A DWARKANAm

SBRI LAL CHAND AND OTOE~

February 10, 1965

B [P. B.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH

AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]

U.P. Court of Wards A~, 1912 (Aot 4 of 1912), ss. 37, 53-Scope of-Consent of Court of Wards for AdOl>tion-Jf adoption can be challenged in Civil Court.

A widow whose estate was under the charge of the Court of Wards, made an adoption and applied under s. 37 of the U.P. Court of Wards Act, 1912. for permission to make the adoption. The Collector refused the permission as the grant of authority to adopt,

by the husband who died in 1901, was not proved. The 1st respondent's father, the nearest reversioner, filed a suit challenging the adoption as contrary to s. 37 of the Act and the suit was decreed.

The widow. thereafter, applied to the Court of Wards for permission to adopt the appellant. Fresh enquiries about grant of authority by the husband to adopt, were made, and permission was granted and the appellant was adopted in 1929. Immediately after the adoption of the appellant the Court of Wards, released the estate and assumed charge of it again on behalf of the appellant who was a minor. On the death of the widow in 1943, the 1st respondent's father filed a suit, challenging the validity of the appellant's adoption on the ground that the widow had no authority from her husband to adopt. The Trial Court decreed the suit and the High Court, on appeal. affirmed the decree. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the conclusion of the Court of Wards to grant permission and the reasons for the decision could not be questioned in a civil suit.

HELD : The Civil Court was competent to reconsider the question nf the authority given by the husband, even after the consent of th.e Court of Wards.

Section 37 of the U.P. Court of Wards Act affects the competence of the wards to make an adoption, and as the consent of the Court of Wards is a pre-requisite, any adoption made without such consent must be ineffective. The section, however, does not make the sanction of the Court of Wards cure illegalities or breaches of Personal law. Nor does the sanction make up for incompetence arising under the personal law. Those matters would have to be determined according to the personal law in a Civil' Court of competent jurisdiction. f30E-G] ·

ction 5~ also is not a bar to such a suit. The section only provides that if the Court of Wards gave or refused its consent to a

proposed adoption a suit would not lie to cancel the consent or to compel it. It does not go to the length of saying that after the consent of the Court of Wards, the adoption itself cannot be questioned at all. f30Hl

In deciding the question of authority, the statements made by witnesses at the second enquiry by the Court of Wards for giving its consent to adopt, could not be considered by the Civil Court as they were not relevant or admissible either under s. 32(7) or s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. f32 D-F; 33 A-Cl

As the 1st respondent's father never llccepted the appellant's A adoption it could not be said that the suit, filed more than 15 years after the adoption during which time the appellant had been con- >idered by everyone to be legally and validly adopted, ought to !Je dismissed. f33E-G l

ClVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 195 of 1%3.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 24, 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appca!No. 76/47.

C. B. Agarwa/a and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant.

S. T. Desai, M. V. Goswami and B. C. Misra, for the respondent No. I.

M. V. Goswami and B. C. Misra, for respondents Nos. 2, 7. and 8.

R. S. Gupta, S. S. Klianduja and Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. 9.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hidayatullah, J. This appeal arises from a suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 for declaration of their rights to the Phulpur Estate,

for possession of properties belonging to the Estate and for mesne profits. The Phulpur Estate is situated in Allahabad District. One E Rai Bahadur Rai Pratap Chand who died on January 23, 1901, was the Zamindar of this Estate. After his death, his widow Rani Gomti Bib; succeeded to the Estate. Rani Gomti Bibi was considerably ilnfiuenoed by her brother Gaya Prasad and priests belonging to some temples. In the years following the death of her husband, Rani Gomti Bibi made many endowments involving F vast properties and in July 1920, the Court of Wards assumed charge of the Estate which the Rani was mismanaging. On Feb ruary 21. 1923, the Rani adopted one Bindeshwari Prasad and then applied to the Court of Wards under s. 37 of the U.P. Court of Wards Act for permission to make the adoption. The Collector (Mr. Knox) made an enquiry and ')n April 3, 1923, made a report G Ex. 79 stating that the evidence tendered before him was so conflicting and unreliable that he had come to the conclusion that the authority of Rai Pratap Chand to adoption by his widow was not proved. He, therefore, recommended that Rani Gomti Bibi be declined "permission to make the adoption and the Board of RevenuPaccordingly refused permission. Rani Gomti Bibi, how H ever, executed a deed of adoption on November 6, 1924 in favour of Bindeshwari Prasad. A suit was filed by Parmeshwar Dayal (who was the first plaintiff in the. persent suit) in 1925 against Rani Gomti Bibi, Bindeshwari Prasad and the Court of Wards challenging the adoption made by the Rani. On August 21, 1926, the suit was decreed, and it was held that the adoption was contrary to s. 37 of the U.P. Court of Wards Act, 1912 and was thus

DWARKA NATH V. LAL CHAND (Hido!Nluilah, J.) 29

A invalid inasmuch as permission to take the adoption was not obtained from the Court of Wards..

Rani Gomti Bibi then apphd to the Court of Wards for permission to adopt Bindeshwari Prasad's brother's son Dwarka Nath who is the present appellant. Fresh enquiries, about the authority B of the husband were made by the then Collector Mr. Thompson.

He examined witnesses from a fat filed by Gaya Prasad in the earlier suit of" 1925. After considering the evidence, the Collector re commended grant of permission under s. 37 of the U.P. Court of Wards Act and permission was accordingly granted by the Board of Revenue. On November 28, 1929, the Rani adopted Dwarka c Nath at Phulpur. Immediately after th; s adoption the Court of Wards released the Estate and assumed charge of it again on behalf of Dwarka Nath who was a minor.

On January 5, 1943, Rani Gomti Bibi died and the present suit was filed by Parmeshwar Dayal and one Amarrrath Agarwal D to whom Parmeshwar Dayal had assigned 6/16th share in the Estate. This suit was decreed by the Civil 'Judge of Allahabad who held inter alia that Parmeshwar Dayal was the nearest reversioner of Rai Partap Chand and was entitled to succeed him, and further that the adoption was invalid as there was .no proof of authority given by Rai Pratap Chand to Rani Gomti Bibi to make the adop- E tion. The suit for declaration and possession was decreed with mesne profits amounting to Rs. 88,000 against Dwarka Nath and the Collector and the Court of Wards who was also made a party to the suit. Three appeals were filed against the judgment and by a common judgment dated March 24, 1959, the High Court affirmed the decree except in respect of mesne profits. The High Court p certified the case as fit for appeal to his Court and the present appeal results.

At the hearing, Mr. C. B. Agarwala stated on behalf of the appellant that he did not challenge that Parmeshwar Dayal was the nearest reversioner of Rai Pratap Chand. We are also not G now concerned with the endowments. Mr. Agarwala contended that the findings about authority by Rai Pratap Chand to the adoption were erroneous an required to be reconsidered.

In seeking reconsideration of this finding, Mr. Agarwala relied both on facts and law. In so far as his claim is to have the evidence reconsidered, it may be stated at once that it is not the practice H of this Court to examine the evidence at large specially when the High Court and the Court below have drawn identical conclusion from it. In this case, the evidence about the authority, such as it was, was considered both by the Trial Judge and the High Court and they could not persuade themselves to accept it. Followin~ the settled practice of this Court we declined to look into the evidence for the third time, but we permitted Mr. Agarwala to raise arguments of law and wt shall deal with tho'c arguments now.

LIB(D)2S0[-4

Mr. Agarwala relies upon ss 37 and 53 of the U.P. Court of A Wards Act, 1912 and contends that inasmuch as the Court of Wards made an enquiry into the truth of the allegat; ons that Rai Pratap Chand had given express authority to Rani Gomti Bibi to make an adoption after his death and found in favour of autho rity, the conclusion of the Court of Wards to grant permission

an? the. reasons for !he dec!sion cannot be questioned by a civil B suit. This argument, m our Judgment, cannot be accepted. Section 37, of the U.P. Court of Wards Act, in so far as it is material. reads as follows: -

"37. pisabilities of wards- A ward shall not be competent-

(a) ...................... ..

(b) to adopt without the consent in writing of the Court of Wards;

(c) ...................... ..

Provided, first, that the Court of Wards shall not

withhold its consent under clause (b) .. .. .. . .. . .. if the D adoption .. .. .. . .. .. . is not contrary to the personal or special law applicable to the ward . "" .......... ".

The section obviously places a hurdle in the way of adoptions by the wards which must be removed before the adoption can be valid. The section affects the competence of the wards to make the adoption and as the consent is a pre-requisite, any adoption B made without such consent must be ineffective. The section, however, does not make the sanction of the Court of Wards to cure illegalities or breaches of the personal law. Nor does the sanction make up for incompetence arising under the personal law. It is obvious that if the adoption is void by reason of the personal law of the person adopting, tbe consent of the Court of Wards 1' cannot cure it. Nor would the consent take the place of the essential ceremonies or the religious observances where necessary. Those matters would have to be determined according to the personal law in civil court of competent jurisdiction.

Mr. Agarwala argues that s. 53 is a bar to any suit questioning the adoption made after the consent of the Court of Wards to 11 the adoption has been given. That section cannot be used in this manner. It reads :

"53. (i) The exercise of any discretion conferred on the State Government or the Court of Wards by this Act shall not be questioned in any Civil Court.

(2) ..................... ".

The section merely puts the exercise of discretion by officers acting under the Court of Wards Act beyond question. Thus if thd Court of Wards gave or refused its consent to a proposed adoption

a suit would not Ee either to cancel the consent or to compel it.

This section. however, does not go to the length that after the consent of the Court of Wards the. adoption 1tsel! cannot be question- . ~

DWARKA NATH v. LAL CHAND (Hidayatullah, J.) 3L

A ed at all. There are no words in the section to this effect nor can. such a result be implied. If the Court of Wards gave its concurrence to a proposed adoption, the bar created by s. 37 of the Act would be removed, but it would not make the adopt'on immune from attacks in a Civil Court on any ground on which adoptions are usually questioned there. Mr. Agarwala claims that the rea- B sons for the consent of the Court of Wards are a part of the consent and are within s. 53(1). This cannot be accepted, No doubt, the Court of Wards reached its own conclusion for purpose of s. 37 that Rai Pratap Chand had accorded authority to Rani Gomti Bibi to adopt a son, but if the adoption was questioned in a civil court, the civil court would not be ousted of its jurisdict; on C to decide the question. All that the civil court would be compelled hold would be that the requirements of the Court of Wards

Act as to the consent of the Court of Wards were fulfilled. In our judgment, the legal argument that after the consent of the Court of Wards the Civil Court was incompetent to reconsider the ques.

tion of the authority given by the husband cannot be accepted.

D In deciding the question of authority, the High Court rejected the oral evidence led before it and affirmed the conclusions of the tr; al Judge. The High Court considered this evidence both intrinsically and in the light of the attending circumstances and found it unacceptable. The trial Judge pointed out that as law- E yers. were present when Rai Pratap Chand 'is alleged to have given authority to his widow. and as it was also suggested that that fact should be recorded, it was unbelievable, if the statements were true, that written authority would not have been prepared then and there. The High Court did not content itself with accepting

the opinion of the tr.ial Judge but discussed the evidence de nova F and rejected it. The High Court pointed out that Rai Pratap Chand was only 30 years old at the time of his death and his wife was 25 years old and he could not have abandoned the hope of having an issue. Evidence shows that the writ; ng was put off because it was not thought that Rai Pratap Chand was dying. The High Court also pointed out that Rani Gomti Bibi executed bet- G ween November 24, 1901 and August 19, 1904 4 documents making d.ifferent endowments. In none of these documents, she mentioned that she had been asked by her husband to make them.

The High Court pertinently pointed out that the oral evidence showed that the declaration of the authority to his wife and the

H oral will to make the endowments, were made by Rai Pratap Chand at the same tim:: nd these facts would have figured as the reason for the endowments in these documents. Mr. Agarwala contends that even if the reasons for the endowments might be expected to be expressed, it is not logical to say that the deeds 11hould have recited the irrelevant fact that authority was given to Rani Gomti Bibi to make the adoption. This is perhaps right, but the fact remains that the two directions of Rai Pratap Chand went hand in hand; and even if the fact of authority was not

recited in the documents, one would expect at least the oral wiU A to make the endowments to be menti9ned. This shows that the whole story about oraLdir.ections to Rani Gomti Bibi was untrue.

Mr. Agarwala then seeks to ii'se the statements made by Gaya Prasad and the witnesses before Mr.

Thompson. In the High Court this claim was based upon ss .. 11, 32 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. The High Court rejected these statement9 B and declined to attach any value to them.

Section 11 was not relied up<>n before us; but the other two sections were referred to in an effort to have that evidence read. Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down:

"157. Former statements of witness may be proved to c corroborate later testimony as to same fact: Jn order to corroborate the testimony of i1 w; tness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved." D Two circumstances, which are alternative, are conditions precedent to the proof of earlier statements under this sect'on. The first is that the statements must have been made at or about the time when a fact took place. The fact here is the authority said to have been given by the husband in 1901. The statements were made on December 18, 1928, 27 years after the event. They cannot be ll said to have been made "at or about the time when the fact took place". Further, as rightly pointed 'out b)j l; he High Court, the Court of Wards was making an enquiry for the purpose of accordi11g its consent. It was not enquiring into the fact of the giving of authority as an 'authority legally competent'. That authority, as F we have pointed out already, is the civil court for the civil court alone can finally decide such a question. It can do so even after the Court of Wards had reached a conclusion, and contrary to that conclusion. Section 157 therefore cannot make the statements provable.

Mr. Agarwala next relies on s. 32(7) of the Indian Evidence Act to introduce the earlier statements. That sub-sectiorr reads:

"32. Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be. found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount

of delay or expense which under the circumstances of H the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- * * * * '.7) When the statement is contained in any deed, will or other document which relates to any such transaction as is mentioned in s. 13. clause (a). • * *

DWARKA NA1H v. LAL CHAND (Hiduyatullah, J.) 33

Clause (7) makes relevant statements made in deeds, w.ills arul such other documents which relate to transactions by which a right or custom in question "was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied" (to add the words of cl. (a) of s. 13).

The clause does not allow introduction of parole evidence, see Field on the Law of Evidence 8th Edn. p. 202. Such parole evidence may be relevant under cl. (5) of s. 32, but that is not relied upon. We questioned Mr. Agarwala whether he wished to rely upon clanse (5), but he did not wish to put his case under that clause and we need not therefore consider the application of that clause. We think Mr. Agarwala is right in taking this course, because cl. (5) requires that such a statement should have been made before the quest'on in dispute was raised. The statements in question were definiuely made after the question in dispute in the suit had already arisen, because one enquiry had already been made by Mr. Knox and the statements now relied upon were made in the second enquiry before Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Agarwala next wishes to use the statements made by Gaya Prasad on March 14, 1926 "Ex. 72"; but that clearly is not admissible, because when it was made in the suit, Gaya Prasad was being examined as a party before issues were framed. In fairness to Mr. Agarwala it may be mentioned that he did not press the point after noticing the above fact.

Mr. Agarwala conten'.!s lastly that as Dwarka Nath was adopted on Nmember, 28. 1929 and the present suit was filed on May 21, 1945, after more than 15 years, and as during this time.

Dwarka Nath had been cons'dered by everyone to be legally and validly adopted the suit ought to have been dismissed. It may be pointed out that Panneshwar Dayal never accepted the adoption of Dwarka Nath. He had filed an earlier suit and questioned the competence of Rani Gomti Bibi to make the adoption of B'ndeshwari Prasad. In that suit he had denied that Rai Pratap Chand had given authority to his wife to make the adoption of a son after h's death. He consistently denied the validity of the second adoption and in these circumstances, it cannot be said that he was I concluded by any rule of law from questioning the adoption of Dwarka Nath after Rani Gomti Bibi's death.

On an examination of all the legal pleas against the judgment of the High Court we are satisfied that none of them avails the appellant. In so far as the question of fact are concerned, we have 11 already stated that we do not propose to go into them as 1t did not appear to us that there was any legal reason for reaching a different conclusion.

We accordingly dismiss the appeal but order that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

Appeal dismissed.

February 10, 1965

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.

c. SHAH

S. M. SIKRI, JJ.

ss. 37, 53

s. 37

Court of Wards Act, 1912

s. 37

Section 37

Court of Wards Act

s. 32(7)

s. 157

Indian Evidence Act

Allahabad High Court

C. B. Agarwa

J. P. Goyal

S. T. Desai

M. V. Goswami

B. C. Misra

R. S. Gupta

S. S. Klianduja

Ganpat Rai

Hidayatullah

Rani Gomti Bib

Rani Gomti Bibi

Gaya Prasad

Feb ruary 21. 1923

Bindeshwari Prasad

s. 37

Court of Wards Act

Knox

April 3, 1923

Rai Pratap Chand

November 6, 1924

Parmeshwar Dayal

Rani

August 21, 1926

s. 37

Court of Wards Act, 1912

DWARKA NATH

Hido!Nluilah

Dwarka Nath

Thompson

s. 37

Court of Wards Act

November 28, 1929

Dwarka c Nath

Phulpur

January 5, 1943

Parmeshwar Dayal

Amarrrath Agarwal

Allahabad

Rai Partap Chand

March 24, 1959

C. B. Agarwala

Agarwala

ss 37 and 53

Court of A Wards Act, 1912

Section 37

Court of Wards Act

s. 53

s. 37

s. 53(1)

s. 37

Act

November 24, 1901

August 19, 1904

Thompson

Indian Evidence Act

Section 11

Section 157

Indian Evidence Act

December 18, 1928

Section 157

s. 32(7)

Indian Evidence Act

s. 13

Hiduyatullah

s. 13

s. 32

March 14, 1926

May 21, 1945

Panneshwar Dayal

B'ndeshwari Prasad


R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS.

CHANDRAMMA AND ANR.

March 5, 1965

[K. N. WANCHOO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SncRJ, JJ.] Indian Evidence, s. 115 and Equitable Estoppel-When conduct does not amount to estoppel-Mesne profits-Past and future-When can be awarded. .

The plaintiff instituted the suit for possession of her half share in the suit properties anci for mesne profits. The first defendant, what was the plaintiff's sister, admitted the plaintiff's ciaim and herselfi claimed a decree against the other defendants in respect of her half share in the suit properties. The second defendant was their fatheJ' and the suit properties were in his possession. He and the other defendants, who were his second wife and children by her, contested the suit. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's claim, but held that the first defendant was estopped from claiming possession of her share. On appeal by the first defendant, the High Court passed .a decree! in her favour also for possession of her half share in the suit properties, and for past and future mesne profits.

On appeal to thi~ Court against the decree in favour of the first defendant, it was contended on behalf of the other defendants: (i) that the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from claiming possession of her half share of the properties because (a) she\ had not replied to a notice from the plaintiff to join with her in the suit for obtaining possession and division of the suit properties; (b)' she had written a letter to her step-mother stating that she wished to have no interest in the suit properties then in her father's possession;

(c) she and her husband had attested a will executed by the father on 25-1-1941 which covered the disposition of the suit properties; and (d) that the first defendant's conduct was either covered by s. 115 Evidence Act or fell within the principle of "equitable estoppel"; (jjy even if the first defendant's claim to the half share in the suit properties could not be denied, she must be made to pay for half the cos~ of various improvements of those properties effected by the secondi defendant in the bona fide belief that the properties belonged to him, as she had acquiesced in the expenditure being incurred; (iii) that no decree can be passed in favour of a defendant who has not asked for transposition as plaintiff in the suit; and (iv) that it is not open to a1 court to award future mesne profits to a party who did not claim them in the suit.

HELD: (i) The first defendant was neither estopped from claim ing possession of her half share of the properties nor could she be made liable to pay half the costs of improvements alleged to have been made by the second defendant; (a) It cannot be implied from the conduct of the first defendant in not replying to the notice given by the plaintiff that she had admitted that she had no interest in the properties; (bl The second defendant's case that the properties belonged to him having been negatived, there was no possibility of an erroneous belief being created in the mind of the second defendant that he had title to the property because of what the first defendant had sa'd in her letter to her step-mother; (c) The attestation of the will by the first defendant and her husband, by which the second defendant purported to make a disposition of the suit properties in favour of the other defendants could not operate as an estoppel, as

284 StJPREME COURT REPORTS

[1965) 3 S.C.R.

no interest had accrued in favour of those defendants on the date of the suit. As •far a~ .the second defendant was concerned, he knew the true legal pos1t10n and could not say that an erroneous belief was created m his mmd by reason of the first defendant and her husband attesting the will. [286 G-H; 287 C; 287 F] Quaere: Whether the Court, while determining whether the conduct of a particular party amounts to an "equitable estoppel" could travel beyond the provisions of s. 115 of the Evidence Act [288 Bl .

Case Jaw reviewed.

(ii) No man who knowing fully well that he has no title to pro~ perty, spends money on improving it, can be permitted to claim pay~ ment for improvements which were not effected with the consent of the true owner. [290 CJ Ramsden v. Dyson, L R.I.H.L.App. 129, 140 distinguished.

(iii) Both the plaintiff and the first defendant claimed under the same title and though the other defendants had urged special defences against the first defendant, they had been fully considered and adjudicated upon by the High Court while allowing her appeal. The High Court could, while upholding her claim, have transposed her as a pla'ntiff. It either over-looked the technical defect or felt that under Order XLI rule. 33, it had ample power to decree her claim. However that may be, the provisions of s. 99 C.P.C., would be a bar to interference by the Supreme Court with the High Court's decree upon such a gm1nd. [290 G-H]

Bhupendra v. Rajeshwar, 58 I.A. 228, referred to.

(iv) Though mesne profits prior to the suit cannot be awarded to a successful party unless a claim is made in respect of them, the position regarding future mesne profits is governed by 0. XX, r. 2, C.P.C. The decree awarding mesne profits to the first defendant musb be upheld because the first defendant admitted the plaintiff'• claim and in substance prayed for a similar decree in her favour.

[291 B; 292 G-H]

Mohd. Amin and Ors. v. Vakil Ahmed and Ors. [1952] S.C.R. 1133, distinguished.

C1v1L A1•PELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 730 of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 19, 1959. of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 208 of 1961-62.

S. K. Venkatarangaiengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants ,., S. T. Desai and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 1.

K. K. Jain, for respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mudholkar, J. This is an appeal by defendants Nos. 3 to 8 from a decision ol the High Court of Mysore passing a decre;: in favour of respondent No. 1 who was defendant No. 1 in the trial court, for posses5icn of half the property which was the subject matter of the mit and also allowing future mesne profits.

The relevant facts are briefly these: The plaintiff who is the elder sister of the first defendant instituted a suit in the court of the District Judge, Bangalore for a declaration that she is the owner of half share in the properties described in the schedule to the plaint and for partiticn and' separate possession of half share and for mesne

lil

1\.S. MA.DANAPPA ~. CHANDRAlOlA (MuiJholkar, J.) 285

profits. According to her the suit property was the absolute property of her mother Puttananjamma and .upon her death this property devolved on her and the first defendant as her mother's heirs. Since, according to her. the first defendant did not want to join her as coplaintiff in the suit, she was joined as a defendant. It is common ground that the property was in the possession of the second defendant R. S. Maddanappa, the father of the plaintiff and the first defendant and Gargavva, the second wife of Maddanappa and her children. Madanappa died during the pendency of the appeal before thh Court and his legal representatives are the other defendants to

th,• suit. Briefly stated his defence, which is also the defence of the defendants other than defendant No. I is that though the suit properties belonged to Gowramma, the mother of Puttananjamma, she had settled them orally on the latter as well as on himself and that after the death of Puttananjamma he has been in possession of those properties and enjoying them as full owner. He further pleaded that it was the last wish of Puttananjamma that he should enjoy these properties as absolute owner. The plaintiff and the Jirst defendant had, according to him, expressly and impliedly abandoned their right in these properties, that his possession over the properties was adverse to them and as he was m adverse possession for over the statutory period, the suit was barred. Finally he contended that he had spent more than Rs. 46,000 towards improvements of the properties which met partly from the income of his joint ancestral property and partly from the assets of the third defendant.

These improvements, he alleged, were made by him bona fide in the belief that he had a right to the suit properties and consequently he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The first defendant admitted the claim of the plaintiff and also claimed a decree against the other defendants in respect of her half share in the suit properties. The other defendants, however, resisted her claim and in addition to what the second defendant has alleged in his written statement contended that she was estopped by her conduct from claiming any share in the properties.

The trial court decreed the claim of the plaintiff but held that the first defendant was estopped from claimin~ possession of her half share in the properties left by her mother. The first defendant preferred an appeal before the High Court challenging the correctness of the decision of the trial court. The other defendants also filed an appeal before the High Court challenging the decision of the trial court .in favour of the plaintiff. It would appear that the plaintiff had also preferred some cross-objections. All the matters were hrd together in the High Court, whiGh dismissed the

ppeal preferred 9Y defendants Nos. 2 to 8 as well as the crossobjections lodged by the plaintiff but decreed the appeal pr'!ferred by th~ first defendant and passed a decree in her favour for possession of her half share in the suit properties, and future mesne profits

against th_e remaining defen.dants. Defendants Nos. 2 to 8 applied tor a certificate from the High Court under Articles 133(1)(a) and 133(])(c) in respect of the decree of the High Court in the t\vo appeals. The High Court granted the certificate to defendants Nos. 2 to 8 in so far as defendant No. 1 was concerned but refused certipcate in so far as the plaintiff was concerned. We are therefore, concernd with a limited question and that is whether the High Court was right in awarding a decree to the first defendant for possess'on of her half share and mesne profits.

Mr. Venkatarangaiengar, who appears for the appellants accepts the position that as the'certificate was refused to defendants Nos. 2 to 8 in so far as the plaintiff is concerned, the only points which they are entitled to urge are those which concern the first defendant alone and no other. The points which the learned counsel formulated are as follows :

(I) It is not open to a court to award future mesne profits to a party who did not claim them in the suit;

(2) No decree can be passed in favour of a defendant who has not asked for transposition as plaintiff in the suit.

(3) That the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from claiming possession of her alleged half share of the properties.

We will consider the question of esfoppel first. The conduct of the first defendant from which the learned counsel wants us to draw the inference of estoppel consts of her attitude when she was served with a notice by the plaintiff, her general attitude respecting

I!angalore properties as expressed in the letter dated 17th January, 1941 written by her to her step-mother and the attestation by her and her husband on 3-10-1944 of the will executed on 25th January, 1941 by Maddanappa. In the notice dated 26th January, 1948 by the plaintiff's lawyer to the first defendant it was stated that the plaintiff and the first defendant were joint owners of the suit properties which were in the possession of their father and requested. for the co-operation of the first defondant in order to effect the division of the properties. A copy of this notice was sent to Maddanappa and he sent a reply to it to the plaintiff's lawyers. The first defendant, however, sent no reply at all. We find it difficult to construethe conduct of the first defendant in not replying to the notice and in not co-operating with the plaintiff in instituting a suit

for obtaining possession of the properties as justifying the inference H of estoppel. It does not mean that she impliedly admitted that she . had no interest in the properties. It is true that in Ex. 15, which is a letter sent by her en 17-1-1941 to her step-mother she has observed thus:

"I have no desire whatsoever in respect of the properties which are at Bangalore. Everything belongs to my father.

He has the sole authority to. do anything .... We give our

R.B. MADANAPPA v. CHANDRAMMA (Mudholkar, J.) 287

consent to anything done by our father. We will not do anything." But even these statements cannot assist the appellants because admittedly the father knew the true legal position. That is to say, the father knew that these properties belonged to Puttananjamma' and that he had no authority to deal with these properties. No doubt, in his written statement Maddanappa had set up a case that the properties belonged to him by virtue of the declaration made by Puttananjamma at the time of her death, but that case has been negatived by the ourts below. The father's possession must, there-·

fore, be deemed to have been, to his knowledge, on behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant. There was thus no possibility of an erroneous belief about his title being created in the mind of Maddanappa because of what the first defendant had said in her letter to her step-mother.

In so far as the attestation of the will is concerned, the appellants' position is no better. This 'will' purports to make a disposition of the suit properties along with other properties by Maddan appa in favour of defendants Nos. 3 to 8. The attestation of thfl will by the first defendant and her husband, would no doubt affix them with the knoweldge of what Maddanappa was doing, but it cannot operate as estoppel against them and in favour of defen• dants Nos. 3 to 8 or even in favour of Maddanappa. The will could1 take effect only upon the death of Maddanappa and, therefore, no interest in the property had at all accrued to the defendants Nos. 3 to 8 even on the date of the suit. So far as Maddanappa is concerned, he, as already stated, knew the true position and therefore, could not say that an erroneous belief about his title to the properties was created in his mind by re1son of the conduct of the first! defendant and her husband in attesting the document. Apart from that there is nothing on the record to show that by reason of the conduct of the first defendant Maddanappa altered his position to his disadvantage.

Mr. Venkatarangaiengar. however, says that subsequent to the execution of the will he had effected further improvements in the properties and for this purpose spent his own moneys. According to him, he would not have done so in the absence of an assurance like the one given by the first defendant and her husband to the effect that they had no objection to the disposition of the suit properties by him in any way he chose to make it. The short answer to this is that Maddanappa on his own allegations was not only in possession and enjoyment of these properties ever since the death of Puttananjamma but had made improvements in the properties even before the execution of the will. In these circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of Section 115 of the Indfan Evidence Act, which contain the law of estoppel by representation do not help him.

Mr. Venkatarangaiengar, however, wanted us to hold that the law of estoppel by representation is not confined to the pr

of s: 115 of the Evidence Act, that apart from the provisions of this scch?n there is what is called "equitable estoppel" evolved by the English Judges and that the present case would come within such "equitabk estoppel". tn some decisions of the High Courts reference has been made to "equitable estoppel" but we doubt whethe~ the court while determining whether the conduct of a particula~ party amounts to an e.stoppel, could travel beyond the provisions of Sect10n 115 of the Evidence Act. As was pointed out by Garth C.J.

in Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Saurjmull(') the provision of s 115 of the Evidence Act are in one sense a rule of evidence and

are founded upon the well known doctrine laid down in Pickard v.

Sears(') in which the rule was stated thus:

"Where one by his word or conduct wilfully causes another to believe for the existence of a certain state of thing and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the first time." The object of estoppel is to prevent fraud and secure justice bet• ween the parties by promotion of honesty and good faith. There

fore, where one person makes a misrepresentation to the otheu about a fact he would not be shut out by the rule of estoppel. if that other person know the true state of facts and must consequent• ly not have been misled by the misrepresentation.

The general principle of estoppel is stated thus by the Lord Chancellor i, n Cairncross v. Lorimer('):

"The doctrine will apply, which is to be found. I believe, in the laws of all civilized nations that if a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully _done without his consent. and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice o~ those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. I am of opinion that, generally speaking, if a party having an interest IOI prevent an act being done has full notice of its being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license." It may further be mentioned that in Cari" v. London & N_W_ Ry. Co.(') four propositions concerning an estoppel by conduct

i'I 1.L-R, 5CCnJ,. 669.

(2) 6 Ad •• E. 469. ('I 3 Macq. s2;. (" T,, Jt. 10 C.P. 307.

R.S. MADANAPPA v. CHANDRAMMA (Mudhotkar, J.) 289

were laid down by Brett, J. (afterwards Lord Reher) the third o~ which rum thus:

"If a man either in express terms or by conduct makes a representation to another of the existence of a certain stattl of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a certain way, and it be acte:l upon in the belief of the existence of such a: state of facts, to the damage 'Of him who so believes and acts, the first is estoppel from denying the existence of such a state of facts,"

This also shows that the person claiming benefit of the doctrine must show that he has acted to his detriment on the faith of the representation made to him.

This was quoted with approval in Sarad v. Gopa[('). It will thus be seen that here also the person who sets up an estoppei against the other must show that his position was altered by reason of the representation or conduct cf the latter and unless he does that even the general principle of estoppe] cannot be invoked by him. As already stated no detriment resulted to any of the defendants as a: result of what the defendant No. I had stated in her letter to her step-mother or as a result of the attestation by her and her husband of the will cf Maddanappa.

Mr. Venkatarangaiengar then tried to urge before us that it was a case of fmily settlement by the father with a view to avoid! disputes amongst his heirs and legal representatives after his death and, therefore, the actions of defendant No. I can be looked at as acquiescence in the family settlement effected by the father. A case of fall'ily settlement was never set up by the defendants either in the trial court or in the High Court and we cannot allow a new case to be set up before us for the first time.

Finally on this aspect of the case the learned counsel referred to the observations of Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v. Dyson(') which are as follows:

"If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own and I (the real owner) perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, a!nd leave him to persevere in his error, a court of equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land, on which he has expended money on the supposition, that the land was his own. It considers that when I saw the mistake in which he had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to state his adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me to remain wilfully passive on such an occasion in order afterwards to profit by the mistake which I might have prevented.

The doctrine of acquiescence cannot afford any help to the appellants for the simple reason that Maddanappa who knew the true state of affairs could not say that any mistaken belief was caused

(') L. R. 19 I.A. 20~. (') L. R.I. JI. L. App. 129, 140.

~UPREME COURT REPORTS

(! 965) 3 S.C.R,

in his mind by reason of what the first defendant said or did.

According to the learned counsel, even if the first defendant's claim to the half share in the suit property cannot be denied to her she must at least be made to pay for the improvements effected by Maddanappa, according to her proportionate share in the suit property. As already stated the appellant was .in enjoyment of thee proportion after his wife's death and though fully aware of the fact that they belonged to the daughters he dealt with them as he chose.

When he spent moneys on those properties he knew what he was doing and it is not open to him or to those who claim under him to say that the real owners of the properties or either of them should' be made to pay for those improvements. No man who, knowing fully well that he has no title to property spends money on improving it can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements which were not effected with the consent of that person.

In our view, therefore, neither was defendant No. 1 estopped from claiming possession of half share of the properties nor can she be made liable to pay half the costs of improvements alleged to have been made by the seconddefendant.

Now regarding the second point, this objection is purely technical. The plaintiff sued for partition of the suit properties upon the ground that they were inherited jointly by her and by the first defendant and claimed possession of her share from the other defendants who were wrongfully in possession of the properties.

Sl'e als; i alleged that the first defendant did not co-operate in the matter and so she had to institute the suit. The first defendant admitted the plaintiff's title to half share in the properties and claimed a decree also in her own favour to the extent of the remaining half share in the properties. She could also have prayed for the transposition as a co-plaintiff and under Order I, rule 10(2) C.P.C. the Court could have transposed her as a co:plaintiff. The power unde~ this provision is exercisable by the Court even suo motu. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Bhupender v. Rajeshwar(') the power ought to be exercised by a court for doing complete justice between the parties. Here both the plaintiff and the first defendant claim under the same title and though defendants 2 to 8 had urged special defences against the first defendant, they.have been fully considered and adjusted upon by the High Court while allowing her-appeal.

Since the trial court upheld the special defences urged by defendants 3 to 8 and negatived the claim of the .first defendant it may have thought it unnecessary to order her transposition as plaintiff.

But the High Court could. while upholding her claim, well have done so. Apparently it either over-looked the technical defect or felt that under 0. XLI, rule 33 it had ample power to decree her claim. However that may be, the provisions of s. 99 would be a bar to interfere here with the High Court's decree upon a ground such as this.

(') L.R. 58 l.A. 22~.

R.S. MADANAPPA '<'.

CHANDRAMMA (Mudholkar, J.) 291

fhe only other question for consideration is whether the High Court was justified in awarding mesne profits to the first defendant even though she was not transposed as a plaintiff. According to the learned counsel mesne profits cannot be awarded to a successful party to a suit for possession unless a claim was made in respect of them. The learned counsel is right in so far as mesne profits prior to the suit are concerned but in so far as mesne profits subsequent to the date of the institution of the suit, that is future mesne profits are concerned, the position is governed by Order XX, rule 2, C.P.C. which is as follows:

"(]) Where a suit is for the recovery of possess'on of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree -

(a) for the possession of the property;

(b) for the rent or mesne profits which have accrued on the property during a period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent or mesne profits;

(c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until: -

(i) the delivery of possession to the decreeholder,

(ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or ('ii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event first occurs.

(2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause

(c) a nnal decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shali be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry." The learned counsel, however, relied upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Amin and others v. Vakil Ahmed and others(').

That was a suit for a declaration that a deed of settlement was void and for possession of the property which was the subject matter of the settlement under that deed. The plaintiffs had not claimed mesne profits at all in their plaint but the High Court had passed a decree in the plaintiff's favour not only for possession but also for mesne profits. In the appeal before this Court against the decision of the High Court one of the points taken was that in a ca; e of this kind, the court has no power to award mesne profits.

While upholding this contention Bhagwati J. who delivered the judgment of the Court has observed thus:

"The learned Solicitor-Genera! appearing for the plaintiffs conceded that there was no demand for mesne profits as such but urged that the . claim for mesne profits would. be included within __!_he expression 'awarding

I') [1952] S.C.IL 1!33, 1144. )!/B(N)3SCl-6

possession and occupation of the property aforesaid together with all the rights appertaining thereto'. We are afraid that the claim for mesne profits cannot be included within this expression and the.High Court was in error in awarding to the plaintiffs mesne profits though they had not been claimed in the plaint. The provision in regard to the mesne profits will therefore have to be deleted from the decree." In order to satisfy ourselves whether these observations related to the award of past mesne profits or to the award of future mesne profits we sent for the original record of this Court and we found that the High Court had awarded past as well as future mesne profits. Mr. S. T. Desai, appearing for the respondent No. 1 stated that a Full Bench in Babburu Basavayya and four others v. Babburu Gar(Jvayya and another(') following the decision of the Judicial Committee in Fakharuddin Mohomed Ahsan v. The Official Trustee(') has held that even after the passing of the preliminary decree, it is open to the court to give appropriate direction&y amongst other matters regarding future mesne profits either suo motu or on the application of the parties in order to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties.

This decision has been followed in a large number of cases. In Bachepalli Atchamma v. Yerragupta Rami Reddy(') Simma, Krishnamma v. Nakka Latchumanaidu and others(') Kasibhaticl Satyanarayana $astrulu and other$ v. Kasibhat/a Mallikarjuna Sastru/u(') and Ponnuswami Udayar and another v. Santhappa(') the decision of this Court was cited at the Bar and has been consi- • dered. The learned Judges have said that the authority of the .. decision in Babburu Basavayya and four others v. Babburu Guravayya(') is not shaken by what this Court has said. One of the grounds given is that the former relates to a suit for partition while the latter to a suit for possession simpliciter. It is not necessary for us to consider whether the decision of this Court can be distinguished upon this ground, but we feel that when a suitable occasion arises it may become necessary to reconsider the decision of this Court as to future mesne profits. In the present case the plaintiff did claim not only partition and separate possession of her half share of the properties but also past mesne profits. The defendant No. 1 admitted the plaintiff's claim and in substance prayed for a similar decree in her favour. The decision of this Court would, therefore, not apply to a case like the one before us.

In the result therefore we uphold the decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.

(') I.L.R. 1952 Madras 173. (') 8 Cal. 178 (P. C.).

I') A.LR. 1957 A.P. 52.

(') A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 520.

1') A.I.R. 1980 A.P. 45. (') A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 171.

Appeal dismissed.

R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS

CHANDRAMMA AND ANR

March 5, 1965

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

R. MUDHOLKAR

s. 115

s. 115

s. 115

s. 99

C.P.C

Supreme Court

C.P.C

Mysore High Court

S. K. Venkatarangaiengar

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

S. T. Desai

Naunit Lal

K. K. Jain

Mudholkar

High Court of Mysore

court of the District Judge, Bangalore

MuiJholkar

Puttananjamma

R. S. Maddanappa

Gargavva

Maddanappa

Madanappa

Gowramma

Section 51

Transfer of Property Act

Articles 133(1)(a) and 133(])(c)

Venkatarangaiengar

17th January, 1941

25th January, 1941

26th January, 1948

Bangalore

Maddan

Maddanappa

Section 115

s 115

Brett

Reher

Cranworth

L. R. 19 I.A. 20

C.P.C

s. 99

R.S. MADANAPPA

C.P.C

Bhagwati

S. T. Desai


NATIONAL BANK OF LAHORE LTD

SOHANLAL SEHGAL AND OTHERS

March 5, 1965

[K. SuBBA RA:o, J. c. SHAH AND R. s. BACHAWAT, JJ.] Limitation Act, 1908, First Schedule, Articles 36 and 115-Scope of The respondents hired Jockers in the safe deposit vaults from the appellant bank at J ullundur through its manager under different agreements on various dates during 1950. In April 1951, the lockers were tampered with and the valuables of the respondents kept in them were removed by the Manager. In due course the Manager was prosecuted and convicted for theft. The respondents filed three suits against t)le bank for the recovery of different sums being the value of the contents of ihe lockers which had been removed. The bank denied

its liability on various grounds and also contended that the suits were barred by l\mitation. .

The trial court held that the Bank was liable to bear the loss incurred by the respondents and that the suits were not barred by !imitation. On appeal, the High Court accepted the findings of the trial court on both the questions and dismissed the appeals.

In the appeal before the Supreme Court, only the question of limitation was raised. It was contended on behalf of the appellants on the facts found that the suit was barred by !imitation as the theft of the valuables by the Manager was a tort committed by him dehors the contracts entered into by the appellant with the respondents and, therefore, Article 36 of the Limitation Act which required that a suit must be instituted within two years applied, and not Art. 115, which provided for a period of limitation of three years; that the suits were1

not based on a breach of contract committed ty the bank but only the theft committed bi its agent dehors the terms of the contract.

HELD: The suit claims, being ex contractu, were clearly govern ed by Article 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and not

by Article 36. [298 FJ

There were clear allegations in the plaint that the appellant committed breach of contract in not complying with some of the conditions thereof and that the appellant understood those allegations in

that light and traversed them. [298 E]

Even ii the respondents' claim was solely based on the fraud committed by the manager during the course of his employment, such a claim could Il'J! fall under Art. 36. To attract.Art. 36, the misfeasance must be :ndcpendent of contract. The fraud of the manager committed in the course of his employment must be deemed to be a fraud of the principal, i.e. the Bank must be deemed to have permitted its manager to commit theft in violation of the terms of the contracts.

While under the contracts the bank was under an obligation to provide good lockers and not to permit access to the safe except to

persons mentioned in the contracts, in v'oJation of these terms the bank gave defective lockers and gave access to the manager, thus facilitating the theft. In either case the wrong committed was not independent of the contract but directly arose out of the breach of contract. [298 G, HJ

2~)4 SUPR.E:M:E COURfr REPORTS [1965] 3 s.c.11.

C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 929, 930 A and 931 of 1963.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 11, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeals Nos. 136, 137 and 138 of 1959.

Hans Raj Sawhney and B. C. Misra, for the appellant (in all B the appeals). ·

B. R. L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondents (In C.A. No. 229 of 1963).

V. D. Mahajan, for the respondent. (In' C.A. No. 930 of 1963).

Kanwar Rajendra Singh and Vidya Sagar Nayyar, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 931 of 1963).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Sobba Rao, J. These appeals by special leave raise a question of limitation. . The National Bank of Lahore Limited, hereinafter called the Bank, is a banking concern registered under the Indian Ccmpanies

Act and having its registered office in Delhi and branches at different places in India. Though its main business is banking, it carries on the incidental business of hiring out lockers out of cabi- nets in safe deposit vaults to constituents for safe custody of their E jewels and other valuables. It has one such safe deposit vault at its branch in Jullundur. The respondents herein hired lockers on rental basis from the Bank at J ullundur through its Manager under different agreements on different dates during the year 1950. In April 1951 the said lockers were tampered with and the valuables F of the respondents kept therein were removed by the Manager of the Jullundur branch of the Bank. In due course the said Manager was prosecuted before the Additional District Magistraite, Jullundur, and was convicted under ss. 380 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondents filed 3 suits in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Jullundur, against the Bank for the recovery of different sums on account of the Joss of the valuable contents of the lockers hired by them. The Bank denied its liability on various grounds and also contended that the suits were barred by limit~- tion.

The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Bank was liable

to bear the loss incurred by the plaintiffs and that the suits were H not barred by limitation. On appeal, the High Court of Punjab accepted the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge on both the questions and dismissed the appeals. The present appeals arise out of the said judgment of the High Court.

The only question raised in these appeals is one of limitation . .Before considering the question of , limitation it is necessary to

NATIONAL BANK OF LAHORE V. SOHANLAL (Subba Rao, J.) 295

notice briefly the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court. TI, le High Court summarized its findings thus:

(I) The whole object of a safe deposit vault in which customers of a Bank can rent lockers for placing their valuables is to ensure their safe custody. The appellant-Bank had issued instructions and laid down a detailed procedure for ensuring that safety but in actual practice the Manager alone had been made the custodian with fulL control over the keys of the strong room and a great deal of laxity had been observed in haVing no check whatsoever. on him.

(2) The lockers had been rented out to the plaintiffs by the Manager Baldev Chaud, who was entrusted with the: duty of doing so. It was he who had intentionally rented out such lockers to the plaintiffs which had been tampered with by him. This constituted a fraud on his part there being an implied representation to the , plaintiffs that the lockers were in a good and sound condition.

(3) Although the Bank authorities were not aware of what Baldev Chand was doing, but the fraud, which he perpetrated, was facilitated and was the result of the gross laxity and negligence on !ht< part of the Bank authorities.

(4) The lockers were indisputably being let out by the Manager to secure rent for the Bank.

Having found the said facts, the High Court held that the fraud was committed by the Manager acting within the scope of his authority and, therefore, the Bank was liable for the loss incurred by tlje respondents. Then it proceeded to consider the question of limitation from three aspects, namely, (i) the loss was caused to the respondents. as the Manager of the Bank committed fraud in the course of hi~ employment: (ii) there was a breach of the implied condition of the contract. namely, that only such lockers would be rented out which were safe and sound and which were capable of being operated in the manner set out in the contract; and (iii) there was a relationship of bailor and bailee between the respondents and the Bank, and therefore the Bank would be liable on the basis of the contract of bailment. It held that from whatever aspect the question was approached Art. 36 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act would he out of place and the respondents' claims would be governed by either Art. 95 or some other article of the Limitation Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant accepted the findings of fact, but contended that on the facts found the suits were barred by limitation. Elaborating the argument the learned counsel pointed out that the theft of the valuables by the Manager was a tort committed by him dehors the contracts entered into by the appellant with the respondents and, therefore, Art. 36 of the First Schedule

2!-JH RlTPRE]tfE COLRT REPORTS [1965) 3 s.c.R.

tqf!he Limittion Act was immediately attracted to the respondent>' A claims.

The scope of Art. 36 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act is fairly well settled. The said article says that the period of limitation "for compensation for any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance independent of contract and not herein specifically rrovided for" is two vears from the time when the malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance takes place. If this article applied, the suits having been filed more than 2 years after the loss of the articles deposited with the Bank, they would be clearly out of time. Article 36 applied to acts or omissions commonly known as torts by English l:iwyers. They are wrongs independent of contract. Article 36 applies to actions "ex de/icto" whereas Art. 115 applies to actions "ex contractu''. "These torts are often considered as of three kinds, viz., non-feasance or the omissicn of some act which a man is by

law bound to do, misfeasance, being the improper performance of some lawful act, or malfeasance, being the commission of some act which is in itself unlawful". But to attract Art. 36 these wrongs shall D be independent of contract. The meaning of the words "independent of contract" has been felicitously brought out by Greer, L.J., in Jarvis v. Moy, Davies, Smith, Vandervei/ and Co.(') thus:

"The distinction in the modern view, for this purpose, between contract and tort may be put thus. Where the breach of duty alleged arises out of a liability independently of the personal obligation undertaken by contract it is tort and it may be tort even though there may happen to be a contract between the parties, if the duty in fact arises independently of that contract. Breach of contract occurs where that which is complained of is a breach of duty arising out of the obligations undertaken by the contract."

If the suit claims are for compensation for breach of the terms of the contracts, this article has no application and the appropriate article is Art. 115, which pwvides a period of 3 years for compenst1tion. for the breach of any contract, express or implied, from the <late when the contract is broken. If the suit claims are based on a wrong committed by the Bank or its agent dehors the contract.

Art. 36 will be attracted .

• Let us now apply this legal position to the claims in question.

One of the contracts that was entered into between the plaintiffs and the Bank is dated February 5, J 951. It is not disputed that the other two contracts, with which we arc concerned, also are of the same p:Htern. Under that contract the Bank, the appellant herein, and Sohanlal Sehgal, one of the respondents herein, agreeC: "to hire. subject to the conditions endorsed, the company's safe No. 1651 I

---··~---------- (I) [1036] l K. H. 3{)(l, 40.J.

NATIONAL BANK OF LAHORE t'. SORANLAL (Subba Rao, J.) 297

2203 Class lower for one year from this day at a rent of Rs. 40".

The relevant conditions read as follows:

l 4. It is agreed that the connection of the renter of the safe and the Bank (and it has no connection) is that of a lessor and Jessee for the within mentioned safe and not that of a banker and customer.

15. The liability of the company in respect of property deposited in the said safe is limited to ordinary care in the performance by employees and officers of company of their duties and shall consist only of (a) keeping the safe in vault where located when this rental contract is entered into or in one of equal specifications, the door to which safe shall be locked at all time except when an officer or an employee is present, (b) allowing no person access to said safe, except hirer or authorised deputy, or attorney in fact having special power to act identificatio'n by signature being sufficient or Iiis/her legal representative in the case of death, insolvency or other disability of Hirer, except as herein expressly stipulated. An unauthorised opening shall be presumed or inferred from proof of partial or total loss of contents.

16. The company shall not be liable for any delay caused by the failure of the vault doors or locks to operate.

17. The company shall not be liable for any loss etc.

The only purpose of the contract was to ensure the safety of the :1rticlcs deposited in the safe deposit vault. It was implicit in the contract that the Jockers supplied must necessarily be in a good condition to achieve that purpose and, therefore, that they should be in a reasonably perfect condition. It was an implied term of such a contract. Condition 15 imposed another obligation on the Bank to achieve the same purpose, namely, that the Bank should not allow access to any person to the safe except the hirer or his authorised agent or attorney. If the articles deposited were lost because cne or other of these two conditions was broken by the Bank, the renter would eertainly be entitled to recover damages for the said breach. Such a claim would be ex contractu and not ex delicto and for such a claim Art. II 5 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act applied and not Art. 36 thereof.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the suits were not based upon the breach of a contract committed by the Banki but only the theft committed by its agent dehors the terms of the contract. This leads us to the consideration of the scope of the plaints presented by the respondents. It would be enough if we take one of the plaints as an example, for others also run on the same lines. Let us take the plaint in Civil Suit No. 141 of 1954, i.e., the 'uit filed by Sohanlal Sehgal and others against the Bank for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 26,500. We have carefully gone through

298 SUPREri.IE

COURT

REPORTS [1965] 3 s.c.R.

the plaint, particularly paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 thereof. It will be seen from the 'plaint that though it was not artistically drafted the relief was claimed mainly on two grounds, namely, (i) th.1t it was an implied term of the contract that the locker rented was in a good condition, and (ii) the valuables were lost because the Manager, on account of the negligence of the Bank in not taking all the necessary precautions, committed theft of the articles in the course of his employment. In the written-statement the defendant denied its liability both under the terms of the contract and also on the basis that it was not liable for the agent's fraud. The High Court found that at the time when the lockers were rented out they were in a defective condition and that the Bank, in actual practice, made the Manager the sole custodian with full control over the keys of the strong, room and permitted a great deal of laxity in not having any check whatsoever on him. In this state of the pleadings and the findings it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs did not base their claims on the branch of the conditions of the contracts. This argument is in the teeth of the allegations made in the plaint, evidence adduced and the arguments advanced in the Courts below and the findings arrived at by them. While ..ye concede that the plaint could have been better drafted and couched in a clearer language, we cannot accede to the contention that the plaints were solely based upon the fraud of the Manager in the course of his employment. We, therefore, hold that there were clear allegations in the plaints that the defendant committed breach of the contracts in not complying with some ot the conditions thereof and that the defendant understood those allegations in that light and traversed them. The suit claims, being <'x contractu, were clearly governed by Art. 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and not by Art. 36 thereof.

If Art. 115 applied, it is not disputed that the suits were within time.

Even if the claim was .solely based on the fraud committed by the Manager during the course of his employment. we do not see how such a claim fell under Art. 36 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. To attract Art. 36, the misfeasance shall be independent of contract. The fraud of the Manager committed in the course of his employment is deemed to be a fraud of the principal, that is to say the Bank must be deemed to have permitted its manager to commit theft in violation of the terms of the contracts. While under the contracts the Bank was under an obligation to give to the respondents good lockers. ensuring safety and protection against theft, it gave defective ories facilitating theft; while under the contracts it should not permit access to the safe to persons other than those mentioned in the contracts, in violation of the terms thereof it gave access to its Manager and enabled him to ccmmit theft. In either case the wrong committed was not independent of the contract. but it dirctly aros~ out of the breach of the contract.

:SAT!ONAL BAXK OF LAHORE v. SOHA:SLAL (.S11bbo Rao, J.) ~'99

ln such circumstances Art. 36 is out of place. The competition between Arts. 115 and 120 to take its place need not be considered. for neither of those Articles hits the claim, as the suits are within 3 years, which is the shorter of the two periods of limitation prescribed under the said two Articles.

In this view it is not necessary to express our view on the question whether the contracts in question were of bailment.

In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs one hearing fee.

Appeals dismissed.

LTD

SOHANLAL SEHGAL AND OTHERS

March 5, 1965

c. SHAH

R. s. BACHAWAT, JJ.

Limitation Act, 1908

First Schedule

Articles 36 and 115

Supreme Court

Article 36

Limitation Act

Art. 115

Article 115

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Article 36

Art. 36

Art. 36

Punjab High Court

Hans Raj Sawhney

B. C. Misra

B. R. L. Iyengar

S. K. Mehta

K. L. Mehta

V. D. Mahajan

Kanwar Rajendra Singh

Vidya Sagar Nayyar

Sobba Rao

National Bank of Lahore Limited

Delhi

India

Jullundur

J ullundur

ss. 380 and 409

Indian Penal Code

High Court of Punjab

Subba Rao

Baldev Chaud

Baldev Chand

Art. 36

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Art. 95

Limitation Act

Art. 36

First Schedule

Art. 36

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Article 36

Article 36

Art. 115

Art. 36

Greer

Art. 115

Art. 36

February 5, J 951

Sohanlal Sehgal

NATIONAL BANK OF LAHORE

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Art. 36

Sohanlal Sehgal

Art. 115

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Art. 36

Art. 115

Art. 36

First Schedule

Limitation Act

Art. 36

Art. 36

Arts. 115 and 120


ABDUL KARIM KHAN AND ORS. v.

MUNICIPAL COMMITTI:E, RAIPUR March 8, 1965

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL

AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] Madhya Prad.esh Public Trusts Act (30 of 1951}-Entry by Registrar that property be]ongs to Public trust-If conclusive against real owner.

The first appellant, who was the Mufawalli of a putlic trust, filed a representative suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from committing acts of encroachment on the suit property, on the ground that the property was that of the trust and had been so registered by the Registrar of Public Trusts, under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and also on appeal.

In their appeal to the Supreme Court the appellants contended that, since the respondent did not avail itself of the right to file a suit within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar must be held to be final and conclusive against the respondent.

HELD: The fact that the property in suit was added to the list of the properties belonging to the trust, could not affect the respondent's title. to it. [306 A-BJ The enquiry which the Act contemplates is an enquiry into the question as to whether a trust is public or private and does not take within its sweep questions as to whether a property belongs to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust at all. The only persons who are required to file their objections in proceedings before the Registrar are persons interested in the public trust-not petsons who dispute the existence of the trust or who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said trust. Inasmuch as the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any otjections in the proceedings the respondent was not bound to file an appeal under s. 4(5) of !ht Act or a suit under s. 8(1). challenging order of the Registrar.

Therefore, the finality given to the finding of the Registrar could not be availed of by the appellant as against the respondent.

[304 G; 305 A-B, D-E] CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 871 of 1962.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 13, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 294 of 1959.

S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowa; a, for the appellant.

S. T. Desai and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respopdent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C . .J; This appeal arises from a suit filed by the appellants who are the representatives of. residents. of Nayapara Ward in particular and of the Muslill1 community of Raipur in general, in whichthey claimed an injunction restraining the respondent, 1\iunicipal Committee of Raipur, from committing acts of encroachmel\t on their rights and the rights of

ABDUi. K.\RDI KHAN v. >!UXICIPAL COM~IITTEE RAIPUR (Gajendragadkar, c. J.) 301

A the Muslim community in holding U rs and other ceremonies on the plot in suit. It appears that at Raipur, there is a piece of land called "Fazle Karim's Bada" Khasra No. 649 measuring 4.62 acres. Inside this Bada, there are three or four Municipal Schools.

The office of the Electric Power House is also located in one corner of the land. Behind the School, there is a Pakka platform B known as "Syed Baba's Mazar". Near the Electric Power House, there is a raised earth platform on which there is a flag.

This flag is called "Madar Sahib's .Thanda".

Surrounding this land, there is a brick wall which was made by the respondent several years past.

According to the plaint, U rs function is held every year in front of Syed Baba's .Mazar for the last several years.

C On or a.bout the 22nd October, 1956, the employees of the respondent started digging foundation at the places A. B, C and D shown on the map attacbed to the plaint. These digging operations were commenced under the Qirections of the respondent, because the respondent intended to construct another school building on the plot. The appellants then served a notice on the D respondent to desist from carrying on the digging operations on the ground that the property on which the said operations were being carried out, was a part of the wakf property.

When the respondent did not comply with the requisition oontained in the said notice. the present suit was filed by the appellants on October 29, 1956. This suit has been filed under 0.1 r. 8 of the Code of E Civil Procedure.

The case of the appellants is that the plot of land in suit was old Kabrasthan known as "Chuchu's Takia'', and is a permanent inalienable wakf property. On this plot are tombs of renowned saints like Syed Baba, and Madar Sahib's Jha .. da. On a part of the plot, every year Urs and other religious functions are performed. In fact, the land has been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (No. 30 of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act) as trust property; as suah, the respondent can claim no right or title tb the said land. That is the basis on which the appellants claimed injunction against the respondent.

The respondent disputed this claim. It was urged in the written statement filed by he respondent that the land was never and could never be wakf property. There was no tomb on the land. There are only two so-called tombs, but they have no significance. The Urs is of very recent origin and it is allowed to be held with te licence of the respondent. The plot originally. belonged to private persons and had been: acquired by the Government in land acquisition proceedings in 1910-11.

The respondent got the said land from the Government in 1922.

In 1932-33, the Deputy Commissioner fixed rent of the land which is being paid by the respondent eversince. On this land, the respondent has constructed some schools, and a part of the land which is lying vacant is allowed to be used by the people of the neighbJurhood for traffic. The respondent thus has full right to

construct on its own plot of land. The representative character A of the appellants was disputed by the respondent and their right to file the present suit was challenged.

On these pleadings, several issues were framed by the learned trial Judge. They covered the title of appellants, the title of the respondent, and the right of the appellants to file the suit. The issue with which we are cor.cerned in the present appeal related to the registration of the plot in the register kept under the relevant provisions of the Act and its effect. The appellants' contention was that the said registration was conclusive against the respondent and in favour of the appellants' claim. This contention was rejected by the trial Judge, with the result that the appellants' suit was dismissed.

With the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge on the other issues we are not concerned in the present appeal.

The matter then went in appeal, and the appellate Court confirmed the conclusions recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellants challenged the correctness of D the said appellate decree by preferring a seoond appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, but the second appeal also failed, and that has brought the appellants . to this Court by special leave. Thus, it would be noticed that the appellants have failed on the merits of their claim in all the courts below, and the technical point raised by them that the registration of the B plot under the relevant provisions of the Act concluded the matter, has also been rejeced. It is this last point which has been urged before us by Mr. Sinha on behalf of the appe!lants.

Before we deal with, this point, however, it would be relevant to mention how the property came to be entered in the F recister kept under the relevant provisions of the Act. The record shows that the Masiid Nayapara, Raipur, had been entered in the register as a public trust on June 25, 1954 in Case No. 23- XXXiii /7 of 1952-53. rertain properties were entered in the said register in respect of this trust. In 1956. Abdul Karim.

Mutawalr Masjid Nayapara. Raipur applied to the Sub- G Divisional Officer. Raipur alleging that the property now in suit also belonged to the public trust and should be included amongst its properties. On this application, public notice was issued

callin~ upon persons interested in the property to show cause why it should not be added to the properties of the wakf. No obiection was. however. received; and on October 23, 1956, the H Sub-Divisional Officer reported that the poperty be shown against the trust. The said report was sanctioned by the Registrar. Public Trusts on April 22, 1957. That is how the property came to be registered as belonging to the public trust. and it is on this entry that the whole argument of the appellants is based.

In considering the validity of the contention raised by Mr.

Sinha before us, it is necessary to examine broadlv the scheme

AllDU/, KARIM KHAN v. MUNICIPAL COMMiiTEE RA!l'UR (Uajeiuirag •• dfor C.J.) 303

A of the Act and the material provisions on which Mr. Sinha relies.

I he Act was passed in 1951 to regulate and to make better pro vision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Section 2(4) of the Act defines a "public trust", and s. 2(8) defines a "wakf". 'Working trustee' is defined by s. 2(9). Section 3(1) provides that the Deputy B Commissioner shall be the Registrar of public trusts in respect of every public trust; and s. 3 (2) imposes on the Registrar the obligation to maintain a register of public trusts, and such other bOoks and registers and in such form as may be prescribed.

Section 4(1) deals with the registration of public trusts and it requires that within three months from the date on which the C said section comes into force in any area or from the date on which a public trust is created, whichever is later, the working trustee of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust. Section 4(3) lays down the particulars which have to be stated by the application which is required to be made under s. 4(1).

All these D particulars are in relation to the nature of the trust, its properties, the mode of succession to the office of the trustees, and other allied matters. Section 4(4) empowers the Registrar to decide the merits of the application, while s. 4(5) provides for an appeal against his decision which is required to be filed within 30 days of the order. Mr. Sinha relies .on a specific provision contained E in s. 4(5) which says that subject to the decision in such appeal, the order of the Registrar under sub-section (4) shall be final, Section 4(6) requires the signing and verification of the application in the manner laid down in the code of Civil Procedure for signing and verifying plaints.

F That takes us to s. 5 which deals with the enquiry to be held by the Registrar on the application made before him under s. 4(1).

Eight points are set down under s. 5(1) which the Registrar has to consider. Section 5(2) lays down that the Registrar shall give in the prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made under sub-section (!) and invite all persons interested in the G public trust under inquiry to prefer objections, if any, in respect of such trust. Under s. 6, the Registrar has to make his findings on the point specified by s. 5(1); and under s. 7, the Registrar causes entries to be made in the Register in accordance with his findings. Section 7(2) naturally lays down that the entriei: made under s. 7(1) shall be final and conclusive. Section 8(1) allows a H civil suit to be filed against the findings of the' Registrar within six months from the date of the publication of the notice under s. 7(1); such a suit can be filed by a working trustee or a person _having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property. Section 9 permits applications to be made for change in the entries recorded in the register. It will be recalled that the application which was made in 1'156 by Abdul Karim was under the provisions of s. 9(1). If an application is made for change in

the entries as, far instance, for adding to the list of properties belonging to the trust, a proceeding has to be taken for making the

said change and this is prescribed by s. 9(2). Section 9(3) makes the provisions of s. 8 applicable to any finding under s. 9 as they would apply to a finding under s. 6. These provisions are contained in Chapter II of the Act. Chapter III deals with the management of trust property; Ch. IV with the problem of audit; Ch. V with control; and Ch. VI contains miscellanemis provisions, including s. 35 which confers the rule-making power on the State Government. That, broadly stated, is the nature of the scheme of the Act and the' material provisions which fall to be considered in the present appeal.

Mr. Sinha relies on the fact that under s. 4(5) of the Act, the decision of the Registrar is made final, subject to the appellate decision, if any; and he also refers to the right of instituting a suit reserved by s. 8. His argument is that if any person who claims interest in the property which is alleged to be trust property fails to satisfy the Registrar about his claim, he can file a suit under s. 8(1). Section 8(1) allows a suit to be filed, subject to the conditions prescribed by it, and the right to file sudh a suit is given to a working trustee, or a person having interest in a public trust or

any property found to be trust property. The respondent is interested in the property in suit which is found to be trust property, and since it did not avail itself of the right to file a suit E within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar must

be held to be final and conclusive against its claim. If finality does not attach to such an order even after six months have expired within the meaning of s. 8(1), then the , provision contained in s. 4(5) will serve no purpose whatever. That is the manner in which Mr. Sinha has presented his case before us.

We are not impressed by this argument. In testing the validity of this argument, we must bear in mind the important fact that the Act is concerned with the registration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the enquiry which its relevant provisions contemplate is an enquiry into the question as to whether the trust in question is public or private.

The enquiry permitted by the said provisions does not take within its sweep questions as to whether the property belongs to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust at all. It cannot be ignored that the Registrar who, no doubt, is given the powers of a civil aourt under s. 28 of the Act, holds a kind of summary enquiry and the points which can fall within his jurisdiction are indicated by clauses (i) to (x) of s. 4(3). Therefore; prima facie, it appears unreasonable to suggest that contested queStions of title, such as those which have arisen in the present case, can be said to fall within the enquiry which the Registrar is authorised to hold under s. 5 of the Act.

Besides, it is significant that the only persons who are required to file their objections in response to a notice issued by the

ABDUL KAR DI KHAN v. i\IUNICIPAI, cmIMl'YrEE llAIPlTR ( Gajendragadkar, C.J .) 305

Registrar ort receiving an application made under s. 4(1), are

pesons interested in the public lrust-not persons who dispute the existence of the trust or who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said trust. It is only persons interested in the public trust, such as beneficiaries or others who claim a right to manage the trust, who can file objections, and it is objeetions of this character proceeding from persons belonging to this limited class that fall to be considered by the Registrar. It cannot be said that the respondent falls within this olass; and so, it would be idle to contend that it was the duty of the respondent to have filed objections under s. 3(2).

It is true, s. 8(1) permits a suit to be filed by a person having interest in the public trust or any preperty found to be trust property. The interest to which this section refers must be read in the light '6f s. 5(2) to be the interest of a beneficiary or the interest of a person who claims the right to maintain the trust or any other interest of a similar character. It is not the interest which is adverse to the tr.us! set up by a party who does not claim any relation with the trust at all. That is why we think the finality on which Mr. Sinha's argument is based cannot avail him against the respondent inasmuch the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any objections in the said proceedings.

Then again, the right to file a suit to which s. 8(1) refers is given to persons who are aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar.

Having regard to the fact that the proceedings before the Registrar are in the nature of proceedings l:.efore a civil court, it would be illogical to hoi.i that the respondent who was not a party to the F proceedings can be said to be aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar. The normal judicial concept -0f a person aggrieved by any order necessarily postulates that 'the said person must be a party . to the proceedings in which the order was passed and by which he feels aggrieved. It is unnecessary to emphasise that it would be plainly unreasonallle to •assume that thouth a person is G not a party to the proceedings and cannot participate in them by way of filing objections, he would still be bound to file a suit within the period prescribed by s. 8(1) if the property in which he claims an exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a public trust.

H Similarly, the right to prefer an appeal against the Registrar's order prescribed by s. 4(5) necessarily implies that the person must be a party to the proceedings before the Registrar; otherwise how would he know about the order? Like s. 8(1), s. 4(5) also seems to be confined in its operation to persons who are before the Registrar. or who could have appeard before the Registrar under s. 5(2). The whole scheme is clear, the Registrar enquires into the question as to whether a trust is private or public,

and deals with the points specifically enumerated by s. 4(3).

A Therefore; we have no hesitation in holding that the courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the fact that the property now in suit was added to the list of properties belonging to the wakf, cannot affect the respondent's title to it.

On the merits, all the courts below have rejected the appellants' case B and have upheld the pleas raised by the respondent in defence.

The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with _costs.

Appeal dismissed.

ABDUL KARIM KHAN AND ORS

MUNICIPAL COMMITTI:E, RAIPUR

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.

Public Trusts Act

Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951

Supreme Court

BJ The enquiry which the Act

s. 4(5)

s. 8(1)

S. P. Sinha

M. I. Khowa

S. T. Desai

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

Gajendragadkar

Raipur

Syed Baba

22nd October, 1956

October 29, 1956

Madar Sahib

High Court of Madhya Pradesh

Sinha

Masiid Nayapara

June 25, 1954

1956. Abdul Karim

October 23, 1956

April 22, 1957

Sinha

Section 2(4)

s. 2(8)

s. 2(9)

Section 3(1)

s. 3

Section 4(1)

Section 4(3)

s. 4(1)

Section 4(4)

s. 4(5)

s. 4(5)

Section 4(6)

the code of Civil Procedure

s. 5

s. 4(1)

s. 5(1)

Section 5(2)

s. 6

s. 5(1)

s. 7

Section 7(2)

s. 7(1)

Section 8(1)

s. 7(1)

Section 9

Abdul Karim

s. 9(1)

s. 9(2)

Section 9(3)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 6

s. 35

s. 4(5)

s. 8

s. 8(1)

Section 8(1)

s. 8(1)

s. 4(5)

Madhya Pradesh

s. 28

s. 4(3)

s. 5

s. 4(1)

s. 3(2)

s. 8(1)

s. 5(2)

s. 8(1)

s. 8(1)

s. 4(5)

s. 8(1)

s. 4(5)

s. 5(2)

s. 4(3)