38.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 423

portion of the income which was earned in British India and not in Bhor State. The answer to the second question is in the negative. The answer to the third question is in the affirmative. The question posed and answered by the High Court hardly arises, in view of the answer to the first question. That question and the answer to it are set aside as being not necessary.

The appeals thus fail except for a slight modification in the answer to the first question, and subject to that modification, are dismissed. The appellants must bear the costs of these appeals. There shall be one hearing fee.

Appeals dismissed.

BABULAL PARATE v.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS.

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAG-O~ALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLXAR, JJ.)

Criminal procedure-Apprehended danger-Power of Magistrate to issue order absolute at once-.Constitutionalily-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of I898), s. I44-Constitution of India, Art. I9 (I)(a) and (b). ·

The District Magistrate, apprehending a breach of peace as a resulfof demonstrations and counter-demonstrations held by two rival labour unions, promulgated an order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which Was to remain in force for a period of fifteen days, prohibiting, inter alia, the assembly of five or more persons in certain specified areas. The petitioner took it as an invasion on the fundamental rights of the citizens under Art. rg(r)(a) and (b) of the Constitution and held a meeting outside the specified areas and exhorted the workers to take out processions in the no.tified areas in defiance of the said order. He was thereupon prosecuted under ss. 143 and r88 read withs. rr7 of the Indian Penal Code. He moved the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and having failed to get relief there, moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of s. 144 of the Code on the ground that it conferred wide and unguided powers on the District Magistrate and thus contravened Art. rg(r)(a) and (b) of •.he Constitution.

Held, that the attack on the constitutional validity of s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must fail.

r96z

M/s. Bhor Indus/ties Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I

HidaytuUah ].

I96I

January 1z.

Babulol Parot•

Stale of Maharashtra

Read as a whole, the section clearly showed that it was intended to secure the public weal by preventing .disorders, obstructions and annoyances. The powers conferred by it were exercisable by responsible Magistrates who were to act judicially and the restraints permitted by it were of a temporary nature and could be imposed only in an emergency,

The restrictions whkh thesecti6n authorises are not beyond. the limits prescribed by els. (2) and'(3) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The prevention of such adivities as are contemplated by the section is undoubtedly in public interest and therefore no less in the interest of public order.

Clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution do not require. a special enactment for the enforcement of the restrictions mentioned in them. The impugned section must be construed as a whole and. although the first part of cl. (irdoes not expressly mention that the order of the Magistrate must be preceded by an enquiry, the second part clearly indicates that the Magistrate has to satisfy himself either by his own enquiry or from a report made to him as to what the facts are. The section does not, therefore, confer an arbitrary power on the Magistrate in the matter of making the order.

The wide power under the section can be exercised only in an emergency and for the purpose of preventing obstruction, annoyance or injury etc. as specified therein and those are the factors that must necessarily condition the exercise of the power and, therefore, it was not correct to say that the power is unlimited or untrammelled. Since the judgment has to be of a Magistrate, it can be assumed that the power will be exercised legitimately and honestly. The section cannot be struck down simply on the ground that tlie Magistrate might possibly abuse -his power.

Although the section makes the Magistrate the initial Judge of an emergency that cannot make the restrictions placed by it unreasonable. Since maintenance of law and order rests with the Executive, it is only appropriate that the initial decision must be with the Magistrate. But such decision is not entirely based on his subjective satisfaction. Sub-sections (2), (4) and (5) clearly indicate that the Magistrate must act jndicially. Moreover. the propriety of his order can be challenged in revision.

It was not, therefore, -correct to say that the remedy of a person aggrieved by an order under the section was illusory.

P. T. Chandra, Editor, Tribune v. Emperor, A.LR. 1942 Lah. 171, referred to.

The American doctrine that previous restraints on the exercise of fundamental rights are permissible only if there is a clear and present danger, can have no application in India, since the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) of the Constitution are not absolute but subject to restrict10ns under els. (2) to (6) of that

Article. Anticipatory action permitted by s. 144 is not, therefore, hit by els. (2) and (3) of Art, 19.

Scheneck v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47, considered. , State oIMadras ';' V. G. Row [1952] S.C.R. 597, relied. on.

ORIGIN,1.L JURISDICTION: Petition No. 90 of 1956.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.

R. V. S. Mani, for the petitioner.

N. S. Bindra, K: L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents: 196L< January 12. The Judgment of the Court Wl)oS delivered by

 MUDHOLKAR, J.~This is s. petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for issuing an appropriate writ to the respondents not to• enforce the provisions of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code or an appropriate writ forbidding respondent No. 4 from proceeding further with the prosecution of the petitioner for offences under ss; 143 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code read withs. 117 thereof, for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner before respondent No. 4 and for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to respondents 1 to 3 directing them to produce or to cause to be produced the.petitioner to be dealt with according to law and to set him at liberty.

The facts which have led up to the petition !j.re briefly as follows : There are two unions. of textile workers in Nagpur, one known as the Rashtriya Mill. Majdoor Sangh and the other as Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh. The former is a branch of the Indian National Trade Union Congress. The Rashtriya Mill l\fajdoor Sangh entered into !!on agreement with the management oft.he Empress Mills regarding the closure of Empress Mill No. 1 for. rebuilding it and regarding the employment of workers who were employd therein. in) a third shift. This agreement was opposed by the Nagpur Mil! Majdoor Sangh. On January 25, 1956, a group of workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh went in a procession to Gujar's Wada, Mah.al, Nagpur, where the office of the Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh is located.

Babulal Parate

State of M aharashlra

Mudholkar ].

Babulal Parate

State of M t1harashtra

Mutlholkar J.

It is said that a scuffle took place there between some members of the proc•ession and some workers belong ing to Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh. Thereupon an offence under s. 452 read with s. 147 of the Indian Penal Code was registered by the police on Jan nary 27,

1956. A large procession consisting of the workers of the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh was ta.ken out.

This procession marched through the city of Nagpur shout ing slogans which, according to the District Magistrate, were provocative. On the same night a meeting was held at the Kasturchand Park in which it was alleged that the workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh were instigated by the speakers who addressed the meeting to offer satyagraha in front of the Empress Mill No. I and also to take out a procession to the office of the Rashttiya Mill Majdoor Sangh.

On January 28, 1956, the workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh assembled in large numbers in Mahal Chowk and on Mahal road blocking the traffic on the road. It is said that these persons were squat. ting on the road and as they refused to budge tlie District Magistrate passed an order at 4-00 a..m. on January 29, 1956, which came into force immediately and was to remain in force for a. period of fifteen days prohibiting, among other things, the assembly of five or more persons in certain areas specified in the order.

The petitioner entertained the view that the order . promulgated by the District Magistrate . under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was an encroach ment on the fundamental rights of the citizens to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably and without arms, guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) and (b) of the Constitution and, therefore, he held a public meeting outside the area covered by the aforesaid order. It is alleged that at that meeting he criticised the District Magistrate and exhorted the workers to contravene his order and take out proces sions in the area covered by the order. Thereupon he was arrested by the Nagpur police for having committed the offences already referred to and producd before a magistrate. The magistrate f<'llrn.nded him to

Ijail custody till February 15, 1956. The petitioner's application for bail was rejected on the ground that the accusation against him related to a non-bailable offence. Thereupon the petitioner moved the High Court at Nagpur for his release on bail but his application was rejected on February 22, 1956. The petitioner then presented a petition before the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a writ of habeas corpus; That petition was dismissed by the High Court on May 9, 1956. The petitioner then moved the High Court for granting a certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution. The High Court refused to grant the certificate on the ground that in its opinion the case did not involve any substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and was also not otherwise fit for grant of a certificate. On April 23, 1956, the petitioner presented the present petition before this Court. The petitioner also sought an ex parte order for the stay of the proceedings before the respondent No. 4 till the decision on the petition to this Court.

Th is Court admitted the petition but rejected the application for stay. On May 6, 1956, the petitioner took out a notice of motion for securing stay of the proceedings before respondent No. 4. On May 28, 1956, this Court ordered that the entire prosecution evidence be recorded but the delivery of the judgment be stayed pending the decision of this petition.

After the proceedings were stayed by this Court, the petitioner was released on bail by the trying magistrate. .

On behalf of the petitioner Mr. Mani has raised the following contentions:

(l) That s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it relates to placing of restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly confers very wide powers on the District Magistrate and certain other magistrates and thus places unreasonable restrictions on the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.

(2) The District Magistrate constitutes the whole legal machinery and the only check for control on

Baulal Parale v.

State of Maharashtra

M udholkar J.

Babulal ParaJe

Stale of Maharashtra

Mudholkar ].

his powers is by way of a petition to him to modify or rescind the order, that thus the District Magistrate becomes" a judge in his f)Wn cause"-presum. ably, what learned counsel means is a judge with regard to his own decision-and so the remedy afforded by the section is illusory. Further the remedy by way of a revision application before the High Court against the order of the District Magistrate is also illusory and thus in effect there can be no judicial review of his order in the proper sense of that expression.

(3) Section 144 adopts "likelihood" or "tendency" a; i tests for judging criminality ; the test of deter. mining the criminality in advance is unreasonable.

(4) Section 144 substitutes suppression of lawful activity or right for the duty of public authorities to maintain order.

(5) Even assuming that s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not ultra vires the Constitution, the order passed by the District Magistrate in this case places restrictions which go far beyond the scope of clauses (2) and (3) of Art. 19 and thus that order is unconstitutional.

Learned counsel also challenged the validity of the order on grounds other than constitutional, but we need not consider them here since it will be open to the petitioner to raise them at the trial. This being a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner must restrict himself to those grounds which fall within cl. ( 1) thereof.

We think it desirable to reproduce the whole of s. 144.

"(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sub.

Divisional Magistrate, or of any other Magistrate (not being a Magistrate of the third class) specially empowered by the ' State Government' or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magis. trate to act under this section there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and im. mediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such.Magistrate may, by a written order stating

the material facts of the case and served in manner provided by section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillty or a riot, or an affray.

(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte.

(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place.

(4) Any Magistrate may, eithn on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by his predecessor in office.

(5) Where such an application is received, the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for doing. ·

(6) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof; unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the ' State Government ' by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs." Sub-section (1) confers powers not on the executive but on certain Magistrates. This provision has been amended in some States, as for instance, the former Bombay State where power has been conferred on the

Commisioner of Police to pass an order thereunder.

But we are not concerned with that matter here

Babula! Parate v.

State of

M ahaf'a$hlra

.. \1 udh(llkar J.

Babulal Parate

State of Maharashtra

M udholkar J.

because that provision is not contained in the law as applicable to the former State of Madhya Pradesh

with which alone we are concerned in the matter before us. Under sub-s. (1) the Magistrate himself has to form an opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. Again the subsection requires the Magistrate to make an order in writing and state therein the material facts by reason of which he is making the order thereunder. The subsection further enumerates the particular activities with regard to which the Magistrate is entitled to place restraints.

Sub-section (2) requires the Magistrate ordinarily to serve a notice on the person against whom the order is directed and empowers him to proceed ex parte only where the circumstances do not admit of serving such a notice in due time.

Sub-section (3) does not require any comment.

Suh-secion (4) enables a Magistrate to rescind or alter an order made under this section and thus enables the person affected, if the order is addressed_to a specified individual, or any member of the public, if the order is addressed to the public in general, to seek, by making an application, exemption from compliance with the order or to seek a modification of the order and thus gives him an opportunity to satisfy the Magistrate about his grievances. The Magistrate has to deal with applications of this kind judicially . because he is required by sub-s. (5) to state his reasons for rejecting, wholly or in part, the application made to him.

Finally the normal maximum duration of the order is two months from the date of its making. The restraints imposed by the order are thus intended to be of a temporary nature.

Looking at the section as a whole it would be clear that, broadly speaking, it is intended to be availed of for preventing disorders, obstructions and annoyances and is intended to secure the public weal. The powers are exercisable by responsible magistrates and these magistrates have to act judicially. Moreover, the

restraints permissible under the provision are of a temporary nature and can only be imposed in an emergency.

Even so, according to th.e learned counsel these provisions place unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights of citizens.

Firstly, according to learned counsel restrictions on the rights guaranteed by els. (2) and (3) of Art. 19 of the Constitution can be placed in the interest of "public order " and not in the interest of the "general public", which expression, according to him is wider in its ambit than public order and that since s. 144 enables a magistrate to pass an order in the interest of the general public the restrictions it authorises are beyond those permissible under els. (2) and (3) of Art. 19. It is significant to note that s. 144 nowhere uses the expression "general public". Some of the objects for securing which an order thereunder can be passed are, " to prevent obstruction, annoyance, injury ......... " etc. No doubt, the prevention of such . activities would be in the "public interest" but it would be no less in the interest of maintenance of " public order, "

Secondly, according to learned counsel, s. 144 is an amalgam of a number of things to many of which there is no reference even in cl. (2) of Art. l!J. In order to enable the State to avail of the provisions of els. (2) and (3), he contends, a special law has to be passed and a provision like s. 144 can serve no purpose. This contention has only to be mentioned to be rejected.

Clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19 do not require the ma.king of a law solely for the purpose of placing the restrictions mentioned in them.

Thirdly, according to learned counsel sub-s. (1) of s. 144 does not require the. magistrate to make an enquiry as to the circumstances which necessitate the making of an order thereunder.

It is true that there is no express mention anywhere in s. 144 that the order of the magistrate should be preceded by an enquiry.

But we must construe the section as a whole. The latter part of sub-s. (1) of s. 144 specifically mentions that t.he ordAr of the magistrate should set out the

Babulal Pafate

State of Maharashtra

Mudholkar ].

Babulal Parate v.

State of Maharashtra

Mudholkar ].

material facts of the case. It would not be possible for the magistrate to set out the facts unless he makes an enquiry or unless he is satisfied about the facts from personal knowledge or on a report made to him which he prima f acie accepts as correct. Clearly, therefore, the section does not confer an arbitrary power on the magistrate in the matter of making an order.

It is contended that s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers very wide powers upon certain magistrates and that in exercise of those powerst-he magist, rates can place very severe restrictions upon the rights of citizens tb freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably and without. arms.

It seems to us, however, that wide though the power appears to be, it can be exercised only in an emergency and for the purpose of preventing obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot, or "an affray".

These factors condition the exercise of the power and it would consequently be wrong to regard , that power as being unlimited or untrammelled. Further, it should be borne in mind that no one has a right tQ cause " obstruction, annoyance or injury:. etc.," to anyone.

Since the judgment has to be ofa .magistrate. as to whether in the particular circumstances of a. case an order, in exercise of these powers, should be made or not, we are entitled to assume that the powers will be exercised legitimately and honestly. The section cannot be struck down on the ground that the magistrate may possibly abuse bis powers.

It is also true that initially it.is the magistrate con. cerned who has to form an opinion as to the necessity of 'ma.king an order" The question, therefore, is whether the conferral of such a wide power a.mounts to an infringement of the rights guaranteed. under Art. 19(l)(a) and (b) of the. Constitution. The rights guaranteed by sub-cl. (a) are not absolute rights but are subject to limitations specified in cl. (2) of Art. 19 which ruris thus:

"Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) sh.all affect . the operation of any existing law, or. prevent the

State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exe.rcise of the right conferred by the Raid sub-cl>tuse in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to con tern pt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. " Sirnil_arly therights to which sub-cl. (b) relates are subject to the limitations to be found in cl. (3) of Art. 19, which runs thus :

"Nothing in wb-clause (b) of the said clause shall

.. affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order, reasonable restrictioi1s on the exercise of the right conferred bv the said sub-clause." The Co, de of Criminal Procedure was an existing law a.t the commencement of the Constitution. and so, in the context of the. grounds on which its yalidity is challenged before us, what we have to ascertain is whether the , conform! . thereunder of a po, ver on a . magistrate to place restrictions on the rights to which

sub, cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 19 relate is reasonabl~. It must be borne in mind that the provisions of s. 1'14 are attracted only in an emergency. Thereunder, the :initial judge of the emergency is, no doubt., the District

M><gistrate or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the sub-divisional magistrate or any other magistrate , specially empowered by the State Government. But then, the maintenance of Jaw and order being the duty and function of the executive department of the State it is ine, itable that the question of formation of the .opinion as to whether there is an emergency or not , must necessarily rest, in the first mstance, with those , persons through whom the executive exercises its

4functions and discharges its duties.

It would, be , impracticable and even impossible to expect the State

Gov.ernment itself. to exercise those duties and func- , tio-ns in , each and every case. The provisions of the 'section therefore which commit the power in this regard . to a magistrate belonging to. any of the classes referred , to :therein: cannot be regarded as unreasonable. We

Babulal Parate

v" State of Maharashtra

M1tdholkar ].

Babulal Parate

State of M aharashlra

M udholkar J.

ma.y a.lso point out tha.t the satisfaction of the magistrte as to the necessity of promulgating an order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not made entirely subjective by the section. . We may also mention that though in an appropriate case a magistrate is empowered to make an order under this section ex parte the law requires that he should, where possible serve a notice on the person or persons against whom the order is directed before passing that order.

Then sub-s. (4) provides that any magistrate may either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section. This clearly shows that even where an ex parte order is made the person or persons affected thereby have a right to challenge the order of the magistrate. Sub-s. (5) provides that where such a challenge is ma.de, the magistrate shall give an early opportunity to the person concerned of appearing before him and showing cause against the order. The decision of the magistratein such a proceeding would undoubtedly be a judicial one inasmuch as it will have been arrived at after hearing the party affected by the order. Since the proceeding before the magistrate would be a judicial one, he will have to set aside the order unless he comes to the conclusion that the grounds on which it rests are in law sufficient to warrant it. Further, since the propriety of the order is open to challenge it cannot be said that by reason of the wide amplitude of the power which s. 144 confers on certain magistrates it places unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights.

Learned counsel, however, says that the right oonfe1red on the aggrieved person to challenge the order of the magistrate is illusory as he would be a judge with regard to his own decision. This argument would equally apply to an application for review ma.de in a civil proceeding and we do not think tha.·~ it is at all a good one. Again, though no appeal ha.a been provided in the Code against the Magistrate's order under s. 144, the High Court has power under s. 435 read with s. 439 of the Code to entertain an application for the revision of such an order, The vawers of the High Court ill

dealing with a revision application are wide enough to enable it to quash an order which cannot be supported by the materials upon which it is supposed to be based.

We may point out that suh.s. (1) of s. 144 requires a magistrate who makes an order thereunder to state therein the material facts upon which it is based and thus the High Court will have before it relevant material and would be in a position to consider for itself whether that material is adequate or not.

As an instance of a case where the High Court interfered with an order of this kind, we may refer to a decision in P. T. Chandra, Editor, Tribune v. Emperor(1). There, the learned judges quite correctly pointed out that the propriety of the order as well as its legality can he considered by the High Court in revision, though in examining the propriety of the order the High Court will give due weight to the opinion of the District Magistrate who is the man on the spot and responsible for the maintenance of public peace in the district. In that case the learned judges set aside an order of the District Magistrate upon the ground that there was no connection between the act prohibited and the danger apprehended to prevent which the order was passed.

We would also like to point out that the penalty for infringing an order under s. 144 is that provided in s. 188, Indian Penal Code. When, therefore, a prosecution is launched thereunder, the validity of the order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, could be challenged. We are, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Mani's contention that the remedy of judicial review is illusory.

The argument that the test of determining criminality in advance is unreasonable, is apparently founded upon the doctrine adumbrated in Scheneck's case(') that previous restraints on the exercise of fundamental rights are permissible only if there be a clear and present danger. It seems to us, however, that the American doctrine cannot be imported under our Constitution because the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19 (l) of the Constitution are not absolute rights but, as pointed out in State of Madras

(I) A.I.R. 1942 Lah. 171.

(2) Schen"k v. U. S., 249 U. S, 47.

I96I

Babulal Parate

State of Maharashtra

M udholkar ] •

SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1961] '"' '\ 1961 \ v. V. G. Row(') are snbject to. the restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Art. 19. There is nothing Babull Parate . h A C · d" 1 (2 mt e mencan onst1tut10n corre,<p_on mg to. c s. )

- v: State of to (6) of Art. 19_ of our Constitution •... The Fourteenth Maharashtra Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, among other things, , that '.' nci State shall m<1.ke or .enforce Mudholkar J. anyJaw which shall abridge the privileges or immunities ofcitizens of the United States ;'nor shall any State _depl:ive any person of _life, liberty, or property, -without due process of law; ...... ,. . - The framework of our Constitution is different from that of the Constitution of the United States.· Then agafo.; the Supreme Court of. the United. States has he!d that the privileges and immunities conferred by the. Constitution are subject to social control by resort to the doctrine of police power. ' It-is .in:the light of this background that the testlaid do'wn .in Scheneck's case (') has to be understood. ., . _ _ .. . . . ·. \The language of s. 144, is somewhat different.·.· The test laid down in the section is not merely "likelihood''. or', "tendency". The section says that the magistrate must lie satisfied that-:immediate preven" tion of particular acts is necessary to counteract danger to. public safety. etc. , The power conferred _by the seCtion is -exercisable not only where present danger exists but is exercisable also , when there is an apprehension :of danger. " . -· .. ·· : Ap.art from this it is worthy of note that in Scheneck's case(') the Supreme Court was concerned with the right 'of freedom of speech and it observed : • . · . . _ . "It well. may be that _the prohiliition of law abridging the. freedom of speech is not. confin_ed to -. previous .restraints, although to prevent them may

 have been the main purpose ...•...... , Ve admit that ill '.' many 'places and in ordinary times the defendants, . , in sayin1(all. that.was said .in the circular, would.

hav:e been within their c~:1stitutional rights. But '', the character of every act depentb npun the circum-

' stances in which it is done ... .'.~ ... The most strincrent

. -., ' ' ' 0 . protection of free 'speech would not protect a. man .· .flsely shouting fire . in a: theatre, and causing a

11> 1195•J s.c.R. 597. <•1 249v:s;· 47.

panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force ......... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

Whatever may be the position in the United States it seems to us clear that anticipatory action of the kind permissible under s. 144 is not impermissible under els. (2) aud (3) of Art. 19. Both in cl. (2) (as amended in 1951) and in cl. (3) power is given to the legislature to make laws placing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by these clauses in the interest, among other things, of public order. Public order has to be maintained in advance in order to ensure it and, therefore, it is competent to a legislature to pass a law permitting an appropriate authority to take anticipatory action or place anticipatory restrictions upon particular kinds of acts in an emergency for the purpose of maintaining public order.

We must, therefore, reject the contention.

It is no doubt true that since the duty to maintain law and order is cast upon the Magistrate, he must perform that duty and not shirk it by prohibiting or restricting the normal activities of the citizen. But it is difficult to say that an anticipatory action taken by such an authority in an emergency where danger to public order is genuinely apprehended is anything other than an action done in the discharge of the duty to maintain order. In such circumstances that could be the only mode of discharging the duty. We, therefore, reject the contention that s. 144 substitutes suppression of lawful activity or right for the duty of public authorities to maintain order.

Coming to the order itself we must consider certain objections of Mr. Mani which are, in effect, that there are three features in the order which make it unconstitutional. In the first place, according to him the order is directed against the entire pubiic though the magistrate has stated clearly that it was promulgated

Babulal Parale

State of Maharashtra

M udholkar J.

I96I because of the serious turn which an industrial dispute Bab.Ual p.,.1, had taken. Mr. Ma.ni con tends that it is unreasonable v.

State of Maharashtra

to place restrictions on the movements of the public in general when there is nothing to suggest that members of the public were likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to public order. It is true that Mudh•lkar ]. h b t ere is no suggest10n that the general pu lie was involved in the industrial dispute. It is also true that by operation of the order the movements of the members of the public would be restricted in particular areas. But it seems to us that it would be extremely

( difficult for those who are in charge of law and order to differentiate between members of the public and members of the two textile unions and, therefore, the only practical way in which the particular activities

- referred to in the ord, er could be restrained or restricted would be by making those restrictiom1 applicable to the public generally.

The right of citizens to take out processions or to hold public meetings flows from the right in Art. 19(l)(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to move anywhere in the territ, ory of India. If, therefore, any members of the public unconnected with the two textile unions wanted to exercise these rights it was open to them to move the District Magistrate and apply for a modification of the order by grantinp them an exemption from the restrictions placed by the order.

Mr. Mani's contention, and that is his second ground of attack on the Magistrate's order, is that the only exception made in the order is with respect to funeral processions and religious processions and, therefore, it would not have been possible to secure the District Magistrate's permission for going out in procession for some other purpose or for assembling for some other purpose in the area to which the order applied. So far as the customary religious or ftHleral processions are concerned, the exemption has been granted in the order itself that if anyone wanted to take out a procession for some other purpose which was lawful it was open to them under s. 144, sub-s. (4), to apply for an alteration of the order and obtain a special exemption.

Mere omission of the District Magistrate to make the exemption clause of the order more comprehensive would not, in our opinion, vitiate the order on the ground that it places unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights of citizens. The third and last ground on which Mr. Mani challenged the constitutionality of the order was that while the order prohibits the shouting of provocative slogans in public places etc., it does not give any definition of what was meant by the expression "provocative slogans". Therefore, according to Mr. Mani,

his order is vague and must be deemed to be placing unreasonable restrictions on the rights of free speech of citizens. It seems to us.that the expression" provocative slogans " has necessarily to be understood in the context in which it has been used in th11 order and, therefore, it cannot be regarded as vague.

We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the order of the District Magistrate is not unconstitutional either because s. 144 is itself violative of fundamental rights recognised in Art. 19 or on the ground that it is vague and places unreasonable restrictions on those fundamental rights.

We, therefore, dismiss this petition.

Shortly after this petition was ma.de to this Court, the petitioner presented a special leave petition in which he eeks to challenge the judgment of the Nagpur High Court dated April 9, 1956, dismissing his writ petition to that High Court. The points raised in the Special Leave Petition a.re similar to those raised in this petition. Since we are dismissing this petition, there can be no question of granting the special leave to the petitioner to appeal against the judgment of the Nagpur High Court.

Pet it ion dismissed.

Babulal PartJle

Stal• of M allarashtra

Mudholkar ).

British India

Bhor State

BABULAL PARATE

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

B. P. SINHA, C.J.

s. K. DAS

A. K. SARKAR

N. RAJAG-O~ALA AYYANGAR

Code of Criminal Procedure

Constitution of India

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

ss. 143

Indian Penal Code

s. 491

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 32

s. 144

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 19

Art. 19

P. T. Chandra

India

Art. 19(1)

s. 144

S. 249

S. 47

Art. 32

Constitution of India

R. V. S. Mani

N. S. Bindra

L. Hathi

R. H. Dhebar

MUDHOLKAR

Art. 32

s. 144

Indian Penal Code

Nagpur

Rashtriya Mill. Majdoor Sangh

Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh

Indian National Trade Union Congress

Rashtriya Mill l\fajdoor Sangh

Empress Mills

Nagpur Mil! Majdoor Sangh

January 25, 1956

State of M

Mutlholkar

Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh

s. 452

s. 147

Indian Penal Code

Jan nary 27,

1956

Empress Mill No. I

Rashttiya Mill Majdoor Sangh

January 28, 1956

January 29, 1956

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 19(l)(a)

Nagpur police

High Court at Nagpur

February 22, 1956

s. 491

Code of Criminal Procedure

May 9, 1956

Art. 132

April 23, 1956

May 6, 1956

May 28, 1956

Mani

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 19(l)(a)

M udholkar

Babulal ParaJe

Section 144

Section 144

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 19

Art. 32

s. 144

Chief Presidency Magistrate

section 134

Bombay

Babulal Parate

State of Maharashtra

Art. 19

s. 144

Art. 19

s. 144

s. 144

s. 144

Art. 19

s. 144

s. 144

s. 144

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

Art. 19(l)(a)

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19

s. 1

Chief Presidency Magistrate

s. 144

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 144

s. 144

s. 435

s. 439

s. 144

s. 144

s. 188

Indian Penal Code

s. 144

Criminal Procedure Code

Scheneck

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19

Mudholkar

nci State shall m<1.ke or .enforce Mudholkar J. anyJaw which shall abridge the privileges or immunities ofcitizens of the United States ;'nor shall any State depl:ive any person of life, liberty, or property, -without due process of law; ...... ,. . -

United States

Supreme Court of. the United. States

s. 144

Supreme Court

s. 144

Art. 19

s. 144

Maharashtra

Ual

Ma.ni

Art. 19(l)(b)

s. 144

s. 144

Art. 19

Nagpur High Court

Babulal PartJle


Januayy Ia.

SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS [1961]

GOP AL VIN AY AK GODSE

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS;

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,

. K. SUBBA RAO, K. N. w ANOHOO and.

J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Habeas Corpus-Sentence-Transportation for life--:Imprisonc ment for life, if equivalent to any fixed term-Remissions, right to- When can be taken into consideration-Indian Penal Code, r86o (XLV of r86o), s. 53A-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (V of 1898), s. 401.

The petitioner was convicted in r949 and sentenced to transportation for life.

He earned remission of 2963 days and adding this to the term of imprisonment actually served by the petitioner the aggregate exceeded 20 years. The petitioner contended that his further detention in jail was illegal and prayed for being set at liberty: Held, that the petitioner had not yet acquired.any right to be released. A sentence of transportation for life could be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India. Section 53A of the Indian Penal Code, introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, r955, provided that any person sentenced to transportation for life before the Amendment Act would be treated as sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life.

A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was bound to _ _serve the remainder of his life_ ill prison unless the sentence was commuted or remitte.d by the appropriate authority. Such a sentence could not be equated with any fixed term. The rules framed under the Prisons Act entitled such a prisoner to earn remissions but su-ch rernissions were to be taken into account only towards the end of the term. The question of remissions was exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government. In the present case though the Government had made certain remissions under s. 4or of the Code of Criminal_Procedure, it had not remitted the entire sentence.

Pandit Kishori Lal v. King-Emperor, (r944) L.R. 72 I.A. r, referred to.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 305/1960.

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

Petitioner in person.

Fl. N.· Sanyal, Additional Solieilor-Genral of India and R. Fl. Dhebar, for the respondents.

1961. January 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SuBBA RAO, J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for an order in the nature of habeas corpus claiming that the petitioner has justly served his sentence and should, therefore, be released.

On February 10, 1949, the Judge, Special Court, Red Fort, Delhi, convicted the petitioner for offences under s. 3, read with s. 6, of the Explosive Substances Act, under s. 4(b) and s. 5 thereof, and for murder under s. 302, read with s. 109, of the Indian Penal Code; for the first two offences he was sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and five years' rigorous imprisonment respectively and for the third offence to transportation for life and all the sentences were directed to run concurrently. After conviction he was imprisoned in jails in the State of Punjab till May 19, 1950, and thereafter he was transferred to N asik Road Central Prison in the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra). According to the petitioner, he has earned the following remissions up to September 30, 1960:

(a) Ordinary remission 836 days

(b) Special re_mission 206 days

(c) Physical training remission 113 days

(d) Literary remission 108 days

(e) Annual good conduct remission 250 days

(f) Sta, te remission 1380 days The total of the remissions earned is 2,893 days; but the State in its counter-affidavit state that the petitioner has earned up to the said date remission of 2,963 days. The figure given by the State may be accepted as correct for the purpose of this petition. If the amount of remissions thus earned was added to the term of imprisonment the petitioner has actually served, the aggregate would exceed 20 years, and even if only the State remission was added to it, it would exceed 15 years. The petitioner, claiming that under the relevant provisions governing his imprisonment bis further detention in jail would be illegal, prays that he might be set at liberty forthwith. The State, while conceding that he had earned remissions 56

Gopal' V inayak

Godse

State bf l1f aharashtra

Subba Rao].

I96I

Gopal V inayak Godse v.

State of Maharashtra

Subba Rao].

amounting to 2,963 days, alleged in the counter. affidavit that the remissions earned did not entitle him to be released and that under the rules the question of his release would be considered only after he completed 15 years' actual imprisonment.

The petitioner argued his case in person. He rejected the help of an advocate as amicus curiae to assist him.

In the circumstances, his argument was based more on emotional plane than on legal basis. But as the liberty of a citizen is involved, we have gone through the relevant provisions and considered the possible contentions that. may be raised on the basis of the said provisions.

The first question that falls to be decided is whether, under the relevant statutory provisions, au accused who was sentenced to transportation for life, could legally be imprisoned in cne of the jails in India ; and if so, what was the term for which he could be so imprisoned. We shall briefly notice the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code before it was amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act XXVI of 1955.

Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code set out six different punishments to which offenders were liable. The second of those punishments was transportation and the fourth was imprisonment which was of two descriptions, namely, rigorous and simple. The word" transportation " was not defined in the Indian Penal Code, but it was for life with two exceptions. Under s. 55 of the Indian Penal Code, "In every case in which sentence of transportation for life shall have been passed, the Provincial Government of the Province within which the offender shall have been sentenced may, without the c01rnent of the offender, commute the punishment for imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding fourteen years." Under s. 58 thereof, in every case in which a sentence of transportation was passed, the offender, until he was transported, should be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and should be held to have been undergoing his sentence of transportation during the term of his imprisonment. It was averred on behalf of the

State that the petitioner's sentence had not been commuted under s. 55 of the Indian Penal Code or under s. 402 {l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to oneofrigorous imprisonment. We have no reason for not accE, pting this statement. On that basis, a question ari; es whether the petitioner, who was sentenced to transportation, could be dealt with legally as if he were a person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment.

This question was raised before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal v. King.

Emperor (1).

After considering the history of the sentence of transportation, the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prisons Act, th<> Privy Council came to the conclusion that the said provisions made it plain that when a sentence of transportation had been passed it was no longer necessarily a sentence of transportation beyond the seas. It was observed at p. 9 thus:

"But at the present day transportation is in truth but a name given in India to a sentence for life and, in a few special cases, for a lesser period, just as in England the term imprisonment is applied to all sentences which do not exceed two years and penal servitude to those of three years and upwards ...... ............ ...... So, in India, a prisoner sentenced to transportation may be sent to the Andamans or may be kept in one of the jails in India appointed for transportation prisoners, where he will be dealt with in the same manner as a prisoner sentenced to rigorous imprisonment." In view of this weighty authority with which we agree, it is not necessary to consider the relevant provisions, particularly in view of s. 53A of the Indian Penal Code which has been added by Act XXVI of 1955.

Section 53A of tb e said Code reads :

"(l) .........

(2) In every casein which a sentence of transportation for a term has been passed before the commencement of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1954, the offender shall be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to rigorous 1mpnsonment for the same term."

(1) (194'!) L.R. 72 I.A. 1.

Go pal V inayak

Godse v.

State of Maharashtra

Subba Rao].

I96I

Gopal Vinayak

Godse

State of .. lf aharashlf'a

Suliba Rao.!

Whatever justification there might have been for the contention that a person sentenced to transportation could not be legally made to undergo rigorous imprisonment in a jail in India except temporarily till he was so transported, subsequent to the said amendment there is none. Under that section, a person transported for life or any other term before the enactment of the said section would be treated as a person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term.

If so, the next question is whether there is any proviflion of law whereunder a sentence for life impri, onment, without any formal remission by appropriate Government, oa n be automatically treated as one for a definite period No such provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Government of India stated before the .Judicial Committee in the case cited supra that, having regard to s. 57 of the Indian Penal Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent to a sentence of transportation for life, the Judicial Committee did not express its final opinion on that question. The Judicial Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:

" Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as one of twent.y years, and subject to remission for good conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient to entitle him to discharge at the time of his application, and it was therefore rightly dismissed, but in saying this, their Lordships are not to be taken as meaning that a life sentence must and in all cases be treated as one of not more than twenty years, or that the convict is necessarily entitled to remission." Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no real bearing 011 the question raised before us. For calculating fractions uf terms of punishment the section provides that transportation for life shall be regarded as equivalent to imprisonment. for twenty years. It does not say that transportation for life shall be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all purposes ; nor does the amended section which substitutes the words "imprisonment for life " for " transportation for life" enable the drawing of any such all-embracing fiction.

A sentenee of transportation for life or

imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life.

It is said that the Bombay rules governing the remission system substituted a definite period for life imprisonment and, therefore, if the aggregate of the term actually served exceeds the said period, the person would be entitled to be released. To appreciate this contention the relevant Bombay rules may be read. Release.

Rule 934. " In n, ll cases of premature releases, orders under Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, will have to b!) issued by Government beforethe prisoners can actually be released from Jail."

Rule 937. ( c) " When a life con vi ct or a prisoner in whose case the State Government has passed an order forbidding his release without reference to it, has earned such remission as would entitle him to relea"e but for the provisions of this .rule, the Superintendent shall report accordingly to the State Government through the Inspector-General in order that his case may be considered with reference to Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898."

The Remission System: Rule 1419. (c) "A sentence of transportation for life shall ordinarily be taken as 15 yea.rs' actual imprisonment." Review of Sentences: Rule 1447. (2) "Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 1419 no prisoner who has been sentenced to transportation for life or inore than 14 years, imprisonment or to transportation and imprisonment or to transportation and imprisonment for terms exceeding in the aggregate 14 years shall be released on completion of his term of transportation or imprisonment or both, as the case may be, including all remissions unless a report with respect to such prisoner has beAn made under sub-rule (l) and orders of Government have been received thereon with regard to the date of his final release." It is common case that the said rules were ma.de under the Prisons Act, 1894, and that they have

Gopal Vinayak

Godse v.

StaJ1 of M aharaslttra

Subba Rao].

Gopal V inayak

God'>t

Sta'e of Maharashtra

Subba Rao J.

statutory force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good conduct, namely, (i) ordinary, (ii) special and

(iii) State. For the working out of the , said remissions under rule l419(c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as 15 years' actual imprionment. The rule cannot be construed as a statutory equation of 15 years' actual imprisonment for transportation for life. The equation is only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of " remission system " a.nd not for all purposes. The word " ordinarily" in the rule also supports the said construction. The non obstante clause in sub-rule (2) of rule 1447 reiterates tha.t notwithstanding anything containAd in rule 1419 no prisoner ho has been sentenced to tra.nsporta.tion for life shall be released on completion of his term unless orders of Government have been received on a. report submitted to it. This also indicates tha.t the period of 15 years' a.ctua.l imprisonment specified in the rule is only for the purpose of calculating the remission and tha.t the completion of the term on that ha.sis does not ipso faclo confer a.ny right upon the prisoner to release. The order of Government contemplated in rule 1447 in the case of a. prisoner sentenced to tra.nsporta.tion for life ca.n only be an order under s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for in the ca.se of a. sentence of transportation for life the release of the prisoner can legally be effected only by remitting the entire ha.la.nee of the sentence. Rules 934 a.nd 937(c) provide for tha.t contingency. Under the sa.id rules the orders of an a.ppropria.te Government under s. 401, Criminal Pruceuure Code, a.re a. prerequisite for a. release. No other rule ha.s been brought to our notice which confers a.u indefeasible right on a.

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COUltT REPORTS 447

prisoner sentenced to transportation for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term including remissions. The rules under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life.

Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act XXVI of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life con Id be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India.

After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term. Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the [ndian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions-ordinary, special and State-and the said remissions will be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the purpose of working out the remissions the sentence of transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for any other purpose.

As the sentence uf transportation for life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predicate the time of his death. That is why the rules provide for a procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit the sentence under s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on a consideration of the relevant factors, including the period of remissions earned. The questiun of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence.

We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any right to release,

Gopal Vinayak

Godse v.

State of Maharashb'a

Subba Rao .f.

Gopal Vinayak Godse v.

Stale of lvf aharashtra

Subba Rao].

IQ6I fj - ' January zz.

The petitioner made an impassioned appeal to us that if such a construction be accepted, he would be at the mercy of the appropriate Government and that the said Government, out of spite, might not remit the balance of his sentence, with the result that he would be deprived of the fruits of remissions earned by him for sustained good conduct, useful service and evPn donation of blood. The Constitution as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure confer the power to remit a sentence on the executive Government and it is in its exclusive province. \Ve cannot assume that the appropriate Government will not exercise its jurisdiction in a reasonable manner.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the petitioner is under legal detention and the petition for habeas corpus is not maintainable. The petition is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

RABIABAI v.

THE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE

PROPERTY.

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,

K. SUBB:. RAO, K. N. W ANCHOO and

J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Evacuee Properly-Sale before enactment of evacuee laws- Confirmation of sale-Vendor inteniling to defeat apprehended evacuee .laws-Good faith, if lacking-Administration of Evacuee

Property Act, r950 (XXXI of r950). s. 40(4)(a).

M who had gone to Pakistan in 1947, sold his property in the State of Madras to the appellant on August II, 1949. At that time there was no legislation with respect to evacuee property in Madras. On August 23, 1949, the Administration of Evac- Property (Chief Commissioners Provinces) Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), was extended to Madras. The appellant made an application for the confirmation of the sale. Subsequently, M was declared an evacuee and the property as evacuee property. It was found that M had entered into the transaction with the object of evading the evacuee Jaw which it was apprehended, would be extended to Madras. Consequently, confirmation of the sale was refused under s. 40(4)(a) of the Administration of Evacuee

Januayy Ia.

Januayy Ia.

GOP AL VIN AY AK GODSE

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS;

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,

.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

A. K. SARKAR

K. SUBBA RAO

R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.

Indian Penal Code

s. 53A

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 401

India

Section 53A

Indian Penal Code

Prisons Act

s. 4

Article 32

Constitution of India

N.· Sanyal

R. Fl. Dhebar

SuBBA RAO

Art. 32

February 10, 1949

Special Court, Red Fort, Delhi

s. 3

s. 6

Explosive Substances Act

s. 4(b)

s. 5

s. 302

s. 109

Indian Penal Code

Punjab

May 19, 1950

Bombay

Gopal V

Indian Penal Code

Section 53

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

s. 55

Indian Penal Code

s. 58

s. 55

Indian Penal Code

s. 402

Code of Criminal Procedure

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Prisons Act

England

s. 53A

Indian Penal Code

Section 53A

L.R. 72 I.A. 1

Go pal V inayak

State of .. lf aharashlf'a

Suliba Rao

Government of India

s. 57

Indian Penal Code

Section 57

Indian Penal Code

Section 401

Criminal Procedure Code

Section 401

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

Prisons Act, 1894

Gopal V

Subba Rao

Prisons Act

Section 59

Prisons Act

s. 401

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 401

Criminal Pruceuure Code

Prisons Act

Before Act XXVI of 1955

Penal Code or the Code

Prisons Act

s. 401

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 401

Code of Criminal Procedure

Gopal Vinayak Godse

Code of Criminal Procedure

RABIABAI

CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE

K. SUBB:. RAO

K. N. W ANCHOO

Property Act

s. 40(4)(a)

Pakistan

Madras

August 23, 1949

s. 40(4)(a)


Gopal Vinayak Godse v.

Stale of lvf aharashtra

Subba Rao].

IQ6I fj - ' January zz.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1961]

The petitioner made an impassioned appeal to us that if such a construction be accepted, he would be at the mercy of the appropriate Government and that the said Government, out of spite, might not remit the balance of his sentence, with the result that he would be deprived of the fruits of remissions earned by him for sustained good conduct, useful service and evPn donation of blood. The Constitution as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure confer the power to remit a sentence on the executive Government and it is in its exclusive province. \Ve cannot assume that the appropriate Government will not exercise its jurisdiction in a reasonable manner.

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the petitioner is under legal detention and the petition for habeas corpus is not maintainable. The petition is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

RABIABAI v.

THE CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE

PROPERTY.

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,

K. SUBB:. RAO, K. N. W ANCHOO and

J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Evacuee Properly-Sale before enactment of evacuee laws- Confirmation of sale-Vendor inteniling to defeat apprehended evacuee .laws-Good faith, if lacking-Administration of Evacuee

Property Act, r950 (XXXI of r950). s. 40(4)(a).

M who had gone to Pakistan in 1947, sold his property in the State of Madras to the appellant on August II, 1949. At that time there was no legislation with respect to evacuee property in Madras. On August 23, 1949, the Administration of Evac- Property (Chief Commissioners Provinces) Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), was extended to Madras. The appellant made an application for the confirmation of the sale. Subsequently, M was declared an evacuee and the property as evacuee property. It was found that M had entered into the transaction with the object of evading the evacuee Jaw which it was apprehended, would be extended to Madras. Consequently, confirmation of the sale was refused under s. 40(4)(a) of the Administration of Evacuee

Property Act, 1950, on the ground that the transaction had not been entered into in good faith. The appellant contended that Rabia Bai there was no lack of good faith on the part of M as he could not be said to have acted dishonestly when at the time of the sale no c d. v. G , 1 h b

1. d M d d th t uslo ian- '""""" evacuee aw ad een app 1e to a ras an at an tn ent1on to ,, E P p 1 avoid a future law could not be said to be dishonest. 01 vacuee ' 0 er: Held, that the vendor had not entered into the transaction in "good faith'" and the confirmation of the sale was rightly refused under s. 40(4)(a) of the Act.

Having regard to the aim and object of the emergency legislation a deliberate intention to defeat the apprehended evacuee law motivating a sale amounted to want of "good faith'". If the vendor sold his property not for any necessity or any other legitimate purpose but solely with the object of converting it into cash and removing it to Pakistan, he intended to defeat the provisions of the evacuee law which he knew was to be extended to Madras soon and he acted dishonestly within the meaning of s. 40(4)(a}.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1956.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 4, 1954, of the Custodian-General,

Evacuee Property, in Revenue Case No.

427/R/ Judl. /53.

A. V. Viswaru.itha BaBtri and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant.

H. N. Sanyal, Add.iticmal Solicitor-General of India, N. 8.Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.

1961. January 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GA.JENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gaj1ndragadkar. is directed against the orde_r passed by the respondent, the Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, in a revision petition confirming the orders of the subordinate authorities whereby the application made by the appellant for confirmation f the sale transaction in question has been rejected under s. 40 (4) (a) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Aot, XXXI of 1950. The appellant, Rahia Bai, who is a citizen of India h.aving her residence at Grange, Y ercaud, in the Salem District, came to know in 1949 that premises No. 20, Godown Street, G.T., Madras, was for sale. Since the appellant desired to acquire some immoveable property ijhe arranged for

1961 the purchase of the said premises through her husband.

Rabia Bai The said premises belonged to one Mohamad Gani v.

Jan Mohamad who had left for Pakistan in 1947 and Custodian-General had settled there. The said Mohamad Gani Jan

01 Evacuee boperty Mohamad had executed a power of attorney in favour

G . d-dk of his nephew, Ahmed Abdul Gani. The said Gctni •Jen raga 0 ' J. came to l\fadras in April, 1949, and arranged for the sale, and as a result of negotiations between him and the appellant's husband the latter entered into a written agreement with the former on April 29, 1949, to purchase the said property for Rs. 2,40,000/-.

A substantial part of the consideration to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/- was paid immediately in the form of cash and bank drafts. Thereafter the sale deed "as duly engrossed and sent to Karachi for execution by the vendor. After it was received back duly executed it was presented at the Collector's Office, Madras, and was duly stamped on June 27, 1949. Income-tax clearance certificate had, however, to be obtained before the said document could be registered, and soon after the said cPrtificate was obtained the document was presented for registration and was duly registered on August 11, 1949. The balance of the consideration of R.s. 30,000/- was pa.id before thf\ registering officer to Mr. M. H. Ga.nni who also held a power of attorney from the vendor. That is how the appellant obtained title to the property in suit. As we will point out the appellant applied for confirmation of this sale deed and her application has been rejected. Before we refer to the relevant facts in connection with the said proceedings it is material to set out very briefly the history of the application of the evacuee laws to the State of Madras.

Within a. fortnight after the registration of the sale deed in favour of the appellant Ordinance No. XII of 1949 which had been promulgated on June 13, 1949, was extended to Madras on August 23, 1949. Section 25(1) of the Ordinance imposed restrictions on transfers by evacuees. In substance this sub-section provided that transfers ma.de by or on behalf of evacuees of any right or interest in their property after such date as may be specified in that behalf with reference to any

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOH-TS 451

Province by the Central Government by notification r96r in the official gazette shall not be effective unless they Rabia Bai are confirmerl by the Custodian. Section 25(2) prov. vided that an application for confirmation of such custodian-General transfer may be ma.de by the transferor or the transof Evacuee Property feree or any person claiming under, or h1wfully . -- authorised bv, either of them to the Custodian within Ga; endragadkar f. two mont.hs'from the date of registration of the deed of transfor or within two months from the coum1encement of the. Ordinance whichever is later. The proviso to the said sub-section empowered the Custodian to admit an application even if it was made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor if he was satisfied that there were sufficient reasons for doing so, and it imposed on the Custodian an ol>ligatiou to record such reasons. Sub-section (3) required the Custodian to hold a summary enquiry into the application in the prescribed manner, and authorised him to reject the application for confirmation if he was of opinion that (a) the transaction had not been entered into in good faith or for valuable consideration, or (b) the transaetion was prohibited under any law for the time being in force, or (c) the tramaction ought not to be confirmed for any other reason.

Sub-s. (4) provides that if the application is not rejected under sub-s. (3) the Custodian may confirm the transfer either unconditionally or subject to such terms and conditions as he thinks fit to impose.

Ordinance No. XII of 1949 was, however, repealed by Ordinance No. XXVll of 1949 which came into force on October 18, 1949.

Section 38 of this latter Ordinance corresponds to s. 25 of the earlier Ordinance except in one material particular. It provides that no transfer of any right or interest in the property made in any manner whatsoever after the 14th day of August, 1947, by or on behalf of an evacuee as therein specified shall be effective unless it is confirmed by the Custodian. In other words, whereas s. 25 of the earlier Ordinance left it to the Central Government to specify the relevant date in reference to any Province by notification in the official gazette, s. 38( 1) has prescribed the date for 11-ll the Provinces

96x where the Ordinance applied. The rest of the relevant

Rabia B•i provisions of s. 38 are the same as those of s. 25 of the earlier Ordinance. v.

Custodian-Ge•,.•/ On April 17, 1950, this Ordinance was in turn o/EvacueeProp .. tyrepealed by Act XXXI of 1950 bys. 58. Section 40(1)

. -- and (4) are similar to thti relevant provisions of ss. 25 Ga1e•dragadhar J. and 38 of the earlier Ordinances. One of the changes made is in regard to the relevant dates prescribed by s. 40(1).

Under s. 40(1) the transfers which are affected by its provisions are those which are macle after the 14th day of August, 1947, but before the 7th day of May, 1954; and in respect of them the said section provides, inter alia, that they shall not confer any rights on the parties thereto, if at any time after the transfer the transferor becomes an evacuee within the meaning of s. 2 or the property of the transferor is declared or notified to be evacuee property within the meaning of this Act unless the transfer is confirmed -by the Custodian in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 40(4) deals with an application made under sub-s. (1) for the confirmation of the transfer. This sub-section and its three clauses (a),

(b) and (c) correspond toss. 25(3) (a), (b) and (c) and 38(4)(a), (b) and (c) of the two earlier Ordinances. Thus it is clear that the relevant provisions, which conferred power on the Custodian to hold an enquiry on the application 1nade for the confirmation of the transfer and to reject confirmation in certain cases, continued to be the same. The position, therefore, is that Ordin- 1 ance No. XII of 1949 wh; ch was extended to Madras • on Augu8t 23, 1949, was in operation only until October 18, 1949. Thereafter Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 took its place, and in turn this Ordinance was repealed by Act XXXI of 1950 on April 17, 1950. The application made by the appellant for confirmation of her purchase has been dealt with under the relevant provisions of the Act, and we would therefore refer to the said provisions hereafter.

On December 19, 1949, the appellant applied for confirmation of the sale tranaction in her favour. This application was resisted by the ten.ants who urged several grounds in support of their plea that the

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 453

transfer should not be confirmed. It appears that on r96r January 11, 1951, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Rabia Bai Property, Madras City, had declared the property of v. the vendor to be evacuee property since he was of the Custodian-Gentral opinion that the vendor's case fell within the fourofEuacueeProperly corners of the definition of "an evacuee " under G . ds. 2(d)(ii) of the Act. The declaration that the vendor's "1'" ragadkar f. property was evacuee property was made under s. 7(1) of the Act .. The Assistant Uustodian considered the appellant's application for confirmation of the transfer in the light of the declaration already made by him that the vendor was an evacuee and that his property was evacuee property. He referred to the relevant features of the transaction and came to the conclusion that he would not be justified in confirming it. It appears that in reaching this conclusion he relied on the provisions of s. 40(4)(c) oft.he Act. In his opinion the feverish hurry disclosed by the conduct of the vendor attracted the provisions of s. 40(4)(0).

The order refusing to confirm the transaction was passed on July 31, 1951.

The appellant challenged the correctness of this conclusion by preferring an appeal before the Custodian.

The Custodian found in favour of the appellant that the sale transaction in question was supported by valuable consideration; even so he proceeded to examine the question as to whether it could be said to have been entered into in good faith. In dealing with this question the appellate authority considered the fact that the vendor had left for Pakistan in June, 194 7, evidently on account of civil disturbances or in fear of such disturbances and that it was obvious that he was permanently settled in Pakistan. According to the appellate authority the vendor was desirous of disposing of his properties in India in order to convert them into cash and take them away to Pakistan.

In this connect10n reliance was placed on a letter written by the vendor to Mohideen on July 4, 1949. In this letter the vendor had stated that " if the matter is delayed there would be many sort of new difficulties as you know that the Government are passing new rules every day". He took the view that this Jetter

r96r clearly disclosed that the vendor's intention was to dispose of his properties as quickly as possible so as to Rabia Bai v. evade the restrictions of the evacuee laws which he custodian-General apprehended would be extended to Madras any day. >fEvacueePropertyOn this finding the appella1e authority came to the conclusion that the transaction had U('('tt <'ntered into Gajendragadkar J. otherwise than in good faith, and so it could not be confirmed under s. 40(4)(a). The appellate judgment shows that according to the appellate authority the request for onfirm:.tion could be rejected also UJH.ler s. 40(4)(c) of the Act.

This order was pranounced on February 4, 1953.

The appellant then moved the respondent, the Custodian-General in his revisional jurisdiction. The respondent considered the matter afresh, and agreed with the finding of the appellate authority that though the tramaction was supported by valuable considerativn it could not be said to have been entered into in good faith. In support oft.his conclusion he reliP, d on the conduct of the vendor, the haste with which the transaction W<1S attempted to be completed and the anxiety disclos<'d by him in his Jetter to Mohideen. In substance the respondent came to the conclusion that the \'endor wanted to evade the restrictions of the evacuee Jaw which he knew would soon be extended to Madras, and that showed that he was not acting in good faith. It is on this view that the revisional application preferred before him by the appellant was dismissed by him on July 4, 1954. ln his opinion the appellant's cr.se ff'll under s. 40(4)(a) of the Act. He did not, therefore, consider the question about the applicability of s. 40(4)1c).

It is clear that if a trausaction is affected by absence of good faith either in the vendmor the vendee its confirmation may properly be rejected under s. 40(4)(a); in other words, good faith is required both in the vendor and the vendee. In that sei18e the provisions of s. 40(4)(a) a.re more rigorous ancl stringent than those of s. 53(1) of the Transfer of Property Act.

Under the latter section which deals with fraudulent transfers the rights of a transferee in good faith and for consideration are expressly protected; that,

however, is not the position under s. 40(4}(a). Therefore '96' the fact that the appellant paid valua'ble consideration Rabia Bai for tho transaction and is not shown to have acted v. otherwi'e than in good faith in entering into the Custodian-General transact.ion would not. justify her claim for confirma- 01 faacuee Prop"'>' tion of the said tranoactiou if it is shown that the G . d--dk 1 . j f . h . . . .a; en raga ar . vendor !tad not acted m goo< a1t m entenng mto the said tranoaction. Tbe fa, d that corrnideration was paid by the appellant and that she was acting in gnod faith may perhaps be relevant in determining the character of her conduct in regard to the transaction; but it would not be relevant or material in determining the character of the conduct of the vendor in relation to the transfrr. This pusition is not seriously disputed before us.

Mr. Sastri, however, contends that in considering the good faith of the vendor it would be necessary to bear in mind that at the relevant timo wlteii negotiations were going on between the pa.rties in respect of the transactwu in question evacuee law had not been applied to Madras, and so evacuees like the appellant's vendor were absolutely free to deal with their properties as they liked.

He also attempted to 11rgue that even where the evacuee law applied, the policy adopted

by the Government of India was to confirm transfers ma.de by i\lohammedan evacuees in favour of Indian nationals unless a certificate signed by the prescribed income-tax authority certifying that the transferor had paid all taxes due from him to the income-tax department in respect of his property, business or undertaking, or has made satisfactory arrangements for the payment thereof, had not been produced, and unless he had failed to pay any uther dues outstanding against him in the Custodian', register in respect of his own property and third party claims recognised ex parte by the Custodi<>11. This argument. is based upon

a copy of the press note alleged to have been issued by the Government of India in the Ministry of Rehabilitation on May 13, 1949. On the other hand, the learned Additional Solicitor-General has relied on a copy of a circular issued hy the Govprnment oflndia. on March 9, 1950, where it has heel) stated that the instructions

'96' issued by the Government of India are subject to other

Rabia Bai requirements of s, 38(4) of the Central Ordinance No.

v, XXVII of 1949; in other words, whatever may be the custodian-Gen,.al nature of the circulars and directions issued by the >/Evacuee Properly Government of India, the appropriate authorities

- administering the provisions of the evacuee bw had to Gajsndragadkar 1deal with the matters brnught before them under the relevant provisions of the said law. We do not think we can attach much importance to the argument that even where the evacuee law applied confirmation of sale transactions was intended to be automatic subject to the satisfaction of the two conditions specified in the press note. We are bound to assume that the question about confirming sale transactions was required to be, and was in fact, dealt with by the appropriate authorities under the relevant statutory provisions which were in force at the material time. It is, however, true that no evacuee law had been extended to Madras '.lot the time when the impugned transaction was completed, and that naturally raises the question as to whether if a transaction had been entered into deliberately and consciously with the object of evading the application of evacuee law which it was apprehended would soon be extended to Madras, does that fact attract the provisions of s. 40(4)(a) of the Act? As we have already indicated the respondent has answered th.is question in the affirmative, and Mr. Sastri contends that this conclusion is erroneous in law.

Mr. Sastri's argument is that the expression "good faith" in s. 40(4)(a) should be construed in the sense attributed to the said expression bys. 3, sub-s. (22) of the General Clauses Act, X of 1897. The said provision lays down that a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not. The argument is that the vendor could not be said to have acted dishonestly when no evacuee law applied to Madras, and an intention to avoid a law which may be applied to Madras in future cannot be said to introduce an element of dishonesty in his conduct. In our opinion this argument cannot be accepted. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that s, 3 of th<J General

Clauses Act itself provides that the definitions pre- •9-0• scribed by the said section are applicable "unless there Rabia Bai is anything repugnant in the subject or context", and v. so it would not be unreasonable to hold that the concustodian-G.,.., al tent of the expression "good~ faith " would depend of Evae1m Prop ... 11 substantially on the context of the statute which uses -- it. In determining the denotation of the said expression Gajendragadkar}. in s. 40(4)(a) it would be essential to take into account the scope and effect of the main provisions of s. 40(1).

As we have already noticed, this section provides, inter alia, that no transfer made after the 14th day of August, 1947, shall be effective so as to confer any rights in respect of the said transfer on the parties thereto if, at any time after t.he transfer, the transferor becomes an evacuee within the meaning of s. 2, or' the property of the transferor is declared or notified to be an evacuee property wit.hin the meaning of the Act, unless the transfer is confirmed by the Custodian in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It would thus be clear that all transfers made after the 14th day of August, 1947, but before the 7th day of May, 1954, are hit by this section, and that obviously would bring within the mischief of the section a large number of transfers effected at a time when no evacuee law was in force in respect of them. Reading s. 40( l) and ( 4,) together it appears that the transfers hit by the former provision would be valid only if they are confirmed under the latter provision. It is possible that a transfer made during the prohibited period may have been entered into in good faith or was for valuable consideration and did not attract any of the provisions contained in els. (a), (b) and (c) of s. 40(4). In such a case merely because it was affected within the prohibited period it would not become void and the Custodian may have to confirm it; but where such a transfer attracts the. provisions of s. 40(4)(a) for instance, it would not 'be affirmed and it would remain inoperative. This shows that the main object of the Aot was to preserve, t_he property of persons who had migrated to Pakistan till the Government of'India could come to some understanding with the Pakistan Government in.regard to 8.djusment of claims of Indian . .

Z961 evacuees in respect of the properties left by them in

Rabi• Bai Pakistan. The idea then presumably was that the two v.

Governments should agree on the valuation of the c ... 1odiaiM; en1ra1 evacuee properties left by evacuees in the two respec- 0/ £"""""Property tive countries and the difference in the said valuation G ·....i -- should be amicably adjusted between them. After such •J ••g•dk•r f. adjustment was made it was intended to compensate the evacuees in regard to the loss incurred by them in respect of the properties left by them in the two respective countries. That this intention did not succeed is another matter. There can, however, be no doubt about the policy and object of the Act, and in determining the content of the expression " good faith" in the context of the main provision of s. 40(1) this object and policy of the Act must be borne in mind.

Section 40( 4) refers to three kinds of cases where the transfer may not be confirmed; cl. (a) . deals with transactions which are not entered into in good faith or for valuable consideration; cl. (b) deals with transactions which are prohibited under any law for the time.being in force; and cl. (c) deals with cases of transactions which are not confirmed for any other reason. It would thus be seen that the scope of the three clauses is very wide. It is not only transactions prohibited under any law that fall within the mischief of s. 40(4); but transactions which are not entered into in good faith or for valuable consideration also fall within its mischief. Now, if the test prescribed by s. 3(22) of the General Clauses Act as interpreted by Mr. Sastri is held to be relevant a large number of transactions may have to be confirmed even though they are shown to have been deliberately entered into with the object of evading the provisions of s. 40(1).

In our opinion, the fact that the evacuee law had not been extended at the relevant time to Madras would not be decisive in the matter. It was well known that the said law was being extended from Province to Province as it was deemed necessary, and indeed the letter written by tlie ve.ndor to Mohideen clearlv shows that the vendor knew as much. The history of the evacuee laws passed in several States and by the

Central Government and Legislature from time to time 1961\ shows that the Legislatures were attempting to meet Rabi• Bai with an unprecedented problem, and the laws passed v. by them in India and Pakistan at the material time Cuslodian-General made it perfectly clear to the evacuees from both the of Evacuee Proper•y countries that the two countries were adopting appro- . -- priate legislative measures to protect the evacee Ga; emlraga4/iar J. properties and prevent their transfers. Therefore, if a vendor sold his property not for any necessity or for any other legitimate purpose but solely with the object of converting it into cash and removing it to Pakistan, that clearly was intended to defeat the provisions of the Act which he knew would soon be extended to Madras, and so it would be U.ifficult to hold that he was acting honestly within the meaning of s. 40(4)(e.) of the Act.

An intention to defeat the provisions of the Act cannot be said to be honest in the context. If despite his inteRtion to defeat the application of the Act a transaction is upheld as ente.red into in good faith many transactions may escape the application of s. 40(1), and that clearly would defeat the purpose of the Act. It is significant that though the provisions of s. 40(1) are drastic they have been deliberately made retrospective, and that emphatically brings out the aim and object of the Act; and it would be unreasonable to ignore this aim and object of the Act in construing the expression "good faith" in s. 40(4Xa).

We would, therefore, hold that having regard to the aim and object of the emergency legislation with which we are concerned in the present case the expression " good faith " used in s. 40( 4X a) has been properly construed by the respondent when he held thl!ot a deliberate intention to defeat the apprehended application of the evacuee law which was responsible for the transfer in question brings the transfer within the mischief of s. 40(4)(a).

The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Subba Rao

Code of Criminal Procedure

RABIABAI v

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

A. K. SARKAR

R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.

Property Act

s. 40(4)(a)

Madras

s. 40(4)(a)

Property Act, 1950

Rabia Bai

s. 40(4)(a)

Pakistan

A. V. Viswaru.itha BaBtri

R. Ganapathy Iyer

H. N. Sanyal

D. Gupta

GA.JENDRAGADKAR

Rahia Bai

Ahmed Abdul Gani

April 29, 1949

Karachi

June 27, 1949

August 11, 1949

s. 30

M. H. Ga.nni

State of Madras

June 13, 1949

August 23, 1949

Section 25(1)

Central Government

Section 25(2)

October 18, 1949

Section 38

s. 25

14th day of August, 1947

s. 25

s. 38( 1)

s. 38

s. 25

April 17, 1950

Section 40(1)

ss. 25

s. 40(1)

s. 40(1)

s. 2

Section 40(4)

Augu8t 23, 1949

December 19, 1949

January 11, 1951

Madras City

s. 7(1)

Uustodian

s. 40(4)(c)

s. 40(4)(0)

July 31, 1951

India

Mohideen

July 4, 1949

Gajendragadkar

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 40(4)(c)

February 4, 1953

July 4, 1954

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 40(4)

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 53(1)

Transfer of Property Act

s. 40(4}(a)

Sastri

Government of India

May 13, 1949

March 9, 1950

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 40(4)(a)

General Clauses Act

Clauses Act

s. 40(4)(a)

s. 40(1)

s. 2

7th day of May, 1954

s. 40( l)

s. 40(4)

s. 40(4)(a)

Pakistan Government

s. 40(1)

Section 40( 4)

s. 40(4)

s. 3(22)

General Clauses Act

s. 40(1)

Rabi• Bai

s. 40(4)(e.)

s. 40(1)

s. 40(1)

s. 40(4Xa)

s. 40( 4X a)

s. 40(4)(a)