THE MORVI MERCANTILE BANK LTD. AND ANR. v.

1UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH THE GENERAL MANAGER,

CENTRAL RAILWAY, BOMBAY March 3, I 965

[K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. R. MUDHOLKAR,

R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J Indian Contract Act (9 of 1872), s. 178, Transfer'of Property Act (4 of 1882). ss. 4 and 137 and Indian Sale of Goods Act (3 of 1930), 8s.

30 and 53-Endorsel of Railway receipt-If pleduee of goods covered by receipt. ,

A firm doing business in Bombay entrusted goods worth Rs. 35,500 to the Railway for delivery in Delhi. The good" were consigned to "self" and the firm endorsed the railway receipts to a Bank against an advance of Rs. 20,0-00 made by the Bank to the firm. The firm also executed a promissory note in favour of the Bank for that amount.

When the goods reached the destination, the Ba.nk refused to take delivery, on the ground that they were not the goods consigned by the firm. The Bank, thereafter filed a suit for the recovery of the value of the goods. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the Bank, the High Court allowed the appeal and decreed the claim for Rs. 2(),000 on the grounJ that as pledgee of the goods, the Bank suffered loss only to the extent of the loss of its security, Both the Bank and the Railway appealed to this Court, and it was contended on behalf of the Railway that the endorsement of the railway reoeipt in favour of the Bank, did not constitute a pledge of the goods covered by the receipt and that the Bank had no right to sue for compensation.

HELD: (Per Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and Bachawat, JJ): The firm by endorsing the railway receipts in favour of the Bank, for con°ideration, pledged the goods covered by the said. receipts, to the Bank, and the Bank being the pledgee could maintain the suit for the recovery of the full value of consignment amounting to Rs. 35,500.

[264 H; 265 D-E] .

On a reasonable construction of s. 178 of the Contract Act, 1872, 8S. 4 and 137 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and ss. 30 and 53 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, an owner of goods, can make a valid pledge of them by transferring the railway receipt representing the said goods. To the general rule expressed by the Maxim nemo dat quod non habet (no one can convey a better title than what he had), to facilitate mercantile transactions, the Indian Law has i:rafted some exceptions, in favour of bonafide pledgees by transfer of documents of title from persons. whether owners of goods who <lo not possess the full bundle of rights of ownership at the time the pledges are made, or their mercantile agents. To confer a right to pffect a valid pledge by transfer of. document of title relating to goods on persons with defects in their title to the goods. and on mercantile agents, and to deny it to the .full owners thereof, is to introduce an incongruity into the Act. On the other hand, the real intention of the legi•lature will be carried out if the said right is conceded to the full owner of goods and extended by construction to persons with defects in their title to the goods or to mercantile agents. A pledge being a bailment of goods under s. 172 of the Contract Act, the pled- gee. as a bailee. will have the same remedies as the owner of the goo:'s would have agaimt a third person for deprivation of the said goods or injury to them under s. 180 of the Act. [264 A-C, HJ

MORVI BANK V. UNION OF INDiA 255

RCtmdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amarchand and Co., (1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 164 and The Official Assignee of Madras v. The Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd. (1934) L. R. 61 I. A. 416, referred to.

Per Mudholkar and Ramaswami JJ. (dissenting): There was no valid pledge of the consignments of goods represented by the railway receipt in favour of the Bank and the Bank was not entitled to sue the Railway for compensation for the loss of goods. relying upon the endorsements of the railway receipts in }ts favour. [272 G-HJ

After the passing of the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930, the legal position with regard to the pledge of railway receipts, is exactly the same in Indian Law as it is in English Law, and consequently, the owner of the goods cannot pledge the goods represented by a railway receipt, by endorsing the railway receipt, unless the railway Authorities were notified of the transfer, and they agreed to hold the goods as bailee of the pledgee_ Under the amended law a valid pledge can no longer be made by every person "in possession" of goods. It can only be made by a mercantile agent as provided. in s. 178 of the Contract Act (after amendment in 1930) or by a person who has obtained possession of goods under a contract voidable under s. 19 or s. 19A of the Contract Act, as provided by s. 178 of the Act. or by a seller or buyer in possession of goods. after sale. as provided in s. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. ~271 F-G; 272 C-D)

Further, though a railway receipt and all other documents. enumerated ins. 2(4) of the Sale of Goods Act are assimilated to bills. ; if lading for the purpose of the right to stoppage in transit and a

pledge under s. 178 of the Contract Act, its legal position is the same as in Enitlish law, so that, no rights are created, merely by reason of the endorsement of a railway receipt by the consignee between the endorsee and the railway company which had issued the rece1nt to the consirmee. the only remedy of the endorsee being against the endorser. The negotiation of the receipt may pass the property m the goods, but it does not tvansfer the contract contained in the receipt or the statutory contract under s. 74E of the Indian Railways Act.

Negotiability is a creature of a statute or mercantile usage, not of judicial decisions apart from either. So, in the absence of any usage of trade or any statutory provision to that effect, a railway receipt cannot be accorded the benefits which fiow from negotiability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, so as to entitle the endorsee, as the holder for the time being of the document of title, to sue the carrier -the railway authority-in his own name. If the claim of the Bank was as an ordinary assignee of the contract of carriage, then it had to prove the assignment. In the absence of proof of such assignment, or of the existence of any practice of merchants treating a railway receipt as a symbol of goods making a pledge of the receipt a pledge of goods, and in view of cl. (3) of the notice printed at the back of the receipt that an endorsement made on the face of the receipt ty the consignee was only meant to indicate_ the person to whom the consignee wished delivery of goods to be made if he himself did not attend to take delivery, the Bank had no right to sue the Railway. [273 E-G; 274 D-G]

Since the language of s. 178 of the Contract Act is clear and explicit, if any hardship and inconvenience is felt because such a practice of treating the receipt as a symbol ?f goods were not recognised, it is for Parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the law and it is not for courts to legislate under the guise of interpretation. [275 G]

256 •

COURT

REPORTS (1965] 3 s.c.R.

SUPREME

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 474 and A 475 of 62.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 10, 1958, .of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 375 of 1953.

J. C. Bhatt, B. R. Agarwala and H. K. Puri, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 474 of 1962) and respondent (in C.A. No. 475 B of 1962).

Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, N. D. Karkhanis, B.R.G.K. Achar, for R. N. Sachthey, for Respondent (in C.A. No. 474 of 1962) and appellant (in C.A. Nos. 475 of 1962).

The. Judgment of SUBBA RAO, DAYAL and BACHAWAT JJ. was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. The dissenting Opinion of MUDHOLKAR and RAMASWAMI JJ. was delivered by RAMASWAMI J.

Sobba Rao, J. On October 4. 1949, Mis. Harshadrai Mohanlal & Co., a firm doing business at Thana, Bombay, hereinafter called the firm, entrusted 4 boxes alleged to have contained menthol crystals to the then G.LP. RaHway for carriage from Thana to Okhla near Delhi under a railway receipt bearing No. 233/27. On October II, 1949, the firm consigned 2 more such boxes to Okhla from Thana under 2 r1ilway receipts bearing Nos. 233 I 35 and 233 I 36. All the said 6 boxes were marked with the name of the said firm and were consigned to "self". The said firm endorsed the relevant railway rceipts in favour of Mo; vi Mercantile Bank Ltd .. hereinafter called the Bank, against an advance of Rs. 20,000 made by the Bank to the firm. The sa; d consignments did not reach Okhla.

The railway company offered to deliver certain parcels to the Bank, but the Bank refused to take delivery of the same on the ground that they were not the goods consigned by the firm. As the railway failed to deliver the boxes, the Bank, as the endorsee of the said railway receipts for valuable consideration, filed Civil Suit No

50 of 1950 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Devision. Thana, against the Union of India through the General Manager, Central Railway, Bombay, for the recovery of Rs. 35,500, being the value of the goods contained in the said consignments as damages. The defendant in the written-statement averred that on February I, 1950, the railway company offered to deliver all the consignments to the Bank, but the latter wrongfully refused to take delivery of the same on the ground that the consignments were not identical to the ones consigned from Thana; it put the plaintiff to strict proof of the allegation that the consignments contained menthol crystals as alleged or that the aggregate value of the said consignments was Rs. 35,500. or that the railway receipts were endorsed in favour of the plaintiff for valuable consideration.

The learned Civil Judge found as follows: (1) The boxes consigned by the firm contained menthol crystals and by the wrongful conduct of the employees of the railway administration the contents of the boxes were lost; (2) the said consignments were not offered

HORVI llANK V. UNION (Subba Rao, J.) 2li7

for delivery to the Bank, but what was offered were different consignments containing caustic soda; (3) the relevant railway receipts were endorsed by the firm in favour of the Bank for valuable consideration; and (4) the Bank, as endorsee of the railway rece.; pts, was not entitled to sue the railway company on the railway receipts for loss of the consignments. On those findings the suit filed by the Bank was dismissed with costs. The Bank preferred an appeal to the High Court against the decision of the learned Civil Judge, being First Appeal No. 375 of 1953.

The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of J. C. Shah and Gokhale, JJ. The learned Judges agreed with the learned Civil Judge on the first 3 findings; but on the 4th finding they took a different view. They held that the Bank, as endorsee of the said railway receipts, was entitled to sue for compensation for the loss suffered by it by reason of the loss of the cons'gnments, but, as pledgees of the goods, it suffered the loss only to the extent of the loss of its security. On that view, the learned Judges gave a decree to the Bank for a su~ of Rs. 20,000 advanced by it with interest and proportionate costs in both the Courts. The plaintiff as well as the defendant preferred, by certificate, cross appeals to this Court.

Learned Additional Solicitor General raised before us the following points: (I) In law the endosement of a railway receipt does not constitute a pledge; (2) an endorsement of a railway receipt for consideration constitutes at the most a pledge of the railway receipt and not the goods covered by it, and, therefore, in the present case the Bank acquired only a right to receive the goods covered by the relevant receipts from the railway; and (3) if the endorsement of the railway receipts does not constitute in law a pledge of the goods, the Bank has no right to sue for compensation, as, though the proprietary right in the goods was transferred to it, the right to sue under the contracts did not pass to it. .

The decision on the first point depends upon the scope of the legal requirements to constitute a pledge under the Indian law.

That calls for a careful scrutiny of all the relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act, the Indian Sale of Goods Act and the Transfer of Property Act. for their combined consideration yields the answer to the problem raised.

Under the Contract Act, delivery of goods by one person to another under a contract as security for payment of a debt is a pledge. Ordinarily delivery of tangible property is essential to a true pledge; but where the law recognizes that delivery of tangible symbol involves .a transfer of possession of the property symboliz.ed, such a symbolic possession takes the place of physical delivery. The short but difficult question, therefore, is whether the Indian law equates the railway receipts with the goods covered by them for the purpose of constituting delivery of goods within the meaning

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1965) 3 S.C, R.

of the Contract Act. Before the amendment of s. 178 of the Con-· A tract Act and the passing of the Sale .of Goods Act, 1930, the scope of ndway receipts vis-a-vis the goods covered by them came up for ' consideration before the Judicial Committee in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amarchand & Co., ('). The head-note of that case succinctly gives the following facts: Sellers of cotton consigned it to the buyer in Bombay, and forwarded to him receipts issued by B the railway company which had undertaken the cardage. The receipts provided that they should be given up at the destination by the consignee, and that if he did not himself attend to take delivery he must endorse on the receipt a request for delivery to whom he wished ino be made. The evidence showed that similar receipts for cotton were used in the ordinary course of business in Bombay 0 as proof of the possession and control of the goods therein referred to, or as authorising the holder to rece; ve or transfer the goods. The consignee endorsed and delivered the receipts as security for advances made specifically upon them in good faith. The sellers sought to stop the cotton in transit. The Judicial Committee held that the railway receipts were instruments of title within the meaning of the D Indian Contract Act, 1872, s.103, and that the sellers were therefore not entitled to stop the goods except upon payment or tender to the pledgees of the advances made by them. This decision lays down 3 propos; tions, namely; (i) the railway receipts in question in that case were used in the ordinary course of business in Bombay as proof of possession and control of the goods therein referred to, E or as authorising the holder to receive or transfer the goods; (ii) such railway receipts were documents of title and a valid pledge of the goods covered by the receipts could be made under the Contract Act, before it was amended in 1930, by endors; ng and delivering the same as security for advances made to the owner of the goods.

It may be noticed at this stage that under the Contract Act before F it was amended in 1930 there was no definition of the expression "documents of title", but there was one in the Indian Factors Act (XX of 1844) which, with certain modifications, made the provisions of the English Factors Act, 1842, applicable to British India.

The last mentioned Acts defined the expression "documents of title to goods" as including any bill of lading, dock-warrant, ware-house- G keeper's cert; ficate, whar-finger's certificate, warrant or order for the delivery of goods and any other document used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or authorising or purporting to authorise, either by endorsement or by delivery. the possessor of the document to transfer or reeive goods. thereby represented. Railway receipt was eo nomine not included H in the definition. But the Privy Council, on the basis of the evidence adduced in that case, brought the railway receipts under that part of the definition describing generally the documents of title to goods. It may also be noticed that the Judicial Committee, though

(') [19lC] L. R. 4a I. A. 134.

llOBVI BANK.V. UNION (Sub/Ja Jlao, J.) '.il59

its attention was called to the provisions of ss. 4 and 137 of the Transfer of Property Act, preferred to decide that case dehors the said provisions. In the Explanation to s.137 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which was introduced by the Amending Act 2 of I 900, the definition of the expression "mercantitle document" i! practically the same as that found in the Indian Factors Act noticed by the Judicial Committee in the decision cited supra, with the difference that it expressly includes therein railway receipt. Under s.4 thereof,. the Chapter and the sections of the Act shall be takem as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In 1930 Parliament in enacting the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, presumably borrowed the definition of "documents of title to goods" from the Indian Factors Act and the Engl.'sh Factors Act noticed by the Judicial Committee, but expressly included in the definition the railway receipt. This indicates the legislative intention to accept the mercantile asage found by the Judicial Committee in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amerchand & Co.('). The same definition was incorporated by reference in the Explanation to s.178 of the Contract Act as amended in the year 1930. This definition is also in accord with the definition of "mercantile document of title to goods" in the Explanation to s.137 of the Transfer of Property: Act. The Judicial Committee had another occasion to consider the question of pledge of railway receipt in Official Assignee of Madras v. Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd.('). The facts in that case were as follows: The insolvents" did a large business in groundnuts, which they purchased from the up-country growers; the nuts were then despatched by rail and arrived in Madras by one or other of the two railways, the Madras & Southern Maharatta Railway or the South Indian Railway. Under an arrangement between the said Railways and the Madras Port Trust, the consignments of nuts when received were deposited in the godowns of the. Madras Port Trust. The general course of business was for the insolvents to obtain from the railway companies in respect of each consignment or wagon load a railway receipt. The insolvnts obtained loans from the respondent-

Bank after sending to ihe said Bank the railway receipts duly endorsed in blank and also after executing a promissory note for the amount a letter of hypothecation., When the goods arrived at the port, delivery was taken from the Port Trust. against the railway receipts. At the time the insolvents were adjudicated the bags of ground-nuts in question in that case were either in transit on the railway or in the transit sheds or godowns of the Port Trust. On those facts, the main question was whether the pledge of the railway receipt was a pledge of the goods represented by them or merely a pledge of the actual documents. If there was a valid pledge before the insolvency, the Bank would be entitled to receive the amount realised by the sale of the goods; if not, the Official Assignee would be entitled to it. The Judieial C.Orrui:J.ittee, after considering

(') (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 164.

(1) (1934) L.R. 51 I.A. '16, 421.

J.(B(N)3SJl-4,

(1965] 3 S.C.R.

its earlier decision in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar's case (') and all the relevant provisions which we have noticed eadier, came to the conclusion that there was a valid pledge of the goods rpresented by the receipts. It may be noticed that this decision also turned upon the relevant provisions of the Contract Act before its amendment in 1930, though at the time the decision was made the amendment came into force. On the question whether a pledge of a document is a pledge of the g::iods as distinct from the document, the Judicial Committee observed:

"Their Lordsh:ps likewise in the present case see no reason for giving a different meaning to the term (documents of title to goods) in s.178 from that given to the tel'!lls in ss. 102 and 103; in addition a railway receipt is specifically included in the definition of mercantile document of title to goods by s. 137 of the Transfer of Propety Act, 1882, which, in virtue of s.4 of the Act, is to be taken as part of the Contract Act as being a section relating to contracts. A railway receipt is now included in the definition of documents of title to goods in s. 2, sub-1>. 4, of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930." On the construction of the expression "person" in s. 178 of the Contract Act, it was argued that the said expression took in only a mercantile agent and that the law in India was the same as in England. Rejecting that plea, the Judicial Committee remarked at p. 426 thus:

"Their Lordships did not in that case see any improbability in the Indian Legislature having taken the lead in a legal reform.

It may well have seemed that it was impossible to justify a restriction on the owner's power to pledge which was not imposed on the like powers of the mercantile agent. The same observation may well be true in regard to the words now being considered. The reasonableness of any such change in the law is well illustrated by the facts of the present case, where it was clearly intended to pledge the goods, not merely the railway receipts, and the respondents have paid i~ cash the advnces they ma?e on that footing. In these c1rcumstances, 1t would be mde.ed a hardship that they should lose their security." These pregnant observations show that there is no justification for the distinction that is being maintained in England between a pledge of a bill o! lading and ~~ pledge f d<><:Jllllets of. t!tle other than a bill of ladmg. The Jud1c1al Committee m this decJSJon clearly laid down, after noticing all the relevant provisions of th!l Contract Act, the Transfer of Property Act and the Sale of Goods Act, that railway receipts were documents of title and the goods cover-

(1)(1916) L.R. 43 l.A. 164•

ll[ORVI BANK v. UNION (Subba Rao, J.) 261

ed by thedocuments could be pledged by transferring the documents. This decision is in accord with the view expressed by us on a fair reading of the said provisions.

Even so, it is contended that by the amendment of s. 178 of the Contract Act in 1930, the Legislature has "taken away the right 'Jf an owner of goods to pledge the same by the transfer of document~ of title to the said goods. Under the old section "a person" wlto was in possession of any goods etc. might make a valid pledge of such goods, whereas under the present section "a mercantile agent'', subject to the conditions mentioned therein, is authorized to make a pledge of the goods by transferring the documents of title. Therefore, the argument proceeds, a person other than a mercar.tile agent qnnot make a valid pledge of goods by transferring the documents representing the said goods. This argument appears to be plausible and even attractive; but, if accepted, it will lead to anomalous results, It means an owner of goods cannot pledge the goods by transferring the documents of title, whereas his agent can do so. As the Privy Council pointed out it is impossible to justify a restriction on the owner's power to pledge when there is no such restriction imposed on the like powers of a mercantile agent. A carefull scrutiny of s. 178 of the Contract Act and the other relevant provision thereof indicates that the section assumes the power of an owner to pledge goods by transferring documents of title thereto and extends the power even to a mercantile agent. A pledge is delivery of goods as security for payment of a debt. If a railway receipt is a document of title to the goods covered by it, transfer of the said document for consideration effects a constructive delivery of the goods. On that assumption if we look at s. 178 of the Contract Act. the legal position is apparent. The material part of s. 178 of the Contract Act reads:

"Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of goods or the documents of title to goods, any pledge made by him, when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, shall be as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same; provided that the pawnee acts in good faith and has not at the time of the pledge notice that the pawnor has not authority to pledge."

The section emphasizes that a mercantile agent shall be in possession of documents of title with the consent of the owner thereof; if he is in such possession and pledges the goods by transferring the documents of title to the said goods, by fiction, he is deemed to have expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the .same. The condition of consent and the fiction of authorization indicate that he 1s doing what the owner could have done. So too,

~62

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

(1965] 3 S.C.R.

1. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act discloses the legislative mind.

The relevant part of the said section reads :

"Where a person, having sold goods, continues or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same!'

This sub-section shows that a person who sold the goods as well as a mercantile agent acting for him can make a valid pledge in the circumstances mentioned therein. If an owner of good~ or his mercantile agent, after the owner has sold the goods, can make a valid pledge by transferring the documents of title to the goods, it would lead to an inconsistent position if we were to hold that an owner who has not sold the goods cannot pledge the goods by transferring the documents of title. Sub-s. (2) of s. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act relevant to the present enquiry reads:

"Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods, obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the , goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof to any person receiv• ing the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in respect of the goods shall have effect as if such lien or right did not exist."

This sub-section clearly recognizes that a buyer or his mercantile agent can pledge goods by transferring the documents of title thereto: it protects a bona fide pledgee from the buyer against any • claim by the original owner based on the lien or any other right still left in him. If the owner-the purchaser becomes the ownercannot pledge the goods at all by transfer of documents of title, the protection given under sub-s. (2) of s. 30 of the Sale of Goods Act to a bona fide purchaser is unnecessary. The material part of s. 53(1) of the Sale of Goods Act reads: . "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppage in transit is not affected by any sale or other disposition of the goods which the buyer may have made, unless the seller has assented thereto:

Provided that where a document of title to goods has been issued or lawfully transferred to any person as buyer or owner of the goods, and that person transfers the document to a person who takes the., document in good faith

MORVI BANK v. UNION (Subba Rae, J.)

and for consideration, then, if such last mentioned transfer was by way of sale, the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppage in transit is defeated, and, if such last mentioned transfer was by way of pledge or other _disposition for value, the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppage in trap. sit can only be exercised subject to the rights of the transferee."

This sub-section protects a bona fide pledgee from an owner against any rights still subs'sting in his predecessor-in-interest. This assumes that the owner can pledge the goods by transfer of the relevant documents of title. The said sections embody statutory exceptions to the general rule that a person cannot confer on another a higher title than he possesses.

The argument that s. 178 of the Contract Act, as amended in 1930, restricts the scope of the earlier section and confines it only to a mercantile agent was noticed by the Judicial Committee in Official Assignee of Madras v. Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd.(') and it observed therein:

"The Indian Legislature may well have appreciated in 1872 the exigencies of business, even though in 1930 they recanted. Or perhaps they did not appreciate fully th~ effect of the actual words of the section." These observations indicate that the Judicial Committee did not express any final opinion on the construction of the amended s. 178 of the Contract Act as the question in the appeal before it related to the unamended section. Further, it did not notice the other sections referred to earlier which throw a flood of light on the true meaning of the terms of s. 178 of the Contract Act, as it now stands.

This conclusion also accords with the view expressed by Bachawat.

J., in Commissioner for the Port Trust of Calcutta v. General Trading Corporation Ltd.('),

The Indian decisions cited at the Bar do not deal with the question whether a valid pledge of goods can be effected by transfer of documents of title, such as a railway receipt, representing the goods; they were mainly concerned with the question whether an endorsee of a railway receipt for consideration could maintain an action on the basis of the contract embodied in the said receipt: see The firm of Dolatram.Dwarakdas v. The Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway Co. ('); Shah Mulji Deoji v. Union of India(') Commissioner for the Port Trust of Calcutta v. General Trading Corporation Ltd.('); and Union of India v. Taherali ('). These raise a larger question on which there is a conflict of opinion. In the view we have taken on the question of pledge, it is not necessary to express our opinion thereon in these appeals.

t') {1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 416, 423. {') A.l.R. 1964 cal. 29r.

(') (191') J, L.R. 38.Bom. 659. (') A.I.R, 1957 Nsg. 31.

(1) (1956) 58 Born. L.l\. 6!50.

~64 SUPil, EME

COURT

REPORTS

(1965] 3 S.C.R.

The law on the subject, as we conceive it, may be stated thus: An owner of goods can make a valid pledge of them by transferring the railway receipt representing the said goods. The general rulr. ' is expressed by 'the maxim nemo dat quad non habet, i.e., no one <:an convey, a better title than what he had. To this maxim, to facilitate mercantile transactions, the Indian law has grafted some ex- <:eptions. in favour bona fide pledgees by transfer of documents

Of title from persons, whether owners of goods or their mercantile :agents who do not possess the full bundle of rights of ownership :at the time the pledges are made. To confer a right to effect a valid pledge by transfer of documents of title relating to goods on owners of the goods with defects in title and mercantile agents and to deny it to the full owners thereof is to introduce an incongruity into the Act by construction. On the other hand, the real intention of the Legislature will be carried out if the said right is conceded to the -full owner of goot!ls and extended by construction to owners with .defects in title or their mercantile agents,

We are glad that, on a reasonable construction of the material provisions of the relevant Acts, we have been able to reach this conclusion. To accept the contentions of the respondents to the -contrary would be a retrograde step and would paralyse the entire mechanism of finance of. our internal trade. In this vast country where goods are carried by railway over long distances and remain

:fu transit for long periods of time, the railway receipt is regarded as a symbol of the, goods for all purposes for which a bill of lading iR so regarded in England.

The next question is whether the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the full value of the consignments amounting to Rs. 35,500 /- or, as the High Court held, only the amount of Rs. 20,000 /- with inte:est, i.e., the amount secured under the pied" ges. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of s. 180 of the Contract Act, it reads:

"If a third person wrongfully deprives the bailee of the

?S~ or possess.ion ?f th~ goods bailed, or does them any miury, the badee 1s entitled to use such remedies as the QWner might have used in the nke cae if no bailment had

been. mad~; and eit.Jier the -bailor or the bailee may bring a suit agamst a thrrd person for such deprivation or injury."

Under this section, a pledge being a bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt, the pledgee will have the same remedies aJ the owner of the goods would have against a third person for deprivation of the. said goods or injury to them. If so, it follows that the Bank, being the pledgee, can maintain the present suit for the recovery of the full value of the consignments amounting! to Rs. 35,500 /-.

MORVI BANK v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 26~

The last question is whether the Bank was the pledgee of the goods or was only the pledgee of the documents of title whereunder they could only keep the documents against payment by the consignee as contended on behalf of the Railway. The firm borrowed a sum of Rs. 20,000 /- from the Bank and executed a promissory note, Ex. 104, dated October 6, 1949, in its favour. It also endorsed the railway receipts Nos. 233/27, 233/35 and 233/36 in favour of the Bank. The Accountant of the Bank deposed that the railway receipt~ were endorsed in favour of the Bank, which had advanced the sa; d amount to the firm on the security of the said railway receipts. The evidence of this witness was not challenged in the High Court. The Bank advanced a large amount of money to the firm. The three transactions, namely the advancing of loan, the execution of the promissory note and the endorsement of the railway receipts, together form one transaction. Their combined effect is that the Bank would be in control of the goods till the debt was discharged. This is a well known practice followed by Banks.

The Judicial Committee both in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v.

S. Amerchand & Co.('), and the Official Assignee of Madras v. The Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd.(') held that such a transaction was a pledge. We, therefore, hold on the facts of this case that the firm by endorsing the railway receipts in favour of the Bank for consideration pledged the goods covered by the said receipts to the Bank. In th; s view it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether if the transaction was not a pledge of the goods, the Bank would be entitled to sue on the basis of the contract entered into between the firm and the Railway.

No other question was raised. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 474 of 1962 filed by the Bank is allowed; and Civil Appeal No. 475 of I 962 filed by the Railway is dimissed. The plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs throughout.

Ramaswami, J.

We regret we are unable to agree with the judgment pronounced by our learned brother Subba Rao J.

On October 4, 1949, Mis. Harshadrai Mohanlal & Co., (hereinafter referred to as the firm) entrusted 4 boxes containing "menthol crystal" to the then G.I.P. Railway for carriage from Thana railway station to Okhla near Delhi. On October 11, 1949, the firm consigned 2 more boxes also alleged to have contained "menthol crystal" to Okhla from Thana railway station. The Railway Receipts issued were numbered 233/27, 233/35 and 233/36. All the six boxes were consigned to "self". It is alleged that the Railway Receipts with regard to these six boxes were endored in favour of Morvi Mercantile Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff-bank) against an advance of Rs. 20,000 by the plaintiff-bank on security of the Railway Receipts. The G.l.P. Railway offered to deliver the boxes at Okhla ra; lway station but the plaintiff-bank declined to accept the same alleging that the boxes were not those ('l (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 164. -- --

(') (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 416, 423.

(1965) 3 S.C.R.

which were consigned from Thana station. The plaintiff-bank filed P, Civil Suit No. 50 of 1950 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thafla, claiming a sum of Rs. 35,000 as damages for breach of contract. The suit was contested by the defendants on the ground that identical boxes which were consigned by the firm at Thana were offered to the plaintiff-bank who declined to accept the same and the Railway Administration had nor committed ar B breach of contract and, therefore, the Union of India was not liable to pay any damages. The trial Judge held that the boxes consign- , ed by the firm contained "menthol crystals" and by the unlawful conduct of the employees of the railway administration the contents of the boxes were lost, but he took the view that the plaintiffbank, as endorsee of the railway receipts, was not entitled to sue C for compensation for loss of the consignments. In taking that view the learned Civil Judge followed a decision of ,.the Bombay High Court in Shamji Bhanji & Co. v. North Western Railway Company('). The Civil Judge accordingly dismissed the suit by a judgment and decree dated January 15, 1953. Against that decision the plaintiff-bank preferred an appeal to the Bombay High Court which D confirmed the findings of the Civil Judge that the Railway failed to deliver the boxes at Okhla and the boxes contained "menthol crystals". The High Court also held that the plaintiff-bank assignees of the railway receipt was entitled to bring a suit for damages for breach of contract against the Union of India though the damages would be limited to the loss of its security. In taking this view E the Bombay High Court relied upon its previous decision in The

Union of India v. Taherali Isaji(').

The first question for determination in this case is whether there was a valid pledge of boxes of "menthol crystals" in. favour of the plaintiff-bank by endorsement on the railway receipts by the firm.

F In English Law a pledge arises when goods are delivered by one person called the 'pledgor' to another person called the 'piedgee' to be held as security for the payment of a debt or for discharge of some other obligation upon the express or implied understanding that the subject-matter of the pledge is to be restored to the pledgor as soon as the debt or other obligation is discharged.

G It is essential for the creation of a pledge that there should be a delivery of the goods comprised therein. In other words, a pledge cannot be created except by delivery of the possession of the thing pledged, either actual or 'constructive. It involved a bailment. If the pledgor had actual goods in his physical possession, he could effect the pledge by actual delivery; but in other cases he could give pos- B session by some symbolic act, such as handing over the key of the store in which they were. If, however, the goods were in the actual physical possession of a third person, who held for the bailor so that in law his possession was that of the bailor, this pledge could be effected by a change of the character of the possession of the

(') A.LR. 1947 Romb. 169. (') (1956) 58 Ilomb. L.R. 650.

MOBVI BANK v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 267

third party, that is by an order to him from the pledgor to hold for the pledgee, the change being perfected by the third party attorning to the pledgee, thus acknowledging that he thereupon held for the latter. There was thus a change of possession and a constructive delivery; the goods in the hands of the third party came by this process constructively in the possession of the pledge. But where goods were represented by documents the transfer of the documents did not change the possession of the goods, save for one exception, unless the custodian (carrier, warehouseman or such) was notified of the transfer and agreed to hold in future as bailee for the. pledgee. The one exception was the case of bills of lading, the transfer of which by the law merchant operated as a transfer of the possess; on of, as well as the property in, the goods.

This exception has been explained on the ground that the goods being at sea the master could not 'be notified; the true explanation was perhaps that it was a rule of the law merchant, developed in order to facilitate mercantile transactions, whereas the process of pledging goods on land was regulated by the narrower rule of the common Jaw.

The position in English Law, therefore, was that in the casec of delivery of documents of title other than bills of Jading, a pied

of the documents is merely a page of the ipsa corpora of them, for the transfer of documents does not change the possession of the goods unless the custodian (carrier, warehouseman or such) was not'fied of the transfer and agreed to hold in future as bailee for the pledgee. In Inglis v. Robertson and Baxter('). It was held by thee

House of Lords that where goods are lodged in warehouses in Scotland a pledgee of the goods must, to make effective all real rights: which depend on the constructive delivery of the goods, give notice of the pledge to the warehouse-keeper. The Factors Act 1889' enacts:

"SJ. A pledge of the documents of title to goods shall be deemed to be a pledge of the goods."; and s.l : 'For the purposes of this Act' (sub-s. 5). The expression 'pledge' shall include any contract, pledging, or giving a lien or security on, goods, whether in consideration of an original advance or of any further or continuing advance or of any pecuniary liability'. Sect. 9. prescribes that the effect of delivery or transfer of the documents of title of the goods under any pledge &c., by a person who having bought the goods obtains with the consent of the seller possession of the goods or documents of title, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner." Goods were stored by G, a domiciled Englishman, in a bonded warehouse in Glasgow, transferred into the name of G as owner; and , he warehouse-keeper issued to G delivery orders showing that

(') (1898) A.C. 616.

~68

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

(1965] 3 S.C.R.

the go@ds were held to G's order 'or assigns by endorsement A hereon'. G obtained a loan from I an English merchant, and delivered to him in England a letter of hypothecation stating that he deposited a part of the goods with him in security, with power of sale, and G endorsed and handed to I the delivery warrants. I did no~ intimate or give notice of the right he had acquired to the warehouse-keeper. R. & B., claiming as peronal creditors of G, B arrested the goods in the hands of the warehouse-keeper and then raised an action against him in the Scottish Court claiming through the arrestment a preferable right thereto. It was held by the House of Lords thats. 3 of the Factors Act, 1889, was merely intended to define the full effect of the pledge of the documents of title made by a mercantile agent, and that it had no application to the case C of the pledge of the documents of title by one in the position of G, who was not a mercantile agent within the meaning of the Act; nor was G a pledgor within s. 9 of the same Act. At pages 625 to 627 Lord Watson states:

'I can see no reason to doubt that, by Scottish law as D well as English, the endorsement and handing over of delivery orders in security of a loan, along with a letter professing to hypothecate the goods themselves, is sufficient in law, and according to mercantile practice, to constitute a pledge of the documents of title, whatever may be the value and effect of the right so constituted. In my opinion, E the right so created, whether in England or in Scotland, will give the pledgee a rlght to retain the ipsa corpora of the documents of title until his advance is repaid. The crucial question in this case is whether the tight goes farther, and vests in the pledgee of the documents, not a jus ad rem merely, but a real interest in the goods to which F these documents relates .

• • • • It was not disputed by the appellant's counsel, and it is hardly necessary to repeat, that by the common law of Scotland the indorsation and hypothecation of delivery orders, although it may give the pledgee a right to retain the documents, does not give him any real right in the goods which they represent. He can only attain to that right by presenting the delivery orders to the custodier by whom they were granted, and obtaining delivery of the goods from him, or by making such intimation of his right to the custodier as will make it the legal duty of the latter to hold the goods for him. His right, which in so far as it relates .to the goods is in the nature of jus ad rem, will be defeated if, before he has either obtained delivery or given such intimation, the goods are validly attached in the hands of the custodier .by a creditor of the person for .Whom the custodler holds them."

MORVI BA,.'!K v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 269

The principle is reiterated by the House of Lords in Dublin City Distiltery Ltd. v. Doherty(') in which the plaintiff advanced moneys to a distillery company on the security of manufactured whisky of the company stored in a ware-house. Neither the company nor the excise officer could obtain access to the warehouse without the assistance of the other, and the whisky could only be delivered out on presentation to the excise officer of a special form of warrant supplied by the Crown. On the occasion of each advance the company entered the name of the plaintiff in pencil in their stock-book opposite the particulars of the whisky intended to be pledged and delivered to the plaintiff (1) an ordinary trade invoice and (2) a document called a warrant, which described the particu\ars of the whisky and stated that it was deliverable to the plaintiff or his assigns. It was held by the House of Lords that the plaintiff was not entitled to a valid pledge on the whisky comprised in the warrants. At pages 843 and 847 of the Report Lord Atkinson states the law on the point as follows:

"As to the second question, it was not disputed that, according to the law of England, and indeed of Scotland. a contract to pledge a specific chattel, even though money be advanced on the faith of it, is not in itself sufficient to pass any special property in the chattel to the pledgee.

Delivery is, in addition, absolutely necessary to complete the pledge; but of course it is enough if the delivery be constructive, .or symbolical, as it is called, instead of actual.

The example of constructive delivery frequently given is the delivery of the key of the store or house in which the goods have, been placed; but that is because, in the words of Lord Hardwicke, 'it is the way of coming at the possession, or to make use of the thing', Ward v. Turner

(1751) 2 Yes. Sen. 431 at P. 443).

* * * * The giving by the owner of goods of a delivery order to the warehouseman does not, unless some positive act be done under it, operate as a constructive delivery of the goods to which it relates: McEwan v. Smith (1849) 2

H.L.C. 309). And the delivery of a warrant such as those delivered to the respondent in the present case is, in the ordinary case, according to Parke B., no more than an acknowledgment by the warehouseman that the goods are deliverable to the person named therein or to any one he may appoint. The warehouseman holds the goods as the agent of the owner until he has attorned in some way to this person. and agreed to hold the goods for him; then, and not till then, does the warehouseman become a bailee for the latter; and then, and not till then, is there a constructive delivery of the goods. The delivery and

( 1/ (191') A.O. 823.

270 8Ul'REM:E COUR'r REPORW

[1965] 3 S.C.R.

receipt o~ the warrant does not per se amount to a delivery and receipt of the goods: Farina v. Home (16 M. & W. 119); Bentall v. Burn ( (1824) 3 B.&C. 423)." In our opinion, the position in Indian Law is not different.

Section 1.72 of the Contract Act which defines a 'pledge' affirms the Eng1'sh Common Law. Sect10n 172 states that "the bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt or performance of a promise" is called a "pledge". The bailor -is in this case called the "pawnor" and the bailee is called the "pawnee". According to s. 148 of the Contract Act "a bailment is the delivery of goods by one .person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them. The person delivering the goods is called the 'bailor'. The person to whom they are delivered is called the 'bailee'. Section 149 states that the delivery to the bailee may be made by doing anything which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the intended bailee or of any person .tuthorised to hold them on his behalf. Reference should also be made to s. 178 of the Contract Act, as it stood before the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930.

The original s. 178 states:

"A person who is in possession of any goods, or of any b; ll of lading, dock-warrant, warehouse-keeper's certificate wharfinger's certificate, or warrant or order for delivery, or any other document of title to goods, may make a valid pledge of such goods or document,;: Provided that the pawnee acts in good faith and under circumstances which are not such as to raise a reasonable presumption that the pawnor is .acting impropc:_;:

Provided also that such goods or documents have not been obtained from the lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody of them, by means of an offence or fraud." By the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930 the section was repealed and the subject-matter of that section is now spread over the present ss. 178 and l 78A of the Contract Act and s. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. The new section 178 of the Contract Act states:

"Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, .in possession of goods or the documents of'title to goods, any pledge made by him, when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, shall be as valid as if he were expressly authorfr,, d by the owner of the goods to make the same; provided that the pawnee acts in good faith and has not at the time of the pledge notice that the pawnor ilas no authority to pledge;

Explanation-fn this section the expressions 'mercantile agent' and 'documents of title' shaII have the meanings assigned to them in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930."

l!ORVI BANK v. UNION (Rumaswami, J.) 271

Section 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act provides as follows:

"30(1) Where a person, having sold goods, continues or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof to any person receiving the same in good faith and without 110tice of the previous sale shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the•same.

(2) Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy

oods, obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods, the rlelivery or transfer by that person or . by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, plec; lge or other disposition thereof to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in respect of the goods shaJJ have effect as if such lien or right did not exist." Section l 78A of the Contract Act states:

"l 78A. When the pawnor has obtained possession of the goods pledged by him under a contract voidable under section 19 or section 19A. but the contract has not been rescinded at the time of the pledge. the pawnee acquires a good title to the goods, provided he acts in good faith and without notice of the pawnor's defect of title." After the passing of the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930 the legal position with regard to the pledge of railway receipts is exactly the same in Indian Jaw as it is in English Jaw and consequently the owner of the goods cannot, pledge the goods represented by the railway receipts in the present case unless the railway authorities are notified of the transfer and they agree to hold the goods as bailee for the pledgee.

On behalf of the appellants Mr. Bhatt placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Official Assignee of Madras v. Mercantile Bank c, f India, Limited(') in which it was held that a railway receipt, providing that delivery of the consigned goods is to be made upon the receipt being given up by the consignee or by a person whom he names by endorsement thereon, is a document of title within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, (s. 178 for which a new section was substituted by the amending Act IV of 1930), and a pledge of a railway receipt operated under the repealed section as a pledge of the goods. But this decision is not of much assistance to the appellants, because it was concerned with the interpretation and legal effect of s. 178 of the Contract Act as it stood before the Indian Contract (Amending)

(') (1934) 61 I.A. ~16.

\!72

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 965J 3 s.c.R.

A:t (ending Act IV of 1930). It was held by the Judicial Com

m!!tee 1il that case that under the repealed s. 178 the owner of the goeds could obtain a loan on security of a pledge of the goods by the pledge of the documents of title. But it is significant to note that s. 178 has been amended by the Amending Act, 1930 and. under the present section tatutory power to pledge goods or documents of title is expressly confined to mercantile agents while acting in the customary course of the business. There are two other instances in which a person other than the owner of the goods may make a valid pledge of the goods and these two instances are dealt with in s. l 78A of the Contract Act and s. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. The result, therefore, under the amended law is that a valid pledge can no longer be made by every person "in possession" of goods. It can only be made by a mercantile agent as provided in the new s. 178 of the Contract Act or by a person who has obtained possession of the goods under a contract voidable under s. 19 or s. 19A of the Contract Act as provided in ~. l 78A, or by a seller or by a buyer in possession of goods after sale as provided in s. 30 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. Learned Counsel for the appellants also referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amerchand & Co.(') in which the Judicial Committee explained the legal effect of ~. 103 of the Contract Act, as it originally stood. It was held by Lord Parker that the railway receipts are instruments of title within the meaning of the Indian Contract Ad, 1872, s. 103, and that the sellers were therefore not entitled to stop the goods in transit except upon payment or tender to the pledgees of the advances made by them. It is manifest that the decision cannot afford assistance to the appellants, because, in the first place, it related to the construction of old s. 103 of the Contract Act in regard to the right of stoppage of goods in transit, and, in the second place, there has been a significant change in the law in view of the legislative amendment of s. 178 of the Contract Act by the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930.

In the present case, therefore, our concluded opinion is that there is no valid pledge of the consignments of menthol crystals represented by the railway receipts in favour of the plaintiff-bank and the finding of the High Court on this point is erroneous in law We shall next deal with the question whetlter the plaintiff can sue on the contract of bailment even though there is no valid pledge of the goods in favour of the plaintiff. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiff-bank was the endorsee of railway receipts and, therefore, it was entitled to sue the defendants for compensation for the loss of .the goods. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. At Common law a bill of lading was not negotiable like a bill of exchange so as to enable the endorsec . to maintain an action upon it in his own name, the effect of the

(') (1914) ~3 I.A. 164.

MORVI BANK v. 1.iNION (Ramaswami, J.) 273

of the endorsement being only to transfer the property in the goods but not the contract itself. It was observed by Alderson. B. in Thompson v. Dominy (') as follows:

"This is another instance of the confusion, as Lord Ellenborough in Waring v. Cox expresses it, which 'has arisen from similitudinous reasoning upon this subject'.

Because, in Lickbarrow v. Mason, a bill of lading was held to be negotiable, it has been contnded that that instrument possesses all the properties of a bill of exchange; but it would lead to absurdity to carry the doctr, ine to that length. The word 'negotiable' was not used in the sense in which it is used as applicable to a bill of exchange, but as passing the property in the goods only."

Delivery orders, warrants, written engagements to cfeliver goods and similar documents are in the same position as the bills of lading were before jhe Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vic.

c. 111). They are mere promises by the seller, being the issuer or transferor, to deliver, or authorise the buyer to receive possession. It is only by reason of the enactment of the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 08 & 19 Vic. c. 111) that the issue or transfer of a bill of lading operates as a delivery to the buyer of the goods shipped, and the consignee of the bill of lading is entitled to sue upon the contract contained in the same. The same provisions are contained in the Bills of Lading Act (Act IX) of 1856 in India. It is true that the railway rece; pt and all other documents enumerated in s. 2, sub-s. (4), Sale of Goods Act, are assimilated to bills of lading for the purposes of the right of stoppage in transit under s. 103, Contract Act and a pledge under s. 178, Contract Act as explained by the Judicial Committee in Ramdas Vitha/das v. S. Amerchand & Co.(') and Official assignee of Madras v. Mercantile Bank of India('). But the effecl of these decisions is not to assimilate the railway receipt to a b; ll of lading for all purposes whatsoever. The legal position ot the railway receipt is the same as it was in English law and that position is not affected at all by the enactment of s. 2, sub. s. (4) ot the Sale of Goods Act, or the enactment of proisions analogous to ss. 103 and 178 of the Contract Act. As stated in Halsbury'&

Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 29, at p. 143, Art. 179:

"Such documents, although they may purport to be, or may commonly be treated as, transferable, are not negotiable instruments, unless there be a trade usage to that effect. Accordingly, subject to the provisions of the Factors Act 1889, the owner cannot claim delivery of the goods except from the seller who is the issuer or immediate transferor of the document." It is manifest that there are no rights created merely by reason of the endorsement of a Railway Receipt between the endorsee and

(') 153 E.R. fi32.

(') (1916) J,.R. 43 I.A. 164.

(1) (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. U6, 413.

.the railway company which has issued. the railway receipt to he consignee, the only remedy of the endorsee being against the endorser. This was the position in English law, except in the case of bills of lading the transfer of which by the Law Merchant operated as a transfer af the possession of as well as the property in the goods as observed by Lord Wright in Official Assignee of Madras

v. Mercantile Bank of India, Limited('} at page 422. The endorsee may bring an action as an assignee of the contract of carriage but then the assignment has to be proved as in every other case. It is

true that by reason of s. 137 of the Transfer of Property Act, the provisions relating to the transfer of an actionable claim do not .apply to a railway receipt, and the assignment need not be accord- .ing to any particular form, but a railway receipt is not like a negotiable instrument (See Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd.('). It is also apparent that subject to the exceptions mentioned in ss. 30 and 53 of the Indian. Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and s. 178 of the Contract Act, 1872, its possessor cannot give a better title to the goods than he has. The negotiation of the railway receipt may pass the property in the goods, but it does not transfer the contract contained in the receipt or the statutory contract under s. 74-E of the Indian Railways Act. Negotiability is a creature of statute or mercantile usage, not of judicial decisions apart from either. So, in the absence ,. f any usage of trade er any statutory provision to that effect, a railway receipt cannot be accorded the benefits which flow from negotiability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, so as to entitle the endorsee as the holder for the time being of the document of title to sue the carrier-the railway authorities---,-in his own name. If the claim of the plaintiff is as an ordinary assignee of the contract of carriage, then the plaintiff has to prove the assignment in his favour. In the present case the plaintiff-bank has furnished no such proof of assignment in its favour. In view of cl. (3) of the notice printed at tne back of the railway receipt it is clear that an endorsement made on the face of the railway receipt by the consignee is meant to indicate the person to whom the consignee wishes delivery of the goods to be made if he himself doe5 not attend to take delivery. An endorsement made by the consignee on the face of the railway receipt requesting the railway company to deliver the goods to the endorsee merely conveys to the railway company that the person in whose favour the endorsement is made by the consignee is constituted by him a person to. whom he wishes that delivery of the goods should be made on his behalf. Clause (3) of the notice printed at the back of the railway receipt states:

"That the railway receipt given by the railway company for the articles delivered for conveyance, must be given up at destination by the consignee to the railway company, otherwse the railway may refuse to deliver and that the signature of the consignee or his agent in the delivery

(') (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 416.

,(1) (1937) 65 I.A. 75.

KORVI BANK v. UNll)N (Ramcswami, J.) 275

book at destination shall be evidence of complete delivery.

If the consignee does not himself attend to take delivery he must endorse on the receipt a request for delivery to the person to whom he wishes it made, and if the receipt is not produced, the delivery of the goods may, at the discretion of the railway company, be withheld until the person entitled in its op in on to receive them has given an indemnity to the satisfaction of the railway company." In the present case the plaintiff has not proved by proper evidence an assignment of the contract of carriage. In our opinion, the law on the point has been correctly stated by Bhagwati, J. in Shamji Bhanji & Co. v. North Western Rly. Co.('). It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff has no right to bring the present suit against the Union of India.

Counsel for appellant has referred to the practice of merchants in treating a railway receipt as a symbol of goods and in making pledge of goods by pledge of railway receipts, but no such practice or custom has been alleged or proved on behalf of the plaintiff in the present case. In the absence of such allegation or proof it is not open to the Court to take any judicial notice of any such practice. Counsel for appellant also referred to possible inconven 'ence and hardship to merchants if such a practice is not judicially recognised, but the argument from inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure.

In Suttps v. Briggs('). Lord Birkenhead stated:

"The consequences of this view of s. 2 of the Gaming Act, 1835 will no doubt be extremely inconvenient to many persons. But this is not a matter proper to influence the House unless in a doubtful case affording foothold for balanced speculation as to the probable intention of the legislature." In the present case the language of s. 178 of the Contract Act is clear and explicit and if any hardship and inconvenience is felt it is for Parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the law and not for the courts to legislate under the guise of interpretation.

For the reasons expressed, we hold that Civil Appeal 474 of 1962 brought by the plaintiff-bank should be dismissed and Civil Appeal 475 of 1962 brought by the Union of Ind; a through the General Manager, Central Railway should be allowed with costs and the suit of the plaintiff-bank should be dismissed with costs throughout.

ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the majority Judgment Civil Appeal 474 of 1962 is allowed and Civil Appeal 475'of 1962 is dismissed, and the olaint'ff's suit is decreed with costs throughout.

(') A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 169.

I~ [192'!] I.A.C. I.

L/B)N)3SCI-5

THE MORVI MERCANTILE BANK LTD. AND ANR

K. SUBBA RAO

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.

R. MUDHOLKAR

R. S. BACHAWAT

V. RAMASWAMI, JJ

Indian Contract Act

s. 178

ss. 4 and 137

Indian Sale of Goods Act

Bombay

Delhi

Subba Rao

Raghubar Dayal

Bachawat

s. 178

Contract Act, 1872

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

ss. 30 and 53

Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930

s. 172

s. 180

(1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 164

(1934) L. R. 61 I. A. 416

Mudholkar

Ramaswami

s. 178

s. 19

s. 19A

s. 178

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

Sale of Goods Act

s. 178

s. 74E

Railways Act

Negotiable Instruments Act

s. 178

Parliament

J. C. Bhatt

B. R. Agarwala

H. K. Puri

Niren De

N. D. Karkhanis

B.R.G.K. Achar

R. N. Sachthey

SUBBA RAO

DAYAL

BACHAWAT

MUDHOLKAR

RAMASWAMI

Sobba Rao

October 4. 1949

Harshadrai Mohanlal & Co.

October II, 1949

Okhla

Thana

Union of India

February I, 1950

Bombay High Court

J. C. Shah

Gokhale

Indian Contract Act

Sale of Goods Act

Transfer of Property Act

s. 178

Goods Act, 1930

Indian Contract Act, 1872

English Factors Act, 1842

British India

llOBVI BANK.V. UNION

Ja Jlao

ss. 4 and 137

Transfer of Property Act

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Madras

Madras & Southern Maharatta Railway

South Indian Railway

Madras Port Trust

(1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 164

Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar

ss. 102 and 103

s. 137

Transfer of Propety Act, 1882

s. 2

Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930

s. 178

India

England

Transfer of Property Act

Sale of Goods Act

s. 178

s. 178

s. 178

s. 178

(1965] 3 S.C.R.

1

Sale of Goods Act

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

s. 53(1)

Sale of Goods Act

Subba Rae

s. 178

s. 178

s. 178

L.R. 61 I.A. 416

s. 180

October 6, 1949

October 4, 1949

Mis. Harshadrai Mohanlal & Co.

October 11, 1949

Morvi Mercantile Bank Ltd.

G.l.P. Railway

(1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 164

(1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 416

Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thafla

January 15, 1953

Scotland

Factors Act 1889

s. 5

Glasgow

Factors Act, 1889

s. 9

Watson

Atkinson

Hardwicke

Parke B.

Section 1

s. 148

Section 149

s. 178

s. 178

ss. 178

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

section 178

Rumaswami

Section 30

Sale of Goods Act

section 19

section 19A

Bhatt

Indian Contract Act, 1872

s. 178

s. 178

s. 178

s. 178

Amending Act, 1930

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

s. 178

s. 19

s. 19A

s. 30

Sale of Goods Act

Parker

s. 103

s. 103

s. 178

Alderson. B.

Ellenborough

Bills of Lading Act, 1855

s. 2

Sale of Goods Act

s. 103

s. 178

s. 2

Sale of Goods Act

ss. 103 and 178

Art. 179

Factors Act 1889

Wright

s. 137

Transfer of Property Act

ss. 30 and 53

Sale of Goods Act, 1930

s. 178

Contract Act, 1872

s. 74

Railways Act

Negotiable Instruments Act

(1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 416

Bhagwati

Union of India

Birkenhead

s. 2

Gaming Act, 1835

s. 178

Union of Ind


GOPISETTI VENKATARATNAM AND OTHERS A v.

THE VIJAYAWADA MUNICIPALITY AND OTHERS

March 5, 1965

[K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.J Indian _Electricity Act, 1910 (At 9 of 1910), ss. 21 (2)-Agreement betu:een Li'censee an~ Co!lS'U; mers-Supply of energy at "current official scale of rates' -Meaning of-Enhancement of rate-Sanction of State Government, if necessary.

The Government of Madras issued a licence to the respondent- Municipality, under s.3(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, for the supply of ele.ctric energy within its municipal limits at rates not exceeding the maximum charges given in the licence. The appellants, some consumers of the electric energy, entered into agreements with the Municipality for the supply and agreed to pay the "current official scale of rates". The rates were increased by resolutions of the Municipality twice and on the second occasion the appellants filed a representative suit for a declaration that the later resolution was illegal, and for an injunction restraining the Municipality from collecting charges at the new rates. The trial court dismissed the suit and the dismissal was confirmed on ppeal by the High Court. In appeal by special leave the appellants contended that (i) the rates agreed between the consumers and the Municipality could not be unilaterally altered and increased by the Municipality to the prejudice of the consumers and, therefore, the impugned resolution was invalid and unenforceable; and (ii) as the impugned resolution was passed without obtaining the previous sanction of the State Gov- ernment under s.'21 (2)-' of the Act, it was void.

HELD: (i) The consumers were under a contractual liability to pay the enhanced rates covered by the impugned resolution.

Under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act the Municipality cannot discriminate tetween consumers in the matter of rates chargeable for the energy supplied. Unless the Municipality enters into agreement with the consumer. enabling it to charge him at a rate fixed from time to time, it would be difficult for the Municipality to maintain equality of treatment between the consumers. Tkat difficulty can be avoided if there is a term in the agreement executed by every consumer that he will pay the official rate fixed by the Municipality from time to time subject to the maximum fixed by the licence. Further, a public body in supplying electric energy to different consumeTs cannot run the risk of incurring loss by agreeing to fixed rates, for the Government may increase the licence fee as had been done in the instant case, or there may be a rise in the cost of distribution. [280 A-DJ Therefore, having regard to the entire document and the surrounding circumstances, the words "current official scale of rates" n the agreement mean the official scale of rates current or prevalent from time to time during the currency of the agreement. [281 CJ

(ii) No sanction of the State Government was necessary for enhancing the rates.

There was no alteration of any condition of the agreement within the meaning of s. 21(2) of the Act. The consumers had agreed to pay the rates that would be fixed from time to time, and if that term was a condition within the meaning of that section, there was no change at all in that condition, for the change in the rates was not in derogation of the condition but in terms of it. [282 A-Bl

A CIVIL APPELLATE JuRiSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 10, 1961, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 872 of 1958.

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K.

B Chaudhuri, for the appellants.

S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, and T. Satyanarayana, for respondent No. I.

T.V.R. Tatachari and B.R.G.K. Achar, for respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sobba Rao, J. On November 22, 1927, the Government of Madras, in exercise of its powers under s. 3(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 1910), here'nafter called the Act, issued a licence to the Bezwada (now Vijayawada) Municipal Council for the supply of electric energy within the municipal limits of Bezwada at rates not exceeding the maximum charges given in the third annexure to the said licence. The appellants, who are some of the consumers of electric energy for domestic and industrial purposes, entered into agreements with the licensee for the supply of electric energy to them for domestic, industrial and other purposes, agreeing to pay the current official scale of rates. On December 13, 1940, the Municipality passed a resolution bringing into force new rates for the supply of electric energy from April 1, 1940. The consumers paid the rates so fixed till the year 1956. On April 30, 1956, the Municipal Council passed another resolution enhancing the rates fro'Il 1-4-1956. The appellants filed a representative suit against the Vijayawada Municipality in the Court of the District Munsif, Vijayawada, for a declaration that the sa.id resolution dated April 30, 1956, passed by the Municipal Council was illegal, invalid and unenforceable and for an injunction restraining the said Mun'cipality from collecting charges from the consumers of electric energy in the licensee's area at the new revised rates in , pursuance of the l, m.pugned resolution. The learned District Munsif held that the demand of enhanced rate was legal and valid and dismissed the su; t. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the levy from the date of the said resolution was good, but it could not be given retrospective operatioq. He further held that the claim for duty at half an anna per unit was invalid. In the result he modified the decree of the District Munsif. On a further appeal, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Comt confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. By special leave the present appeal has been filed in this Court.

Mr. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the appellants raised before us the following two cuntentions: (1) The rates

reed upon between the cnsumers and the Muniipaliy cannot be unilaterally altered and mcreased by the Mumc1pahty to the prejudice of the consumers and, therefore, the said. resolution qatec1

April 30, 1956, was invalid and unenforceable; and (2) as the said resolution was passed without obtaining the previous sanction of the State Government under s. 21(2) of the Act, it was void for that reason also.

The first contention turns upon the relevant clauses of the agreement entered into between the Municipal Council and the consumers. Ex. B-4 is one such agreement dated May 27, 1932, between the Municipality and one of the appellants herein. The material clauses of the agreement read:

Para, IV. The consumer shall pay to the licensee for all electrical energy so supplied at the rates and in accordance with the terms, given in the l; censee's Current Official Scale of rates and the signing of this Agreement is held to imply. con, currence in the terms of the said . Scales of rates.

Provided that the minimum rates as specified therein shall be paid irrespective of whether energy to the extent has been consumed or not.

Para, V. A consumer under this Agreement is required to state (see Schedule) under which of the rates set out in the licensee's Official Scale of energy Rates, he desires to be charged.

Para, X. This Agreement shall be read and construed as subject in all respects to the provisions of the Bezwada Municipal Electric Licence, 1927, and to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act 1910, and of any modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force thereunder so far as the same respectively may be applicable. The supply of electrical energy under this agree ment is subject to following among other provisions of law, namely: - • • • • The schedule above referred to.

(2) Purposes to which the supply is to be given, and in the

case of domestic supply under which rate to be charg- G ed, as referred to in paragraph V:

(a) (Supply) Domestic Purposes.

(b) (Rate) Rs. 0-6-0 per ,µnit.

(3) Maximum electrical power required by the consumer:

0--54 K.W.

(4) Minimum monthly charge: Rs. 2-8-0 in accordance with (a) class rate in the Schedule of Rates.

The Schedule of Rates mentioned in this agreement presumably refers to scale of rates fixed by the resolution of the Municipality.

The conflicting arguments centre on the question whether the words "current official scale of rates" in para. IV relate to the scale of rates current on the date when the agreement was enred into

VENKATARATNAM v. MUNICIPALITY (Subba Jlao, J.) 179

or refer to the scale of rates current from time to time in accordance with the resolution passed by the Municipality. The expres sion "current" means "vogue or prevalent": and "current rate" may mean the rate obtaining at a particular time or at a future time or from time to time. The term goes well with the present, future and recurrent. It is capable of different meanings depending upon !he context or setting in which it appears. As the meaning of the word is ambiguous, it is legitimate, iJ1 order to ascertain its true mean; ng, not only to study the document as a whole but also to ascertain its meaning from the circumstances whereunder the said agreement came into existence. Under para. X of the agreement the said agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the licence and the provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1940, that is to say the said provisions are incorporated by reference into this agreement. Under the licence the licensee is precluded from charging rates higher than those prescribed thereunder. On April 1, 1940, the Electricity Department of the Vijayawada Municipality prepared a document styled as "Conditions and Rates of Supply". It does not contain any statutory rules, but only administrative directions in regard to providing, inter alia. for the method of entering into agreements and for charging rates for the energy supplied. This embodies the administrative practice of the Municipality in the matter of charging rates for the energy supplied. Paragraph 15 thereof, under the heading "Method of charging for current''. reads:

"The price and method of charging for current supplied shall be such as may from time to time be fixed by the licensee in accordance with the prov; sions of the Act and of his licence, or such as may be made subject of special agreement between the consumers and the licensee."

This makes a distinction between the official rate and the contrac tual rate. The official rate is that fixed by the licersee from time to time and the contractual rate is that fixed by special agreement between the parties. It may be assumed that th's dual method is followed by the Municipality in the matter of entering into agree ments. The form of application prescribed for the supply of electric energy contains the following clause:

"I agree to pay for the said energy, service connection and other dues including the deposit of such security as may be demanded in accordance w'th the scale of rates and the rules of the licence." The scale of rates in the context 1!1eans the official .scae o~ rate~

that may be fixed by the Municipality. When an apphcatl?n 1s filed an obligation is imposed under s.22 ?f the At on th~ licensee to supply energy, except in so far as 1s otherwise provided by the terms and condit'ons of the licence, on the s.ame erms. as . th?Se on which any other person in the same area 1s en!Itled m sllllilar

circumstances to corresponding supply. Section 23 of the Act says that a licensee shall not, in making any agreement for the supply of

e!lergy, show undue preference to any person. The combined operat10n of these prov1s10ns 1s that the licensee cannot discriminate between the applicants in the matter, among others, of rates chargeable for the energy supplied. Unless the Municipality enters into an agreement with a consumer enabling it tq charge him at a rate fixed by it from time to time, it would be very difficult for the Municipality to maintain equality of treatment between the consumers in the matter of rates. To illustrate, if under certain agreement a rate obtaining at a particular date is agreed upon and the tate is binding on the Mun'cipality even if it is raised later on, the

Municipality may be guilty of discrimination which it is asked to avoid by statute if it charges other consumers at a higher rate. This difficulty can be avo'ded if there is a term in the agreement executed by every consumer that he wi.11 pay the official rate fixed by the Municipality from time to time subject to the maximum fixed by the licence. That apart, a public body like the Municipality in supplying energy to different consumers cannot run the risk of incurring loss by agreeing to fixed rates, for the Government may increase the licence fee, as it has done in the present case, or there may be a rise in the cost of distribution. On the other hand, if the term in the agreement is flexible to meet the said eventualities, the maintenance of continuous supply of electric energy may be assured without any loss to the public body. The circumstances obtaining at the time when the agreements between the consumers and the Municipality were entered into were these: The licensee had power to fix the rates subject to the maximum prescribed by the Government. The administrative' directions provided for charging for the current supplied at rates that may be fixed from time to time. The Municipality was in practice fixing the rates from time to time having regard to the relevant circumstances. The said rates fixed by the Municipality from time to time were the "Official Scale of Rates". The consumers applied to the Municipality for supply of energy, agreeing to pay for the energy supplied at the scale of rates fixed by the Municipality.

With this background if we look at paragraphs IV and V of Ex.B-4 the meaning of the expression "current official scale of rates" will be clear. Paragraph IV speaks of "current official scale of rates" whereas para. V mentions "official scale of energy rates". These two paragraphs bring out the distinction between the official scale of rates and the official scale of energy rates: the former refers to the scale of rates maintained by the Municipality as modified from time to t'me by appropriate resolutions, and the latter refers to the different rates payable in respect of energy supplied for different purposes. Under para. IV the consumer specifically agreed to abide by the official scale of rates. If the intention of the parties is tha.t the consumer shall pay only the scale of energy rates obtaining at the time the agreement is entered into, there is no necessity for this

specific agreemeent, for para. V serves that purpose. On the other hand, the said express condition and the use of the word "current" make it clear that the consumer agrees to pay at the official scale

of rates current from time to time. The adjective "current" will become a surplusage, if the intention is to pay the rates obtaining at the time the agreement is entered into, for the agreement itself gives the ex; sting rates. The use of the adjective "current" emphasizes the fact that the official scale of rates is not the existing rates, but the scale of rates current from time to time. We have, therefore, on a reasonable construction of the ambiguous expression "current" having regard to the entire document" and the surrounding circumstances, come to the conclusion that the words "current official scale of rates" in para. IV of the agreement mean the official scale of rates current or prevalent from time to time during the currency of the agreement. If so, it follows that the appellants were under a contractual liability to pay the enhanced rates covered by the impugned resolution.

The next question turns upon s. 21(2) of the Act, which, as it then stood read:

"Subject to the provisions of sub-section (!), a licensee may, with the previous sanction of the State Government given after consulting the local authority, make conditions not inconsistent with this Act or with his licence or with any rules made under this Act, to regulate his relations with persons who are or intend to become consumers, and may with the like sanction given after the like consultation add to or alter or amend any such cond'tions; and any conditions made by a licensee without such sanction shall be null and void."

Under this sub-section the licensee cannot make conditions to regulate his relations with the consumers or amend any such conditions without the sanction of the State Government. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri argued that to enhance the rates was to alter a condition within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of s. 21 of the Act and as admittedly the sanction of the State Government was not obtained before such alteration, the said resolution was void. The learned Solicitor General contended that s. 21 (2) of the Act was a general provision relating to conditions, whereas s. 23 thereof was a specific provision in regard to fixing of rates and that s. 23 would, therefore, prevail over s. 21 and that s. 23 did not prescribe the sanction of the Government as a condition precedent for fixing the rates, Mr. Tatachari, while supporting this argument, added that on the interpretation of para. IV of the agreement suggested by the respondents there was no alteration in the conditions at all and, therefore, there was no scope for invoking s. 21 of the Act It is not necessary to express our opin'on in this case on the qestion whether s .. 23 xcludes the operation of s. 21(2) of the Ac_t m the matter of fixation f.rates, for we are satisfied that there 1s no alteration of any cond1Uon of

the agreement within the meaning of s. 21(2) thereof. We have held that under para. IV of the agreement that was enteroo into bel\".een

the consumers and the licensee, the consumers agreed to pay the rates that were fixed by the Mun; cipality from time to time. If the said term was a condition within the meaning of s. 21(2) of the Act, there was no change at all in that condition, for the change.in the rates was not in derogation of the condition but in terms of _it. To state it differently, the same condition embod'ed in para: IV of the agreement continued to operate between the parties even after the rates were enhanced under the impugned resolution. Therefore, no sanction of the State Government was necessary for enhancing the rates.

No other point was raised before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with one set of costs.

' Appeal dismissed.

GOPISETTI VENKATARATNAM AND OTHERS

THE VIJAYAWADA MUNICIPALITY AND OTHERS

March 5, 1965

K. SUBBA RAo, J.

C. SHAH

R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ

Electricity Act, 1910

ss. 21

Government of Madras

Indian Electricity Act, 1910

ss. 22 and 23

s. 21(2)

October 10, 1961

Andhra Pradesh High Court

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri

K. Rajendra Chaudhuri

K.

B Chaudhuri

S. V. Gupte

T. Satyanarayana

T.V.R. Tatachari

B.R.G.K. Achar

Sobba Rao

November 22, 1927

s. 3(1)

Indian Electricity Act, 1910

Bezwada

December 13, 1940

April 1, 1940

April 30, 1956

Vijayawada Municipality

Andhra Pradesh High Comt

A.V. Viswanatha Sastri

s. 21(2)

May 27, 1932

Para

Indian Electricity Act 1910

Indian Electricity Act, 1940

Section 23

s. 21(2)

Viswanatha Sastri

s. 21

s. 21

s. 23

s. 23

s. 21

s. 23

Tatachari

s. 21

s. 21(2)

s. 21(2)

s. 21(2)