~ the Rajya Sabha on the a)leged ground of corrupt practice com1s11ng of bribery as well as offer of bribery.\n\nTh~ Tribunal held that \"!>th the above mentioned o/t>OS of corrupt pracuces were proved ag01nst the appellant.\n\nThe High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal holding only that offer of brib~ in two cases was proved .. The appellant. ~\"!'le to this Court with certificate. It was urged that (1) when the Div1S1on Bench which oriJ!inally heard the appeal,, on difference arising among the Judges consututing it, asked for a reference to another bench, the Chief Justice had no power under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent to refer the matter to a single Judge, (ii) this Court should examine the evidence as to offer of bribe to cenain persons for itself, as the High Court had misread the evidence and bad relied on certain irrelevant pieces of evidence, (iii) the facts proved did not justify a finding that bribe was offered by the appellant.\n\nHELD : (i) Under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent the 'reference of the case to a single Judge was competent. The word 'Bench' in the Article includes a single Judge. [21 HJ\n\n(ii) In considering the allegations of bribery against the appellant the court was entitled to take into consideration the fact that the appell\"!'t was a man of means and that he had no political background in B1har. wher~ he did not have a permanent residential house. There was no mISreadmg of the evidence by the High Court and no case had been made out fot a reappraisal of the findings. [23 B.C, HJ\n\n(iii) The proposition cannot be accepted that an offer of bribery cannot be held to be such unless a specific amount is mentioned in the offer. [27 DJ\n\nEmperor v. Amiruddin Salebhoy Tyabjee, A.LR. 1923 Born. 44, Emperor v. Choubt Dinkar Rao & Ors. A.I.R. 1933 All. 513.\n\nJn the matter 7'f Balls v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, (1865-66)\n\n1 Q.B.\n\nCases 3~7, Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal & Orr. A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1366 and Union of India v. H. C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364, distingui>hed.\n\nCharturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram & Ors. [1954J S.C.R. 817, Cast No. XII of Borough of Staleybridge, (1869) I O'Malley and Hardcastle p. 66 and Case No. XV of Borough of Coventry, (1869) I O'Mal!ey and Hardcastle p. 97,, relied on.\n\n20 SUPllBMB COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE Ju&rsmcnoN : Civil Appeal No 1454 of 1966. .\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated March 3 1966 of the Patna High Court in Election Appeal No. 3 of 1965.\n\nVeda Vyasa,' K. K. Jain and R. Gopalakri&hnan, for the ap pellant.\n\nK. P. Varma and D. Goburdhun, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nBhargava, J. In 1964, there were eight vacancies in the Rajya Sabha for which members had to be elected from the constituency of the Legislative Assembly of Bihar; The election was to be held on 26th March, 1964. It appears that the Congress Party put up 6 candidates out of the total of 13 candidates who were nominated fdr these eight vacancies. Two of the candidates withdrew after scrutiny of nomination papers and, consequently, for the actual election there were 6 Congress candi\n\ndates and 5 others. . Amongst these 5 others was the appellant Rajendra Prasad Jain who was standing as an Independent candidate. One of the Congress candidates was respondent Sheel\n\nBhadra Yajee.\n\nAt the election, Rajendra Prasad Jain was declared as one of the elected candidates, . while respondent Sheel\n\nBhadra Yajee was unsuccessful. Respondent No. 1, Sheel Bhadra Yajee, then filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant to the Rajya Sabha. The main ground for challenge was that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice of bribery or offer of bribery in order to secure his election. In the election petition as originally filed, Schedule I contained the names of five persons to whom, it was alleged, bribe had actually been paid by the appellant. Schedule II contained the names of five persons to whom bribe had been offered by the appellant. By a subsequent amendment, three fresh names were added in Schedule I and five in Schedule II. The amendment having been allowed by the Election Tribunal, , the petition, at the stage of the trial, contained allegations of payment of bribe to ight persons and of offer of bribe to ten persons. In the actual tnal, howver, evidence was not tendered in respect of some of these allegatmns.\n\nThe Election Tribunal, after full trial of the petition, held that respondent No. 1 had succeeded in proving that the appellant had given bribes .to three of the persons mntiond in Schedule I and had offered bribe to four persons mentioned m Schedule II. 1:'he\n\nappellant appealed to the High Court t. i:-atna.\n\nIn the High Court, when the appeal was heard by a D1v1s10n ench, one member Mahapatra, J., held that none of the allegatJons of paym.ent of bribe or of offer of bribe had been proved and was of. e v1w that the appeal should be allowed and the election petition d!s missed. The other member, Ramratna Singh, . J., agreed with\n\nR. P. JAINv. s. B. YAJEE (Bhargava, J.) 21\n\nA Mahapatra, J. with regard to the three instances of giving bribe to the three persons mentioned in Schedule I and also with regard to the offer of bribe to two of th.e persons mentioned in Schedule II. With regard to two instances of offer of bribe in Schedule 11, he disagreed with Mahapatra, J. and upheld the decision of the Election Tribunal. The two persons in whose cases the offer of 8 bribe was held proved by Ramratna Singh, J. were Shah Mustaq Ahmad and Ram Narain Choudhary who were both members of the Bihar Legislaive Assembly and belonged to the Congress Party. Owing to this difference of opinion, the two learned Judges directed that the case may be placed before the Hon'ble the Ch1d Justice for reference of the point of difference to another Bench under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent. Under the directions of C the Chief Justice, the appeal came up before U. N. Sinha, J., who, in both cases, agreed wi'.h the view taken by Ramratna Singh, J. and, consequently, in accordance with the view of the majority, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal holding that the offer of bribe by the appellant to Shah Mustaq Ahmad and Ram Narain Choudhary had been proved. The appellant has o now come up in appeal to this Court under certificate granted by the High Court at Patna against this judgment of that Court.\n\nIn his appeal, three points were urged by Mr. Veda Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant. The first question of law raised was -that the Division Bench of the Patna High Court, which first heard the appeal, made a direction that the case is to g be placed before the Chief Justice for reference of the point of difference to another \"Bench\" under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent\n\nand, consequently, the reference made subsequently by the Chief Justice to a single Judge was not competent. It was urged that the use of the expression \"another Bench\" in the referring order meant that '.he case had to be laid by the Chief Jmtice before a I' Bench of two or more Judges and not before a single Judge.\n\nThere are two reasons why, in our opinion, this submission has no force. The first is that the word \"Bench\" used in the referring order cannot be interpre'.ed as necessarily indicating that the cae must be laid before two or more Judges. In this connection, the language of Rule 1 (xi) and r. 3 of Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court at Patna is significant.\n\nUnder r. 1 (xi), a case G under the. Inian Companies Act is to be heard by a single Judge; and r. 3 md1cates the nature of one of the orders which can be passed by a Bench hearing the case under r. I (xi).\n\nThus, in\n\n~· 3 of the Rules of the High Court at Patna itself a single Judge is rferred to as a Bench. In fact, it is well-known that, when referrmg .to Judges of the High Court sitting to decide a case, the H express10ns frequently used are Single Bench and Division Bench.\n\nThe wor~ \"Bench\" used in the refening order, even in its ordinary\n\nconnota'.1on, would. therefore, include a single Judge.\n\nThe second aspect is that the order of reference mentions that the case\n\n22 SUPllEMB\n\nCOURT llBPOllTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nis to be placed for reference under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent.\n\nArticle 28 of the Letters Patent lays down that, in such circumJtances, the case is to be referred to one or more of the other Judges of the High Court. This reference to Art. 28 of the Letters Patent also thus clarifies that under the order of reference made by the Division Bench which first heard the appeal, the case was intended (o be placed before the Chief Justice for reference to one or more of the other Judges of the Court. Further, under the Rules of the High Court at Patna, the Chief Justice had the discretion to decide whether a case placed before him under Art. 28 of the Letters Patent should be heard by one Judge or more Judges than one, and this power of the Chief Justice was actually exercised when, in this case, he directed that the case be laid before U. N. Sinha, J. The reference to U. N. Sinha, J. and his decision were, therefore, not incompetent.\n\nThe second point urged by learned counsel was that the finding recorded by the High Court of Patna that the two instances of offer of bribe by the appellant to Shah Mustaq Ahmad and Ram Narain Choudhary were proved was incorrect. He urged that we should go into the merits of this finding on the ground that at least one of the Judges who recorded that finding, viz., Ramratna Singh, J., had misread evidence and had taken into consideration irrelevant matters.\n\nHe pointed out to us that Ramratna Singh, J., had held at p. 454 of the Paper-book that \"it is true that P.W. 2 did not disclose the names of P.Ws. 9 and 14 to Yajee before September or October, 1964, but the non-disclosure of the names of persons to whom he had spoken about the incident when the first talk with Yajee took place is not material.\" P.W. 2 was Ram Narain Choudhary who was one of the persons to whom bribe was alleged to have been offered by the appellant, and P.Ws. 9 and 14 were two persons examined to corroborate him. . Respondent Yajee, in the trial of the election petition, did not disclose the names of P.Ws. 9 and 14 to the Court when he gave the first list of his witnesses in October, 1964, and it was from this circumstance that the learned Judge drew the inference that the names of these two persons had not been disclosed by P.W. 2 to respondent Yajee before September or October, 1964.\n\nLearned counsel pointed out that Yajee had admitted that the names of these two witnesses had been disclosed to him in September, 1964. It, however, appears that it cannot be held that the learned Judge committed an error of misreading evidence if he chose not to rely on this admission of Yajee and preferred the evidence which showed that the names of these two witnesses had not been disclosed to him before September or October, 1964. This may be at best a question as to the weight to be attached to different pieces of evidence and cannot be held to be an instance of misreading of evidence.\n\n' (\n\nAs regards the second aspect of reliance on irrelevant evidence by Ramratna Singh, J., it was urged that in his judgment at p. 444 of the Paper-oook he referred to the fact that the appellant is a man of means and that he had no political background in Bihar where he did not have a permanent residential house.\n\nIt was urged that facts were totally irrelevant to the charge of giving or offering of bribe in order to secure his election. We fail to see how it can be held that the fact that the appellant had no political background in Bihar and was a man of me.t11> is irrelevant. These considerations could certainly be relevant for holding whether it was probable that the appellant would offer bribes or give bribes to secure his election. Obviously, a person who had no meam; at all could not possibly offer bdbes or give bribes inducing voters to vote for him, and the fact that he had no political background could easily be the reason why the appellant might have resorted to this corrupt practice for securing\n\nvotes.\n\nReference was also made to a part of the judgment at p. 451 of the Paper-book where the learned Judge ocld that a candidate who wanted to bribe a voter would at first send some feeler before making the offer; but there was not much time left, as the allotments to different Congress candidates ware made by the leader of the party only on the 24th or 25th Marh and election was to take place on the 26th March. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that this reference to the allotment to different Congress candidates was irrelevant. We are unable to find any force in this submission. It appears that the system was\n\nthat the members of the Congress Party in the Bihar Legislative Assembly were divided into six groups and each group was asked to vote for a particular camidate. Thii was the ailotment reierred to by the learned Judge. This circumstance is quite relevant, because it is obvious that another candidate seeking to bribe a voter of the Congress Part}' would only approach that voter who may have been allotted for voting to a candidata whom he did not like or whom, for some Other reason, he would not be keen to support, while it would be futile to approach a v.:ter who had a asked to voe for a candidate with whom he wa£ on fri.!ndly\n\nterms or whom he was himself keen to support. It cannot be said in these circumstances that any irrelevant material was taken into account by the learned Judge at this stage. We cannot, therefore, hold that there was any such misreading of evidence or admission of irrelevant evidence which would justify our reopening findings of fact which have been concurrently recorded by the Election Tribunal at the stage of trial and by the High Court at the stage of appeal. Consequently, we reject the suggestion of learned\n\ncunsel taat we should for oul'Selves go through the evidence and\n\nre-examine on merits, after weighing evidence, the concurrent tinding of fact that the appellant was proved to have offered bribes to Shah Mustaq Ahmad and Ram Narain Choudhary.\n\nSUPllEMB\n\nCOURT RBPOllTS (1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe last and the third point urged by learnd counsel was that, even on findings of fact recorded by the High Court, . we must hold as a question of law that there was in fact no offer of bribe by the appellant.\n\nThis argument was urged on the basis that the finding recorded did not show that any specific amount was offered as bribe to either Shah Mustaq Allmad or Ram Narain Choudhary. In the case of Shah Mustaq Ahmad, th~ finding is that the appellant had said to him : •'fn your election a lot of money is spent and, therefore, take some money from me and cast your first preference vote in my favour.\" In the other case of Ram Narain Choudhary, 1he significance of the olft>r is very clear when the actual words in Hindi used by the appellant are considered. They were as follows :-\n\n\"Is Par Jain Saheb Ne Kaha Ki Apko Bhi To Election Men Kharch Burch Hua Hoga. Isliye Ham Upko Kuchh Seva Karna Chahete Hain. Ap Hamare Madad Kijiye.\"\n\nIt is true that in these words there was no direct offer of giving money, but the language used clearly indicated that the appellant was offering his services in the form of contribution towards the expenditure which Ram Narain Choudhary had incurred in his own election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly. In both cases, therefore, it is clear that an offer of payment of money was made by the appellant to these voters to induce them to cast votes for him in the lection to the Rajya Sabha.\n\nLearned counsel, however, urged that as long. as no specific amount was offered by the appellant, there was, in fact, no offer of bribery. According to him, it was still a stage when an intention of offering bribery was expressed, but no offer of bribery was actually made. An offer, it was urged, must be held to he made only when a specific sum is mentioned as the amount of bribe to\n\nbe given and there is to be no negotiation about the amount. In this connection, learned counsel drew our attention to the meaning given ·!o the word \"offer\" as explained in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd fain., Vol. 8, at p. 69.\n\nHalsbury, at that stage, deals with the meaning of the word \"offer\" as used in connection with the law of contract; and we do not think any assistance can lJe taken from the principle laid down therein. He also made a reference to some Indian cases dealing with the meaping of the word \"offer\" in connection with the offer of bribery under the Criminal Law.\n\nThe case mainly relied upon was Emperor v.\n\nAmimiddin Salebhoy Tyabjee('), where the accused was alleged to have used the words : \"my cousin wishes to give you Rs. 5,000\" to a government servant.\n\nIt was held that these words did not constitute an offer of bribery. W.e do not think that that case is\n\n(1) A.LR. 1923 Born. 44.\n\nR. P. JAIN v. s. B. YAJEB (Bhargava, J.) 2 s.\n\nA at all parallel with the case before us. In that case, the accused himself did not offer any bribe and all that he did was to indicate to the government servant .that his cousin wanted to give to the government servant the sum of Rs. 5,000. There was, thus, no direct offer by the accused of bribery to the government servant.\n\nB In Emperor v. Choube Dinkar Rao and 01hers('), Dinkar Rao accused admitted that he went to a Judge and told him that the plaintiff would pay Rs. 10,000 if the suit were decreed, but denied that he had gone on behalf of the plaintiff. Once again, that was a case where there was no offer of payment of any money by the accmed to the Judge. In the instant case, the words used c by the appellant clearly amounted to an offer to give money himself to the two voters.\n\nSimilarly, we do not think that any assistance can be taken from the decision of Blackburn, J. in In the Matter of Balls v.\n\nThe Metropolitan Board of Works('), where it was held in connection with compensation for land that \"the offer of compensation is to be an offer which the claimant can either accept or reject; if it is of one sum for compensation and costs, the claimant cannot know how much he is to have for the injury to his land and how much for his costs. He might, therefore, be misled by it.\" That was again a case where the point which came up for consideration before the learned Judge related to offer of compensation for land which would be in the nature of an offer in connection with a contract and not an offer of bribe under the election law.\n\nReliance was also placed on the view expressed by this Court Moha'! Sinh v. Bhanwarlal lll!d Others(\"), in which, dealing with gratification under the Election Law it was held : \"Gratification in its ordinary connotation means stisfaction. In the context in \"\".hich. the expression is ued, nd its deli!Ilitation by the Explanat10n, 1t must mean something valuable which is calculated to satisfy a person's aim, object or desire whether or not that thing is estimable in terms of money; but ; mere offer to help in securing employment to a person with a named or unnamed employer would not amount to such gratification.\" We again fail to see how that decision affects the point before us. In that case, all that as held was that a mere offer of help in securing employment with another person does not amount to gratification. In e case bef that the applicatron has to be heard and determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in Ss. 115, 117, 118 and 119. The subject-matter of Profession Tax is not very complicated and the procedure provided for the assessment and ro- B view is reasonable. (8 E-FJ\n\nRohtas Industries Ltd., Dalm/anagar v. State of Bihar (1965} Bihar L.J.R. 886, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL J URISDICTJON : Writ Petition No. 194 of 1966.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nB. Sen and K. K. Sinha, for !he petitioner.\n\nB. P. Jha, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J. In this petition under art. 32 of the Constimtion a notice of demand issued by the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee demanding Rs. 100/ • on account of Profession Tax levied under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 (B. & 0.\n\nAct VII of 1922 )-hereinafter referred to as the Act-for the period 1963-64 to 1965-66 from the petitioner, Shri Ram Bachan Lal, Land Officer, who is in the employment of Roh!as Industries Ltd., Dalmianagar, is sought to be quashed on the ground that !he provisions of the Act under which it has been issued infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner under arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee was constituted by notification dated May 23, 1942, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) of s. 388 of the Act. Section 388 reads as follows :\n\n\"388. Constitution of notified area- ( 1) The State Government may by notification declare that it is necessary to make administrative provision for all or any of the purposes of this Act in any area specified in the notification, other than a municipality or a cantonment.\n\n(2) An area in respect of which such a notification has issued is hereinafter called a notified area.\"\n\nSection 389 enables the State Government to impose taxation in, apply enactments to and constitute committee in the Notified area.\n\nThis section reads thus :\n\n\"389. Power to impose taxation in, apply enactments to and constitute committees in, notified area.- Th! State Government niay by notification :-\n\n(a) apply or adapt to a notified area or to any part of a notified area any provision of this Act which may be applied to a municipality, or any rule or by-law in force or which can be made in any municipality under this or any other Act;\n\n(b) impose in a notified area or in any part of a notified area any tax which could be imposed by the Commissioners if the notified area were a municipality; and\n\n( c) appoint or make rules for appointment or election of a committee to carry out the purpose of this Act in the notified area.\"\n\nIn exercise of the powers under s. 389 by notification dated May 23, 1941, the Governor of Bihar applied to the notified area the following provisions of the Act :\n\n\"Chapter I Section 3.\n\nChapter II Sections 21-27, 29-48, 51-52 dauses (b),\n\n(c) and (d).\n\nChapter III Sections 58-78 and 81.\n\nChapter IV Sections 82(1)(b), (c), (f), (il, (j) and Sections 82(2), 84, 86-88, 98-150, 154-163.\n\nThe whole of Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and X.\n\nChapter XI section 340, 341 and 342-343.\n\nThe whole of Chapters X!I and XIII.\" The Act was amended by the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act,\n\n1953 (Bihar Act XXXII of 1953 ).\n\nIt inserted cl. (ff) in sub-s. (I) of s. 82, which reads as follows :\n\n''82. Power to impose taxes.- ( I J The Commissioners may, from time to time, at a meeting convened expressly for the purpose, of which due notice shall have been given, subject to the provisions of this Act and with the sanction of the State Government, impose within the limits of the municipality the following taxes and fees, or any of them :-\n\n(ff) a tax on the trades, professions, callings and employments specified in the Fourth Sc; hedule at such\n\nrates i!Ot exng the rate~ specified therein as may from time to time be determined by the Commissioners\n\nat a meeting;\n\nProvided that the rates determined by the Commissioners at a meeting shall be subject to the approval of the State Government and subject to such modification in the rates of taxes and exemption of classes of profes- 'ion, trades and callings to be taxed as the State Gov ernment may direct.\" Proviso (iv) was added to sub-s. (1) of s. 82 of the Act by Bihar Act III of 1959, and reads as follows :\n\n\"Provided that the Commissioners-\n\n(iv) shall, if so directed by the State Government by notification, impose within limits of a municipality the taxes mentioned in clauses (c), (b), (f) or (ff) at such rates, subject to the maxima specified in sections 84 and 85 and the First and the Fourth Schedules, and from such dates, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, as may be specified in the notification.\" The Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1953, also inserted Chapter IV-A, which deals with the tax on profession, trades, callings and employments.\n\nChapter IV A consists of s. 150A to s. 1 SOE.\n\nSection 150A provides that the person liable to pay such a tax shall take out a half-yearly licence and pay the tax assessed on him in pursuance of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of section 82, provided that such tax shall be imposed on the income accrued within the municipality during the year next preceding the year for which the tax is imposed. The second proviso exempts persons whose taxable income does not exceed Rs. 1,500 per annum or the value of whose place of business does not exceed Rs. 10 per mensem or whose income from employment does not exceed Rs. 2,400 per annum. The explanations to s. lSOA may be set out:\n\n\"Explanation ( 1 )-The taxable income of any person liable to pay the tax under this section shall be deemed to be the amount computed in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, and where any such person is not subject to assessment of income-tax under the said Act, his taxable income shall be the amount which shall be computed, so far as may be. in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act.\n\nExplanation (2).-The onus of providing e amounts of tile taxable income computed under the said\n\nB i\n\nD '\n\nRAM BACHAN LAL V. JllllAR (Sikri, /.)\n\nAct shall lie on the person liable to pay the tax under this section.,.\n\nSection I SOB enables the Commissioners to call for information.\n\nSection I SOC renders statements and returns furnished under s. !SOB confidential.\n\nSection !SOD, which deals with the application of money received from tax on professions, trades, callings and emplo)Qllents, reads thus :\n\n\"!SOD. All moneys collected by the Commissioners, on account of a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments imposed under clau~ (ff) of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 82, shall- ( 1) in any municipality in which there is a provision for the supply of piped water, in accordance with a scheme for water-supply sanctioned under section 292, be applied notwithstanding anything contained in this Act and after deduction of such proportionate share of the cost of collection and supervision as the Commissioner at a meeting may fix, in whole or in part and subject to such conditions and exceptions, if any, as the State Government may direct, in defraying the expenses on account of extending or maintaining the water supply and in repaying or paying interest on debts incurred in connection with the scheme of the said water-supply and where only a part of the proce.eds of the tax is so applied, the balance shall form part of the municipal fund; ( 2) in any other municipality in which there is no such provision for the supply of piped water form part of the municipal fund.\"\n\nSection I SOE provides for review in the following terms:\n\n\"!SOE. Application for review.-(1) Any person who is dissatisfied with the assessment of the total income or taxable income or the determination of the amount of tax payable by him or who disputes his liability to be assessed may apply to th.e Commissioner to review the assessment of his total income or taxable income or the amount of tax assessed upon him or to exempt him from the liability to be assessed.\n\n(2) Every application presented under sub-section ( 1) shall, as nearly as may be, be heard and determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in sections 11 S, 117, 118 and 119, as if such applications were applications presented under section 116.\" On March 1, 1957, the Governor of Bihar applied the provisions of cl. (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 82, and sections lSOA to\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n\nlSOE, of the Act to the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified area. It appears that the petitioner was not aware that these provisions had been applied to the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified area.\n\nOn March 4, 1957, the Governor of Bihar sanctioned the unposition by the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified area Committee of the tax on trades, professions, callings and employments.\n\nThe notification provided that the tax shall be levied at the maximum rates specified in the Fourth Schedule of the Act.\n\nOn March 23, l 959, the Governor of Bihar, in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso (iv) to sub-s. (1) of s. 82 directed the Commissioners of the Municipalities as well as the Notified Areas Conunittees specified in the Schedule, which i:icluded Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee, to levy tax mentioned in cl. (ff) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 82 at the maximum rates specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act with effect from April 1. 1959. Thereupon the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee imposed the profession tax and sent separate demand notices to the petitioner for the years 1963-64. 1964-65 and 1965-66, and later sent the impugned demand notice covering all these three years.\n\nNumber of points had been raised in the petition but Mr.\n\nB. Sen, the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner, has raised only two points before us.\n\nHe urged ( 1) that ss. 388 and 389 of the Act violate art 14 of the Constitution, and (2) that s. 82{1) (ff), ss. lSOA to lSOE. and the Fourth Schedule offend arts. 14, 19(g) and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nRegarding the first point, the ground of attack was that ss. 388 and 389 give arbitrary power to the Government either to constitute a municipality under s. 4 of the Act or to constitute a notified\n\narea committee under s. 388.\n\nIt would be noticed that the Notified Area Committee was constituted as long ago as 1942.\n\nWithout deciding the point, we a>wme that Mr. B. Sen is entitled to challenge the validity of ss. 388 and 389.\n\nIt seems to us that there is no substance in this point.\n\nSection 4(1) (a) and\n\n(b) provide as under :\n\n\"4. Declaration of intention to constitute or alter limits of municipality.-\n\n( 1) (a) When the State Goverrunent is satisfied that three-fourths of the adult male population of any town are engaged on pursuits oer than agriculture and that such town contams not less than five thousand inhabitants, and an average number of not less than one thousand inhabitants to the square mile of the area of such town, the State Government may declare its intention to constitute such town, together with or exclusive of any railway station, village, land or\n\nbuilding in the vicinity of such town, municipality, ll!ld to extend to it all or any of the provisions of this Act.\n\n(b) When the State Government is satisfied that any municipality, or any area in a municipality, does not fullil the conditions specified in clause (a), or when the Commissioners at a meeting have made a recommendation in this behalf, the State Government may declare ; ts inten 10n to withdraw such municipality from the operation of this Act, or to exclude such area from such municipality.\"\n\nIt would be noticed that s. 4( 1) contemplates a town containing not less than five thousand inhabitants and a town of a particular density of population, and further that three-fourths of the adult male population should be engaged in pursuits other than agriculture.\n\nNow, these requirements show that the area has reached such a stage of development that the government should constitute a municipality in the area.\n\nSection 388 would come into the picture only if the requirements of s. 4 are not satisfied but yet the Government considers it necessary to make administrative provisions for all or any of the purposes of this Act.\n\nIn our opinion, this gives sufficient guidance to the Government and thus no arbitrary power has been conferred on the Government.\n\nComing to the second point, s. 82 is challenged on various grounds. First, it is said that the proviso to s. 82 ( 1 )(ff) enables the Government to exempt any class.es of profession, trades or callings from the tax, without giving any guidance as to which classes should be exempted.\n\nWe do not find it necessary to deal with this academic point because, first, the Government has not exercised this power and, secondly, even if we were to hold this proviso to be violative of art. 14, it would be severable and would not give any relief to the petitioner. The second ground of attack is that the rate of tax to be levied has been left to the discretion of the Commissioners under s. 82 ( 1 )(ff) and of the Government under proviso (iv) to s. 82(1) without giving any guidance as to the amount of tax.\n\nWe see no force in this contention.\n\nSchedule IV specifies the maximum amount of tax that can be levied and s. 1500 lays down the purposes for which the tax can be utilised.\n\nThis, in our view, gives sufficient guidance to the Commissioners or the State Government to fix the rate of tax. In The Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema(') this Court, by majority, upheld the validity of s. 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act.\n\nSpeaking for the majority, Sarkar J., as he then was, observed :\n\n\"It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court which support the proposition that for a\n\n(I) /1965J 2 S. C.R. 477.\n\n8 StlPl.U!MB COtJ&T lllPOJlTS [1967) 3 s.c.R.\n\nStatutory provision for raising revenue for the purposes of the delegate, as the section now under consideration is, needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power was conferred on it, may afford sufficient guiducc\n\nto make the power to fix the rate of tax valid.\"\n\nIa view of these observations it is clear that s. 1500 gives sufficient guidance to the Commissioners and the State Government to fix the rate of taxation.\n\nMr. Sen then urged that proviso (iv) to s. 82(1) is void becailse it does not give any indication as to the circumstances under which the Government should direct the Commissioners to levy the tax under s. 82( 1) (fl). lt seems to us that the Govern ment will only direct the Commissioners to levy the tax if the Commissioners do not carry out their duty properly.\n\nC'hapter XIII of the Act, which has been applied to the Notified Areas, confers powers of control on the State Govenunent over the Notified Areas and the Government would only act under proviso\n\n(iv) to s. 82 ( 1) if it is necessary in view of the circumstances of the case.\n\nMr. B. Sen then argued that the Act does not lay down proper procedure for the assessment and the determination of the ta\"t.\n\nWe see no force in this contention.\n\nWe have already set out the explanations to s. 150A. Explanation (1) clearly provides that if a person is assessable to income tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, .his taxable income would be determined\n\naccording to the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, and if hc:is not assessable, his taxable income would be computed as far as may be in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act.\n\nSome complaint was made about Explanation (2) that unnecessary burden was being placed on the person liable to tax, but we are unable to appreciate this point.\n\nThe :issessec has only to produce the order from the a:isessing authorities to establish the amount of his taxable income.\n\nThe last complaint was that no appeals or references .ire G provided in the Act and the. only remedy of an assessee who was aggrieved by the assessment is to file a review under s. 150F.\n\nIn the circumstances we consider that s. 150E gives a reasonable remedy to an aggrieved person.\n\nSub-section (2) of s.\n\n!SOE directs that the application has to be heard and determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in ss. 115, 117, 118, and\n\n119. These sections have been applied to the Notified Area Com- H mittees. Under s. 117 a review would be heard by a Committee consisting of not less than three Commissioners 'and the Committee is further entitled to take evidence and to make such enquiries as\n\n)- ..\n\nit deems necessary. The subject-matter of Profossion Tax is not very complicated and, in our view, the procedure provided for the assessment and review is reasonable.\n\nWe may mention that similar points were raised before the Patna High Court and the High Court . rejected them in Rohtas Industries Ltd. Dalmianagar v. State of Bihar(').\n\nIn the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nY.P.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(I) [1965] Bihar L.J.R. 886.\n\nUSupCI/67-2", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "RAM BACHAN LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM BACHAN LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BffiAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 28, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BffiAR\n\nFebruary 28, 1967\n\n[K. SUBBA RAo, C.J., J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI, V, RAMASWAMI\n\nAND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.j\n\nBihar and Orissa Municipal Act (8. &"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss.\n\n82(1)(1!), 1S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207, "end_char": 225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 & 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313, "end_char": 330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922"}}, 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{"linked_statute_text": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 150E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1436, "end_char": 1443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "The respondent-Notified Area Committee-imposed profession tax under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1490, "end_char": 1508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1564, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2184, "end_char": 2195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2255, "end_char": 2261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1965] 2 S.C.R. 477", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2674, "end_char": 2680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3058, "end_char": 3064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act clearly provides that if a person is assessable to income tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Act clearly provides that if a 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Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and K. K. Sinha, for !", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and K. K. Sinha, for !"}}, {"text": "B. P. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Jha, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J. In this petition under art."}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Profession Tax levied under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 4018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Bachan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act VII of 1922 )-hereinafter referred to as the Act-for the period 1963-64 to 1965-66 from the petitioner, Shri Ram Bachan Lal, Land Officer, who is in the employment of Roh!as Industries Ltd., Dalmianagar, is sought to be quashed on the ground that !", "canonical_name": "RAM BACHAN LAL"}}, {"text": "Roh!as Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4200, "end_char": 4222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act VII of 1922 )-hereinafter referred to as the Act-for the period 1963-64 to 1965-66 from the petitioner, Shri Ram Bachan Lal, Land Officer, who is in the employment of Roh!as Industries Ltd., Dalmianagar, is sought to be quashed on the ground that !"}}, {"text": "Dalmianagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4224, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act VII of 1922 )-hereinafter referred to as the Act-for the period 1963-64 to 1965-66 from the petitioner, Shri Ram Bachan Lal, Land Officer, who is in the employment of Roh!as Industries Ltd., Dalmianagar, is sought to be quashed on the ground that !"}}, {"text": "arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Profession Tax levied under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "Profession Tax levied under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee was constituted by notification dated May 23, 1942, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. 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("}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11613, "end_char": 11618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 4, 1957, the Governor of Bihar sanctioned the unposition by the Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified area Committee of the tax on trades, professions, callings and employments."}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 23, l 959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12150, "end_char": 12165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 23, l 959, the Governor of Bihar, in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso (iv) to sub-s. (1) of s. 82 directed the Commissioners of the Municipalities as well as the Notified Areas Conunittees specified in the Schedule, which i:icluded Dehri-Dalmianagar Notified Area Committee, to levy tax mentioned in cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12259, "end_char": 12264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12494, "end_char": 12499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12538, "end_char": 12553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12587, "end_char": 12600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 82 at the maximum rates specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act with effect from April 1."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12913, "end_char": 12919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Number of points had been raised in the petition but Mr.\n\nB. Sen, the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner, has raised only two points before us.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "ss. 388 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13032, "end_char": 13047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13108, "end_char": 13113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "arts. 14, 19(g) and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13172, "end_char": 13194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 388 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13274, "end_char": 13289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13371, "end_char": 13375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13437, "end_char": 13443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 388 and 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13631, "end_char": 13646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13707, "end_char": 13719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14841, "end_char": 14849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15236, "end_char": 15247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15304, "end_char": 15308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15612, "end_char": 15617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16061, "end_char": 16068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16265, "end_char": 16270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16325, "end_char": 16333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16425, "end_char": 16436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16496, "end_char": 16503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16777, "end_char": 16783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16843, "end_char": 16849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the majority, Sarkar J., as he then was, observed :\n\n\"It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court which support the proposition that for a\n\n(I) /1965J 2 S. C.R. 477."}}, {"text": "U!MB COtJ&T lllPOJlTS [1967) 3 s.c.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17022, "end_char": 17057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U!MB COtJ&T lllPOJlTS [1967) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 1500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17434, "end_char": 17441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17548, "end_char": 17551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen then urged that proviso (iv) to s. 82(1) is void becailse it does not give any indication as to the circumstances under which the Government should direct the Commissioners to levy the tax under s. 82( 1) (fl)."}}, {"text": "s. 82(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17584, "end_char": 17592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 150A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18393, "end_char": 18400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18490, "end_char": 18517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18616, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 150F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19225, "end_char": 19232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 150E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19273, "end_char": 19280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "ss. 115, 117, 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19466, "end_char": 19483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19571, "end_char": 19577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19985, "end_char": 20001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may mention that similar points were raised before the Patna High Court and the High Court ."}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_205_213_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD.\n\nUNION OF INDIA.\n\nMarch 16, 1967\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, S, M. SIKRI AND C. A. VAIDIALINOAM, JJ.]\n\nC1hlrol Excls1 Act, 1. 4 and Cintra! Exe/st Rul11 1944 r, 9 and r. 9A- Good1 re1nov1d from factory afttr pll)'mlnt of dury-Chan111 In rat• of duty-Crucial tlm1 /or chang1d ra11 to apply, wh1tla1r paytMlll of dury nr r1moval of 1ood1.\n\nThe 1ppell1111 company curried on In the State of Orina the buslne\" of manuf1cturln1 ind ielllng piper und board1.\n\nIt held n l'cnce In Porm L.4 under the Olntrlll Excl11 Act H/rucrlbed by the Central llxclH\n\nlllll11 .. 1944. The company'• !oelory 1n Ill praml1e1 ware demucllled under the 11111 R11l11. The F1ctor1 1riioy1.t the boneftt or 1 prlvMe r1:1w1y\n\n11dl111 Ill th• factory uu. In 1960 1 ntw aiding w11 con111i1cted out• 1ld1 the orl1ln1I factory preml111; the comp1ny'1 req11ut to Iha 1!10111 0111horltl11 10 amend 111 lfc1ne1 ao 11 to lneludo tho new r1ilwny 1ldi11t In\n\nthe factory 1111 WH r1fu11d. On Pubnmy 27 and 28, 1961 the eomp1111y loaded aome w1ao111 of paper after 1lflotln1 cle1nnce ol 11me aoodll by 11aymt11t of axoflt duty under r. 52 of the l!xclM Rlll11. The w1gon.1 th111 pauld Into the h1nd1 of railway Admlnl1tratlon but 11 a pllot eniln• w11 not available they were ahunted Into the new 1ld:na. On Mllfcli I,\n\n1961 new r1111 of 11oll1 duty came Into foroe and tho Deputy S11p11rln tmd111t of Ctntral !xcl11 demanded extra duty OD the wa1on1 loadild on\n\nFebruary 27 and 2BL 1961 on the around that thuy wrre found In the faotory1, nm1 .. 1111 ~.45 a, m, oD March I, 1961. The comp1111y nlylna on r. l of the l!xol11 RulH 1ubmlt11d that the duty wu payable al Iha r111 In fom on th• date on which tho duty wu actulllly paid, 1n tba lll11rn1tlv1 It 1ubmlt1td that the 1ood1 havlnt bten clnnd an.cl remowd from the factory premll11 blfor1 t11t mldnlabt of l'tbruary 28, 1951, could not ht made llablt for tht tnh1natd duty which 011m1 Into force on Man:h\n\nI, 1961. The oonten1lon1 w111 not aoHpttd by the Otputy S11p1rl111tn, dtlll, H:ahar dtpll'lmtnllll 1uthorltl11 1110 reJeotod thtm. Th• company then ftlo; r 1n 1ppl'o1tlon for revl1lon b1.ftlr1 the Oovtrnment of India Thl1 &llO b1ln1 l'ljlCtod lh• oomp1ny IPPtAl1d by IPlllllAI luve to lhlt!\n\nCourt,\n\nI HILD I (I I In tht OAll of m1111utao1u11d 1ood1, aooordlng 10 Ill• pro• v !lllhlu r, II, th1 payment of tho duty and the olar111oe of aooo1 m1y bl! 1yno l'llllOll~ or !lie 111ymtnt may ht po1tpontd nlthOllAh th.e good1 my lit ramovld, In tho !&lier Hilt, tintlor lho 11aond p1rt Cit r. VA lbe arltlCAI I!.'!'' I b1oom11 th• rtmoval of tht aood1 from the laoto!')' or wat'lho\\180; \"\"' f th1 p1ym1n1 of du!Y 11 m1d1 btlOH lht r1mov1L then 1111d1r llw \"\"I Pll'I of r, VA lht orllloal tlmt 11 lht p1ym1nt of d11iy, [2U CJ\n\n• !.!!.dbt 11111 that lht ftrat pan of r. 9A r1l1l18 10 urunanufaetur• ... ...- an 1111 1IOOllCI p&rl to m1nllf1orurte1 loodl [212 Pl\n\nI (II) fn lht pmtnt 0111 lht payment of duty w11 1ynohronou1 with the e 14r1Dot of !lit l@llll1 hto111111 Iii• pit p1111 1111d1r r. 52 llllll only bo l11ued wfhon Ille IOOd8 b1v1 1011111lly bteti olwld for removlll. The pay ment o duly Mil lbt removlll Of tb1 IOOd1 had both betn efltOttd bttore lht oh1n11 In lht, r1t1 of duty, Th• rtoovery ot enb1nolltl duty fl'Olll lht 1pp11l1nt OOl!IPIDY Wll tlltl'lfOH. trrontou1. riu !), Ol\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(iii) The Excise authorities had themselves refused to recognise the new railway siding as part of the factory and it could not therefore be said that the wagons being in the new siding must be treated as stiJI in the factory. [213 F] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the order dated June 7, 8, 1963 of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) in Central Excise Revision Application No. 463 of 1963.\n\nB. Sen, Bishan Narain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, S. G.\n\nPatwardhan,\n\nR. N.\n\nSaththey, and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company which carries on the business of manufacturing and selling wholesale, paper and boards at Brajrajnagar in the State of Orissa. The appellant company holds a licence under the Central Excise Act in Form L-4 prescribed by the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The appellant company's factory and its premises and precincts have been demarcated under th~ said Rules. The Factory is traversed qy railway lines, because the appellant company enjoys the benefit of a private siding. In 1960, the appellant Company constructed a new railway siding outside the original factory premises where bamboos and other raw materials were stored and constructed a . platform for loading and unloading.\n\nThis extension has not been included in the factory or its premises or precincts for purposes of the Excise Rules.\n\nIt is presumably so, because. to reach the new siding, a public road has to be traversed which is not enclosed .and from which public cannot be excluded. It is in evidence that after this new siding was constructed, the appellant company requested the Excise authorities to amend the licence to include the new railway siding;· but this was refused.\n\nOn February 27, 1961, the appellant company loaded 20 wagons of paper after effecting clearance of these goods by payment of the excise duty under r. 52 of the Excise Rules.\n\nOn February 28, 1961, the appellant company loaded 13 more wagons and cleared them. These wagons were sealed by the railway administration and railway receipts were issued to the appellant company.\n\nThe company also obtained gate pass.\n\nThe wagons then passed into the control of the railway administration., but as a pilot engine was not available, the wagons were shunted mto the new siding. . The exit from th~ new siding is only through the factory premises because the railway track comes to a dead-end nn the other side.\n\nA The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise wrote to the\n\nppellant company on March 1, 1961 that the wagons loaded on February 27 and 28, 1961 were found inside the factory premises till 9-45 A.M. on March 1, 1961 and the goods were therefore liable to be assessed at the higher rates of excise duty current from Mareh 1, 1961. The appellant company contended before B the Deputy Superintendent that the wagons were duly sealed after the completion of loading in his presence, were taken out of the factory premises and were not. in the factory when the new rates came into force. The appellant company relying upon r. 9A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 submitted that duty was payable at the rate in force on the date on which the duty was actually C paid. In the alternative, the appellant company submitted that the goods having been cleared or removed from the factory premises before the midnight of February 28, 1961, could not be made liable for the enhanced duty which came into force from March 1, 1961.\n\nThese contentions were not accepted by the Deputy Superintendent who demanded payment of Rs. 45,475.83, from the appellant company as differential excise duty.\n\nThe amount D was paid under protest and without prejudice to the rights of appeal and representation to the proper authorities under the Excise Act.\n\nThe matter was then placed by the appellant company before the Assistant Collector, C_entral Excise, Cuttack and the company It requested that the differential duty be refunded as it had been illegally collected.\n\nThe Assistant Collector rejected the claim and confirmed the collection of differential duty. The appellant company appealed to the Collector of Central Excise, Calc\\llta and Orissa but the appeal was dismissed on March 12, 1962.\n\nThe appellant company then filed an application for revision against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and F Orissa before the Government of India (Central Excise Revision Application No. 473 of 1963). The application for revision was rejected by the Government of India on June 7 /18, 1963. No reason was given in the order communicated to the appellant company.\n\nThe present appeal has been filed by special leave\n\nagainst the last order.\n\nThe first contention in this appeal is that the order of the Deputy Superintendent confirmed by the Assistant Collector, the Collector of Excise and the Central Government was illegal and contrary to the provisions and intendment of the Central 'Excise Act and the rules framed thereunder, because under r. 9A, first part, these goods were cleared by payment of excise duty and could not be reassessed to the enhanced duty. It is further submitted alternatively that the goods were removed from the factory proper before the midnight of February 28, 1961 and therefore could\n\n208 SIJPJ.BMB COIJJ.T J.BPOll.TS\n\n11967) 3 s.c.11..\n\nnot be assessed to the enhanced duty even if the latter part of A rule 9A applied. A third contention that the order of the Central Government was bad because it gave no reason for the rejection of the application for revision was not pressed seriously. We shall examine the first two arguments only.\n\nThe duty of excise on paper and boards was increased by s.\n\nB 13 of the Finance Act, 1961 (Act XIV of 1961) read with item 17 of the Schedule. Under the Provisional Collection of Central Taxes Act (XVI of 1931) this duty became payable from the .1st day of March, 1961. The question, therefore, arises whether the 11oods are to bear the old duty or the new. This question depends upon the tlme at which the quty was payable on tbe goods in this C c11111.\n\nThat In Its tum depends U!)On the true construction of r. !IA of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The rule consists of two 1ubl'llles, but we are concerned with the first 1ubrule and first provl10 to . that subrule. The relevant portion of the rule mny be read even at thl1 1ta11e:\n\n\"9A. ( 1) Alteration of duty or tarltf v11l11111lcm.- The rate of dutY 11nd the tral! valuation (If 1111y) llP pllcable to 11ood8 cleared on payment of duty 1h11!1 be tlie rate nnd valuation (If 11ny) In force on the date on which duty ls pald, or If the 11ood1 are cleared from a f11ctory or a warehoue, on the date of the actual removal of Ruch 11oods from such factory or warehouse:\n\nProvided that If tho aoodl have previously been removed from w11rehouMe under bond to be , rewnre hou8ed, 1111d the duty 11 pllld on 1uch SQOd8 without their belo11 rewnrehcm1ed, the nte 11nd v11luatloo (If 11ny) oppl!c11bl11 thereto 1h11!1 be the rl\\te 1111d vlllm1tlon\n\n(If 11ny) In force on the date on which duty 18 pllld or I! duty 11 p11ld 1hrou1h 11n 11ccount-eurren1 mlllnt11lo; i with thll Colleetor uniler Rule 9, on tho d111e on whleh 11n 11pplle11!1on In the proper form 18 delivered to the omcerltteliorse ot the w11rehou81.1 from whleh the 11ood8 wore removed:\n\n\" a\n\nTo u11demnnd thl1 rule nnd lt1 lmpllcll!lon1 80met111na mu1t be Mllid flr11 about the 1eheme of tho Ceotr11! Bxe!J11 nod lla1t Act, 1944 11nd the Centrnl B!iel1e Rule1, 1944. The Ceotrnl Excise Act del\\nu 'exclHble go0d1' 10 menn 11ood1 1peclfled In It• Finl Schedule and 1ubjeot to 11 duty of excl111. The Act fllrther deftnH It\n\n'ffteto~' 10 m111111 any preml1e1 Including the preclnct1 wherein exelH\\; le sood1 11r11 m11nuf11cmred, or wlloreln or In 1111y p11rt of whleh 11ny mnnufneturlng proe111 connected with the proiluctlon\n\nORIBNT PAPBR MILLS v. UNION (H/dayatu/lah, /,) 209\n\nA of tbee goods Is being carried on Dr ls ordinarily carried on.\n\n'Manufacture' ls defined to lncludo any procosa ldontlcal or ancll lary to tbo completion of a manufactured product, and certain processes in relation to tobacco and 1alt aro included in manufucture, but with tbeso wo aro not concerned. It also defines 'curing' as including any process for rendering an unmanufac a turecl product fit for marketing or manufacture. Section 3 of tbe Act lays down inter alla that there shall be lovled and collected in such a manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India at the ratea setforth in tbe Flr1t Schedule. Section 4, wblch is, heuded ''Determination. of. valuo for tho purposes of duty\", pro c vides that where any article Is charpable with duty at ntes do\n\npendent on tbe valuo of auch article auch valuo lhal1 be .deemed to be the whole 11le ca1h price for which an article of like: kind\n\nand quality la aold or II capable of belna aold at the time. of tho removal of the article charpablo with duty from tbe factory or any other prem1111 Of manufacture or production for delivery, etc. The emph11!1 In 1. 4 11 on the time Of removal of the article D chnr1eable with duty from the factory, Thl1 l1 tho only 1uldance\n\nwhich the Act fum11he1. We may now turn to the llulea.\n\nUnder the Rulea, duty mOIDI duty payable under 1. 3 of the Act above-mentioned.\n\nRule 2 (xv) deftnea 'warehouie' u any plliCll or preml1ea appointed or licenaed under rule 140. We I now come to Chapter Ill which deal1 with levy and refund of 111d\n\n.•emption from duty. Rule 7 provld11 that every penon who\n\nprod11Cea, cures or manufactures any nolaable lo0d1 or who 11or11 111ck aood• In 11 wmho1111 1hall pay the cfuty or .dutlel levl1bl1 on 111eh good1 11 1ueh time and pl1c1 and to 111ch ~\n\nllN m11y be dHl1n111ecl In or under the nuthorlty of the •::i: r wbelher the p11ym1111 of 1ueh duty or dutl111 11 11cul'ld by\n\nor otherwl111. Rule 9 l11y1 down the time and m1nner of pnym1nt of duty, The r11!1 m11y be rud hart:\n\n\"9. Time Md manner of p1yment of duty.-\n\n( I ) No exolHble aood1 1hllll be removed from Aft)' pl1ee wher1 they are J)roclueed, eured or manutaolllreil or •l!Y preml111 M1PUl'lln1nt. thereto, which may bl 1poolfted by the CO!leetor In thl1 behalf, whether for eon111mplion, export, or manufacture of any other eom modl!Y In or out1lde 1uch pl11ee, until thi excl1e duty levlable thereon ha1 been pllld at 1uch place and In 111eh m11nner 11 11 prHcrlbid In th111 Rul11 or u tho Coll1etor may l'IClU11'1l, and aoept on ent1tlon of an 1ppl1011tlon In Ill• pr fonn and on obtlllnln1 lilt penrilillon of the proper olllcer on the form:\n\nSUPIUIMB GOWT 0101.TS\n\n(1967) 3 S.C.R\n\nProvided that such goods may l?e deposited without payment of duty in a store-room or other place of stor age approved by the Collector un.der rule 27 or rule 47 or in a warehouse appointed or licensed under rule 140 or may be exported under bond as provided in rule 13 :\n\nProvided further that such goods may be removed on part payment of duty leviable thereon if the Central\n\nGovernment, by notification in the Official Gazette, allow the goods to be so removed under rule 49:\n\nProvided also that the Collector may, if he thinks fit instead of requiring payment of duty in respect of each separate consignment of goods removed from the place or premises specified in this behalf, or from a store-room or warehouse duly approved, appointed or licensed by him keep with any person dealing in such goods an account-current of the duties payable thereon and such account shall be settled at intervals not exceeding one month, and the account-holder shall periodically make deposit therein sufficient in the opinion of the Collector to cover the duty due on the goods in tended to be removed from the place of production, curing manufacture or storage. ..\n\nThis rule prohibits the removal of goods from the factory or any premises appurtenant thereto until the excise duty leviable thereon has been paid.\n\nThe factory and the premises appurtenant thereto has to be specified by the Collector. To this rule there are exceptions. One of them is that the goods may be deposited without payment of duty in a store-room or other place of storage approved by the Collector under rule 27 or under rule 4 7 any warehouse appointed or licensed under rule 140.\n\nAnother exception is that the goods may be removed on part payment of duty leviable if the Government notifies and allows the goods to be so removed or the Collector if he thinks fit, approves the opening of .an account-current of the duty payable and the account-holder periodically makes. deposits sufficient in the opinion of the Collector to cover duty due on the goods intended to be removed from the place of manufacture or storage.\n\nAs we are not concerned with export under bond we may not refer to rule 13 but it is necessary to see rules 47 and 140. Rule 47 is headed \"Goods\n\nmay be stored without payment of duty\" Under this rule a manufacturer has to' provide a store-room or other place of storage at his premises for depositing goods made on the same . premises without payment of duty.\n\nDuty-paid goods and good!> -other than excisable goods made in the factory must not be\n\nORIENT PAPER MILLS \\!. UNION (Hidaya1ullah, I.) u I\n\ndeposited in such store-rooms or place. The store-room or place must be declared by the manufacturer and approved by the Collector.\n\nTo this rule there is an exception and .it is that if the manufacturer undertakes to pay duty on all the manufactured goods and clears them immediately on completion of manufacture the Collector may exempt him from providing a store-room or other place of storage. Rule 140 deals among other matters with the appointment and licensing of warehouse.\n\nUnder this rule the Collector shall by order in writing from time to time approve and appoint a public warehouse and may in like manner license private warehouses for the stora&e of excisable goods on which duty has not been paid.\n\nThe Rules make a distinction between manufactured and unmanufactured goods.\n\nThe relevant rules may also be seen.\n\nRule 25 provides for unmanufactured goods and rules 52 and 52A for manufactured goods.\n\nRule 25 deals with clearance of unmanufactured products on payment of duty. This rule applies to a curer who may apply to an officer to get the goods weighed and duty assessed. If the duty so assessed is then paid the carer is granted a transport permit authorising him to remove the products to any destination named by him. Rule 52 deals with manu factured goods. It deals with clearance on payment of duty. The rule reads as follows :- \"52. Clearance on payment of duty.- When the manufacturer desires to remove goods on payment of duty, either from the place or premises specified under rule 9 or from a store-room or other place of storage approved by the Collector under rule 4 7, he. shall make application in triplicate (unless\n\notherw1e by rule or order required) to the proper officer m the proper Form and shall deliver it to the officer at least twelve hours (or such other period a.~ ay be elswhere prescribed or as the Collector may\n\nn any particular case require or allow) before it is mtended to remove the goods.\n\nThe officer shall, thereupon, assess the amount of duty due on the goods and ?n production of evidence that this sum has been paid mto. the Treasury, or paid to the account of the Collector .m the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of lndta, or has been despatched to the Treasury by money. order shall allow the goods to be cleared.\"\n\nWe ma? also refer to rule 52A which provides for the actual 1 emova_. of the goods from the factory.\n\nThe rule provides that no excisable goods shall be delivered from a factory except\n\nnder a gate pass signed by the owner of the factory and countersigned by the proper officer.\n\nSuch a gate pass is made out in\n\nSUPREME <;:OURT REPORTS\n\n\ntriplicate and must be presented to the proper officer for countersignature at least one hour before the actual removal <>f .th:e goods from the factory. In the pre8ent case a gate pass had been obtained.\n\nRule S 1 A then provides that except as otherwise expressly provided for in the Rules, no duty-paid goods shall be allowed to re-enter or be retained in, any part or premises of factory.\n\nWe may now tum to rule 9A, the interpretation of which has given rise to the present case.\n\nThe dispute, shortly stated, is as to the application of the two\n\npart~ of Rule 9A.\n\nAccording to Mr. B. Sen for the appellant company, the first part applies where duty is paid and the goods cleared and in such a case the critical point of time is the payment of duty and the point of time of the removal from the factory is not relevant.\n\nIn the second part, according to him, the critical time is the removal of the goods from a factory or warehouse without payment of duty such as happens when they are removed under the provisos to Rule .9A.\n\nIn this view of the matter he contends that this case falls within the first part of Rule 9A.\n\nOn the other hand, the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India submits that the main rule is in the first part and the second part of the rule is an exception. He suggests that one part speaks of payment of duty and the other of removal and the difference in point of time is between clearance of duty in the case of unmanufactured goods and the actual removal of the goods from the factory or warehouse ia the case of manufactured goods.\n\nTo prove his point he. emphasises the separate provisions regarding manufactured goods in Chapter V and unmanufactured goods in Chapter IV of the Rules.\n\nIn our opinion Rule 9A cannot be read on the basis of the classification suggested by the Solicitor General. No doubt rules 9 and 9A apply to manufactured as well as unmanufactured goods because rule 9 speaks in terms of both and rule 9A mentions in one place goods without adverting to the source and in the other the factory or warehouse.\n\nBut the distinction in the two parts of rule 9A cannot be founded on the basis. of a difference to be found in Chapters IV and V of the Rules.\n\nRule 25 allows the clearance of unmanufactured products on payment of duty but rules 26 and 27 allow such products to be despatched to a bonded warehouse or to be deposited in a curer's bonded storeroom.\n\nA special rule applies to the latter goods deposited in the store-room.\n\nThey must be cleared on payment of duty ordinarily before the 30th day of June (extend~ to 31st. Dece.mber under certain conditions) of the year followm_g that m which they are harvested or deposited. On the other hand, under rue\n\n49 payment of duty is not required in. respect of goods made m a factory until they are about to be issued out of the .place or\n\npremises specified under rule 9 or are about to be removed from a store-room or other place of storage approved by the Collector.\n\nThe only exception to this is their removal to a licensed warehouse. Rule 52 then says that when the manufacturer desires to remove goods on payment of duty from .the factory or store-roo~ or other place of storage, he can get the duty assessed, pay 11 and get a clearance and a gate pass. He must then remove the goods and such goods must not lie in che factory etc. or after removal re-enter the premises (vide r. 51A).\n\nIt will thus be seen that in the case of manufactured goods the payment of duty and. the clearance of goods may be synchronous or the payment may be postponed although the goods may be removed (provisos to r. 9). This immediately sets up two kinds of cases in respect of manufactured goods. The critical time thus becomes the removal from the factory or ware.house but if the payment of duty is made before the removal then the critical time is the payment of duty.\n\nIn the present case the payment of duty was synchronous with the clearance of the goodS\n\nbecause the gate pass can only be issued when the goods have actually been cleared for removal.\n\nThe above construction of the Rules agrees with the construction placed by the Board of Revenue in its ruling of 1957 when the effect of the sealing of the wagons by the Railway after loading and the issuance of railway receipts was considered. The Board ruled that such goods would not be considered as lying in the stock in the factory pcem.ises.\n\nWhen we add to it the fact in this cast: that duty was paid on the goods and gate pass was also issued, there remains little to argue except to say that the wagons being in the new siding must be treated as still in the factory.\n\nHere the difficulty in the way of -the Union of India is that the Excise authorities themselves refused to recognise this portion as part of the factory. 1f !he goods were put in the wagons after payment of duty, and the wagons were sealed and shunted out of the factory proper on a gate pass, not only under the ruling of the Board but also on the application of the Rules as explained here these goods became free of the enhanced duty. The recovery was accordingly erroneous.\n\nThe duty collected must, therefore, be refunded and we order accordingly. The appellant's costs must be paid by the respondent.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal a//oowetf_", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ORIENT PAPER MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16, 1967\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, S, M. SIKRI AND C. A. VAIDIALINOAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1355, "end_char": 1358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1992, "end_char": 1995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Bishan Narain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Bishan Narain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, Bishan Narain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, S. G.\n\nPatwardhan,\n\nR. N.\n\nSaththey, and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. G.\n\nPatwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, S. G.\n\nPatwardhan,\n\nR. N.\n\nSaththey, and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSaththey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, S. G.\n\nPatwardhan,\n\nR. N.\n\nSaththey, and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3987, "end_char": 3999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, S. G.\n\nPatwardhan,\n\nR. N.\n\nSaththey, and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company which carries on the business of manufacturing and selling wholesale, paper and boards at Brajrajnagar in the State of Orissa.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Brajrajnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4215, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company which carries on the business of manufacturing and selling wholesale, paper and boards at Brajrajnagar in the State of Orissa."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.\n\nThe appellant is a public limited company which carries on the business of manufacturing and selling wholesale, paper and boards at Brajrajnagar in the State of Orissa."}}, {"text": "Central Excise Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4349, "end_char": 4375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 27, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 27, 1961, the appellant company loaded 20 wagons of paper after effecting clearance of these goods by payment of the excise duty under r. 52 of the Excise Rules."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5450, "end_char": 5467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 28, 1961, the appellant company loaded 13 more wagons and cleared them."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise wrote to the\n\nppellant company on March 1, 1961 that the wagons loaded on February 27 and 28, 1961 were found inside the factory premises till 9-45 A.M. on March 1, 1961 and the goods were therefore liable to be assessed at the higher rates of excise duty current from Mareh 1, 1961."}}, {"text": "February 27 and 28, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6095, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise wrote to the\n\nppellant company on March 1, 1961 that the wagons loaded on February 27 and 28, 1961 were found inside the factory premises till 9-45 A.M. on March 1, 1961 and the goods were therefore liable to be assessed at the higher rates of excise duty current from Mareh 1, 1961."}}, {"text": "Mareh 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise wrote to the\n\nppellant company on March 1, 1961 that the wagons loaded on February 27 and 28, 1961 were found inside the factory premises till 9-45 A.M. on March 1, 1961 and the goods were therefore liable to be assessed at the higher rates of excise duty current from Mareh 1, 1961."}}, {"text": "Central Excise Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6606, "end_char": 6632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 12, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7732, "end_char": 7746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company appealed to the Collector of Central Excise, Calc\\llta and Orissa but the appeal was dismissed on March 12, 1962."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7864, "end_char": 7872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company then filed an application for revision against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and F Orissa before the Government of India (Central Excise Revision Application No."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7897, "end_char": 7916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company then filed an application for revision against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and F Orissa before the Government of India (Central Excise Revision Application No."}}, {"text": "June 7 /18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for revision was rejected by the Government of India on June 7 /18, 1963."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8365, "end_char": 8383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention in this appeal is that the order of the Deputy Superintendent confirmed by the Assistant Collector, the Collector of Excise and the Central Government was illegal and contrary to the provisions and intendment of the Central 'Excise Act and the rules framed thereunder, because under r. 9A, first part, these goods were cleared by payment of excise duty and could not be reassessed to the enhanced duty."}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9215, "end_char": 9232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".1st day of March, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9388, "end_char": 9411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Provisional Collection of Central Taxes Act (XVI of 1931) this duty became payable from the .1st day of March, 1961."}}, {"text": "IA of the Central Excise Rules, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9658, "end_char": 9694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Alteration of duty or tarltf v11l11111lcm.- The rate of dutY 11nd the tral! valuation (If 1111y) llP pllcable to 11ood8 cleared on payment of duty 1h11!1 be tlie rate nnd valuation (If 11ny) In force on the date on which duty ls pald, or If the 11ood1 are cleared from a f11ctory or a warehoue, on the date of the actual removal of Ruch 11oods from such factory or warehouse:\n\nProvided that If tho aoodl have previously been removed from w11rehouMe under bond to be , rewnre hou8ed, 1111d the duty 11 pllld on 1uch SQOd8 without their belo11 rewnrehcm1ed, the nte 11nd v11luatloo (If 11ny) oppl!c11bl11 thereto 1h11!1 be the rl\\te 1111d vlllm1tlon\n\n(If 11ny) In force on the date on which duty 18 pllld or I! duty 11 p11ld 1hrou1h 11n 11ccount-eurren1 mlllnt11lo; i with thll Colleetor uniler Rule 9, on tho d111e on whleh 11n 11pplle11!1on In the proper form 18 delivered to the omcerltteliorse ot the w11rehou81.1 from whleh the 11ood8 wore removed:\n\n\" a\n\nTo u11demnnd thl1 rule nnd lt1 lmpllcll!lon1 80met111na mu1t be Mllid flr11 about the 1eheme of tho Ceotr11! Bxe!J11 nod lla1t Act, 1944 11nd the Centrnl B!iel1e Rule1, 1944.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9891, "end_char": 11023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the rule mny be read even at thl1 1ta11e:\n\n\"9A. ( 1) Alteration of duty or tarltf v11l11111lcm.- The rate of dutY 11nd the tral!"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12064, "end_char": 12069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of tbe Act lays down inter alla that there shall be lovled and collected in such a manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India at the ratea setforth in tbe Flr1t Schedule."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12115, "end_char": 12124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18915, "end_char": 18936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Treasury, or paid to the account of the Collector .m the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of lndta, or has been despatched to the Treasury by money."}}, {"text": "State Bank of lndta", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18944, "end_char": 18963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Treasury, or paid to the account of the Collector .m the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of lndta, or has been despatched to the Treasury by money."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19609, "end_char": 19612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19986, "end_char": 19992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute, shortly stated, is as to the application of the two\n\npart~ of Rule 9A.\n\nAccording to Mr. B. Sen for the appellant company, the first part applies where duty is paid and the goods cleared and in such a case the critical point of time is the payment of duty and the point of time of the removal from the factory is not relevant.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20593, "end_char": 20607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second part, according to him, the critical time is the removal of the goods from a factory or warehouse without payment of duty such as happens when they are removed under the provisos to Rule .9A.\n\nIn this view of the matter he contends that this case falls within the first part of Rule 9A.\n\nOn the other hand, the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India submits that the main rule is in the first part and the second part of the rule is an exception."}}, {"text": "Chapter V and unmanufactured goods in Chapter IV of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21075, "end_char": 21136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapters IV and V of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21592, "end_char": 21622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_214_218_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY A\n\nM/S. WALCHAND & CO. (PVT.) LTD., BOMBAY\n\nMarch 17, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIICRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JI.]\n\nlndia11 Income-tax Act (11 of 1922), ss; 10(2)(xv) and 33(4)- lncrease in Director's remuneration not reflected in assessee's profiJs-lf .allowable.\n\nAppellate Tribunal-Jurisdiction-Reasons in support of decision, if .11eces1ary.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer disallowed the increase in the remuneratloa of the Directors and Officers of the asses9ee-company sinoe the increase was not reflected in the increase in the profits of the assessee and wo on 111at\n\naccount not expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpoilel of the business under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act. The onl\" was modified by the Appellate Tribunal. On reference the High Court IUUll'er -ed the question aga:nst the Revenue, holding that the Tribunal acted with\n\n•out evidence in partially disallowing the increase in respect of aierlain officers, In appeal to this Court, HEID : The appeal must be dismissed.\n\nThe practice of recording a decision without reasons in support cannot but be severely deprecated.\n\nThough the Tribunal is not a Court, it is\n\ninvested with judic:al power to be exerci>ed in manner similar to the E •exerci>e of power of an appellate .Court acting under the Code of Clvil Procedure.\n\nAuthority to ''pass such orders thereon. as it thinks fif' in s, 33(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is not arbitrary; the expression i9 intended to define the jurisdiction or the Tr:bunal to deal with and determine questions which arise out of the subject-matter of the appeal in the light of the evidence, and consistently with the justice of the case.\n\nJn the hierarchy of authorities the Appellate Tribunal is the final factfinding body : :ts decioions on questions of fact are not liable to be F questioned before the High Court.\n\n[216H-217C) When a claim for allowance under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income4ax Act is made, the Income-tax authorities have to decide whether the cx- .PenditUre claimed as an allowance was incurred voluntarily and on grout!ds of commrcial expediency. In applying the test of commercial expediency for detennining whether the expenditure was wholly and exclus\"vely laid -0ut for the purpose of the business. reasonabJen-ess of the expenditure must G be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not of the Revenue.\n\nAn ·mployer in fixing the remuneration of his employees is entitled to consider the extent of h:s. business, the nature of the duties to bo performed, and the special altitude of the employee, future prospects of cXtension of the business and a host of oher related circumstances. The rule that increased remuneration can only be justified if there be corresponding increase in the profits of the employer is erroneous,\n\n[217F- H\n\n218B]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTH?N : Civil Appeals Nos. 279 and 280 of 1966.\n\nC.I.T. V. WAI.CHAND & CO. (Shah, J.) 215\n\nA Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 4, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax\n\nReference No. 23 of 1961.\n\nS. K. Mitra, T. A. Ramachandran, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSaclzthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nJ. B. Dadachanji and 0. C. Mathur, for the respondent (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The respondent (hereinafter called 'the assessee') is a private limited Company registered under the Companies Act, 1913.\n\nThe assessee carries on the business of acting as Managing Agents for nine public limited Companies.\n\nThe business of ! he assessee was managed by three Directors.\n\nEach Director was paid a remuneration of Rs. 2,500 per month.\n\nThe assessee lmd employed three executive officers to administer its affairs.\n\nBy resolution dated July 9, 1952, the remuneration of each of the Directors of the assessee was increased with retrospective effect from April 1, 1952 by Rs. 1,000 per month and of two out of the three officers by Rs. 500 per month and of the remaining officer by Rs. 750 per month. In the year 1953 the remuneration of each of the Directors was increased by Rs. 500 per month :md of each of the officers by Rs. 250 per month.\n\nIn proceeding3 for assessment of income for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 the Income-tax Officer called upon the asscssee to show cause why the increase in the remuneration of the Directors and officers should not be disallowed in the computation of the taxable income of the assessee.\n\nThe assessee submitted that the managed Companies had considerably increased the area and activities of the business and they had undertaken new lines which entailed greater burden on the Directors and officers of the assessee.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer disallowed the increase in the remuneration of the Directors and officers of the assessee.\n\nHe was of the view that since the increase in the remuneration or the salary of the officers \"was not reflected in the increase in the profits of the assessee\", it was not expenditure which could be justified as laid out wholly and necessarily for the purposes of the business under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Incometax Act.\n\nIn appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal modified the order of assessment.\n\nThe Tribunal observed that \"it was not for the Income-tax Officer to run the assessee's business and to fix the\n\nalary of every member of the staff.\n\nThat, however, does not mean that it is open to an assessee to allow unreasonable rise in the salaries without a valid reason. It may amount to giving a gift in the garb of a salary\" The T1ibunal then directed that\n\nconsidering the salaries previously drawn by the Directors, \"salary A at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month in each case be allowed as a revenue deduction\".\n\nIn making this order the Tribunal apparently lost sight of the fact that in the account year 1952-53 the Directors received Rs. 42,000 as remuneration for the whole year. and it was only in the year 1953-54 that the Directors received Rs. 48,000 as remuneration. The Tribunal also directed that in B regard to each employee increase in salary not exceeding Rs. 3,000 per annum as compared to the preceding year's assessment be allowed as a permissible deduction. The Tribunal gave no reasons for disallowing the balance of the salary paid to the tl!ree officers.\n\nThe Tribunal submitted tl!e following question for determination of the High Court of Bombay :- C\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in tl!e circumstances of the case the Tribunal acted witl!out evidence in disallowing Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty thousand) ?\" ·\n\nThe High Court was of the view tl!at the Tribunal acted without evidence in partially disallowing the increase in tl!e remuneration of the three executive officers during the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. The Commissioner of Income-tax has appealed to this Court, with special leave.\n\nThe assessee claimed the additional remuneration paid to the Directors and tci the executive officers as a permissible allowance under s. 10(2) (xv) of tl!e Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which reaJs :\n\n\"Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following al1C1Wances, namely :-\n\n(xv) any expenditure not being an allowance of bbe nature described in any of the clauses (i) to (xiv) inclusive, and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation.\" G\n\nThe remuneration paid to the executive officers was not of the\n\nnature allowable under els. ( i) to (xiv) : nor was it of the nature • of capital expenditure, or personal expenses of the assessee. The Income'tai; Officer disallowed the entire increase in the remuneration holding that it was not expended \"wholly and necessarily\" H for the purpose of such business. The Tribunal without recording any reasons partially disallowed the amount as a permissible deduction.\n\nIt is necessary to emphasiz.e that though the Tribunal\n\nC.l.T. v, WALCHAND & CO. (Shah, J.) 217\n\nis not a Court, it is invested with judicial power to be exercised in manner similar to the exercise of power of an appellate Court acting under the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nAuthority to \"pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit\" in s. 33 ( 4) of the Income\"tax Act, 1922, is not arbitrary : the expression is intended to define the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with and determine. questions which arise out of the subject-matter of the appeal m the light of the evidence, and consistently with the justice of the case.\n\nIn the hierarchy of authorities the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding body; its decisions on questions of fact are not liable to be questioned before the High Court.\n\nThe nature of the jurisdiction predicates that the Tribunal will approach and decide the cae in a judicial spirit and for tl!at purpose it must indicate the disputed questions before it with evidence pro .md con and rerord its reasons in support of the decision.\n\nThe practice of recording a decision without reasons in support cannot but be severely deprecated.\n\nIn paragraph 2 of their order the Tribunal correctly set out the principle applicable to claims for deduction of expenditure incurred in payment of remuneration to its employees by the assessee.\n\nBut for partially rejecting the claim for allowanc~ of the amount paid, no reasons were recorded. If the Tribunal was satisfied that the expenditure was laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assesee tbere wa; no reason why the full amount expended should not have been allowed. It is open to the Tribunal to come to a conclusion either that the alleged payment is not real or that it is not incurred by the assessee in the character of a trader or that it is not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee and to disallow it. But it is not the function of the Tribunal to determine the remuneration which in their view should be paid to an employee of the assessee. When a claim for allowance under s.\n\n10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act is made, the Income-tax authorities have to decide whether the expenditure claimed as an allowance was incurred voluntarily and on grounds cf commercial expediency.\n\nIn applying the test of commercial expediency for determining whether the expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business, reasonableness of the expenditure has to be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not of the Revenue. The Income-tax Officer was of the view that there was no adequate increase in the earnings of the assessee, for the increase in remuneration was not reflected in the increase in profits of the assessee and that it appeared that as compared to the previous years, the business profits disclosed y the assessee had fallen by Rs. 2 lakhs an<:! therefore the increase\n\nm expenditure could not be justified as laid out wholly and necessarily for the purposes of the business. But an employer in fixing the remuneration of his employees is entitled to consider the extent\n\nof his business, t, be nature of the duties to be performed, and the special aptit1J, C1;1of th6 employee, future prospects of extension of the business and a host of other related circumstances. The rule that increased remuneration can only be justified if there be corresponding increase in the profits of the employer is, in our judgment, erroneous.\n\nThe Tribunal did not agree with the view of the Income-tax Officer. That is clear from the observations made in paragraph 2 of their order. But, without assigning any reasons, the Tribunal allowed the claim only partially.\n\nThe High Court on a careful consideration has pointed out that the work of the assessee has increased considerably and has become more strenuous by reason of the prosperity of the managed Companies and ii would be reasonable and natural to infer that \"the strain on both the Directors and the top executives had increased justifying increase in their remuneration\". In their view the fact that additional remuneration was not sanctioned in favour of other executive officers is by itself not a ground for regarding the expenditure incurred as otherwise than wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purpose of the business. We agree with the High Court that the order of the Tribunal disallowing the claim for allowance of the whole of the additional remuneration was not supported by any evidence.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nY.P.\n\nA ppea/s dismissed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. WALCHAND & CO. (PVT.) LTD., BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. WALCHAND & CO. (PVT.) LTD., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 17, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 93, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY\n\nMarch 17, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIICRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JI.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 694, "end_char": 702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 715, "end_char": 729, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1419, "end_char": 1439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTH?N", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule that increased remuneration can only be justified if there be corresponding increase in the profits of the employer is erroneous,\n\n[217F- H\n\n218B]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTH?N : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "C.I.T. V. WAI.CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.I.T. V. WAI.CHAND & CO. ("}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2937, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J.) 215\n\nA Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 4, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax\n\nReference No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, T. A. Ramachandran, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSaclzthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, T. A. Ramachandran, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSaclzthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, T. A. Ramachandran, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSaclzthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSaclzthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, T. A. Ramachandran, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSaclzthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3208, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachanji and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachanji and 0."}}, {"text": "Company registered under the Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3410, "end_char": 3458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By resolution dated July 9, 1952, the remuneration of each of the Directors of the assessee was increased with retrospective effect from April 1, 1952 by Rs."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By resolution dated July 9, 1952, the remuneration of each of the Directors of the assessee was increased with retrospective effect from April 1, 1952 by Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal submitted tl!e following question for determination of the High Court of Bombay :- C\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in tl!e circumstances of the case the Tribunal acted witl!out evidence in disallowing Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7057, "end_char": 7065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7079, "end_char": 7106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8234, "end_char": 8261, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10139, "end_char": 10152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10160, "end_char": 10174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_219_237_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "TIIE UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE GENERAL MANAGER, NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY, GORAKHPUJt\n\nTHE INDIAN SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION, CALCUTTA &\n\nANOTHER\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)\n\nMarch 21, 1967\n\nIndian Railways Act, 1890, ss. 29 and 41-Charges made by Railways for maintenance, etc. of \"assisted siding\" constructed to facilitate goods traffic and for shunting wagon to and from compa11ys' mill-Services rendered by Railways not under any statutory duty but under prlvale agreement-Railways giving notice of enhancement of charges-Whether such charges fall within expression 'any other charge' in ss. 29 ( 2) and 4!(1)(c). Therefore wheth:r complaint alleging charges unreasonable can\n\nbe entertained by Railway Rates Tribunal under s. 41(1)(c).\n\nThe predecessor of the appellant Railway entered into an agreement in November, 1933, with the respondent company, which had a large sugar mill, for the construction of two \"assisted sidings\" to facilitate the nlovenent of goods. iraffic to and from the sugar mill.\n\nUnder the agreement, part of the expenditure was met by the company and it was provided that the company would pay an annual contribution to the Railways for the use of the Railway portion of the siding and in lieu of paying separately the interest and maintenance cost of the siding. It was further provided that in the event of the contribution not being sufficient to meet the cost of the working of the siding, the Railway was entiUed, ou giving six months notice, to modify tho contribut'on and charge the company such higher amount as it may consider necessary.\n\nBy virtue of another arrangement between the Railway and the Company, at the company's request, the Railway would arrange for the shunting of wagons from the Company's factory yard to the Railway lines and for doing so, the Railway would charge the company a shunting engine charge calculated at a fixed rate per hour.\n\nIn February 1958, the Railwav gave notice of increased charge.'l to be paid instead of the fixed contribution. It also demanded an increased •hunting engine charge. The company thereupon filed a complaint under s .. 4l(l)(c) of the Indin .Railways Act, 1890 befre the Railway Rates Tnbunal at MadraJ, cla1mmg that the charges claimed by the Railway\n\nere un!easonble and requesting the Tribunal to fix reasonable charges in exerc1rrges being levied by the Railway arooe only as a result of a voluntary agreement which the Railway, at its option, might have refused 10 enter into.\n\n[226H; 2278, E-F]\n\nHa/sbury's Laws of Engla11d, 2nd Edn. Vol. 27, Paras 434 arnl 436 at p. 196; referred to.\n\n(ii) The figures of the proposed increase in chares given on behalf of the company,. which were challenged in the complamt, did prima facie\n\nindicate that the rates fixed and demanded were unreasonable. It could not therefore be held that the Tribunal committed any error in going into the evidence given on behalf of the Railway and arriving at reasonable rates aftet a full consideration of that evidence and the evidence tender~ -ed on behalf of the company.\n\n[229E, F-G]\n\n(iii) It was necessary to include a margin of profit in the '; shunting engine charge\" fixed by the Tribunal and (upon an examination of the evidence) to revise the siding charges.\n\n[The Court therefore itself fixed the rates for the charges to he levied by the Railway].\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTIOll: Civil Appeal No. 610 ol 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 31, 1963 of the Railway Rates Tribunal, Madras in Complaint No. I of 1962.\n\nN. S. Hindra, R. H. Dhebar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appel !ant.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. P. Maheshwari and R. K. Chaudhary, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bbargava, J. Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd., Riga, (hereinafter refer red to as \"the Company\") was incorporated in the year 1932.\n\nSoon after the incorporation o~ the Company, the ompny esta~ lished a. fairly large sugar mill near railway stat10n Riga.\n\nTuts\n\nstation was on the railway line of the Bengal an~ orth Western Railway which, at that time, was owned by a hm1ted Company known as the Bengal and North Western Rilay Limitd. At Riga railway station, the Railway had two mam lines runmng, one along the passenger platfonn, and another forming a loop gainst it running parallel to the first line with points on both s1d:s. of the platform for taking the railway trains to line 2 when amvmg from either direction at Riga railway station.\n\nFor the sake of convenience, the line along. the passenger platform will be referred to as line l, and the other main line forming the loop as line\n\n2. In addition, there was a goods platform and a line was run connecting line 1 to the line along the goods platform fro~ both directions.\n\nThat line is to be referred to hereinafter as !me 5.\n\nSince the sugar factory of the Company was established close to Riga station, considerable goods traffic started being received for the Company and, at the same time, goods traffic was also booked by the Company for outward transmission from this station.\n\nDr ing the crushing season, a large number of wagons loaded with sugarcane used to be received and, under the existing constructions of the Railway, delivery of the sugarcane had to be taken from the goods wagons on line 5 at the goods platform. Since the traffic was considerable, it became inconvenient and, consequently, an arrangement was entered into between the Railway and the Company for construction of two sidings, described as assisted sidings.\n\nIn pursuance of this arrangement, two further lines (hereinafter referred to lines 3 & 4) were laid between lines 2 and 5 running parallel to these lines. Trains from line 1 could be taken to lines 3 and 4 from both directions in the same manner as they could be taken to line 5. At the time of construction of these assisted sidings represented by lines 3 and 4, an agreement was entered into between the Railway and the Company on 21st November,\n\n1933. Under that agreement, part of the expenditure on the construction of these assisted sidings was met by the Company, while part of the expenditure was incurred by the Railway. It was agreed m that agreement .that the Company will pay in advance, in two equal half-yearly mstalments on the first day of April and the\n\nfist ay of October respectively in each half-year, a fixed contnbut10n. of Rs. 709/8/- per half-year to the Railway for the use of the rallway portion of the siding. The agreement proceeded to lay down that th\". pyment of !his contribution by the Company was to be !aken m lieu of paymg separately for interest on, and cost .of mamenance of, the permanent-way, points and crossings and mterlcmg connected therewith and for freight on the traffic over the s1dng.. It was further agreed that, in the event of the\n\nabov~ contnbutm? .not being sufficient to meet the cost of the workmf of. the s1.dm.g, th\". Railway was entitled, on giving six m?nts notice of tis mtention to do so, to modify the above contnbut10n and charge the Company such higher amount as it may\n\nconsider necessary to meet the increased cost of working. Further railway lines were also laid from Riga railway station up to the factory of the Company. A line ran from the junction of lines 3 and 4 on the western side of the station in a semi-circular loop and then entered the factory of the Company where the line was connected to four different lines. This line, running from the junction up to a point where there was further bifurcation of lines, will be referred to as line .6. At the end of line 6, this line was connected to two lines, one situated to the south, and the other to the north. There was also a loop formd by connecting the northern line to the southern line by another connecting line. This loop is to be referred to as line 7. Lines 6 and 7 were laid at the cost .of the Company. The arrangement was that the Company was to take delivery of its sugarcane wagons as well as all other goods on lines 3 and 4 at the assisted sidings. Thereafter, it was the duty of the Company to unload the wagons there, or to have them rolled into their own factory yard. It appears that the Company purchased a railway engine and used it for taking the loaded wagons to the factory and bringing back the unloaded wagons to these lines 3 and 4. For outward traffic also, the empty wagons often used to be loaded in the factory yard and brought by the factory engine to Riga railway station. On some occasions, the wagons were taken by being pushed by manual labour instead of using the engine. A third alternative was that the Company would request the Railway to arrange for the shunting of their wagons from lines 3 and 4 to the factory yard. Whenever this arrangement was adopted, the Railway charged the factory for this service rendered. It appears that between the years 1956-57 to 1958·59, the Railway used to charge the Company at the rate of Rs. 18/ •\n\npe~ hour, computing the time taken by the shunting engine in completing the work of the Company.\n\nThe time computed began when the shunting engine came to lines 3 and 4 to take away the Company's wagons, and ended when the engine returned to the railway station after completing the work of shunting the wagons.\n\nSometimes, on return, the engine brought empty wagons, but this was considered immaterial, because the charge was made from the Company by the Railway on the basis of the time actually taken by the shunting engine calculated @ Rs. 18/ • per hour. This rate of Rs. 18/. per hour will be described hereafter as the rate of the shunting engine charge.\n\nIt may be mentioned that, in the year 1942, the Bengal and North Western Railway was taken over by the Indian Government and, at the relevant time in the year 1958, the Railway was owned by the Union Government and was run under the name of North Eastern Railway, which is the name it continues to bear at present.\n\nThe arrangement, mentioned above, co!1tinued up t? 8th February, 1958. On this date, a notice was given by the Railwav\n\nto the Company proposing enhancement of the charges to be levied in pursuance of the agreement which had been entered into on 21st November, 1933, under which the Railway was empowered to enhance the charges, if it considered it necessary to meet the increased cost of the working of the assisted sidings. By this letter dated 8th February, 1958, the Railway gave six months' notice of enhancement of the charges, after mentioning that the fixed contribution of Rs. 709/8/- per half-year for use of the Railway portion of the siding in lieu of paying separately for interest on, and cost of maintenance of, the permanent-way, points and crossings and interlocking connected therewith and for freight on the traffic over the siding was not considered sufficient to meet the cost of present-day working of the siding. The charges to be levied in lieu of existing fixed contribution were mentioned as a sum of Rs. 603.7nP per half-year in respect of interest on the capital and cost of maintenance of the permanent way, points and crossings and interlocking connected therewith, while for the freight on the traffic over the siding, described as the siding charge, the Railway demanded Re. 1 /- per 4-wheeled wagon hauled over the siding, subject to a minimum of Rs. 7 /- per shunt. The new rates were to come into force with effect from 10th August, 1958. Though the Company did not agree to these new rates, the Railway demanded payment at these rates and, ultimately, the Company was informed by the Railway that, if payments at new rates were not made, the facility of the assisted siding would be withdrawn. The Company made payments under protest. Further, the Railway also enhanced the rate for the shunting engine charge. The rate was enhanced to Rs. 28/- per hour for the year 1959-60 and to Rs. 30/50nP per hour for the year 1960-61.\n\nThe Company, bein~ dissatisfied with these charges, filed a complaint under section 4l(l)(c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890\n\n(hreinafter referred to as \"the Act\") before the Railway Rates Tn?unal at Madras (hereinafter referred to as \"the Tribunal\") agamst the enhancement of the shunting engine charges from Rs. 18/- per hour to Rs. 28/- and subsequently Rs. 30/50nP per\n\nour, as -well as the enhancement of the siding charges by prescribmg a scale of payment @ Re. 1/- per wagon with a minimum of Rs_. 7 /- per s.hunt. It appears. that there were a large number of sugar mills s1tuate.d along van?us railway stations served by the North Eastern Railway, and with them also there existed similar\n\narrangemets as the one arrived at between the Railway and the Company m 1933 under the agreement mentioned above.\n\nAll t!1ese sugr mills Vfee membe.rs. of the Indian Sugar Mills Associat10~. This Association also iomed as a complainant in the complamt of the Company representing all its constituent sugar mills.\n\nIn the proceedings before the Tribunal, however, the Indian Sugar\n\nMills Association did not take any active part and the case was\n\nactally fought out by the Company. It was urged in the complaint that both the shunting engine charges and the siding charges at the enhanced rates claimed by.the Railway were unreasonable and the Tribunal was requested to fix reasonable charges in exercise of its powers under s. 41(3) of the Act.\n\nThe complaint was contested by the Railway on three grounds.\n\nThe first ground was that the charges, to which the complaint related, were in respect of services which the Railway was not bound to render to the Company and was rendering under private agree ments with the Company and, consequently, no complaint could be filed under s. 41 of the Act challenging them on the ground of being unreasonable.\n\nThis plea was taken on the basis that the expression \"any other charge\" ins. 41(1)(c) of the Act could only cover a charge made by the Railway in discharge of its duties under the statute and could not cover a charge made by the Railway for voluntary services which the Railway might render under a private agreement of a commercial nature to any other party. The se\">nd ground was that the complainants had not succeeded in showing that the charges demanded by the Railway were unreason able and, that burden of proof not having been discharged by the complainants, the Tribunal was not competent to call upon the Railway to prove the reasonableness of the charges and to reduce the charges only on the ground that the Railway had failed to establish their reasonableness.\n\nThe third point of contest was that the rates, at which the charges were demanded by the Railway, were, in fact, reasonable and should not be reduced.\n\nThe Tribunal held that the complaint was competent and that the expression \"any other charge\" in s. 41(l)(c) of the Act did cover both these charges to which the complaint related. The Tri bunal did not, in specific words, hold that the complainants had established that the charges were unreasonable, before proceeding to examine the reasonableness of the charges. On the other hand, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the evidence of the parties adduced before it and came to the finding that, in both cases, the charges being demanded were unreasonable. Further. after examin ing in detail the evidence given on behalf of the Railway, and on making its own computation, the Tribunal held that a sum of Rs. 20/- per hour was a reasonable rate for the shunting engine charge. In respect of the siding charge, the Tribunal rejected the plea of the Railway that this charge should also be levied on the basis of the time taken in shunting the wagons of the Company to lines 3 and 4, after taking into account the shunting engine charge. lt was held that, in the original agreement of 1933, parties, had agreed to a lumpsum in respect of various services, and the subsequent conduct of the Railway established that, out of the total sum of Rs. 1,419/-per year, a sum of Rs. 1,206/14nP per year represented charges in respect of interest c;>n the capita~ and cst of maintenance of the permanent way, pomts and crossmg and mterlocking connected therewith. The remaining sum of Rs. 212 and odd was held to represent the freight on the traffic over the assisted\n\nsidin~ and was treated as the siding charge. In the absence of reliable material provided by the Railway for arriving at a reasonable figure on any other basis, the Tribunal held that the only amount which the Railway could be permitted in respect of the siding charge would be double the amount originally chargeable under the agreement of 1933 and, consequently, allowed the Rai!· way siding charge at a fixed rate of Rs. 424/- per year. It 1s against this decision of the Tribunal that the Ra!IV'.ay has come up in this appeal to this Court by special leave, and, m the appeal, has taken all the three points, mentioned above, on the basis of which the complaint before the Tribunal was resisted.\n\nDealing with the first. question, which was the only questi?n of law raised in this case, learned counsel appearing for the Railway\n\ndrew our attention to the definition of \"railway\" in s. 3(4) of the Act and, in particular, to clause (b) thereof under which the \"railway\" is defined to include all lines of rails, sidings or branches work ed over for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway. It was urged that the assisted sidings, comprised of lines 3 and 4, were not worked over for the purpose of, or in connection with, the work of the railway and, consequently, these assisted sidings could not be held to be a part of the railway. Attention was also drawn to s. 11 of the Act, which lays down the duty of the Railway to make and maintain certain works, to show that there was no duty on the Railway to maintain the permanent way, points and crossings and interiock; ing connections existing for the service of these assisted sidings, lines 3 and 4. The duties of the Railway in respect of goods traffic are laid down in s. 27 which requires the Railway to ffod all reasonable facilities for the receiving, foIVarding and dehvenng of traffic upon and from the several railways belonging to o~ orked by it and for the return of rolling stock. Under this provmon also, there was no duty on the Railway to give delivery of goods to the Company on lines 3 and 4. The duty was to carry\n\noods o~ th: Company an~ to dliver them on line 5 which was the lme mamtamed by the Railway itself for delivery of goods It was\n\nured that, in thse circumstances, it must be held that th~ charges levied by the Railway for taking the wagons, containing the goods ?f the Company, to lines 3 and 4, as well as the charges for renderm~ the sel'vice of taking the wagons of the Company to the prem1es of its factory over lines 6 and 7 cannot be held to be charges levied for the purpose of performing any duty cast on the Railwav by the Act.\n\nSection 29 of the Act lays down how rates are to be xed. Under s\" 29(1), the Central qovernment is empowered, by 0 eneral or special order, to fix maximum and minimum rates\n\nfor the whole or any part of a railway, and prescribe the conditions in which such rates will apply. Under sub-s. (2), the Ceniral Government is empowered, by a like order, to fix the rates of any other charges for the whole or any part of a railway and to prescribe the condition in which such rates of charges are to apply. It was urged that the charges now in dispute will not be charges covered by s. 29(1) or s. 29(2) of the Act, and, on the same basis, they will not be charges covered by s. 41 ( 1 )(b) or s. 41 (I )(c) of the Act.\n\nWe are unable to accept this submission made on behalf of the Railway. It is correct that s. 29(1) of the Act will apply to rates of charges for carrying goods from station to station over the railway itself, in such a case, the Central Government can fix\n\nthe maximum and minimum rates, whereas the actual rates to be charged can be fixed by the Railway Administration itself. If any person has a grievance that the rate being charged by the Railway is excessive, he can complain to the Tribunal, and the complaint would be covered by the provisions of s. 41(l)(b) of the Act. This charge for carriage of goods over the. railway or part of a railway is the only charge in respect of goods which can be the subjectmatter of a complaint under s. 41(1)(b) of the Act. The language of s. 4l(l)(b), by itself, excludes its applicability to passenger fares.\n\nCharges are often made by the Railway for wharfage and demurrage, but the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with the fixation of these charges is expressly taken away bys. 45(l)(b) of the Act.\n\nConsequently, it appears that, in respect of a commodity carried by a railway over its own railway lines, the only charge that the Railway can levy, and which can be the subject-matter of a com• plaint under s. 41(1)(b), will be the charge for carriage of the commodity between two stations and it would be in respect of the discharge by the Railway of its statutory duty of carrying goods between stations maintained by it. There does not appear to be any other statutory duty in respect of which any other charge could be levied by the Railway, and, consequently, if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the Railway is accepted, the result would be that s. 29(2) will become ineffective and redundant, because there would be no other charges in respect of which fixation of rates by the Central Government would be required.\n\nSimilarly, the provision contained in s. 41(1)(c) would also be redundant, as there would be no other charges in respect of which a complaint could be filed under this provision. It is clear that a complaint under s. 41(1)(b) relates to fixation of a rate relating to charges mentioned in s. 29(1), while s. 41(1)\\c) relat~ to a complaint in re:rpect of any other charge mentioned m s. 29(2). It appears to us, in these circumstances, that the expression \"any other charge\" used in s. 29(2) and s. 4 l(l)(c) cannot be given the narrow me:aning of covering a charge in respect of the\n\nc .\n\nstatutory duty of the Railway so as to exclude charges made or levied by the Railway for all other services. In this connection, the language used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 41(1) is significant.\n\nSection 41(1)(b), as has been mentioned earlier, covers a complaint in respect of a charge for carriage of any commodity between two stations at a rate which is unreasonable, while s. 41(1)\n\n(c) relates to the levy of any other charge which is unreasonable.\n\nThe expression \"any other charge\" in clause (c) must, therefore, cover charges which are not included in clause (b).\n\nClause (b) specifically mentions charges for carriage of a commodity between two stations, and, hence, the expression \"any other charge\" in clause (c) must necessarily include within it a charge for carriage of any commodity between places other than two stations.\n\nIn the present case, the shunting engine charge and the siding charge are both being levied by the Railway for carrying goods from the railway to sidings not forming part of the railway. In bringing goods from other stations to Riga station on Jines 1, 2 or 5, the railway would only be carrying the goods between stations. It is only thereafter, when the wagons are shunted by the railway to Jines 3 and 4 or over Jines 6 and 7 to the factory of the Company, that the railway will be carrying goods between a station and another place or between two different places which cannot either of them be described as stations. This charge for carriage of the commodity in the context in which the expression \"any other charge\" is used in s. 29(2) and s. 41(1)(c), must be covered by this expression. It appears to us to be immaterial that the charge being levied by the Railway for taking the wagons to the assisted sidings or to the factory of the Comeany arises only as a result of a voluntary agreement by the Railway which the Railway, at its option, might have refused to enter into. It is correct that the Railway was not bound to agree to carry the goods of the Company to the assisted siding or to. the factory of the Company; but .it seems to us that, once the Railway did, in fact, agree and decide to charge the Company for it, the Railway became bound to make the charge in accordance with s. 29 (2) of the Act. If a rate of charge is prescribed by the Central Governmen.t _under s. 2~(2) for such voluntary service and the person rece1vmg the service feels aggrieved, he can complain to the Tribunal nder s. 41(1)(c) of the Act and have the reasonable rate determmed. Even if no rate is prescribed by the Central Government under s. 29(2) and the Rai!way levies such a charge, it will be competent for the person aggrieved to file the complaint against the rate f charge fore the Tribunal under s. 4l(l)(c).\n\nIn !his connec!Ion, it was urged by learned counsel that the\n\nexpres10n \"any ther charge\" should not be given a very wide manmg and he cited before us instances of various other charges bemg made by the Railway, such as charges for advertisement on LS Sup. C. I./67-2\n\nrailway premises, catering charges, retiring room charges and time-table charges, to urge that at least these charges would not be covered by the expression \"any other charge\" in s. 41(1)(c) of the Act. It seems that, in this case, it is not at all necessary for us to examine whether charges of this nature mentioned by learned\n\ncounsel will or will not be covered by the expresion \"any other charge\". In fact, we do not think it to be advisable that we should try to define the full scope of the expression \"any other charge\" in this case. It is enough to hold for the purposes of this case that at least the charges for carriage of goods from parts of the railway to points or places, not forming part of the railway, will certainly be covered by the expression \"any other charge\" used in s. 4l(l)(c), so that the complaint in the present case was competently entertained by the Tribunal.\n\nThis view that we have arrived at is in line with the principles laid down in England as noted in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 27, in paras 434 and 436 at p. 196. In para 434, the principle noted is that \"loading and unloading, covering and uncovering. in classes 7 to 21, though performed at the private siding, are services otherwise provided for in the standard charges, and the company must charge for these either the standard or an exceptional rate.\n\nAnd where the Railway Rates Tribunal have by order fixed charges for serviees not included in conveyance and terminals, as long as the order stands unchallenged the company may only exact the charges fixed by the Tribunal and not what the company thinks are reasonable charges\". Then; in para 436, it is said : \"So, even when the carriage charges are paid by a siding owner who has entered into an express agreement to pay a fixed or ascertainable sum for the private siding services, he may still refer the matter to the Railway Rates Tribunal ...... The Tribunal may consider from a business point of view what is the money value of the services rendered or they may ascertain the total cost of .the services over a year and divide it by the number of. tons carried during the same period to give an addition to the tonnage rate\". These principles clearly indicate that the Railway Rates Tribunal is competent to determine the reasonableness of charges for services by a railway even on private sidings.\n\nThe same principle is incorporated in s. 41(1)(c) of the Act in India\n\nby empowering a complainant to complain to the Tnounal, if any charges, other than a charge for carriage of commodity between stations, is found to be unreasonable. The preliminary legal objection raised on behalf of the Railway was, therefore, rightly rejected l>y the Tribunal.\n\nOn the second question, we find that, in the pleadings. taken before the Tribunal, the Railway did not in so many words specifically raise the issue that, before proceeding to examine the rea-\n\n' D\n\n-UNION;,, SUGAR 'MILLS' ASSOCN. (Bhargava, J.) ,229 . / sonableness of the rates demanded by the Railway, the Company should be called upon to show that those rates were unreasonable, though the issues, which wefe framed both with :i:egard to the siding charges as well as the shunting engine chllfges, were couched in languagy enquiring whether the rates •demanded by the Railway were unreasonable.\n\nIt appears that, in the. complaint, the Company. had mentioned figures 1 on !lie basis of which the Company requested-the Tribunal tQ .hold lhat these charges were unreasonable.' In respect of'-the shunting engine charges, the pleading was that the Railway had been charging the Company at a rate'of Rs. 18/- per hour for the years 1956-57 to 1:958-59 and had, then, suddenly r_aised the charges to Rs. 28/ • per hour :withr out any justification.\n\nThis sudden enhancementdrom .Rs. 18/,- to RS. 28/-' per hour in, th\" )'ear.il 959-60> was ged.tobe unreasonable. In the case\" of siding• charges, the pleading [was that the\"Cpmpanyhad ben paying earlier.a fi, xed._sum of~· 212/- per year, while, dftet'the enhancetiieht bY, the-.'ilotice dated 8th February, ,1958, the charges were 'So fixed that the burden orrthe Comp.any rose to amounts in the next t!Jtee years varying between Rs. 7,752/- to Rs. 9,676/-. 'AC'Cording to'the Company,.thus,:the siding charges were fixed in such a manner that1•.after enhance' nl.en't, 'the charges payable became 10 tc1\"80 times the charges\n\nqriginlly\"payabl&'. under the agr~ment of 193 3.\n\nThese figures g!vpn on behalf of the c!ornpany. did,· p)'ima 'fdcie, indicate, that tlie 'rates fixed and demande'll, which were challenged in the com• plaint, were unreasonable. Further, the new rate of Re. If.•. pep wagon was, per se ,1,1nreasoni1ble inasmuch as\"lhe cost incqrretl by the 'Railway on 'shunting the wagons could not be in proportion to the n'Umber of wagons shfinted 'and 'C'oaltl' not, in any case; be ss>' high as'.'io jtlf}'. t~\\s rati:'.even i_n cases -hen ·:r'large .num. ber of wagohs were sliunted togethr IO one sIOgle shunt, :Conl\n\nsuently, it was_ bnipten~1or the 'Fribunar tb cal~U'pon•the parl!cs to...adduce evidence 'and fo c!'eterinine V?hlit woul11 be the reasonole_ ~11e.s 'ac~rdjpg to the T, ilbun~I' iislf. -'!; hat being the factual pOltI?n, we cannot n9Jath'at, the T{!biinal confmittedany 'error in Jl'oing liito the evidence given ofrbehalf o~ the Railway\n\nantj. arriving at the! reasonable rates, after a full cbiisid, erlitiorr•of that e'vfdence arid\" the evidencetendered 'on beqalf bf the C61ii.- pal)y.' J~· is' to' be noi7d that thbne~srJ'.'fac_t.s fqt ~teiminifi~ what expenses the a1lway must be mcurrmg•m order to render the services for -\"'.his:1t1t11y ere geman, di'!g}:h; tr?es, t.th~ impµ, g~ e:J rates wer'e IO , the specij\\I k!:1owlcje', o'f11he .Ra1lway; a, uth'm; !ICs only and, onsequeptly, whep~ subsque~9Y the Tribunal eX3:, mind' tl\\is , qil~S't, io11,; it .Proceede~1riglitiy ]ri x; aflil)y scrutiriisin'l! th, e , ev1~nce _fe{laercl on bpf-tax Act, 1922. The department, the Appel late Tribunal, and the High Court on reference, held against the appellant, on the basis of cl. 3 of the agreement, that the loss •uffered by the appellant was a capital loss.\n\nIn appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Since all payments reduce. capital one is apt to consider a E. loss as a capital loss.\n\nBut losses in the running of a business cannot be said to be of capital. To find out whether an expenditure is on the capitul account or on revenue account, one must consider the expenditure in relation to the business. In the present case, the debt was in respect of and incidental to the business of the appellant in the relevant accounting year, and the accounts of his business were kept on mercantile basis. If els. 3 and 7 of the agreement are read together, the transaction would be F a money-lending transaction or a transaction in the nature of a financlal deal in the course of the appellant's business, resulting in a loan repayable with interest.\n\nTherefore, the loss suffered was a revenue loss and the appellant was entitled to claim the deduction of the amount as a bad debt under s. 10(2) (xi) of the Act.\n\n[24!H; 242E-F) Reid's Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Male, 3 T.C. 279, applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1230 of G 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 27, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 18 of 1961.\n\nS. T. Desai, M. N. Shroff for /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nR. M. Hazarnavis, Gopal Singh, S. P. Nayyar for R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondent.\n\nBHARUCHA v. C.I.T. (Ramaswami, J.) 239\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J, This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated August 27, 1962 in Income Tax Reference No. 18 of 1961.\n\nThe appellant is an individual having income from House Property, Government Securities, Cinema Exhibition and financing film producers and distributors.\n\nDuring the period from March 3, 1952 to November 5, 1952 the appellant advanced a sum of Rs. 40,000/- to a firm of film distributors known as Tarachand Pictures. The appellant thereafter entered into an agree. ment dated January 5, 1953 with Tarachand Pictures under which the appellant advanced a further sum of Rs. 60,000/- in respect of the distribution, exploitation and exhibition of a Picture called\n\n\"Shabab\". According to cl. 2 of the agreement the distributors were to pay a lumpsum of Rs. 1,750/- by way of interest on the initial advance of Rs. 40,000/-. Clause 3 of the agreement read as follows :-\n\n\"No interest will run henceforth on this sum of Rs. 40,000/- as also on the advances to be made as provided hereinabove but in lieu of interest it is agreed that the Distributors will share with the Financier profit and loss of the Distribution, Exploitation and Exhibition of the picture SHABAB in the Bombay Circuit, two-third going to the Financier and one-third to the Distributors.\" Clauses 4 and 5 were to the following effect :-\n\n\"4. The Distributors shall on or before the 15th of every month submit to the Financier a Statement of Account of the business done during the previous month in respect of the picture 'SHABAB' in the territories of Bombay Circuit.\"\n\n\"5. The Distributors shall keep the proper accounts of the business of the picture 'SHABAB' and the same as well as all documents, reports and contracts will be available to the Financier or his agent for inspection.\" Clause 7 read as follows :- . \"In case the picture is not released in Bombay withm 15 months from the date hereof the Distributors shall be bound to immediately return all the moneys so far advanced to the Distributors by the Financier. In that event the Distributors shall be bound to return all the moneys together with interest thereon @ 9% per annum.\" Clause 8 stated :\n\n\"In case of any breach being committed by the Distributors of any of the terms herein provided this agree ment shall at once terminate and the moneys paid by the Financier shall be at once raid by the Distributors to the Financier with interest @ 9% per annum.\"\n\nIt appears that the distributol's were not in a position to, exlubit the film in Bombay within the stipulated time.\n\nWhen the fihn was ultimately released for exhibition it proved to be unsuccessful. The matter was taken to the Cit; r Civil Court and ultimately a consent decree was obtained in Suit No. 2061 of 1954 in the Bombay City Civil Court. In the end the appellant found that there was a balance of Rs. 80,759/- which was irrecoverable and he accordingly wrote it off as a bad debt on December 31, 1955 in the ledger account.\n\nFor the assessment year 1956-57, the corresponding previous year being the calendar year 1955, the appellant claimed a loss of Rs. 80,759/- which he had written off as bad debt, under s. 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nBy his assessment order dated July 31, 1957, the Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the moneys advanced by the appellant under the agreement could not , be regarded as a dealing in the course of his financing business, but the true nature of the transaction, as evidenced by the agreement, was a venture in the nature of a trade. The Income-tax Officer accordingly held that the loss was a capital loss and it could not be allowed as a bad debt under s. 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax who dismissed the appeal. The appellant preferred a second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which by its order dated February 19, 1960 rejected the appeal, holding that the loss of Rs. 80,759/- was a capital loss and not a loss of stock-in-trade.\n\nThe Tribunal took the view that the transaction was not a joint venture with the distributors or any partnership business and that it was also not a mere financing deal or a part of the money-lending activities of the appellant. According to the Appellate Tribunal, the true nature of the transaction was an investment of the capital for a return in the shape of share of profits, and the loss suffered by the appellant was therefore a capital loss and not a revenue loss. As required by the appellant, the Tribunal stated a case to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act on the following question of law :-\n\n\"Whether the aforesaid loss of Rs .. 80,759/· is deductible under any of the provisions of the Act ?\"\n\nBy its judgment dated August 27, 1962, the High Court answered the Reference in the negative nd against the appellant.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the High Court was right in taking the view that the appellant had advanced\n\nBHARUCHA v. C.I.T. (Ramaswaml, !.)\n\n24L\n\na sum of Rs. 1,00,000/· not with a view to earn interest thereon but with a view to making an investment in the business of Tarachand Pictures and get a return on the said investment by way of a share of profits in the said business. It was contended that the money was not lent for any definite term and no rate of interest had been fixed under cl. 3.\n\nThe argument was also stressed that cl. 3 of the agreement stipulated that the appellant was to share with the distributors not only the profit but also the loss of the business, and in the case of no money-lending transaction is there a covenant between the parties that the money-lender will share the loss of the business for which the money is lent. In other words, it was argued that no money-lending transaction can have the attribute of the money-lender sharing the risk of the loss of the business for which the money is lent, nor could it be a feature of any purely financial deal.\n\nWe arc unable to accept the argument of the respondent that the transaction between the parties under the agreement dated January 5, 1953 was not a money-lending transaction or a transaction in the nature of a financial deal in the course of the appellant's business. If cl. 3 of the agreement is taken in isolation there may be some force in the contention of the respondent that the term under which the appellant undertook to share the loss took the transaction out of the category of a money-lending transaction and the loss suffered by the appellant was therefore a capital loss. In the present case, however,\n\ncl. 3 of the agreement dated January 5, 1953 cannot be read in isolation but it must be construed in the context of cl. 7 which provides that in case the picture was not released in Bombay within 15 months from the date of the agreement, the distributors will return all the moneys so far advanced to them by the appellant together with interest thereon at 9% per annum. It is the admitted position in the present case that the picture was not released by the distributors till the stipulated date, namely, April 4, 1954 but It was released on May 28, 1954 and cl. 7 of the agreement therefore came into operation. The result therefore is that on and from April 4, 1954 there was a contract of loan between the parties in terms of cl. 7 of the agreement and the principal amount became repayable from that date to the appellant with interest thereon at 9% per annum. It follows therefore that the appellant is entitled to claim the amount of Rs. 80,759/- as a bad debt under s. 10 ( 2) (xi) of the Income-tax Act and the loss suffered by the appellant was not a loss of capital b.it a revenue loss.\n\nTo find out whether an expenditure is on the capital account or on revenue account, one must consider the expenditure in relation to the business. Since all payments reduce capital in the ultimate analysis, one is apt to consider a loss as amounting to a loss of capital. But it is not true of all losses, because losses in the running of the business cannot be said to be of capital. The distinction is brought out for example, in Reid's Brewery Co. Ltd. v.\n\nMale('). In that case, the brewery company carried on, in addition to the business of a brewery, a business of bankers and moneylenders making loans and advances to their customers. This helped the customers in pushing sales of the product of the brewery company. Certain sums had to be written off and the amount was held to be deductible. In the course of his judgment Pollock B. said:\n\n\"Of course, if it be capital invested, then it comes within the express provision of the Income-tax Act, that no deduction is to be made on that account.\" but held that :\n\n\" ...... no person who is acquainted with the habits of business can doubt that this is not capital invested.\n\nWhat it is is this. It is capital used by the Appellants but used only in the sense that all money which is laid out by persons who are traders, whether it be in the purchase of goods be they traders alone, whether it be in the purchase of raw material be they manufacturers, or in the case of money-lenders, be they pawnbrokers or money-lenders, whether it be money lent in the course of their trade, it is used and it comes out of capital, but it is not an investment in the ordinary sense of the word.\" In the present case, the conditions for the grant of the allowance under s. 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act are satisfied. In the first place, the debt is in respect of the business which is carried on by the appellant in the relevant accounting year and accounts of the business are admittedly kept on mercantile basis. In the second place, the debt is in respect of and incidental to the business Of the appellant. It has also been found that the debt had become irrecoverable in the relevant accounting year and the amount had been actually written off as irrecoverable in the books of the appellant.\n\nFor these reasons, we hold that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 27, 196?. should be set aside and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant. We accordingly allow this appeal with costs here and in the High Court.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(0 3 Tax C... 279.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "BHARUCHA, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B.D.BHARUCHA,BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CENTRAL BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CENTRAL BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D.BHARUCHA, BOMBAY\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CENTRAL BOMBAY\n\nMarch 21, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. Sil{RI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay City Civil Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5552, "end_char": 5575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2061 of 1954 in the Bombay City Civil Court."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5948, "end_char": 5960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5982, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6494, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 19, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred a second appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which by its order dated February 19, 1960 rejected the appeal, holding that the loss of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7407, "end_char": 7415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7423, "end_char": 7437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7600, "end_char": 7615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated August 27, 1962, the High Court answered the Reference in the negative nd against the appellant."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8256, "end_char": 8261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9083, "end_char": 9088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9428, "end_char": 9433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9544, "end_char": 9549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 4, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9935, "end_char": 9948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the admitted position in the present case that the picture was not released by the distributors till the stipulated date, namely, April 4, 1954 but It was released on May 28, 1954 and cl."}}, {"text": "May 28, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9972, "end_char": 9984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the admitted position in the present case that the picture was not released by the distributors till the stipulated date, namely, April 4, 1954 but It was released on May 28, 1954 and cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9989, "end_char": 9994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10159, "end_char": 10164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10403, "end_char": 10408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10426, "end_char": 10440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pollock B.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11359, "end_char": 11369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his judgment Pollock B. said:\n\n\"Of course, if it be capital invested, then it comes within the express provision of the Income-tax Act, that no deduction is to be made on that account.\""}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11466, "end_char": 11480, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12239, "end_char": 12251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12259, "end_char": 12273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12823, "end_char": 12840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, we hold that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 27, 196?."}}, {"text": "August 27, 196", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, we hold that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 27, 196?."}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_243_255_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY\n\nCO. LTD.\n\nTHE MUNICIPAL BOARD, SAHARANPUR\n\nMarch 21, 1967\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M. SIKRI AND C. A. VAID!ALINGAM, JJ.]\n\nIndian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886) and Indian Railways Act, 1890 (I of 1890)-N\"r!'ow-gauge railway between Shchdara and Saharanpur----Originally registered as a Tramway under the 1886 Act-Railways Act made applicable to it in 1901-Company whether a 'railway' or a 'tramway' for the purpose of exemption from terminal tax levied by Saharanpur municipality under item 2 of Schedule B to the rules undtr\n\nthe U.P. Municipalities Act I of 1918.\n\nThe appellant company ran a narrow-gauge railway between Shahdara and Saharanpur. As it operated partly within the Municipal area of Saharanpur the Municipal Board of that place sought to subject railway stores and materials brought within the municial area to terminal tax as provided by the Rules framed under the Untied Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended by Act I of 1918. The exemption from terminal tax given to railway stores and materials by item 2 to Schedule B of the said rules was denied to the appellant company on the ground that it was a 'tramway' and not a 'railway'. The company had been originally registered in 1905 under the Indian Tramways Act, 1886, (Act 11 of 1886); in 1907 the whole of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, (Act I of 1890) with the exception of s. 135 bad been extended to the company by the Governor-General-in-Council. The Company's claim that it was a 'railway' entitled to the exemption under item 2 of Schedule B aforesaid, was rejected by the Municipal authorities as well as in appeal, by the Additional District Magistrate. The company therefore filed a writ petition before the High Court which was rejected.\n\nBy special leave appeal was filed to this Court.\n\nIt was cntended on behalf of the appellant that : (i) in the absence\n\nf \"'!Y spcc1~ definition contained in the provisions granting the exemption 1n quesllon, the expression 'railway' occurring in item 2 of Schedule B of the ;!'erm}nal Tax Rules must bear the commonly understood meaning of a cr;1ag~ of passenger and goods, on iron rails\"; (ii) by virtue of the defiml!on m s. 311(2) of the Gcvermnent of India Act 1935 and the provts1on corresponding to it in the Constitution viz Art 366(20) the ppellan!'.~ system though registered under the Traway; ~~· wa\\ a ra1lwa~, (111) the mere fact that s. 135 of the Railways Act . not h een applied to the appellant's system was not a deci, ive factor against t e appella; it a. assumed by the High Court.\n\nIt was not in dispute that appellants system had all the features of a railway.\n\nHELJ? : Neit~r the Municipal Act nor the Terminal Tax Rules give i? secial defimt1on of the expression 'railway' and there is nothing in t e said Ac! or Rules to indicate that the word 'railway' in item 2 of H Schedule B \" usd. only to refer to a 'railway' registered under the Rail- as Ac~ or t~ hm1t the generality of the expre'lsion 'railway' in any way. n er t osc c1rcumstances, if the appe1lant was a 'railway• in fact_ a~ commnly .understood-there did not appear to be any controversy on the pomt-11 would be a railway notwithstanding the fact that it was re- L5Sup. C.1./67---3\n\ngistered as a 'tramway' under the Tramways Act. The legislature itself had applied the 11rovisions of the Railway Act to the appellant, and the appellant also satisfied the definition of a 'railway' under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution. [254B-D]\n\nIf the appellant was a 'railway' otherwise, the mere fact that the provisions of s. 135 of the Railways Act had not been applied to it, was of no consequence.\n\n[251H]\n\nBlackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Company\n\nv. Thornton Urban Council, L.R. [1907] 1 K.B.D. 568, Thornton Urban Council v. Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Company, L.R. [1909] AC. 264 and Tort£nham\n\nUrban Council v. Metropolitan Electric Tramways, Ltd.,\n\nL.R. [1913] A.C. 702, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1323 of 1966.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 10, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 3567 of 1965.\n\nNiren De, Addi. Solicitor-General and N. H. Hingoranl, for D the appellant.\n\nR. K. Garg, D. K. Agarwala and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, 1. In this appeal, by special leave, the short question, that arises for consideration, is as to whether the appellant railway is entitled to claim exemption from payment of terminal tax, under item 2, of Schedule B, of the rules framed by the Municipal Board cif Saharanpur. The appellant will be so entitled, if it is held to be 'a railway', as contended, on behalf of the appellant.\n\nThe High Court of Allahabad, in its order and judgment, under appeal, has held that the appellant is not a railway, but only a tramway and, as such, not eligible for exemption, from the tax, in question. The short facts, leading to this appeal, may now be briefly set out. The appellant is a limited liability company; and it runs a railway, between Shahdara, in Delhi, and Saharanpur, in the State of Uttar Pradesh-a distance of about 95 miles or 148.865 kilo meters. The appellant company also operates within the municipal area of Saharanpur. The company was, originally, registered as a tramway, under the Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (Act XI of 1886) (hereinafter called the Tramways Act), on November 20, 1905.\n\nBy Notification, No. 5752, dated July 5, 1-907, the Governor General in Council extended to the appellant company, the whole of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act I of\n\n1890) (hereinafter called the Railways Act), excepting the provisions of Section 135.\n\nThe Municipal Board of Saharanpur, th.e.first respondent~ in, imposes a terminal tax, under the provmons of s. 128(1)(x111) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended by Act I of 1918. Under the said Act, the first respondent has prohibited the importation of goods, within the local limits of the Saharanpur Municipality, by rail, until the tax leviable thereon, or in respect thereof, has been paid, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Board has also framed rules for the assessment and collection of Terminal Tax, as authorized by the Government Notification No. 856/XI-D.T. 3, dated May l,\n\n1919. The rules have been amended, as per another notification, No. 5965/XI-D.T. 3, dated September 21, 1939.\n\nItem 2, of Schedule B, of. these rules, provides for a list of articles being exempted from payment of Terminal Tax. The said item is as follows :\n\n\"Railway stores and materials, which are required for use on Railways, whether in construction, maintaining or working the same and which are not removed outside the Railway land boundaries but r.ot stores imported into Municipal limits for purchase and consumption by Railway employees nor stores with which Railway Cooperative Stores are stocked for sale to Member.\"\n\nIt is the claim of the appellant that, till 1961, the first respondent has •ever imposed any terminal tax, on 'railway stores and materials' required for use on the railway of the appellant company, for the purposes mentioned in item 2 of Schedule B. But, for the first time, in January 1962, according to the appellant, the first respondent i!llposcd tax on such stores and attempted to make the appellant liable.\n\nThe a_Ppellnt comany protested against this levy, on the\n\ngroud tat, 1t bemg rilway, was entitled to the exemption provided m respect of ra!lway stores and materials which are required for use on railway'.\n\nBut, the first respondent, by its order,\n\ndted October 11, 1962, over-ruled the appellant's objections in this !:gard. .~ appeal~ taken by the appellant company, to the Add1, tt?n~ .District Magistrate, Saharanpur, under s. 160 of the Muruc1paht1es Act, read with the relevant Rules did not meet with success, as the said Magistrate rejected the appeal by his order dated May 25, 1965. '\n\nThe appellant pany filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 3567 H of 1 ?65, m the High Court of Allahabad, challenging the levy of termmal tax an~ claimed exemption, under item 2, of Schedule B, referred to earlier.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, by their judgment, dated September 10, 1965, dismissed\n\nthe writ petition.\n\nThey were of the view that the appellant company was not 'a railway', but 'a tramway' constructed under the Tramways Act.\n\nIn this connection, the learned Judges adverted to the Railways Act, which defines both the terms 'tramway' and 'railway'. It is their view that when a tramway and a railway, are both separately defined in an Act, a tramway cannot also be a railway.\n\nThe learned Judges, of the High Court, then referred to the fact that so far as the appellant company was concerned, the Central Government had not applied s. 135 of the Railways Act, though all the other provisions of that Act had been applied.\n\nThey further held that a mere application of the Railways Act, in whole or in part, to a tramway, will not convert the tramway into a railway and that, in order to be a railway, it has to be opened, in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter IV, of the Railways Act. So, they concluded that, inasmuch as the appellant railway was not opened, in accordance with the provisions of the Railways Act, it had been, from its inception, and it continued to be, not a railway, but only a tramway. On this line of reasoning, the High Court further held that in the rules framed by the Municipal Board, the expression 'railway' must be intended to refer only to 'railways' coming under the Railways Act, and could not include a 'tramway', like the appellant, opened under the Tramways Act. In consequence, the claim of the appellant, for exemption, was, according to the High Court, rightly rejected by the authorities.\n\nThe result was the dismissal of. the appellant's writ petition, by the High Court.\n\nWe shall now refer to the main features of the appellant company. The appellant railway is worked by steam, or other mechanical power, and is not wholly within a Municipal area. The railway line comprises narrow gauge track of 2' 6\" gauge, and consists of main line, transportation sidings and commercial sidings.\n\nThe line passes through four districts viz. Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Delhi, within the provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. The system has about 155 level crossings, comprising of Special Class, A-class, B-class and C-class. Some of the level crossings are provided with signalling and interlocking arrangements and the system takes in 406 bridges, and 26 railway stations, in all.\n\nThe bridges and culverts are maintained, in accordance with the instructions contained in 'Way and Works Manual' of the Indian Railways, and the railway stations are fitted with Morse speakers and instruments, for working trains, as per general rules applicable to all railways. There is annual inspection of the railway line, by the Additional Commissioner of Railways Safety, appointed by the Government, to inspect Indian Railways. There are arrangements for through booking of goods and passengers. From\n\nSHAHDARA RLY. co. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Vazdialingam, J.) 247\n\nwhat is stated above, it will be seen that the appellant company is a 'railway', as commonly understood, and described in ordinary parlance. ·\n\nThe Tramways Act was an Act passed to facilitate the con, struction and to regulate the working of Tramways. Section 3(5} defines 'tramway' as follows :-\n\n\" 'tramway' means a tramway having one, two or more rails, and includes-\n\n(a) any part of a tramway, or any siding, turnout, connection, line or track belonging to a tramway;\n\n(b) any electrical equipment of a tramway; and\n\n(c) any electric supply-line transmitting power from a generating station or sub-station to a tramway or from a generating station to a sub-station from which power is transmitted to a tramway.\" The expression 'order', under s. 3(6), means an order authorizing the construction of a tramway under the Act, and includes a further order substituted for, or amending, extending or varying, that order. There are various other provisions in this Act relating to the construction and maintenance of tramways, orders authorizing the construction of tramways, and other incidental matters.\n\nThe Railways Act was an Act to consolidate, amend and add .to the law relating to Railways in India. Section 3 ( 1) defines 'tramway' as meaning a tramway constructed under the Tramways Act, or any special Act relating to tramways.\n\nSection 3(4) defines 'railways' and is as follows :\n\n\" 'railway' means a railway, or any portion of a railway, for the public carriage of passengers, animals or goods, and includes-\n\n(a) all land within the fences or other bountlarymars indicating the limits of the land appurtenant to a railway; ·\n\n(b) all lines of rails, sidings or branches worked over for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway;\n\n(c) all stations, offices, warehouses wharves workshops, manufactorics, fixed plant and' machinery and\n\nothe~ wors constructed for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway; and\n\n~ d) all ferries, ships, boats and rafts which are used on mland waters for the purposes of the traffic of a rail- ay and. ~Ion~ to or are hired or worked by the authority adm1mstermg the railway.\"\n\nThis Act also contains various provisions relating to the opening of railways, inspection of railways, construction and maintenance of works, working of railways and i; everal other incidental matters.\n\nSection 135, occurring in Chapter X, containing supplemental provisions, relates to taxation of railways by local authorities. That section reads : . \"135. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment, or in any agreement or award based on any enactment, the following rules shall regulate the levy of taxes in respect of railways and from railway administrations in aid of the funds of local authorities, namely :-\n\n(1) A railway administration shall not be liable to pay any tax in aid of the funds of any local authority unless the Central Government has, by notification in the Official Gazette, declared the railway administration to be liable to pay the tax. r. (2), While a notification of the Central Governinent under clause (1) of this section is in force, the railway administration shall be liable to pay to the local authority either the tax mentioned in the notification or, in lieu thereof, such sum, .if any, as an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government may, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, from time to time determine to be fair and reasonable.\n\n(3) The Central Government may at any time revoke or vary a notification under clause (1) of this section.\n\n(4) Nothing in this section is to be construed as debarring any railway administration from entering into a contract with any local authority for the supply of water or light, or for the scavenging of railway premises, or for any other service which the local authority may be rendering or be prepared to render within any part of the local area under its control.\n\n(5) 'Local authority' in this section means a local authority as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1887, and includes any authority legally entitled to or entrusted with the control or management of any fund fot the maintenance of watchmen or for the conservancy of a river.\" • The point to be noted, in this provision, is that unless a notification has been issued by the Central Government, under sub-s. (1) of s. 135, declaring a railway administration to be liable to pay a tax, a railway administration shall not be liable to pay any tax in\n\naid of the funds of any local authority. Section 146, giving power to the Government to extend the Railways Act to certain tramways, is as follows :\n\n\"146. (1) This Act or any portion thereof may be extended by notification in the Official Gaz.ette :-\n\n(a) to any tramway which is wholly within a municipal area or which is declared not to be a railway under clause (20) of article 366 of the Constitution, by the State Government; and\n\n(b) to any other tramway, by the Central Government.\n\n(2) This section does not apply to any tramway not worked by steam or other mechanical power.\"\n\nWe have already pointed out that all the provisions of the Railways Act, except s. 135, have been extended to the appellant company.\n\nThe next enactment to be referred to is the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895 (Act X of 1895), which provided for the payment, by railway companies, registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, of interest out of capital during construction.\n\nSection 2(1) defines 'railway' as meaning a railway as defined in s. 3, cl. ( 4) of the Railways Act. Section 3 provided for a railway company paying interest on its paid-up share capital, out of capital, for the period, and subject to the conditions and restrictions contained in that section.\n\nThere are other consequential provisions, in this Act.\n\nThe Indian Tramways Act, 1902 (Act IV of 1902) was one to apply the provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895, to certain tramway companies. The preamble to this Act IV of 1902, stated that it was expedient to apply the provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895, to companies formed for the construction of tramways 'not differing in structure and working from light railways'.\n\nThis preamble will clearly show that, even as early as 1902, the Legislature considered that though certain systems were called 'tramways', substantially they did not differ, in structure and working, from light railways.\n\nThe expression 'railway' is defined, in s. 311 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, as follows :-\n\n\" 'railway' includes a tramway not wholly within a municipal area.\"\n\nIt is to be noted that if a system, though a tramway, is wholly not within a municipal area, that system will be a 'railway'. Entry\n\n58, of List I (Federal List) of the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act, was: . ·~Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air; taxes on railway fares and freights.\" . It is, again, .to be noted, that under this Entry, in respect of a\n\ntrway, which is not wholly within a municipal area and which will, therefore, be a 'railway', under s. 311 (2), the levy of terminal tax on goods or passengers carried by such a system, will be within the competence of the Federal Legislature.\n\nUnder Art. 366(20) of the Constitution, the expression 'rail way' is dealt with, as follows :\n\n\" 'railway' does not include-\n\n(a) a tramway wholly within a municipal area, or\n\n(b) any other line of communication wholly situate in one State and declared by Parliament by law not to be a railway.\" It may be noted here that the appellant's system does not come within the exclusions mentioned in els. (a) or (b) of this definition.\n\nEntry 89 of List I (Union List), of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, is as follows :\n\n\"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights.\" It may be noted that the competent legislative body to levy terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by the appellant's system, which will be a 'railway', under Art. 366(20), is the Parliament.\n\nThe only other Act to be referred to is the Railways (Local Authorities' Taxation) Act, 1941(ActXXVof1941), which was an Act to regulate the extent to which railway -property shall be liable to taxation imposed by an authority.\n\nSection 3(1) of that Act provided that a railway administration shall be liable to pay any tax in aid of the funds of any local authority, if the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, declared it to be so liable. Section 4 provided for the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, revoking or varying any notification issued under s. 135(1) of the Railways Act.\n\nThe learned Additional Solicitor-General, appearing for the appellant, pointed out that the expression 'railway' had not been defined in the United Provinces Municipalities Act, or in the Terminal Tax .Rules. In the absence of any special definition contained in the provisions, granting the exemption, in question, the expression 'railway', occurring in item 2, of Schedule B, of the Terminal Tax Rules, must bear the commonly understood meaning of 'a carriage of passenger and goods, on iron rails'. By virtue of the definition, ins. 311(2) of the 1935 Act, and the provision,\n\n11'\n\ncorresponding to it, in the Constitution, viz., Art. 366(20), the appellant's system, though registered under the Tramways Act, was a railway. The mere fact that s. 135, of the Railways Act, had not been applied to the appellant's system, is not a decisive factor against the appellant, as had been assumed by the High Court. In view of the various features of the appellant's system, and pointed out by us earlier, it is argued that the appellant's system is a 'railway', both in law and in fact. It satisfies all the ingredients of a railway and, if that is so, the appellants are entitled to the exemption provided for, under item 2 of Schedule B, of the Terminal Tax Rules.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Board, pressed before us for acceptance the various reasons, given by the High Court, for holding that the appellant is not entitled to claim the exemption. In particular, counsel pointed out that there were two different enactments, one dealing with 'tramways' and the other with 'railways', being the Tramways Act and the Railways Act, respectively. Therefore, there were two different systems, under two different names, namely 'tramways' a11d 'railways', which was clearly known to the authorities concerned at the time when the Terminal Tax Rules were framed, and so when the expression 'railway' was used in the exemption clause, it must have been the intention of the framers of the Rules to bring, within its ambit, only the 'railways' constructed under the Railways Act. The appellant's system, though called a 'railway' and though it might have all the features of a railway, it is pointed out, nevertheless, that inasmuch as it has been constructed under a different enactment, viz., the Tramways Act, it cannot be treated as a 'railway' for the purposes of the exemption. Counsel also stressed that s. 135 of the Railways Act had not been applied te> the appellant.\n\n. We are not impressed with the approach made by the learned Judges of the High Court, for negativing the claim for exemption, made by the appellant. It must be borne in mind that the expression 'railway' has not been defined either in the concerned Municipalities Act, or the Rules; if such is the case, the definition must hold the field.\n\nGoing by the definition of the expression 'railway', co111ained in s. 311 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the corresponding provision in Art. 366(20) of the Constitution, the appellant's system is a 'railway'.\n\nAll the provisions of the Railways Act have been extended to the appellant, excepting s. 135. In our opinion, if the appellant is a 'ra!lway', otherwise, the mere fact that the provisions of s. 135, of the Railways Act, have not been applied, is of no consequence. We have already referred to the fact, which is not in dispute, that the appellant's railway passes through four districts in U.P. and\n\n252 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nDelhi,. and that it has got all the features of a.railway, as ordinarily understood.\n\nIn this connection, we may refer to certain English decisions, where the claim, made on behalf of a system, for being taxed at a concessional rate, had come up for consideration.\n\nIn Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Company v. Thornton Urban Council('), the Court of Appeal had to consider as to how far the Blackpool & Fleetwood Tramroad Company, the appellant before them, was entitled to the assessment, at a lower\n\nrate under s. 2ll(l)(b), of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Viet. c. 55). The material portion of that section was :\n\n\"the occupier of any land . . . used only as a canal . . . or as a railway, constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament, for public conveyance, shall be assessed in respect of the same in the proportion of one-fourth. part only of the net annual value thereof.\" The question was as to whether the appellant, in that case, was a 'railway', to whom the said provision would apply.\n\nThe appellant company had constructed and maintained a tramroad connecting two systems of tramways, under the local Acts of 1896 and 1898. Various provisions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, had been applied to the tramroad.\n\nThe tramroad, in that case, was on r11ils laid on sleepers, fenced off from adjoining land, excepting at the level crossings of roads.\n\nThe Divisional Court had rejected the claim of the appellant; but the Court of Appeal held that the tramroad was land 'used only as a railway constructed under the power of an Act of Parliament for public conveyance', within the meaning of s. 211(1)(b) of the Public Health Act, 1875, and that the company was, consequent ly, entitled to be assessed, in respect of the said 'railway', at onefourth of its net annual value. The appellants contended that the tramroad was and could only be worked as a railway and was, in fact and in law, used as a railway, and, in consequence, they urged that the tramroad, maintained by them, is 'land' used only as a railway. The Court of Appeal noted that the rails were raised ai;:td laid on sleepers, just as a railway is laid, and that was the main distinction between the appellant's system, and a tramway, which ran along public streets and in grooved rails.\n\nNo doubt, it was pointed out for the Urban Council, that the appellant company had been incorporated under the Tramways Act and the very fact that certain provisioru of the bilway Clauses Consolidation Act were applied to the appellant's system showed that the appellant was not a railway.\n\nThe Court of Appeal held that it was impossible to distinguish the piece of tramroad, owned by the\n\n(I) L. R. (1907] I K.B.ri. S68.\n\nSHAHDARA llLY. co. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Vazdialingam, /.) 253\n\nappellants, from a railway and that the exemption provided for in the Public Health Act applied to the trarnroad of the appellants as it would, to any ordinary railroad passing through parts where it was not deriving the full benefit from the district rates in those parts. The Court of Appeal also rejected the contention of the\n\nUrban Council that the tramroad, owned by the appellants could be treated as a 'railway' only for particular purposes, and not for the purpose of claiming the exemption under the Public Health Act; because, according to the Court of Appe~. a reading of s. 211 ( 1) (b) of the Public Health Act, showed that it applied to land used as a railway, i.e., constructed as a railway in fact.\n\nThis decision was taken up in further appeal, before the House of Lords, whose decision is reported as Thornton Urban Council v. Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Compan, y('), and the decision of the Court of Appeal was confirmed. In the course of the judgment, after referring to s. 211 of the Public Health Act, Lord Macnaghten observed, at p. 267 :\n\n\"Now it cannot be denied that the rails on which the tramcars run, with the embankment or foundation on which they rest, and everything that supports them, do form a road or way, and that that road or way was constructed under parliamentary powers for public conveyance. Is it 'a railway' ? There is nothing in the Public Health Act, 1875, or in the earlier Acts, in which the same provision is found, to confine the word 'railway' as used in those Acts to a particular kind of railway, or to limit the generality of the expression in any way.\"\n\nHis Lordship, further observed at p. 268 :\n\n\"It seems to me that if it is a railway in fact, not differing from other railways in any material particular, it is nonetheless a railways because the promoters in their special Act chose to call it a 'tramroad' -a very convenient term to use for the title of their Act and the name under which they sought incorporation. Nor is it the less a railway because some only of the sections of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act are incorporated in the special Act, or because, if one did not know what the thing really was, the language used for the purpose of applying the sections which are incorporated might seem to import that it was not, properly speaking, a railway at all. You must look at the special Act to see that it confers the appropriate powers of construction. Everything else in the Act is, I think, beside the question which this House has now to determine.\"\n\n(1) L.R. [1909] A.C. 264.\n\nIn our opinion, the observations of the House of Lords, extracted above,. are apposite, to the case on hand.\n\nWe have. already pointed out that neither the Municipal Act, nor the TeriJlinal Tax Rules give any special 'definition of the expression 'railway', and, so far as we could see, there is. nothing in the said Apt or the Rules to indicate that the word 'railway', in item 2 of Schedule B, is used only to refer to a 'railway' registered under the Railways Act or to limit the generality of the expression 'railway' in any way, Under those circumstances, if the appellant is a 'railway' in fact,' as commonly understood-there does not appear to be any serious controversy on that point-it will be a 'railway', notwithstanding the fact that it is registered as a 'tramway', under the Tramways Act.\n\nThe legislature itself has applied the various provisions of the Railways Act to the appellant, and the appellant also satisfies the definition of a 'railway' under the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution. The provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895, have also been applied to the tramways constructed, under the Tramways Act, by the Indian Tramway Act of 1902. The second preamble to the last mentioned Act, clearly shows that the tramways, to which the Indian Railway Companies Act was made applicable, 'do not differ in structure and working from railways'.\n\nThe object underlying the exemption under item' 2, of Schedule B, to the Terminal Tax Rules, is also not far to seek. The railways pass through areas where it is not deriving the full benefit of all the amenities provided by the Municipal Boards. Therefore, in our opinion, the appellant satisfies the definition of a 'railway', so as to be entitled to the exemption provided under item 2 of Schedule B.\n\nBefore we close the discussion, we will also refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Tottenham Urban Council v. Metropolitan Electric Tramways, Ltd. ( 1). The same question regarding the eligibilty of a 'tramway' for exemption, under s. 21l(l)(b) of the Public Health Act, 1875, came up for consideration in that case. From the judgment, it will be seen that the company were working, as a connected system, a tramway and a light railway, which were constructed in and along certain public streets and roads, in the district of the urban Council. The 'tramway' was constructed under'the Tramway Acts and Orders and the 'railway,' under the Light Railways Act, 1896. Both were iden'tical as to the mode of construction and materials used.\n\nThe claim of the company in respect of the 'railway', as such, for assessment at a lower rate, was accepted; but, so far as the 'tramway' was concerned, the House of Lords held that it is not a 'railway', within the meaning of s. 21 l(l)(b), of the Public Health Act, 1875. The\n\n(ll L. R. [1913) A. C. 712.\n\n&HAHDARA RLY. co. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD (Vaidialingam, 1.) 255\n\nreason given by the House of Lords, for not accepting the claim of the tramway, was that in the great bulk of public legislation, relating to railways, the legislation has universally been understood and interpreted by Courts as applying only to that which is popularly known as a 'railway', and not to that which is popularly known as a 'tramway'. And special emphasis is laid by the House of Lords that the legislature has used the word 'railways' and not 'railways and tramways', in s. 211 of the Public Health Act, 1875.\n\nWe are only adverting to this decision to show that, on the basis of an interpretation placed by the Courts, the House of Lords held that the word 'railways', in the Public Health Act, 1875, will not take in 'tramways'. But, no such circumstances, as pointed out by the House of Lords, in the said decision, exist in the present case before us. On the other hand, the position is exactly tbe opposite, as will be seen from the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution. Even applying the popular test, adopted by the House of Lords, in this case, the appellant is undoubtedly a 'railway'.\n\nIn our opinion, the principles laid down by the House of Lords in Thornton Urban Council v. Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Company('), apply to the particular matter on hand and, we hold that the appellant, being a 'railway', is entitled to the exemption under item 2, of Schedule B, to the Terminal Tax Rules, in question.\n\nWe, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court, and further direct that a writ will issue, as prayed for by the appellant. The appellant will be entitled. to its costs, from the first respondent, both in this Court and in the High Court.\n\nG. C.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) L. R. [1909) A. C. 264.", "total_entities": 134, "entities": [{"text": "SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY\n\nCO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE MUNICIPAL BOARD, SAHARANPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MUNICIPAL BOARD, SAHARANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE MUNICIPAL BOARD, SAHARANPUR\n\nMarch 21, 1967\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M. SIKRI AND C. A. VAID!ALINGAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Tramways Act, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shchdara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 273, "end_char": 281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886) and Indian Railways Act, 1890 (I of 1890)-N\"r!'ow-gauge railway between Shchdara and Saharanpur----Originally registered as a Tramway under the 1886 Act-Railways Act made applicable to it in 1901-Company whether a 'railway' or a 'tramway' for the purpose of exemption from terminal tax levied by Saharanpur municipality under item 2 of Schedule B to the rules undtr\n\nthe U.P. Municipalities Act I of 1918."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 354, "end_char": 366, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act I of 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shahdara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company ran a narrow-gauge railway between Shahdara and Saharanpur."}}, {"text": "Saharanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company ran a narrow-gauge railway between Shahdara and Saharanpur."}}, {"text": "Indian Tramways Act, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1334, "end_char": 1359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "s. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Gcvermnent of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 366(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gcvermnent of India Act 1935", "statute": "the Gcvermnent of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2421, "end_char": 2427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gcvermnent of India Act 1935", "statute": "the Gcvermnent of India Act 1935"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2447, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3596, "end_char": 3602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3622, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4120, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 10, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No."}}, {"text": "Niren De", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niren De, Addi."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingoranl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4226, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General and N. H. Hingoranl, for D the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4265, "end_char": 4275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. K. Agarwala and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. K. Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4277, "end_char": 4291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. K. Agarwala and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, D. K. Agarwala and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, 1."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4782, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad, in its order and judgment, under appeal, has held that the appellant is not a railway, but only a tramway and, as such, not eligible for exemption, from the tax, in question."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5141, "end_char": 5146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a limited liability company; and it runs a railway, between Shahdara, in Delhi, and Saharanpur, in the State of Uttar Pradesh-a distance of about 95 miles or 148.865 kilo meters."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a limited liability company; and it runs a railway, between Shahdara, in Delhi, and Saharanpur, in the State of Uttar Pradesh-a distance of about 95 miles or 148.865 kilo meters."}}, {"text": "Indian Tramways Act, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 20, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was, originally, registered as a tramway, under the Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (Act XI of 1886) (hereinafter called the Tramways Act), on November 20, 1905."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1-907", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5752, dated July 5, 1-907, the Governor General in Council extended to the appellant company, the whole of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act I of\n\n1890) (hereinafter called the Railways Act), excepting the provisions of Section 135."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5692, "end_char": 5704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Saharanpur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Board of Saharanpur, th.e.first respondent~ in, imposes a terminal tax, under the provmons of s. 128(1)(x111) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended by Act I of 1918."}}, {"text": "s. 128(1)(x111)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5880, "end_char": 5921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Saharanpur Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the said Act, the first respondent has prohibited the importation of goods, within the local limits of the Saharanpur Municipality, by rail, until the tax leviable thereon, or in respect thereof, has been paid, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules."}}, {"text": "May l,\n\n1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6382, "end_char": 6394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "856/XI-D.T. 3, dated May l,\n\n1919."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5965/XI-D.T. 3, dated September 21, 1939."}}, {"text": "s. 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7863, "end_char": 7869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Judges adverted to the Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges, of the High Court, then referred to the fact that so far as the appellant company was concerned, the Central Government had not applied s. 135 of the Railways Act, though all the other provisions of that Act had been applied."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges adverted to the Railways Act", "statute": "Judges adverted to the Railways Act"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8911, "end_char": 8923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "They further held that a mere application of the Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8988, "end_char": 9049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9253, "end_char": 9265, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9383, "end_char": 9395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9680, "end_char": 9692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10366, "end_char": 10379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Delhi, within the provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi."}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10381, "end_char": 10387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Delhi, within the provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10827, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bridges and culverts are maintained, in accordance with the instructions contained in 'Way and Works Manual' of the Indian Railways, and the railway stations are fitted with Morse speakers and instruments, for working trains, as per general rules applicable to all railways."}}, {"text": "s. 3(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12478, "end_char": 12483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Railways Act was an Act to consolidate, amend and add .to the law relating to Railways in India."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12485, "end_char": 12494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Governinent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r. (2), While a notification of the Central Governinent under clause (1) of this section is in force, the railway administration shall be liable to pay to the local authority either the tax mentioned in the notification or, in lieu thereof, such sum, .if any, as an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government may, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, from time to time determine to be fair and reasonable."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15288, "end_char": 15313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15623, "end_char": 15629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1887", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1887", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15856, "end_char": 15868, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16131, "end_char": 16142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1887", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "have already pointed out that all the provisions of the Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16347, "end_char": 16415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16424, "end_char": 16430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already pointed out that all the provisions of the Railways Act", "statute": "We have already pointed out that all the provisions of the Railways Act"}}, {"text": "next enactment to be referred to is the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16482, "end_char": 16556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16649, "end_char": 16675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16726, "end_char": 16738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16792, "end_char": 16796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16814, "end_char": 16826, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16828, "end_char": 16837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Indian Tramways Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17082, "end_char": 17107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17327, "end_char": 17361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17742, "end_char": 17748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "statute": "the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17760, "end_char": 17789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18044, "end_char": 18060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18360, "end_char": 18366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 366(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18511, "end_char": 18523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18761, "end_char": 18771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "366(20) of the Constitution, the expression 'rail way' is dealt with, as follows :\n\n\" 'railway' does not include-\n\n(a) a tramway wholly within a municipal area, or\n\n(b) any other line of communication wholly situate in one State and declared by Parliament by law not to be a railway.\""}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18976, "end_char": 18992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 366(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19308, "end_char": 19320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19571, "end_char": 19583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19807, "end_char": 19816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19945, "end_char": 19954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19962, "end_char": 19974, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 366(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20610, "end_char": 20622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20724, "end_char": 20730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20739, "end_char": 20751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21264, "end_char": 21268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Board, pressed before us for acceptance the various reasons, given by the High Court, for holding that the appellant is not entitled to claim the exemption."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21639, "end_char": 21651, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22081, "end_char": 22093, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22426, "end_char": 22432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22440, "end_char": 22452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22903, "end_char": 22909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22921, "end_char": 22950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 366(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22987, "end_char": 22999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "All the provisions of the Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23061, "end_char": 23099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23147, "end_char": 23153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All the provisions of the Railways Act", "statute": "All the provisions of the Railways Act"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23252, "end_char": 23258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All the provisions of the Railways Act", "statute": "All the provisions of the Railways Act"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23267, "end_char": 23279, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23451, "end_char": 23455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the fact, which is not in dispute, that the appellant's railway passes through four districts in U.P. and\n\n252 SUPREME COURT llEPOllTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nDelhi,."}}, {"text": "Blackpool & Fleetwood Tramroad Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23901, "end_char": 23939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramroad Company v. Thornton Urban Council('), the Court of Appeal had to consider as to how far the Blackpool & Fleetwood Tramroad Company, the appellant before them, was entitled to the assessment, at a lower\n\nrate under s. 2ll(l)(b), of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Viet."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24023, "end_char": 24027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All the provisions of the Railways Act", "statute": "All the provisions of the Railways Act"}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24044, "end_char": 24067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Various provisions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24664, "end_char": 24730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 211(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25143, "end_char": 25155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Various provisions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845", "statute": "Various provisions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845"}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25163, "end_char": 25186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26222, "end_char": 26225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26874, "end_char": 26880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27288, "end_char": 27294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27326, "end_char": 27336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the judgment, after referring to s. 211 of the Public Health Act, Lord Macnaghten observed, at p. 267 :\n\n\"Now it cannot be denied that the rails on which the tramcars run, with the embankment or foundation on which they rest, and everything that supports them, do form a road or way, and that that road or way was constructed under parliamentary powers for public conveyance."}}, {"text": "is nothing in the Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27657, "end_char": 27698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29309, "end_char": 29321, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29724, "end_char": 29736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29828, "end_char": 29857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29885, "end_char": 29937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30158, "end_char": 30171, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tottenham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30747, "end_char": 30756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, in our opinion, the appellant satisfies the definition of a 'railway', so as to be entitled to the exemption provided under item 2 of Schedule B.\n\nBefore we close the discussion, we will also refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Tottenham Urban Council v. Metropolitan Electric Tramways, Ltd. ( 1)."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30896, "end_char": 30901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895", "statute": "The provisions of the Indian Railway Companies Act, 1895"}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30916, "end_char": 30939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Light Railways Act, 1896", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31302, "end_char": 31326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31628, "end_char": 31633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Light Railways Act, 1896", "statute": "the Light Railways Act, 1896"}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31650, "end_char": 31673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32256, "end_char": 32262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Public Health Act, 1875", "statute": "the Public Health Act, 1875"}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32270, "end_char": 32293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Public Health Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32462, "end_char": 32485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32723, "end_char": 32752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_256_262_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "JAGIR SINGH\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMarch 21, 1967 [R. $. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.j\n\nIndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860). s. 34-Two convicted, other accused acquitted-Applicability.\n\nThe two appellants and four other named persons were charged for murder. The Sessions Judge acquitted the four persons but sentenced\n\nthe two appellants under ss. 302 and 201 read with s. 149 I.P.C. The High Court altered the convictions to those under ss. 302 and 201 read c with s. 34. In appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : The appeal. must be dismissed.\n\nWhere six named accused persons are charged under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder and the evidence is directed to establish that the said six persons have taken part in the murdrice was to. b~ credited as income.\n\nI~ the appeal to the Appellate Asststant CommtsSIOner and the Tribunal, the view taken by the Income-tax Officer on both the points was substantially ipheld However, upon a reference, the High Court held in favour of tl1e res: pondent company.\n\n1 I~ the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the Income ax epartment that (i) the expenditure incur d · - development of plots previously sold b th fi re m connectio\". with the s. J0(2)(xv) as the lands already sd b [h' ws not deductible under trade of the respondent com an . d Y e rm w.ere not. stock-1nthc price paid by the rcspnd~· tan that furthermore, It was hkely that dated July 7 1948 to the fi n company under the contract of sale of the firm had been fixed e{ 0; aakm~ over the assets and liabilities the development of such lots th mg mto acount the obligation for these obligation must therefore •be e tt ~pt\"'des incurred . in discharge of the respondent company's b . a n e to the capital structure of\n\noligation incurred in connecti~nlth ah could . not be considered an\n\n(n) part of the consideration e car'l'.mg ?n of its business; who had bought the plots money not received m cash from those was treated as a loan to the purchaser for\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1967] 3 S.C.RI\n\nwhich the plot sold was mortgaged in favour of the respondent company and as such should be treated as a constructive receipt liable to be in cluded in the profits of the respondent company derived during the respective accounting years.\n\nHELD: Dismissing the appeal,\n\n(i) It is not a right approach to examine the question as if all reve nue expenditure must be equated with expenditure in connection with B stock-in-trade.\n\nIn the present case, the sale deed dated July 7, 1948 showed that the respondent company purchased from the firm a whole running business with all its goodwill and stock-in-trade and including its liabilities. It could not be said that the respondent company had nothing to do with the lands already sold which did not form part of its stock-in-trade. The development of the entire land sold in plots was an integrated process and could not be sub-divided into water-tight com partment or related to any !?articular piece of land. Furthermore, the\n\nC entire expenditure was required to be incurred as a matter of commercial expediency.. [269A-EJ\n\nEastern Investments Ltd. v.\n\nC.l.T. 20 l.T.R. I; Cooke (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Quick Shoe Repair Service, 30 T.C. 460; referred to.\n\nThere was nothing to show that the obligation under the sale deed D to complete the development work on the plots sold by the firm was quantified and formed part of the total consideration paid by the res pondent company. [2700)\n\nRoyal Insurance Company v. Watson (Surveyor of Taxes) 3 T.C. 500 distinguished.\n\nCon1n1issioner of lncon1e-tax (Central), Calcutta. v.\n\nMugneera1n 1t Bangur & Co. (Land Department) 51 l.T.R. 299; referred to.\n\n(ii) The execution of the mortgage deeds by the purchasers of plots in respect of the balance of the consideration money could not be treated as equivalent to payment of cash. It cannot be said that the mere giving of security for the debt by the purchaser was tantamount to payment. The amount of consideration not received and which the purchasers agreed to pay in future for which plots were mortgaged in F favour. of the respondent company, could not therefore be considered to be taxable income for the assessment periods in question. [271DFl\n\nCo1n1nis.fioner of Jnco1ne-tax, Bi/Jar & Orissa v.\n\nMaharojadhiraja of Darbhanga, 60 I.A. 146; referred to.\n\nCIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 169 and 170 of 1966.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 4, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 57 of 1958.\n\nS. K. Mitra, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appetlants (in both the appeals).\n\nA. K. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 4, 1962 in Income-Tax Reference No. 57 of 195 8.\n\nThe respondent company purchased the assets and liabilities of the firm, Mugneeram Bangur & Co., (Land Department), hereinafter referred to as the 'firm', on July 7, 1948 for a consideration of Rs. 34,99,300/-. The consideration was paid by the issue of shares to the vendor or its nominees in the share capital of the respondent company.\n\nThe assets included land at cost, Rs. 12,68,268/- as also goodwill and certain other assets subject to certain liabilities incurred by the firm. By the time the respondent company took over the land, the firm had sold a number of plots in respect of which part of the consideration money had been realised and for the balance Mortgage Bonds had been executed by the purchaser. In respect of those plots there was an undertaking to Jay out roads, etc. The respondent company took over the debts as well as the liabilities. After the purchase, the respondent company itself sold certain other plots. The purchaser paid a percentage of the price in cash and undertook to pay the balance with interest at a specified rate in annual instalments which was secured by creating a charge on the land purchased. The sales made by the respondent company were in all material respects similar to the sales made by the firm.\n\nA specimen copy of the sale deeds executed by the firm of the respondent company is Annexure 'A• to the Statement of the Case. The relevant provisions of the sale deed are as follows :\n\n\" .... And whereas the said Vendor hath agreed with the Purchaser to sell him the said land .... hereunder written at the rate of price or sum of Rs. 3,000/- per cotta free from all encumbrances. And Whereas the total amount of price payable in respect of the said plot .... at the rate aforesaid amounts to Rs. 8,708-5-6. And Whereas at the treaty for sale it was agreed by and between the parties hereto that one-third or thereabout of the total, price will be paid at the time of execution of these presents and the payment of the balance will be secured in the manner hereinafter appearing. Now This Indenture Witnesseth that in pursuance of the said Agreement and in consideration of the sum of Rs. 8, 708-5-6 whereof the sum of Rs. 2,908-5-6 of lawful money of India to the said Vendor in hand well and truly paid by the Purchaser at or before the execution of these presents (the receipt whereof the said Vendor doth hereby as well as by receipt hereunder written admit and acknowledge) and the payment of the balance namely the\n\nsum of Rs. 5,800/- being secured under a security deed of even date with these presents and executed by the Purchaser in favour of the Vendor creating First Charge upon the said land .... \";\n\n\" ... And the said Vendor shall at all costs complete the construction of the said twenty-five feet wide road on the North of the said plot No. 35A and will also lay out the said surface drains by the side of the said road within a year from the date hereof and will maintain the said road and drains in proper state or repairs and shall arrange for lighting the said roads with electric light till the same are taken over by Tollygunge Municipality ...... \"; and,\n\n\" Memo of Consideration By amount paid as earnest. money on 5th August, 1948\n\nBy Cheque (pari) No. 6985706\n\non The Bank of India Ltd., on 30th January, 1949.\n\nBy amount secured under Security Deed of even date being these presents and executed by the Purchaser in favour of Vendor.\n\nRs. 501.0.0\n\nRs. 2,407.5.6\n\nRs. 5,800.0.0\n\nRs. 8,708.5.6\"\n\nA specimen copy of the mortgage deeds is Annexure 'B' to the Statement of the Case. The relevant provisions of the said F Mortgage Deed are to the following effect :-\n\n\" ... and by the said Indenture of Conveyance it was provided that the payment of the balance of the consideration money, namely, the sum of Rs. 5,800/- owing by the said mortgagor to the said mortgagee should be secured by an Indenture of Security Deed of even date G being these presents to be executed by the said mortgagor in favour of the said mortgagee immediately after the execution of Conveyance now in recital. Now this Indenture Witnesseth and declares as follows :-(!) In consideration of the said premises the said mortgagor doth hereby covenant with the said mortgagee that the H said mortgagor will pay to the said mortgagee the said sum of Rs. 5,800/- within ten years to be computed from the date of these presents together with interest thereon\n\nA at the rate of 8 % per annum calculated from the date of these presents upto the date of payment payable monthly .... \"\n\nWe are concerned in this case with the assessment of the respondent company for two periods.\n\nThe first period is the accounting year ending June 30, 1949 corresponding to the assessment year 1950-51 and the second period is the accounting year ending June 30, 1950 corresponding to assessment year 1951-52.\n\nFor the assessment year 1950-51, the respondent company was maintaining its accounts in the mercantile system. According to this system, the value of the land sold was credited at Rs. 373,375/- against which the unpaid balance was debited in the debtors' account and shown under the heading \"book debts considered good-secured against mortgage of land\". Against this sale, there was an item of expenses aggregating to Rs. 2,77,047 /- of which the actual expenses paid out in cash was Rs. 1,12,577 /- and the estimated expenses against future development was Rs. 1,44,470/-.\n\nOut of the actual expenses paid out in cash amounting to Rs. 1,12,577/-, a sum of Rs. 48,238/- was expended for lands sold by the respondent company and a sum of Rs. 64,340/- for expenses incurred by the respondent company on account of land already sold by the vendor.\n\nAs already stated, the accounts were kept in the account books of the respondent company on a mercantile system, for this period.\n\nLater on, the respondent company adjusted its accounts on a cash system and submitted a revised return showing a loss of Rs. 11,583/-. The Income-tax Officer, in assessing the income for the assessment year 1950-51, originally accepted the cash basis and computed the income. On appeal, the assessment was set aside and the case was remitted to the Income-tax Officer for a fresh assessment. In this fresh assessment, the Income-tax Officer adopted the mercantile basis on which the books of the respondent company had actually been kept.\n\nThereafter, the Income-tax Officer allowed the sum of Rs. 48,238/- which was the expenses actually incurred by the respondent company in respect of the lands sold by it but disallowed the sum of Rs. 64,340/- which was the expenditure in respect of the lands which had already been sold by the firm before the respondent company's purchase.\n\nWith regard to the sale price of the plots, the Income-tax Officer held that the entire amount of consideration was to be treated as income, though only a portion of the consi deration was realised in cash and the other portion was left outstanding after taking a mortgage on the plots sold from the purchaser as security. With regard to the next assessment year, 1951-52, the respondent company kept its accounts on the cash system and not on mercantile system.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer however held that for this assessment year also the amount of unrealised purchase price for the plots sold should be treated as\n\nincome.\n\nAs regards expenses, the Income-taic Officer allowed a sum of Rs. 56,953/- being the expenditure in respect of the lands actually sold by the respondent company but disallowed the amount of Rs. 87,517/- being the expenses incurred in respect of the lands already sold by the firm when the respondent company took over. Against the orders of the Income-tax Officer the respondent company preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who dismissed the appeals by a consolidated order dated November 7, 1956.\n\nThe respondent company thereafter took the matter in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The view taken by the Appellate Tribunal was .that the Income-tax Officer should have made the assessment on the basis of cash system for the year 1951-52 and for that year only the cash receipts and disbursements should be considered. With regard to the question of unrealised consideration-money, the Appella~ Tribunal held that for both the assessment years the unrealised consideration should be treated as income. With regard to expenses incurred, the Appellate Tribunal upheld the finding of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIn other words, for both the assessment years it was held that the expenses incurred in respect of lands already sold before the respondent company took over should be disallowed. At the instance of the respondent company the Appellate Tribunal stated a case to the High Court on the following questions of law :\n\n\"1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the entire sums of Rs. l, 12,577 /- and Rs. 3,43,155/- for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951- 52 respectively spent in c; mying out the obligations subject to which lands were sold by the assessee were allowable in computing the assessee's profits from the land business.\n\n2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the assessee was liable to be taxed only on the actual realisation of sales in cash subject to the allowances admissible under the Indian Income-tax Act ?\" By its judgment dated December 4, 1962 the High Court answered both the questions in favour of the respondent company.\n\nWith respect to the first question it was submitted by Mr.\n\nG Mitra that only the expenditure incurred in the relevant accounting year in connection with the lands sold by the respondent company should have been allowed and not the expenditure incurred in connection with the lands sold by the vendor-firm previously. It was not disputed by Mr. Mitra that under the terms of the contract between the vendor-firm and the respondent company the latter was H bound to meet the obligations of the development of land previously sold by the firm, but the contention was that the lands already sold by the firm were not stock-in-trade of the respondent company. It\n\nc.1.T. v. AMALGAMATED DEVELOPMENT LTD. (Ramaswaml, J.) 269'\n\nwas said that expenditure not incurred in connection with stock-in,- trade of the business of the respondent-company is not deductible; under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. We are unable to ac-- cept this argument as correct. It is not, in our opinion, a right approach to examine the question as if all revenue expenditure must be equated with expenditure in connection with the stockin-trade. In the present case, the sale deed dated July 7, 1948 shows that the respondent-company purchased from the firm a whole running business with all its goodwill and stock-in-trade and including its liabilities. The respondent-company had taken over undeveloped land and the idea was to develop the same by making roads, installing a drainage system, street lighting, etc., and then selling the same in small plots at a profit. The principal inducement therefore for the purchasers was that the respondent-company would develop the land and the purchasers 'would be able to pay by instalments spread over a number of years. At the time the respondent-company took over the lands a portion thereof had already been sold by the firm but the development had not been completed and in the sale deeds entered into by the respondentcompany with the subsequent purchasers the respondent-company expressly undertook the liability to complete the development within a reasonable time. The argument that the respondent-company had nothing to do with the lands already sold which did not form part of its stock-in-trade is not correct. In the present case, the development of the entire land is an integrated process and cannot be sub-divided into water-tight compartments as the making of the roads and the provisions for drainage and street lighting, etc., cannot be related to any particular piece of land but the development has to be made as a whole as a complete and unified scheme. It is a case of commercial expediency and, as pointed out by this Court in Eastern Investments Ltd. v. C.l.T.( 1 ) :\n\n\"A sum of money expended, not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business, may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade.\" (approving the dictum of Viscount Cave, L.C. in Atherton v. British Insulated &: Helsby Cables Ltd. (10 T.C. 155, 191).\n\nThe same test has been applied in Cooke (H.M. Inspector of Taxes v. Quick Shoe Repair Service('), in which the agreement by which the respondent firm purchased a shoe repair business provided that the vendor should discharge all liabilities of the business outstanding at the date of sale. The vendor failed to do so, and the 1 espondcnts, in order to preserve the goodwill and to\n\n(I) 20 I. T. R. 1.\n\n(21 30 T.C. ~60.\n\nensure continuity of supplies of material, etc., paid certain sums in discharge of the vendor's liabilities.\n\nI.t was held by Croom Johnson, J. that the sums so paid by the respondent firm were wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of its business and were not capital expenditure and were, therefore, allowable deductions for income-tax purposes.\n\nIt was also contended by Mr. Mitra that so far as the expenditure incurred in development of plots already sold by the firm is concerned, it was likely that the price paid by the respondent-company in the contract of sale dated July 7, 1948 to the firm for taking .over the assets and liabilities of the firm had been fixed after taking into account the obligation for the development of such plots. On this assumption it was submitted by Mr. Mitra that the discharge of this obligation must be attributed to the capital structure of the respondent-company's business and cannot be considered as an obligation incurred in connection with the carrying on of its business.\n\nIt was argued that such expenditure must be regarded as capital in character and not debitable to the revenue account of relevant accounting years. In support of this proposition Counsel relied upon the decision in.Royal Insurance Company v. Watson\n\n(Surveyor of Taxes)(') in which it was held that the payment by the transferee-company of a sum of £55,846-8s.-5d. to the manager in commutation of his annual salary was capital expenditure since the payment formed part of the consideration for the transfer of the business and therefore could not be deducted. On behalf of the respondent-company Mr. Asoke Sen referred to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central), Calcutta: v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. (Land Department)(') and to the terms of the sale deed dated July 7, 1948 and . the Schedule thereto and argued that there was no quantification of the obligations taken over by the respondent-company under cl. 5 of the sale deed. It was stated by Mr. Asoke Sen that the obligations were not computed and did not form part of the consideration of Rs. 34 lakhs and odd• arrived at in the Schedule. In our opinion, there is justification in the argument put forward by Mr.\n\nAsoke Sen and the principle of the decision in Royal Insurance Company v. Watson(') has no application to the present case.\n\nThere is nothing to show in the present case that the obligation incurred under cl. 5 of the sale deed was quantified and fom1ed part of the consideration amounting to Rs. 34 fakhs and odd mentioned in the sale deed as paid by the respo.ndent-company.\n\nWe accordingly reject the argument put forward by Mr. Mitra on behalf of the appellants on this aspect of the case.\n\nWe next proceed to consider the question whether the full price as recited in the sale deed should be regarded as having been rea-\n\n(!) 3 T.C. lOO. (2l l7 l.T.R. 299.\n\nlised by the respondent-company for the relevant accounting years and not merely the actual cash paid by the purchasers. The recital in the sale deed showed the consideration for the transfer of the property, that part of the consideration was paid in cash and the balance was secured by a mortgage executed by the purchasers on the same date. It was argued by Mr. Mitra that the amounts of the consideration money not received in cash but which were treated as a loan to the purchasers and for which the lands sold were mortgaged in favour of the respondent-company, should be treated as constructive receipt of the money by the respondentcompany and therefore liable to be included in the profits of the respondentcompany derived during the respective accounting years. We are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nThe Memo of Consideration in the sale deed reproduced above shows that there was cash payment of the earnest money on August 5, 1948 (Rs. 501/-) and a cheque was paid as part of the consideration on January 30, 1949 for a sum of Rs. 2,407 / 5 I 6 and the balance of the amount \"secured under Security Deed of even date\". It is therefore impossible to hold in this case that there was any cash payment by the purchasers to the respondent-company on the date of the execution of the sale deed and the execution of the mortgage deed on the same date by the purchasers cannot be treated as equivalent to payment of cash. In the circumstances found in the present case it cannot be said that the mere giving of security for the debt by the purchaser was tantamount to payment. We accordingly hold that, in the circumstances of this case, the amount of consideration not received and which the purchasers agreed to pay in future for which lands were mortgaged in favour of the respondent-company, cannot be considered to be taxable income for the assessment periods in question.\n\nThe view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar & Orissa v. Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga('). In that case, the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga lent to Kumar C?anesh ingh, about 32 lakhs of rupees. In the assessment year m question, the Kumar owed to Maharaja six lakhs of rupees a~ interest. This he did not pay in cash, but entered into an arrangement whereby the assessee took over various items of property in lieu of principal and interest.\n\nOne of the items so\n\naken over consisted of promissory notes executed by the Kumar !n favour o~ the Maharaja. The question was whether this was mcome received by the Maharaja. In the course of his judgment Lord Macmillan stated at page 161 of the Report as follows: '\n\n\" ...... but the seventh item .... consisting of the debtor's own promissory notes, was clearly not the equiva}ent of cash. A debtor who gives his creditor a promissory note for the sum he owes can in no sense be .\n\n(1} 60 I.A. 146.\n\n272 SUPIUIMB COUllT IUIPORTS [1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nsaid to pay his creditor; he merely gives him a document or voucher of debt possessing certain legal attributes. So far then as this item . . . . . . is concerned the assessee did not receive payment of any taxable income from his debtor or indeed any payment at all. In so holding their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the learned\n\njudg~ of the High Court who differed on this point from the commissioner.\"\n\nFor the reasons already expressed, we hold that both the questions referred to the High Court have been rightly answered by it in favour of the assessee and these appeals are without merit and 11hould be dismissed with costs. One set of heariD.g fee.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "llSSIONER OF INCOME-TAX CENTRAL, CALCUTTA\n\n&ANR.\n\nAMALGAMATED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX CENTRAL, CALCUTTA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 23, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 23, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M & Co. At the time the firm had sold a number of plots for which part of the consideration money had been realized and for the balance mortgage bonds had been executed by the purchasers."}}, {"text": "Asststant CommtsSIOner", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2022, "end_char": 2044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I~ the appeal to the Appellate Asststant CommtsSIOner and the Tribunal, the view taken by the Income-tax Officer on both the points was substantially ipheld However, upon a reference, the High Court held in favour of tl1e res: pondent company."}}, {"text": "July 7 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stock-1nthc price paid by the rcspnd~· tan that furthermore, It was hkely that dated July 7 1948 to the fi n company under the contract of sale of the firm had been fixed e{ 0; aakm~ over the assets and liabilities the development of such lots th mg mto acount the obligation for these obligation must therefore •be e tt ~pt\"'des incurred ."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the sale deed dated July 7, 1948 showed that the respondent company purchased from the firm a whole running business with all its goodwill and stock-in-trade and including its liabilities."}}, {"text": "CIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5694, "end_char": 5713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 4, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appetlants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appetlants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5781, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appetlants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5801, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the appetlants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5871, "end_char": 5887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5976, "end_char": 5985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated December 4, 1962 in Income-Tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company purchased the assets and liabilities of the firm, Mugneeram Bangur & Co., (Land Department), hereinafter referred to as the 'firm', on July 7, 1948 for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Tollygunge Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35A and will also lay out the said surface drains by the side of the said road within a year from the date hereof and will maintain the said road and drains in proper state or repairs and shall arrange for lighting the said roads with electric light till the same are taken over by Tollygunge Municipality ...... \"; and,\n\n\" Memo of Consideration By amount paid as earnest."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13967, "end_char": 13983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the orders of the Income-tax Officer the respondent company preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who dismissed the appeals by a consolidated order dated November 7, 1956."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15438, "end_char": 15452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15478, "end_char": 15494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated December 4, 1962 the High Court answered both the questions in favour of the respondent company."}}, {"text": "G Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15636, "end_char": 15643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With respect to the first question it was submitted by Mr.\n\nG Mitra that only the expenditure incurred in the relevant accounting year in connection with the lands sold by the respondent company should have been allowed and not the expenditure incurred in connection with the lands sold by the vendor-firm previously.", "canonical_name": "G Mitra"}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15921, "end_char": 15926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed by Mr. Mitra that under the terms of the contract between the vendor-firm and the respondent company the latter was H bound to meet the obligations of the development of land previously sold by the firm, but the contention was that the lands already sold by the firm were not stock-in-trade of the respondent company.", "canonical_name": "G Mitra"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16439, "end_char": 16451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16459, "end_char": 16473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Viscount Cave, L.C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18628, "end_char": 18647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "approving the dictum of Viscount Cave, L.C. in Atherton v. British Insulated &: Helsby Cables Ltd. (10 T.C. 155, 191)."}}, {"text": "Croom Johnson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19270, "end_char": 19283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.t was held by Croom Johnson, J. that the sums so paid by the respondent firm were wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of its business and were not capital expenditure and were, therefore, allowable deductions for income-tax purposes."}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20777, "end_char": 20786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent-company Mr. Asoke Sen referred to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central), Calcutta: v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. (Land Department)(') and to the terms of the sale deed dated July 7, 1948 and ."}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21110, "end_char": 21115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21580, "end_char": 21585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22979, "end_char": 22993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Memo of Consideration in the sale deed reproduced above shows that there was cash payment of the earnest money on August 5, 1948 (Rs."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23060, "end_char": 23076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "501/-) and a cheque was paid as part of the consideration on January 30, 1949 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24122, "end_char": 24150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga lent to Kumar C?anesh ingh, about 32 lakhs of rupees."}}, {"text": "Kumar C?anesh ingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24159, "end_char": 24177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga lent to Kumar C?anesh ingh, about 32 lakhs of rupees."}}, {"text": "Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24258, "end_char": 24266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the assessment year m question, the Kumar owed to Maharaja six lakhs of rupees a~ interest."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24665, "end_char": 24674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his judgment Lord Macmillan stated at page 161 of the Report as follows: '\n\n\" ...... but the seventh item .... consisting of the debtor's own promissory notes, was clearly not the equiva}ent of cash."}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_273_278_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "PREM DULAR! v.\n\nRAJ 1'.UMARI March 23, 1967 [K. SUBBA RAo, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ. M. SHELAT AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J\n\nTh.e Right of Prior Purchase Act (J. & K. Act 11 of 1993), a . . 15 (fourthly)--Scope of-CIMuae If v.lolates Ari. 19(1) (/) of the Constllu 'tion.\n\nThe •econd respondent sold her houso to the appellant. Tho first respondent filed a suit for possession 0>! the house on the ground tat she !tad a right of prior purchase under s. IS (fourthly) o! th.e Right.of Prior Purchase Act 1993, because, her house and the house m question had a common outer entrance within the meaning o! that clause. The suit was decreed. In appeal to tllis Court it was contended that: (I) On a proper construion of the clause such an entrance would not give rise to a right o! pre-emption unless the owner claiming the right and the owner o! the house in question jointly owned the common outer entrance, and, (2) the clause as mterpreted by the Courts below violated Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and was therefore ultra vlres.\n\nHELD: (I) lbe clause provides that where the sale is of property hzving a common outer entrance with other properties, the right of prior purchase shall vest in the owners of such properties. There is nothing Ill the section to warrant the construction that such a right would vest only if the common outer entrance is jointly owned by the owners of such houses. [275H]\n\n(2) In the case of properties having a common entrance, the owners of the buildings would stand more or less in the pooition of Cer 2, 1964 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in C1vi1 First Appeal No. 7 of 1964.\n\nB. C. Misra, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and Mohan Behari Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by .\n\nShe~~ ~· Respendent No. 1 filed a suit in the Court of AdditiOnal Distnct Judge, Jammu for possession of the house in dispute, owned by the second respondent and sold by her to the appellant .. The caue of action pleaded was that respondent No. 1 had a right of prior purchase under sectioa 1 S (fourthly) of the\n\n- Right of Prior Purchase Act, 11 of 1993 as her house and the A house in question had a common-outer entrance within the meaning of that clause. The trial court and the High Court on evidence held that the two houses had a common outer entrance and decreed the suit on respondent No. 1 paying the sate price-of Rs. 13,000/-.\n\nHence this appeal by special leave.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, the vendee, Mr. Misra raised two B questions (I) that on a proper construction of s. 15 (fourthly) this was not a case of the two houses having a common outer entrance as that clause requires that such an _entrance must be owned jointly by the owners of such two houses, and (2) that section 15 (fourthly) is ultra vires as it offends Art. 19 ( 1 )( f) and constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the appellant's right to property. c\n\nThe evidence shows that the entire property consisting of these two, together with other houses in the vicinity were owned at one time by witness Mohinder Nath and one Uttam Chand. Subsequently they sold some of them. To give to these houses access to the public road, called the Secretariat Road, they retained to themselves the ownership of the lane but granted a right of way D thereon to the said vendees. The lane ends as a blind alley where the two houses are situate.\n\nThe plan produced during the trial shows that there is first a common outer entrance through which one enters into this lane from the Secretariat Road and at a distance of about 10 yards there is another such entrance marked 'common entrance' in the plan through which one enters into the alley and E on which the doors of these and certain other houses open. During the course of the trial, the trial Judge madelocal inspection and recorded his inspection note which was admitted by the parties as correct. The inspection note is as follows :-\n\n\"On spot I find that there is a common outer entrance from the street to number of houses and then again about F 10 yards from the common outer entrance there is another common outer entrance of six houses and. there is a street which ends at the houses of the plaintiff and the suit house. At the end of the street the outer door of the plaiptiff and the suit house abut\".\n\nI There is thus no rooin for dispute that the said passage leading to G the said Secretariat Road has two common entrances, one where it opens on to the said Road and the other at a distance of about 1 O yards therefrom. Apart from the inspection note, the parties led oral and documentary evidence on a consideration of which the trial Judge rcorded the following finding :-\n\n\"Both the parties !!gree with this note and they adm!t H that there is a common outer entrance from the Municipal Street to the plaintiff's house and the suit house.\n\nThe difference between the plaintiff's case and the defen-\n\nPREM DULARI v. RAJ KUMAR.I (Shelat, /.) 27.f!\n\ndant's case as made out by the counsel for the defendant is that the plaintiff's house and the defendant's huse both open into the blank alley (kucha sarbasta) and mto the same alley opens some more houses. The plaintiff has not shown that the alley was the private property. of the owners of the houses which abut on that. Accordmg to the statement of Pt. Mohinder Nath that alley belongs to him and Pt. Uttam Chand. The owners of the houses which abut in that alley are entitled to right of wa¥ over it. As they are not owners of the alley so accordmg to the counsel for defendant No. 1 the plaintiff is not entitled to right of prior purchase on the basis of their having a common outer entrance .... The words used in the subclause are that the property sold and the property on the basis of which the right is exercised must have a common outer entrance. It is not essential that the street which leads from outer entrance to the houses of the plaintiff and the defendant should be owned by them''.\n\nThe High Court also came to a similar finding and held that once it had been shown that the owners of the four houses abutting on that alley had exclusive right of way over it, it was enough to vest in them the right of pre-emption. The High Court also held that it was not necessary to prove that the common outer entrance wall\" jointly owned by the owners of the houses. It is therefore clear that the question raised by the appellant was not that there was no common outer entrance to the two houses but that on a proper construction of s. 15 (fourthly), such a common outer entrance would not give rise to a right of prior purchase unless the owner claiming such a right and the owner of the house in question jointly own the common outer passage.\n\nThe construction urged before the trial court and the High Court and rejected by both of them was once again urged before us by Mr. Misra. The language of s. 1 S(fourthly) is plain. The section in unambiguous language provides that \"the right of prior purchase .................... shall vest :- Fourthly : Where the sale is of property having a common outer entrance with other properties in the owners of such properties''.\n\nThe section clearly says that where the sale is of property having a common outer entance with other properties, the right of prior\n\npurcase. shall vest .m the owners of such properties.\n\nThere is nothmg m the sectton to warrant the construction that such a right would vest only if the common outer entrance is jointly ?wned b¥ the owners of such houses. What the section requires 1s the existence of a common outer entrance which need not be owned by the person claiming the right of pre-emption. Whether\n\nLSSup.Cl/67-5\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 ~.C.R.\n\nthere is such a common outer entrance which would attract the A provisions of s. 15(fourthly) would, therefore, depend upon the facts proved in eayh case. In the present case, both the trial court as also the High Court came to the conclusion from the evidence led by the parties that there does exist a common outer entrance for both the houses. Nothing has been shown by Mr. Misra from the evidence which would justify our disagreeing with that con 8 clusion.\n\nLet us now turn to the decisions relied upon by Mr. Misra.\n\nIn Naba and others v. Piara Mal and another('), the High Court of Punjab held that the entrance to the alley in question was not 'a common entrance from the st.reet' of the pre-emptor and the vendor within the meaning of s. J 3(1)(fifthly) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1905. The decision, however, turned on the facts and the situation of the alley which was said to be the common entrance to the houses in question.\n\nThe High Court found that the evidence led by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove that the said alley was the private property of the owners of the houses opening on to it or that none except the owners thereof had free access to or right of way over it. Nor was it shown that the houses at one time constituted one building and were subsequently subdivided and that the privacy of those houses was ensured by the blind alley as it ordinarily would be by the existence of a common entrance. In Nanak Chand v. Tek Chand and others(2 ), the right of pre-emption was claimed on the ground that there was a step leading to a thara which formed part of the plaintiff's house and the house in question. The High Court held that the step could not be called either a 'staircase' or a common entrance from the street within the meaning of s. J 3(1)(fifthly) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1905. In Asa Nand v. Mahmud('), the dispute was between two parties claiming the right of pre-emption and the High Court rejected the defendant's claim on the ground that he had not even the right of way over the compound and his use of it was only permissive.\n\nIn Ram Chand v. Ram Jowa, va('), the Punjab Chief Court held that a public street leading from the main road to two houses cannot be considered a common entrance from the street and that to bring a case withins. 13(1) (fifthly) it would not be sufficient to prove that the street into which the house sold and the house of the person claiming pre-emption opened was common to the two properties or that each had an entrance from that street. There must be an entrance from the street which is common to both properties.\n\nNone of these decisions, in our view, can assist, for, each turned on its own facts which determined whether there was in fact a common entran0P within the meaning of the Punjab Act.\n\n(1) (1912) 44 P.R. 159.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1920 Lah. 278.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1927 Lah. 96.\n\n(4) [1912] I.C. 484.\n\nPREM DULARI v. RAJ KUMARI (She/at, 1.) 277\n\nIn the instant case, there is the admitted evidence that the alley, at the blind end of which the two houses are situate, has a com mon entrance which opens into a passage of about 10 yards where there is again another common entrance opening on to the public road. It is also not in dispute that the entire passage is owned by the original owners of the houses opening into this passage and that at the time of the sales of some of these houses they had granted a right of way over this passage to them so that the said houses may have access from the public road. The said passage, therefore, is the private property of the said Mo hinder Nath and Uttam Chand and the right of way over it is enjoyed only by the owners of the houses opening on to it. The appellant did not raise any dispute with regard to these facts. Indeed, the only question raised by her was that in order to constitute a common outer en trance under s. 15(fourthly) such an entrance must be owned jointly by the owner of the house in question and the owner claiming pre-emption. As aforesaid, both the courts negatived the su~· gested construction and we think that they were right for. the plam words of the section do not justify such a construction.\n\nThe question next is whether s. 15(fourthly) providing for the right of prior purchase amounts to an unreasonable restriction.\n\nThere can be no doubt that such a provision amounts to a restric tion in the sense that a person purohasing such a property has to give way to the person claiming such a right. The nature of the E right is expressed in felicitous language by Mahmood J. in Gov ind Dayal v. lnczyatullah('). The right of pre-emption, he observed: \"is simply a right of substitution, entitling the pre-emptor, by means of a legal incident to which sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations aris ing from the sale, under which he derived his title. It is, in effect, as if in a sale deed the vendee's name were rubbed out and pre emptor's name inserted in its place\". This statement was approv ed by this Court in Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh('), and the Court summarising the incidents of the right observed :\n\n. '1'hat the rit of pre-emption is not a right to the thmg sold but a nght to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right.\n\nThe pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. It is a right of substitution but not o! re-purchase, i.e., the pre-emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee\".\n\nThat being the nature of the right, the next question is whether the restriction on the vendee's right of property created by s, IS\n\n(fourthly) can be said to be an unreasonable restriction. A similar\n\n• 'I) fli!8SJ I.LR. 7 All.175, 809.\n\n(2) [19S9J S.C, R. 878.\n\nquestion in regard to a similar provision in section 16 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 arose in Babu Ram v. Baijnath ('). Section 16 of that Act provided for pre-emption on six grounds, the first, third, fourth and sixth grounds 'being in favour of co-sharers, owners of common staircases, owners of common entrance from a street and owners of contig'JOUs property. The Court held that the first, third and fourth grounds of pre-emption did not offend Articles 19(1)(£) and 14 and were valid. The Court observed that the Jaw under the first ground providing for pre-emption by co-sharers imposed reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public on the right under Art. 19(1)(£). If an outsider was introduced as a co-sharer in a }:lroperty it would make common management extremely difficult and destroy the benefits of ownership in common.\n\nThe advantage of excluding a stranger in the case of a. residential house was all the greater as it would avoid all .kinds of disputes.\n\nThe third ground which applied in a case where the property sold had a staircase common with other properties stood practically on the same footing as that of co-sharers. Regarding properties having a common entrance from the street with other properties, the Court held that that ground was similar to the first and the third grounds. At page 7 41 dealing with the fourth ground, the Court observed that the buildings were in a common compound and perhaps were originally put up by members of one family or one group v.; ith a common private passage from the public street. In such a case the owners of the buildings would stand more or less in the position of co-sharers, though actually there might be no co-sharership in the house sold. Such a case would approximate to cases of a common staircase and co-sharers and, therefore, the right of preemption in such a case was sustainable. The reasoning employed in upholding the validity of the fourth ground in s. 16 of the Punjab Act would apply with equal force to the provisions of s. 15(fourthly) before us.\n\nConsequently, the contention that the impugned provision amounts to an unreasonable restriction cannot be sustained.\n\nBoth the contentions raised by Mr. Misra fail. The appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) [1962] 3 Supp. S.CR. 724.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "PREM DULAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM DULARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT,\n\nJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Right of Prior Purchase Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prior Purchase Act 1993", "statute": "Prior Purchase Act 1993"}}, {"text": "B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1975, "end_char": 1986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 1999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Mohan Behari Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2056, "end_char": 2072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Mohan Behari Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "AdditiOnal Distnct Judge, Jammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 filed a suit in the Court of AdditiOnal Distnct Judge, Jammu for possession of the house in dispute, owned by the second respondent and sold by her to the appellant .. The caue of action pleaded was that respondent No."}}, {"text": "Right of Prior Purchase Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2459, "end_char": 2486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant, the vendee, Mr. Misra raised two B questions (I) that on a proper construction of s. 15 (fourthly) this was not a case of the two houses having a common outer entrance as that clause requires that such an _entrance must be owned jointly by the owners of such two houses, and (2) that section 15 (fourthly) is ultra vires as it offends Art."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Right of Prior Purchase Act", "statute": "Right of Prior Purchase Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Right of Prior Purchase Act", "statute": "Right of Prior Purchase Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Right of Prior Purchase Act", "statute": "Right of Prior Purchase Act"}}, {"text": "Mohinder Nath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nThe evidence shows that the entire property consisting of these two, together with other houses in the vicinity were owned at one time by witness Mohinder Nath and one Uttam Chand."}}, {"text": "Uttam Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nThe evidence shows that the entire property consisting of these two, together with other houses in the vicinity were owned at one time by witness Mohinder Nath and one Uttam Chand."}}, {"text": "dant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dant's case as made out by the counsel for the defendant is that the plaintiff's house and the defendant's huse both open into the blank alley (kucha sarbasta) and mto the same alley opens some more houses."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5692, "end_char": 5705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Nath that alley belongs to him and Pt.", "canonical_name": "Mo hinder Nath"}}, {"text": "Uttam Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5740, "end_char": 5751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uttam Chand."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(fourthly)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8161, "end_char": 8176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Naba and others v. Piara Mal and another('), the High Court of Punjab held that the entrance to the alley in question was not 'a common entrance from the st.reet' of the pre-emptor and the vendor within the meaning of s. J 3(1)(fifthly) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1905."}}, {"text": "Punjab Preemption Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Preemption Act, 1905", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9886, "end_char": 9913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Chief Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10208, "end_char": 10226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ram Chand v. Ram Jowa, va('), the Punjab Chief Court held that a public street leading from the main road to two houses cannot be considered a common entrance from the street and that to bring a case withins."}}, {"text": "RAJ KUMARI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10990, "end_char": 11000, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ KUMARI", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Mo hinder Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11650, "end_char": 11664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said passage, therefore, is the private property of the said Mo hinder Nath and Uttam Chand and the right of way over it is enjoyed only by the owners of the houses opening on to it.", "canonical_name": "Mo hinder Nath"}}, {"text": "s. 15(fourthly)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11943, "end_char": 11958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(fourthly)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12276, "end_char": 12291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahmood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nature of the E right is expressed in felicitous language by Mahmood J. in Gov ind Dayal v. lnczyatullah(')."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13944, "end_char": 13954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13962, "end_char": 13990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14026, "end_char": 14036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Articles 19(1)(£) and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14356, "end_char": 14380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(£)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14580, "end_char": 14593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15857, "end_char": 15862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(fourthly)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15931, "end_char": 15946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_279_285_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "UNION CO-OPERATIVE INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD.,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY March 23, 1967\n\n(J. C. SHAH, S. M. S!KRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act 1922, ,; 10 and Rule 6 of Schedule-llldian Insurance A.ct, 1938, s. 15-Profits of insurance companies. assessment of-Bonus paid by company to policy-holder on renewal of policies on which no claim had been made.--Estimated amoultl so payable debited by company to appropriation account and not to profit and loss account -Bonus paid during previous year whether allowable expenditure.\n\nThe appellant company carried on general insurance business.\n\nOne of the bye-laws of the company allowed payment of bonus where a policy was renewed and there had been no claim in the preceding year.\n\nThe company did not debit in its profir and loss account the amount so paid in the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59; it showed an amount estimated to be payable as bonus in its profit appropriation account. The Income-tax Officer held that ( i) the payment of bonus was made after the profits for the relevant year were determined and on that account it was only a case of appropriation of profits after they were earned, (ii) in any event since the company had not charged the bonus paid to revenue account and had merely made a provision in the appropriation account, it could not claim relief after modifying the accounts in Form B to Schedule I! of the Insurance Act 1938 submitted to the Controller of Insurance.' The High Court in a reference under s, 66 of the Income-tax Act held against the company The company appealed.\n\nHELD: (i) Rule 6 of the Schedule to the Income-tax Act enjoins the Income-tu Officer to take the balance disclosed by the annual accounts as the profits and gains of insurance business other than life insurance : it does not oblige him to accept the figure disclosed at the foot of the profit and loss account in the determination of the quantum of profits and gains 1Jf the insurance buSiiness.\n\nSection 15 of the Insurance Act requires the insurer to submit not merely the profit and loss account in Form B but also the balance sheet and the account in Form C and other accounts, and there is no warrant for the view that the balance of profits disclosed must be equated with the balance of profits disclosed in Form B. [28JG-H]\n\n(ii) By debiting the estimated bonus payment to the profit appropriation account the company did not seek to alter the character of the expenditure. If it had been debited in the profit and loss account it cou)d not with any show of reason be regarded as not incidental to the bustness of the assessee company.\n\nMerely because it was debited as an estimated amount an intention not to treat it as expenditure for the pur pose o~ the business is not indicated. It was open to the assessee company to debit to its annual accounts a certain outgoing actual or estimated and if sanctioned by the Controller to claim that amount or such other amount as the Income-tu Officer may irnder s. 10(2) allow as a permissible deduction.\n\n[2R4B-D]\n\n(iii) The bonus scheme was clearly intended to advance the business of the insurer and the expenditure in this regard was expenditure laid\n\nout wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the com pany within the meaning of s. 10(2) (xv). [284F] •\n\n(iv) The liability of the company for payment of bonus was not a conungent liability.\n\nSo long as the year of risk bas not expired the liability is contingent, but once the year of risk is over, and the policy ra renewed the liability becomes actual and concrete.\n\nThe assessee company had not claimed the full amount for which an estimate was matle in the accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance but only those amounts which were entered in the balance sheet as actually paid.\n\nThis expenditure could not be said to be contingent. [284 H; 285 A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JurusDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 1052 & 1053 of 1966.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated October 4, 5, c 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 50 of 1961.\n\nR. l. Ko/ah, and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nR. M. Hazarnavis, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.-hereinaiter called 'the assessee Company'--carries on general insurance business. Bye-law 52 of the assessee Company provides that bonus shall be paid on those policies (not being Reinsurance Policies) on certain conditions, the following of which are relevant :\n\n\"l. That the premium on that policy is more than Rs. 5/-.\n\n2. That there has been no claim on that policy. \"3. That the policy was insured during the year for which bonus is declared.\n\n4. That the bonus amount will be paid only if the policy is renewed on expiration and the bonus amount may be credited towards premium under the renewed policy.\"\n\nIn proceedings for assessment of the income of the assessee Company for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 the assessee Company claimed allowance of Rs. 29,615/- and Rs. 44,920/- respectively, paid under the bonus scheme under Bye-law 52, in the computation of its taxable income. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim holding that payment of bonus was made after its profits for the relevant years were determined and on that account it was only a case of appropriation of profit after it was earned, and that in any event since the assessee Company had not charged the bonus paid to the revenue account and had merely made a\n\nprovision in the appropriation account, it could not claim relief after modifying the accounts in Form B to Schedule II of the Insurance Act, 1938, submitted to the Controller of Insurance. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of the Incometax Officer. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, however, held that the payments were not mere appropriation of profits, d were admissible as permissible deductions on the ground of busmess expediency. The following question submitted for determination of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amounts of Rs. 29,615/- and Rs. 44,920/- paid to certain policy-holders in the calendar years 1956 and 1957 respectively by the assessee Company were admissible deductions for the purpose of computation of its taxable income for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 ?\"\n\nwas answered in the negative.\n\nThe High Court held that since the amounts paid were not entered in the Profit & Loss account in Form B Schedule II to the Insurance Act and were also not regarded by the assessee Company as expenditure charged on profits, .they were not admissible as deductions in the computation of the taxable income of the assesscc Company under r. 6 of the Schedule to the Income-tax Act. With special leave, the assessee Company has appealed to this Court.\n\nBy s. 10(7) of the Income-tax Act the profits and gains of any busin_ess of ii; isurance nd the tax payable thereon are computable, notw1thstandmg apythmg to the contrary containoo in ss. 8, 9, 10,\n\n12 or 18, in accordance with the rules contained in the Schedule to the Act. Rule 6 of the Schedule which prescribes the method of computation of taxable income of insurance business (other than life insurance) provides :\n\n\"The profits and gains of any business of insurance other than life insurance shall be taken to be the balance of the profits disclosed by the annual accounts copies of whih are required under the Insurance Act, 1938, to be furmshed to the Controller of Insurance after adjusting such balance so a~ to excude from it any expenditure other han expend.1ture which may under the provisions of sect10n 10 of this Act be allowed for in computing the profits and gains of a business . . . . . \"\n\nBy s. 15 of the Insurance Act 4 of 193 8 every insurer is directed to furnish to the Controller of Insurance, among others, the audited accounts and statements referred to in s. 11 of that Act.\n\nBy s. 11(1) of the Insurance Act every insurer is directed to prepare at\n\n'.282\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S, C.R.\n\nthe expiration of each calendar year with reference to that year, the following accounts and statements in respect of all insurance business transacted by him ;\n\n\"(a) in accoraance with the regulations contained in Part I of the First Schedule, a balance-sheet in the form setforth in Part II of that Schedule;\n\n(b) in accordance with the regulations contained in Part I of the Second Schedule, a profit and loss account in the forms setforth in Part II of that Schedule, except where the insurer carries on business of one class only of the classes specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 7 and no other business.\"\n\nSection 21 of the Insurance Act authorises the Controller of Insurance, if it appears to him that any return furnished to him under the provisfons of the Act is inaccurate or defective in any respect, to require the insurer to correct or supplement such return, or to call upon the insurer to submit for his examination any book of . account, register or other document or to examine any officer of\n\nthe insurer on .oath in relation to the return, or to decline to accept any such return unless the inaccuracy has been corrected or the deficiency has been supplied.\n\nBy s. 22 the Controller has the power to order investigation or re-valuation to be made by an actuary .appointed by the insurer for the purpose. Having regard to the wide powers conferred upon the Controller, the Income-tax Act has in respect of the business of insurance, other than life insu ranee, provided that the balance of the profits disclosed by the annual accounts, copies of which are required under the Insurance Act, 193 8, to be furnished to the Controller of Insurance, shall be accepted by the Income-tax Officer, subject to any adjustment he may make so as to exclude from it any expenditure other than expenditure which may under the provisions of s. 10 of the Incometax Act be allowed for in computing the profits and gains of the business. ·\n\nIt is common ground that the assessee Company had submitted its balance-sheet, the profit & loss account and profit & loss appropriation account.\n\nThe balance-sheets for the two years 1956 and 1957 have not been printed in the record and only the profit & loss accounts and the profit & loss appropriation accounts have been printed. In the statements of profit & loss account (Form B) for the years 1956 and 1957 disbursements by way of bonus to the renewing policy-holders under Bye-law 52 are not included.\n\nBut in the profit & loss appropriation accounts (Form C) for the years 1956 and 1957 entries for allocations for Rs. 50,000/ • and Rs. 70,000 /' respectively are made under the head \"Policy-holders\n\nBonus Fund\". In Form .'B' in Schedule II of the Insurance Act\n\nunder the head \"Other Expenditure (to be specified)\", outgoings other than taxes, expenses of management, loss on realization of investments, depreciation and loss transferred from Revenue Account are required to be included. In Form C which is the form of profit & loss appropriation account the following appropriations are directed to be made :\n\n\"Balance being loss brought forward from last year.\n\nRalance being loss for the year brought from Profit & Loss Account (as in Form B).\n\nDividends paid during the year on account of the current year.\n\nTransfers to any particular Funds or Accounts, and Balance at the end of the year as shown in the Balance-Sheet.\" The assessee Company in drawing up its profit & loss account instead of showing the actual disbursement in Form B against the head \"Other Expenditure\" estimated the amounts which it would be liable to pay and debited the same against the head \"Transfers to any particular Funds or Accounts\" in Form C. The High Court held that r. 6 merely provides for adjustment of the balance of expenses which are in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer not permissible allowances under s. 10, and on that hypothesis inferred that the annual accounts referred to in r. 6 of the Schedule mean the profit & loss account submitted in Form B and not the profit & loss appropriation account submitted in Form C. In our judgment that view cannot be sustained. In Form B expenditure which is 111ready incurred or which is capable of being actllally ascertained at the close of the year may be included. But the insurer who has incurred a liability may allocate (subject to adjustment in the balance-sheet) an estimated amount out of the profit & loss account and enter it in the profit & loss appropriation account. The Controller of Insurance may, if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the estimate, or the allocation refuse to accept it, and may call upon the insurer to rectify the accounts. If the Controller certifies the accounts, the expenditure cannot be disallowed by the Incometax Officer, merely because it is not entered in the profit & loss account, and is found appropriated in the profit & loss appropriation account. Rule 6 of the Schedule to the Income-tax Act enjoins the Income-tax Officer to take the balance disclosed by the annual accounts as the profits and gains of insurance business other than life insurance : it does not oblige him to accept the figure disclosed at the foot of the profit & loss account as determinative of the quantum of profits and gains of that insurance business. Section 15 requires the insurer to submit not merely the profit & loss account in Form 'B', but also the balance-sheet and the account in Form 'C' and other accounts, and there is no warrant for the view\n\nthat the balance of profits disclosed by the annual account must be equated with the balance of profits disclosed in Form 'B'.\n\nThe other plea which appealed to the High Court that the assessee Company had itself not treated the bonus paid as an expenditure related to the business, but only as disbursements made out of the profit after it had accrued to the assessee Company, also cannot be sustained. The assessee Company maintains its accounts according to the mercantile system. It chose to estimate the liability arising under Bye-law 52 in respect of the business transacted by it, and debited it in the profit & loss appropriation account. By adopting that method of accounting the assessee Company did not seek to alter the character of the expenditure. If it had been debited in the profit & loss account it could not with any show of reason be regarded as not incidental to the business of the assessee Company. Merely because it was debited as an estimated amount, an intention not to treat it as expenditure for the purpose of the business is not indicated.\n\nIn our judgment, it was open to the assessee Company to debit in its annual accounts a certain outgoing actual or estimated, and if sanctioned by the Controller to claim that amount or such other amount as the Income-tax Officer may under s. 10(2) allow as a permissible deduction.\n\nThe High Court did not express any view on the question whether the expenditure was a permissible allowance under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. It appears from the scheme for payment of bonus to the policy-holders who renew their policies that bonus would be admissible if there was no claim on the policy and the renewal policy was issued during the year for which bonus was declared. This scheme was evolved to induce the policy-holders to renew their policies with the assessee Company. Even if no immediate benefit results therefrom to the trade of the insurer, the scheme is clearly intended to advance the business of the insurer, and payment to renewing policy-holders or adjustment of bonus against renewal premium made under that scheme constitutes expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee Company.\n\nCounsel for the Commissioner contended that the estimated liability was not \"crystallised liability'' and was on that account inadmissible as an allowance in the computation of taxable income.\n\nThe liability, submitted counsel, was a mere contingent liability which could not amount to expenditure within the meaning of s. 10(2)(xv), nor a permissible outgoing in the determination of the income, profits or gains of the business. This question was appa rently not raised before the Tribunal. Assuming that it could be raised before the High Court and this Court, we are of the view that under the scheme of Bye-law 52, the liability is not a con tingent liability. So long as the year of risk has not expired, the\n\nco-OP. INSUllANCB SOCY. v. C.I.T. (Shah, !.) 285\n\nliability is contingent; but once the year of risk is over, and the policy is renewed the liability becomes actual and concrete. Theassessee Company has not claimed the full amount for which an estimate was made in the accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance, but only those amounts which were entered in the balance-sheet as actually paid. This expenditure cannot be said to be \"contingent\".\n\nIt was finally said that under s. 41 of the Insurance Act there is prohibition against the grant of any rebate and it is urged that no insurer. can in the course of assessment proceedings claim deduction in respect of the amounts allowed by him by way rebate when grant of rebate is expressly prohibited by statute. Section 41(1) of the Insurance Act prohibits the allowance or offer of allowance either directly or indirectly as an inducement to any person to take out or renew or continue an insurance in respect of any kind of risk relating to lives or property in India. But the question whether grant or bonus is a rebate within the meaning of s. 41 was never raised before the Tribunal This Court will not be justified in entering upon an investigation whether payment of bonus was in the nature of rebate and on that account offended s. 41 of the Insurance Act.\n\nThe answer recorded by the High Court will be discharged and an answer in the affirmative be recorded on the question submitted.\n\nThe appeals will be allowed. The assessee Company will be entitled to its costs in this Court and the High Court. One hearing fee.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppwls allowed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "UNION CO-OPERATIVE INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD.,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION CO-OPERATIVE INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 23, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOMBAY\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY March 23, 1967\n\n(J. C. SHAH, S. M. S!KRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. 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Ko", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4114, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. l. Ko/ah, and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. l. Ko/ah, and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. M. Hazarnavis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Hazarnavis, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Hazarnavis, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Hazarnavis, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. 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"gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16259, "end_char": 16271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17153, "end_char": 17166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 41(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17425, "end_char": 17438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17446, "end_char": 17459, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17677, "end_char": 17682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 41(1) of the Insurance Act prohibits the allowance or offer of allowance either directly or indirectly as an inducement to any person to take out or renew or continue an insurance in respect of any kind of risk relating to lives or property in India."}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17758, "end_char": 17763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17950, "end_char": 17955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17963, "end_char": 17976, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_286_297_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "JOHRIMAL v.\n\nDIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION. OF HOLDINGS, PUNJAB\n\nMarch 28, 1967\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J B\n\nEast Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948) S.<. 18, 36 and 42 and Rules 16(ii)-Sclie111e confirmed-If can be varied by State-Procedure-Proprietors' Gher land taken and formed illfo common pool- Legality.\n\nA scheme was prepared and confirmed under s. 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Pre.vention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. providing that the owners of permanent ghers or enclosure• would be permitted to retain them in their possession.· The respondent, under s. 42 of the Act, reconsidered this matter and ordered that the plot of the appellant, who had. made a gher, should be kept for non-proprietors and consolidation records should be changed to that effect. The appellant successfully challenged the respondent's order in a writ petition, which in appeal was reversed.\n\nJn appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that (i) the power of the State Government under s. 42 was controlled by the procedure prescribed under s. 36 if it involved a variation of the r.onfirmed scheme and the order of the respondent wa• ultm vires since the procedure contemplated by s. 36 had not been followed, and (ii) the\n\nrespondent's order was illegal as it violated s. 18(c) and Rule 16(ii) beca11se under Rule 16(ii) only a fraction of each proprietors' land could be taken and formed into a common pool so that the whole may be used for the common needs and benefits of the. estate and there was no such reason mentioned in the impugned order as required by s. 18.\n\nHELD : (i) The power conferred on the State Government by s. 42 is not controlled by s. 36 and the procedure of publication and hearing objections contemplated by ss. 19 and 20 of the Act is not necessary.\n\nSections 36 and 42 envisage two different situations and the inten:ion of the Act is to give powers rcspectivoly to the Confirming Authority and to the State Government to act under these sections in their discretion in any particular case.\n\nThe reason for two different provisions in ss. 36 and 42 of the Act is also clear for if a scheme is varied or revoketl by the authority confirming it, then the new scheme has to be published so that interested parties may object and their objection decided by competent authorities se.t up under the Act those decisions\n\nbeing finally appealable to the State Government.\n\nBut when a scheme is to be varied by the State Government itself under s. 42 of the Act, there is no requirement of the statute that the varied scheme should be published.\n\nThe State Government is only required to give notice and to give an opportunity to the interested parties to be heard before the variation is made. [293G-294Bl ·\n\n(ii) The respondent's order was illegal.\n\nIn view of the decision in Ajit Singh v. Tile State of P1111j11h, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 143 the wide interpretation of \" 18(c) would make the operation of the section unconstitutional.\n\nIt is a well c•'.ablishcd rule that a slu:ulc has to he so read ns to make it valid., it has to he construccl 11t res n1agi.\\' valeat quani pareat.\n\nApplying the principle to the present e•i.c, it is manifest that\n\ns. !S(c) must be read in a restricted sense and the authority of the Consolidation Officer to reserve land for the common purpose under s. 18(c) of the Act must be restricted and it must be held that the Consolidation Officer has power under the section to take the land out of the comlr\\on pool of the village only according to the rateable shre fn; m\n\nthe propnetors and othr right-holders for any common purpose mcludmg the extension of the village ahadi. It is also clear that the power of the State Government to make reservation of land for common purposes under s. 42 is co-terminus with the power of the Consolidation Officer under s. !S(c). [296G-297D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 153 of 1964.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated November 8, 19.60 of the Punjab High Court in L. P.A. No. 284 of 1958.\n\nBishan NaraiTJ, B.R.L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.\n\nGopa/ Singh, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated Novem ber 8, 1960 in Lettrs Patent Appeal No. 284 of 1956.\n\nFor the consolidation of land holdings in village Kheowara, a scheme was prepared by the Consolidation Officer under s. 14 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (Act L of 1948), hereinafter called the 'Act',\n\nand the scheme was confirmed by the Settlement Officer acting under s. 20 of the Act. The scheme, among other things, provided that the owners of permanent ghers or enclosures will be permitted to retain them in their possession. One of the proprietors, Johrimal had made a gher in khasra No. 3942 and, under the scheme, this was to remain with him. Para 7 of the Scheme which was finalised under s. 20 of the Act provided as follows :\n\n\"The existing houses and permanent enclosures shall be kept in the ownership and possession of those proprietors who were owners in possession prior to the consolidation and in addition if these persons so desire, they shall be entitled to be given additional area upto one bigha for extension of the abadi. In the case of such persons of right holders who have constructed houses or enclosures etc. within the Shamlat area they would keep them in teir possession but adjustment would be made out of then Khewat land ...... , .... ·,. ,.\"\n\nLater on the Director of Consolidation, to whom the powers of the State Government under s. 42 of the Act had been delegated\n\nJ:econsidered this matter and ordered that this particular piece of -land i.e., khasra No. 3942 should be reserved for the extension of abadi for non-proprietors. The Director of Consolidation accordingly ordered that instead of bein$ reserved for Johrimal, the plot 'Should be kept for the non-propnetors and the Consolidation re' Cords should be changed to that extent. The order of the Director of ConsolidatiQft was dated March 8, 1957. Aggrieved with this order, Johrimal applied to the High Court for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petition was heard by Grover, J. who allowed the petition holding that the Director of Consolidation had no authority to make any order contrary to the scheme without amending the scheme itself, and an amendment of the scheme could be made only under s. 36 of the Act and not •Under s. 42 of the Act. It was accordingly held that the order of the Director of Consolidation was ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari. Against this order the Director of Consolidation of Holdings appealed under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. The appeal wa5 heard by a Full Benclt which, by its Judgment dated November 8, 1960, allowed the appeal and reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and ordered that the writ petition should be dismissed.\n\nThe view taken by the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench was that the impugned order amounted to an alteration of the Consolidation scheme and the State Government had power, under s. 42 of the Act as amend- . ed by the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) (Second Amendment and Validation) Act (Punjab Act 27 of 1960), to make any change in the Consolidation schem\" subject to the requirements of that section. The present appeal is brought by Johrimal against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court.\n\nThe Act was passed to provide for the compulsory consolidation of agricultural holdings and for preventing the fragmentation of\n\naicultural holdings in the State of Punjab. Chapter III of the Act deals with Consolidation of Holdings and it is provided by s. 14 that the Government may either suo motu, or on application made, declare its intention by notification to make a scheme for consolidation of holdings in an estate or estates or part thereof as may be specified. The Consolidation Officer is required to obtain the advice of the land owners and of the non-proprietors and of the Gram Panchayat and he is thereafter directed to prepare a Scheme for the consolidation of holdings. Section 15 requires the Consolidation Officer to provide for the payment of compensation to any owner who is allotted a holding of less market value than his original holding and for the recovery of compensation from any owner who is allotted a holding of greater market value than that of his original holding. Under s. 19, the Consolidation Officer shall cause to be published the draft scheme of consolidation, and\n\nwithin 30 days of such publication any person likely to be affected by such scheme may communicate in writing to the Consolidation Officer, any objection relating o it. The Consolidation Officer shall then consider the objections, if any and submit the scheme with such amendments as he may consider to be necessary together with his remarks on the objection to the Settlement Officer (Con solidation). The scheme as amended shall then be published. Sec tion 20 provides that if no objections are received to the draft scheme, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) shall confirm the scheme. If objections are received, then the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may either confirm the scheme, with or without modifications, or refuse to confirm it. If the scheme is confirmed it should be published. Section 21 relates to repartition to be carried out by the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the scheme as confirmed under s. 20 and the boundaries of the holdings as demarcated are required to be shown on the shajra which shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates con\n\ncemed. Any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objections before the Consolidation Officer who shall after hearing the appellant pass such order as he considers proper. An appeal is provided from the order of the Consolidation Officer to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).\n\nA person aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may appeal to the State Government. Section 22 provides for the preparation of a new record-of-rights by the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the provisions contained in Ch. IV of the Punjab Land Revenue Act: .1887 for !he area under onsolition, giving effect to the repart1t1on. Section 23 deals with the nghts to possession of new holdings. Section 36 provides for the power to vary or revoke the scheme and reads as follows :\n\n\"A scheme for the consolidation of holdings confirmed under this Act may, at any time, be varied or revoked by the authority which confirms it subject to any order of the State Government that may be made in relation thereto and a subsequent scheme may be prepared published and confirmed in accordance with the provi: sions of this Act.\"\n\nSection 42 of the Act, as it originally stood, was to the following effect :\n\n\"The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit :\n\nProvided that no order shall be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.\" Section 18 of the Act is important and provides as follows :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, it shall be lawful for the Consolidation Officer to direct-\n\n(a) that any land specifically assigned for any common purpose shall cease to .be so assigned and to assign any other land in its place;\n\n(b) that any land under the bed of a.stream or torrent flowing through or from the Siwalik mountain range within the State shall be assigned for any common purpose;\n\n(c) that if in any area under consolidation no land is reserved for any common purpose including extension of the village abadi or if the land so reserved is inadequate, to assign other land for such purpose.\" Section 46 of the Act confers powers on the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in particular to provide for :\n\n\"(e) the manner in which the area is to be reserved under s. 18 and the manner in which it is to be dealt with and also the manner in which the village abadi is to be given to proprietors and non-proprietors (including sche duled castes, Sikh backward classes, artisans and labourers) on payment of compensation or otherwise;\" On March 3, 1956 the Punjab Government, by a notification, add ed rule 16 to the Rules for reservation of the abadi for the pro ._prietors as well as the non-proprietors and it read as follows :\n\n\"The area to be reserved for the common p1i1rpose of extension of abadi for proprietors and non-proprietors under section 18(c) of the Act shall be reserved after scrutinizing the demand of proprietors desirous of build ing houses and of non-proprietors including Harijan families working as agrarian labourers who are in need of a site for house.\n\nThe land reserved for extension of abadi shall be divided into plots of suitable sizes. For the plots allotted to proprietors area of equal value shall be deducted from their holdings but in the case of non proprietors including Harijan families these shall be allotted without payment of compensation and they shalJ\n\nbe deemed to be fUll owners of the plots allotted to them.\" On April 9, 1957 the Punjab Government added rule 16(ii) which provided for reservation of lands for the Gram Panchayat. It read as follows : • \"In an estate or estates where during consolidation proceedings there is no shamlat deb land or such land is considered inadequate, land shall be reserved for the village Panchayat, under section 1 S(c) of the Act, out of the common pool of the village at a scale prescribed by Government from time to time.\n\nProprietary rights in nspect of land, so reserved (except the area reserved for the extension of abadi of proprietors and non-proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body of the estate or estates concerned, and it shall be entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as (jumla malikan wa digar haqdaran arazi hasab rasad raqba).\n\nThe management\n\n~ of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietary body and the Panchayat shall have the right to utilize the income derived from the land so reserved for the common needs and benefits of the estate or estates concerned.\"\n\nIn Munsha Singh v. State of Punjab('), the Punjab High Court declared n1le 16(ii) as ultra vires. After the decision of that case the second amending Act (27 of 1960) was passed. It gave a legal cover to rule 16(ii) by including in s. 2 of the Act the following :\n\n\"2(bb) 'Common purpose' means any purpose in relation to any common need, convenience or benefit of the village and includes the following purposes :-\n\n(i) extension of the village abadi;\n\n(ii) provide income for the Panchayat of the village concerned for the benefit of the village community;\n\n(iii) village roads and paths; village drains; village wells, ponds or tanks; village water-courses or water channels; village bus stands and waiting places; manure pits; hada rori; public latrines; cremation and burial grou!lds; Panchayat Ghar; Janj Ghar; grazing grounds; tanmng places; mela grounds; public places, of religious or charitable nature; and\n\n(iv) schools and playgrounds, dispensaries, hospitals and institutions of like nature, waterworks or tube-wells, whether such schools, play grounds, dispensaries, hospi-\n\nsessee appealed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, inter a/ia, held that as a copy of the notice was not pasted on the outer wall of the office room of the Income-Tax Office, the substituted service was invalid.\n\nFurther, on appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that the notice was properly served under Order V. r. 20(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as the Income-Tax Officer was not a Court it \"\".as not incumbent on him to affix a copy of the notice on th~\n\nnotice board of the Income-Tax Office. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the notice was properly served and set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe High Court, following its earlier decision in Jhabar Mal Clwkhani v. Commi.uioner of Income-Tax(') held that the substituted service was invalid and answered the question in the negative.\n\nIt also refu; ed to allow the counsel for the Revenue to raise the --- - --~-·- --- -·\n\n(I) 49 I. T. R. 391.\n\n:JOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\npoint that the notice under s. 34 had been served in time even if the service be taken to have been effected after March 31, 1954.\n\nHe had relied before the High Court on the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, and the decision of this Court in S. C.\n\nPrasher v. Vasantson Dwarkadas.( 1)\n\nThe learned counsel for the Revenue, Mr. B. Sen, urges, first, that in view of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Straw Products Ltd. (') the High Court erred in not allowing the second point to b.e raised, and secondly, he contends, that the earlier case of the High Court in Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Commissioner of lllcome\n\nTax(') was wrongly decided.\n\nAs we agree with the latter con tention. it is not necessary to deal with the first point raised by him.\n\nUnder s. 63 of the Income-Tax Act a notice may be served us if it were the summons issued by the court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The answer to the question depends on the true interpretation of 0. V. r. 20( I) of the Civil Procedure Code which reads as follows :-\n\n\" (I ) Where the Court is satisfied that there is reason to believe that th.e defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the court-house, and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have lust resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the Court\n\nthinks~!~-. --·----·- . .. ------\n\nMr. Sen divides the above sub-rule into two parts. According to him, the first part deals with a copy of the summons being affixed in the court-house and another copy being uflixed in some conspi cuous part of the residential house or business premises. He suys thnt it is not obligatory on the Court to ndopt this method. but the Court can. in view of the circumstances. order the service of the notice in my other manner as it thinks fit. Mr. Sen further says thnt it would be noticed that the word \"also\" has not been repeated in the Just ten words of the sub-rule. underlined above. He says that in a particular case it is in tht: discretion of the Court to order\n\nservice of the notice by registered post or by affixing n copy thereof and then satisfying itself that. the copy has been affixed in a proper manner.\n\n(I) [196<) IS. C.R. ~9: 401.T.R. I.\n\n(1) [1965] 1 S. C.R. si1.\n\n(~) 49 LT.R. 391.\n\nIn our view, there is great deal of force in what Mr. Sen urges.\n\nIt seems to us that the last ten words in sub-rule ( 1) of r. 20, do confer a discretion on the Coun to adopt any other manner of service.\n\nThe sub-rule prescribes one manner which the Court may follow and this manner consists of two acts; ( 1) affixing a copy of the summons in the court-house, and (2) affixing it in some conspicuous part of the residential house or the business premises of the defendant. If the High Court were right we would expect that the word \"also\" would be repeated and inserted between the word \"or\" and \"in\" in the last ten words. The alternative manner which the Court decides to adopt for serving must of course be such as gives notice to the person to be served.\n\nThe High Court in Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Commissioner of l11come Tax(') had relied on Deccan Co-operative Bank Ltd. v.\n\nParsram Tolaram(') but that case considered 0. 21, r. 46, subr.\n\n(2), and in our view, t.he High Court wrongly regarded that provi sion being in pari materia with 0. V. r. 20(1 ), because, in r. 46(2) the last ten words in 0. V. r. 20(1) which we have underlined do not figure.\n\nThe decision of the Patna High Court in Narendra Prasad Sinha v. Maharani Janki Kuer(') is also distinguishable as it also deals with 0. 21, r. 46(2).\n\nIt seems to us that the object of the Legislature in giving a discretion to the Court is to enable the Court to see that unnecessary steps are not taken anci the service is effected in the most E expeditious and best manner. For example, if the person to be\n\nservd had, to the knowledge of the Court, temporarily gone outside India, the Court might have sent, even before the insertion of r. 20A, the summons by registered post to his address abroad without affixing a copy thereof in the court-house. In Narendra Klshore Das v. Bnamli Sahu Dibakar Sa/tu Firm(') the Division Bench F of the Or1ssa High Court held that \"the last mode of service namely 'or in such other manner as the Court thinks fit' no doubt gives the Court the jurisdiction to have the servic~ of suons through registered post.\"\n\n. I~ our opinion, the case of Jhabar Mal Chokhanl v. Comm1s.1wnc1 of Income Tax(') was wrongly decided, In the result we G accept the appeal, ct asde the judgment of the High Court and answer the queuon m the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.P.S.\n\n(1)491.T.R.391.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1942, Sind, 96.\n\n(3) A. l. R. 1947. Pat. 385. (4)A.1. R. 1951. Oriw1, )12.\n\nA ppea/ allowed.", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAULAT RAM KHANNA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAULAT RAM KHANNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB\n\nDAULAT RAM KHANNA March 29, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 431, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, T. A. Ramachandran and S. P. Nay.var for R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2183, "end_char": 2201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, T. A. Ramachandran and S. P. Nay.var for R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nay.var", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2206, "end_char": 2219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, T. A. Ramachandran and S. P. Nay.var for R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, T. A. Ramachandran and S. P. Nay.var for R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2261, "end_char": 2272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Aiyar and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Aiyar and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2360, "end_char": 2365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed againt the judgment of the High Court of Punjab, Chandigarh, in Income Tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab, Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2439, "end_char": 2471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSikri, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed againt the judgment of the High Court of Punjab, Chandigarh, in Income Tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2558, "end_char": 2563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2576, "end_char": 2603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2736, "end_char": 2746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram Khanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts, in brief, are that the respondent, Shri Daulat Ram Khanna, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a Hindu Undivided family, and the dispute relates to the year of assessment 1945-46.", "canonical_name": "DAULAT RAM KHANNA"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3076, "end_char": 3090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proceedings under s. 34 of the Income-Tax Act were started by the Income Tax Officer, 'B' Ward, Amritsar, against the assessee by issue of a notice on March 29, 1954."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3196, "end_char": 3210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proceedings under s. 34 of the Income-Tax Act were started by the Income Tax Officer, 'B' Ward, Amritsar, against the assessee by issue of a notice on March 29, 1954."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Process Server went to the assessee's shop for service of the notice on the assessee on March 30, 1954, but he could not serve it on the assessee because the karta of the assessee was not present."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need not give the facts regarding the service of the notice by registered post because it was received by the assessee on April 5, 1954."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "JOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1967] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":JOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1967] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5244, "end_char": 5249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\npoint that the notice under s. 34 had been served in time even if the service be taken to have been effected after March 31, 1954."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1)\n\nThe learned counsel for the Revenue, Mr. B. Sen, urges, first, that in view of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Straw Products Ltd. (') the High Court erred in not allowing the second point to b.e raised, and secondly, he contends, that the earlier case of the High Court in Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Commissioner of lllcome\n\nTax(') was wrongly decided.", "canonical_name": "B. Sen"}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5984, "end_char": 5998, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6074, "end_char": 6101, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6831, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sen divides the above sub-rule into two parts."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8911, "end_char": 8927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Patna High Court in Narendra Prasad Sinha v. Maharani Janki Kuer(') is also distinguishable as it also deals with 0."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For example, if the person to be\n\nservd had, to the knowledge of the Court, temporarily gone outside India, the Court might have sent, even before the insertion of r. 20A, the summons by registered post to his address abroad without affixing a copy thereof in the court-house."}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_302_321_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "BHAGAT RAJA v.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMarch 29, 1967\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nMines & Minerals (Regulation and Dev.elapme11t) Act, 1957, s. 30 and Rules 54 & 55 1nade under the Act--State Governnient's order refusing mining lease to one party and granting it 'to another-Central Governnient whether in deciding revision under r. 55 should pass 'speaking order.\n\nThe appellant was one of several applicants for a mmmg lease in Andhra Pradesh.\n\nThe State Government however granted it to respondent No. 3.\n\nThe appellant then filed an application in revision, under s. 30 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, read with r. 54, to the Union of India.\n\nRespondent No. 3 filed a counter statement and the State Government filed its comments.\n\nThe appellant filed a rejoinder. The Union Government without hearing the appellant rejected his revision application, An appeal was filed before this Court. The question that fell for consideration was whether it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or aliunde because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court.\n\nHELD: (i) In exercising its powers of revision under r. SS the Central Government discharges fuiictioas which are quasi-judicial, The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this court under Art. 136.\n\nBoth the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word 'rejected' or 'dismissed'. In such a case this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction ..,, atisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the case. This would certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appCal.\n\n[308E-F; 309B-C]\n\nIf the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision.\n\nBut when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court. in appeal may have to examine the case de novo, without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government.\n\nThe same difficulty would arise where the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not and the Central Government gives its decision without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the ordr of the State Govemn1ent.\n\nThat is why in such circumstances, what 1s known as a 'speaking order' is called for.\n\n[309C-FJ\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 303\n\nA 'speaking order' is all the more necessary in the case of a decision under r. 55 because there is provision for new material being placed before the Central Government which was not there before the State Government, and further, because the decision, affecting important rights of parties, is given in a sui:imary manner without a hearing. eing allowed to the parties.\n\nA party IS entitled to know why the dec1S1on has gone against him.\n\n[320G-321B]\n\nThe absence in r. 55 of any provision for giving such reasons is not decisive of the matter in view of the above considerations.\n\n[315H]\n\nShivji Nathub/Jai v. The Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775, M.P.\n\n\nShyam Sundar lhunjhunwala, (1962] 2 S.C.R. 339 and Sardar Govindrao\n\nv. State, [1965] I S.C.R. 678, followed.\n\nNandram Hunatram, Calcutta v. Union of India, A.i.R. 1966 S.C. 1922 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. V. Pi//iah, 43 I.T.R. 411, distinguished.\n\nRex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal Ex flprte Shaw, [1951] 1 K.B. 711, Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras, AO.R.\n\n1952 Madras 276, Ramayya v. State of Andhra, I.L.R. 1956 Andhra 712, Annamalai v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 738 and Joseph v. Superintendent of Post Officts, Kottayam,\n\nJ.L.R.\n\n1961 II Kerala 245, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeals Nos. 2596 and 2597 of 1966.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Orders dated May 2, 1966 and June 22, 1966 of the Government of India, Ministry of Mines and Metals, New Delhi on application is filed by the appellant under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.\n\nS. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal for the appellant (in both the appeals). '\n\nG. N. Dikshit, R. N. Sachthey for S. P. Nayyar for respondent No. 1 (in both the apals). '\n\nP. Ram Reddy and B. Parthasarathy, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals) .\n\nM. C. Setalvad, B. Dutta, and 0. C. Mathur for respondent No. 3 (in both the appeals). '\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Milter, J.\n\nThese two appeals by special leave, are limited to the question as to whether in dismissin_g a revision and confirming the order of the State of Andhra Pradesh the Union of India was bound to make a speaking order. The text of the order is the same in both the cases, the only difference being in\n\nthe situs and the area in respect of wh, ich tho lease was applied for. One of the orders runs as follows :\n\n\"New Delhi, the 22nd June, 1966\".\n\nI am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh.\n\nYour application for revision is, therefore, rejected.\"\n\nThe facts leading to the two appeals are as follows : In response to a notification dated January 8, 1964 published in the State Gazette by the Andhra Pradesh Government inviting applications under r. 5 8 of the rules framed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules and the Act) the appellant submitted two applications in the prescribed form viz., Form \"I\" for areas aggregating Ac. 113-50 in village Brahmanapalli and Ac. 13-10 in village lppatta both in the district of Cuddapah for mining asbestos. Res pondent No. 3 also made similar applications on the same date.\n\nAccording to the appellant. his applications complied with all the requirements of Form \"I\" while those of respondent No. 3 were defective in some respects.\n\nBesides the appellant and the respondent No. 3, there was only one other person who applied for a prospecting licence which was rejected off-hand.\n\nAs between the appellant and the respondent No. 3, the Government of Andhra Pradesh preferred the latter.\n\nThe relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:\n\n\"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja G and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government.\n\nThe mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for H the areas covered by the mining lea1e application of M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is rejected.\"\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 305\n\nThe text of the order with regard to village Ippatta is practically the 5ame.\n\nThe appellant filed application in revision in the prescribed fonn i.e. Fonn 'N' under s. 30 of the Act read with r. 54 to the Union of India on December 14, 1964. The appellant tried to. bring out in his revision applications that the financial condition of the 3rd respondent was extremely precarious as would be evidenced by documents, copies whereof were annexed to his petition.\n\nThe 3rd respondent filed a counter statement to the revmon application in April 1965. In March 1966 the appellant received the comments of the Andhra. Pradesh Government on his revision applications.\n\nThe appellant filed rejoinder to the counter statements of the 3rd respondent in May 1965 and to the comments of the Andhra Pradesh Government in April 1966.\n\nHe also asked for the grant of a personal hearing before the decision of the case which was not given. Ultimately, his applications were rejected by ord.ers quoted hereinabove.\n\nVarious grounds of appeal were taken in the application for special leave to appeal preferred by the appellant.\n\nAn attempt has been made therein to show that respondent No. 3 had no experience in asbestos mining, that its financial position was very unsatisfactory and that its application for mining lease was not in proper form.\n\nA complamt was also made that in rejecting the applicant's revision applications the Union of India was bound to give reasons for its decision as it was exercising quasi .iudicial powers under s. 30 of the Act read with tT. 54 and 55, that principles of natural justice and £airplay requiring the divulgence of the grounds were violated and that a personal hearing should have been given to the appellant before the disposal of the revision applications.\n\nWe are not called upon in this case to go into the merits of the case but only to examine the question as to whether it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or aliunde because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court. It is necessary to take note of a few provisions of the Act and the relevant rules framed thereunder to ascertain the scope of a party's right to apply for a lease and the powers and duties of the Government in accepting or rejecting the some. The preamble to the Act shows that its object was to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union of India. Under s. 4( 1) no person can undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the tenns and conditions of a prospecting licence or a mining lease granted under the Act and the Rules.\n\nUnder sub-s. (2) of the section\n\n\"No prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.\"\n\n.S. 5 Jays dowp, certain conditions which a person desiring to have a mining lease must fulfil.\n\nS. 8 provides for the period for which a mining lease may be granted.\n\nUnder s. 10( 1) an application for a mining lease has to be made to the State Government concerned in the prescribed form.\n\nSub-s. (3) of s. 10 runs as follows :\n\n\"On receipt of an application under this section, the State Government may, having regard to the provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder, grant or refuse to grant the licence or lease.\"\n\nUnder sub-s. (2) of s. 11 a person whose application for a licence is received earlier than those of others shall have a preferential right for the grant thereof over the others. The proviso to this sub-section enacts that where applications are received on the same day, the State Government, after taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-s. ( 3), may grant the mining lease to such one of the applicants as it may deem fit. Sub-s. ( 3) specifies 4he matters referred to in sub-s. (2) and they are as follows:-\n\n(a) any special knowledge or experience in, prospecting operations or mining operations, as the case may be, possessed by the applicant;\n\n(b) the financial resources of the applicant; ( c) the nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by the applicant; and ( d) such other matters as may be prescribed. s. 13(1) enables the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases.\n\nUnder s.19 any mining lease granted, riinewed or acquired in contravention of the provisions of the Act' is to be void and of no effect. Power of revision of the order of the State Government is given to the Central Government in the following terms :\n\n\"The Central Government may, of its own motion or on application made within the prescribed time by the aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exeipse of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act.\" Rules were made by the Central Government under s.13 of the Act known as the Mineral Concession Rules, 19~0. R.22 pres- -cribes that an application for the grant of a mining lease must be made to the State Government in Form \"I\" accompanied by a\n\nJ;'\n\nDllAGAT RAJA V. UNION (Mille!', J.) 307\n\nfee of Rs. 200/-, a deposit of Rs. 500/- and an income-~ clearance certificate.\n\nUnder r. 26 the State Government IS obliged to give reasons for refusal to grant a mining lease. Any\n\nperson aggrieved by an order made by the State Government may prefer an application for revision under r. 54 in Form 'N'. In every such application against the order of the State Government refusing to grant a mining lease, a person to whom .a. lease has been granted must be impleaded as a party. R. 55 onginally framed in 1960 was amended in July 1965. Under the amended r. 55 the position is as follows :-\n\n\" ( 1 ) On receipt of an application for revision under r. 54, copies thereof shall be sent to the State Government and to all the impleaded parties calling upon them to make such comments as they may like\n\nto make within three months of the date of issue of the communication and if no comments are received within that period, it is to be presumed that the party omit.ting to make such comments has none to make. ( 2) On receipt of the comments 'from any party under sub-rule ( 1), copies thereof have to be sent to the other parties c, alling -upon them to niake further comments as they may like to make within one month from the date of the issue of the communication.\n\n( 3) The revision application, the communications containing comments and counter-comments referred to in sub-rules (1) and (2) shall constitute the record of the case. .\n\n( 4) After considering the records referred to in sub-rule ( 3), the Central Government may confinn, modify or set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as it may deem just and proper.\" From t)le above, it will be amply clear that in exercising its powers of revision under r. 55 the Central Government mu5t take into i;:onsideration not only the material which was before the State .Government but comments and counter-comments, if any, which the parties may make rejlarding the order of the State Government.\n\nIn other words, it is open to th.e pa1 ties to show how and where the State Government had gone wrong, or, why the order of the State Government should be confinned.\n\nA party whose application for a mining lease is turned down by the State Government is therefore given an opportunhy of showing that the State Government had taken into consideration irrelevant matters or based its decision on grounds which were not justified.\n\nAt the time when applications for a licence are made by different parties to the State Government, they are not LSSup/67-7\n\ngiYen a~ opportunity of showing any defects or demelits in the applications of the others or why their applications shuuld be preferred to others.\n\nThe State Government has to make up its ind by considering the applicatlo115 before it as to which party 1s to be preferred to the other or others.\n\nS.11 ( 3), as already noted, prescribes the matters which the State Government must consider before selecting one out of the numerc; ius applicants.\n\nBut the po3sibility of the State Government being misled in its consideration of the matters cannot be ruled out.\n\nIt may be that a prty to whom a lease is directed to be granted has in fact no spl?C1al knwledge or experince requisite for the mining operations or 1t may be that hts financial resources have not been properly disclosed.\n\nIt may also be that the nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by him is not of the requisite standard.\n\nEn an application for revision under r. SS it will be open to an aggrieved party to contend that :the matters covered by sub-s. (3) of s. 11 were not properly examined by the State Government, or that the State Government had not before it all the available material fo make up its mind with respect thereto before granting a licence. In a case where complaints of this nature are made, of necessity, the Central Government has to scrutinise matters which were not canvassed before the State Government.\n\nA question may arise in such cases as to whether the order of the Central Government in the form in which it was made in this case would be sufficient, specially in view of the fact that the correctness thereof may be tested in appeal to this Court.\n\nIt is now well-settled that in exercising its powers of revision under r. S5 the Central Government discharges functions which are quasi judicial : see Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India & Ors.(') and M. P. Industries v. Union('). In the latter case one of us (our present Chief Justice) said (at p. 471):\n\n\"The entire scheme of the rules posits a judicial procedure and the Central Government is constituted as a tribunal to dispose of the said revision.\n\nIndeed this Court in Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of I.nia\n\n(supra) rules that the Central Government cxerc1s1ng its power of review under r. 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was acting judicially as a tribunal.\n\nThe new rule, if at all, is clearer in that regard and emphasises the judicial character of the proceeding.\n\nIf it was a tribunal, this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution can entertain an appeal against the order of the Central Government made in exercise of its revisional powers under r. 55 of tbe Rules.\" (i}(I96':ji S.C.R. 775.\n\n(2) [1966] 2 S. C.R. 466,\n\n\\ A\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 309\n\nLet us now examine the question as to whether it was incumbent on the Central Government to give any reasons for its decision on review.\n\nIt was argued that the very exercise of judicial or quasi judicial powers in the case of a tribunal entailed upon it an obligation to give reasons for arriving at a dision for or against a party. The decisions of tribunals in Indta are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Art. 136.\n\nIt goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word \"rejected\", or, \"dismissed\" In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealmg with the appeal. Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of the others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reaspns given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision.\n\nBut, when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to -uphold the order of the State Government, this Court, in al?peal, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a \"speaking order\" is called for.\n\nThe order of the Central Government of June :2, 1966 is so woded as to be open to the construction that the reviewing authority was primarily concerned with finding out whether any grounds had been made out for interfering with the decision of the State Government. In other words, the Central Government was not so much concerned to examine the grounds or the reasons for the decision of the State Government but to find out whether here was any cause for disturbing the same. Prima facie the order does not show that the reviewing authority had anv thought of expressing its own reasons for m:uutaining the decision arrived at. If detailed reasons had been given by the\n\nState Government and the Central Government had indicated clearly that it was accepting the reasons for the decision of the\n\nState Government, One would be in a position to say that the reasons for the grant of a lease to a person other than the appellant were obvious.\n\nBut, where as here, the State Government does not find any fault or defect in the application of the unsuccessfully applicant and merely prefers another on the ground that \"he had adequate general experience and technical knowledge and was an old lessee without any arrears of mineral dues\" it is difficult to say what turned the scale in favour of the successful applicant excepting the fact that he was known to the State Government from before. We do not want to express any views on this but if this be a proper test, then no new entrant in the field can have any chance of success where there is an old lessee competing with him.\n\nThe order of the Central Government .does not bring out any reason for its own decision except that no ground for interference with the decision arrived at was established.\n\nNow we propose to examine some decisions of this Court where the question as to whether the reviewing authority should give reasons for its decisions was gone into. In Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala(\") this Court had to consider whether the Central Government exercising appelVate powers under s.111 of the Companies Act, 1956 before its amendment in 1960 was a tribUI)al exercising judicial functions and as such, subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and whether the Central Government had acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or acted illegally otherwise in directing the company to register the transfer or transfers in favour of the respondents. There, the articles of association of the company concerned gave the directors the right in their absolute discretion and without assigning any reason to refuse to register any transfer of shares. The directors declined to register some shares in the name of the transferees who applied to the High Court at Bombay for orders under s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 for rectification of the share register on the ground that the board of directors had exercised their right ma/a fide, arbitrarily and capriciously. The High Court rejected tbese petitions on the ground that controversial questions of law and fact could not be tried .in summary proceedings under s. 38. The transferees request.ed the directors once more to register the shares.\n\nOn their refusal to do so, appeals were preferred to the Central Government under s.111 (3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 which had since come into operation. The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, who heard the appeals declined to order registration of transfers\n\n\n\\, A ,_\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNioN (Mitter, J.) 31.l\n\npractically on grounds similar to those put forward by the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThereafter, the original holder of the shares transferred some shares to his son and some to his daughter-iniaw and the transferees requested the company to register the transfers.\n\nThe directors once more refused.\n\nAgainst the resolution of the directors, separate appeals were preferred by the son and daughter-in-law of the original holder of the shares. The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India set aside the resolution passed by the board of directors and directed the company to register the transfers. No reasons were however given for such order. The company came up in appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. According to the judgment of the majorit)' of Judges, the exercise of authority by the Central Gove.rnment was judicial as it had to adjudicate upon the rights of contesting parties when there was a !is between them.\n\nIt was observed in that case that\n\n\"If the Central Government acts as a tribunal exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that power is subject to the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, we fail to se how the power of this court can be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of its . order.\"\n\nThis Court further held that there had been no proper trial of the appeals, no reasons having been given in support of the orders of the Deputy Secretary who heard them and in the result, the orders were quashed with a direction that the appeals be re-heard and disposed of according to law.\n\nIn Sardar Govindrao v. State ( 1 ) the appellants who claimed to be descendants of fonner ruling chiefs in some districts of Madhya Pradesh applied under the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Lan;:i Revenue Exemptions. Act, 1948 for grant of money or pension as suitable maintenance for themselves.\n\nThey held estates in two districts on favourable terms as Ja!zgirdars Maufidars and Ubaridars and enjoyed an exemption from payment of land revenue aggregating Rs. 27,828-5-0 per year. On the passing of the Act, the exemption was lost and they claimed to be entitled to grant of money or pension under the pr<;>visions of the Act. They applied to the Deputy Commissioner who forwarded their applications to the State Government.\n\nThese were rejected without any reasons being given therefor. The appellants file.ct a petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art. 226 of the Constitutfon\n\nfor a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Government. l'he High Court held that the State Government \"was\n\n\nnot compelled to grant either money or pension because the exercise of the power under s. S was discretionary and the peti\n\ntion, therefore was incompetent.\" S. S (3) of the C.P. and Berar Act provided as follows :-\n\n\"The Provincial Government may make a grant of money or pension- ( i) for the maintenance or upkeep of any religious, charitable or public institution or service of a like nature, or\n\n(ii) for suitable maintenance of any family of a descendant from a former ruling chief.\" S. 6 barred the jurisdiction of civil courts. It was observed b} this Court:\n\n\"The Act lays down upon the Government a duty which obviously must be performed in a judicial manner.\n\nThe appellants did not seem to have been heard at all. The Act bars a suit and there is all the more reason that Government must deal with such case in a quasi-judicial manner giving an opportunity to the claimants to state their case in the light of the report of the Deputy Commissioner.\n\nThe appellants were also entitl~ to know the reason why their claim for the grant of money or pensipn was rejected by Government and how they were considered as not falling within the class of persons who it was clearly intended by the Act to be compensated in this manner. . . . . . . . As the order of Government does not fulfil the elementary requirements of a quasijudicial process YI!: do not consider it necessary to order a remit to the High Court.\" In the result this Court set aside the order of the Government and directed the disposal of the case in the light of the remarks made.\n\nIn M. P. Industries v. Union(') the order of the Central Government rejcting the revision application under r. 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules was couched in exactly the samo language as the order in appeal before us (see at p. 475 of the report).\n\nOne cannot help feeling that the Ministry concerned have a special form which is to be used whenever a review application is to be rejected.\n\nThis may easily lead anyone to believe that the review is a sham and nothing but the formal observance of the power granted to the Cen !):al Government.\n\nIn that case, all the three learned Judges of this Court who heard the appeal were unanimous in dismissing it : sorne of the obser\n\n(I) [196] I S.C.R. 466.\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNION lMitler, I.) 313\n\nvations made bear repetition.\n\nIt was there 11rgued that if tho Central Government had to give reasons when it functioned u\n\na tribunal, it would obstruct the work of the Govenunent and lead' to unnecessary delays.\n\nAs to this it said by our present Chief Justice :\n\n\"The Central Government functions only through different officers and in this case it functioned through an Under Secretary.\n\nThe condition of giving reasons is only attached to an order made by the Government when it functions judicially as a tribunal in a comparatively small number of matters and not in regard to other administrative orders it passes . . ... .\n\nOur Constitution posits a welfare State ..... .\n\nIn the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necesary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself.\n\nSelf-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimise arbitrnriness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind.\n\nThe compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimises arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds.\n\nA reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal.\n\n. . . . If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or\n\nirrelvant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutmy and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard.\"\n\nIt was further obseryed in that case that the position of ordinary courts of law was different from that of tribunals exercising judicial functions and it was said :\n\n. \"A Judge is traied t~ look at tings objectively, uninfluenced by cons1derallons of pohcy or expediency; but, an execul!ve officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of\n\nmind of an executive .offi6er so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appellate courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the appellate or rcvisional court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or there are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with it.\n\nBut the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is lacoruc and does not give any reasons.\n\nThat apart, when we insist upon reasons; we do. not prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons.\n\nThe extent and the nature of the reasons depend upon case of aflirmance where the original tribunal gives hunal shall give its own reasons succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons.\n\nWhat is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal. The nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon the facts of each case.\"\n\nIt must be noted however that the above view was not shared by the two other Judges of the Bench constituting this Court. It was said by them :\n\n\"For the purpose of an appeal under Art. 136, orders of Courts and tribunals stand on the same footing.\n\nAn order of court dismissing a revision application often gives no reason, but this is not a sufficient ground for quashing it. Likewise, an order of an adminstrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground !hat it do.es not give reasons for the rejection.\"\n\nThey distinguished the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.(') on the ground that the Central Government had reversed the. deci siOL appealed without giving any. reasons and the latter did not disclose any apparent grounds for reversal and added :\n\n\"There is a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority in that case for no\n\n(1) [19621 2 S.C.R. 339.\n\nBHAGAT RAJA V. UNION (Mitte~. J,)\n\nreason whatsoever and the order of affinnance by the revising authority in the present case.\"\n\nAs has already been :noted, the board of directors in that case did not give any reasons for the refusal to register and th~ entral Government adopting the same course reversed the decmon of the directors without giving any reasons. Clearly, the act of the Central Government there savoured of arbitrariness.· Under the articles of association of the company, the directors were not obliged to give any reasons.\n\nTheir power of refusal was unrestricted if they acted bona fide or in the interest of the company.\n\nThe reversal of their discretion clearly amounted to a finding that they had acted arbitrarily or ma/a fide and one was, left to guess the reasons of the Central Government for coming to this conclusion.\n\nAs has already been said, when the authority whose decision is to be reviewed gives reasons for its conclusion and the reviewing authority affinns the decision for the reasons given by the lower authority, one can assume that the reviewing authority found the reasons given by the lower authority as acceptable to it; but where the lower authority itself fails to give any reason other than that the successful applicant was an old lessee and the reViewing authority does not even refer to that ground, this Coun has to grope in the dark for finding out reasons for upholding or rejecting the decision of the reviewing authority. After an a tribunal which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers can certainly indicate its mind as to why it acts in a particular way and when important rights of parties of far-reaching consequence to them are adjudicated upon in a summary fashion, without giving a personal hearing where proposals and counter-proposals are made and examined, the least that can be expected is that the tribunal should tell the party why the decision is going against him in all cases where the law gives a further right of appeal.\n\nOn behalf of the res{Xlndents, it was contended that r. 55 whic~ provided for a revision did not envisage the filing of fresh pleadmgs and fresh material but only invited comments of the pllrties with regard to the matter before the Central Government.\n\nIt was argued that if after going through the comments and co'!nter-comments t_he Cntral Government found no reason to arnve .at a conclusion different from that of the State Governll}Cnt: 1t W'.15 not called upon to disclose any grounds for its decis10n 1~ review. Our. attention was drawn in particular tor. 26 of the Ml!leral Concession Rules which enjoined upon the State Govrnment to communicate in .writing the reasons for any .order\n\ntefus.1g grant or ree~ a mining lease. The absence of any P.?OV1S1on Ill r. 55 for glVlng such reasons was said to be decisive 911, the.matter sindiCl\\tiye of.the view of the legislature that there was no necessity fr giving reasons for the order on review. We find ounel\\\"e8 unable to accept this contention.\n\nTake the case\n\nwhere the Central Government sets aside the order of the State\n\nGovernment without giving any reasons as in Harinagar Sugar Mills' case('). The party who loses before the Central Government cannot know why he had lost it and would be in great difficulty in pressing his appeal to the Supreme Court and this Court would have to do the best it could in circumstances which are not con\n\nducive to the proper disposal of the appeal. Equally, in a case where the Central Government merely affirms the order of the State Government, it should make it clear in the order itself as to why it is affirming the same. It is not suggested that the Cen trnl Government should write out a judgment as courts of law are wont to do.\n\nBut we find no merit in the contention that an authortiy which is called upon to determine and adjudicate upon the rights of parties subject only to a right of appeal to this Court should not be expected to give an outline of the process of reasoning by which they find themselves in agreement with the decision of the State Government. As a matter of fact, r. 26 considerably lightens the burden of the Central Government in this respect. As the State Government has to give reasons, the Central Govern\n\nment after considering the comments and counter-comments on the reasons given by the State Government should have no diffi culty in making up its mind as to whether the reasoning of the State Government is acceptable and to state as briefly as possible the reasons for its own conclusion.\n\nOur attention was drawn to a judgment of this Court in Nand ram Hunatram, Calcutta v. Union of India('). There, one of the points made by the appellant in the appeal to this Court was that the order of the Central Government, in review, upholding the action of the State Government cancelling the mining lease grant\n\ned to the appellant was bad inasmuch as no reasons were given. It was pointed out in the judgment in that case that the facts there were so notorious that the reasons for the action of the State Gov ernment and the confirmation of its order by the Central Government were too obvious and could not possibly be questioned by anybody. The1e the partners of the appellant firm had fallen out among themselves and none of them was willing to spend money on the colliery with the result that the work came to a stand-still and the colliery began to get flood~. At this juncre, Govern mcnt stepped in and made pronus~ to the essenttl workmen that their wa&es would be paid and this saved the colhery. There\n\n;1fter, the Chief Inspector of Mines was infom1ed by one of the partners of the appellant firm that the othe~ partners were pre\n\nventing him from making payment o.r runmng expelll!es of. the colliery and that he was. not in a position to perfom1 his duties .as\n\nan occupier. He accordingly resigned his office. Tre Manager also\n\n---- .. .. -~-···--·--\n\n(2) A.1.R.. \\966 S.C.R. l9l2\n\n(I) (196212 S.C.R. ,39,\n\nE ..\n\nG·\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, /.) 317\n\nresigned and the Sub-Divisional Officer of the district informed Government that the situation had become so alam1ing that some action on the pa1t of the Government was absolutelr necary.\n\nIn spite of notice, the partners refused to take any action with the result that the Government took over the colliery and terminated the lease.\n\nThe revision application filed before the Central Government under r. 54 of the rules was turned down without giving any reasons.\n\nNegativing the contention of the appellant that the order of the Central Government was bad in law because no reasons were given, it was said by this Court that\n\n'The documents on the record quite clearly establish that the colliery was being flooded as the essential services had stopped functioning and but for the timely intervention of the State Goverment the co~ liery would have been lost. In these circumstances, it is quite clear that the action of the State Government was not only right but proper and this is hardly a case in which any action other than rejecting the application for revision was called for and a detailed order was really not required because after all the Central Government was merely approving of the action taken in the case by the State Government, which stood completely vindicated . . . . .\n\nThe action of the State Government far from being arbitrary or capricious was perhaps the only one to take and all that the Central Government has done is to approve of it.\"\n\nThe last portion of the passage was relied upon by the counsel for the respondents in support of his argument that as the order in review is merely in confirmation of the action of the State Government reasons need not be 'given.\n\nBut the above dictum cannot be considered dissociated from the setting of the circum '1ances in which it was made.\n\nThere it was plain as a pike-staff lhat the State Government had no alternative but to cancel the lea>e : ti: absence of any reasons in the order on review could not possibly !ave aybody in doubt as to whether reasons were.\n\nAs matter ?f fact In the setting of facts, the reasons were so\n\n~1bv1?us tat It .11'.as not necC'.ssary to set them out. There is noth· mg. in t1h1s dem1on which is contrair to M.P. Industries v.\n\nUn!on( ).\n\nWhat the decision says is that the reasons for the acuo? of the State were so obvious th.at it was not necessary, on the fact~ of the case, to repeat them m the order of the Central Government.\n\nOu~ attention was also drawn to another judgment of this Court in Cornmi, V; rioner of Income-tax v. K. V. Pilliah (a). One o! th~ -~~-e~~J~s .. m that case before the High Court of Mysore\n\n(I) (1966] I, S. C. R. 466.\n\n(2) 43 1. T R. 411.\n\n.under s. 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act was, whether, on 1he facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in sustaining both the addition .of Rs. 41,142/- as income from business and Rs. 7,000/- as cash credits, nnd whether such addition did not result in double taxa- .tion. It was held by this Court that the question whether Rs. 41,142/- was liable to be taxed fell to be detennined under the first question. In respect of the other amount of Rs. 7,000/-\n\nthe Income-tax Officer had held that the explanation of the assessec was untrue and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal had agreed with that view.\n\nIn this setting of facts, it •was said by this Couri:\n\n''The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is the final factfinding authority and normally it should record its conclusion on every disputed queftion raised before it, setting out its reasons in support of its conclusion. But, in failing to record reasons, when the Appellate Tribunal fully agrees with the view expressed by ihe Appellate Assistant\n\nCommissioner and has no other ground to record in support of its conclusion, it does not act illegally or irregularly, merely because it does not repeat the grounds of the Appellate Assistant .Commissioner on which the decision was given against the assessee or the department.\n\nThe criticism made by the High Court that the Tribunal had \"failed to perfonn its duty in merely affirming the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner\" is apparently unmeri!PA. On the merits of the claim for exclusion of the umount of Rs. 7,000/-, there is no question of law which could be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal.\" The above observations were sought to be pressed into service 'by the counsel for the respondents but there is a good deal of difference between that case and the one with which we have to deal. The High Court there was merely called upon to give its opinion on the statement of facts set out by ihe Appellate Tribunal.\n\nIt was for the Income-tax Officer in the first instance to accept or reject the explanation with regard to the cash credit. It the Income- • tax Officer found the assessee's explanation unacceptable, he had to say why he did not accept it. Unless the assessee in appeal was able to point out to the Appellate autoities some flaw in the reasoning of the Income-tax Officer, 1t is not necessary for the appellate authorities to give their reasons independently.\n\nThe explanation of the assessee is either accepted or rejected; but in the case which we have before .us, the State Government has to consider the merits and demerits of the applications and to give its reasons why it prefers one to the ?ther or .others. There is a dispute between two or more contestmg parties and the reasons for\n\nBHAGAT RAJA. v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 319'\n\nA preferring one to the other or others may be more than one. It i&\n\nnot a question of accepting or rejecting an explanation. In our opinion, what was said in the above Income-tax case will not apply .in the case of a review by the Central Government of a decision of the State Government under the Act and the Rules.\n\nIt may be of interest to note that in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw(') an application was mi.de in the King's Bench Division in England for an order of certiorari for the quashing of a decision reached by the Compensation Appeal Tribunal dismissing an appeal by Shaw against an award to him of compensation for loss of employment as a clerk to a Hospital Board payable under the National Health Service (Transfer of Officers and Compensation) Regulations, 1948. There the question of the practice and procedure with regard to the issue of a writ of certiorari was gone into at some length. The tribunal in that case had made a speaking order, It was contended by the co•msel for the tribunal that the King's Bench Division had no power to examine the order in the case before it on certiorari on the ground that certiorari went only to defect of jurisdiction, This was turned down and the Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction to quash by certiorari the decision of an inferior tribunal when the latter had embodied the reasons for its decision in its order and those reasons are bad in law. For our purpose, we need only refer to the observations of Lord Goddard. C.J. at p. 724 of the report where he said :\n\n\"I think it is beneficial in this case that we should do so, not merely having regard to the facts of this case, but because so many tribunals have now been set up, all of whom, I am certain, desire to do their duty in the best way, and are often given very difficult sets of regulations and statutes to construe. It certainly must be for their benefit., and I have no doubt but that they will welcome, !ha.t this e; ourt sould be able to give guidance to them if, m makmg their orer~, they make their orders speakmg orders, so that th.is court can then consider them if they are brought before the court on certiorari.\"\n\nThe case for giving reasons or for making a speaking order becomes much stronger when the decision can be challenged not only by the issue of a writ of certiorari but an appeal to this court.\n\nCounsel for the respondents referred us to the comment on this c.ase made by Sir C. K. Allen in his Law and Orders (Second EditlOn) at p. 259 to p. 261. According to the learned author the Northumberland Compensation case might be a great deterent than encouragement to speaking orders inasmuch as \"the prospect\n\n(I} (1951] 1 K.B. 71 I. ·- ,\n\nof having their mental process set forth in literary form, might be extremely disagreeable to them\" and up to the year 1956 did not seem to have assisted iireatly the means of recourse against decisions of inferior jurisdictions. Speaking for ourselves, with great respect to the learned author, we do not think that the position of the Central Government as a reviewing authority under the Mineral Concession Rules can be equated with an appellaie tribunal of the type whose decision was before the King's Bench Division in England. If the State Government is enjoined by law to give its reasons, there is no reason why it should be difficult for the appellate authority to do so. The necessity and the desirability of tribunals making speaking orders has been adverted upon by different High Courts in India. Thus in Vedachala M udaliar v.\n\nState of Madras(') where the State Government of Madras set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board without giving any reasons, it was observed that\n\n\"When the policy of the Legislature is to confer powers on administrative tribunals with a duty to discharge their functions judicialJy I do not see any reason why they should be .exempted from all those safeguards inherent in its exercise of that jurisdiction. . . .\n\nFrom the standpoint of fair name of the tribunals and also in the interests of the public, they should be expected to give reasons when they set aside an order of an inferior tribunal. . . . . . Further, if reasons for an order are given, there wilJ be less scope for arbitrary or partial exercise of powers and the order 'ex facie' will indicate whether extraneous circumstances were taken into consideration by the tribunal in passing the order.'.'\n\nRefrence may also be made to Ramayya v. State of Andhra(') and Annamalai v. State of Madras(•). To the same effect is the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Joseph v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Kottayam (').\n\nWe have already commented that the order of the Central Government in this case is couched in the same language as was used in the case before this court in M.P. Industries v. Union(') in August J 965. The old rule 55 was replaced by a new rule which came into force on 19th July 1965. Whereas the old rule directed the Central Government to consider comments on the petition of review by the State overnment or other. autority nly, the new rule is aimed at calling upon all the parties mcludmg the State Government to make their commenw m the matter and the parties are given the right to make further comments on those made by\n\n(I} A.l:R. 1952 Modras 276.\n\n(2) 1, L.R. 1956 Andhro 712\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 739,\n\n(4) l.L.R. 1961·11Kerala245.\n\n(5) [1966] l S.C.R. 466.\n\nBHAGAT llAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 321\n\n.A the other or others. In effect, the parties are given a right to bring forth material which was not before the State Government.\n\nIt is easy to see that an unsuccessful party may challenge the grant of a lease in favour, of another by pointing out defects or demerits which did not eome to the knowledge of the State Government. The order in this case does not even purport to show that the comments B and counter-comments, which were before the Central Governme.nt in this case, had been considered. It would certainly have been better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the Central\n\nGovernment had taken into consideration all the fresh material adduced before it and for the reasons formulated they thought that the order of the State Government should not be disturbed.\n\nC In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the Central Government passed on 22nd June, 1966 are set aside. The Central Government is directed to decide the review applications afresh in the light of the observations made. The appellant will get his costs throughout from the 3rd respondent.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 117, "entities": [{"text": "BHAGAT RAJA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 29, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 29, 1967\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J\n\nMines & Minerals (Regulation and Dev.elapme11t) Act, 1957, s. 30 and Rules 54 & 55 1nade under the Act--State Governnient's order refusing mining lease to one party and granting it 'to another-Central Governnient whether in deciding revision under r. 55 should pass 'speaking order."}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.M. SHELAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was one of several applicants for a mmmg lease in Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then filed an application in revision, under s. 30 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, read with r. 54, to the Union of India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1079, "end_char": 1084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question that fell for consideration was whether it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or aliunde because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1318, "end_char": 1336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: (i) In exercising its powers of revision under r. SS the Central Government discharges fuiictioas which are quasi-judicial, The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1483, "end_char": 1491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 S.C.R. 339", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "New Delhi on application is filed by the appellant under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. J. Sorabji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal for the appellant (in both the appeals). '"}}, {"text": "A. J. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal for the appellant (in both the appeals). '"}}, {"text": "J. R. Gagrat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal for the appellant (in both the appeals). '"}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4753, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal for the appellant (in both the appeals). '"}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4811, "end_char": 4824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Sachthey for S. P. Nayyar for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4826, "end_char": 4840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Sachthey for S. P. Nayyar for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Sachthey for S. P. Nayyar for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4903, "end_char": 4915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and B. Parthasarathy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarathy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4920, "end_char": 4936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Ram Reddy and B. Parthasarathy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4984, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. Dutta, and 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. Dutta, and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. Dutta, and 0."}}, {"text": "Milter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5117, "end_char": 5123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Milter, J.\n\nThese two appeals by special leave, are limited to the question as to whether in dismissin_g a revision and confirming the order of the State of Andhra Pradesh the Union of India was bound to make a speaking order."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Milter, J.\n\nThese two appeals by special leave, are limited to the question as to whether in dismissin_g a revision and confirming the order of the State of Andhra Pradesh the Union of India was bound to make a speaking order."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5537, "end_char": 5546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the orders runs as follows :\n\n\"New Delhi, the 22nd June, 1966\"."}}, {"text": "14-12-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5629, "end_char": 5639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "28-1-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5657, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5889, "end_char": 5917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Brahmanapalli village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6013, "end_char": 6034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Cuddapah District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is\n\n~- no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah District, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6219, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to the two appeals are as follows : In response to a notification dated January 8, 1964 published in the State Gazette by the Andhra Pradesh Government inviting applications under r. 5 8 of the rules framed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules and the Act) the appellant submitted two applications in the prescribed form viz.,"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to the two appeals are as follows : In response to a notification dated January 8, 1964 published in the State Gazette by the Andhra Pradesh Government inviting applications under r. 5 8 of the rules framed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules and the Act) the appellant submitted two applications in the prescribed form viz.,"}}, {"text": "Brahmanapalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "113-50 in village Brahmanapalli and Ac."}}, {"text": "lppatta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6635, "end_char": 6642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13-10 in village lppatta both in the district of Cuddapah for mining asbestos."}}, {"text": "Cuddapah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13-10 in village lppatta both in the district of Cuddapah for mining asbestos."}}, {"text": "19th October 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:\n\n\"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja G and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government."}}, {"text": "s. 10(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7282, "end_char": 7290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagat Raja G", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:\n\n\"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja G and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government.", "canonical_name": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION"}}, {"text": "Tiffin's Barytes", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:\n\n\"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja G and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government."}}, {"text": "Asbestos and Paints Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7397, "end_char": 7421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the order dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:\n\n\"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja G and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district, without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government."}}, {"text": "Bhagat Raja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for H the areas covered by the mining lea1e application of M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is rejected.\"", "canonical_name": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION"}}, {"text": "Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for H the areas covered by the mining lea1e application of M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is rejected.\""}}, {"text": "Ippatta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7893, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.) 305\n\nThe text of the order with regard to village Ippatta is practically the 5ame."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8014, "end_char": 8019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra. Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8455, "end_char": 8481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In March 1966 the appellant received the comments of the Andhra."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9376, "end_char": 9381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9781, "end_char": 9800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not called upon in this case to go into the merits of the case but only to examine the question as to whether it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or aliunde because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10382, "end_char": 10390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10888, "end_char": 10892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10965, "end_char": 10974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11097, "end_char": 11102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11342, "end_char": 11347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12180, "end_char": 12188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12309, "end_char": 12313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Government or other authority in exeipse of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12704, "end_char": 12801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12852, "end_char": 12856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Government or other authority in exeipse of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act", "statute": "State Government or other authority in exeipse of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act"}}, {"text": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13056, "end_char": 13077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.22 pres- -cribes that an application for the grant of a mining lease must be made to the State Government in Form \"I\" accompanied by a\n\nJ;'\n\nDllAGAT RAJA V. UNION (Mille!',", "canonical_name": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION"}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15922, "end_char": 15926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16680, "end_char": 16685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17375, "end_char": 17377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17915, "end_char": 17945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18133, "end_char": 18141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S. C.R. 466", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18328, "end_char": 18348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18759, "end_char": 18764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisions of tribunals in Indta are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18828, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18901, "end_char": 18909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "June :2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20649, "end_char": 20662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Central Government of June :2, 1966 is so woded as to be open to the construction that the reviewing authority was primarily concerned with finding out whether any grounds had been made out for interfering with the decision of the State Government."}}, {"text": "s.111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22678, "end_char": 22683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22691, "end_char": 22710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22857, "end_char": 22865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23378, "end_char": 23398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The directors declined to register some shares in the name of the transferees who applied to the High Court at Bombay for orders under s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 for rectification of the share register on the ground that the board of directors had exercised their right ma/a fide, arbitrarily and capriciously."}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23416, "end_char": 23421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23429, "end_char": 23455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23753, "end_char": 23758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s.111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23918, "end_char": 23923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23935, "end_char": 23961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24217, "end_char": 24237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, who heard the appeals declined to order registration of transfers\n\n\\, A ,_\n\nBHAGAT RAJA v. UNioN (Mitter, J.) 31.l\n\npractically on grounds similar to those put forward by the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24852, "end_char": 24860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25290, "end_char": 25298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25889, "end_char": 25903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sardar Govindrao v. State ( 1 ) the appellants who claimed to be descendants of fonner ruling chiefs in some districts of Madhya Pradesh applied under the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Lan;:i Revenue Exemptions."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26605, "end_char": 26633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants file.ct a petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26640, "end_char": 26648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27283, "end_char": 27287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cen !):al Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28873, "end_char": 28893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This may easily lead anyone to believe that the review is a sham and nothing but the formal observance of the power granted to the Cen !):"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33116, "end_char": 33124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33531, "end_char": 33557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They distinguished the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.(') on the ground that the Central Government had reversed the."}}, {"text": "BHAGAT RAJA V. UNION", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33880, "end_char": 33900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGAT RAJA V. UNION (Mitte~. J,)\n\nreason whatsoever and the order of affinnance by the revising authority in the present case.\"", "canonical_name": "DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION"}}, {"text": "Harinagar Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37011, "end_char": 37032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take the case\n\nwhere the Central Government sets aside the order of the State\n\nGovernment without giving any reasons as in Harinagar Sugar Mills' case(')."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37187, "end_char": 37200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The party who loses before the Central Government cannot know why he had lost it and would be in great difficulty in pressing his appeal to the Supreme Court and this Court would have to do the best it could in circumstances which are not con\n\nducive to the proper disposal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "Central Govern", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38110, "end_char": 38124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the State Government has to give reasons, the Central Govern\n\nment after considering the comments and counter-comments on the reasons given by the State Government should have no diffi culty in making up its mind as to whether the reasoning of the State Government is acceptable and to state as briefly as possible the reasons for its own conclusion."}}, {"text": "Cornmi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42402, "end_char": 42408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ou~ attention was also drawn to another judgment of this Court in Cornmi, V; rioner of Income-tax v. K. V. Pilliah (a)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore\n\n(I) (1966] I, S. C. R. 466", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42504, "end_char": 42552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th~ -~~-e~~J~s .. m that case before the High Court of Mysore\n\n(I) (1966] I, S. C. R. 466."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42583, "end_char": 42591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42606, "end_char": 42620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43314, "end_char": 43343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this setting of facts, it •was said by this Couri:\n\n''The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is the final factfinding authority and normally it should record its conclusion on every disputed queftion raised before it, setting out its reasons in support of its conclusion."}}, {"text": "Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45855, "end_char": 45859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be of interest to note that in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw(') an application was mi.de in the King's Bench Division in England for an order of certiorari for the quashing of a decision reached by the Compensation Appeal Tribunal dismissing an appeal by Shaw against an award to him of compensation for loss of employment as a clerk to a Hospital Board payable under the National Health Service (Transfer of Officers and Compensation) Regulations, 1948."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45920, "end_char": 45927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be of interest to note that in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw(') an application was mi.de in the King's Bench Division in England for an order of certiorari for the quashing of a decision reached by the Compensation Appeal Tribunal dismissing an appeal by Shaw against an award to him of compensation for loss of employment as a clerk to a Hospital Board payable under the National Health Service (Transfer of Officers and Compensation) Regulations, 1948."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46957, "end_char": 46964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For our purpose, we need only refer to the observations of Lord Goddard."}}, {"text": "C. K. Allen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47908, "end_char": 47919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the respondents referred us to the comment on this c.ase made by Sir C. K. Allen in his Law and Orders (Second EditlOn) at p. 259 to p. 261."}}, {"text": "State Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49042, "end_char": 49068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus in Vedachala M udaliar v.\n\nState of Madras(') where the State Government of Madras set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board without giving any reasons, it was observed that\n\n\"When the policy of the Legislature is to confer powers on administrative tribunals with a duty to discharge their functions judicialJy I do not see any reason why they should be .exempted from all those safeguards inherent in its exercise of that jurisdiction. . . ."}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49096, "end_char": 49122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus in Vedachala M udaliar v.\n\nState of Madras(') where the State Government of Madras set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board without giving any reasons, it was observed that\n\n\"When the policy of the Legislature is to confer powers on administrative tribunals with a duty to discharge their functions judicialJy I do not see any reason why they should be .exempted from all those safeguards inherent in its exercise of that jurisdiction. . . ."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50032, "end_char": 50049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Joseph v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Kottayam (')."}}, {"text": "Central Governme.nt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51380, "end_char": 51399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order in this case does not even purport to show that the comments B and counter-comments, which were before the Central Governme.nt in this case, had been considered."}}, {"text": "22nd June 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51487, "end_char": 51501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would certainly have been better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the Central\n\nGovernment had taken into consideration all the fresh material adduced before it and for the reasons formulated they thought that the order of the State Government should not be disturbed."}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51521, "end_char": 51540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would certainly have been better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the Central\n\nGovernment had taken into consideration all the fresh material adduced before it and for the reasons formulated they thought that the order of the State Government should not be disturbed."}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51812, "end_char": 51827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the Central Government passed on 22nd June, 1966 are set aside."}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_322_328_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL, A\n\nCALCUTTA & ANR.\n\nANIL KUMAR ROY CHOWDHURY & ANR.\n\nMarch 30, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH,.:S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)\n\nIndiall [T1come Tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1962) Ss. 33 (2), and 66- Proper person to file appeal, who is-New facts, jurisdiction of Hlgli Court.\n\nOn the success of the assessee's appeal against an assessment made by the Income Tax Officer, District I (2), the Department appealed to the Tribunal. This was filed by the Income Tax Officer, District VI, in whose jurisdiction the assessee had shifted his n!s-idencc.\n\nThe assessee objected that the appeal was incompetent as it was not filed by the Income Tax Officer who 1had made the assessment.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the objection.\n\nOn reference, the High Court sent for the records looked into them and on new facts, answered the question against the Revenue.\n\nIn appeal by special leave\n\nHELD.-The Income Tax Officer. District VI, had jurisdiction over the assessee and he could be directed by the Commissioner to file the appeal.\n\nUnder S. 33(2), the person who has a right to appeal is the Commissioner of Income Tax and not the Income Tax Officer. The Income Tax Officer, when he files the al'peal under the direction of the Commissioner performs merely a ministenal function.\n\nBut the Income Tax Olftcer E selected must have some concern with ihe assessee against whom the appeal is filed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax.\n\nIt may be that the Income Tax Officer who completed the original assessment would also be concerned with the appeal to be filed by the Commissioner, but it does not mean that he is exclusively so concerned.\n\nIf the case had been trans~ ferred by the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue from he Income Tax Officer who completed the assessment to another Income Tax Officer, then obviously the former officer will have no concern with the appeal.\n\nF But if there has been no such transfer then it cannot be said that be alone is concerned with the appeal. The Income Tax Officers can have concurrent jurisdiction over some matters.\n\nOne illustration of this is prr vided by s. 64(4). [325F-H; 327D] .\n\nCommissioner of Jnco1n.e Tax, We.\\·/ Bengal, Calcutta v. S.. Sal'kar & Co. A.I.R. 1954 Cal. 613. approved.\n\nSardar Ba/dev Singh v.\n\nCommi.l'sioner of Income Tax, De/Iii 40 G I.T.R. 605, followed.\n\nR. B. L. Benarsl Dass v. C.l.T. East Punjab, 42 T.T.R. 363, disaporoved.\n\nThe High Curt exceeded its ju, rises or not ordering production of documents and we should judge whether the hearing was adequate on the basis of the reasons given by the authority in the present case.\n\nFurther, reliance in this connection is placed on the observation of this Court in Nehru Motor Transport Co-operative Society's case( 1 ) that the authority might help the objectors by issuing summonses.\n\nThis observation in our opinion does not mean, in the absence of any provision in the Act or the rules, that the authority was bound to summon witnesses even though the persons summoned were not bound to obey the summonses as there was no provision in law for issue of such summonses.\n\nThe use of the words \"by issue of summonses\" in the circumstances of that case was by oversight, for issue of summonses presumes that there is authority to issue them and the person to whom they are issued is bound to obey.\n\nBut in the absence of such power all that the authority can do is to issue letters merely requesting persons to appear and it is open to those persons to appear or not. In this situation if an authority decides not to issue such letters it cannot be said that there was no effective hearing. In short, what the cases of this Court to whkh we have referred show is only this : If the party concerned wishes to produce any document or produce any witness, the authority may take the documentary evidence into rn111idcration or take the evidence of the witness. if it\n\n(I) (1964] 1 S.CR. 22i.\n\nL5SupCl/67 -9\n\n340 SUPREME COURT RllPORtS (1967] 3 s.c.R\n\nconsiders such evidence relevant and necessary.\n\nBut there is in A the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules, no power in the authority or the State Government to compel attendance of witnesses or to compel production of documents.\n\nThis is of course not to say that if the authority wants any party before it to produce any document for satisfying itself whether the scheme is for the purposes mentioned in s. 68-C it cannot so ask; and if B the party asked to produce documents does not do so, the authority would be entitled to draw such inferences as it might consider justified from the non-production of . documents. But apart from this, there is no power conferred on the authority under the Act or the Madhya Pradesh Rules to compel production of documentary evidence or to summon any witness. c\n\nBut apart from this, even if we examine the reasons given by the authority for not compelling the production of documents or for not summoning witnesses we see no reason to disagree with the view taken by the authority in this case. So far as the witnesses are concerned, the authority was of opinion that their oral evidence would be irrelevant and it said so. after hearing arguments on the question.\n\nNothing has been shown to us which would induce us to hold otherwise. As to documentary evidence, it was asked for to show, firstly, that the Corporation did not have equipment and finances to carry out the schemes and, secondly, that the Corporation's past record of running its services was worse than that of the private operators. We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act. It may be mentioned that this Chapter was introduced in the Act in 1956 after Art. 19(6) of the Constitution had been amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 195 I. By that amendment the State was given power relating to the carrying on by it or by a Corporation owned or controlled by it, of any trade, busiuess, industry, or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.\n\nChapter IV-A envisages what we have called nationalisation of transpoi:t service, and this has to be undertaken by a State Transport Undertaking which under s. 68-A (b) may be\n\n(i) the Central Government or a State Government; or\n\n(ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950; or\n\n(iii) the Delhi Road Transport Authority established under section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950; or\n\nE .\n\n(iv) any municipality or any corporation or company owned or controlled by the State Government.\n\nH It will thus be clear that nationalised road transport under Chapter IV-A would be run either by the Central Government, or a State\n\nGovernment or any of the other three authorities mentioned there which are all under the control of the State Government or tl; le Central Government.\n\nIn these circumstances, with the resources of the Government behind those authorities it would in our opinion be futile for any objector to say that the Central Government, the State Government or the authorities backed by it could not have equipment and finances to carry out the schemes. It seems to us that the very fact that a scheme is proposed suggests that the Central Government or a State Government or the authorities would carry it out. So there is no question of asking for production of documents relating to the equipment and financial posi tion of a State Transport Undertaking as defined in s. 68-A (b).\n\nWe are further of opinion that there is no question of consideration of comparative merits of the State Transport Undertaking and the private operators in the context of Chapter IV-A. As we have said already Chapter IV-A was enacted for nationalisation of road transport services in accordance with the amendment made in Art. 19 (6) of the Constitution. The nationalised road transport under that Chapter can only be run by th.e State Transport Undertaking as defined in s. 68-A (b) of the Act. In view of that fact, if nationalisation has to come as envisaged by the amendment of the Constitution, the only body which can run the nationalised service is the State Transport Undertaking, and in those circumstances we fail to see any necessity for comparison between a State Transport Undertaking on the one hand and individual operators on the other.\n\nApart from this general consideration, we are further of opinion that ordinarily no question of comparative merits based on past record between a State Transport Undertaking and individual operators ca~ arise, Section 68-C provides that the State Transport Undertaking has to run an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, and for doing that it does not take up just one route and put one transport vehicle on it.\n\nIt takes up a large number of routes and puts a large number of transport vehicles on them in order to run an integrated service whether for passengers or for goods, or for both.\n\nIn these circumstances it is difficult to see how one can compare sue~ an undertaking with individual private operators who are running one transport vehicle or so on individual routes.\n\nSecondly, i~ would be unusual for the State Transport Undertaking to be running transport vehicles on individual routes before it produces a scheme for nationalisation of the type provided for in\n\nCh.aptr IV-~. though it. may be conceded that this may not be quite 1mposs1ble, for some State Transport Undertaking might have entered into competition with private operators and mi2ht\n\nhav~ obtained permits under Chap. V: (see, for instance, Parbham Tra11Sport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. The Reglorral Trans-\n\n3'42 SUPREME COURT R.EPOk £S\n\n\n.pert Authority('). Even so, wht>n the State Transport Undertaking takes action under Chap. IV-A of the Act there can in eur opinion be no question of compatison between a State Transport Undertaking running an integrated service and individual operators running one transport vehicle or more on individiral routes. We are therefore of opinion that the authority cannot be said to have gone wrong in not asking for past records of the Corporation in the present case for purposes of such comparison. It is true that s. 68-C requires that the scheme should be in the public interest.\n\nBut unless the scheme is shown not to be efficient, adequate, economical and. properly co-ordinated, it will in our opinion generally follow that it is in the public interest. We do not think therefore that the comparative merits of the Corporation as against individual operators requires to be judged under Chapter IV-A in the public interest. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the hearing in this case was both adequate and real.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with costs -0ne hearing fee.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "A CAPITAL\n\nMULTI-PURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY\n\nBHOPAL AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CAPITAL MULTI-PURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY BHOPAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 30, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A CAPITAL\n\nMULTI-PURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY\n\nBHOPAL AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS March 30, 1967\n\n(K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 469, "end_char": 483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 639, "end_char": 644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "May 11, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1024, "end_char": 1036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 11, 1964, the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation published two schemes for :he take-over by the corporation of certain routes under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939 to the exclusion of the existing private operators on those routes and objections were imited within 30 days."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 11, 1964, the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation published two schemes for :he take-over by the corporation of certain routes under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939 to the exclusion of the existing private operators on those routes and objections were imited within 30 days."}}, {"text": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1173, "end_char": 1211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "June 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the objectiollll li.led by various private operators were heard by a Special Secretary to the State Government empowered under s. 68-D of the Act, he passed orders on June 8, 1965, modifying the schemes in certain particulars."}}, {"text": "June 18, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The modified and corrected schemes were finally published on June 18, 1966."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1912, "end_char": 1917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2607, "end_char": 2618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2684, "end_char": 2689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3050, "end_char": 3055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3549, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5839, "end_char": 5844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7145, "end_char": 7148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ct or the Madhya Pradesh Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7293, "end_char": 7323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S.C.R. 978", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7529, "end_char": 7548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 1 S.C.R. 220", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M. N. Phadke, Naunit Lal, Y. S. Dharmadhikari and M. N.\n\nPuranik, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7915, "end_char": 7925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M. N. Phadke, Naunit Lal, Y. S. Dharmadhikari and M. N.\n\nPuranik, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Dharmadhikari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7927, "end_char": 7946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M. N. Phadke, Naunit Lal, Y. S. Dharmadhikari and M. N.\n\nPuranik, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. N.\n\nPuranik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7951, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M. N. Phadke, Naunit Lal, Y. S. Dharmadhikari and M. N.\n\nPuranik, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. P. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8010, "end_char": 8019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. Sen, Advocate-Genera/ for the State of Madhya Pradesh and/. N. Shroff, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. P. Sen, Advocate-Genera/ for the State of Madhya Pradesh and/. N. Shroff, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, K. A. Chitale, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. A. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, K. A. Chitale, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8183, "end_char": 8197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, K. A. Chitale, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Mahinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8202, "end_char": 8217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, K. A. Chitale, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Wancboo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWancboo, J. These are two appeals on certificates granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8443, "end_char": 8468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWancboo, J. These are two appeals on certificates granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8784, "end_char": 8789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8799, "end_char": 8817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter IV-A of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8987, "end_char": 9010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9434, "end_char": 9439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "May 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9658, "end_char": 9670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finelly, arguments were heard on May 20, 1965."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 11, 1965, the modified schemes were published, but 'as there were."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10733, "end_char": 10745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention raised before us is that the proposed schemes published on May 22, 1964 .were bad inasmuch as they were not in compliance with s. 68-C of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, for they did not give necessary particulars which would enable the appellants to formulate their objections to the proposed schemes in respect of the four-fold purposes mentioned in s. 68-C.\n\nThe High Court rejected this contention holding that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions contained in s. 68-C and the rules framed thereunder and there was enough material in the proposed schemes to enable the appellants to file objections thereto."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10801, "end_char": 10806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11035, "end_char": 11040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11163, "end_char": 11168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11534, "end_char": 11542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11799, "end_char": 11804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12168, "end_char": 12173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12377, "end_char": 12382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13111, "end_char": 13116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13305, "end_char": 13315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13937, "end_char": 13947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14314, "end_char": 14324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15361, "end_char": 15366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16645, "end_char": 16650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18126, "end_char": 18131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18465, "end_char": 18470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18908, "end_char": 18919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19413, "end_char": 19418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19861, "end_char": 19865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19893, "end_char": 19912, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19967, "end_char": 19985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21935, "end_char": 21946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24036, "end_char": 24041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24048, "end_char": 24053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24217, "end_char": 24222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24283, "end_char": 24288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24842, "end_char": 24847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24860, "end_char": 24865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25961, "end_char": 25966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26037, "end_char": 26047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26419, "end_char": 26424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27694, "end_char": 27702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the documents were concerned, the authority said in its order dated February 17, 1965 that the matter would be dealt with at the time of argument."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28687, "end_char": 28692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29154, "end_char": 29159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malik Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29448, "end_char": 29457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is clear that Malik Ram's case(2) only decided that if any party desired to produce evidence, whether documentary or oral, the authority should take that evidence, subject to its right to consider whether the evidence was relevant or not and to reject such evidence as it considered irrelevant'."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30959, "end_char": 30973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged on behalf of the Corporation that there is no pro vision in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder in Madhya Pradesh applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to summoning of witnesses and discovery or inspection of documents, to proceedings before the authority hearing ob jcctions under s. 68-D.\n\nTherefore the authority was not in any case bound to summon witnesses or order inspection or discovery of documents."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31001, "end_char": 31028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31172, "end_char": 31177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nehru Motor Transport Co-operative Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31950, "end_char": 31992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, reliance in this connection is placed on the observation of this Court in Nehru Motor Transport Co-operative Society's case( 1 ) that the authority might help the objectors by issuing summonses."}}, {"text": "(1964] 1 S.CR. 22", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 33153, "end_char": 33170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is in A the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33291, "end_char": 33351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33651, "end_char": 33656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But there is in A the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules", "statute": "But there is in A the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35004, "end_char": 35014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35504, "end_char": 35509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35532, "end_char": 35550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter IV-A envisages what we have called nationalisation of transpoi:t service, and this has to be undertaken by a State Transport Undertaking which under s. 68-A (b) may be\n\n(i) the Central Government or a State Government; or\n\n(ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950; or\n\n(iii) the Delhi Road Transport Authority established under section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950; or\n\nE ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35632, "end_char": 35641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act", "statute": "We think that both these questions really do not arise in the context of a scheme of nationalisation envisaged in Chapter IV-A of the Act"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35649, "end_char": 35686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Road Transport Authority", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35702, "end_char": 35732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter IV-A envisages what we have called nationalisation of transpoi:t service, and this has to be undertaken by a State Transport Undertaking which under s. 68-A (b) may be\n\n(i) the Central Government or a State Government; or\n\n(ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950; or\n\n(iii) the Delhi Road Transport Authority established under section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950; or\n\nE ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35751, "end_char": 35760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35768, "end_char": 35808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36811, "end_char": 36816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37146, "end_char": 37153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37296, "end_char": 37301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37888, "end_char": 37898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39560, "end_char": 39565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_343_350_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "' B\n\nIDRALAL VALLABHRAM v.\n\nKASTORBHAI LALBHAI & ORS.\n\nMarch 31, 1967\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]\n\nBombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (51 of 1947), s.r. 14 and 28-Notice by landlord terminating tenancy-If tenancy 11is determined for any reason\"..:.....Sub.tenant's rights-Jurisdiction of court to order eviction.\n\nThe landlords of certain premises gave notice .to their tenants termi natlru! the tenancy. After the period fixed in the notice for vacating the premfses expired, the landlords filed a su:t for eviction under s. 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, in the Court of the Judge of Small-Causes. The suit was based on two grounds, namely : (i) that the rent was in arrears for six months, and (ii) that there was unlawful sub-Jetting by the tenants to the appellant. The tenan's contended that the rent was not in arrears and that there was no sub-Jetting to the appellant, but that he was a partner of their firm. . The appellant's contention was that he was not a sub-tenant but the tenant of the landlords b=use of a tran.•fer by the tenants of their interest to him, and that, there were no arrears of rent. The trial Court held that. (i) there were no arrears of rent, and (ii) that the appellant was a sub-tenant, bnt that be could not be evicted because of s. 15(2) of the Act.\n\nIn appeal by the landlords the appellate Court also held, ( i) that there were no arrears but (ii) that since the appellant himself denied that be was a sub tenant he could not be held to be a sub-tenant; and, as he had failed to p!ove the assignment :n his favour he was a mere trespasser.\n\nIt therefore ordered his eviction on the ground that the benefit of s. 15(2) was available only to a sub-tenant, The appellate Court, however, did not order the eviction of the tenafttsin-chief. When the appellant took the matter to the H'o.h Court. in revision under s. 115, Civil Procedure Code, the High Court held, (i) that the appellate Court was not right in setting aside the finding that the appllant was a sub'enant, and that the find; n_g that the appellant was a sub-tenant stood unchallenged; but (ii) 'that the tenants and the sub-tenant, namely the appellant, were liable to be evicted because the rent was in arrear.\n\nJn appeal to this Court, HELD : ( l) Assuming that the finding that the appellant was a Ires passer could not be assailed in revision, the High Court erred in not .. etting as; dc the decree for eviction, because., the awellate Court had no jur!sdiction to pass any decree against a trespasser in a suit brought under s. 28.\n\nSuch a decree against a trespasser could only be passed by an ordinary civil court in a regular suit under the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIt could not be passed by a Jud.e of the Small Causes Court before whom, as a special forum, a suit for ev:ction under s. 28 of the Act is brought.\n\nThat section gives power to that Court to order eviction of a tenant\n\n(along with whom a sub-tenant will go) provided the prO\\; sions of s. 12 or s. 13 of the Act are satisfied.\n\nAs far as the appellate Court was con cerned, thoµgh it was .the Court of Extra Assistant Judge. its jurisdiction could not be wider than that of the trial urt. [347H; 348AD]\n\n(2) Even on the assumption that the appellant was a sub-tenant the High Court should have held that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS (1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nto order the appellant's oviction wnen there was no order evicting the ten.ant.t-ln-chief. (3480]\n\nUnder the Act, the landlord cannot suo a sub-tenant alone for eviction.\n\nHe has to sue the tenant, and if ho succeeds agitlnst the tenant, the sub\n\ntenant would be evicted along with the tenant-in-chief, unless he can take advantage of some provision of the Act. [348F] ( 3) It could not be said that the Interest of the tenants-in-chief was determined by the notice given by the landlords, that thereupon the appellant, who was a sub-tenant, became a tenant by virtue Qf s. 14 and that therefore, it was unnecessary to order the eviction of the tenants-inchief. [3490, Fl\n\nSection 14 would come into play in favour of t!he sub-tenant only after the tenancy of the contractual tenant has been determined by notice QJld the contractual tenant has been ordered to be evicted under s. 28 of th• Act on any of the grounds in ss. 12 or 13. Till that event happens, or till he gives up the tenancy himself, the interest of a tenant who may be a contractual tenant for purposes of s. 14 cannot be said to have been determined1, that i9, come to an end completely, in order\" to give rise to a tenancy between the pre-existing sub-tenant and the landlord.\n\nTh.e interest of a tenant comes to an end completely only when he is not only no longer a contractual tenant but also when he has lost the right to remain in possession which s. 12 has given him and :s thus no longer, even a statutory tenant. The words in s. 14, namely \"is determined for any\n\nreason\" mean, that the interest of the tenant \"comes to an end completely.\" They do not mean a determination by notice as in s. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\n[349H; 350A-E]\n\nAnand ?Vivas (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi [1964] 4 S.C R. 892, explained.\n\n( 4) The High. Court was also not justified in interfering with the concurrent finding of fact of the )ewer courts that there were no arrears of rent.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1965.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated F June 17, 18, 1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 430 of 1961.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and 1. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte: Solicitor-General, G. L. Sanghl and B. R. Agarwala, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wancboo, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.\n\nBrief facts necessary for present purposes are these.\n\nA suit was brought by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) against.the\n\nappellant and three others in the Court of Judge Small Causes at\n\nAhmedabad under s. 28 of the Bombay Rents; Hotel and Lodging\n\nVALLABHRAM v. KASTORBHAI (Wanchoo, !.) 345\n\nHouse Rates Control Act, No. LVII of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The case of the respondents was that the other three persons who were defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were the tenants-inchief of the premises while the present appellant who was defendant No. 4 was their sub-tenant.\n\nThe respondents had given notice to the tenants-in-chief terminating the tenancy and asked them to vacate the premises from after November 30, 1956, which was the end of the month of tenanify. The suit was filed on March 1, 1957 and was based on two grounds, namely, (i) that the rent had not been paid for six months, and (ii) that there had been unlawful sub-letting by the tenants-in-chief to the appellant. The suit was resisted by the three tenants-in-chief. One of them took the defence that the premises had been taken by a firm at a time when it consisted of the three defendants. But later defendant No. 1 no longer remained a partner of the firm and had nothing to do with the premises and the suit against him was not maintainable. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the other hand contended that the rent claimed (i.e .. Rs. 26) was excessive and prayed that standard rent should be fixed for the premises. These defendants further said that defendant No. I was no longer a partner of the firm and that in his place defendant No. 4 .(i.e., the present appellant) had become partner. Thus defendants Nos. 2 and 3 denied that there was any sub-letting, unlawful or otherwise, to the appellant.\n\nIt was further stated that the rent due had been deposited on the first date of hearing and in consequence there were no arrears due to the respondents. The appellant also filed a written-statement. He denied that he was a sub-tenant but his case was that the entire !nterest ?f defendans Nos. I to 3 in the business along with the mterest m the premises had been transferred to him and he was thus the tenant of the respondents and not a sub-tenant. He further said that the arrears of rent had been paid into court and thus there were no arrears due to the respondents.\n\nOn these pleadings, the trial court framed fou~ issues.\n\nThe first issue was whether defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were m arrear. and it was held that they were not in arrears. The second issue was about the standard rent of the premises and the trial court held that it was the same as the contractual rent, namely, Rs. 26 per mensem. The third issue was whethe~ defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had sublet the premises and the fourth issue was whether there was an assignment in favour of the preset appellant by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 of their interest. The tnal court held that defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had sub-let the premises to the present appellant and did not accept the contention of defenants Nos. and 3 about partnership or of the appellant about assignment. Fmal!Y the trial court held on the basis of the amendment of the Act m 1959 that there could be no eviction. It therefore dismissed te suit against all the four defendants, namely, the three tenants-m\n\n346 SUPRBMli COURT REPORTS [L967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nchief' and the appellant so far as eviction was concerned. It further ordered the tenants-in-chief to pay rent from September 1, 1956 upto date at the rate of Rs. 26 per mensem.\n\nIt further said that the amount of rent had been deposited by the tenants in court and should be taken away by the respondents with the rider that in case the amount fell short the respondents would be at liberty to recover the deficiency if any from the person and property of the tenants-in-chief.\n\nFinally the suit was dismissed in toto against the present appellant.\n\nThe respondents then went in appeal against the dismissal of the suit so far as eviction was concerned. To this appeal the three tenants-in-chief and the appellant were made parties, and the main contention of the respondents in the appellate court was that the suit .for eviction should have been decreed both on the ground of arrears of rent and on the ground of sub-letting. Two main questions were formulated by the appellate court for decision, namely-\n\n(i) whether the tenants-in-chief were tenants in arrears and (ii) whether the respondents were entitled to possession from the present appellant on the ground that he was not a sub-tenant and also on tlie ground that he was not protected under s. 15 (2) of tlie Act as amended in 1959 .. On the question of arrears, the appellate court held that there were no arrears. But on the other question the appellate court seems to have taken a curious view. It did not examine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court that the present appellant was a sub-tenant. It took the view that as the present appellant had in his written-statement denied that he was a sub-tenant, he could not be a sub-tenant. It then went on to hold that as the present appellant was in possession and as he was not a sub-tenant on his own showing he must be held to be a trespasser because he had failed to prove assignment.\n\nSo holding that the present appellant was a trespasser, it ordered his ejectment on the ground that benefit of s. 15 (2) as amended in 1959 could only be available to a sub-tenant, whjch the present appellant was not on his own showing. The appellate court therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court and ordered that the present ap]lellant should hand over possession of the suit premises to the respondents within six months of the order of the appellate court. We have said that the view taken by the appellate court was curious because the appellate court does not seem to have. ordered the ejectment of the tenants-in-chief. At least there is. nothing in the judgment of the appellate court to show this. though it is certainly said therein that the trial court's decree was set aside.\n\nThen followed a revision under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the High Court by the present appellant. It seems that. the tenants-in-chief t?Ok no .action after the judgment of the appellate court, may be because there was nothing in that judgment\n\nF '\n\nVALLABHRAM v. KASTORDHAI (Wane/zoo, J.) 347\n\nwhich went against them. The High Court held that the appellate court was not right in setting aside the finding that the present appellant was a sub-tenant of the three tenants-in-chief without going mto it. The High Court also seems to have held that in the circumstances the finding of sub-letting stood unchallenged and in view of that finding the present appellant was entitled to contend that he was protected under s. 15 (2) of the Act. The High Court then went on to consider the question whether arrears of rent were due from the tenants-in-chief and held in spite of the concurrent finding on this question of the two courts thar the tenants-in-chief were in arrears and were liable to ejectment under the Act; and if so, the appellant who was a sub-tenant would have to go with them.\n\nThe High Court further rejected the contention of the present apPellant that s. 14 of the Act protected him.\n\nFinally therefore the High Court upheld the order of the appellate court, though on different grounds. The High Court having refused leave to appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained special leave from this Court, and that is how the matter has come before us.\n\nThe main contention on behalf of the appellant before us is that the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the concurrent finding of the courts below that nothing was due as arrears of rent, and in this connection reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Vora Abbas Bhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi(').\n\nOn the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contends, relying on the same judgment of this Court, that no question of jurisdiction being involved in the revision before the High Court, the High Court could not interfere with the decision of the appellate court however wrong it might be.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to decide the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the circumstances of this case, for we have come to the conclusion that though the question of jurisdiction had not been urged before the High Court it stares one in the face on the judgment of the appellate court. We are satisfied that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment against the present appellant in the manner in which it did so.\n\nWe have already indicated that the appellate court took the curious view that the present appellant was a trespasser. Now this was no one's case in the present litigation. The resp<>ndents alleged that the present appellant was a sub-tenant. The present appellant contended that he was an assignee while two of the tenants-in-chief contended that he was their partner. In the circumstances it is curious that the appellate court came to the conclusion that he was a trespasser.\n\nBut assuming that that finding, if correct, cannot be assailed in revision under s. 115 of the Code of CM!· Procedure, a question\n\n(I} {1964J S S.C.R. 157.\n\nSUPR.EM.E CO~T. R, EPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nof jurisdiction of the appellate court to pass a decree for eject ment inunediately arises on the finding thanhe present appellant was a trespasser. The suit was bro.ught in the court of the Judge Small causes under s. 28 of the Act. That section gives power to the Small Cause Court to proceed to evict a tenant (along with whom a sub-tenant would also go) provided the provisions con tained either in s. 12 or s. 13 of the Act are satisfied. But when the ilppellate court held that the present appellant was a trespasser, there was no jurisdiction under the Act to pass a decree for ejectment against a trespasser. Such a decree against a trespasser could only be passed by a regular civil cburt in a suit brought under the Code of Civil Procedure. It could not be passed by a Judge, Small Cause Court, before whom a suit for eviction as a special forum is maintainable under s. 28 of the Act. Therefore when the appellate court after holding that the appellant was a trespasser went on to order his eviction on that ground it had no jurisdiction to do so in a suit brought under s. 28 of the Act. It is true that the appellate court was the court of an Extra Assistant Judge, but its jurisdiction could not be wider than that of the trial court and it would be equally circumscribed within the four comers of s. 28 of the Act.\n\nThough this point was not raised in the High Court, it is so obvious that we have permitted the appellant to raise it before us.\n\nWe are of opinion that on the finding that the appellant was a trespasser, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to order his eject ment in a suit brought under s. 28 of the Act.\n\nThere is another aspect of the matter which equally affects the jurisdiction of the appellate court and which also does not seem to have been urged in the High Court. We have already indicated that there is nothing to show in the appellate court judgment that it ordered the ejectment of .the tenants-in-chief. If it did not do so, it could not in a suit brought by the landlord order the ejectment of the sub-tenant, which the present appellant had been held to be by the trial court. It is not disputed that a landlord cannot sue a sub-tenant alone for eviction: he has to sue the tenant, and if he succeeds against the tenant, the sub-tenant would be ejected along with the tenant-in-chief unless he can take advantage of any provision of the Act. But if the tenant-in-chief is not ordered to be ejected and there is no such order by the appellate court, it follows that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to order the ejectment merely of the sub-te!lant assuming that the appellant was a sub-tenant. But it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that on the determination of the tenancy by notice on November 30, J 956, the appellant became a tenant-in-chief under' s. 14 of the Act, and reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of this Court in Anand Nivas (Pvt.) Lid. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi(1 ) .. Section 14 is in these terms :\n\n(II [19j\\j 4 S.C.R. 892.\n\nv ALLABHRAM v. KASTORBHAI ( w anchoo. J.) 3 4 9\n\n\"Where the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof have been lawfully sub-let before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rents Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 19 5 9, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued.\"\n\nThe argument is that s. 14 relates to contractual tenancy and the interest of a tenant is determined as soon as a notice determining the tenancy is given, and therefore immediately the period fixed in the notice expires, the contractual tenancy comes to an end, and if there is a sub-tenant he becomes the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions s he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued. It is therefore submitted that on the determination of the interest of the tenants-in-chief by notice on November 30, 1956, the appellant became a tenant by virtue of s. 14 and therefore it was unnecessary to order ejectment of the tenants-in-chief. Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of this Court in Anand Nivas (Pvt.) Ltd. (1) where this Court held that s. 14 contemplated sub-tenancies created by a contractual tenant while the contractual tenancy was in existence; it did not take in the case of a sub-tenancy created by what may be called a statutory tenant who had only the right to remain in possession under s. 12 (1) of the Act after the determination of the contractual tenancy until e.iected by suit on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 12 or s. 13. No further proposition is laid down in that case and it does not support the contention on behalf of the respondents that as soon as a notice is given determining a contractual tenancy, the sub-tenant of the contractual tenant who was there from before has to be deemed a tenant under s. 14 from the date the notice expires. If anything the following observation in the said case at p. 917 goes against the contention of the respondents, namely :-\n\n\"The object of s. 14 is to protect sub-tenants. By that section forfeiture of the rights of the tenant in any of the contingencies set out in s. 13 does not in all cases destroy the protection to the sub-tenants.\" Learned counsel for the respondents however contends that the words \"is determined\" used in s. 14 are analogous to the determination of tenancy by notice under s. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, (No. 4 of 1882) and all that s. 14 requires is that there should be determination of the tenancy under s. 1 ll(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. We are of opinion that in the con-\n\n(!) (1964] 4 S.C.R. 892.\n\n350 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntext of the Act this is not the meaning to be given to the words \"is determined for any reason''.\n\nThese words in the context of, the Act mean that where the interest of a tenant comes to an end completely, the pre-existing sub-tenant may, if the conditions of s. 14 are satisfied be deemed to be a tenant of the landlord. The i!1terest of a tenant who for purposes of s. 14 is a contractual tenant comes to an end completely only when he is not only no longer a contractual tenant but also when he has lost the right to remain in possession which s. 12 has given to him and is no longer even a statutory tenant. In other words s. 14 would come into play in fa\\iume-Presumption under s. 7 when nrises,\n\nUnder s. 6(l)(i) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, a search warrant can be issued by a Deputy Superintendent of Police especially empowered in this behalf. By a notification dated January 22,\n\n1955 the Saurashtra Government empowered specially certain AsSistant Superintendents and Deputy Superintendents of Police Porbandar Divi sion, Porbandar, to authorise by issue of special warrants in each case a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector of police to do tibe various things necessary in order to raid a house when the police officer suspected gaming to be carried on and which house room or place was suspected as being used as a common gaming house. The appellant's house was raided by a sub-inspector of police and on the basis of incriminating evidence the appellant and six others were charged under ss. 4 and 6 of the Act. At the trial the accused contended that Shri Pandya the Deputy Superintendent of Porbandar who issued the search warrant was not authorised to do so and accepting their plea the magis trate acquired them.\n\nThe High Court however took the opposite view and convicted the accused.\n\nThe appellant came to this Court by special leave.\n\nHELD : (i) When a power is conferred on a person by name or by virtue of his office the individual designated by name or as the holder of the office for the time being is empowered specially.\n\nJudged by this test the notification dated January 22, 1955 specially empowered Shri Panclya holder of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar to issue the search warrant under s. 6.\n\n[353F-G]\n\nEmperor v. Udlto and Ors., A.J.R. 1943 Sind. 107, E111peror v ..\n\nSav/aram Kaslii1uirh Joshi, 49 B.L.R, 798, Aluga Pillai v. E111peror, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 256, Mahomad Kasi111 & Am•. v. Emperor, A.l.R. 1915 Mad. 1159, State of Mysore v. Kashambi, ( 1963) 2 Cr. L.J. 226, State v. illdlwhir Clietri, A.J.R. 1953 Assam 35, K. N. VijayO/l v. State,\n\nJ.L.R. 1953 Trav. Cochin 514 and Po/ubha Vajub/la & Anr. v. Tapu Ruda, A.J.k. 1956 Saurashtra 73, referred to.\n\n(ii) The seizure of instruments of gaming in the appellant's house under s. 6 raises a presumption under s. 7 that the hoU&e was used as a common gaming house and the persons found thereia '\"''ere then present for the purpose of gaming.\n\nIn applying this artificial presumption the court should act with circumspection. Playing cards can be kept and used for innocent pn-; time.\n\nThe presun1ption can he rebutted if from the prosecution evidence itself it is apparent tho.t there was a reasonable probability of the playing cards not being kept or used as means of gaming or for profit or gain of the occupier ot t.he house.\n\nIn the present case the appellant could not successfully rebut the presumption.\n\n[354E-HJ\n\n362 SUP&BMB COURT Rl!PORT5 [1967] 3 s.c.R.\n\nNo prejudice had been caused to the appellant by the production of the notification dated January 22, 1955 for the first time at the appellate 1taae\n\n[3SSAJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1964.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 16, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 154 of 1962.\n\nDaniel A. Latifi and K. K. Sinha, for the appellant.\n\nHans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. The appellant and six other persons were charged under ss. 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act\n\n1887. The sub-inspector of police Shri Anjaria received information that the appellant was keeping a common gaming house. He obtained a special search warrant from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar, Shri S. M. Pandya, and raided the appellant's house in Bantwa on June 4, 1961 at 1 p.m. The raiding party found the door leading to the upper floor closed. The inmates pressed against the door from the inside and did not open it until a blacksmith broke open the latch. Shri Anjaria seized torn and burnt pieces of playing cards lying on the floor of the central room, two packs of cards from a wall cabinet, some burnt cards lying on the floor and in the folds of a bed in the drawing room, four jokers and three packs of cards from trunks in the kitchen, some cash, burnt cigarette ends, bidis and matches and empty cigarette cases.\n\nAll the accused were found in the upper f!o8r.\n\nThe appellant as the occupant of the house was charged under s. 4 of the Act and the other six accused were charged under s. 5 of the Act.\n\nThe learned magistrate refused to raise a presumption under s. 7 of the Act on the ground that Shri Pandya was not specially empowered by name to issue a search warrant. He acquitted all the accused.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court held that Shri Pandya as the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar was specially empowered to issue the search warrant and the prosecution was entitled to the benefit of the presumption under s. 7. The High Court convicted the appellant of the offence under s. 4 of the Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one month. The High Court convicted the other six accused under s. 5 of the Act and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default simple imprisonment for one month. The present appeal was filed by the appellant by special leave.\n\nA search warrant under s. 6(1)(i) of the AGt can be issued by a \"Deputy Superintendent of Police especially empowered by the\n\n,._ D\n\nState Government in this behalf'. By a notification dated J anu ary 22, 1955, the Saurashtra government empowered specially cer tain assistant superintendents and deputy superintendents of police including the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar Division.\n\nPorbandar, to authorise by issue of special warrants in each case a police officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector of police to do the various things necessary in order to raid a house where the police officer suspected gaming to be carried on and which house, room or place was suspected as being used as a common gaming house. The magistrate relying upon Emperor v.\n\nUdho and others(1 ), held that under s. 6, the officer must be specially empowered by name. The High Court relying on Emperor v.\n\nSavlaram Kashinath Joshi,(') held that an officer may be specially empowered under s. 6 either by name OD in virtue of his office.\n\nIt is because of the conflict of opinion between the Sind and the Bombay decisions that special leave was granted in this case.\n\nSection 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 shows that a person may be appointed to execute any function either by name or by virtue of office. A person may therefore be empowered by name or by virtue of his office of deputy superintendent of police to issue a special search warrant.\n\nSec. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act requires that the deputy superintendent of police must be \"specially empowered\" to issue the warrant.\n\nIn Emperor v. Udho and others( 1), the expression \"specially empowered\" was interpreted to mean specially empowered by name and not by virtue of his office, and an authorization of \"the deputy superintendent of police, Rohri\" was said to be insufficient for the purposes of s. 6. This decision does not lay down the correct test.\n\nA person may be specially empowered not only by name but also by virtue of his office.· In Emperor v. Savlaram Kashinath Joshi( 2 ) it was rightly held that a notification authorizing the deputy superintendent of police of the Poona city to issue a search warrant under s. 6 specially empowered the holder of that office by virtue of his office to issue the warrant. We think that where power is conferred on a person by name or by virtue of his office, the individual designated by name or as the holder of the office for the time being is empowered specially. Judged by this test, the notification dated January 22, 1955, specially em powered Shri Pandya as the holder of the office of the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar, to issue the search warrant under s. 6.\n\nFor the meaning of the expression \"specially empowered\" reference is often made to s. 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides \"in conferring powers under this Code; the State\n\nGovernment may by order, empower persons specially by name or\n\n(I} A.l.R. 1943 Sind 107.\n\n(2) 49 B.L.R. 798.\n\n3S4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nin virtue of their office or dasses of officials generally by their offi- A cial titles\". In Aluga P{/la/ v. Emperor('), it was rightly held that an authorization of the second class magistrate of Thirumangalam to try certain cases was a special empowering of the person holding that office by virtue of his office within the meaning of s. 39(1).\n\nOn the question whether a notification empowering all magistrates of a certain class to try certain cases can be said to empower specially every magistrate of that class to try those cases, there is a conllict of opinion, see Mahomad Kasim and another v. Emperor('), State of-Mysore v. Kashambi( 8 ). On the further question whether a magistrate should be regarded as an office and not as an official for the purposes of s. 39 (l) of the Ccide of Criminal Procedure, there is a sharp conflict of opinion, see C State v. Judhabir Chetri('), K.\n\nVijayan v. State(') and Polubha Vajudha and Anr. v. Tapu Ruda(\").\n\nWe do not express any opinion on those questions, as it is not the practice of this Court to express opinion on questions which do not arise for decision. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to hold that a notification conferring power on the deputy superintendent of police of Porbandar to issue a search warrant specially empowers the holder of that office by virtue of his office to issue the warrant.\n\nWe hold that Shri Pandya as the holder of the office of the: deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar was specially empowered under s .. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act by the notification of the Saurashtra government dated January 22, 1955.\n\nIt is conceded that the notification continued to be in force after the merger of Saurashtra with the State of Bombay. The seizure of instruments of gaming in the appellant's house entered under s. 6 raises a presumption under s. 7 that the house was used as a common gaming house and the persons found therein were then present for the purpose of gaming. In applying this artificial presumption the Court should act with circumspection. Playing cards may be kept and used for innocent pastimes. The presumption can be rebutted if from the prosecution evidence itself it is apparent that there was a reasonable probability of the playing cards not being kept or used as means of gaming or for the profit or gain of the occupier of the house.\n\nIn the present case, the appellant could not successfully rebut the presumption. The resistance to the entry of the sub-inspector and the attempt to burn, destroy and conceal the playing cards fortified the presumption. The explanation that the appellant had invited friends and relatives on the occasion of his son's betrothal was not convincing. We do not find any compelling reason for interfering with the findings of fact by the High Court in this appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1924 Mad, 256.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1915 Mad. 1159.\n\n(3) (1963] (2) Cr.L. J. 226.\n\n(4) A.T.R. 1953 Assam 35.\n\n~) [1953] I.L.R. Trav.-Co 514.\n\n(6) A.1.R. 1956 Saurashtra 73.\n\nNo prejudice was caused to the appellant by the production of the notification dated January 22, 1955 for the first time at the appellate stage. His contention in the trial court was that such a notification was not sufficient for raising the preswnption under s. 7. This argument was not tenable. He had ample opportunity for rebutting the presumption arising under s. 7. Nor did be ask the High Court to give him any further opportunity for this purpose.\n\nCounsel sought to argue that the search warrant was invalid as it did not ex-facie set out the authority under which it was issued.\n\nThe point was not taken either in the High Court or in the special leave petition. We therefore indicated that we will not allow this point to be raised. The High Court rightly convicted the appeDant under s. 4 of the Act.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nG.C.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "SINDW LOHANA CHAITHRAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SINDHI LOHANA CHAITHRAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SINDW LOHANA CHAITHRAM\n\nTHE STATE OF GUJARAT March 31, 1967\n\n[R. S. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHBLAT, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. BACHAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. BACHAWAT*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gambling Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act, 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act, 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "s. 6(l)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 389, "end_char": 399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gambling Act, 1887", "statute": "Gambling Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 407, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1218, "end_char": 1229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887", "statute": "the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887"}}, {"text": "Pandya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial the accused contended that Shri Pandya the Deputy Superintendent of Porbandar who issued the search warrant was not authorised to do so and accepting their plea the magis trate acquired them."}}, {"text": "Porbandar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial the accused contended that Shri Pandya the Deputy Superintendent of Porbandar who issued the search warrant was not authorised to do so and accepting their plea the magis trate acquired them."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1810, "end_char": 1826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged by this test the notification dated January 22, 1955 specially empowered Shri Panclya holder of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar to issue the search warrant under s. 6."}}, {"text": "Panclya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1852, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged by this test the notification dated January 22, 1955 specially empowered Shri Panclya holder of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar to issue the search warrant under s. 6."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daniel A. Latifi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daniel A. Latifi and K. K. Sinha, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daniel A. Latifi and K. K. Sinha, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hans Raj Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3636, "end_char": 3650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3655, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hans Raj Khanna and R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bachawat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. The appellant and six other persons were charged under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anjaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-inspector of police Shri Anjaria received information that the appellant was keeping a common gaming house."}}, {"text": "S. M. Pandya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He obtained a special search warrant from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar, Shri S. M. Pandya, and raided the appellant's house in Bantwa on June 4, 1961 at 1 p.m. The raiding party found the door leading to the upper floor closed."}}, {"text": "Bantwa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He obtained a special search warrant from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar, Shri S. M. Pandya, and raided the appellant's house in Bantwa on June 4, 1961 at 1 p.m. The raiding party found the door leading to the upper floor closed."}}, {"text": "June 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4132, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He obtained a special search warrant from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar, Shri S. M. Pandya, and raided the appellant's house in Bantwa on June 4, 1961 at 1 p.m. The raiding party found the door leading to the upper floor closed."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act\n\n1887", "statute": "the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act\n\n1887"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4873, "end_char": 4877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated J anu ary 22, 1955, the Saurashtra government empowered specially cer tain assistant superintendents and deputy superintendents of police including the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar Division."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6495, "end_char": 6499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6849, "end_char": 6859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6867, "end_char": 6898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7141, "end_char": 7147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7566, "end_char": 7570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904"}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Emperor v. Savlaram Kashinath Joshi( 2 ) it was rightly held that a notification authorizing the deputy superintendent of police of the Poona city to issue a search warrant under s. 6 specially empowered the holder of that office by virtue of his office to issue the warrant."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7893, "end_char": 7897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8483, "end_char": 8491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8499, "end_char": 8525, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9083, "end_char": 9091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9515, "end_char": 9520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10460, "end_char": 10470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceded that the notification continued to be in force after the merger of Saurashtra with the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10480, "end_char": 10495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceded that the notification continued to be in force after the merger of Saurashtra with the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10573, "end_char": 10577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10605, "end_char": 10609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.T.R. 1953 Assam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11706, "end_char": 11723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) A.T.R. 1953 Assam 35."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12160, "end_char": 12164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12590, "end_char": 12594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_356_364_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "THE E,\\Sl' INDIA INDUSUlQ':S (MAl>RAS) PRIVATE LTD., A\n\nMADRAS & ANR. v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS\n\nApril 3, 1967\n\n[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SJKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act 11 of 1922), Ss. 4(3)(1) Olld 15- B-DoMtion to Trust-One object not charitable in Mture, and income to be utilised for any one of the objects-I/ exempted.\n\nThe assessee claimed exemption from tax under s. 14-B of the Income- 1ax Act, 1922 for a sum donated to a Trust, whose most of tbe objects were charitable and religious in nature. but one was not, and it was open\n\nlo the tru!W'.es to utilise the income of any one of the objects to the exclusion of all other objects.\n\nTbe Revenue rejected the claim for exemption, but the Appellate Tribunal allowed it as it had in relation to the previous assessment year held that the Trust was a public trust.\n\nOn reference, the High Court answered the question against the assessee. In appeal to this Court, the assessee contended that ( i) this particular object must not be read isolated from the other objects of the trust but having regard to the immediately preceding object which was to run hospitals and dispensaries, the impugned object, vi:., the manufacture of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations must be deemed to be for the purpose of carrying out the earlier object, and (ii) the High Court acted in excess of jurisdiction in raising a new question which was not raised by the Appellate Tribunal, namely, whether the trust itsdf was constituted for wholly religious or charitable purposes within the meaning of s. 4 (3) (i) of the Act.\n\nHEID :-The appeal must fail.\n\n(i) There was no connection between the two objects of the trust and upon an interpretation of the document as a whole, it could not be said that the earlier object was the dominant object of the trust and the latter was a subsidiary object. In view of the absolute power of selection\n\ngranted to the trustees to select between charitable and non-<:haritable objects, the provision of s. 4 ( 3) ( i) of the Act could not be applied to the Trust and no exemption could be granted to the assessee under s. 15-B of the Act.\n\n[360D-E, G]\n\nMohammad Ibrahim Riza v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur, 57 I.A, 260; Oxford Group v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1949] 2 All.\n\nE.R. 537 and Keren Kayen1eth Le Jisroel. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Con1rs. 17 T.C. 27, 40 applied.\n\n(i) The High Court was within its jurisdiction in examining the question whether the Trust was eligible for exemption from income-tax under s. 4(3) (i) of the Act. Even where a question of law was not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, it must be deemed lo be one arising out of its order.\n\n[364B-D] Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.\n\nScindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, 42 I.T.R. S89, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1399 of 1966.\n\nBAST INDIA INDUSTRIES v. C.I.T. (Ramaswami, J.) 357\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 25, 1961 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No. 62 of 1958 (Reference No. 37 of 1958).\n\nS. Swamlnathan and R. Gopa/krishnan, for the appellant.\n\nVeda Vya.sa, S. K. Aiyar, S. P. Nayyar and R. N. Sachihey, for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRamaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Madras High Court dated October 25, 1961 in T.C. No. 62 of 1958.\n\nThe assessee, the East India Industries Limited, paid a donation of Rs. 7 ,500 to a trust called \"the Agastyar Trust\" and claimed exemption from tax under s. 14-B of the Income-tax Act, 1922. hereinafter called the 'Act'. The trust had been created by the partners of a business firm, K. Rajagopal and Company.\n\nThis firm had been carrying on business in waste paper.\n\nUnder the terms of the partnership it was setting apart 80 per cent of the profits for charitable and religious purposes. On July l, 1944, a trust deed was executed,, liy Venkatarama Chetti. The claim of the assessee to exemption from tax was rejected by the Income Tax Officer on the ground that the trust did not fulfil the conditions laid down under s. 15-B of the Act.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner to whom an appeal was preferred took the same view. The matter was taken up in further appeal to the lncometax Appellate Tribunal which observed that in relation to the previous assessment year, it had held that the Agastyar Trust was a public trus! and that any donation made to that trust was an allowable deduction under s. 15-B. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the determination of the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act :\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the cirmustances of the case the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under Section 15-B in respect of the donation paid to the Agastyar Trust ?\"\n\nG The High Court answered the question against the assessee who bas brought the present appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nSection 15-B of the Act provides for exemption from tax in respect of any sums paid by the assessee as donations to any institution or fund to which the section applies. Sub-section (2) reads as follows:\n\n\"(2) This section applies to any institution or fund established in the taxable territories for a charitable purpose--\n\n(i) the income whereof is exempt under clause (i) of sub-section (3) of section 4; ..\n\nSection 4(3)(i) of the Act states as follows :\n\n\"(3) An): income, profits or gains falling within the following classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them;\n\n(i) Subject to the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 16, any income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes, in so far as such income is applied or accumulated for application to such religious or charitable purposes as relate to anything done within the taxable territories, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied or finally set apart for application thereto : ..\n\nParagraph 2 of the trust deed dated July 1, 1944 sets out-the objects of the 'Agastyar Trust' as follows :\n\n\"(a) to establish, conduct and maintain residential schools, colleges, workshops and other institutions for imparting general, technical, vocational, professional, industrial or other kind of education and training for the utility and welfare of the general public;\n\n(b) to make pecuniary grants by way of scholarship, donation, subscription, allowance. gratuity, guarantee or otherwise to and for the benefit of students, scholars and other persons; ·\n\n(c) to establish, maintain and conduct hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, maternity houses and other institutions for affording treatment, cure, rest, recuperation and other reliefs;\n\n(d) to manufacture, buy, sell and distribute pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical, and other preparations and articles such as medicines, drugs, medical and surgical articles, preparations and restoratives of food;\n\n(e) to establish and maintain choultries and resthouses, to provide food, clothes, medicines and other articles of necessity free or at concessional rates and to make money grants to the poor, needy for celebration of marriages or ceremonies of, for other purposes, floods. famine, pestilence, and other causes;\n\n.. ; -\n\n(f) to collect, encourage, conduct research in, interpret and popularise Nadis (ancient manuscripts inscribed on palm leaves in Indian languages with authorship ascribed to Deva.~. rishis, saints, sages and seers);\n\n(g) to promote and encourage the study of and research in religion and to propagate religious principles;\n\n(h) to buy, print, publish, sell for profit or distribute free or at concessional rate such literature as may be thought beneficial for the objects of the trust;\n\n(i) to conduct worship and festivals in temples, shrines and other places of worship, to build, maintain, administer and manage temples, shrines and other places of worship; G) to do all such other things as may be necessary, incidental conducive or convenient to the attainment of the above objects or any of them and the decision of the trustees that any particular thing is necessary, incidental, conducive or convenient to the attainment of the above objects or any of them shall be conclusive.\" The other clauses of the trust deed provide for the appointment of additional trustees, the administration and management of schools, colleges, etc., that may be set up, investment of the moneys, the power conferred on the trustees to alter the form of the properties and re-invest the funds, to grant leases, to borrow, and lastly to conduct or carry on any business or undertaking alone or in partnership with any other person for the benefit of the trust.\n\nThe question to be considered is whether the property from which the income of the Agastyar trust is derived is held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable pw:poses within the meaning of s. 4(3)(i) of the Act. Iii the present case, it appears from the deed of trnst that one of the objects of the trust, namely item 4, is not for charitable or religious purposes.\n\nItem No. 4 is \"to manufacture, buy, sell and distribute\n\nphm1aceutical, mediial, chemical, and other preparations and arl!cles such as med1cmcs, drugs, medical and surgical articles preparati.ons and restoratives of food\". It may be that most of th~\n\n?!er obii:cts of the rust are religious and charitable in nature but 1f. item 4 1s not charitable, then the conditions envisaged by s. 4(3) ( 1) of the Act are not fulfilled and the exemption conferred by\n\n~. 15-B of the Act cannot be applied. Clause 5 ( i) of the trust deed states that \"the trustee shall have power to apply the whole or any part of the trust property or fund whether capital or income in or towards payment of the expenses of the trust or for or towards aU or any o~ the prposes of the trust provided any property or money he-Id m pc;; ial trust shall be applied only for that purpose , ind not otherwise . Jn the present case, there is no special trust,\n\nthat is to say, no particular item of property has been burdened with the performance of any specific object of the trust. It is therefore manifest that under cl. 5(i) of the trust deed it is open to the trustees to utilise the income for any one of the objects of the trust to the exclusion of all other objects. In other words, it would not be a violation of the trust if the trustees devoted the entire income to the carrying on of a business of manufacture, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical, medicinal and other preparations. In our opinion, this particular object of the trust is neither charitable nor religious in character. If the trustees can, under a trust held validly, spend the entire income of the trust on this non-charitable object, it is difficult to hold that the trust property is held under a trus.t or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes within the meaning of s. 4(3)(i) of the Act.\n\nIt was argued by Mr. Swaminathan on behalf of the appellant that this particular object must not be read isolated from the other objects of the trust but having regard to the immediately preceding object which is to run hospitals and dispensaries, the impugned object, viz., the manufacture of pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations must be deemed to be for the purpose of carrying out the earlier object, viz., running of hospitals and dispensaries. We are unable to hold that there is any connection between the two objects of the trust and upon an interpretation of the document taken as a whole, it is impossible to accept the appellant's contention that cl. 2(c) is the dominant object of the trust and cl. 2(d) is a subsidiary object. The argument of the appellants is, in fact, contradictory of the last clause of para 2 of the trust deed which states that the objects shall be independent of each other, notwithstanding that any of the objects shall be void for any reason whatsoever, the trust shall be valid and operative with respect to the other objects. This clause expressly provides that the trustees shall have discretion \"to apply the property of the trust in carrying out all or any of such objects of the trust as the trustees may deem fit\".\n\nHaving regard to the language of paragraph 2 of the trust deed in the context of other paragraphs of the document, we are of opinion that th, e trust deed, on a proper interpretation, gives an absolute power of selection to the trustees to choose between charitable and non-charitable objects of the trust for spending the entire income of the trust properties. It follows that the Agastyar trust does not fulfil the conditions imposed by s. 4(3)(i) of the Act and the donation made by the assessee to the Agastyar trust cannot therefore be exempted under s. 15-B of the Act.\n\nThe view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the JudiCial Committee in Mohammad Ibrahim Riza v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur(') in which it was held that if there\n\n(I} 57 I.A. 260.\n\n! p ,\n\n~ l---\n\n• '\n\nBAST !NOIA INDUSTRIES v. C.l.T. (Ramaswami, !.) 361\n\nare several objects of the trust, some of which are charitable and some non-charitable, and the trustees have unfettered discretion to app1y the income to any of the object, the whole trust would fail and no part of the income would be exempt from tax. The same view has 1'een expressed by the Court of Appeal in Oxford Group\n\nv. Inland Revenue Commissioners('). In that case, the memorandum of association of the Oxford Group, a company limited by guarantee, set out the following as the objects of the company :\n\n\"3(A) The advancement of the Christian religion, and, in particular, by the means and in accordance with the principles of the Oxford Group Movement, founded in or about the year 1921 by Frank Nathan Daniel Buclunan. (B) The maintenance, support, development and assistance of-the Oxford Group Movement in every way ...... (C) (9) To establish and support or aid in the establishmellt and support of any charitable or bene- . volent associations or institutions, and to subscribe or guarantee money for charitable or benevolent purposes in any way connected with the purposes of the association or calculated to further its objects. (10) To do all such other things as are incidental, or the association may think conducive, to the attainment of the above objects or any of them.\"\n\nThe Oxford Group sought exemption from income tax on the ground that it was a body of persons established for charitable purposes only. It was admitted by the. Crown that, if object A of the objects clause of the company's memorandum of association stood alone, the company would be established for charitable purposes only. It was, however, held by the Court of Appeal that the words in cl. 3(B) of the memorandum of association, \"the maintenance, support, development and assistance of the Oxford Group Movement in every way,\" extended beyond purely religious activities, permitted the company to engage in secular activities, and authorised the expenditure of its funds on matters which were not charitable, and, therefore, the company could not be said to be formed for charitable purposes only. It was ii!so observed that although a\n\neligious body might, without losing its religious character, engage ma numbr of subsidiary activities which were not purely religious, a trust which was so worded as to permit the expenditure of income by such a body in such subsidiary activities was not a good charitable trust.\n\nIt was further held that the objects set forth in cl. 3(C), paras. (9), (10), of the memorandum of association were not merely ancillary to the main objects expressed in suh-cls. (A) and (B), ut themselves conferred powers on the compa11y which were so wide that they could not be regarded as charitable. The pdn-\n\nuld be subject to s. 68 of the Act.\n\n[370F; 372E-0]\n\nDaulat Ram v. Bansla A.LR. 1937 Lahore page 2. approved; Venk\"\"\" ruma v. An11athayamma/ A.LR. 1933 Madras 471, Heerabai v.\n\nOfficial' Receiver A.1.R. 1963 A.P. 296; disapproved.\n\nVel/ayappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Cite/liar 1.L.R. 47 Madras 446.\n\nG. N. Godbole v. Mr. Nani Bai A.LR. 1938 Nagpur 546, M11tluipa/mriapp'er A.I.R 1937 Lahore. 297, Ganda Ram v. Shiv Nand Ganesh Das A.LR. 1937 Lahore 757; and Ma, Sein Nu v. U. Mg. Mg. A.LR. 1934 Rangoon 97; Bhairo Prasad v. S. P. C. Dass, A.LR. 1919 Allahabad 274, Hussaini v.\n\nMuhammad Zamir Abdi A.LR. 1924 Oudh. 294 and Mui Chand v. Murari Lal, I.L.R. 36 Allahabad 8; referred to.\n\nNat/Ju Ram v. Madan Gopal, A.LR. Allahabad 408; distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; CIVIL APPEAL No. 1000 -Of 1964.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated November 28, 1962 of lhe Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 212 of 1961.\n\nBishan Narain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.\n\nNaunit Lal, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. This is an appeal by a certificate against a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court at Chandigarh in Letters\n\nPatent Appeal No. 212 of 1961. The High Court allowed the ap- D peal on the ground that the application out of which it arose was incompetent as barred by limitation and, in our opinion, it did so correctly.\n\nThe short question before us is, whether application leading to this appeal was one under s. 68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and as such having been made beyond the period of 21 days from the date of the act of the receiver complained of, E was covered by the proviso to that section 7 In substance, the argument on behalf of the appellant was that the application was one under s. 4 of the Act in which there is no mention of any period -Of limitation.\n\nThe facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows :-Brij Lal and Hans Raj were brothers.\n\nOn an applica tion having been made by the creditors of Brij Lal in .the year 1949, the insolvency Judge, Bamala adjudicated hiin as an insolvent, on 23rd November, 1954.\n\nTwo days thereafter, one Mohinder Lal was appointed as a receiver in insolvency by the order of the Court and he was directed to take possession of. the property of the insolvent. en 26th and 27th November, 1954 tlie receiver took possession of various properties of the insolvent and at.tached some urban property and agricultural land which are the subject-matter of the present litigation.\n\nHans Raj filed an objection application on 21st December, 1954 alleging that the property. detailed therein belonged to him and was exclusively in his possession. He prayed for release of the property from .attachment and restoration of possession to him. Tiie receiver pleaded that he had taken possession thereafter at the instance of two creditors~ The insolvency Judge framed two issues, namely, (1) Is\n\nthe objector owner of the suit property and in possession thereof and is it accordingly not liable to be attached by the receiver ? and (2) whether the objection petition was time-barred ? The learned Judge decided the first issue against the objector but held that the application was not covered by s. 68 of the Act. In appeal, the District Judge differed from both the findings. He held that there had been no partition of the joint Hindu family of the insolvent and bis brother, but, on the point of limitation he found against the objector. In the result, he accepted the appeal and dismissed the objection petition. Hans Raj went up in Second Appeal to the Punjab High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the property in dispute must be deemed to be the separate property of Hans Raj and held that the application was within time.\n\nRattan Lal who replaced the original receiver on the latter's death filed a Letters Patent Appeal to the High Court. The High Court, as already noted, held that the application of Hans Raj was not within time resulting in the dismissal of the objection petition.\n\nWe must first consider the nature of the application made by the objector and then find out whether it is covered by s. 68 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act on which great reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant is one of the three sectio~. in Part I of the Act i.e. ss. 3, 4 and 5. Section 3 lays down that the District Courts shall be the courts having jurisdiction under the Act. Section 4 defines the jurisdiction of the Court and runs as follows :-\n\n\"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of Jaw or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case.\n\n(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for ail purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's est; ite and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them.\n\n(3) Where the Court does not deein it expedient or necessary to decide any question of the nature referred to in sub-section (I), but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the Court\n\nmay without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think _fit.\"\n\nSection 5 lays down the general powers of courts under the Act.\n\nPart II which has the heading \"Proceedings from the act of insolvency to discharge\" deals generally with the course of the proceedings in insolvency beginning from the acts of insolvency to the order for discharge of insolvency. Part III is headed \"administration of property\" and deals with different subjects like method of proof of debts, effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions, realisation of property, distribution of propeny\" and lastly \"appeals to court against receiver\". The last topic is covered by s. 68 which provides as follows :-\n\n\"If the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the receiver, he may apply to the Court, and the Court may coafirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of, and make such order as it thinks just: Provided that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the act or decision complained of.\" Part IV deals with penalties, Part V with summary administration, Part VI with appeals and Part VII with topies like costs, power to make rules, etc.\n\nUnder s. 20 (contained in Part II) the court when making an order admitting the petition may, and where the debtor is the petitioner ordinarily shall appoint an interim receiver of the property of the debtor or of any part thereof and the interim receiver shall theroopon have such of the powers conferable on a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure as the court may direct. If an interim receiver is not so appointed, the court may make such appointment at any subsequent time before adjudication. Under s. 21, at the time of making an order admitting the petition or at any subsequent time before adjudication the court may either of its own motion or on the application of any creditor make orders to s.uit the occasion, namely, direct the attachment by actual seizure of the whole or any part of the property in the possession or under the control of the debtor, order a warrant to issue with or without bail for his arrest, or order the debtor to give reasonable security for his appearance until final orders are niade on the petition. Under s. 28(2) on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent is to vest in the court or in a receiver as provided in the Act and become divisible among the creditors in terms of the Act. Under s. 56(1) the court may at the time of the order of adjudication or at any time\n\n~1fterwards, appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent, and\n\nHANS RAJ v. RATTAN CHAND tMitter, ]. ) 3 69\n\nsuch property shall thereupon vest in such receiver.\n\nUnder subs. (3) of the section, where the court appoints a receiver, it may remove the person in whose possession or custody any such proi}erty as aforesaid is from the possession or custody thereof but nothing in this section is to be deemed to authorise the court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom the insolvent has not a present right so to remove. Under sub-s. (5) the provisions of this section shall apply so far as may be to interim receivers appointed under s. 20.\n\nIt will be noted from the above that s. 4, sub-s. (1) lays down the ambit of the powers of the court exercising insolvency jurisdiction.\n\nIts primary object is to empower such courts to decide all questions whether of title or priority or of any nature whatsoever and whether involving matters of law or fact which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the court.\n\nIn other words, the aim of this provision is that all questions of title or priority arising in insolvency should primarily be disposed of by the insolvency courts so as to achieve expedition. It will be noted at once that resort to ordinary courts of law is not proscribed and at the same time the legislature provided that a person could resort to the insolvency court if the matter arose in insolvency proceedings. Under sub-s. (2) however every such decision arrived at by the insolvency court was to be final and binding for all purposes as between on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's estate, and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons\n\n~!aiming throuh or under them or. a.ny of them. This provision 1s however sub.1ect to the other prov1s1ons of the Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. It is also to be noted that this section does not lay down\n\nhat p:ocedure or what steps should be taken by any person who 1s agg:1e.ved by any ?rder of the insolvency court or of any act or om1ss1on or commission of the receiver.\n\nection 20 of the Act empowers the court to appoint an interim rece1.ve.r of the pro.P_Crty of the debtor as soon as an order is made adm1ttmg the pet1t1on.\n\nF.or the prervation of the insolvent's\n\nproerty, the c?urt may direct such mterim receiver to take immediate possession of the whole or any part thereof.\n\nA duty therefore cst on the interim receiver to see that the property ~~ the .d:btor 1s n?t lost an.d for that purpose he must act quicklf.\n\nAs It is not possible tor him ecept on the application of the debtor lo know all the ?etads of the 1solvent's property, he may take the help ?f the cred1tos to ascertam what they are. In this case, on the ay f the mamg of th.e order for adjudication, the court did not appomt a r:ce1ver but did so two days afterwards directina him to take possss1on of the roperty of the insolvent.\n\nIt is posible that the 1ece1ver may be n11sled hy the creditors and he may attach\n\nproperties in which as a matter of fact, the insolvent has no interest.\n\nIn such Ii case, the stranger to the insolvency proceedings is not without a remedy. He need not resort to the ordinary and dilatory proceedings by filing a suit and getting an adjudication of title to his property, removal of the attachment, etc. Section 68 is aimed at giving him speedy relief by enabling him to make an application to the court straightway against any act or decision of the receiver and asking for appropriate relief. If however the party aggrieved seeks to benefit by this provision, he must also bring his case within the four corners of the section and prefer his application within 21 days irom the date of the act or decision of the receiver complained 'lf. When the receiver does an act .under the express directions or orders of the court, an application by a third party complaining thereof does not fall within s. 68 because the receiver's act is a ministerial one. The aggrieved person is however not without a remedy. He can inter alia apply to the insolvency court for und<>-· ing the wrong complained of and the court can give such relief as the circumstanceS may call for. The jurisdiction of the court and the ambit of its powers are as contained in s. 4 which however does not lay down any procedure for obtaining such relief. It is not therefore correct to 'describe an application for relief as one under s. 4.\n\nLeaving aside the decisions which were cited at the Bar, it appears to us, on a plain reading of the sections mentioned above and in particular, ss. 4 and 68, that there can be no doubt that a person (like the appellant before us) complaining of tbe receiver taking possession of or attaching property in which the insolvent has no interest, must apply for relief within 21 days of the wrongful act of the receiver. He cannot be heard to say .that his application is not under s. 68 bµt under s. 4 and thus seek to avoid the short period of limitation prescribed under s. 68. Moreover, subs. (1) and sub-s. (2) of s. 4 both start with the phrase \"subject to the provisions of this Act\" and even if it was possible to construe that s. 4 envisaged the making of an application for relief, such application would be subject to s. 68 of the Act.\n\nWe may now consider some of the decisions cited at the Bar for or against the proposition put forward on behalf of the appellant.\n\nThe sheet anchor of the appellant's case is the decision of thl Allallabad High Court in Nathu Ram v.\n\nMadan Gopal(').\n\nThere the Official Receiver, in pursuance of an order of the insolvency court attached a property on 8th June 1929. On 2nd July following; the son. of the insolvent appli~ to the insolvcy eourt alleging that the property belonged to him and not the msolvent. The court decided in favour of the son but wa; i caHed upon to go into the question as to whether the application was within time.\n\n(I) A.1.R. 1932 Allahabad 408\n\nThis question of limitation was raised before the District Judge and the objection was over-ruled by him.\n\nIt was observed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court :\n\n\"The house was attached under an order of the Insolvency Court, and not by any independent decision of the Official Receiver.\n\nThe actual attachment was a mere ministerial act done in pursuance of the order of the Court. The objector was not challenging the act of the receiver, who had no voice in the matter, but the order of attachment passed by the Court ex parte.\n\nIt seems to us that it was not an act or decision of the receiver within the meaning of s. 68. On the other hand, it was a claim put forward by a stranger to the insolvency proceedings setting up his own independent title, and it fell within the scope of s. 4, Provincial Insolvency Act.\"\n\nThe learned Judges distinguished the cases of Bhairo Prasad v.\n\nS. P. C. Dass(') and Hussaini v. Muhammad Zamir Abdi(2 ) on the ground that in those cases there was no order of the court directing attachment but the act complained of was an act of the receiver himself. ; .. ,\n\nIn Bhairo Prfila'd's case(') the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907 was in operation and there a stranger to the insolvency complained of an act of attachment after the lapse of 21 days. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the application was barred by limitation observing at the same time :\n\n\"A stranger to the insolvency is not bound to go to the Insolvency Court at all. He has the ordinary right, which every individual has, to seek redress in the ordinary civil courtsfor any grievance or trespass to his property, whether committed by an Official Receiver or anybody else, but he can, if he pleases, if he complains against the act of the receiver, apply under s. 22 to the insolvency court itself. . . .\n\nBut similarly if he applies under s. 22, he must comply with the terms of s. 22.\" In Mt. Husaini Bibi's case(') certain houses were proclaimed for '\"le on 14th June 1922 and on !st July the appellant, the wife of the imolvent. put in a claim that the properties belonged to ber.\n\nThe insolvency court referred the appellant to the civil court and a ; uit was filed on 4th July 1922. The properties were sold by the receiver on 5th July before an injunction of the , civil court restraining-a sale could be served on the receiver. On 3rd August 1922 the appellant applied to the District Judge for the cancellation of the sale. This was dismissed. The subject of appeal before the\n\n(I) A.1.R. 19t9 Allahood 274.\n\n(2) Al R. 1924 Oudh 294. (I) A.LR. 19.'4 Oudh 29' l5Sui'. Cl/67-11\n\nHigh Court was the order of dismissal. The learned single Judge relied upon Bhairo Prasad's case(1 ) and observing that the appli cation presented on 3rd of August was apparently one under s. 68 of the Act held that it was barred before the 3rd of August. It was further pointed out that a stranger to _the insolvency may seek his redress in ordinary civil court w!J.en -aggrieved by any act of the Official Receiver, or he may apply under s. 68 of the Act (corresponding to s. 22 of the previous Act). Reference may also be made to an earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mui Chand v. Murari Lal(2 ). There the receiver in insolvency seized certain m0vable property on the information laid by one of the creditors as property of the insolvents. The appellant before the High Court claimed that the property was his and presented an objecting purporting to be one under 0. XXl r. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was dealt with by the Second Additional Judge of Meerut on the merits who after taking evidence came to the conclusion that the property_ seized belonged to the insolvents and dismissed the appellant's application. The Allahabad High Court pointed out that the appellant's position was that of a person aggrieved by an act of the receiver and his remedy was by an application under s. 22 of Act IIl of 1907.\n\nThese decisions, in our opinion, do not assist the appellant on whose behalf it was argued that an application mightbe made either under-s. 68 or under s. 4 of the Act. It is clear from the above deCi sions that a person complaining of the act of the receiver may either apply under s. 68 or proceed under the ordinary law of the land.\n\nSection 4 does not prescribe any application for relief under that section. Its object is to define the limits of jurisdiction of the courts exercising powers in insolvency. It is not correct to say that a person aggrieved by an act of the receiver has the choice of mak • ing an application under s. 4 or under s. 68. Section 4 comes into operation whenever any question of the nature mentioned therein is sought to . be canvassed before a court exercising insolvency jurisdiction.\n\nSuch. questions may arise because of a9ts or deci sions of the receiver complained of. A question as to whether an insolvent has any interest in the property attached by the receiver would fall within the purview of s. 4, but the application for the adjudication of such a question when tlie receiver acts otherwise than under the order of a court would be covered by s. 68 and as such the period of limtiation of twenty-one days would be attracted to any such application.\n\nMr. Bishan Narain referred us to a few decisions of different High Courts as illustrating his proposition that applications are permissible under s. 4-of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In Vellayappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar(2) cited on behalf of the (I) A.I.R. 1919 All. 274.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 36 Allahabad 8.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 47 Madras 446.\n\nappellant, the facts were as follows.\n\nThe respondent obtained a mortgage decree against a person who was subsequently adjudicated an insolvent and the Official Receiver assumed jurisdiction over his properties.\n\nWhile the latter was taking steps to realise the assets, the appellant asserted that some of the properties covered by the mortgage decree were his and denied the right of the insolvent to such properties, at the same time, preferring a claim petition before the Official Receiver. The Receiver enquired into the same and allowed it. Against that order, the mortgagee-decrecholder filed a petition before the District Judge under s. 68 who set aside the order of the Official Receiver and further directed that the claim petition also do stand dismissed. The claimant went up in appeal to the Madras High Court. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court said that the whole of the proceedings was misconceived observing that the Official Receiver had no power to make any order in a claim petition as this was not a power delegated to him under s. 80 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of\n\n1920. According to the High Court, if the claimant wanted to prevent the sale of the property as belonging to the insolvent, he should have applied to the District Judge direct to take action under s. 4 of the Act. He did not however do so. In the result, the High Court set aside all the proceedings in the lower court and left the parties in status quo ante, commenting at the same time, that if the claimant found that the Official Receiver proposed to sell the properties he might apply to the District Judge under s. 4 of the ct. The last portion of the above paragraph was quoted as\n\nsupporting the proposition that an application lay under s. 4 of the Act. That is not what the learned Judges of the Madras High Court meant. In our view, what was meant was that the claimant might make an application to the District Judge who would under s. 4 of the Act have jurisdiction to pass a proper order thereon.\n\nOur attentit!>n was also drawn to the case of Venkatarama v.\n\nAngathayamma!(') where the above Madras decision was cited a.nd a~. more an .one place, the learned Judge used the express1ns an application under s. 4\" and \"an appeal under s 68\" With. all respect to the learned Judge, it seems to us that th~ ex: press10ns wee not accurate for s. 68 although headed \"a al to court agamst receiver\" does not as a matter of fact ppeths word \"appeal\" in th bod f th ' . , use e s. 68 howeyer in reli r; oun e section. The application under decision of the receive7 but th ts to .an ppeal to a court from a party aggneved must \"a 1 e section itself tays down that the ing in which 1 risdi' PP Y to the court\". Similarly a proceed . . u ctton under s 4 b ' . • appl1catton under s 4 Th . may e exercised is not an of an application hnevere proceeding has to be started by way tion by the court of the uatur:de~~t~~ss t~ have an adjudica-\n\n(1} A. l.R. 1933 Madras 471. ·\n\n.\".:PRFMF C'OURT REPORTS\n\n[1967] 3 S.C.R.\n\nIn this connection, our attention was drawn to several other decisions; it is not necessary to go into the facts of these cases.\n\nIn G. N .. Godbole v. Mt. Nani Bai(') and Muthupalaniappa v.\n\nRaman Chettiar('), the expression \"proceedings under s. 4\" had been used while in Heeri:.bai v. Official Receiver(•) the petitioner before the High Court, mother of the two insolvents, laid a claim to I/3rd share in the properties which the Official Receiver sold on 16th April, 1960 purporting to be those of the insolvents.\n\nAccording to the judgment \"the petitioner filed I.A. No. 1900 of\n\n1960 on 28-6-1960 purporting to be under ss. 4 and 68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.\" She also filed I.A. No. 1899 of 1960 for condoning the delay in filing this application as ordinarily \"the appeal under s. 68 should have been filed by her ori or before 5-7-1960\". Tne insolvency court held in the proceedings under s. 68 that there could be no condonation of delay but failed to ascertain with reference to the nature of I.A. No. 1900 of 1960 whether it fell under s. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The learned Judge found that the petitioner had not made any claim before the Official Receiver and even if she chose to make any such claim, the Official. Receiver had no power whatever to decide upon such claim petitions. It was observed :\n\n\"Therefore, an application such as I.A. No. 1900 of 1960 cannot be taken in any sense to be an appeal against the act of the Official Receiver as such. On the other hand, when the petitioner herein wanted that her share should be untouched, it is certainly a case where the petitioner approached the court to determine the question of her title, which it is competent to do only under s. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Therefore, in my view, it is idle to contend that I.A. No. 1900 falls within the purview of s. 68, and that it should be taken to be an appeal and not an application which is contemplated and competent under s. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.\"\n\nIt is difficult to accept the soundness of some of the dicta in the above judgment. The Official Receiver's act in selling the property on 16-4-1960 may have been wholly wrong, but if the petitioner wanted the same to be set aside, she could either have made an G application under s. 68 to the court or she could have filed a suit for relief under the ordinary law of the land. She could not, after a period of 21 days, start a proceeding in the insolvency court describing it as one under s. 4 so as to get out of. the ar of limitation imposed by s. 68.\n\nShe need not have waited till the sale of property. She might have appl!ed to the court as soon as H the receiver took the first step by attaching the property.\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1938 Nagpur S46. - (2} A.T.R. 1941 Madras 75. (3} A.l.R. 1963 A.P. 296.\n\n• c\n\nIn our opinion, Jai Lal, J. correctly pointed out the correlation between ss. 4 and 68 in Dau/at Ram v, Bansilal( 1). The appellant had a money decree against the insolvents which he executed by attachment of a moiety of a share in a house which he alleged belonged to the judgment-debtors. This was before the order of adjudication. An objection was raised by the respondent, Bansi Jal, that he was a purchaser for consideration of the attached property. The objection having been allowed, a suit was filed under\n\n0. 21, r. 63 C.P.C. by the attaching decree-holder and ultimately decreed, it having been held that the sale by the judgment-debtors was fraudulent as against the creditors.\n\nThe receivers in insolvency then took possession of the property attached by the appel lant and sold the same in the insolvency proceedings. Bansilal thereupon made an application under s. 68 on the ground that the action of the receivers was illegal.\n\nThe District Judge allowed the application holding. that the decree passed in the suit under 0. 21 r. 63 was operative only so far as the execution proceedings were concerned and that it did not enure for the benefit of the other creditors. He therefore set aside the sale by the receivers. The creditors including the appellant came up in appeal from the order of the District Judge. An objection was raised by the respondents that no appeal lay without the leave either of the District Judge or of the High Court. In disposing of this, Jai Lal, J. observed:\n\n\"I am inclined to think that though the District Judge was moved under s. 68 which is not one of the sections mentioned in Sch. I, the investigation, which he is expected to make in a case like the present, should be under s. 4, Provincial Insolvency Act, and any order passed by him under s. 4 is appealable as of right to this Court.\"\n\nAn observation similar to the above was made by the same learned Judge in Mui Raj v. Official Receiver('). This point was also brought out in Ganda Ram v. Shiv Nand Ganesh Das(8 ). The scope of the two sections was brought out even more clearly in a judgment of the Rangoon High Court in Ma Sein Nu v. U Mg.\n\nMg.(') where it was said :\n\n\"Now, s. 4 defines the powers of the Insolvency Court to decide questions of law and fact arising in insolvepcy proceedings, but it does not lay down how the court is to be moved to exercise those powers. . . . . Of course, the powers of the court in deciding such an application are defined in s. 4, but this does not mean that the application itself is made under s. 4, and clearly it cannot be for s. 4 contains no provision as to how the court is\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1937 Lahore page 2.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1937 Lahore 757. \\2) A.l.R. 1937 Lahore 297.\n\n(4) A.1.R. 1934 Rangoon 97.\n\nto be moved to exercise its powers, and for the mode of invoking the authority of the Court other provisions of the Act, such as ss. 53, 54 and 68, have to be consulted.\"\n\nIn the result, we hold that the application being one under s. 68 was incompetent on ihe ground of limitation after the lapse of 21 days from November 25, 1954. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.\n\nR.K.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' '\n\nIt,\n\nc • ' •", "total_entities": 143, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ\n\nRATIAN CHAND, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RATTAN CHAND, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 43, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 3, 1967\n\n[K. N. WANCHOO, V. BHARGAVA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 & 6S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "statute": "Provincial Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "statute": "Provincial Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 289, "end_char": 294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "statute": "Provincial Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Insolvency Act", "statute": "Provincial Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "23rd November,. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 445, "end_char": 465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 & 6S-appli- <'!aning of.\n\nElectricity (Supply) Act (54 of 1948)-.s'tate Electricity Board co11- ,1·1ituted under Act-If \"State\".\n\nIn 1958 the services of respondents I and 4 to 14, who were permanent emloyees of the State C?overnment holding posts C?f. foremen. were provis1onally placed at the disposal of the State Electnc1ty Board\n\n(appellant) constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, The Electricity Board was directed to frame its own grades and service conditions, but this was never done. Jn 1960, the first respondent was taken on deputation from the Board and posted to the P.W.D. of the State Govvernment retaining his lien in the Electricity Board. The first respondent remained with the P.W.D. for about three years, and during that time, the Electricity Board promoted respondents 4 to 14 as Assistant Engineers under the Electricity Board. In 1963, the State Government directed the reversion of the first respondent to his parent department, namely, the Electricity Board; and the latter posted him as one of its foremen. When hi• request that he was also entitled to be considered for promotion as Assistant Engineer was rejected, he moved the High Coun under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution the ground that there was a violation of Ans. 14 and 16; and the High Coun allowed the petition.\n\nIn appeal to this Coun, the appellant-Board contended that : (1) the first respondent never became its permanent servant and so could not claim to be considered along with respondents 4 to 14; and (2) the appellant-Board could not be held to be \"State\" as defined in Art. 12 and consequently no direction could be issued to it under Art. 226 and 227.\n\nHELD : (I) The words \"deputation\" and \"reversion\" used in the orders of the State Government and the Electricity Board implied that the first '\":\"l?\"ndent was being sent back to his parent department, namely, the Electric1ty_ Board, from the P.W.D. where he had been sent on deputation. Moreover Ill the case of respondents 4 to 14 who were identically placed with\n\nth.e first respondent, there was nothing to show that after their services were provisionally placed at the dispooal of the Board any order was !>'Ssed permanently transferring them to the Board, and yet they were treated as permanent employees of the Board. Thus, both the Government an~ the Board, in dealing with respondent 1 and 4 to 14, treated them as 11 they bad become employees of the Board. Since the Board did not frame any new grades or service conditions, these respondents continued to he governed by identical rules, namely, the old grades and service conditions applicable to them when they were servants of the State Government d therefore, the first respondent was entitled to be considered for promotion under the Board on the basis of equality with respondents 4 to 14. [381E-F; 3820-HJ\n\n(2) (Per Subba Rao, C.J., Shela!, Bhargava and Mitter JJ.): The appellant-Board is \"other authority\" within the meaning of Art 12 and therefore, is \"State\" to which appropriate directions could be given under Arts. 226 and 227.\n\n[386D]\n\nThe expression \"other authority\" is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute, on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activ:ties, because, under Arts 19(1)(g) and 298 even the State is empowered to carry on any trade or business.\n\nIn interpreting the expression \"other authority\" the principle of ejusdem generis should not be applied, because, for the. application of that rule, there must be distinct genus or category running through the bodies previously named. The bodies specially named in Art. 12 are the Executive Government of the Union and the States, the Legislatures of the Union and the States and local authorities.\n\nThere is no common genus running through these named bodies, nor could the bodies be placed in one single category on any rational basis.\n\n[384C-D, G-N, 385-A, C..D; 386B-C]\n\nUjjambai v. Stmoting coordinated development, generation, supply and distribution of electricity and for that purpose to make, alter, amend and carry out schemes under Ch. V of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, to engage in certain incidental undertakings; to organise and carry out power and hydraulic surveys; to conduct investigation for the improvement of the methods of transmiision; to close down generating stations; to compulsorily purchase generating stations, undertakings, mains and transmission lines; to place wires, poles. brackets, appliances, apparatus, etc; to fix grid tariff: to issue directions for securing the maximum economy and efficiency in the operation of electricity undertakines: to make rules and regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act; and to issue directions under certain provisions of the Act and to enforce compliance with\n\nl!LBCTRICITY BOARD v. MOHAN LAL (Bhargava, J.) 3 8 7\n\nthose directions. The l3oard also invested by statute with ex tensive powers of control over electricim1:gs. The power to make rules and regulations and to a · ter the Act is in sub stance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the l3oard.\n\nThe Board is, in my judgment, \"other authority\" within the mean ing of Art. 12 of the Constitution.\n\nI am unable, however, to agree that every constitutional or sta tutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is \"other authority\" within the meaning of Art. 12. The expression \"autho rity\" in its etymological sense means a body invested with power to command or give an ultimate decision, or enforce obedience,\n\nor having a legal right to command and be obeyed.\n\nThe expression \"State\" is defined in Art. 12 for the purpose of Part ill of the Constitution. Article 13 prohibits the State from making any legislative or executive direction which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part ill and declares any law or executive direction in contravention of the injunction void to the extent of such contravention. In determining what the expression\n\n\"other authority\" in Art. 12 connotes, regard must be had not only to the sweep of fundamental rights over the power of the authority, but also to the restrictions which may be imposed upon the exercise of certain fundamental rights (e.g., those declared by Art. 19) by the authority. Fundamental rights within their allot ted fields transcend the legislative and executive power of the sovereign authority. But some of the important fundamental rights are liable to be circumscribed by the imposition of reasonable res trictions by the State. The true content of the expression \"other authority\" in Art. 12 must be determined in the light of this dual phase of fundamental rights. In considering whether a statutory or constitutional body is an authority within the meaning of Art. 12, it would be necessary to bear in mind not only whether against the authority, fundamental rights in terms absolute are intended to be enforced, but also whether it was intended by the Constitution makers that the authority was invested with the sovereign power to impose restrictions on very important and basic fundamental freedoms. ·\n\nIn my judgment, authorities constitutional or statutory invest ed with power by Jaw but not sharing the sovereign power do not fall within the expression \"State\" as defined in Art. 12. Those authorities which are invested with sovereign power i.e., power to make rules or regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others fall within the definition of \"State\" in Art. 12, and constitutional or statutory bodies which do not H share that sovereign power of the State are not, in my judgment, \"State\" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution.\n\nV.P.S.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nL 5 Sup. Cl/67-12", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "RAJASTHAN STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, JAIPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJASTHAN STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, JAIPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHAN LAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAN LAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 3, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 3, 1967\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHBLAT, V. BHARGAVA B\n\nAND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. K. MITTER, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.K. MITTER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 371, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2007, "end_char": 2014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2073, "end_char": 2089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3275, "end_char": 3284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "381E-F; 3820-HJ\n\n(2) (Per Subba Rao, C.J., Shela!,", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3292, "end_char": 3297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "381E-F; 3820-HJ\n\n(2) (Per Subba Rao, C.J., Shela!,", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3300, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava and Mitter JJ.):", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3313, "end_char": 3319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava and Mitter JJ.):", "canonical_name": "Mitter"}}, {"text": "Art 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3389, "end_char": 3395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3475, "end_char": 3492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[386D]\n\nThe expression \"other authority\" is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute, on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activ:ties, because, under Arts 19(1)(g) and 298 even the State is empowered to carry on any trade or business."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[386D]\n\nThe expression \"other authority\" is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute, on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activ:ties, because, under Arts 19(1)(g) and 298 even the State is empowered to carry on any trade or business."}}, {"text": "Arts 19(1)(g) and 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Executive Government of the Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 are the Executive Government of the Union and the States, the Legislatures of the Union and the States and local authorities."}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 S.C.R. 778", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4617, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 1 S.C.R. 656", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4712, "end_char": 4731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P'Y Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P'Y Shah, J.) : Every constitutional or, statutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is not \"other authority\" within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5764, "end_char": 5771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5964, "end_char": 5971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6977, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 14, 1965 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7059, "end_char": 7070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. K. Puri and K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7072, "end_char": 7082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. K. Puri and K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. K. Puri and K. K. Jain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7189, "end_char": 7198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHELAT, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "SHELAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7206, "end_char": 7212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHELAT, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ.", "canonical_name": "SHELAT"}}, {"text": "BHARGAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHELAT, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ.", "canonical_name": "V. BHARGAVA"}}, {"text": "MITTER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7227, "end_char": 7233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHELAT, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Mitter"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7265, "end_char": 7269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by BHARGAVA, J. SHAH, J. delivered a separate Opinion.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Electricity Board of Rajasthan, Jaipur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7350, "end_char": 7388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J. The appellant in this appeal is Electricity Board of Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as \"the Board\"), a body corporate constituted on 1st July, 1957, under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (No."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7463, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhargava, J. The appellant in this appeal is Electricity Board of Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as \"the Board\"), a body corporate constituted on 1st July, 1957, under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (No."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7618, "end_char": 7627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the constitution of the Board, the supply of electricity in the State of Rajasthan was\n\nbeing controlled directly by a department of the State Government named as the Electrical and Mechanical Department."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7768, "end_char": 7777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Mohan Lal, as well as respondents 4 to 14 were all permanent employees of the State Government holding posts of Foremen in the Electrical and Mechanical Department.", "canonical_name": "MOHAN LAL & ORS"}}, {"text": "12th February, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8141, "end_char": 8160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the constit11tion of the Board, the services of most of the employees, including all these respondents, were provisionally placed at the disposal of the Board by a notification issued by the Government on 12th February, 1958, purporting to exercise its powers under section 78A of Act 54 of 1948."}}, {"text": "section 78A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8202, "end_char": 8213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th January, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9006, "end_char": 9024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was, however, deputed by the State Government by its order dated 27th January, 1960, after having worked under the Board for a period of about two years, to the Public Works Department of the Government."}}, {"text": "10th August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9148, "end_char": 9165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th August, 1960, an order was made by the Government addressed to the Secretary of the Board indicating that respondent No."}}, {"text": "24th November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9360, "end_char": 9379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 24th November, 1962, the Public Works Department passed an order reverting respondent No."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RP.PORTS\n\n(1967) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9490, "end_char": 9529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to his parent department with effect\n\nSUPREME COURT RP.PORTS\n\n(1967) 3 S.C.R.\n\nfrom 1st December, 1962, but the period of deputation was later extended till 25th July, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to his parent department with effect\n\nSUPREME COURT RP.PORTS\n\n(1967) 3 S.C.R.\n\nfrom 1st December, 1962, but the period of deputation was later extended till 25th July, 1963."}}, {"text": "11th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9630, "end_char": 9645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th July, 1963, he."}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10474, "end_char": 10494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10522, "end_char": 10545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11278, "end_char": 11286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11290, "end_char": 11298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11375, "end_char": 11393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11812, "end_char": 11830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the Board, the State of Rajasthan, and the Chief Engineer & Technical Member of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, were also impleaded as opposite parties in the writ petition; and they are respondents 2 and 3 in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11881, "end_char": 11922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the Board, the State of Rajasthan, and the Chief Engineer & Technical Member of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, were also impleaded as opposite parties in the writ petition; and they are respondents 2 and 3 in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14696, "end_char": 14701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Desai, the Power Department mentioned in this order was meant to refer to the Electrical and Mechanical Department of the Government which used to be popularly known by that name."}}, {"text": "1 lth July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15977, "end_char": 15993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the Board itself, in its order dated 1 lth July, 1963, proceeded on the basis that respondent No."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16202, "end_char": 16209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had reverted from the Public Works Department and made a direction that, on reversion from that Department, he was posted as Foreman I, Chambal Grid Sub-Station, Udaipur, against a newly sanctioned post."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18574, "end_char": 18581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18748, "end_char": 18767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 of the Constitution, Mr. Desai urged\n\nthat,- on the face of it, the Board could not be held to be covered by the authorities named therein, viz .• the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and local authorities, and the expression \"other authorities\", if read ejusdem generis with those named, cannot cover the Board which is a body corporate having a separate existence and has been constituted primarily for the purpose of carrying on commerical activities."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19240, "end_char": 19257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his proposition that the expression \"other authorities\" should be interpreted ejusdem generis, he relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in The University of Madras v. Shantha Bai and Another(')."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19436, "end_char": 19443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "University of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19731, "end_char": 19751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The University of Madras is a body corporate created by Madras Act VII of 1923."}}, {"text": "Madras Act VII of 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19783, "end_char": 19805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19927, "end_char": 19937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act VII of 1923", "statute": "Madras Act VII of 1923"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20310, "end_char": 20330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In B. W. Devadas v. The Selection Committee for Admission of Students to the Karnatak Engineering .College, and Others('), the High Court of Mysore similarly held : \"The term 'authority' in the ordinary dictionary sense may comprise not merely a person or a group of persons exercising governmental power, but also any person or group of persons who, by virtue of their position in relation to other person or persons, may be able to impose their will upon that other person or persons."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21333, "end_char": 21340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21661, "end_char": 21678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latest case on the point cited by Mr. Desai is lhe decision of the Punjab High Court in Krishan Gopal Ram Chand Sharma v. Punjab University and Another('), where the decision given in the case of University of Madras(') was followed and the principle laid down therein was approved and applied."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22250, "end_char": 22257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22432, "end_char": 22439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23179, "end_char": 23186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell in his book on 'Interpretation of Statutes' explained the prlnciple by saying : \"But the general word Which follows particular and specific words of the same nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words .... Unless there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine(').\"", "canonical_name": "Maxwell"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23907, "end_char": 23914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24265, "end_char": 24272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn.", "canonical_name": "Maxwell"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25387, "end_char": 25394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25465, "end_char": 25473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), Ayyangar, J., interpreting the words \"other authorities\" in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25525, "end_char": 25532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25549, "end_char": 25556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26222, "end_char": 26232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no characterisation of the nature of the 'authority' in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those Jaws.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26861, "end_char": 26868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT .RJ!PORTS [l 967] 3 s.c", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27250, "end_char": 27287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT .RJ!PORTS [l 967] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27378, "end_char": 27385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27435, "end_char": 27442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27595, "end_char": 27602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27822, "end_char": 27830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28125, "end_char": 28132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29067, "end_char": 29071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. I agree with the order proposed by Bhargava, J The Board is an authority invested by statute with certain sovereign powers of the State.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30471, "end_char": 30478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30661, "end_char": 30668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30909, "end_char": 30916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30966, "end_char": 30976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31288, "end_char": 31295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31525, "end_char": 31532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31867, "end_char": 31874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32045, "end_char": 32052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32567, "end_char": 32574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32790, "end_char": 32797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32948, "end_char": 32955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1967_3_388_392_EN", "year": 1967, "text": "THE\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nPRADESH, HYDERABAD v.\n\nK. ADINARAYANA MURTY\n\nApril 3, 1967\n\nANI>HRA\n\n(J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J\n\nlndian Income•tax Act, 1922, s. 34-Notice of reasscssme11t issued to assessee in status of individual-Return filed in status of HUF- Appellate Authority ho/di11g that correct starus was HUF-Another notice under s. 34 issued-Assess111ent on return filed in response 10 second notice-Validity of asses.Hnent.\n\nThe respondent had two sons. Prior to the assessment year 1954-55 the Income-tax Authorities assemd him as had of a Hindu undivided family.\n\nIn 1954-55 the Income-tax Officer held that he was an 'individual' and assessed him accordingly.\n\nThereafter, having ob'lained sanction from the Commissioner he issued to the respondent a not:ce under s. 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922 in respect of the. year 1949-50 in the status of an individual. A return was filed by the respondent in response to the notice.\n\nHowever in the appeal relating .to 1954-55 the Appellate Assistant CommiS&ioner held that the correct sta