CALCUTTA DOCK LABOUR BOARD

11.

JAFFAR IMAM AND OTHERS

March 22, 1965

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND

V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] Natural Justice-Detention under Preventive Detention Act- Termination of service based on such detention-Validity.

The respondents had been detained u"'der the Preventive Detention Act. On their release theiir employer-the appellant-Board, commenced disciplinary proceedings and show cause notices why their services should not be terminated on the principal ground that they had been detained for acts prejudicial to the .maintenance of public order. Not being satisfied with their answers, the appellant terminated their servi9es. The respondents' appeals to the Chairman of the appellant-Board were dismissed. Thereupon, the respondents

tiled writ petitions in the High Court, challenging the orders on the grounds that reasonable opportunity was not given to them, and that even the relevant statutory provisions had been contravened. The petitions were dismissed, but were allowed by a Division Bench on appeal.

In the apveal to this Court, HELD: If the appellants wanted to take disciplinary action against respondents on the ground that they were guilty of misconduct, it was absolutely essential that the appellant should have held a proper enquiry instead of equating the detention to a conviction by 2riminal Court. At this enquiry, reasonable opportunity should have been given to the respondents to show cause and before reaching its conclusion, the appellant was bound to lead evidence against the respondents, and give them a reasonable chance to test the evidence in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, the Court of appeal was right in taking the view that in the departmental enquiry which the appellant held against the respondents it was not open to the appellant to act on suspicion, and inasmuch as the appellant's decision was based only upon the detention orders and nothing else, there could be little doubt that the said conclusion was based on suspicion and nothing more. [ 459E-H]

Case law referred to : G An obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the employer by cl. 36(3) of the Calcutta Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1951, and cl. 45(6) of the Scheme of- 1956.

[459G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JurusmCTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 569 to 571 of 1964.

B Appeals from the judgment and orders dated August 4, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders Nos.

22. 29 and 30 of 1959.

B. Sen and S. N. Mukheriee, for the appellants.

K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,' C. J. These three appeals arise out of writ petitions filed by the three respondents, Jaffar Bnndaban Nayak and Jambu Patra, respectively on the Ongmal Side of the Calcutta High Court against the appellant, the Calcutta Dock Labour Board. Each one of the respondents challenged the validity of t)ie order passed by the appellant, terminating his employment as a registered dock worker with the appellant, on the ground that the said order was illegal and inoperative. The basis on which the impugned orders were challenged was that the enquiry which had been held before passing the said orders had not afforded to the respondents a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves and as such, the principles of natural justice had not been followed and even the relevant statutory provisions had been contravened. The writ petitions filed by Jaffar Imam and Jambu Patra were heard by.

Sinha, J., whereas the writ petition filed by Bridaban Nayak was heard by P.B. Mukherji, J. The learned single Judges who heard these respective writ petitions substantially took the same view and rejected the contentions raised by the respondents. In the result, the writ petitions were dismissed.

Against these decisions, the respondents preferred appeals befol'e a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Division Bench has allowed the appeals and has issued an appropriate writ directing that the impugned orders by which the employment of the respondents was terminated by the appellant should be quashed.

The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the said High Court and it is with the certificate thus granted to it that it has come to this Court in appeal.

It appears that the three respondents were Dock workers attached to the Port of Calcutta and were registered in the Reserve Pool. On August 12, 1955, the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, passed an order under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act,

1950 (No. 4 of 1950) (hereinafter called 'the Act'} directing that the respondents should be detained, as he was satisfied that they were guilty of violent and riotous behaviour and had committed assault and as such, it was necessary to detain them with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The respondents then made representaticns to the State Government under s. 7 of the Act alleging that the grounds set out in the detention orders passed against them were untrue and that their detention was in fact malafide.

On receipt of these representations, they were forwarded by the State Government to the Advisory Board under s. 9. It is wellknown that the Act had made a provision for referring orders of detention to the Advisory Boards constituted under s. 8. When the

Adviso_ry received the representations. made by ihe respon- . dents, .1t took mto a?count the material placed before it, considered

the said representat10ns, and submitted its report within the time

OALCUTr1. DOCK LABOUR llOAIID v. JAFFAII IMAM (GajendragaJkar, O.J.) 456

specified by s. 10(!). Since the report was against the respondents, their detention was confirmed by the State Government under s. 11 of the Act and in consequence, their detention was continued for about 11 months.

After they were released from detention, they applied for allocation to registered dock employment, but instead of passing orders in favour of such allocation, the appellant commenced disciplinary proceedings against them and not; ces were served on them to show cause why their services should not be terminated on 14 days' notice in terms of clause 36(2)(d) of the Calcutta Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1951 (hereinafter called "the Scheme"). The principal ground in these notices was that the respondents had been detained for acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such, their services were liable to be terminated. Accordingly, the respondents showed cause against the proposed order, but the Deputy Cha 'rman of the appellant was not satisfied with their representations, and so, he terminated their services on December 17, 1956. While doing so, each one of them was given 14 days' wages in lieu of notice for the equivalent period. The respondents challenged this decision by preferring appeals to the Chairman of the appellant, but their appeals did not succeed and the orders passed by the Deputy Chairman were confirmed on April 4, 1957. It is against these appellate orders that the respondents filed the three writ petitions which have given rise to the present appeals.

It is plain that both the Deputy Chairman who passed the impugned orders against the respondents, and the Chairman of the appellant who heard the respondents' appeals, have taken the v:ew that the orders of detention passed against the respohdents, in substance, amounted to orders of conviction and as such, the appellant was justified in terminating the respondents' employment. Both the original as well as the appellate orders nnequivocally state that having regard to the fact that the respondents had been detained, and that their detention was confirmed and continued after consultation with the Advisory Board, it is clear that they were guilty of the conduct alleged against them in the orders. of detention. In

that connection. it was pointed out that the Advisory Board consisted of persons of eminent status and undoubted impartiality, and so, the fact that the representations made by the respondents were

not accepted by the Advisory Board and that their detention was confirmed by the State Government in consultation with the Advisory Board, was enough to justify the appellant in terminating the employment of the respondents.

The two learned single Judges who heard the respective writ petitions substantially took the same view. Sinha, J. has observed that the respondents had a hearing before a very responsible body and the report that went against them showed that the detain!ng authority was justified in holding that the respondents were gmlty

of the charges and had thus. committed acts of ii1discipline and A misconduct within the meaning of the Scheme. In fact, Sinha J., felt no hesitation in holding that the appellant would be entitled to take disciplinary action against the respondents upon suspicion, and he held that the appellant's susp'cion against the respondent5 was more than justified by the fact that the detention of the respondents received the approval of the Advisory Board. P.B. Mukherjee, J., B also approached the question on the same lines. He held that the appellant was entitled to take into consideration the fact that the respondents had been detained, that the statutory Advisory Board had considered the representat'ons of the respondents and had not accepted them, and that the grounds of detention showed that the detaining authority was satisfied that the respondents were guilty C of the conduct which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. "In the premises", sa; d the learned Judge, "I am satisfied that the order terminating Brindaban Nayak's services was justified".

The Conrt of Appeal which heard the three appeals filed by the respondents against the respective orders passed by the two learned single Judges has disagreed with the approach adopted by them in d; smissing the respondents' writ petitions. It has held that in acting merely on suspicion based on the fact that the respondents had been detained, the appellant had acted illegally and that made the impugned orders invalid and inoperative. Mr. B. Sen for the appellant contends that the view taken by the Court of Appeal is erroneous in law.

Before dealing with this point, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Scheme. The Scheme has been made

by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred on F it by sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (IX of 1948). Clause 3(n) defines a "reserve pool" as mean'ng a pool of registered dock workers who are available for work, and who are not, for the time being, in the employmerrt of a registered employer as a monthly worker. The three respondents belong to this category of workers. Clause 23 of the Scheme guaran- G tees the specified minimum wages to workers on the Reserve Pool Register. Clause 29 prescribes the obligations of registered dock wo.rkers, whereas clause 30 provides for the obligations of registered employers. Clause 31 prescribes restriction on employment, Clause 33 deals with wages, allowances and other conditions of service, whereas clause 34 is concerned with pay in respect of un- H employment or underemployment. Clause 36 deals with. disciplinary procedure and it is with this clause that we are directly concerned in these appeals. Clause 36(2) provides that a registered dock worker in the Reserve Pool who is avaHable for work and fails to comp!.\'. w!th. ai:iy of the_ provisions of the Scheme, or commits any act md1sc1plme or ma.\'. be_ reported in writing to the Special Officer, who may, after mvest1gatmg the matter and without prejudice to in addition to the powers conferred by clause 35,

CALCUTTA DOCK LABOUR BOARD v. JAFFA& IMAM(Gajeridragadkar, C.J.) 457

A take any of the five steps indicated by sub-clauses (a) to (e) as regards that worker. Sub-clause (e) refers to dismissal of the guilty workman. Clause 36(3) lays down that before any action is taken under sub-cl. (!) or (2), the person concerned shall be given an opportunity to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken against him. Clause 36A provides for the disciplinary powers B of the Chairman of the Board. Clause 37 deals with termination of employment. Clauses 38 and 39 provide for appeals. That, in brief, is the nature of the Scheme. This Scheme was substituted by another Scheme in 1956. Clause 45(6) of !h's new Scheme corresponds to

cl. 36(3) of the earlier Scheme. In other words, the relevant clauses under both the Schemes require that before any disciplinary action C is taken against a worker, an opportunity must be given to him to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken against him.

There can be no doubt that when the appellant purports to exercise its authority to terminate the employment of its employees D such as the respondents in the present case, it is exercising authority and power of a quasi-judicial character. In cases where a statutory body or authority is empowered to terminate the employment of its employees, the said authority or body cannot be heard to say that it will exercise its powers without due regard to the principles of natural justice. The nature or the character of the proceedings E which such a statutory authority or body must adopt in exercising its disciplinary power for the purpose of terminating the employment of its employees, has been recently considered by this Court in several cases, vide the Associated Cement Companies Ltd.,

v. P. N. Sharma & Another,(') and Lala Shri Bhagwan and Another

v. Shri Ram Chand & Anr.,(') and it has been held that in ascertain F ing the nature of such proceedings with a view to decide whether the principles of natural justice ought to be followed or not, the tests laid down by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin & Others(') are relevant. In view of these decisions, Mr. Sen has not disputed this position and we think, rightly. ·

G Therefore, the question which falls to be considered is whether the appellant can successfully contend that it was justified in acting upon suspicion against the respondents, the basis for the suspicion being that they were detained by orders passed by the appropriate authorities and that the said orders were confirmed by the State Government after consultation with the Advisory Board. It is hard- H ly necessary to emphasise that one of the basic postulates of the rule of law as administered in a democratic country governed by a written Constitution, is that no citizen shall lose his liberty without

a fair and proper trial according to law; and legal and proper trial

(1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366.

(') [1965] 3 R.C.R. 218.

(') L.R. [J9C.>] A. C. 40.

8UPRE?4E COURT REPORTS

(1965) .3 S.O • .B.

according to Jaw inevitably ineans, inter alia, rl trial held ill accor-

JI; dance with the relevant statuiory provisions or in their absence, consistc:1tly. with the principles of natural justice. The Act is an exception to this rule and in that sense, it am"mints to. an encroachment on the I'berty of the citizen. But the said Act has been held to be constitutionally valid, and so far as detention of a citizen effecJed by an order validly passed bY. the appropriate authorities in exercise B of the powers confer.red on , th.em is concerned, its validity can be challenged only on grounds permissible in the light of the relevant provisions' pf the Act. or on the ground of malafides. Whenever detenus move the High Courts or the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the orders"of detention passt<CI against them, the scope of the. enquiry which can be legitimately held in such pro- C ceeaings is thus circumscribed and limited. In such proceedmgs, Courts cannot entertain the plea that the of liberty suffered. by - the detenu by his detention is the result of mere suspicions entertained by the detaining authorities, provided the detaining authorities act bona fide; their subjective judgment about the prejudicial character of the activities or conduct of the citizen sought to be D detained, is not open to challenge or scrutiny in ordinary course, and in that sense, it may have to be conceded that the.loss of liberty has to be suffered by a citizen if he is detained validly under the relevant provisions of the Act. Thus far, there is no dispute.

A But the question wIµch we have to consider in the present ap- E peals is of a different character. A citizen may suffer loss of liberty if he is detained validly under the Act; even so, does it follow that the detenion order which deprived the citizen of his liberty should also serve indirectly but effectively the purpose of depriving the said citizen of his livelihood?· If the view taken by the appellanrs officers who tried the diss:iplinary proceedings. is accepted, it would F follow that if a citizen is detained and his detention is confirmed by the State Government, his services .would be terminated merely and splely by reason of such detention. In our opinion, such a position is , obviously and demonstrably inconsistent with the elementary 'concept of the rule of law on which our constitution is founded.

When a citizen is cjetained, he may not succeed in .challenging the G order of detention passed against liim, unless he is able to adduce grounds permissible under the Act. But we are:-unable to agree with Mr. Sen's argument that after. such a citizen is released from detention, an 'employer, like the appellant, can immediately start disci-. plinary proceedings against him and tell him in substance that he was detained for prejudicial activities which amount to misconduct H and that the detention order was confirmed by the State Government after consultation with the Advisory Board, and so, he is liable to be dismissed from his employment. It. is obvious that the

Advisory Board does not try question about the propriety or validity of the citizen's detention as a Court-of law would; indeed, its function is limited to consider the relevant material p)aced before it and the received from the detenu, and then submit -

I 1

0.U.CUTl'A DOCK LABOUR BOARD t•, JAFFAR IMAM (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 459

its report to the State Government within the time specified by s. l 0(1) of the Act. It is not disputed that the Advisory Board considers evidence against the detenu which has not been tested in the normal way by cross-examination; its decision is essentially different in character from a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. In some cases, a detenu may be given a hearing; but such a hearing is often, if not always, likely to be ineffective, because the detenu is deprived of an opportunity to cross examine the evidence on which. the detaining authorities rely and may not be able to adduce evidence before the Advisory Board to rebut the allegations made against him.

Having regard to the nature of the enquiry which the Advisory Board is authorised or permitted to hold before expressing its approval to the detention of a detenu, it would, we think, be entirely erroneous and wholly unsafe to treat the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board as amounting to a judgment of a criminal The main infirmity which has vitiated the impugned orders arises from the fact that the said orders equate detention of a detenu with his conviction by a criminal court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Court of Appeal was right in taking the view that in a departmental enquiry which the appellant held against the respondents it was not open to the appellant to act on suspicion, and inasmuch as the appellant's decision is clearly based upon tjie detention orders and nothing else, there can be little doubt that, in substance, the said conclusion is based on suspicion and nothing more.

Even in regard to its employees who may have been detained under the Act, if after their release the appellant wanted to take disciplinary action against them on the ground that they were guilty of misconduct, it was absolutely essential that the appellant should have held a proper enquiry. At this enquiry, reasonable opportunity should have been given to the respondents to show cause and before reaching its conclusion, the appellant was bound to lead evidence against the respondents, give them a reasonable chance to test the said evidence, allow them liberty to lead evidence in defence, and then come to a decision of its own. Such an enquiry is prescribed by the requirements of natural justice and an obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the appellant by clause

36(3) of the Scheme of 1951 and cl. 45(6) of the Scheme of 1956.

It that in the present enquiry, the respondents were not given notice of any specific allegations made against them, and the record clearly shows that no evidence was led in the enquiry at all.

It is only the detention orders that were apparently produced and it is on the detention orders alone that the whole proceedings rest and the impugned orders are founded. That being so, we feel no hesitation in holding that the Court of Appeal was pedectly right in setting aside the respect!ve orders passed by the two learned single Judges when they dismissed the three writ petitions filed by the respondents.

Mr. Sen strenuously contended that if we were to insist upon a proper enquiry being held against the respondents before terminating their services, the appellant would find it impossible to take A any disciplinary action against them. He urges that the respondents

are bullies and they have terrorised their co-workers to such an extent that no one would be willing or prepared to give evidence against them in a departmental enquiry. Even assuming that Mr. Sen is right that the appellant would experience difficulty in bringing home its charges to the respondents, we do not see how such a fear B could justify the approach adopted by the enquiry officer in the present case. What would happen if a desperate character who is m the employment of the appellant had not been detained under the Act? In such a case, before -the appellant can validly dismiss such an employee, it will have to hold a proper enquiry. The circumstance that the respondents happened to be detained can afford no C justification for not complying with the relevant statutory provision and not following the principles of natural justice. Any attempt to short-circuit the procedure based on considerations of natural justice must, we think, be discouraged if the rule of law has to prevaif,. and in dealing with the question of the liberty and livelihood of a citizen, considerations of expediency which are not permitted by D law can have no relevance whatever.

The result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.

Appeals dismissed.

CALCUTTA DOCK LABOUR BOARD

JAFFAR IMAM AND OTHERS

March 22, 1965

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO

V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.

cl. 36(3)

cl. 45(6)

Calcutta High Court

B. Sen

S. N. Mukheriee

K. R. Chaudhuri

Gajendragadkar

Jaffar Bnndaban Nayak

Jambu Patra

Calcutta Dock Labour Board

Jaffar Imam

Jambu Patra

Sinha

Bridaban Nayak

P.B. Mukherji

Calcutta

August 12, 1955

s. 3(1)(a)(ii)

Preventive Detention Act

s. 7

s. 9

s. 8

s. 10(!)

s. 11

clause 36(2)(d)

December 17, 1956

April 4, 1957

P.B. Mukherjee

Brindaban Nayak

B. Sen

Central Government

s. 4

Clause 3(n)

Clause 23

Clause 29

clause 30

Clause 31

Clause 33

clause 34

Clause 36

Clause 36(2)

clause 35

Clause 36(3)

Clause 36A

Clause 37

Clause 45(6)

cl. 36(3)

Reid

Sen

[1965] 2 S.C.R. 366

Supreme Court

0.U.CUTl'A DOCK LABOUR BOARD

JAFFAR IMAM

clause

36(3)

cl. 45(6)


STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

MOHANLAL DEVICHAND SHAH

March 23, 1965

[K. N. WANCHOO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.]

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), s. 2(b) Part I Entry 8-Stone breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry-Jur1sd1ctwn whether of Central or State Government-Competency to file complaint.

The Labour Inspector, appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 filed two complaints before the Judicial Magistrate al!eging that the respondent, doing quarrying operation wmk, had contravened certain provisions of the Minimum Wages (Control) Rules, 1950. The respondent, inter alia, submitted that the Inspector wos not authorised to file the complaint, and only an Inspector appointed by the State Government was competent to file the complaint. The Judicial Magistrate held that the word "mine" in sub-cl.

(i) of s. 2(b) of the Act, does not include a stone quarry and therefore, the appropriate government was the State Government and not the Central Government. The appellants' appeals were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal to this Court.

HELD: An examination of the definition of "appropriate Government" in s. 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act in the context and background of GDvernment of India Act, 1935, and the Mines Act, 1923, shows that the word "mine" in s. 2(b)(i) includes quarries.

Also stone breaking or stone crushing in a quarry is within Entry 8 in Part I of the Schedule of the Act. Since the employment in stone breaking or stone crushing is in a quarry, it is within the jurisdiction of the Centrc:-.1 Governm-ent, because it is a scheduled employment in a rn.ine v.:1ithin the meaning of s. 2(lf'(i}. Therefore, the Inspector appointed under the Act was competent to file the complaints. [465F: 466A-B, D] ·

Madhya Pradesh Mi.neral Industry Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 476, applied.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 198 and 199 of 1963.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 4, 1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 & 780 of 1962.

S. C. Patwardhan, B. R. G. K. Achar for R. H. Dheber, for the appellant.

Avadh Behari, for respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These are two appeals by certificate, granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against its judgment dated February 4, 1963, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 and 780 of

1962, By this judgment the High Court affirmed the order of

L/P(N )4SCI-3 461

SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS

(1965] 3 8, C, R.

acquittal passed against the respondent by the Judicial Magistrate, A First Class, Vadagaon (Mawal).

The relevant facts are as follows : The Labour Inspector (Central), Bombay-I, appointed under the Minimum Wages Act

(XI of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) by the Central Government filed two complaints in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate B alleging that the respondent had contravened certain provisions of

the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950. It was alleged that the respondent was doing quarrying operation work in quarry survey Nos. 23(1) Kusegaon village near Lonavala, and while carrying on this quarrying operation work he, failed to observe

certain provisions in the Rules.

The respondent submitted a c written statement admitting the facts but he contended, inter alia, that the Inspector was not authorised to file the complaint and it was only an inspector appointed by the Maharashtra State who was competent to file a complaint. The Judicial Magistrate, treating this as a preliminary objection, came to the conclusion that the Inspector was not entitled to file the complaint. According to him, D the word "mine" in sub-cl. (i) of s. 2(b) of the Act does not include

a stone quarry and, therefore, the appropriate Government was the State Government and not the Central Government.

There upon he acquitted the accused of the offence under s. 22A, read with s. 18, of the Act and for contravening certain rules of the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950.

The State then filed two appeals before the High Court. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the Inspector was not competent to file the complaints but the reasoning of the High Court was different. It was of the opinion that "a stone quarry can fall within the category of a mine as defined in the Mines Act of 1952 or the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) F Act of 1957." But even so, according to it, "the Schedule does

not mention either a mine or a stone quarry and item No. 8, viz.,· Employment in stone breaking and stone crushing, cannot, therefore, be said to be an employment in respect of a mine whether

G in its broadest sense so as to include a stone quarry or in narrow sense as given in the Oxford English Dictionary." The High Court further held that 'unless, therefore, the Parliament amends item No. 8 of the Schedule so to include the operation of

stone-breaking and stone-crushing in a stone quarry or in all mines

including a stone quarry, it is not possible to hold that the appropriate Government would be the Central Government, merely on the that, in its widest connotation, the words 'stone quarry' H may fa 11 within the ambit of the word 'mine'."

Section 2(b) of the Act defines "appropriate government" as follows:

"2(b) "appropriate government" means-

(i) in relation to any scheduled employment carried on

STATE V, MOHANLAL (Sikri, J.) 463

by or under the authority of the Central Government or a railway administration or in relation to a mine, oilfield or major port, or any corporation established by a Central Act, the Central Government, and

(ii) in relation to any other scheduled employment, the 11 State Government."

Sub-clause (g) defines 'scheduled employment" to mean an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment.

The Schedule is divided into two parts, and Part I contains entry 8-Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing. Section 22 prescribes the penalties for certain offences and s. 22A provides that "any employer who contravenes any provisions of this Act or of any rule or order made thereunder shall, if no other penalty

is provided for such contravention by this Act, be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees." Section 22B deals with the cognizance of offences and provides that "no Court shall take cognizance of a complaint against any person for an offence ...

under clause (b) of section 22 or under section 22A except on a complaint made by, or with the sanction of, an Inspector."

The first question which arises is whether the quarry which the respondent is alleged to be working and in which the employees are alleged to be carrying on the operation of stone breaking or stone crushing is a mine, within s. 2(b). Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the definition of the word "mine" in the Mines Act, 1952 (XXXV of 1952), and the Mines

Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of 1957). Section 2(j) of the Mine Act defines 'mine', and the relevant part of the definition is as under:

""Mine" means any excavation where any operation for

the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and includes- • • I •

(iv) all open cast workings." The word 'minerals' is defined to mean all substances which can be obtained from the earth by mining, digging, drilling dredging, hydraulicing, quarrying or by any other operation and mineral oils (which in turn include natural gas and petroleum).

The learned counsel says that a quarry is a mine within this definition.

In the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Deve10pment) Act, 1957, the expressions 'mine' and 'owner' have the meanings assigned to them in the Mines Act, 1952. The learned counsel contends that this meaning should be read into the Minimu111

Act v

The learned counsel for the respondents relies on the observations of this Court in Pandit Ram Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') that "it is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act ml)st take their colour from the context in which they appear." The learned counsel further contends, relying on a number of English

decisions, that in its primary signification the word 'mine' means underground excavations or underground workings.

He relies in particular on the speech of Lord Macnaughten in Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Farie(').

The House of Lords was concerned in that case with the interpretation of s. 18 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, which was in the following terms:

"The undertakers shall not be entitled to any mines of coal,

ironstone, state, or other minerals under any land purchased by them, except only such parts thereof as shall be necessary to be dug or carried away or used in the construction of the water-works unless the same shall

have been expressly purchased, and all such mines, excepting as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be excepted out of the conveyance of such lands, unless they shall have been expressly named therein and conveyed thereby." The appellants in that case had purchased from the respondent a parcel of land for the purpose of erecting waterworks and the conveyance contained a reservation. of the "whole coal and other minerals in the land in terms of the Waterworks Clauses Act,

1847." Under the land was a seam of valuable brick clay.

The respondent worked this clay in the adjoining land, and having reached the appellants' boundary, claimed. the right to work out the clay under the land purchased by the appellants. The House of Lords held that common clay, forming the surface or subsoil of land, was not included in the reservation in the Act, and that the appellants were entitled to an interdict restraining the respondent from working the clay under the land purchased by them. It is true Lord Macnaughten first construed the. word 'mjne' in this enactment to mean underground excavations or underground workings, and then proceeded to construe the section. But Lord Watson was of the opinion that the word 'mine' did not necessarily mean underground excavations. He said that "it does not occur to me that an open excavation of auriferous quartz would be generally described as a gold quarry; I think most people would call it

a gold mine." Later he observed that "the word 'quarry' is, no doubt, inapplicable to underground excavations but the word

'mining' may without impropriety be used to denote some quarries.

Dr. Johnson defines a quarry to be a stone mine". He arrived at the conclusion that "the word 'mine' must be taken to signify all

(') [!956] S.O.R. 664 at G73,

(') 13 A.O. 657,

STA1'E v. MOltANLAL (Sikri, J,) 465

excavations by which the excepted minerals may be legitimately worked and got."

In our opinion, as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, volume 26, p. 317, the word 'mine' is not a definite term, but is one susceptible of limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it is used.

In s. 2(b) of the Act; we have to see the context in which word has been used, What the legislature is purporting to do is to demarcate the jurisdiction of the State Governments and the Central Government in respect of minimum wages to be paid to persons employed in the employments enumerated in the Schedule.

Entry 35 in List I of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, was "regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields." Entry 36 read "regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral develooment to the extent to which such regulation_ and development under Dominion control is declared by Dominion law to be expedient in the public interest." It is not seriously contested that in Entries 35 and 36 the word 'mines' would include quarries. The Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923)

which was the existing law when the Government of India Act came into force, made provisions regarding health and safety in mines and regulated hours and limitations of employment in the mines. The word 'mine' had been defined to mean any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and includes all works, machinery, tramways and sidings, whether above or below

ground, in or adjacent to or belonging to a mine, provided that it shall not include any part of such premises on which a manufacturing process is being carried on unless such process is a process for coke making or the dressing of minerals. Therefore, if we examine the definition of 'appropriate government' in s. 2(b) in the context and in the background of the Government of India Act anc\ the existing law, it seems to us that the Central Legislature must have intended to include quarries in the word 'mine', otherwise it would be rather incongruous that some matters such as health and saftey, hours and employment in quarries should be regulated by the Central Government and minimum wages by the State Governments. Further, there is no indication whatsoever in the Act that the word 'mine' has the narrower meaning suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent.

If the word 'mine' is held to include a quarry, the next question that arises is whether stone breaking or stone crushing in a quarry is within the Schedule.

While interpreting Entry 8 in the Schedule, this Court observed in Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur(') as follows:

"When we speak of stone-breaking or stone-crushing normally we refer to stone in the sense of "piece of rock"

and that would exclude maganese. Employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing in this sense would refer to quarry operations." This Court thus read Entry 8 to refer to quarry operations, and we hold that stone-breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry is within the Schedule.

Thus reading item 8 of the Schedule and s. 2(b) of the Act together, it seems to us. that the definition demarcates the jurisdiction of the Central Government and the State Governments in this way: If the employment in stone-breaking or is in a quarry then it is within the jurisdiction of the Central Government; if the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is not in a quarry, it is the State Government that will have jurisdiction.

We are unable to appreciate the observations of the High Court that the operation of stone-breaking and stone-crushing in a stone quarry does not fall within item 8 of the Schedule and that it is necessary that Parliament should amend item 8 of the Schedule.

In the result, we hold that the Inspector was competent to file the complaints and the Magistrate and the High Court should not have acquitted the respondent on the ground of his being incompetent to file the complaints. The appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court and the order of the Magistrate are reversed and the cases remitted to the Magistrate to proceed with the complaints in accordance with law.

Appeals allowed.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

MOHANLAL DEVICHAND SHAH

March 23, 1965

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.

Minimum Wages Act, 1948

s. 2(b)

Minimum Wages Act, 1948

s. 2(b)

Central Government

s. 2(b)

Mines Act, 1923

s. 2(b)(i)

Part I of the Schedule of the Act

[1960] 3 S.C.R. 476

S. C. Patwardhan

B. R. G. K. Achar

R. H. Dheber

Avadh Behari

Sikri

Labour Inspector (Central), Bombay-I

Minimum Wages Act

Lonavala

Maharashtra State

s. 2(b)

s. 22A

s. 18

Mines Act

Parliament

Section 2(b)

Section 22

s. 22A

Section 22B

section 22

section 22A

s. 2(b)

Mines Act, 1952

Section 2(j)

Mines Act, 1952

Macnaughten

s. 18

Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847

Waterworks Clauses Act

Watson

Johnson

England

s. 2(b)

Mines Act, 1923

s. 2(b)

s. 2(b)


MOHAMMAD SAFI

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

March 25, 1965

[A. K. SARKAR, J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), s. 403.(1}---Proceedings before a Special Judge-Erroneous assumption of want of jurisdiction-Acquittal of accused after framing. charge-Subsequent trial, if barred.

A charge sheet was filed in the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, against the appellant for an offence under s. 409, LP.C. After the examination of the prosecution witnesses a charge was framed.

Thereafter, the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined and the

accused was questioned under s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code; At the time of hearing arguments, the Public Prosecutor

placed before the Special Judge two judgments of the High Court according to which the Special Court could not take cognizance upon a charge sheet and that therefore the entire proceedings were without. jurisdiction. Though the case was in fact allotted to the Special Judge by a Government notification, he held that he had no jurisdiction to proceed, and as the charge had already been framed. made an order acquitting the appellant. A formal complaint against the appellant was then preferred by the Public Prosecutor before the s1.1ccessor-in-office of the Special Judge and a fresh proceeding was

commenced against the appellant which ended in his conviction.

His appeal. to the High Court was dismissed.

In his appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that since he was tried and ac.quitted upon the same facts by the former Special Judge, his trial over again for the same offence was barred bv s. 403 of the Code.

HELD: The trial and eventual conviction of the appellant were valid in law, because, the earlier order of the Special Judge did not amount to an order of acquittal as contemplated by s. 403(0 It was merely an order putting a stop to the proceedings.

Section 403(1) can be successfully pleaded as a bar to a sutsequent trial for the same offence or for an offence based on the facts, where the accused had been (a) tried bv a court (b) of competent jurisdiction and (c) acquitted. It is only a court which is competent to initiate proceedings or to carry them on that can properly make an order of acquittal which will have the effect of barring a subsequent trial upon the same facts and for the same offence. It is true that in the instant case the former Special Judge could have properly taken cognizance of offence because of the allotment and, therefore, the proceedings before him were irl fact not vitiated by reason of lack of jurisdiction. But where a court says, though erroneously, that it was not competent to take cognizance of the offence, it has no power to acquit that person of the offence. Therefore, the order acquitting the appellant was in fact " nullity. [470E; 471A-B, HJ .

Ywiofalli Mulla Noorbboy v. The King, L.R. 76 LA. 158, applied.

467 .

The fact that a charge had been framed w<ould not help the A appellant. A criminal court is precluded from determining the case before it in which a charge has been fnmed otherwise than by

making an order of acquittal or conviction, only where the charge was framed by a competent court. But in the present cas<e, since the former Special Judge was, on his own view, not competent to take cognizance of the offence, he was incompetent to frame the

charge. Similarly, the provisi(\lls of s. 494 of the Code could not be B attracted, because; that provision also assumes the withdrawal by a Public Prosecutor of a charge competently made and before a court competent to entertain the withdrawal application. [473C-El

Moreover, the earlier proceedings could not be deemed to be a trial at all, because, for proceedings to amount to a trial, they must be held before a court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is not of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. c

[473E-FJ - CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No: 18 of 1963.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 24, I 962 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 601 of

1%Q D

D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.

P. K. C hakravarti and P. K. Bose, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mudholkar, J. The only point which has been urged inAhis appeal by certificate from a judgment of the High Court at Calcutta is whether the trial and conviction of the appellant for an offence under s. 409, Indian Penal Code were barred by the provisions of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code).

The facts which are not in dispute are these: The appellant was tried for an offence. under s. 409, LP.C. b' Mr. T. Bhattacharjee, Judge., Birbhum Special Court and sentenct< to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years.

His convictin was maintained in appeal by the High Court but the sentence , as reduced to rigorous imprisonment for two years.

One of the pints urged before the High Court was that upon the same fact1and with respect to the same offence the appellant was tried earlF by Mr. N. C. Ganguly, Judge, Birbhum Special Court and

thereof.

He could, therefore, not have been tried over .-am m respect of that offence and consequently his conviction id sentence are illegal.

What actually happened was this. The appe!IanfNho was a shed clerk at Sainthia Railway Station is alleged mitted criminal breach of trust with respect to 8 bags had been booked by rail at Murarai by one Bhikam (l_nd the consignee being the firm of Lalchand Phusraj He wa3 alleged to have done this in conspiracy with brah1m and Nepal Chandra Das. We are not concerned with the two persons

MOHD. SAFI v. STATE (Mudholkatr, J.) (69

and so we can leave them out of account. The offence was investigated into and a charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under s. 409, I.P.C. and two other persons by the Officer-in-charge,

Government Railway Police, Asansol. Apparently he filed the charge sheet himself in the court of Judge, Birbhum Special Court.

However, as set out in the order of Mr. Ganguly acquitting the

appellant the case was distributed to the Birbhum Special Court for trial by notification No. 4515-J dated May 8, 1959 (Law Judicial Department), Government of West Bengal. The prosecution examined 21 witnesses before him and on August 28, 1959 he framed a charge against the appellant under s. 409, I.P.C. The prosecution witnesses were cross-examined on behalf of the

appellant and the court examined him under s. 342 of the Code.

At the time of the hearing of arguments the Public Prosecutor placed before him a typed copy of a judgment of the High Court

in Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 1958 in which it was held that a Special Court cannot, in view of the ame11dment of s. 5 (!) of the

West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 by Act 27 of 1956 take cognizance upol) a charge sheet because it is neither entitled to follow the procedure for trial under s. 251-A nor can it take cognizance under s. 190(1 )(c) unless in the latter case the provisions of s. 191 of the Code were complied with. The attention of the learned Judge was also drawn to A. P. Misra v.

The State(') where it was held that where a magistrate could not legally take cognizance of an offence on the basis of a charge sheet

the entire proceedings before him are without jurisdiction. In view of these decisions the learned Judge made an order of which the relevant portion runs thus:

"So the proceeding is without jurisdiction. As the unreported decision of their Lordships was not available at the time of framing of charge, charge was framed against the accused person and the case continued as usual. As the unreported decision of their Lordships has

to the notice of this Court, the accused persons agamst whom charge was framed should be acquitted. As

the )Jersons. ar_e because the entire proceedmg is without 1umd1ct10n I am of opinion that it is necessaiy (sic) to discuss the evidence on record and decide the merits of the case."

Thereafter a formal complaint was preferred by the Public Prosecutor on May 16, )960 and Mr. Bhattacharjee who had succeeded. Mr. Ganguly as Judge of the Special Court, Birbhum

cogmzance of the offence and commenced a fresh proceeding agamst all the accused persons, including the appellant. He framed a charge under s. 409, I.P.C. against the appellant and eventually convicted and sentenced him with respect to it, as already and the appeal from the conviction was dismissed by the High Court.

(') [1958] Cr. L.J. 1386.

 In order to appreciate the argument advanced before us by Mr. D. N. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to set out the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 403 of the Code. They are as follows;

"A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236 or for which he might have been convicted unde.r section 237."

These provisions are based upon the general principle of auterfoi.1 acquit recognised by the English courts.

The principle on which the right to plead auterfois acquit depends is that a man may not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence.

This principle has now been incorporated in Art. 20 of the Constitution. The defence of auterfois acquit, however,_has no application where the accused person was not liable lawfully to be convicted at the first trial be cause the court lacked jurisdiction. This is what has been pointed out by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Thoma!; Ewart Flower v.

R. ('). From the language used in s. 403(1) of the Code it is clear that what can be successfully pleaded as a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offence or for an offence based on the same facts is that the accused had been (a) tried by a court, (b) of com petent jurisdiction and (c) acquitted of the offence alleged to have been committed by him or an offence with which he might have been charged under s. 236 or for which he might have been convicted under s. 237, of the Code .. Mr. Mukherjee, however, says that in so far as competency of the court is concerned it was there because the offence in question was cognizable by a Special Court

and Mr. Ganguly made the order of acquittal as Judge of the Special Court.

The competence of a court, however, depends not merely on the circumstance that under some law it is entitled to try a case falling in the particular category in which the offence alleged against the accused falls.

In addition to this taking cognizance, of the offence is also material in this regard. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure a court can take cognizance of an offence only if the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before it as set out in Part B .of Chapter XV are fulfilled. If they are not fulfilled the court does not obtain jurisdiction to try the offence. In the case before us Mr. Ganguly took the view, though erroneously, that as one of the conditionnequisite for taking cognizance of the offence was not satisfied he had no jurisdiction over the matter. Having come to that conclusion he had no option but

to put a stop to those proceedings. It appears, however, that he

• (') 40 Cr. App. R. 189.

MOBD. SAFI v. STATE (Mudholkar, J.) 471

A felt that having already framed a charge the only manner in which

he could put an end to the proceedings was by making an order of acquittal. It requires, however, no argument to say that only

a court which is competent to initiate proceedings or to carry them on can properly make an order of acquittal, at any rate, an order of acquittal which will have the effect of barring a subsequent B trial upon the same facts and for the same offence. Mr. Mukherjee,

however, raises two contentions on this aspect of the matter.

In the first place, according to him, the view taken by Mr. Ganguly that he could not have taken cognizance of the offence was erroneous as has been pointed out by this Court in Ajit Kumar Palit v.

State of West Bengal(') and, therefore, he could legally acquit the C appellant. He further says that since Mr. Ganguly had not only

framed a charge against the appellant but also examined all the witnesses both for the prosecution and for the defence and recorded the examination of the appellant he had completed the trial.

In the second. place, he says, that where a charge has been framed against an accused person in a warrant case the proceedings before D the court can either in acquittal or in conviction and in no other way.

HP points out that under s. 494 of the Code the Public Prosecutor may with the consent of the court withdraw before a certain stage is reached, the prosecution of any person and that the only order which the court is competent to make is

to acquit the accused if the withdrawal is made after a charge has E been framed.

It is true that Mr. Ganguly could properly take cognizance of the offence and, therefore, the proceedings before him were in fact not vitiated by reason of lack of jurisdiction. But we cannot F close our eyes to the fact that Mr. Ganguly was himself of the

opinion-and indeed he had no option in the matter because he was bound by the decisions of the High Court-that he could not take cognizance of the offence and consequently was incompetent

to try the appellant. Where a court comes to such a conclusion, albeit erroneously, it is difficult to appreciate how that court can G absolve the person arraigned before it completely of the offence

alleged against him.

Where a person has done something which is made punishable by law he is liable to face a trial and this liability cannot come to an end merely because the court before which he was placed for trial forms an opinion that it has no jurisdiction to try him or that it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the H offence alleged against him. Where, therefore, a court says, though

erroneously, that it was not competent to take cognizance of the offence it has no power to acquit that person of the offence.

An order of acquittal made by it is in fact a nullity. In this connection we might profitably refer to the decision in Yusofally Mu/la Noorbhoy v. The King('). That was a case where there was no

(') [1963] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 953.

(1) L.R, 76 I.A. 158.

valid sanction as required by cl. 14 of the Hoarding and Profiteer- A

ing Prevention Ordinance, 1943 for the prosecution of the appellant therein on separate charges of hoarding and profiteering. The sanction for the prosecution had been granted by the Controller General of Civil Supplies who was authorised to give such sanction

by virtue of a notification of the Government of India duly published. Charges were framed by the Magistrate and thereafter B further evidence was called for by the prosecution and some of the witnesses were recalled for cross-examination. On the date of hearing, however, counsel for prosecution made a statement to the following effect:

"In view of the High Court decision in Revisional C Application No. 191 of 1945, as this court is not competent to try this offence, he does not wish to tender the witnesses already examined for further cross-examination nor to lead any further evidence." ·

Thereupon the Magistrate recorded an order in the following D terms:

"Mr. Mullick's evidence is deleted.

Accused acquitted for reasons to be recorded separately."

After referring to the statement of counsel for the prosecutio11 E and the order made on it the Magistrate continue\!:

"On a perusal of the said decision, however, I find that the filing of this charge sheet by the prosecution itself is invalid in law, because the sanction is signed by the Controller-General under a Notification of the Government of India, and the said Notification does not state that the various officers therein mentioned are not below the rank of a District Magistrate. Thus it is the incompetence of the prosecution to proceed against the accused

without sanction as provided for in law.

As, however, the invalidity of the sanction invalidates the prosecution in court, the accused was acquitted."

The Government filed an appeal against the order of acquittal.

The High Court allowed it and set aside the orders of the Magistrate acquitting the appellant and directed that the case should be tried by another Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it and dealt H with according to law.

Against the decision of the High Court the appellant took an appeal to the Privy Council. The Privy Council accepted the view of the Federal Court in Basdeo Agarwalla v .. King Emperor(') that the prosecution launched without valid sanction is invalid and held that under the common law a plea of auterfois acquit or convict can only be raised where the

(') [1945] F.C.R. 93.

MOHD. SAFI v. (Mudholkar, J.) 473

A first trial was before a court competent to pass a valid order of

acquittal or conviction. Unless the earlier trial was a lawful one

which might have resulted in a conviction, the accused was never in jeopardy. The pfinciple upon which the decision of the Privy Council is based must apply equally to a case like the present in which the court which made the order of acquittal was itself of the B opinion that it had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case and

therefore the accused was not in jeopardy.

As regards the second contention of Mr. Mukherjee it is necessary to point out that a criminal court is precluded from detennining the case before it in which a charge has been framed otherwise C than by making an order of acquittal or conviction only where

the charge was framed by a court competent to frame it and by a court competent to try the case and make a. valid order of acquittal or conviction.

No doubt, here the charge was framed by Mr.

Ganguly but on his own view he was not competent to take cognizance of the offence and, therefore, incompetent to frame a charge.

D For this reason the mere fact that a charge had been framed in this

case does not help the appellant. Similarly the provisions of s. 494 of the Code cannot be attracted to a case of this kind because that provision itself assumes the withdrawal by a public prosecutor of a charge competently made and before a court competent to entertain the application for withdrawal.

E In addition to the competent of the court, s. 403 of the Code speaks of there having been a trial and the trial having ended in

an acquittal. From what we have said above, it will be clear that the fact that all the witnesses for the prosecution as well as for the defence had been examined before Mr. Ganguly and the F further fact that the appellant was also examined under s. 342

cannot in law be deemed to be a trial at all. It would be only repetition to say that for proceedings to amount to a trial they must be held before a court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. A fortiori it would also follow that the ultimate order G made by it by whatever name it is characterised cannot in Jaw

operate as an acquittal.

In the Privy Council case it was interpreted by Sir John Beaumont who delivered the opinion of the Board to be an order of discharge. It is unnecessary fon us to say whether such an order amounts to an order of discharge in the absence of any express provision governing the matter in the Code B or it does not .amount to an order of discharge. It is sufficient to

say that it does not amount to an order of acquittal as contemplated by s. 403(1) and since the proceedings before the Special Judge ended with that order it would be enough to look upon it merely as an order putting a stop to the proceedings. For these reasons we hold that the trial and eventual conviction of the appellant by Mr. Bhattacharjee were valid in law and dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

MOHAMMAD SAFI

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

March 25, 1965

A. K. SARKAR, J.

R. MUDHOLKAR

R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 403

s. 409

s. 342

s. 403

s. 494

D. N. Mukherjee

P. K. C hakravarti

P. K. Bose

Mudholkar

s. 409

Indian Penal Code

s. 403

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 409

T. Bhattacharjee

N. C. Ganguly

Birbhum Special Court

appe!IanfNho

Murarai

Bhikam

Lalchand Phusraj

Nepal Chandra Das

s. 409

I.P.C

Ganguly

August 28, 1959

s. 409

I.P.C

s. 342

s. 5

s. 251

s. 190(1 )(c)

s. 191

May 16, )

Bhattacharjee

Special Court, Birbhum

s. 409

I.P.C

D. N. Mukherjee

s. 403

section 236

section 237

Art. 20

s. 403(1)

s. 236

s. 237

Mukherjee

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 494

cl. 14

Government of India

Mullick

[1945] F.C.R. 93

Ganguly

s. 494

s. 403

s. 342

John Beaumont

s. 403(1)