3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 875

have been smuggled. The story subsequently men•

tioned by the appellant about his journey to Tata- , nagar which has been disbelieved brings into bold belief the purpose which the appellant had in mind in travelling without a ticket. After-all, when we are dealing with a question as to whether the belief in the mind of the officer who effected the seizure was reasonable or not, we are not sitting in appeal over the decision of the said officer.

All that we can consider is whether there is ground which prima facie justifies the said reasonable belief. That being so, we do not think there is any substance in the argument that the seizure was effected without a reasonable belief and so is outside section l 78A.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed' with costs. ·

Appeal di8missed.

MOHAMMADBHAI KHUDABUX CHHIPA

AND ANOTHER

1!.

THE STATE OF. GU, TARAT AND ANOTHER

(And connected. petitions)

(P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.

WANCHoo, K. C. DAS GuPI'A and N. RA.TA-

GOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)

Agricu.lturaf Produc'! ]Jfarkets-Market committees-Levy of fees-Notijication-Validzt1;-A clas8 and B class traderslicences-Discrimination-Ruz; s. declared invalid-S1tbsequent

amendments to ena_ctment-Validzty of rules-Doctrine of eclipse . -Saurashtra .Agicultural Produce Maikets (Gujarat Amendment and Va~1dating Provisions) Ordinance, 1961 (1of1961)- Bombay Agricultural Produce Market.s Ar; t, 7939 (Bam, 22 of

.793.'J),_ a.~ am, ended, 8s.5A, 11, 2.<J.B, rr. 58, Ct/, 65; G6, fJ7- Constitutwn of India, Art.,.u, (.11)(1), 2G5,

Consequent on the decision in Gula.m Mohammad v, The Jtate ~!Bombay, (1962] 2 S.C.R. 659, by 'l'hich rr. 53, 65, 611

Pukhraj .

y, D. R; Kohli

Qajendtagadkar J

March 15.

JI oh""'1!14d6ha; Irhud•bwt Ohhipa

Tht Stott of Gujorol

876 SUPREME COURT REPORT5 [1982] SUPP.

and 67, famed under the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, were held to he ultra. 11irr.s the provisions of ss. 6A and 11 of the Act, the State nf Gnjarat amended r.5'.l by a notification dated June 23, 1%1, and also promulgated an Ordinance on June 26, 1901, by which amendments were made in certain sections of the Act and a ne\v s 29 B was inserted in the Act \'aJidating certain acts or things <lone prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance.

The petitioners, some of v.rhom \Vf!re \vholcsale dealers and the re.::t retail dralr.rs, filed petitions under Art. 32 of thr. Constit11tion of India for certain reliefs on the ground, (I) that the notifica tion dated June 23, 1961, was discriminatory and thus offended Art. 14 because under it a rnarkct r.on1mittec could Jcvy fee.s on agricultnral produce by different modes, (2) that s. 29-Jl was insufficient to validate the defects noticed in the earlier decision of the Supreme Court inasmuch a'i the rclevcnt provisions of the Act and the Rules \Yerc not retrospectively amended, (3) that undr.r the bye-laws .\class traders '''ere charged much higher fees than n class traders an<l, further, B class traders , .. ere allo\ved to sell to consumers any, ... hcre in the market area ,, hercas 1\ class trader~ wrre not

so al1ov.ed, and this amonntecl to dic; crimination, (4) that the main provisions of tho Act had been amende<l by the Ordinancr. and, therforc, the basis on ,,•hich the Suprr.mc Court upheld the Act no lon!(er existed, (o) that rr. 65, 6G and fi7 which had been declared to be ultra vin• had neither been rcframcd no validated hy the Ordinance and, therefore, it \.\.ac;; not open to the market committr.e to issue licences 1111dt; r those rules, and (6) thats. 29-ll was had in so far as it prevented refund of her.nee fees collrcted before the Ordinance camr.

into force in view of Art.31 (I) of the Constitution.

Held, that: (I) the notification dated .June 23, 1961, by itself could not Uc said to .Ue discriminatory because imposi. tion of the f('C,; WiLS made only lJy the bye-Ja.vs framed by the market committee under the power conferred on it by s. 11 subject to thr. maxima prescribed in the notification; if a bycla\Y prescrihcd rates of fees in two modes in such a \\'ay as to result in discrirnination then such a bycla\Y ,, ould have to be struck down.

(2) the fact that un<ler r.5'.{ the rnarket com1nittr.e might levy fees by one metho<l on one agricuhural produce and liy another method on another agricultural produce, \\'Ould not be a grouud of discrin1ination 1 beca11se each co1nn1odity must be treated as a class by itself.

(3) s. 29-ll was sufficient to cure the defects pointed out

~!1 the earlier judgrnent of the Supreme Court and to validate

ii s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS

~ 877

the actions taken and the things done before the promulga• tion of the Ordinance dated June 26, 1961.

( 4) the1e was a basis for classification of traders into A class and B class, and the restrictions placed Ly the Act, llules and Bye-laws were reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public.

(5) the purpose of the licence granted to B Class traders was to permit them to buy in the market yard and thus control their activity in connection with whole-sale trade, and not to control retail dealers. Consequently, the market committees

were acting within their powers under Act.

( 6) though s.5A had been amended, the said section read with the Rules did not involve any radical departure from

the scheme of the Act as it was before the amendment. ·

(7) rr. 65 and 67, which were valid when they were originally framed but became bad on the insertion of 5A in the Act in 1953, became valid again after the amendment of the section by the ordinance, by the application of the doctrine of eclipse.

Dhikaji NarBin Dhakr<UJ v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,

(1955) 2 S. C.R. 589 and Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ( 1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R.8. applied.

(8) s. 29-B having validated the levy and collection of licence fees, Art. 31 (l) was not applicable to the case, since fees were included within the taxing power of the legislature which had also power to legislate retrospectively. ....,.__, M. 1'. V. Sundararamier J, Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, (1958) S.C.R. 1422, relied on.

OmGINAL JuRISDIC'.l'ION : Petitions Nos. 226 tu 229 and 233 of 1961.

Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

A. S. R. Chari, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. 0. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in Petns.

Nos. 226 to 229 of 61).

l. N. Shroff, for tu.i petitioners (in Petn.

No. 233 of 61).

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, N. S. Bindra and

1962 .

M ohammadllhai K/1udcbux Chhipa •• The State •/Gtdoral

WGZ

MDhmnmadbhai Khudobux Chliipa

Th< Siok of Oujaral

Wonthoo J ·

878 SUPRE:ME COtJHT REPORTs tl962] SUPP.

R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. I (in all the petitions.)

1962. :\larch 15.

The Judgment of the Court was deli vercd by

WANCHOO, .T.-- These fl ve pt, titions umfor Art. 32 of tbe constitution, which am connected and will be dealt with together, raise questions a.A to the constitutionality of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, Bombay Act No.XXII of 1939,

(hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended . by the Bombay and SauraBhtra Agricultural Produce Markets (Gujarat amendment and validating Provisions) Ordinance, No. I of l!l61 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), arid the Rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder. They are a sequal to the judgment of this Court in Gulam Moliamined

v. The State of Bombay ('), which was delivered on May 2, 1961. One of petitioners before us in these petitions was also a party in that petition, which was with respect to a market estabJished in Ahmedabad. In that petition the challenge to the constitutionality of the main provisions of the Act failed but the provisions of certain Rules, namely rr. 53, 65, 66 and 67 wore held to.be ultra. vires

the provisions of s. 11 and s. 5A of the Act. In consequence, a direction was issued prohibiting tho respondents in that petition from enforcing the provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-laws agaill!!t

the petit-ioners in that petition till a market was established in law for that area under s.5AA and from levying any fe,, under e. 11 till the maximum wru; prescribed under the Rulce.

Consequent on that decision, the State of Gujarat amended r. 53 by notification dated June 23, 1961.

Further the Ordinance wae promulgated on J unc 26, 1961, Ly which certain amendments were made in certain sections of the a.ct and a news. 2!!-13 was inserted in the Act validating certain acts or things done prior 'to the promulgation of the

(I) [11162] 2 S.C.R. 6511,

ordinance. The present petitions were filed there after.

Four of tho petitions (namely, Nos. 226 to

229) are with respect to Abmedabad while the fifth petition (No. 233) is with respect to Nadiad.

Two of the petitioners of Ahmedahad are wholesale dealers while the other two claim to be retail dealers. 1'he contentions on behalf of the Ahmedabad petitioners are that the notification amended r. 53, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and is therefore bad. It is further contended that though s. 5AA has been amended, the amendment is prospective ; therefore the infirmity noticed in the earlier judgment of this Court still remains .and s. 29-B whioh has been inserted in the Act is insufficient to validate what had been done before the Ordinance came into force. It is further contended that the bye-law under which the market committee issues licences to A Class and B class dealers isdiscriminatory and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on trade and business and is therefore bii.d.

Lastly it is contended that the market committee insists on issuing licences for retail trade and this it. cannot do for control of retail trade is not within the provisions of the Act as held by this Court in the earlier judgment, and further in consequence the market committee is using r. 64 in a manner in which it was not intended to be used and therefore that rule though it was upheld in the earlier judgment should be declared ultra vires.

The majority of the petitioners in the Nadiad case are wholesale dealers but a few of them claim to be retail de&lers.

These petitioners further challenge the constitutionality of the Act after its amendment by the Ordinance, and their contention is that the Ordinance makes radical changes in the main provisions of the Act and the basis on which these main provisions .were upheld by this Court

J.1 ohamrn•dbhai Khudabu:c Chhipa

The Stole ofGujora

Wanchoo J.

JI ohammadhhai Kh11dalmx Chhipa

The Stal< ojGujarot

Wanclioo I.

earlier, no longer applies, and therefore the Act as it now stands after the amendment is violative of the, fundamental right to carry on trarle and business guaranteed under Art. I U( I )(g) of the constit.ution as the restrictions placed by it on the said right are unreasonable. Further it is contended that rr. 65, 66 and 67 were struck down by th is Court in the earlier judgment as beyond the power conferred on the State under s. 26 of the Act.

These rules therefore cannot be htold to be a part of the Rules in force now and in consequence it was

not open to the markot committee to Act as pro vided in these Ru leM.

Lastly it is urged on behalf of one of the petitioners that he had paid licencefoe 'to the market, committe and was entitled to a refund of that after the earlier judgment of this Court; but s. 29-B newly inserted in the Act which in effect deprives this petitioner of getting lefund is invalid and illegal as it is against the provisions of Art. 31( I) .. Some other points have also been raised by tho Na.diad petitioners ; but as they arc not pressed, we shall not refer to them.

The petitions have been opposed on behalf of the State and it has traversed a.II the points raised on behalf of the petitioners. It is not necessary to set out the grounds on which it is urged on behalf of the rcspondcntB that the contentions of the petitioners have no force.

These grounds will appear when we deal with t.he contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners one by one.

Nor do we think it uccessary to set out the provious history as to the establishment of the market in Ahmeda.bad

118 that will be found in the earlier judgment ; nor is it necessary to set out the previous history as to the establishment of the market in Jl\adiad, for it is not in dispute that that history is similar to the history in the case of the Ahmedabad market.

We shall therefore proceed to indicate the points which alone have been prnssed on behalf of the petitioners and then consider them one by one.

I..

' 3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS 881

Some of the points are, not common; but as they have been raised in one petition or the other and these petitions have been dealt with together 3nd the decision on any point will effect even other petitions in which it has not been raised, we shall proceed on the basis that all the points have .been raised in all the petitions particularly as the learned counsel appearing in the various petitions adopted the arguments of one another during the hearing.

The points therefore which call for decision are as below- ( I) Is the notification dated June 23, 1961 fixing the maximum fee to be charged hit by Art.14 of the Constitution ?

( 2) Does the insertion of s. 29-B in the Act suffice to validate acts or things done before the promulgation of the Ordinance?

(3) Are the by-laws by which the market committee issues licences to A class and B class dealers discriminatory and thus offend Art. 14-, and do they amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade and business under Art. 19(l}(g)? ·

(4) Is the market committee acting beyond its power under the Act in requiring retail dealers to take out licences and is r. 64 bad on account of the manner. in which it is being enforced by the market committee?

(5) Are the main provisions. of the Act after its amendment by the Ordinance liable to be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade and business under Art. 19( l )(g)?

(6) 'Vas it necessary to re-frame rr. 65,66 •\ and 67 under power conferred on the State Government under s. 26; if so, what is thA effect of its not having been done?

Mohammadhh(li Khudabux Chhipa ...

The State of Gujarat

W onchoo J,

Moha1nm1d; hai ICA.e.bux Chhipa •. .

he Staie of Gujara&

w ""'hoo J.

8s2 SUPREME OOURT REPoRTs (1962] SUPP.

(7) Is s. 21!-ll bad in view of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution insofar as it prevents refuud of Jiooncefee collected before the Ordinance ca.mo into force?

Re (1).

' The notification is iu these terms:-

" So. Ai'!U/061J/i!Oi07-E-In the exercise of the powers conferred by section 26 of the Bombay Agricultural Prm111cc .Jiarket Act, ID39 {Boru. XXII of l!Ji!9J, the Government of Gujarat hereby amends the Bombay Agricultural l:'roductJ .Jlarkct ltulcs 19·11 as follows namtJ!y:-

"ln the said rules in ruic 5:!, for sub-rule (I) ex co pt in w:plaruition thereto tho following shall be su bstitutcd, namely:-

( I) "fbe Market Committee shall levy and collect fees on agricultural produce bought and sold m the market area at such rates as may be specified in the by-Jaws, subject to the following maximums, namoly:- ( 1) Rate when levied according to cart Joad shall not exceed 40 naya paise per ca.rt load. (2) Rate when levied ad vuwrem shall not exceed 40 naya paise per Hs. 100.

(3) Rate when. levied according to weight shall not exceed. -

(l} per quintal 15 naya pa.ise

{ 2) per Bengali Maund 5 naya pa.ise

(4) Rate when levied .acording to. he number of containers contammg the agr1cultural produce shall not exceed,

(a) per bale of cotton 40 naya. paise

(b) per gunny bag or 5 naya pa1se any other container,

(5) Rate when levied in respect of cattle, sheep and goat shall and exceed per animal Rs.2.' By order.and in the name of Governor of Gujarat."

The contention on behalf of• the petitioners is that the notification is discriminatory in two ways: in the first place; because it allowll foes to be collected - by different modes, i.e., by cart load, by value, by weight and by containers. It is urged that it Is open to the market committee to levy fees on certain agricultural produce by (say) cart load and on certain other agricultural produce by (say) weight; and this is very likely to result in disorimina ti on.

In the second p.lace, it is urged that the notification gives power to the committee to Jevy fees on the same commodity by even two of the methods men tioned therein. For example, it is urged that the same commodity, say, potatoes may be charged under the notification by the market committee both by weight and by cart . load depending upon whether they are brought into the market area in a oart, or for example, in a basket. It is said that there is nothing in the rule which prevents the market committee from doing so, and this may result in discrimination.

We may however point out that the notification by itself does not impose any fee on any commodity. What it does is to carry out the terms of s. 11 which require the maxima to be prescribed subject to which the market committee can levy fees on Agricultural produce. The imposition of the fees still remains to be made by the market committee under the power conferred on it by s. 11 subject to the maxima prescribed in the notification and therefqre the notification by itself cannot be

ea id to be IU&orimin&tory. ·

- M ohammadbhai Khud®u• Chhipo

The Stall of Gujara

1Vanchoo J.

]tf ohemmadbhai Khudabu:c Chhipa

Tlir. Stoic ojGujorol

WancAoo J.

884 SUPREME COUitT REPORTS [l962j SUPP.

Let us, however, examine the two contentions raised on behalf of tho petitioners on the basis that though the notification may not actun lly impose fees on any commodity, it still allows discrimination to be practised by the market <'Ommittee, when it proceeds under s. 11 to levy fees within tho maxima preserihed by the notification. Taking the first contention, it may ho that by using one method in the caso of one agriculural produce and another method in the case of another agricultural produce, there may be some differenoo in tho incidence of the fees charged, if one wern to judge that incidence on the ha.sis of only one of the modes prescribed in the notification. But th1Lt in our opinion cannot be said to result in discrimination for each

produc<' must for this purpose be treated to be a. class by itself. Therefore, so long as the market committee uses one method of levying fee with

respect to one kind of agricultural produce, it cannot be said that it is discriminating if it uses another method for levying fee on another kind of Agricultural produce. It is well known even in svstems of taxation that taxes arc levied with diff.

ecnt incidence dependi11g upon the nature of the article taxed, and a fee levied und!'r s. I I is only . the exercise of the power of taxation using that word in its widc3t sense. Therefore, the fact that und<>r this rule, the markot committee may levy fees by one method on one agricultural produce and by another method on another agricultural produce will not ho a ground of discrimination, for each commodity must bo treated as a class by itself.

Turning now to the second contention, it is true that there is nothing in the rule expressly to

prevent the market committee from using two of the modos prescribed therein for the purpose of levying fees on thv s1me agricultural produce. It must be rcmem bercd however that the rule is a. gt•neral provision for levying fees within the

maxima prescribed on the.agricultural produce by market committees in the market areas all over the State. Various methods of levying fees have been included in the rule, for we assume that the rule making authority kriew that there wore various ways in which things are brought into various market areas. The rule is meant to apply to .all situations that may arise in tho State and there . m; i.y be different ways in which things may be brought to the market areas in difforent parts of

he State. That is why the rule has a wide sweep and allows the market committee to levy fees either by cart load, or by value, or by weight or by containers. It may be that if for the same agricultural producii fees are levied subject to the maxima two different modes, the rates fixed may result in discrimination. It would however not be improin r to assume that in framing the bye-laws in whioh pee rates for any particular agricultural produce .thll be fixed the market committee shall pay due

wigard to the prohibition against discrimination rentained in Art. 14 of the Constitution. The praccocal consequence of this is likely to be that for one tigricultural produce the market committee will fix ane rate only in one of the four modes: If that is oone no discrimination can be said to arise. It will dot also in our opinion be unreasonable to think nhat in issuing the notificathn the Government tproceeded on the assumption that for any particular agricultural produce one mode of fixing feeswhether according to cart load or according to value or according to weight or according to the number of containers-will be adopted. Nor would it be difficult if the rate is fixed in one of the modes, say according to cart load, to calculate the fees to be levied where the produce is brought in aey other manner, say in baskets, for then the proportional fee can bo charged on each basket on the basis of so many basket-fuls being equal to QIJ.e ca.rt loa.q.

Siilarl~ wqere t4e b, Ye-lii.w fie~

Mohamm odbhai KhudabU< Chbipo

•• The Stat' of Guj•rat

Wanchoo J.

MoMmtnodbhoi Kllld.tux Chhipa .. 1hf: Stal1 of Gujarat

W1nchon J,

886 SUPREMECOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

the fees according to containers and a dealer brings the produce in cart load, it will be possible to calculate the fco due on the basis of containers, by calculating how many containers would be equal to one cart load.

Where the fee is fixed by weight or value there w<1uld he no difliculty in any case.

Therefore one may reasonably conclude that the market committee when acting under s. l l read with the notification will levy the fees on a single commodity in one only of the permitted modes. If that happens in actual practice there will be no question of any discrimination.

But assume that a market committee chooses to adopt two modes for levying fees on tho same agricultural produce, sny one according to cart load and another according to weight, In such a case a question may arise whether there is discrimination in the incidence of fees. That question may have to be considered if and when it arises and whether discrimination actually arises in such a case will depend upon the rates fixed by the market committee for levying of foes on the same agricultural produce in the two modes that it might choose. If the rates are RO fixed that the incidence is substantially the same whether the fees arc !•vied on the basiR of cart load or on the basis of weight, there will be no discrimination. On the other hand if the rates are so fixer! that the incidence works out substantially differently there will bo a case of discrimination and in such a ease it is the bye law that will have to il<l struck down as being discriminatory for the act.ual imposition of fees will be made by tho bye-law fra.mecl hy the committee and not by the impugnod notification. Tho chances howevor of fixing two modes for the levy of fees even on the same agricultural produce in such a way as to result in discrimination are in our opini on so remote that the notification cannot be struck clown on that account as discriminator>'. In sqc!J

a case it is not the notification which will have to be struck down but the actual bye-law if it prescribes rates of fees in two modes in such a way as to result in discrimination.

Turning now to the facts of the present case we find that the bye-laws framed by the market committees have fixed only one mode of levying fees in these cages for one kind of produce. It is not the petitioners' case that the market committees with which we are concerned in the present cases have used more than one mode for levying fees on the same agricultural produce. There is therefore no case for discrimination made out on the basis of the actual bye-laws which have been framed by the market committees under the power conferred on them under s.ll read with the notifi cation. Iu these circumstances, the attack on the notiffoation on the ground of discrimination must fail.

Re. (2).

Sub-section ( 1) of s.29'.B provides that in the case of a market area declared before the commencement of the Ordinance, a market for such market - area shall be deemed always to have been established for the purposes of the Act. with effect from the date on which a market yard for such market area was declared for the first time under the R.u!es or the Act and such market shall include and shall be deemed always to have inc>luded the said market yard. By this provision the defect that was pointed out in the .earlier judgm\)nt with respect to the establishment of a market is intended to be validated. The sub -section further provides that any action taken or anything done by a market committee or any other authority after the establishment of a market therein as aforesaid but before the commencement of tbe Ordinance, which but for the provisions of this clause would have been

ivalid, shall be and shall be deemed alwa, YS to

M Dhammadbhai Khudabwr Chhipa

•• '/he State ofQujaral

Wanchoo J.

19GZ

."11hommadhhai Khudahux Chl, ip•

- v.

Th, Stott of GujGral

Jf ON(ht>O J •

have been valid ann shall not bo called in question

merely on the ground that no market w11s established for such market arna when uch action was taken or thing done. 8uh-scction (:!) then provides that any fees leviocl and r:nlle0td on agricultural

produc~ hought :ind sold in 11 market area before the commencementof the Ordinance by a market committee at the rates spc.cificd in its bye-laws shall be deemed to have been validly levied and collectod and such levy and collection shidl not ho called in question merely on the ground that at the time of such levy and collection no maxima were prescribed as required by s. l I. The intention of this provision is to cure the defoct which was noticed in the earlier judgment inll.Smuch as no maxima hd been prescribed under s.11 by the State Government.

Sub-seotion (3) finally provides that all licences issued to operate in a market area or any part thereof and fees charged therefor before the commencement of the Ordinance hy a market committee under the Hules and bye-laws and any action taken or thing done relating to li"ensing of personR, or obtaining of a licence, to operate in the market area or any part thereof, taken or done hy a market

committc" or any other authority or p1raon nndor the Hules and bye-laws before t.ho commencement of the Ordinance hall be• and 11hall be deemed always to have been \-alid and the validity thereof shall not be called in question merely on th~ ground that when such action wa11 taken or thing done, the power rio-ht or obligation therefor was not duly conferred

o; imposed by the Act on such market committee, authority or person.

This provision is intended to cure the defect arising from rr.(i!i and fi7 being declare<! 1dtm vire.s by thio Court in its earlier judgment.

The contention on hohalf of the petitionerR is that these provisions are iJlsutTiciont to validate

the defects which were noticed in the earlier judgment of this Court itrnsmnch as the relevant provisions of tho Act and the Rules have not been retrospectively amended. We sc no force in this argument, for the provisions as they stand certainly validate the defects pointed out in the earlier judgment of this Court. It is true that the relevant sections and the Rules have not been retrospectively amended by the Ordinance, but this in our opinion was unnecessary. Retrospective amendmant may be necessary when it is desired to change the law; but it seems that so far as s.11 is concern. ea, the legislature did not intend that the control of the State Government over levy of fees should be done awity with for the future also. Therefore, all that was necessary in that respect was to validate t):te past actions and this is specifically provided for by snb-ss.(2) and (3) of s.29-B. As for the establishment of market committees, an amendment has been made in s.5.AA of the Act deleting the provision by which a market could be established.only if so required by the State GovPrnment. This amendment is prospective. It could have been made retroepective also and in that case sub-s. ( 1) of s.29-B may not havo been necessary.

The legislature, however, adopted the method of amending s.5-AA prospectively and .making a separate provision for validating the establishment of markets in sub-s. (1) of s.211-B.

We see no reason why it should be held that the validation made by sub-s.(l) is not sufficient because the legislature has adopted one method rather tha, n the other for carrying out its purpose. We are therefore of opinion that s.29-B is sufficient to cure the defects pointed out in the earlier judgment of the Court and to validate actions taken and things done before the promulgation of the Ordinance '.vhich would otherwise have been invalid in view of the earlier judgment of this Court.

The contention on this head must ii.Jso be rejected. · ·.

196~

Mohammadbhai Khudabux Chh;; pa

The State of G1yarat

Wanchoo J.

196t

M,,._modbhai 1171""4!ia Chippa

•• TM Blatt of Guj4rat

W onchoo J.

Re. (3).

Gnder the bye-laws as they now stand two classes of traders are mentioned. namely A class traders and B class traders.

A class traders are those who hold licences to buy and/or sell agricultural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard, and tho liconce-fee which they have to piiy per year is Rs. 75. B olass traders are those who have licences to buy agricultural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard and to sell in retail to consumers anywhere in tho market area. They have been divided into three classes, namely, (a) shop-keepers, (b) /, ari holders, and (cl Toplawala (hawkers), with a licence-fee of Rs. 12, Its. 6 and Rs. 3 respectively.

It is urged that th, is amounts to discrilllination between A class an<l B class traders inasmuch as A class traders are chari; e<l much higher fees than the B class traders. It is however clear that there is a basis for clruisification between the two classes of traders. A class traders are those who can both buy and sell agricultural produce in the market yard while B class traders can only buy iii the markc•t yard but cannot sell there. It is submitted on behalf of the Sui.tc Government that H class traders arc those perHons \yho generally sell in retail to consumers after buying wholesale in t.he market yard from A class traders or producers. The reason why B class traders have been permitted to buy in the market yard is to allow for competition, as otherwise there woulcl have been a monrpoly of the few A class traders who operate in a particular market yard. This classification in our opinion is reasonable. A cla0s traders are wholesale traders who are permitted both to buy an<l sell in the market yar<l and arc thus charged a higher licence-fee.

R class traders are ordinary rotailers who in order to carry on their retail tmcln are permitted to buy in the 'market yarcl but they are

ot permitteq to sell there. They are small traders

and are therefore charged lower licence fees. It appears to us that in order to avoid the monopoly of A class traders, who are a few in number, with the result that prices might be depressed by such traders, B class traders are permitted only to buy in the market yard on payment of a small licence fee in.order that the producer who brings his produce in the market yard may have a fair price. We see no reason therefore to hold that there is any discrimination in creating the two classes of traders, for there is a fair basis of .classification of traders into A class and B class.

Nor can this restriction be deemed to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade and business, for such regulation is obviously envisaged by the Act in order to carry out its purposes and this Court has already held in the earlier judgment that the Act is a valid piece of legislation. It is unnecessary to repeat the reason given in the earlier judgment, where it was held that the restrictions placed by the Act, Rules and Bye-laws framed thereunder are reas.., nable restrictions in the interest of general public.

It is however urged that B olass traders are allowed to sell to consumers anywhere in the market area whereas A class traders ar.e not so allowed.

It has already been held in the earlier judgment that retail trade iH not controlled under the Act . . Therefore, the fact that the bye-law has added the

words "to sell in retail to consumers anywhere in • the market area" in the case of B class traders is of no consequence, for B class trader8, ns they are retailers, would be entitled in any case, without being controlled under the Act, to sell to consumers anywhere they like. It is not the addition of these words which gives that right to B class traders, for that right of theirs is not controlled by the Act and they would be entitled to exercise it without the addition of these words, which we consider ns surplusage in tJie circumstances .. As for A class traders

196S

Mohammad61lai Khutlabux Cliliipa

Tht St.te of Gujarat

Wanehaa J.

Mohommadbhai KAudabwr ChiPP• •..

Tht Stal• of Guj•lfol

WanchoO J.

they are admittedly wholesalers and there is no queAtio11 of their selling in retail. We aro therefore of opinion that tho addition of the words mentioned above wit.h respect to B class trader• iH a more ur plusago and makeR no difference to tho basis of classification. There is no forco therefore in the contention under thi8 head and it must be rejected.

Re. ( 4) . . It is next urged .that the market committee is attempting to control retail dealt1rs and requires them also to takn out' licences, and thiH it is not authorised to do, as this Court has already held in the earlier judgment that retail trade is not within the ambit of the Act.

This argument is based on the use of the words "to sell in retail to consumers anywhere in the market area" in connection with B class traders. It is said that in this way the market. committee i.'l controlling ret'lil trade also under the Act which it 011.nnot do. We are of opinion that this cont{lntion )11\s no force. 13 class traders are required to take out licencrs in order to buy agricultural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard.

The licence in our opinion is not. meant to permit thorn to carry on retail sale anywhere in the market area.

AA we h1tve said already these wordR are a mere surplnsage and the r<ial purpose of the

liccncP grankd to 13 class tradcrR is to prrmit them to buy in t.hc market vard and thus control their activity in connection with. wholesale trade.

It. iR urgf'd, 'however, that no provision haR bcon made under s.2(ix a) of the Act to define the limit of

retail sale under any bye-law.

It is true that no Bpccific provision for that purpose has been made but whP-n the limit of 10 lbs. is fixed below which no transaction can take place in the market yard it is some indication of what is tho limit of retail s; ile.

In any case the bye laws which provide for A class and 13 class traders, indicat<> the limit below which t)1ey cannot trade in the market yard and this c)Qarly

:s.c.:R.

SUPREME CoURT REPORTS 8!i3

shows that the intention of the market committee

was not to control retail trade by the issue of licence to traders for the large proportion of retail trade may well be below 10 lbs. for each transaction. We cannot therefore accept the contention of the petitioners that thti bye-laws by providing for A class and B class traders are really providing for control of retail trade. It is clear that B class traders can only buy in the market yard but cannot sell there and as for sale, they will be entitled to sdl in retail wherever they like, for the Act does not control retail trade.

As for r. 64, it inerely provides for incidental powers ; n connection with the regulation of market yards and it has already been held valid in the earlier judgment. We see no reason to hold that that rule is invalid on the ground that the market committee is using that rule to control retail trade. We have already pointed out that the market committee cannot be said to control retail trade by providing for A and B class licences and there is no question therefore of r. 64 being used in a manner not intended thereunder.

Lastly, it seems that there is some dispute by some petitioners in Petitions Nos. 228 and 229 as to whether they hold certain shops in the market yard from the municipal committee or must be deemed to hold them from the market committee and what rights the market committee has over those petitioners in that connection. It appears that there have been suits in courts with respect to that dispute. That is a matter which in our opinion has to be decided by the courts where the suits are said to be pending and cannot be the subject of adjudication in a petition under Art. 32. In any case r. 64 cannot be declared bad because of any dispute between the mnrket committee, the municipal committee and stall holders as to their respective rights

196Z

M ohammadbhai Khudabux Chhipa

The State of Guja,0 1

WanchooJ.

Mo"4mmdbhai Kludobtu CllMH•

•• Th4 State of <lujorat

W-.looJ,

8114 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

over the stalls in the market yard. There is therefore no force in this contention either and it must be rejected.

Re. (5).

The main coutention under this head ii that the main provisicns of tho Act havt' been so amended by the Ordinance that the ha.sis on which this Court upheld the provisions as constitutional no longer exists and therefore the Act as it now stands aftRr its amendment by the Ordinance is an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade>.

This cont<ntion requires a .consideration of the provisions of the Act as they stand after tho amendment by the Ordinance nnd it will have to be seen whether there has been any radiral rfoparture from the scheme of the Act as it was before the amenrlment. If there has been no radica, l departure after

the amendment and the control envisaged by the Act as amended is still the same, as it was before the amendment, the basis on which tho earlier judgment of this Court upheld the main provisions of the Act would still apply, and the Act as amended would ho constitutional. Let us therefore see if there has been any radical departure from the main provisions of the Act as they stood before the amendment. The Act still deals with the regulation of purchase and sale of agricultural produce and establishment of markets for such produce. Section 3 stands unamended and provideR for the eonstitu-. tion of market areas and market committees and gives power to the Commissioner by notification to declare his intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce and in such area a.s m1Ly be specified in the notification. Section 4( I) is also unamended and gives power to tho Commiesioner after holding such inquiry as may be necessary and eonsirlering the objections and suggestions if any made after the notification under s. 3 to declare

. 3 s.d.R.

SuPREME COUBT REPORTS s95

a particular area as a market area for the purposes of the Act.

There has been some amendment in s: 4(2) but it is not of a radical character and does not make any difference to the main provisions of the Act. Section 4-A has also been amended by providing for declaration of a market proper and consequential changes necessary due to such provision.

This amendment only brings into the Act what was formerly in r. 51.

This amendment also therefore makes no radical change in the Act. Section 5-AA has also been amended and the, provision which made it necessary for the State Government to require a market committee to establish a marke thas been deleted. Section 5-AA as it now stands makes it the duty of the market committee to enforce the provisions of the Act etc. and when a market is established thereunder to provide for such facilities in the market as tho State Government may from time to time direct in connection with the purchase and sale of agricultural produce with which it is concerned.

The change in s. 5-AA therefore is also of an incid, ental character and does not in any way affect the scheme of the Act as it was before the amendment. Section 5A has also been amended and it now reads as follows:-

"Where a market is established under section 4A, the market committee may issue licences in accordance with the rules to traders, commission agents, brokers, weighmen,

measurer~, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market area or any part thereof." .

The main argument of the petitioners is based on thi~ amendment. It is urged that under the unamended Act after a market was established the market com mittee had to issue licences for operation in the market so that the business of sale and purcha, se of agricultural produce was concentrated in the market which consisted of a principal market. yard and

111J2

ftl ohammedbhai Khudabux Chhipa

•• The Stall of {}ujaraf

WanchaaJ.

ilt u hammufflhoi Khud .bux Cl1hipa

The Slot! o/Gujnrat

IV am/Joo J,

896 SUPREl'lfE COURT REPORTS fl962) SUPP.

0·1~ )'." mrJre 811\J-markct yards with the con- Sllquent a<lva.ntage to the. agricultural producer

that they had a place or places where they could find a large number of buyers for their produce and could thus secure fair prices under regulated conditions.

Now, however, it is urged that under s. 5A it is open to the market committee, after tho market is established under s. 4A to give licences to traders and othor to operate in the market area or any part thereof with the result that it would not be necessary to have a principal market yard or sub-market yR.rds.

Tber" would be some for"e in this argument if we were to ignorn tho rules fmmud under the Act.

Ilut the rules which were framed by the State Government are still the same. Huie 51 provides for the declaration of market yards and market proper by the State Government.

Rule 60 provides that all agricultural produce brought into the market shall pass through the principal market yard or sub-market yards and Rhall not subject to the provisions of Rub-r.(2), be sold a.t any place outside such yards. The only exception to this is sub-r.(2), which providcA that proceed agricultural produce may be sold either in the principal market yard, or sub-market yard, or in the market proper, or in the market area in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws.

The reason for this distinction is clear, for where produce is to be processed, as for example, ginned cotton, it bas to be taken to a ginning factory in which case it would be most inconvenient to bring the produce to the market yard for sale and that may also add to the

price by further transport charges. Heading s. 5A therefor!" a.long with the Rules, it is clear that the present provisions are materially the same as tho agricultural produce (except that which is processed) shall have to 1mss through the principal market yard or suh-Jllarket yards and be sold there.

Tho only difference that the amendment has mad0

is that whereas formerly under s. 5A traders could only operate in the market by virtue of the pro-·

visions o( the Act, now they will oprate in the market by virtue of the provisions of the Act read with the Rules. The rules, however, are still the same and therefore in effect t, he provisions of the Act and the Rules read together still provide for the same kind of regulation which was intended under the unamended Act. It is urged that it will be open in the future for the. market committee to do away with the necessity of having market yards and sub-market yards and concentrating wholesale trade only in market yards and submarket yards in view of the provisions in the amended s.5A, for the market committee would be entitled to issue licences in accordance with the Rules in case they are changed to traders etc. to trade in the market area or any part thereof ..

It will be seen however that the power to change the Rules is not in the ma<ket committee and until the Rules are changed the position as it was under the unamended Act would remain the same.

We have no reason to suppose that the State Government intends to change the Rules as they are now and to permit the market committee to grant licences under s. 5A for trade anywhere in the market indiscriminately. It is true that such a possibility can arise . if the State Government changes the Rules as t]Jey exist at present. But there is no reason to suppose that such a change is in tended. So long therefore as the Rules stand as they are, there is no radical departure from the scheme of the Act as it was before its amendment and the reasons which impelled this Court t.o uphold the Act and the Rules framed thereunder would still hold good. If and when the Rules are so changed as to make a radical departure from the present position, a question may well arise whether the scheme of control envisaged under the

/Y62

M ohammad61rai Khudabux Chhipo

The State of Oujatal

Wonchoo J,

}JohGmmadblloi Kliulabux Chliipa

Tiu Slolt of ojorol

ll'411choo J.

Act has failed in its purpose. It may then be nece- . esary to <l<'cidc whether the Act and the ru !es

framed thereuuder are urwonstitutional; hut so long as the rules st.ind aR they arc, we have to read s.5A along wit.h the Hules, for licences are issued under that section in accordauce with the Rules, and readings. 5A and tbe present Rules together it must be held that there has been no radical drparture from the scheme of the act ail it was before the amendment and therefore the reaRcms which impelled this court to uphold the Act, Rules and bye-laws framed under it in the earlier judgment still stand.

Hesi<l<~ this main argument certain subsidiary contentions am also urged on hch11lf of the petitioners to challenge the co11stiWtionality of thci act, and the Rules framed thereunder on the ground that it was an unreasonable restrict.ion on the funda.mentnl right to carry on trade or business. It is urged that a trade1: who has busineHs all over the St.ate may have to take 80 or morn licences to trade in tlift'crent market area.; and that will mean a heavy burdon on b_im resulting in increase in price of agricultural produce. This in our opinion is a theoretical con sitleration and in any case if a tr; tder is so big as to carry on trade in all the 80 or more market areas establishetl in the State we see no reason why he should not take licence in each market area.

He will be in a position to bear the burden and it need not necessarily affect tho price of agricultural produce seriously. Then it is urged that the Aet affects transaction8 between traders outside the market areA.

We have not been able to understand what exactly is weant by this. It is only when the sale takes place within the market area that tlie produce has tu pass through the principal market yard 01 sub-market yard, but if a trader gets something from ou t"ide the market area and the sale takes plal'e on t ,; jd,, the market area and the thing is brought in to the market 1rea by the trader after the purchase, such trllill suction will not

, I

be subject to any fees, for fees have only to be charged on agricultural produce bought and sold in the market area under r. 53 read with s. 11. But where the sale takes place outside the market area 1md the commodity is merely brought into the market area by the wholesale trader, the.re will be no question of any fee being charged on that transaction; of course, if there is a further sale in the market area or in the market yards by the wholesale

trader to some one locally that may be liable to foe.

We do not see how iii the circumstances tt can be said that this is a case of unreasonable restriction

011 the right to carry on trade and business.

Next it is urged that the provisions in the Act also affect transaction between traders .and traders, and also affect produce not grown within the market area if it is sold in the market area. That is undoubtedly so. But if control has to be effective in the interest of the agricultural producer siich incidental control of produce grown outside the market area and brought into the market yard for sale is necessary as otherwise the provisions of the Act would be evaded by alleging that the particular produce sold in the market yard was not grown in the market area. For the same reasons transactions between traders and traders have to be controlled, if the control in the interest of agricultural producers and the general public has to be effective.

We are therefore of opinion that the Act and the Rules and Bye-laws thereunder cannot be struck down on this ground. The. contention uuder this head therefore must fail.

Re. (6).

The next contention is that rr. 65, 66 and 67 • were struck down by this Court in the earlier judgment and have neither been reframed nor validated by the Ordinance. Therefore, these rules do not exist. Consequence of this, it is alleged, is that it

1VG2

M ohammadbhai Khudaiwc Chhipa

v. ..

The Stole of Gujarat

Wanchoo J.

Moltamm•dhhai nhudabux CJihipa

v. 1/u Stal< ojGuja•ol

If anchoo J.

is not open to the market committee to issue licences which were provided by these rules.

Rules 65 provides tba.t no person shall do business as a trader or. a generil commission agent in agricultural produce m any market area except und1fr a licence granted by the market committee under this rule.

Huie 67 prov ids that no person shall do business as a trader, oommissiou a.gent, broker, weighmen, measurer:, surveyor, warnhouse-man or operate in any other manner in any m11rkct area except under licence granted by. the market com"litl.ee. It is urged that

licences aro granted under these rules read with s.5A, which now provides that where a market is ustablished the market committee may issue licences in aceordanco with rules to traders, commission agentll, brokers ete. to operate in the market area or any pint thereof.

Sc<, tion 5A, it is urged, is a mere enabling provision and becomes effective when the ruleE are framed and that licences under the enabling provisions of s. <iA are to issue in accordance with the rules; and if there arc no rules as to issue of licences the enabling provisions of s. 5A cannot be availed of by the market committee to require the taking out of liocnces. It is rr. 65 and 67 wbich prohibit business in the market area. without taking licences anrl provide for the manner in which applications for licence shall b,. made, the period for which tlie licence shall remain valid and other incidental m; itters. It is urged that as these rules were struck down by this Court and ha vo neither been re-framed nor validat"d under the Ordinance there is no power in the market committee to require traders to take out. licences merely because s. 5A enables it to issue licences. The. argument on behalf of the State is that even though these ; r. 65 and ()7 were struck down because they were inconsistent withs. 5A as it 8tu1)d before the amendment, now that s. 5A has hc<'n amended these rules must be held to have reviv'cd and reliance in this connection is placed on certain decisions of

...

I .

this Court where it w:1s held that an Act which was valid when it was passed before the Constitution came into force and some provisions of which became invalid for certain purposes in view of the provisions in the Constitution relating . to fundamental rights and Art. 13 thereof, became wholly effective again when the Constitution was amended and the inconsistency with the fundamental rights removed. This principle was laid down by this Court in Bhilmji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ('), in these words:

"The true effect of Art. 13(1) is to render an Act inconsistent with the fundamental right inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. It is over-shadowed by the fundamental right and remains dormant but is not dead.

With the amendment made in clause (6) of Art. 19 by the First Amendment Act, the provisions of the impugned Act .were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the inpugned Act. began to operate once again from the date -0f such amendment with this difference that, nnlike amended clause (2) of Art.19 which was expressly made retrospective, no right~ and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act from the date of the commencement of the constitusion till the date of the amendment."

This matter was further considered in De, ep Ohnnd v. The State of Uttar _Pradesh(') and it was held by majority that "there was a clear distinction

beteen the two clauses of A.rt. 13. Under cl. (I), pre-Constitution law subsistedecept to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions or Part III whereas under cl. (2) any post Constitution• Jaw contravening those provisions was a nullity from its inception to the extent of such contravention," and

(I) (1955) 2 s.c.R. 589. (21

(1955) Suppl. 2 s.C.R, 8, .

19GB

Mohommadbhai Khud•bux Chhipo

•• The State of Gt1jllfat

Wonchoo J,

19~1

Mo"4mmwlb/uJi KJmddux CMipa

T"' State of a,.Ja"u

lY1nhoo J.

therefore a. law which was bad ab initio under Art. 13 (~) either wholly or to the extent of the contravention could not be revived by tho application of the doctrine of eclipse and the doctrine could only apply in the case of a law that was valid when made but was rendered invalid for certain purposes by a supervening constitutional inconsiotency. The argument on behalf of the State is that if rr. 65 and 07 were valid when they were first framed and became invalid on the introduction of s. ;)A in the Act, they became cffecti ve again when s. 5A was amended by the Ordinance. ·

It has not been disputed in this case that the doctrine of eclipse applies to cases of rules.

The . only dispute was whether rr. 65 and 67 in the preBent form were in existence before 1953 when s. 5A was inserted in the Aet and if so w hethn they were valid in that form before l 9ii3.

Time was taken by tho parties to trace the history of the Act and theBe two rules and the form in which the Act and these rules stood beforo 1953. Investigation in this matter shows that rules were frame<! for the first time in 1941 after the Act came on the statute book. Rule 65 (1) was in the same form as it existerl when it was struck rlown by the earlier judgment.

Rule 67

(1) was also substantially in the same form except that it did not originally include a trader or a commission agent or warehouseman as it did at tho time when it was struck down. The addition or tho words

"tho trnders and commission agents" in r. 67(1) is however not material, , for these classes were already covered by r.65( I). As for the werrhousemen which were adrlerl sometime later to I'. 67( I), that addition need not detain us because we arc not concerned in these petitions with warehousemen. So it seems that r. 6ii (I) and r. fi7 (1) were practically the same when they were first framed in Hl4 l as they existed when they wem struck down.

The Act as originally passed in 1939 dirl not. ()Olltain a section like s.5A. 'J.'4e scheme of the ;\ct the11 was tllat qnder e. 4 ( 2 ) ,

the Government alone could grant licences for setti 9as ing up any place for the purchase and sale of agricul- Moha=adbhoi ture produce notified under the Act and thereafter Khudabux Chhipa under s. 5 it was the duty of the market committee The State :j Guja,.1 established under the Act for every market area to -- enforce the provisions of the Act afld the conditions Wanclioo J. of the licence granted by the Government setting up a place as above and to establish a market therein, if so, required by the Government. Section 26 gave power to the Government to frame rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2)(e) and (f) were as below:-

"(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions such rules may provide for or regulate:- .............................................................. (e) the maximum fees which may be levied by the market committee in respect of licences granted to traders and on the agricultural produce bougFit and sold in the market area and the rerovery of such fees;

( f) the issue of licences to brokers , weighmen measures and surveyors the form in which and. the conditions subject to which such licences shall be issued or renewed and the conditions subject to which the licences shall carry on their business and the fees to be charged therefor." It will be seen that these provisions by whichc rules could be framed for grant of licences did not confer power for issuing licences only for the market established under s.5 ris it originally Rtood.

These powers were general in terms and the Government could frame rules empowering the market committee to issue: licences for carrying on business throughout the market area. Rules 65 (I) and 67 (I} therefore would be within the power granted to the

tate GovernlJlent unqer s. 26 w4en the; r were

}962

Jlohammadbhai lrhuda/Jux Chhippa

v. 7 ht Stale of Gujarat.

IY "'-"°" J •

originally framed in l!l4 l and would thus be valid then.

Then we come to tlw amendment of the Act in I !M8.

By this aruenrlment, clauses (e) and (f) of s. 26(2) wnc combined in one and were numbered as sub-s. (2)(f), which runs as follows:-

(2) Tn particular and without prejudice to the generality of tho foregoing provision such rules may provide for or regulate:- ................................ ' .......................... .

( f) the isAue of licences to traders, eommiHsion agents, warohousemf'n and other personR operating in the market, brokers, weighmen, measurers and surveyors, the form in which, and the conditions subject to which such licences shall be issued or renewed and the fees to be charged thnefor;".

It will be seen that tJiough the words "market area" do not appear in this provision, it is still of a gt1neral nnture nnd does not restrict the.operation nf the licence only to the market.'I So rr. li5 and Gi won Id not he incnnsistent with it.

Then we eome to the amen<lmPnt. of 1953 which introduced s.5A ( ftR it was lwforc th" amendment hy the Or<linnnrn) in the Act and that provided that "whcrn a market is established uncfor s.5, the market commit.tee may issue licences in accord1mce with the rules to traders, commission agents, broktirs, wcighmen, mea.surers, surveyors, warehous1mcn and other persons t.o operate in tho market." This section was onsidered in the earlier judgment and it was held thore on the bnsis of this Rection that rr. (j,; and 67 when they gavo power to the committee to issue licences for operation in the mark1•t arPa. as distinguished from the market were bad after the enactment of s. 5A.

'It is howaver clear from the above narration of facts th1.t r.fi5(1) and r.67 (I) were valid when they were originally framed and remained valid till s. 5A was en 1cte:l. in 195:1 and became bad on the insertion of s. 5A in the Act. Now that s. 5A has been amended by the Ordinance, rr. 65 and 67 are obviously in conformity with it, r. 66 being merely oonsequential. Therefore they will revive by the application of the doctrine of eclipse as they are no longer overshadowed by s. 5A as it was before the Ordinance. The contention under this head ust therefore fail.

Re. ( 7).

The argument under this head is that subs.(3) of s. 29-B which validates the collection of licence-fees by market committees "is bad inasmuch as it makes it impossible for refund to be made of licence-fees collected at the time when the market committee had no power to collect it. We h'1ve not been able to understand this contention, for it is not disputed that the legisl1tture has power to legislate retrospectively even with respect to taxation (see M. P. V. 81mdararam.ier cG Go. v. The 8tat, e of Andhra Pradesh (1), where Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, was held consititutionally valid.

Fees are also included within the taxing power of the legislature in the broadest sense. Article 31 (l) therefore has no application in the present case and we have to look to Art. 265 which says that "no tax shall be levied or collected exc.ept by authority of law".

Sub-section (3) of s. 29-B is the law which retrospectivelyauthorises the levy of licence-fees collected in this case.

Retrospective power of the legislature to make a law being there even in the case of taxation, we fail to see how the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 29-B which validate the levy and collection of licence-fees can be held to be invalid

(1) [1958) S.C.R. 1422

196!

Mohammadbh•i Khudab"" Chhipa

Y, Tiu Stat, oJ Guj., al

WanchaoJ.

Mohamm<dbh.i Khudob..x Cll/tipa

•• Tira Blall of<Jujarol

WancAH ,1.

Morch JG.

undor Ar_t. 31(1). \Ve may add that the same will apply to fecH collcctecl 11nder 8. I I ancl validated by sub-s. (2) of s. 29.R. Thcre iR therefore no force in

this contention. It iR hcrc:by rejected.

In the result, the petitions are dismissed with cost; i, One set of hearing fee.

Petilfon.y dismissed.

MADAN GOPAL RU~GTA

SECRETAH.YTO THE OOVERNMENTOF

ORISSA

(B. P. SINHA, p, B.

GA.mNDRAGADKAR, K. WANCHOO, N. RA.JAOOPALA AYYANOAH, and

T. L. VENKATARA)[A AIYAR, JJ.)

Writ-Iliyh Court-If can i.<.1uc writs beyond its territorial juristliclion-Mi11eral Conce..; sion /l1de.~, 194.9, 6,57 !J.'J 00-Constilution of India Ari. 226. ' '

The Stace Government of Orissa rejected the application of the appellant who had applied f()r grant of a mining least: in Decr.rnher 1957 on the ground that the State Government proposed to arrangr. for lhe exploitation of the area in the public si:ctor.

The appellant rnadr. an application for review to the Central Govern1nent under r. 57 of the rules of Mineral Concession Rub, 1949.

This application was rejected by the Central Government in June 1959.

Thereupon the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Oris'ia.

This petition was dismhsed by th~ 1-ligh Court on the ground that it had no j11risdiction to dc;1l \vi th the matter under l\rt. 226 a'i the final order in the case \\'a." passed by the Central Government, \vhich ,., as located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellant came up by special leave to appeal to the Supren1e Court. The 1nain question is as to the limit of the jurisdiction of the Iiigli Court under Art.

226. The appellant contended that as the Central Go, ern- !JlCnt had rq.crely dismissed the revcw petition, the effective

THE STATE OF. GUJARAT AND ANOTHER(And connected. petitions)

A. K. SARKAR

WANCHoo

GOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.

(1962] 2 S.C.R. 659

ss. 6A and 11

s 29

Art. 32

Art. 14

s. 29

s. 11

s. 29

(1955) 2 S. C.R. 589

s. 29

Art. 31

Art. 32

Constitution of India

Art. 32

s. 11

s. 5A

Art. 14

s. 5A

s. 29

s. 26

s. 29

Art. 31( I)

s. 29

Art. 14

Art. 19(l}(g)

Art. 19( l )(g)

s. 26

s. 21

Art. 31(1)

section 26

s. 11

s. 11

s. 11

Art. 14

s.2(ix a)

Art. 32

Section 3

Section 4( I)

s. 3

Section 4

Section 5

Section 5

s. 5

Section 5A

section 4A

s. 5A

s. 4A

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 11

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5A

Art. 13

Art. 13(1)

Art. 19

Art. 13

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5

Section 26

s. 26

s. 26(2)

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 5A

s. 29

Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956

Article 31

Art. 265

s. 29

s. 29

s. 29

Art. 226

Art.

226


3 S.C.R.

S.UPREME COUB, T REPORTS 89

THE ATLAS

CYCLE INDUSTRIES, LTD.,

SONEPAT . v.

THEIR WORKMEN

(B. P. SINHA, C .. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J. R. MuDHOLKAR and

T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)

Industrial Dispute-Constitution of Tribunal-Qualifications of members-"(,!ua/ified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court''. meaning of-Validity of Reference-Industrial Dispute., (Punjab Amendment) Act, l!J57(Punj.8 of 1957),

s. 3-Industriat Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 7 (3) (c)- Constitution of India, Arts.14, 165,217.

On Iiebruary 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred certain disputes between the appellant company and its workmen to the Industrial Tribunal which had been constituted on August 29, 1953, by a notification issued under s. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by which G, an Advocate, was appointed as the Industrial Tribunal for Punjab.

When the reference was pending the Act was amended.

The Amendment Act inter alia repealed s. 7 of the principal Act and replaced it by ss. 7A, 7B and 7C, and bys. 30 provided for a saving clause in respect of the proceedings pending before the Tribunal constituted under the principal Act.

On April 19, 1957, the Punjab Government issued a notification under s. 7 of the Act and s. 30 of the Amendment Act extending the life of the Tribunal constituted under the repealed s. 7 and also extending the term of G as the member.

On the same date another notification was issued under s. 7A of the Act constituting a new Tribunal and appointing G as the Presiding Officer up to June 3, 1957.

Under s. 7C (b) the age of retirement for members '\Vas fixed at sixty five and under that provision G would have to retire by June 3, 1957.

The Punjab Government intervened and passed the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1957, raising the age of retirement of members to sixty seven years.

Af:er G had retired on June 3; 1959, the Punjab Government issued a notification appointing another person as the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal.

The appellant challenged the legality of the reference on the grounds, inter alia, ( l) that G was not qualified to be appointed to the Tribunal under s. 7 (3) (c) of the Act, as he was over sixty years and, therefore, the reference to him dated

19~!

February.!.

Tht Af/a_1 C11clt lt:d1otrif.1, ltd.,

So11tpat

J l1eir M'orAmen

Venkalaroma

AVar J.

90 SUPREME CO"CH'J. Rl!, l'ORTS [1962]. St:PP.

l; cbruary 14, 1955, \\'as iucon1petcnt, and :2) that the Indusuial Disputes (Punjab A1ne11drnent) Acl, 19j7, \vas passed \\'llh a view to ·)cnclit a single individual, G, an<l, therefore, \Vas void as offeatiing Art. l•t of the Constitution of India.

He/cl, (I) s. 7(3)(c) of the Industrial Dispute; Act,

1~17, did not irnport any qualification based on the age of the periOJl to be appointc<l, and that the appointrnent of(} on J\ugust 2~, l j~., \Vas valid under that section.

On the true constn1ction of 1\rt. 217 of the Constitution of India, the prescription of age therein is a condition attached to the duration of the office and not a "qualifica

tiou-'' fOr appoi11tn1cnt to it.

G.D. Karkare v. 1'.L. Shevd., LL.IL [ 19'J2j :"lag. 409 and l'mbhudayal v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1959 Punj. 460, approved.

(2) the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act, I Y5 7, did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution, because though the occassion \\.'hich inspired the cuar.tment of the statute might he: to benefit an individual, it was of gncral application and could not therefore be held to be discriminatory.

Ameeruni8'a v ... M ehboob,[ 19531 S.C.R. 10.J., distinguished.

Crvn, APPELLATE J umsmcTrox: Civil Appeal Xo. 188 of J 961.

A1, peal by special lea\'e from the judgment and order dated Septemher IJ,19.'i!l, of tho Industrial 'l'ribnnal, Punjab, Patiala in Reference No.

30 of 195i. ·

G. S. Pathak, J.B. 1Jarlacha11ji, 0. C .. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.

Bawa Shivcharan Singh and Jam1rdan Sharma, for tho respondents.

1962. l!'ebruary 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATAHAMA AIYAR, .J.-This is an appeal by special lenve against the Order of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, dated September 11, 1959, in Reference No. ::lO of 1957, overruling certain preliminary objections raised by the appellant to the

- jurisidiction of the Tribunal to hear the reference.

The facts are that on February 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred under s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, i947, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", certain disputes between the appellant and the respondents to the Industrial Tribunal.

Punjab, Jullundur, for adjudication. That was numbered as lieforence No. 3 of 1955. This Tribunal had been constituted on August 29; 1953, by a Notification issued by the Government of Punjab, which is as follows :-

"In exercise of the powers conferred under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ·(Act XIV of 1947), the Governor of Punjab, in consultation with the Punjab High Court, is pleased to appoint i:lhri Avtar Narain Gujral Advocate, as Industrial Tribunal for Punjab."

The ma.in contention pressed before us on behalf of the appellant is that Shri A.N. Gujral was not qualified under s. 7(3)(c) of the Act under which the Notification was issued to be appointed as Tribunal on August 29, 1953, as he was over sixty years of age on that dat'l, having been born on June 4, 1892, and that there was therefore no Tribunal validly constituted in existence, and that in consequence the reference to that so-called Tribunal on February 14, 1955, was wholly inoperative.

While Reference No. 3 of 1955 was pending before the Tribunal, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were amended by the Industrial Dispute (Amendment iind Miscellaneous Proviions) Act, UJ56 (Act No. 36 of 1956), which came into . force on March 10, 1957.

This Amendment Act repealed s. 7 of the principal Act, and replaced it by ss. 7A, 7B and 70. Section 30 of the Amendment Act contains a saving as regards proceedings in relation to any industrial dispute which had been pending before a Tribunal constituted under the principal Aot.

Acting under this section, the

1 he At/as Cycle

lndustrie-~, Ltd.,

Sonepat

Their Workmen

Venkataram1J

AQ•ar J.

196B

I ht A.•las C;-cl1 !11dustriu, Itd.,

Sontpat

v. 1hei1 W orktntn

Venkalarama

AijarJ,

92 SuPREJIE COlJRT REPORTS ll962] SOPP.

Punjab Government issued on April 19, Hl5i, the following N" otilication :-

" Xo. -ll!l-1-C. Lab-57/652-l{A-In continuation of Punjab Governmont :IIemorandum Xo. :lOi8-C-Lab-5i/4224, dated the lstjllth ,'\fopch, Ul:)i, and in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputt>S Act, HJ47, as in force before the commen cement. of the ludustrial Disputes (Amendment and '.\Iiscellaneous Provisions) Act, l !J5ti,

read with Section 30 of the latter Act and all other powNs enabliug him in this behalf the Governor of Punjab is pleased tu extend-

(a) the period for which the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Jullundur, is const i 1,11 ted, and

(h) the term of appointment of the Sole Member thereof.

HJ> to the last day of October, I !J5i, or such date as the proceedings in relation to industrial disputes pending in the said

Tribunal immediately before the I 0th l\farch, l!J57, are diaposPd of, whichever

is earlier." To put it briefly, this Xotification extended tho life of the Tribunal constituted under the repealed s. 7, for the period spocifid therein, and it also continued the term of Shri A.N. Gujral, as a :\Iember thereof, for the said period.

The contention of the appellant with reference to th is Notification is that s. ; lO of A ct 36 of

l!:J5G does not authoritte tho appointment of a )!ember to the Tribunal constituted under s. 7, and that the Not, ification in so far as it continued Shri A.N.

Gujral. as a l\Iembcr of tho Tribunal after his term

of office had expired on Mach IO, 1957, was unauthorised and void.

On the same date on which the above Notification was i"sud, t, hat is on April 19, 1957, the Government of Punjab issued a Notification under s. 7 A of the Act of which the relevant portion is as follows:-

"No. 4194-C'.-Lab-57 /66 l-RA-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 19!7, as inserted by section 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)

Act, 1956, (No. 36 of 1956), and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal with Headquarters at Jullundur and to appoint Shri Avtar Narain Gujral, B.A., LL.B., as its Presiding Officer

with effect from the date of the publication of this notification in the Official Gazette up to 3rd June, l!l57."' It will be noticed that this Notification firstly constituted a new Tribunal being the Industrial Tribunal, Jullundur, and secondly it appointed 8hri A. N. Gnjral as its Presiding Officer np to June 3, 1957. The significance of that date is that, under s. 70 (b) enacted by the Amendment Act, 1956, the age of retirement fur members was fix<•d at sixty-five, and under that provision, Shri A .N. Gujral would have to retire on June 3, 1957.

Tne Punjah Legislature intervened at this stage and enacted two statutes which are material for the present dispute. One of them was the Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Act 8 of Ul57.

Section 3 of this Act amended s. 70 (b) of the principal Act by substituting for the words "he has attained the age of sixty-five years'', tho words "he has attained the the age of sixty-seven years".

Thus the age of retirement was raised to sixLy-seven years. By the operation of this Act, the tenure of Shri A. N. Gujral could be extended from

The Atlas Cycle Industries, Ltd. 1

Sonepat

Their Workmen

V tnkatarama

Al)ar J.

i9ti2

Tht Atltu Cycl1 In du,<trit •, lld.,

So,,, pnt ..

ThP.ir l1'orl.mt11

Ve!!katarama

Aiyar J.

94 SUPRE:lfE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP . .

Juno 3, 1057 to .June 3, 1959, and that in fact was <lono by a number of~ otifications issue<l from time to timo.

The -ippellant cont<mds that this legislation wa,~ inten<led to benefit a single individ1ial Shri A.X. Gujral, and is therefore void as offending A rt. 14 of the Constitution. Tho result, accor<ling to tho appellant, is that aft.er June 3, IP57, there wae no one validly holding the office of i\fombr, r of the Industrial Tribnnal.

The second statute t>nacted by the Punjab Governmf'nt is the Industrial Disputes (Amendment an<l :IIiscc!lancous Provisions) (Punjab Amendment.) Act 9 of 1957. It introduced in s. 30 of the Amendment Act, 1956, a new subs. (2) conferring on tho State Government 1iuthority to re.const.it.ute Tribunal established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,

where those TriburnLls had come to an end anrl there were matters pending before thPm for adjudication.

Going haek to the Tribunal which was constituted under tho r<'pealed s. 7 of the Act it will be r<'ml'mbcred t h:i.t a ot ifir.atinn ha<l been isue.cl 0n April 19, 1957 un<ler H. !lO of the Amendment Act, l 95fl, keeping it alivr until the pending matters were disposed of or until Oct.nber !ll, 1957, whichevn was earlin. The expectation that the proeeedingR before that Tribunal would be complek<l hy that <late was however, not realised and therefore >ict.ing 1111drr R.

3:~B (I) oft.he Art, and A. :lO of th" Amendment Act

19:i6, ns further amended by Punjnh Art, 9of19fl7. thP Government. of P1injab issne<l ; m October !l l, l!l57 a N'ntificr.tion trnsferrin.g the matter" pcnrling hefuro the old Trihnn:d l'0nstit.i1kd nn<lcr "· 7 to thn new Tribunal cnnstitnto<l on April Hl, 1!157, unclPr H. 7A.

In accnnlancc with thiR '.'<ot.ific:ttion. R"fcr<'11ce No. 3 of l !Ii),) waR transferre<l t.o the new Tribunal and was

renumbf•r<'<I n.s 30 of Hl57.

The contentions urg<>d by t.he appellant against this or<ler of transfer arc, firstly, that the Tribunal to which the transfrr had

been made was not, 'for tho rea..•ons already given, validly constituted :ind had no legal existence, and,

.. ..,.

secondly, that the new provision introduced by the Punjab Act 9 of 1957 has no retrospective operation and that, in consequence, the proceedings which had been pending before the old Tribunal on March 10,

1957, could not be transferred to the new Tribunal under this section.

T_he present reference 30 of 1957 was pending till June 3, 1959, when Shri A.N. Gujral retired. The Punjab Government then issued a Notification appointing Sri Kesho Ram Passey. retired Judge of the Punjab High Court !IS the Presiding; Officer of the Industrial Tribunal, Jullundur. Before him, the present appellant filed an application on September 4, 1959, raising a number of preliminary objections to the hearing of the reference.

By its Order dated September 11, 1959, the Tribunal overruled these objeotions and posted the matter for hearing on the merits. It is the correctnesR of this Order that is now challenged before us in this Appeal.

Though a number of objections were raised to the hearing of the reference before the Tribunal, the contentions advanced before us for the appellant are the following :- ( 1) Shri A. N. Gujral was not qualified to be appointed to the Tribunl under s. 7(3)(c) ofthi> Act that, in consequence, the reference to him dated Febr.uary 14, 1965, was incompetent;

(2) that the Notification of the Punjab Government d1tted April. Hl, 19ii7, appointing Shri A. N. Gujral as a Member of the Industri1tl Tribunal, Jullundur, and the subequent Notifications extendin~ his tenure of office are unauthorised and inoperative;

(3) that the Notification of the Punj1tb Government dated October 3 /, 1957, tmnsf,, rring the proceedings pending before the old Tribunal to the new Tribunal was inoperative, because (i) the Punjab Act 8 of I 967 is void being repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution and the appointment of Shri A. N. Gujral as Member under that Act is also void;

The Atlas Cyclt

lndustr1:es, Ltd.,

Stmepat

Their Vlorkmeti

VenkatMama

A(var J.

19G2

The Atlas Cyclt

lrl'luslriu, 1.td.,

Their Worl; mtn

Venlcularama

:liya•, .!,

96 Sl"PREl\IE COCRT REPORTS [1962] SL"PP.

and (ii) s. 30[2) enitcted by Punjab Act 9 of 1957 under whieh the transfer was made, did not authoriso transfer of proceedings, .which had Loen pending on or before :lfarch 10, I !J57.

(I) Taking up fil'llt the cont-0ntion that Shri.

A. N. Gujral was not <]nalified to he appoinU, d to th~ Trihunal on August 29, l!J53, by reason of the fact that he was over sixty years of age, the question is one of interpretation of the language of s. i ( 3)( c) of the Act.

Section 7, in so far as it is material for the present purpose, is as folloirn:-

"7. lnd1utrial Trilrunals.-(I) The appropriate Go-vPrnment m"v contitute one or more Tn1!ustrial Tribunals for thA adju<lirMion of indtmtrial disputes in accordance with tho provisions of this Act..

(2) A Trihunal shall consist of such number of independent mcmhers ru; tho appropriato Government may think fit to appoint, and where the Tribunal consists of two or more men: hers, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof.

(3) Where :t Trihunal consists of one member onlv, that memh..r, and where it con Rists of two or more mcmbern, the Chairman of the 'rrihunal, shall be a person who- ·

(a) is or has.hccn a Judgo of a High Court; or

(bl is or haA been a Di3trict .Judge: or

(cl is qualified for appointment as a Judgo of a High Court;

Provided that no appointment under this sub•ection to a Tribunal Ahall he made of any person not qualified undrr clause(~) or (bl cxopt with the itpproval of the High Court of \

' ,, ,_ ,\ - l .ssc.R. sbPREME CbUR'.r i1EPORT~ 97

the State in which the Tribunal has, or is intended to have its usual mt."

Shri A. N. Gujral was appointed under s. 7(3)( c) being an Advocate. The question is, whether he was then qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court under that clause. The Constitutional provi sion hearing on this point is Art. 217, which in so far as it is material is as follows :- ''217.

(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governer of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as. provided in article 224, and in any other case until he attains the age of sixty years; Provided that .............. . (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is citizen d India and-

( a) has foi: at'least ten years held an Judicial office in the territory of India, or

(b) has for at least ten years been a l}dvocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession.

Explanation ...... " While Art. 217 ( 2) prescribes the qualifications for appointment as a Judge, Art. 217(1) lays down that the Judge shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty years. The whole of the controversy before us is as to the inter-relation between these two clauses. The contention of Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant, is that though Art. 217 ( 1) refers, in terms, to the termination of the office of Judge, in substance, it lays down a

Thi Atlas Cycle Industries, Lid .•

8onepat

v, Their Workmen

Venkatarams

Aiyar J_,

Th Atlas Cycle Indu8b/es, Ltd.,

Sonepat

Thtir Wo, kme11

V enkaJaramtJ

A1.1•r J.

98 Sl'PREl\IE coeRT REPOR'J s [1962) SUPP.

qualification for appointment,' because the appointment of a person over sixty as a.Judge would clearly be repugnant to Art. 21 i(I) even though he might satisfy all the requirements of Art. 21 i(2). It 'is accordingly argued that it is r.n implied qualification for appointment as a , Judge under Art. 217 that the pernon should not have attained thP age of sixty at tlw time of the appointment.

We agree that there is implicit in Art. 217(1) a prohibition against. appointment as a Judge of a person who has attained the age of sixty years.

But in our view, that is in tho nature of a condition governing the a ppointm!'nt to the office-not a qualification with reference to a person who is to be appointed th!•rcto.

There is manifost on tlw terms and on the scheme of the "rticle a clear distinction between requirements a8 to the age of a person who could he appointed as a Judge and hiH fitn .. s based on experience and ability to fill the office. Art. 217(1) deals with the former, and, in form, it has reference to the termination of the office and can tb<?rcfore be properly read only as imposing, by implication a restriction on making the appointment, In strong contrast to thi~ is Art. 217(2} which expressly refers to thn qualifications of the person to be appointed such as his having held a judicial post or having been an Advocate for a period of not less than ten years. Wt• think that on a true construction oftbe article the prescription as to age is a concli. , tion attached to the duration of the offic., and not a

qualification for appointment to it.

_\fr. Pathak also relied on Arts. '224 and 316 as lending support to his cont•mtion that age is to he

regarded as an impliecl qualification under Art. 21 i, Art, 22·1 rclates tot.he appointment of additional and

!cting Judges and it is provided in ck ( !) :md (2) that th~ pt>rson to bo appointed as additional or ading , Judge by the Prsi<lent hould be a duly qualified person.

There is nothing about the age of the perwn to be appointe<I in these~ clauses.

That is provided in Art. 224(3) when enacts that

"no person appointed as an additional or acting

Jndge of a High Court shall hold office after attaining the age of sixty years." This article is also framed on the same lines as Art. 217 and does not crtrry the matter further. Nor is there anything in Art. 376 which throws any further light on this point. It has reference to persons who were Judges in the High Courts of the States specified in part B of the First Schedule at the time when the Constitution came into force, and provides that they shall become Judges of the High Courts in those

States under the Constitution, an.d then enacts a special provision that they "shall notwithstanding anything in clauses (ll and (2) of article 217 but subject to the proviso to clause (1) of that article, continue to hold office until the expiration of such period as the President may by order determine." We see nothing in the terms of this article which lends any support to the contention that age is to be regarded as a qualification.

More to the point under consideration iR Art. 165 ( 1) that the "Governor of each State shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the State." The question has been discussed whether on the terms of this article, a person who has attained the age of sixty could be appointed as an Advocate-General. If the age of a person is to be regarded as one of his qualifirations, then he could not be. The point arose for decisi6n in G. D. Karkare v. T. L. Shevde (1), where a Judge who had retired at the age of sixty had been appointed as Advocate-General.

The validity of the appointment was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified by reason of his age. The learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court held that cl. (1) of Art. 217 of the Constitution prescribed only the duration of the appointment of a Judge of the High Court and could not be construed

(I) I. L.R. (1952] Nag. 409.

The Atlas Cycle Industries, Lti., Sonepat

•• Their Workmen

Venkataramc

Aiyar J.

1'/u AU'" C; rl , lndwhits l..ld . .

Sonepal

Their iVorkmt.

Venkatarama

A.fyar J.

ioo SUPRE~IE COUltT REPORT.:; [1962) stJpi>.

as prescribing a qualification for his appointment. It is argued for tho :tppcllant that the appointment of an AdvoC<tk-General under Art. W5 might stand on a different footing from that of a Judge under Art. 217. because of the special provision in Art. 165(3) that the Achocatc-Gcneral is to hold office. at pleasure, whereas a , Judge holds office during good bohaviour. But this difference bears only on the power of the appropriate authority to terminate the appointment and not on the qualifieation of the person to be appointed to the office.

In our view, the interpretation put upon Art. 21 i in G.D. Karkare's caoe (1) iH correct.

Though the true meaning of Art. 217 has figured largely in the argument before us, it is to be noted that we ar~ primarily concerned in this appeal with the interpretation of s. 7(31( e) of the Act, and that must ultimately tum on its own

context. Section i(3)(a} provides for the appointment of a High Court Judge, sitting or retired, as

a Member of the Tribunal.

Age is clearly not a qualification under thiH sub-clause, as tho age for retirement for a .Ju<liie of the High Court is sixty. Likewise, cl. (b) providt'S for the appointment of a District , Judgo, setting or retired, as a Member.

A retired District .T udge who is aged over sixty will be eligible for appointment under this subelause. Thus the age of a person does not euter into his qualific>Ltions under sub-els. (a) and (b).

It would therefore be legitimate to constme sub-el. (c} as not. importing any qualification on the ground of age. But it iH said t.hat sub-els. (a) and {h)

form a distinct group having reference to judicial officers, whereas,

cl. (c) is confined to Advocates, who form a distinct category by themselves, and

that in view of this difference, considerations as to age applicable to cl. (a) and (b) need not be applicable t<J cl. ( e).

There is undoubtedly a distinction

{I) !. L. R. [1952) Nag. 409.

between els. (a) and (b) on the one hand and cl. (c) on the other.

But the question is whether this has any reasonable relation to the difference whiuh is souht to be made between the two classes with reference to the age of appointment. If a retired Judge of the age of sixty can fittingly fill the office of a Member of the Tribunal under s. 7, an Advocate of that age can likewise do so.

In our view, there is no ground for importing in, s. 7(3)(c) an implied qualification as to age, which is not applicable to cl. 7(3)(a! and (b).

This question was considered by a Bench of the Punjab High Court in Prabhudayal v. State of Punjab (I). There the validity of the appointment of Shri A. N. Gujral under the notification dated August 29, 1953, which is the very point now under debate, was challenged on the ground that as he was over sixty on that date, he was not qualified to be appointed under s. 7(3)(c).

The Court held approving of the decision in G. D. Karkare's case('), that the prescription as to age in Art. 217 (l) was not a qualification to the office of a Judge under Art. 217(2), and that a person who was more than sixty was qualified for appointment under s. 7(3)( c).

Reliance is placed for the appellant on the terms of s. 70 which was substituted by the Amendment Act 36 of 1956 in the place of s. 7 as supporting the contention that age ie a qualifiration for appointment under s. 7(3) (c).

Section 7C is as follows :-

"No person shall be appointed to, c r continue in, the office of the presiding offic< r of a Labour CJurt, 'l'ribunal or National Tribunal, if-

( a) he is not an independent person ; or

(1) A. J. R (1959) Pun.i. 460.

(2) J.L.R. [19!'2] Na~. 409,

 The Atlas Cycl1 Industries, Ltd.,

Sonepat

•• Pheir Workmen

Venkatarama

Atvar J.

TJ11 Arla (,'ycl1 lntiuslrUe, Ltd.,

Sff'tP•I

v. r luir W.' ., kmen

Ytnk1larama

Aiµr J,

102 SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [19Ci2] SUPP.

(b) he has attained the age of sixty-fivo

years." The marginal note t(> that section which was also relied on is as follows :-

"Disqualifications for the presiding officers of Labour Courts, Trilmnals and National Tribunals."

The argument of the appellant is that, in prescribing the age as a qualification under s. 7C, the Legislature only made cxplioit what was implicit in

8. i(3)(e), and that therefore the qualification on the basis of age should also be imported in s. 7(3)(c).

This inforenco does not, in our opinion, follow.

The insertion of age qualification in s. iC is more consistent with an intention on the part of the Legislature tu add, in the light of the working of the repealed s. i, a new provision prescribing the age of retirement for i\lcmbers.

We ; greo with the decision of the Punjab High Court in Prabhu- <.Wyals case(I) and hold that s.i(3)lc) docs not import any qualification based on the age of the person to be appointed, am! that the appointment. of Shri A. N. Gujral on Augui; t 29, 1953, wao valid under s. 7(3)(c).

(2) The next contention advanced for the appellant is that tho Notification dated April 19,

11157, appointing Shri A. N. Gujral as a llfembcr of the Tribunal issued under s. 30 of the Amendment Act 36 of 1956 was not authorised by thu terms of that section and that therefore there was no validly constituted Tribunal from that date.

Section 3U is as follows :-

"Savings as to proceedings pending before Tribunals : If immediately before the commencement of thi~ Act there is pending any proceeding in relation to an Industrial dispute before a Tribunal oonstituted

(1) A. I. R. [1959] Puoj. 460.

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as in force before such commencement, the dispute may be adjudicated and the proceeding disposed of by that Tribun'11 after such commencement, as if this Act had not been passed."

The contention urged before us is that s. 7 under which Shri A. N. Gujral had been constituted Tribunal was repealed on March 10, 1957, the notification dated April 19, 1957, appointing him as a Member of the Tribunal is void.

There is no substance in this contention.

Section 30 expressly provides for the life of the Tribunal being extended for the period specified therein, and that necessarily implies a power to continue Shri A. N.

Gujral as the Tribunal, and we should add that in view of our decision on point No. 3 this objection is practically of no importance.

(3) Lastly, it is contended that the transfer of the proceedings pending before the old Tribunal to the new Tribunal under the Notification dated October :n, 1957, was invalid and inoperative.

Two grounds were urged in support of this contention. One is that Shri A.N. Gujral attained the age of sixty-five on June 4, 1957, and his term of office would have then expired under s. 7C. , Then the Punjab Legislature enacted Act 8 of 1957 raising the age of retirement under s. 7C(b) from sixty- five to sixty-seven. That was with 9, view to continue Shri A.N. Gujral in office. And this legislation came into force only on June 3, 1957. This Act,' it is said offends Art. 14 as its object was to benefit a particular individual, Shri A.N. Gujral, and reference was made to a decision of this Court in Ameeroonissa v. Mehboob (1) as supporting this contention. There is no foree in this contention.

There the legislation related to the estate of one

(1) [1953) S.C.R 404.

Tiu Atlas Cycle Industries, ltd.,

Sunepat •

Thefr Workmen

Venkatarama

.A.tyar J.

Ttu Atla1 Cyclt lwlwtr; tI, ltd., • Soritf'aC ...

Thtir W orkmtn

Vtnk1itcrema

Aiyar .. ,

104 SCPREJIE COCRT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

Nawab 'Waliu<ldoula, and it provided th, it the claims of llfahLoob Begum and Kadiran Begum, who claimed as ht:i1 s stood dismissed thereby and could not b1' called in question in any court of law.

And this Court held th:1t it wa-; repugnant to Art. 14, as it singled out individuals and denied them the right which other citizens have of resort to a court of law.

But the impugned Act, 8 of l 9i>7 is of gem ral application, the age being raiRcd to sixty

seven with refer<'nce to all per8ons holding tho ofiice under that oection. The occasion which inspired

the enactment of the statute might he t.bc impen ding retirem1nt of Siu i A. !\. Gujral.

But that is not a ground for holding tltat it is discrimim1tory and contravenes .l\rt. I~, when it is, on its terms, of general application.

The second ground of attack against. the order of transfer i' that it is not competP11t under s.:l0(2) of the Ami n<lment Act :{fl of l 9ii6 as furthor amended by the Punjab Act 9 of l!l5i.

Section :J0(2) is a~ follows : -

"'[f .immediately before the rommencc- m!•nt of thiR Act. there was pPnding any pro- CPcdin!! in relation to an indm1fl'ial dispute brfcH c n Tribunal const itut.!'d under the Indus. trial Disputs Act, 1947, as in force hefore such commencement and such prnrPcding could not

he disposed of by that Tribunal due to the Tribunal ha\·; ng come to an cnrl on the expiry of th" prriorl for which it wa" constituted, the State Government mav r<>conRti

t.utn that Tribunal for adjudieatin°q that dispute and dispo; ing of that proci>edin6 after Hn<'h commence nwnt as if this Act. bad not

b1,..n pa; sed, and the proceeding may be eontinunl by that Tribunal from tlw stage at wjiieh it Wall left,"

3 S.C.R.

. SU~REME COURT REPORTS 105

The contention urged before us is that this provision has no retrospective operation and that in consequence t.he proceedings which had been pending before the old Tribunal on March 10, 1957, could not be transferred to the new Tribunal under thi" section. This content.ion is clearly untenable, because the whole object of s.30(2) is to provide for the hearing of disputes which were pending before the old Tribunal, and its operation is entirely retrospective. This contention must therefore be rejected.

In the result, the repeal fails and is dismissed with costs. "

A ppe, al dismissed.

SRI SATYA NARAIN SINGH

DISTRICT ENGINEER, P.W.D. AND ANOTHEli

(B. P. SINHA, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH and J, R. M:uDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Pu.blic ferry--Toll-Right to coUe<t from Governrnent Roadway JJuses-Co nmercial undertaking by Government, if public service-Hotijication No 252/IX-209/ (10) dated March.

JG, 1925-Northern India Ferries Act, 1878 (XVII of 1878) • 15.

The appellant being the highest bidder at a public auc tion got the right to collect the toll in respect of ferry for crossing the river of Piprighat for the year 1954. The'practice upto 1954 wa.• to allow the licensee to collect the toll from every stage carriage bus.

Till March of the year 1954 only privately owned stage carriage buses used to ply on the route.

Thereafter the route \\'as taken over by the Roadways department of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The applicant was informed 1'.nter alia that no toll \vas leviablc on the Roadways Vehicles and was asked to pay the monthly instalments of the 1ictnse fee without making any deduction therefor consequent upon the exemption of the Roadways buses from tolls. The point for consideration foter alia is whether tii~

Thi Atlus Cycl1 lndnJtries. Ltd,,

Sonepat

Their Workmen

Venkatarama

Aiyar J.

1962.

Februaty II.

THEIR WORKMEN

B. P. SINHA

K. SUBBA RAO

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.

R. MuDHOLKAR

s. 3

Industriat Disputes Act, 1947

s. 7

Constitution of India

Arts.14, 165

s. 7

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 7

ss. 7A, 7B and 7C

s. 7

s. 30

s. 7

s. 7A

s. 7C

s. 7

Constitution of India

s. 7(3)(c)

Constitution of India

Art. 14

Industrial Disputes Act

section 7

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 7(3)(c)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 7

ss. 7A, 7B and 70

Section 30

section 7

Section 30

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

Section 7

Industrial Disputes Act

section 4

s. 70

Amendment Act, 1956

Section 3

s. 70

s. 30

Amendment Act, 1956

s. 7

cl 0

s 30

s. 7(3)(c)

Art. 14

Gujral as Member under that Act

s. 30

Section 7

s. 7(3)( c)

Art. 217

article 224

Art. 217

Art. 217(1)

Art. 217

Art. 21

Art. 21

Art. 217

Art. 217(1)

Art. 217(1)

Art. 224(3)

Art. 217

Art. 376

First Schedule

article 217

Art. 165

Art. 217

Art. 217

Art. 165(3)

Art. 21

Art. 217

s. 7(31( e)

s. 7

s. 7(3)(c)

cl. 7(3)(a! and (b)

s. 7(3)(c)

Art. 217

Art. 217(2)

s. 7(3)( c)

s. 70

s. 7

s. 7(3)

Section 7C

s. 7C

s. 7(3)(c)

s. 7(3)(c)

s. 30

Section 3U

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 7

Section 30

s. 7C

Then the Punjab Legislature enacted Act

s. 7C(b)

Art. 14

Art. 14

Disputs Act, 1947

Northern India Ferries Act, 1878