SHAH CHHOTALAL LALLUBHAI AND OIBERS

CHARITY COMMISSIONER, BOMBAY, AND OTHERS

I anuary 22, 1965

[K. SUBBA RAO, ACTING C.J., RAGHUBAR DAYAL, R. S.

BACHAWAT AND V. RAMAsWAMI, JJ.]

Bombay Public Trusts A.ct (29 of 19SO), ss. SS and 56--DiversJon of accumulatil>n of trust funds-When permitted.

A testator, who professed the Jain religion, gave directions in his will that certain amounts should be spent annually on religious and ch<dtlhlo objects specified by him, and that an annual feast sh<>uld be given to members of his caste in certain specified villages.

He died in 1916 and by 19S5 there was a large accumulation of unexpended income mainly because of discontinuing the feas~ and so, the Charity Commissioner filed an application before the District Judge, under ss. SS(l)(b) D and 56 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 for directions for the utilization of that sum.

The District Judge directed a division of the amount between an educational institution and a hospital. The appellants, who were of the same caste as the testator and who objected before the District Judge to the diversion of the sum appealed to the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed.

In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants challenged the E propriety and legality of the directions given by the District Judge and

confirmed by the High Court.

HELD : The directions should be set aside, as the respondent had llOt made out a case for such diversion of trust funds, and the directions w"a objectionable on the ground that they did not take into account the original objects of the trust. [821 H; 822 A]

F On an application eithar under s. 5S(l){a) or s. 55(1){b) read with s. 56(2) the Court is bound to give direction in respect of all public trusts.

Section 56(1) provides that in giving the directions, the Court ahall, so far as may be expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary

or proper in the public interest, give effect to tho original intention of the author of the trust or tho object for which the trust was created.

Under tho latter part of s. 56(1), if the Court finds that tho carrying out of the original intention or object wholly or partially, is neither expedient G nor practicable nor desirable nor necessary nor proper In the public interest, the court may direct the property or income of the trust or any portion thereof to be applied cy pres to any other charitable or rdigiooa

object. One of the objects for which the trust was created in the instant case, was the annual feast to the members of the testator's caste.

Looking at the interest of the community, it was certainly expedient, practicable, desirable and proper to give the feast.

Even if it was not a religious act, it was a meritorious one prescribed by the scriptures of the H Jains. In the wider public interest also it was expedient, practicable, deoirable and proper to respect the sentiments and interests of that section of the Jain public and to give effect to the charity. [818 B-C, D-B, F,

0-H]

812 SUPllEMB COURT llEPOllTS

(1965] 2 S.C:R.

Further, the overriding intention of the founder of the trust wu A that the amount set apart by him should be devoted to the objects mentioned in the will, so that those objects may be continued and carried out for ever. In accordance with the intention of the founder the surplus should be applied, as nearly as possible to the original uses and purposes of the trust.. The savings shoQld be applied suitably for carrying out the same objects in future or to increase the amounts spendable for the surviving objects of the truSt, instead of diverting them for other purposes.

[820 C, F, H]

[Suitable directions were given by the Court in lieu of thooe set aside, for utilising the accumulations].

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 634 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated C January 25, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 620 of 1956.

Gumanmal Lodha, J. S. Rastogi and J.B. Dadachanji, for the appellants.

P. K. Chatterjee, B. R. G. K. Achar for R. H. Dhebar, for D respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bachawat. J, One Jbaverchand Dahyabhai Shah died in 1916, leaving a will, dated August 6, 1915. He was a resident E of V ejalpore in the suburbs of Broach and a Ladva Shrimali Bania by caste.

He professed the Jain religion, and believed in the tenets of the Swetembar Murti Pujak sect of Jains. By cl. (7) of the will, he directed his executors to spend out of the earnings of his shop every year during the life-time of his niece, Bai Jakore, the amounts mentioned below on the following religious objects : F

( 1) Rs. 100 for feeding cattle with grass, fodder, oil cakes etc., in the Broach Pinjrapole. ( 2) Rs. 100 for J iva-daya Khat a (fund for kindness to animals).

( 3) Rs. 25 for offering flowers for the worship of Lord G Rikabdev in the Jain temple at Vejalpore, Broach. ( 4) Rs. 200 for providing food to Shravak pilgrims at the Shatroonjaya Hill at Palitana. ( 5) Rs. 50 for providing food to pilgrims at Mount Gimar.

( 6) Rs. 50 for providing food to pilgrims at Mount Abu.

(7) Rs. 250 for providing cereals, clothes etc., to Shravaks and Shravikas.

( 8) Rs. 100 for providing cloth to Jain Sadhus and Sadhavies.

( 9) Rs. 200 for education and food of Hindu orphans.

(10) Rs. 200 for Jain Gyan Khata (fund for imparting knowledge).

( 11 ) Rs. 100 for feeding Shravaks and Shravlkas who have observed fast.

( 12) Rs. 300 for giving food, cloth etc., to the blind,

lame and crippled members of the Hindu Community.

In addition, he also directed his executors to give a Swamivat:raJ 0 feast or meal consisting of methi-dal and ladus made of sugar to the members of his caste at 15 specified villages and towns in the Broach and Surat Districts every year on the occasion of the sacred festival of Pajusan. By cl. (15) of the will, he directed that after the death of his niece, Bai Jakore, a sum of Rs. 75,000 should be set apart by the executors, and out of the moneys so set E apart, suitable amounts should be sent to the respective Khata:r

(funds) in his name, so that the religious acts mentioned in cl. (7) be continued for ever.

On the death of Bai Jakore on May 20, 1928, the estate vested in the residuary legatee, Bai Chanchal, daughter of Bai Jakore.

F Mulchandbhai, husband of Bai Chanchal, set apart Rs. 75,000 on trust for the purposes mentioned in cl. ( 7) of the will, and began to manage the trust estate. Out of the trust moneys, he invested Rs. 8,000 in per cent tax-free Government Loan, 1944-45, yielding an annual income of Rs. 400, and pursuant to the directions given in cl. (15) of the will, handed over loans of the face G value of Rs. 4,000, Rs. 1,000, Rs. 1,000, and Rs. 2,000 respectively to four religious and charitable institutions in full discharge of the obligation of the trust for expending annually the sums of Rs. 200, Rs. 50, Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 on items 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the religious purposes mentioned in cl. (7) of the will. On December 8, 194 7, Bai Chanchal executed a trust deed in respect of the H investments representing the balance amount of Rs. 67,000 and an accumulation of surplus or unexpended income amounting to Rs. 25,796-6-8. The trust is registered as a public trust under the

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SUPJU!MB COURT JU!PORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the A Act. The trust deed provided that the unexpended accumulation of Rs. 25, 796-6-8 should be applied for establishing, maintaining and supporting a Nivas for housing the poor and middle-class provided . that after setting apart the aforesaid sum of Ladva Shrimali Jains at low and cheap rents. The trust deed also provided that after setting apart the aforesaid sum of B Rs. 25,796-6-8 the balance funds would be held in trust for applying its income to the charities mentioned in cl. (7) of the aforesaid will other than items 2, 4, 5 and 6. Now, the trustees had no authority to divert any part of the trust fund for the purposes of the Nivas scheme. The establishment of a Nivas for housing the poor C and middle-class Ladva Shrimali J ains is not one of the original objects of the trust. As a matter of fact, the Nivas scheme was not carried into effect. The Charity Commissioner, Bombay challenged the validity of the Nivas scheme. The Courts below rightly proceeded on the footing that the Nivas scheme is invalid. Subsequent

to the execution of the trust deed, there were further accumula- D tions of unexpended income. The Swamivatsal feasts were given, and the fixed annual payments to all the charities were duly met up to Samvat year 1999 corresponding to 1942-1943 A.D. During the subsequent years, the fixed annual payments to the charities were duly made, but on account of rationing restrictions, the feasts could not be given up to Samvat year 2010 corresponding to E 1953-1954 A.D. During the Samvat year 2011 corresponding to 1954-1955 A.D., the feast was not given in spite of the removal of rationing restrictions. The trustees allege that the current income of the trust fund after disbursing the fixed annual payments is not sufficient to meet the usual expenses of annual feasts. On June 3, 1955, the Charity Commissioner filed an application F before the District Judge, Broach under s. 55 ( 1 )(b) and s. 56 of the Act for suitable directions for the utilisation of the accumulations of the unexpended income of the trust for some educational purpose.

The trustees were impleaded as respondents to this application. Pursuant to a general notice issued by the Court, the appellants and four other members of the Ladva Shrimali G Shravak Bania Community in Broach and Surat Districts appeared, and intervened in the application. On their behalf, it was contended that the trust was for religious purposes and its funds could not be diverted for other purposes under ss. 55 ( l )(b) and 56 of the Act, and that the accumulations should be utilised year after year for meeting the deficit amount required for the annual Swami- H vatsal feasts.

The District Judge held that the provisions of s. 56 of the

A Act did not apply to the funds of a public religious trust, and if the accumulations were held for a religious purpose, the Court could not give any directions for its utilisation under that section, that the Swamivatsal feast confers religious benefits and objects Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 11 are also religious in character, while the remaining objects are charitable, and therefore the entire feast B was not of a religious character, but assuming that the trust was wholly religious, the accumulation was not held for religious purposes, and was subject to the directions of the Court as to its utilisation under s. 56 read with s. 55 (1) (b) of the Act. He also held that the trustees could not save any moneys in future by simply refusing to give the Swamivatsal feasts but it was not in the C public interest to provide for the expenses of the feast out of the accumulation, and the accumulation should be spent for educational and medical purposes. The District Judge passed final orders on October 25, 1956. On that date, the accumulation of unexpended income amounted to Rs. 45,019-14-0, besides another sum of D Rs. 107-2-0. The District Judge directed the trustees to hand over a sum of Rs. 22,505-15-0 to an institution known as the Sad Vidya Manda! for giving four freeships every year to deserving student~. who should preferably be Jains of Broach District and failing such deserving cases, to other Hindu students. Subject to the condition of giving freeships, the Sad Vidya Manda! would be at liberty to E spend the amount for purposes of the building of the College or its hostel or in providing other educational facilities to the students.

He also directed the trustees to pay another sum of Rs. 22,509-15-0 to the trustees of the Sevashram Hospital at Broach on condition that the amount be invested in any approved trust security and its income be utilised in providing maintenance, food and medicine F to poor and deserving patients. He directed the payment of the remaining sum of Rs. 107-2-0 towards costs.

The appellants and two other members of the Ladva Shrimali Shravak Bania Community preferred an appeal to the Bombay High Court. The High Court held that the Court could on an application under s. 5 5 of the Act deviate from the directions of G the settler, even if th':' purpose of the trust has not failed, where the Court finds that it is inexpedient, impracticable, undesirable, unnecessary or improper in the public interest to abide by his directions, but the Court could exercie this power only in respect of funds of a public trust which was not a trust for religious purposes. The High Court held that none of the purposes H mentioned in cl. (7) of the will except the one mentioned in item 3 of the clause could be regarded as religious, that the object of providing funds for annual Swamivatsal feasts was charitable and

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

not religious, and that the Court was, therefore, competent to A entertain the application under s. 5 5.

The High Court further held that providing a feast to the members of the caste even on the occasion of a religious festival or on days which may be regarded as , holy is not expedient, desirable, necessary or proper in the -public: interest, and the directions of the District Judge with regard to the distribution of the fund should not be interfered B with.

The High Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

The appellants now appeal to this Court by special leave. They challenge the propriety and the legality of the directions given by the District Judge below, and repeat the submissions made on their behalf in the Courts below. The respondents contend that the aforesaid directions were rightly given under ss. 55 (1) (b) C and 56 of the Act.

The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was passed on August 14, 1950, with a view to regulate and make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the D State of Bombay. Soon after the Act came into force, its constitutional validity was assailed. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v.

The State of Bombay and Others('), this Court held that a religious sect or denomination has the right guaranteed by the Constitution to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for E religion and for religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage obtaining in a particular institution. To divert the trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the Court considers expedient or proper,. although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out, is an unwananted encroachment on the freedom of F religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs and therefore s. 55 (1 )( c), which contains the offending provision and the corresponding provision relating to the powers of the Court occurring in the latter part of s. 56(1) must be held to be void. Subsequently, Bombay Act 59 of 1954 amended s. 55(1)(c) by excluding from its purview a trust for a religious G purpose. Sections 55 and 56 of the Bombay Trusts Act, 1950, as they stand now, are as follows :

"55. (I) If upon an application made to him or otherwise the Charity Commissioner is of opinion that-

( a) the original object for which the public trust H was created has failed,

(1) [19541 s. c. R. toss, 1010-1012.

' ;-

(b) the income or any surplus balance of any public trust has not been utilized or is not likely to be utilized, ( c) in the case of a public trust other than a trust for a religious purpose, it is not in public interest expedient, practicable, desirable, necesary or proper to carry out wholly or partially the original inJention of the author of the public trust or the object for which the public trust was created and tkat the property or the income of the public trust or any portion thereof should be applied to any other charitable or religious object,

( d) in any of the cases mentioned in sections 10 to 13 or in regard to the appropriation of the dharmada sums held in trust under section 54 the directions of the Court are necessary,

the Charity Commissioner shall require the trustee to apply within the prescribed time for directions to the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate.

(2) If the trustees fail to make the application as required under sub-section ( l) or if the Charity Commissioner himself is a trustee or if there is no trustee of the public trust, the Charity Commissioner shall make an application to the Court.

56. ( l) On such application being made, the court after hearing the parties and making an inquiry shall decide the matter and shall give directions.

In giving the directions, the court, shall, so far as may be expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary or proper in public interest, give effect to the original intention of the author of the public trust or the object for which the public trust was created. If the court is of opinion that the carrying out of such intention or object is not desirable, necessary or proper in public interest the court may direct the property or income of the public trust or any portion thereof to be applied cy pres to any other charitable or religious object.

In doing so, it shall be lawful for the court to alter .any scheme already settled or to vary the terms of any decree or order already passed in respect of the public trust or the conditions contained in the instrument of the public trust. ( 2) Any decision or order passed by the Court under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a decree

.. •. ~' ' . ' '~

.·~· ..

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818 SUPllBMB COURT llBPORTS

( 1965[ 2 S.C.R.

of such court and an appeal shall lie therefrom to the A High Court." Section 2(13) of the Act provides that unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context, public trust means an express or constructive trust for either a public religious or charitable purpose or both. Section 55(1){c) expressly excludes B from its operation a trust for a religious purpose. But ss. 55 ( 1)

(a) and 55 { 1 )(b) do not exclude religious trusts from their operation, and they apply to all public trusts for religious and charitable purposes. On an application either under s. 55 ( 1) (a) ors. 55(1)(b) read with s. 56(2), the Court is bound to give directions in respect of all public trusts. Section 56 ( 1) provides c that in giving the directions, the Court shall, so far as may be expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary or proper in the public interest, give effect to the original intention of the author of the trust or the object for which the trust was created. The conjunction "or" in this sentence introduces several alternatives.

The Court must give effect to the original intention or object if and so D far as it may be either expedient or practicable or desirable or proper or necessary to do so. If, for example, the Court finds that it is proper in the public interest to give effect to the original object, the Court must give effect to it, though it is not necessary to do so in the public interest. Under the latter part of s. 56( 1), if the Court finds that the carrying out of the original intention E or object wholly or partially is neither expedient nor practicable nor desirable nor necessary nor proper in public interest, the Court may direct the property or income of the trust or any portion thereof to be applied cy pres to any other charitable or religious object.

The latter part of s. 56(1) thus permits the diversion of trust funds for other objects, though the original F objects of the founder can still be carried out. But we think that the respondents have made out no case for such a diversion of trust funds. One of the objects for which the trust was created was that a Swamivatsal feast to the members of the Ladva Shrimali Bania caste should be given every year on the occasion of the holy festival of Pajusan. The Jains of Ladva Shrimali Shravak G Bania Community are the chief beneficiaries of this trust. Looking at their interest, it is certainly expedient, practicable, desirable and proper to give the feast. The . giving and taking of the Swamivatsal feast on the occasion of the holy festival of Pajusan, if not a religious act, is a meritorious act prescribed by the scriptures of Swetambar Murti Pujak Jains. The wider public interest 8

does not require that this special charity for a section of the Jain public should be subverted and overthrown. In the wider public

A interest also, it is expedient, practicable, desirable and proper to

respect the sentiments and interests of this section of the Jain public and to give effect to this charity, and we find no reason for giving directions under the latter part of s. 56(1). We, therefore, propose to give directions under the first part of s. 5 6 ( 1 ) .

In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to decide, whether B the trust is a trust for religious purposes, and if so, whether, having regard to Ratila/Panachand's case(') its income or surplus balance spendable for the purposes of the trust can be diverted for other purposes, though the original object of the trust can still be carried out.

The question whether or not the objects C mentioned in cl. (7) of the will are religious objects is not raised in the plrodings. No issues were framed and no evidence was led on this point by either party. What are religious purposes must be decided according to the tenets and religious beliefs of the Murri Pujak Swetambara sect of Jains, to which the testator belonged.

It is difficult to decide the point in the absence of

0 relevant pleadings, issues and evidence. The District Judge held that the Swamivatsal feast and many other objects are religious objects.

The High Court too lightly brushed aside this finding.

Chapter IX of the Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-62) contains an interesting discussion of Jain endowments. Paragraphs 7 to 11 of Chap. IX of the Report refer E to seven types of religious funds specifically recognised by the Jain scriptures concerning ( 1) Jeena Bimba, (2) Jeena Chaitya,

(3) Gyan Fund, (4) Sadhu, (5) Sadhvi, (6) Shravak and (7) Shravika.

The Jains recognise numerous other endowments or funds for the general or specific purposes, the corpus or interest of which is to be utilised as per the donor's intentions. The question F whether the several objects of the trust including the giving of a Swamivatsal feast are religious in their character must be left open for future decision.

We must now consider what directions should be given under s. 56 on the present application. No case for applying the latter part of s. 56(1) and for refusing to give effect to the original G objects of the trust has been made out.

We should, therefore; give effect to the original intention of the founder as far as that intention can be carried out. If the method indicated by the founder cannot be carried out, the C, Ourt will substitute another method cy pres, that is to say, as nearly as possible to the method specified by the founder. The application of the cy pres principle H is explained in Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn., Art. 1176, p. 494 thus:

(1) [19S4) s. c. R. 1055.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

"The doctrine of cy pres as applied to charities was formerly pushed to a most extravagant length. But this sensible distinction now prevails that the Court will not decree the execution of the trust of a charity in a manner different from that intended, except so far as it is seen that the intention canriot be literally executed. In that case another mode will be adopted, consistent with the general intention, so as to execute it, although not in mode, yet in substance. If the mode should become by subsequent circumstances impossible, the general object is not to be defeated, if it can in any other way be attained." In the instant case, the overriding intention of the founder of the trust is that the sum of Rs. 75,000 set apart by him should be devoted to the objects mentioned in cl. ( 7) of the will, so that those objects may be continued and carried out for ever.

His intention was that fixed sums should be expended annually for

the 12 items of charity mentioned and reasonable sums should be D expended annually in giving Swamivatsal feasts to members of his caste. The sum spendable annually for the feast was necessarily of a fluctuating character. In accordance with the directions given in cl. (15) of the will, the obligations of the trust for

me charities mentioned in items 2, 4, 5 and 6 of cl. (7) of the will have been fully discharged by donating Rs. 8,000 out of the E corpus of the trust. The expenses of t4e annual Swamivatsal feasts were met, and the payments to other charities were duly made out of the income of the balance funds every year up to Samvat 1999 corresponding to 1942-43 A.D., and the accumulations of the unexpended income up to that year represent a true surplus. In accordance with the intention of the founder of the trust, the F surplus should be applied as nearly as possible to the original uses and purposes of the trust. In all the circumstances of the case, the surplus should be applied to increase the amounts spendable for the surviving objects of the trust. During the subsequent years up to Samvat year 2010 corresponding to 1953- 1954 A.D., the annual feasts could not be given due to rationing G restrictions, but the expenses of the other charities were duly met. The savings of the income spendable during these years for the feasts should be applied suitably for carrying out the same object in future. The balance savings, if any, should be devoted towards increasing the amounts spendable f<ir the other objects of the trust. The savings during Samvat year 2011 corresponding H to 1954-55 A.D. were due to the fact that the annual feast was not given in spite of the absence of rationing restrictions. The

A savings for this year should be devoteq towards the giving of the Swamivatsal feasts. The trustees cannot be allowed to defeat the objects of the trust by refusing to carry them out. It is said that the giving of a SwamivatsdJ feast on the scale given in the past would now cost about Rs. 3,000. But if the income at the disposal of the trustees will not permit the spending of such a large B amount, there is no reason why the trustees would not spend a smaller amount and give the feast to a smaller number of guests.

In view of the enormous rise in prices since the creation of the trust, an increase of the amounts spendable for the charities would be in accordance with the general intention of the founder. This is an additional reason for applying the unexpended fucome for C the original objects of the trust instead of diverting them for other purposes.

It is desirable that instead of spending the corpus of the accumulations, the corpus should be invested and its income should be applied towards the original objects. In the light of all these considerations, we propose to give the di.rectioo, s set out in our order.

The scheme framed by the Courts below is objectionable in several ways. In framing the scheme, the Courts below erroneously disregarded one of the main objects of the trust, viz., the giving of the annual Swamivatsal feast on the ground that it is not expe- E dient, desirable, necessary or proper in the public interest to carry out this object The scheme disregards the basic principle that the trust funds should be applied for effectuating the intention of the founder of the trust as far as possible. The direction for payment of one half of the accumulations to the Sad Vidya Manda! on the ground that its object is analogous to the object F of the 1 ain Gyan Fund mentioned in item 8 of cl. 10 of the will is objectionable on the ground that the freeships are not restricted to the 1 ains and also on the ground that subject to giving the freeships the donee is entitled to spend the corpus for other purposes. Moreover, the purposes of the Sad Vidya Manda! and its freeships are not analogous to the purposes of the 1 ain Gyan G Fund, which is a religious fund for imparting knowledge of 1 ain religion and 1 ain Shastras. The direction for payment of one half of the accumulated amount to the Sevashram Hospital is objectionable on the ground that medical treatment of the poor and deserving is not one of the objects specifically mentioned in cl. 7 of the will.

Both these directions are :ilso objectionable on the H ground that they do not take into account the original objects of the trust. For all these reasons, the directions given by the Courts below must be set aside.

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(1965] 2 S.C.R.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the judgments and A decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside. In lieu of the directions given by the Courts below, we give the following directions :

Out of the accumulations of the unexpended income up to the 25th October, 1956 amounting to Rs. 45,091-14-0 the B trustees will set apart a reasonable sum not exceeding Rs. 5,000 as a working fund to meet current expenses.

The trustees will invest the balance amount in such manner as they think fit in accordance with s. 35 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

The trustees will spend and utilise every year one-half of the annual income from these investments for the charities mentioned C in items l, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of cl. 7 of the will of Jhaverchand Dahyabhai Shah, dated August 6, 1915 in such proportion and in such manner as the trustees think fit and proper.

T)le trustees will spend and utilise every year the balance one-half of the annual income of those investments for the annual Swamivatsal feast (caste-dinner) mentioned in cl. 7 of the afore- D said will. The disbursemnts to be made under these directions will be in addition to the payments to be made by the trustees out of the income of the investments of the original corpus of the trust funds.

Out of the net income of the investments of the original corpus, the trustees will continue to make the annual payments to the charities mentioned in items t, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 E and 12 of cl. 7 of the aforesaid will and will spend the balailCe income for giving the annual Swam, ivatsal feasts.

The trustees shall give the Swamivatsal feast every year as far as possible. If for some reason the feast cannot be given in any year, the amount spendable for this object in that year should be spent for giving the feast 'in the following years.

In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties will pay and bear their own costs throughout in this Court as also in the Courts below, except that the trustees will pay the sum of Rs. 64-8-0 to the Charity Commissioner and the sum of Rs. 42-10-0 to opponents Nos. 6 to 13 to the application, as G originally directed by the District Judge.

Appeal 11llowed.

SHAH CHHOTALAL LALLUBHAI AND OIBERS

anuary 22, 1965

K. SUBBA RAO

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

BACHAWAT

V. RAMAsWAMI, JJ.

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950

Supreme Court

s. 5S(l)

s. 55(1)

s. 56(2)

Section 56(1)

s. 56(1)

Gumanmal Lodha

J. S. Rastogi

J.B. Dadachanji

P. K. Chatterjee

B. R. G. K. Achar

R. H. Dhebar

Bachawat

Jbaverchand Dahyabhai Shah

Broach

Bai Jakore

G Rikabdev

Palitana

Surat Districts

May 20, 1928

Bai Chanchal

F Mulchandbhai

December 8, 194

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950

Ladva Shrimali

June 3, 1955

District Judge, Broach

s. 55

s. 56

ss. 55

s. 56

s. 56

s. 55

October 25, 1956

Broach District

Sevashram Hospital at Broach

Ladva Shrimali Shravak Bania

Bombay High Court

s. 5

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

s. 5

ss. 55

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950

August 14, 1950

Bombay

s. 55

s. 56(1)

s. 55(1)(c)

Sections 55 and 56

Bombay Trusts Act, 1950

sections 10 to 13

section 54

Section 2(13)

Section 55(1)

ss. 55

s. 55

s. 56(2)

Section 56

s. 56( 1)

s. 56(1)

Pajusan

Swetambar Murti Pujak Jains

s. 56(1)

s. 5

Ratila

Panachand

Murri Pujak Swetambara

Jeena Bimba

Jeena Chaitya

Sadhu

Sadhvi

Shravak

Shravika

s. 56

s. 56(1)

Art. 1176

cl. 10

Sevashram Hospital

cl. 7

s. 35

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950

cl. 7

Jhaverchand Dahyabhai Shah

August 6, 1915

cl. 7

cl. 7


SAHIB SINGH MEHRA v.

STATE OF UlTAR PRADESH

I anuary 22, 1965

[RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ,] Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 499 and 500--Puf>..

B /Jcation of statement defom<llory of Public prosecuting stafJ at A/Jgarh-

State Government giving sanction for prosecution under s. 198B(c) Code of Criminal Procedure-Whether A/igarh Prosecuting staff a 'collection of persons' within the meaning of Explanation 2, s. 499-Considered

whether remarks published for public good.

The appellant published in his paper, which had a circulation mainly in Aligarh, a statement to the effect that Public Prosecutors and Aasi!- C tant Public Prosecutors had been receiving bribes,

The Public Prosecutor and the 11 Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh obtained the sanction of the State Government as required under s. 198B(c) of Code of Criminal Procedure to file a complaint nnder s. 500 Indian Penal Code in a court of Sessions against the appellant

for publishing defamatory remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecutor S, of District Aligarh and olher police prooecuting staff of the Govern- D ment in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions.

The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and the High Court dismissed his appeal against the conviction.

It was contended on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, that the sanction granted under s. 198B(c) was not the sanction contemplated by law because it was a general sanction and not with respect to the defamation of any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor; for the purpooe of an offence under s. 500 Indian Penal Code the person defamed mu.tt be E an individual or a particular group and there was no evidence that the remarks were defamatory of any particular group; that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establi.•h that the defamed group had any reputation which could be harmed; and that in any event the remarks were for public good.

HELD : (i) the sanction given by the Government was specifically with respect to the defamation of S, the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Aligarh, and the other prosecuting staJf of the Government and as such F it could not be considered a general sanction not contemplated by law. [826 HJ The sanction given could be taken to be sanction in respect of the defamation of the entire Prosecution staff in the State; there was therefore no force in the contention that the Public Prosecutor was not competent to restrict his complaint to the defamation of S, and other Public Prosecuting staff of the State Government at Aligarh.

Furthermore, G although the impugned article did not contain any express reference to the prosecuting staff at Aligarh, the offending remarks could properly be taken to refer t& the prosecuting staff at Aligarh in the context of the paper being a local weekly and the other circumstances of the case. [827

C.E]

(ii) Explanation II to s. 499 makes it clear that there can be a defamation of an individual pe1'0n and also of a 'collection of persons'.

Such a collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could H with cartainty say that the particular group had been defamed as distin~ from the rest of the community.

The prosecuting staft' of Aligarh, and even the prosecuting staff in the State of U.P. would be such an identifiable group or 'collection of persons'. [827 0-H; 828 A-CJ lASup. 65-6

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824 SUPllBMB COURT llBPORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

(ill) The impugned remarks were per se 'defamatory of the group A of persons referred to. The tenor of the article did not indicate that the purpose of the appellant in publishing these remarks was "public good''.

No enquiry could have been started by that Government on such a publication implying the acceptance of bribes by the prosecuting stall'. The impugned remarks could lead readers to believe or suspect that the Public Prosecutors were corrupt and thus affected the reputation of the prosecuting staff adversely.

Unless proved otherwise, the presumption ie S that every person bas a good reputation. [828 E-H]

The lower courts were therefore right in rejecting the contention that the impugned remarks were protected under Exceptions 3 and 9 to s. 499 I.P.C. and in convicting the appellant. [829 B-D) CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 1963.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated C

Juary 29, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 1962.

M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and D. P.

Singh, for the appellant.

Girish Chandra and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Kaglmbar Dayal, J.

Sahib Singh Mehra, appellant in this appeal by special leave, published an article in his paper 'Kaliyug' of Aligarh, dated September 12, 1960, under the heading "Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko Dante' which means that a thief reprimanded the E kotwal, a police officer, though the right thing would be the other way. The article contained the following expressions, as translated :

"How the justice stands at a distance as a helpless spectator of the show as to the manner in which the illicit bribe money from plaintiffs and defendants enters into the pockets of public prosecutors and assistant public prosecutors and the eJttent to which it reaches and to which use it is put"

The Public Prosecutor and the eleven Assistant Public Brosecutors at Aligarh requested the Superintendent of Police for G obtaining the sanction of the Government for filing a complaint by the District Government Counsel in the Court of the Session~ Judge under s. 500 l.P.C. The Government was duly approached through proper channel and, ultimately, the Home Secretary, U.P.

Government, wrote to the Inspector General, U.P. on March l, 1961 :

"I am directed to convey the sanction of the State Government under section 198B(c) of the Code of

.A.

Criminal Procedure to the filing of a complaint under section 500 Indian Penal Code in a Court of Sessions, against the Editor and Publisher of the Newspaper 'Kaliyug' of District Aligarh which published a news item under the caption 'Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko Dante' in its issue, dated September 12, 1960 containing defama- B tory remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecutor Sri R K. Sharma of District Aligarh and other police prosecuting staff of the Government in respect of their

conduct in the discharge of public functions."

Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor of Aligarh filed the complaint C in the Court of Session, Aligarh, praying for the summoning of the accused and for his trial according to law for the offence under s. 500 1.P.C.

The appellant admitted before the Sessions Judge the publication of the impugned article and stated that he never had any evil intention. He further stated that he had published the news D item for the good of the public and that he had published it in most general terms to bring bad things to the notice of the Government and the authoritit'.s for the public good.

The Sessions Judge convicted him of the offence under s. 500 l.P.C. holding that the aforesaid statements in the article were defamatory and dial the appellant was not protected by exceptions E 3 and 9 to s. 499 I.P.C. He sentenced the appellant to simple iJ[lprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200. His appeal against the conviction was dismiSscd by the High Court.

Of the points sought to be urged for the appellant, we did not allow one to be urged. It was that there was no proof that the F Government had sanctioned the lodging of the complaint. This point had not been taken in the Courts below and was not even

taken in the petition for special leave. What was urged in the petition for special leave was that one of the questions of law which arose in the case for consideration was whether the charge framed was the one for which sanction was granted or the requi- G site complaint was filed. This question is very much different from the question whether the Government did grant the sanction or whether the granting of the sanction by the Government had been duly proved in the case.

The other points urged are : ( 1 ) that the sanction granted was a general sanction and not with respect to the defamation H nf any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor and that such sanction was not contemplated by law; (2) that it is not proved that the appellant had any intention to harm the

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826 SUPJlBMlt COUil.T RBPOR TS (1965] 2 S.c.R.

reputation of any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public A Prosecutor; ( 3) that there was no evidence that the remarks wdefamatory of any particular group; ( 4) that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish that the defamed group had any reputation which could be harmed and ( 5) that the remarks were for public good.

Before dealing with the contentions raised for the appellant, B

we may refer to the provisions of law which enable a Public Prosecutor to file a complaint for an offence under s. 500 I.P.C. committed against a public servant. Section 198 Cr. P.C. provides inter alia that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XXl (which contains ss. 499 and 500 I.P.C.) c except upon complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence. Section 198B, however, is an exception to the proYisions of s. 198 and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXl of the Indian Penal Code other than the offence of defamation by spoken words is alleged to have been committed against any public D servant, employed in connection with the affairs of a State, in respect of his nduct in the discharge of his public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor. It is thus that a Public Prosecutor can file a complaint in writing in the Court of Session E directly with respect to an offence under s. 500 I.P.C. committed against a public servant in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions. Sub-s. ( 3) of s. l 98B provides that na complaint under sub-s. ( l ) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned for the filing of a complaint under s. 500 I.P.C. The sanction F referred to above, in this case, and conveyed by the Home Secretary to the Inspector-General of Police, was a sanction for making a complaint under s. 500 I.P.C. against the appellant with respect to the article under the heJ!ding 'Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko Dante', in the issue of 'Kaliyug', dated Septembc:r 12, 1960, containing defamatory remarks against the Assistant Public Prosecu- G tor, R. K. Sharma, of Aligarh, and other prosecuting staff of the Government in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions. The sanction was therefore with respect to defamation of two persons (i) R. K. Sharma, Assistant Public Prosecutor, Aligarh; and (ii) the other police prosecuting staff of Government of Uttar Pradesh, which would be the entire prosecuting staff in H the State.

There was thus nothing wrong in the form of the sanction.

.A The case did not proceed with respect to the defamation of R. K. Sharma, Assistant Public Prosecutor, as such. We may, however, here indicate in brief this reference to the defamation of R. K. Sharma. The appellant published sometime in May 1960 something which was defamatory of R. K. Sharma. R. K. Sharma filed a complaint about it in September 1960.

The impugned B article had stated, prior to the remarks to which objection has

been taken, the publication of the earlier article and the news

reaching the Editor that R. K. Sharma was contemplating taking action in a Court of law and then expressed that the Editor welcomed the news and would show how the bribe money reaches the Public Prosecutors, how it is utilised and _how justice sees ail C this show from a distance. The Public Prosecutor, however, in his complaint, restricted it to the defamation of R. K. Sharma and other police prosecuting staff of the U .P. Government at Aligarh.

It is not possible to say that he was not compe<ent to do so, when the sanction by the Government could be taken to be sanction for the defamation of the entire prosecuting staff D in the State of Uttar Pradesh, there being no such express statement in the article as to restrict the imputation to the staff at Aligarh alone and when the remarks could be properly taken to be with reference to the prosecuting staff at Aligarh in the context of 'Kaliyug' being a local weekly and the desire of the Editor to make public all these matters in a Court in proceedings to be E started by R. K. Sharma in view of certain matter published about him in an earlier issue of the paper. We therefore do not coni; ider that the sanction suffered from any defect.

The next question to determine is whether it is essential for the purpose of an offence under s. 500 1.P.C. that the person F defamed must be an individual and that the prosecuting staff at Aligarh or of the State of Uttar Pradesh could not be said to be a 'person' which could be defamed.

Section 499 1.P.C. defines 'defamation' 'and provides inter aliiz that whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will G harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in cases covered by the exceptions to the Section, to defame that person.

Explanation 2 provides that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. It is clear therefore that there could be H defamation of an individual person and also of a collection of persons as such. The contention for the appellant then reduces itself to the question whether the prosecuting staff at Aligarh can

be considered to be such a collection of persons as is contem-

828 SUP.ll!MB OOUllT REPORTS [1965] 2 S.C.ll.

plated by Explanation 2. The language of Explanation 2 is general A and any collection of persons would be covered by it. Of course. that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could, with certainty, say that this group of particular people has been defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community.

The prosecuting stall of Aligarh or, as a matter of fact, the prosecuting stall in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is certainly B such an identifiable group or collection of persons.

There is nothing indefinite about it. This group consists of all members of the prosecuting stall in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Within this general group of Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is again an identifiable group of prosecuting stall, consisting C of Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors, at Aligarh.

This group of persons would be covered by Explanation 2 and could therefore be the subject of defamation.

We have not been referred to any case relating to s. 499 LP.C. in support of the contention for the appellant that the Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh could not D form such a body of persons as would be covered by Explanation 2 to s. 499 I.P.C.

The impugned remarks are per se defamatory of the group f persons referred to. It is no defence-and it has not been urged as defence-that the remarks were true. The defence in the I: Courts below was that they were for public good and the appellant was protected under Exceptions 3 and 9, of s. 499 I.P.C. The tenor of the article does not indicate that the purpose of the appellant in publishing these remarks was 'public good'.

According to the article. the appellant would have welcomed the opportunity that would be offered by the case contemplated against him by F R. K. Sharma, to make public the impugned matters. His remarks therefore could have the tendency to dissuade R. K. Sharma from instituting the proceedings for fear of giving greater currency to untrue allegations which be not favourable to him or to the prosecuting stall at Aligarh or in the State, and by themselves could not render any public good. No enquiry could have been started G by the Government on such a publication implying the passing of money from the pockets of certain set of people to the pockets of the prosecuting staff.

The impugned remarks could certainly lead the readers of the article to believe or suspect that the prosecuting staff is corrupt in the discharge of its duties as public prosecutors, and are thus bound to affect the reputation of the H prosecuting staff adversely. Unless proved otherwise, the presumption is that every person has a good reputation. In this case, the

-'<S

SAHIB SINGH V. STATB (Dayal, J.) 829

A Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor had deposed

that they are not corrupt, and according to their knowledge, none at Aligarh, is corrupt in the discharge of his duty. There is no evidence to the contrary.

Exception 3 to s. 499 I.P.C. comes into play when some defamatory remark is made in good faith. Nothing has been brought on the record to establish that those defamatory remarks were made by the appellant after due care and attention and so, in good faith.

Exception 9 gives protection to putations made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it or of any C other person or for the public good. . The appellant has not established his good faith and, as we have said above, the imputations could not have been said to have been made for the public good.

We are therefore of opinion that the appellant has been rightly D held to have committed the offence under s. 500 l.P.C. by defaming the Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh.

It is urged for the appellant that the sentence is severe. and be reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone. We do E not see any justification for reducing the sentence. The Press has great power in impressing the minds of the people and it is essential that persons responsible for publishing anything in newspapers should take good care before publishing anything which tends to harm the reputation of a person. Reckless comments are to be avoided. When one is proved to have made defamatory comments F with an ulterior motive and without the least justification motivated by self-interest, he deserves a deterrent sentence.

We dismiss the appeal. The appellant will surrender to his bail.

Appeal dismissed.

SAHIB SINGH MEHRA

STATE OF UlTAR PRADESH

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ

Indian Penal Code, 1860

ss. 499 and 500

s. 198B(c)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 499

Aligarh

s. 198B(c)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 500

Indian Penal Code

s. 198B(c)

s. 500

Indian Penal Code

s. 499

U.P.

s. 499

I.P.C

Allahabad High Court

M. K. Ramamurthi

S. C. Agarwal

R. K. Garg

D. P.

Singh

Girish Chandra

. P. Rana

Kaglmbar Dayal

Sahib Singh Mehra

s. 500

March l, 1961

section 198B(c)

section 500

Indian Penal Code

R K. Sharma

s. 500

s. 500

s. 499

I.P.C

s. 500

I.P.C

Section 198

ss. 499 and 500

I.P.C

Section 198B

s. 198

Chapter XXl of the Indian Penal Code

s. 500

I.P.C

s. 500

I.P.C

s. 500

I.P.C

Septembc:r 12, 1960

R. K. Sharma

Government of Uttar Pradesh

U .P. Government

Uttar Pradesh

s. 500

State of Uttar Pradesh

Section 499

s. 499

s. 499

I.P.C

s. 499

I.P.C

K. Sharma

SAHIB SINGH V. STATB

In this case, the
'<S

SAHIB SINGH V. STATB (Dayal, J.) 829

A Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor had deposed

that they are not corrupt, and according to their knowledge, none at Aligarh, is corrupt in the discharge of his duty.

s. 499

I.P.C

s. 500


UNION OF INDIA v.

SREE RAM BOHRA AND OTHERS

January 29, 1965

[RAGHUBAR DAYAL, R. S. BACHAWAT AND

V. RAMASWAMY, JJ.J

Hindu Ltw-Suit by two persons representing joint Hindu family- Dealh of on~Appea/ against the otMr-1/ competenl-C111le of Civil ProcedlJ1'e (Act S of 1908), 0.22. r. 11.

The respondent and B filed a suit and obtained a decree for a certain SlllD against the appellant.

The appellant appealed to the High Court !Jld subsequently B died.

The High Court dismissed an applica- C lion setting aside the abatement of the appeal against B and for substitution as it was of opinion that there had been gross negligence on the part of the appellant. When the appeal came up for hearing a preliminary objection was raised by the respondent that the appeal had abated entirely which was upheld by the High Court. On appeal by certificate, the appellants contended that there could be no abatement of the appeal as the suit had been brought by the respondent and B as the Kartas of the D joint family and on the death of one of the Karta, the other Karla continued to represent the joint family, the real plaintiff-respondent.

HELD : The appeal against the respondent was incompetent.

When two representatives of a joint Hindu family sued and obtained a decree in their favour for the benefit of the joint Hindu family, and an appeal was filed against both of them as respondents representing the joint Hindu family, the other representative would not continue to repre- I: seat the joint family on the death of one of the representatives. [835

B-DJ

Any one of them could not represent the joint f8lD11y after the death of the other till his authority to represent the family was confirmed by

the members of the family. [835 F-G]

The State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 636, relied on.

F CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 611 of 1962.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 11, 1959, of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 525 of 1951.

Bishan Narain, D. R. Prem. B. R. G. K. Achlll' and R. N.

G Sachthey, for the appellant.

A. V. Viswanatha Sostri and K. K. Sinha, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Raghubar Dayal J.

Bilas Rai Bohra, son of Bansidhar Bohra and Sree Ram Bohra, son of Ganpat Ram Bohra, sued the Union of India for the recovery of Rs. 13,448 from the defendant tor

UNION V. RAM BORRA (Dayal, /.) 831

A compensation on account of loss and damage suffered by the plaintifts owing to non-delivery of 11 bales of cloth which had been consigned on October 20, 1948 by M/s Ram Kishun Das Sagarmal of Bombay to the plaintiffs under the description of M/ s Banshidhar Ganpat Rai. It was alleged in para 1 of the plaint that the plaintiffs . carried on business in cloth and other articles in the B name and style of M/s Bansidhar Ganpat Rai which was their

joint family trading firm governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law of which joint family the plaintiffs were the kartas and representatives and that they sued as such.

This statement in para 1 of the plaint was not admitted in the written statement.

C The trial Court decreed the suit on August 29, 1951. The decree, inter alia, said :

"It is ordered that the suit be decreed with costs defendants do pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 13,448 with interest thereon ... "

D The Union of India appealed to the High Court of Patna and prayed for the setting aside of the decree and for the dismissal of the suit with costs.

The plaintiffs-respondents were served with notice of the appeal. Subsequently Bilas Rai Bohra died on July 24, 1957. On September 5, 1958, the Union of India presented an application for substitution under 0. 22, r. 4 read with 0. 22, r. 11, E C.P.C. for setting aside the abatement and condonation of delay.

It was stated in the application that the applicant's advocate came to know of the death of Bilas Rai Bohra, plaintiff No. 1, on May 14, 1958 when the case was on the daily list with a note to that effect, that he promptly communicated the fact to the railway authorities but due to the mistake of the Attacher, proper steps P for substitution could not be taken in time. It was further stated that after a good deal of enquiry and efforts for three days the date of the death of Bilas Rai Bohra and the names and addresses of his heirs and legal representatives could be ascertained.

A prayer was made for substituting the heirs of Bilas Rai Bohra, G they being his sons, a widow and a daughter. Their names were mentioned in the application. ·

This application was opposed on behalf of the heirs of Bilas Rai Bohra. It was mentioned therein that on September 27, 1957, an application for substitution of the heirs of Bilas Rai Bohra was made in another , appeal in which the Union of India was a respon- H dent and that therefore the Union of India and its Advocate were aware of the death of Bilas Rai Bohra and of the names of his heirs .

SUPRBMI! COURT RBPORTS

On December l, 1958, the High Court dismissed the applica- A tion for the setting aside of the abatement of the appeal against Bilas Rai Bohra and for the substitution of the heirs as it was of opinion that there had been gross negligence on the part of the appellant, the Union of India, as its counsel had information about the death of Bilas Rai Bohra at least on May 16, 1958. Tho High Court did not feel satisfied on the facts of the case that any B ground had been made out for setting aside the abatement of the appeal.

It may be mentioned here that it was not urged in the High Court that there had been no abatement of the appeal against the heirs and legal representatives of Bilas Rai Bohra. It could not C have been urgM when the Union of India itself had applied for the setting aside of the abatement and the substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of Bilas Rai Bohra.

The appeal of the Union of India against the surviving respon- 0 dent, viz., Sree Ram Bohra, came up for hearing on February 11, 1959, when a prelin; linary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the appeal had abated entirely as it had abated against the heirs of plaintiff-respondent No. 1.

It was contended for the Union of India that the two plaintiffs, viz. ..

Bilas Rai Bohra, deceased, and Sree Ram Bohra, had filed the E suit as kartas of the joint family which was the owner of the firm of M / s Bansidhar Ganpat Rai and that after the death of one of the kartas the other plaintiff who was also described in the plaintiff's suit as karta was competent to represent the family and so there could be no question of abatement of the entire appeal.

Again, it was not contended that the appeal against the heirs of F Bilas Rai Bohra had not abated.

The High Court upheld the preliminary objection and held that the appeal had become incompetent and was liable to be dismissed. It was of opinion that even if it be taken that both th plaintiffs had filed the suit in their capacity as kartas of the G 'Same joint family, the joint family had gained by virtue of the appeal having abated against the heirs of Bilas Rai Bohra as the decree passed in favour of the joint family through the representation of Bilas Rai Bohra could not be set aside and in case the appeal was permitted to proceed against the joint family in the presence of the other karta Sree Ram Bohra, there might be H occasion for the coming into existence of two inconsistent decrees.

The High Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal. It was against

UNION v. RAM BOHRA (Dayal, J.) 833

A this order that the Union of India obtained the certificate from the High Court under Art. 13 3 and then filed this appeal.

The sole point for decision in the appeal then is whether the appeal of the Union of India before the High Court against the respondent Sree Ram Bohra, respondent No. 2, was competent B after it had abated against respondent No. l, Bilas Rai Bohra, on

account of his heirs and legal representatives being not brought on the record. It has not been disputed for the appellant that in case it is held that the appeal had abated against the heirs and legal representatives of Bilas Rai Bohra, it became incompetent against the surviving respondent alone.

The suit was filed by c both the plaintiffs.

Both were respondents in the appeal. The decree was a joint one, without any specification regarding the shares of each of the decree-holders. The appeal must, therefore, become incompetent if it has abated against one of the respondents.

D What is really urged for the appellant is that there could be no abatement of the appeal on the death of Sree Ram Bohra and the omission to bring on record his heirs and representatives, as the real plaintiff was the joint family which owned the firm Bansidhar Ganpat Rai, the consignee of the bales which were not delivered and as the suit had been brought by the two named plaintiffs as :& the kartas of the joint family. It is said that on the death of one of the kartas, the other .karta continued to represent the joint family, the real plaintiff-re5pondent, and that therefore there could not be any abatement of the appeal. We do not consider the contention sound. ·

We have not been referred to any text of Hindu Law or any F decided case in support of the proposition that a joint Hindu family can have more than one .karta. The very idea of there being two .kartas of a joint Hindu family does not appear, prima facie, consistent with the concept of a karta.

Their describing themselves as kartas of the joint Hindu family owning the firm and G their suing as such cannot make them kartas of the joint Hindu family if the Hindu Law does not contemplate the existence of two kartas.

In paragraph 236 of Mulla's Hindu Law, XII Edition, is said :

"Property belonging to a joint family is ordinarily managed by the father or other senior member for the time being of the family. The manager of a joint family is called karta.

8S4 SUPl.J!MB COUllT REPORTS

[1965) 2 S.C.R.

The father is in all cases naturally, and in the case of A minor sons necessarily, the manager of the joint family property."

The existence of two kartas cannot lead to the smooth managoment of the property of the joint Hindu family and the other affairs of the family in view of the powers which the karta of a joint 8 Hindu family possesses under the Hindu Law, powers which are not restricted to only such powers which ordinarily the manager of property of certain persons who confer authority on him to manage the property possesses.

The karta of the joint Hindu family is certainly the manager of the family property but undoubtedly possesses powers which the ordinary manager does not C possess.

The karta cannot therefore be just equated with the manager of property.

Reference was made to the case reported as Bhagwan Dayal

v. Mst. Reoti Devi('). It was stated at p. 482:

"The legal position may be stated thus : Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and cannot be created by agreement of parties eitcept in the case of reunion. It is a corporate body or a family unit. The law also recognizes a branch of the family as a subordinate corporate body. The said family unit, whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can acquire, 1ioid and dispose of family property subject to the limitations laid down by law. Ordinarily the manager, or by consent, express or implied, of the members of the family, any other member or members can carry on business or acquire property, subject to the limitations'Jaid down by the said law, for or on behalf of the family."

The fact that any other member or members other than the manager of the joint Hindu family, carry on business etc., on behalf of the family, does not mean that such members who act for the family do so as kartas of the family.

In the absence of any text of Hindu Jaw or of any previous decision that a joint Hindu family can have two kartas we are not prepared to express any definite opinion on the question whether there can be two kartas of a joint Hindu family and, if there can

be two kartas, what would be the effect of the death of one of H them on the maintainability of a suit brought by both of them.

(1) 11962] 3 s.c.R. 440.

UNION v. RAM BHORA (D11Yal, J.) 835

A Two persons may look after the affairs of a joint Hindu family on the basis of the members of the joint Hindu family clothing them with authority to represent the family. They would be two persons entitled to represent the family and their power to represent would depend on the terms of the authority conferred on them by the members of the joint Hindu family. Their authority to act B for the family is not derived under any principle of Hindu law, but is based on the members of the joint Hindu family conferring certain authority on them. It cannot, therefore, be said that when two such representatives of a joint Hindu family sue and obtain a decree in their favour for the benefit of the joint Hindu family, and an appeal is filed against both of them as respondents repre- C senting the joint Hindu family, the other representative would continue to represent the joint family on the death of one of the representatives. He could not possibly do so when the authority given by the joint Hindu family be to the effect that both of them were to act jointly. In the absence of any knowledge about the D terms of authority of the two representatives, it is not possible to urge successfully that on the death of one of the representatives, the other representative still continued to represent the joint Hindu family. On the death of one of the representatives, the karta of • the family, in accordance with the principles of Hindu law, will automatically be the person entitled to represent the joint Hindu J: family till such time that the family again decides to confer the authority on specified members of the joint Hindu family to represent it. There is no material on the record to indicate the terms and scope of the authority conferred on the two plaintiffs by the joint Hindu family.

F We, therefore, consider the matter in appeal on the basis that the suit was brought by two persons as plaintiffs.

They can at best be taken to represent the joint Hindu family which owned that firm Bansidhar Ganpat Rai. Any one of them cannot represent the joint family after the death of the other till his authority to represent the family is confirmed by the members of the G family. There is no allegation or proof about such confirmation or fresh vesting of authority in the second plaintiff, viz., Sree Ram Bohra. For the purpose of the suit, there were two plaintiffs and on the death of one of them it was necessary for the opposite party to implead his heirs and legal representatives within time. It failed to do so and therefore the appeal against those heirs and repre- H sentatives of Bilas Rai Bohra was rightly held to have abated. 1be result of such abatement makes this appeal against the other respondent incompetent as the decree against both the respon-

836 SUPllBMB COURT llBPORTS

[196S] 2 S.C.R.

dents viz .• Bilas Rai Bohra and Sree Ram Bohra was a joint decree.

A There was nothing in the decree to indicate for whose benefit it was passed or in what proportions the two decree-holders were to get the decretal amount.

The appeal against Sree Ram Bohra was therefore incompetent.

This view is supported by the decision of this Court in The B State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram('). It was held there that whe.n the decree in favour of the respondents is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the respondents other than the deceased respondent cannot be proceeded with if the appeal against the deceased respondent has abated.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was right C in holding that the appeal against Sree Ram Bohra alone became incompetent.

It has been further argued for the appellant that the High Court should have allowed the appellant's application for setting aside the abatement.

The High Court exercised its discretion D judiciously, after taking into consideration the facts urged in support of the prayer that the abatement of the appeal be set aside.

We do not find any reason to consider that the discretion was not properly exercised. We, therefore, do not consider this a fit case

to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in this regard.

We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dimiimd.

(1) [1962] 2 S.C. R. 636.

UNION OF INDIA

SREE RAM BOHRA AND OTHERS

January 29, 1965

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

R. S. BACHAWAT

[1962] 2 S.C.R. 636

February 11, 1959

Patna High Court

Bishan Narain

R. G. K. Achlll

R. N.

G Sachthey

A. V. Viswanatha Sostri

K. K. Sinha

Raghubar Dayal

Bilas Rai Bohra

Bansidhar Bohra

Sree Ram Bohra

Ganpat Ram Bohra

Union of India

Ram Kishun Das Sagarmal

Bombay

Banshidhar Ganpat Rai

Bansidhar Ganpat Rai

Mitakshara School of Hindu Law

August 29, 1951

Union of India

High Court of Patna

Bilas Rai Bohra

July 24, 1957

September 5, 1958

Union of India

C.P.C

May 14, 1958

September 27, 1957

SUPRBMI! COURT RBPORTS

December l, 1958

May 16, 1958

Bilas Rai Bohra

F Bilas Rai Bohra

Sree Ram Bohra

Art. 13

Mulla

[1962] 2 S.C. R. 636


BHAURAO SHANKAR LOKHANDE & ANR.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

February 1, 1965

[RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. R. MUDHOLKAR, AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), s. 494-Whether second marriage required to be 'valid' for offence to be committed-Therefore whether essential ceremonies must be perfurmed-Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, s. 17-Marriage 'solemnised'-Meaning of-Hindu.

Hindu Law-'Gandharva' marriage-Whether usual essential ceremonies necessary-Modification by custom considered.

Appellant No. 1 was convicted of an offenee under s. 494 I.P.C. (and

allant No. 2 of abetting him) for going through a marriage which was void by reason of its taking place during the life-time of a previous wife.

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that in law it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the alleged marriage had been duly performed in accordance with the essential religious rites applicable to the form of marriage gone through, On the other hand it was urged by the State that for the commission of an offence under s. 494, it was not necessary that the second marriage should be a valid one and a person going through any form of marriage during the life-time of the first wife would commit the ., ffettce; and that in any event, in the present case the rites necessary for a 'Gandharva' form of marriage,

as modified by custom prevailing among Maharashtrians, had been duly J: observed.

HELD :

(i) Prima fade, the expression 'whoever-marries' in s. 494 must mean 'whoever-marries validly' or 'whoever-marries and whose marriage is a valid one'. If a marriage is not a valid one acoording to the law applicable to the parties, no question arises of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying. [839 C-D]

(ii) For a marriage between two Hindus to be void by virtue of i' 1. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, two conditions are required to be satisfied, I.e. (a) the marriage is solemnised after the Act; and (b) at the date of such marriage, either party has a spouse living. Unless the marriage is celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due form, it cannot be said to be 'solemnised' within the meaning of s. 17. Merely

going through certain ceremonies, with the intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make them ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established custom. [839 G-H; 840 A-C] G

(iii) The two ceremonies essential to the validity of a Hindu marriage, I.e. invocation before the sacred fire and sapatapadi. are also a requi•ite part of a 'Gandharva' marriage unless it is shown that some modification of these ceremonies has been introduced by custom in any particular rommunity or caste.

It was not disputed that in the present case these two ceremonies were not performed when the appellant No. I H married a second time and the evidence on record did not establish that these essential ceremonies had been abrogated by custom. The prosecution had therefore failed to establish that the second marriage was performed in accordance with the customary rites applicable.

[840 H: 841

A-C; 843 E-GJ

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1965] 2 S.C.R.

Mu/Ids Hindu Law, 12th &In. pp. 605 and 615, relied upon.

(iv) The facts that the two essential ceremonies may not have been performed for a period of five or seven year.s oou!d not be said to have established a custom as contemplated by s. 3(a) of the Hindu Marriage

Act, 1955. [843 C-E]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.

178 of 1963.

A ppe'al by special leave from the judgment and order dated AugtlsLl9, 1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 388 of 1963.

_,/" / , <S. G. Patwardhan and M. S. Gupta, for the appellants.

W. S. Barlingay, B. R. G. K. Achar for R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Raghubar Dayal, J. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande, appellant D No. 1, was married to the complainant Indubai in about 1956. He married Kamlabai in February 1962, during the lifetime of Indubai.

Deorao Shankar Lokhande, appellant No. 2, is the brother of the first appellant.

These two appellants, together with Kam!abai and her father and accused No. 5, a barber, were tried for an offence under s. 4 94 I.P. C.

The latter three were acquitted by E the Magistrate.

Appellant No. 1 was convicted under s. 494 I.P.C. and appellant No. 2 for an offence under s. 494 read with s. 114 1.P.C. Their appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed.

Their revision to the High Court also failed. They have preferred this appeal by special leave.

The only contention raised for the appellants is that in law it F

was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the alleged second marriage of the appellant No. 1 with Kamlabai in 1962 had been duly performed in accordance with the religious rites applicable to the form of marriage gone through. It is urged for the appellants that the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage were G not performed during the proceedings which took place when appellant No. l and Kam!abai married each other. On behalf of the State it is urged ti!at the proceedings of ihat marriage were in accordance with the custom prevalent in the community of the appellant for gandharva form of marriage and that therefore the second marriage of appellant No. 1 with Kam!abai was a valid H marriage. It is also urged for the State that it is not necessary for the commission of the offence under s. 494 I.P.C. that the second

B. S. LOKHANDE v. STATE (Dayal, /.) 839

A marriage be a valid one and that a person going through any form of marriage during the life-time of the first wife would commit the offence under s. ~~4 lP.C. even if the later marriage be

void according to the law applicable to that person.

Section 494 I.P.C. reads : B "Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries

in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished With imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Prima facie, the expression 'whoever .... marries' must mean 'whoever .... marries validly' or 'whoever .... marries and whose marriage is a valid one'. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband D or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife.

E Apart from these consid_erations, there is nothing in the Hindu law, as applicable to marriages till the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which made a second marriage of a male Hindu, during the life-time of his previous wife, void. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a marriage may be solem- F niud between any two Hindus if the conditions mentioned in that section are fulfilled and one of those conditions is that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. Section 17 provides that any marriage between two Hindus solemniud after the commencement of the Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living, and that the provisions of G ss. 494 and 495 I.P.C. shall apply accordingly.

The marriage between two Hindus is void in view of s. 17 if two conditions are satisfied : (i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act; (ii) at the date of such marriage, either party had a spouse living. If the marriage which took plce between the appellant and Kamlabai in February 1962 cannot be said to be 'solem- H nized', that marriage will not be void by virtue of s. 17 of the Act and s. 494 I.P .C. will not apply to such parties to the marriage as had a spouse living.

L4Sup./6S-7

840 SUPllEMB COUltT IU!POR.TS

(1965] 2 S.C.R.

The word 'solemnize' means, in connection with a marriage, A 'to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form', according to the Shorter O)dord Dictionary. It follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is 'celebrated or performed with prop" ceremonies and due form' it cannot be said to be 'solemnized'. It is therefore essential, for the purpose of s. 17 of the Act, that the marriage to which s. 494 l.P.C. applies on account of the provi- B sions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make them ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established custom.

We are of opinion that unless the marriage which took place between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai in February 1962 was performed in accordance with the requirements of the law applicable.

to a marriage between the parties, the marriage cannot be said to have been 'solemnized' and therefore appellant no. 1 cannot be D held to have committed the offence under s. 494 l.P.C.

We may now determine what the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage between the parties are. It is alleged for the respondent that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai was in 'gandharva' form, as modified by the custom prevailing E among the Maharashtrians.

It is noted in Mul/ds Hindu Law, 12th Edition, at p. 605 :

"The Gandharva marriage is the voluntary union of a youth and a damsel which springs from desire and sensual inclination. It has at times been erroneously descri- F bed as an euphemism for concubinage.

This view is based on a total misconception of the leading texts of the Smritis. It may be noted that the essential marriage ceremonies are as much a requisite part of this form of marriage as of any other unless it is shown that some modification of those ceremonies has been introduced by G custom in any particular community or caste."

At p. 615 is stated:

"(l) There are two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage, whether the marriage be in the H Brahma form or the Asura form, namely-

( l) invocation before the sacred fire, and

B. s. LOr; HANI)B V. STATB (Dayal. 1.) 841

(2) saptapadi, that is, the taking of seven steps by the

bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire.

(2) A marriage may be completed by the performance of ceremonies other than those referred to in subsection (1), where it is allowed by the custom of the caste to which the parties belong."

It is not disputed that these two essential ceremonies were not c performed when appellant no. 1 married Kamlabai in February

1962. There is no evidence on record to establish that the performance of these two essential ceremonies has been abrogated by the custom prevalent in their community. In fact, the prosecution led no evidence as to what the custom was. It led evidence of what was performed at the time of the alleged marriage. It was D the counsel for the accused in the case who questioned certain witnesses about the performance of certain ceremonies and to such questions the witnesses replied that they were not necessary for the 'gandharva' form of marriage in their community. Such a statement does not mean at the custom of the community deemed what took place at the 'marriage' of the appellant no. 1 and E Kamlabai, sufficient for a valid marriage and that the performance of the two essential ceremonies had been abrogated. There ought to have been definite evidence to establish that the custom prevalent in the community had abrogated these ceremonies for such , form of marriage.

What took place that night when appellant no. 1 married Kamlabai, has been stated thus, by P.W. 1 :

"The marriage took place at 10 p.m. Pat-wooden sheets-were brought. A carpet was spread. Accused no. 1 then sat on the wooden sheet. On the other sheet accused no. 3 sat. She was sitting nearby accused no.

1. Accused no. 4 then performed some Puja by bringing a Tambya-pitcher. Betel leaves and cocoanut was kept on the Tambya. Two_garlaJids were brought. Accused no. 2 was having one and accused no. 4 having one in his hand. Accused no. 4 gave the garland to accused no. 3 and accused no. 2 gave the garland to accused no.

1. Accused nos. 1 and 3 then garlanded each other. Then they each struck each other's forehead."

+, -

842 SUPREMB COUllT RBPOR.TS

[1965] 2 S.C.R.

In cross-examination this witness stated :

"It is not that Gandharva according to our custom is performed necessarily in a temple. It is also not that a , Brahmin Priest is required to perform the Gandharva

marril\ge.

No 'Mangala Ashtakas' are required to be chanted at the time of Gandharva marriage. At the time of marriage in question, no Brahmin was called and Mangala Ashtakas were chanted. There is no custom to blow a pipe called 'Sher' in vernacular."

Sitaram, witness no. 2 for the complainant, made a similar starement about what happened at the marriage ceremony and further stated, in the examination-in-chief : C

"Surpan is the village of accused no. 3's maternal uncle and as the custom is not to perform the ceremony at the house of maternal uncle, so it was performed at another place. There is no custom requiring a Brahmin Priest at the time of Gandharva." D

He stated in cross-examination :

"A barber is not required and accused no. 5 was not present at the time pf marriage.

There is a custom that the father of girl should make to touch the foreheads of the girl and boy tq each other and the Gandharva is E completed by the act."

It is urged for the respondent that as the touching of the forehead by the bridegroom and the bride is stated to complete the act of Gandharva marriage, it must be concluded that the ceremonies which, according to this witness, had been performed, F were all the ceremonies which, by custom, were necessary for the validity of the marriage. In the absence of a statement by the witness himself that according to custom these ceremonies were the only necessary ceremonies for a valid marriage, we cannot construe the statement that the touching of the foreheads completed the gandharva form of marriage and that the ceremonies gone G through were all the ceremonies required for the validity of the marriage.

Bhagwan, witness no. 3 for the complainant, made no statement about the custom, but stated in cross-examination that it was not neeessary for the valid performance of gandharva marriage in their community that a Brahmin priest was required and mangala H ashtakas were to be chanted. The statement of Jeebhau, witness no. 4 for the complainant, does not show how the custom has

B. S. LOKHANDB V. STATB (Dayal, /.) 843

A modified the essential forms of marriage.

He stated in crossexamination :

"I had witnessed two Gandharvas before this. For the last 5 or 7 years a Brahmin Priest, a Barber and a Thakur is not required to perform the Gandharva but formerly it was essential. Formerly the Brahmin used to chant Mantras and Mangala ashtakas. It was necessary to have a maternal uncle or any other person to make touch the foreheads of the sponsors together. A Brahmin from Kasara and Dhandana comes to our village for doing rituals but I do not know their names."

C This statement too, does not establish that the two essential ceremonies are no more necessary to be performed, for a Gandharva marriage. The mere fact that they were probably not performed in the two Gandharva marriages Jeebhau had attended, does uot establish that their performance is no more necessary according D to the custom in that community.

Further, Jeebhau has stated that about five or seven years earlier the performance of certain ceremonies which, till then, were essential for the marriage, were given up. If so, the departure from the essentials cannot be said to have become a custom, as contemplated by the Hindu Marriage Act.

Clause (a) of s. 3 of the Act provides that the expressions 'custom' and 'usage' signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a. long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family.

We are therefore of opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai in February 1962 was performed in accordance with the customary rites as required by s. 7 of the Act. It was certainly not performed in accordance with the essential requirements for a valid marriage under Hindu law.

It follows therefore that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai does not come within the expression 'solemnized marriage' occurring in s. 17 of the Act and consequently does not come within the mischief of s. 494 l.P.C. even though the first wife of appellant no. 1 was living when he married Kamlabai in H February 1962.

We have not referred to .and discussed the cases referred to in support of the contention that the 'subsequent marriage' referred

844 SVP:UMJI COUllT Rl!POil.TS

(196S] 2 S.C.11..

to in s. 494 I.P.C. need not be a valid marriage, as it is unnecessary A. to consider whether they have been correctly decided, in view of the fact that the marriage of appellant no. 1 with Kamlabai could be a void marriage only if it came within the purview of s. 17 of the Act.

The result is that the conviction of appellant no. 1 under B s. 494 I.P.C. and of appellant no. 2 under s. 494 read with s. 114 l.P.C. cannot be sustained. We therefore allow their appeal, set aside their convictions and acquit them.

The bail bonds of appellant no. 1 will stand discharged. Fines, if paid, will be refunded. c Appeal allowed.

BHAURAO SHANKAR LOKHANDE & ANR

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

February 1, 1965

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.

R. MUDHOLKAR

V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

s. 494

s. 17

s. 494

I.P.C

s. 494

s. 494

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

s. 17

s. 3(a)

Act, 1955

S. G. Patwardhan

M. S. Gupta

W. S. Barlingay

B. R. G. K. Achar

R. H. Dhebar

Raghubar Dayal

Deorao Shankar Lokhande

Kam!abai

s. 4

s. 494

I.P.C

s. 494

s. 114

Kamlabai

s. 494

I.P.C

Section 494

I.P.C

Hindu Marriage Act

Section 5

Hindu Marriage Act

Section 17

ss. 494 and 495

I.P.C

s. 17

Kamlabai

s. 17

s. 494

s. 17

s. 494

s. 494

E Kamlabai

Kamlabai

Sitaram

Bhagwan

Jeebhau

Kasara

Dhandana

Jeebhau

Hindu Marriage Act

s. 3

s. 7

s. 17

s. 494

s. 494

I.P.C

s. 17

s. 494

I.P.C

s. 494

s. 114