I96I

February a7.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

M/S. DHANRAJAMAL GOBINDRAM

M/S. SHAMJI KALIDAS AND CO. (J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)

Arbitration-Contract for purchase of African cotton-Provision for arbitration under statutory bye-laws on failure-Application in court for filing of arbitration agreement-Power of Court-Validity of contract-Indian Arbitration Act, r940 (Io of r940), ss. zo, 46-Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, r947 (7 of r947), ss. 5, ZI- Bye-laws of East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bomba)--Byelaw 48A.

The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent to purchase African raw cotton. The agreement. included a clause that the contract would be subject to the "1Jsual Force Majeure clause", the Bye-laws of East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay, except bye-law 35, the said Bye-laws having statutory force, and to the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. Clause 6 of the agreement provided that the buyers were to. obtain import licence from the Government of India, failing which the seller would be entitled eithar to carry over the goods at the cost of the buyers or call upon them to take immediate delivery on payment in British East Africa, and in default to sell the goods in British East Africa and claim the deficit, if any between the contractual price and the price obtained on re-sale. Clause 7 further provided that notwithstanding the import policy followed by the Government of India in respect of the import of the contracted goods, the buyers would be bound to obtain the necessary import licences and communicate the numbers thereof to the sellers on specified dates, failing which cl. 6 would operate. The buyers did not perform the contract and the sellers after notice to them re-sold the goods and thereafter claimed the deficit which the buyers refused to pay. The sellers invoked the atbitration clause and the rules contained in bye-law 38A of the Bye-laws and others following it, which conferred on the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., the power of selecting the arbitrator or arbitrators, and applied to the High Court under s. 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act for filing the agreement and referring the dispute to arbitration. The buyers resisted and the trial Judge dismissed the application, but the Court of appeal reversed that decision. It was urged in this Court on behalf of the buyers that (r) els. 6 and 7 contemplated acquisition of property or Exchange in Africa and thus involved a breach of s. 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, since no general or special exemption had been granted thereunder by the Reserve Bank, (2) that the expression "subject to the usual Force M ajet.tre clause" was vague and uncertain and rendered the agreement void, (3) that the application of bye-law 48A et seq left no powers in the Court to act under sub-ss. (r) and (4) of s. 20

x96r of the Arbitration Act and the section was thus inapplicable and

(4) that the Jaw applicable to the case was the law of British East Africa and not that of India.

M/s. Dhanrajamal Held, that the contentions must fail.

The provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, properly construerl, left no manner of doubt that they contemplated matters which were within the prohibition of s. 5 of the Act and had the effect of engrafting on the agreement of p11rties a term that it would be for the decreeholder before he could enforce the decree or order of the court to obtain the permission of the Reserve Bank and were thus designed to prevent the non-performance of the contract under a cover of illegality.

The contract involved no actual or contingent right to acquisition of property abroad, and even assuming it did, it was saved by s. 21 of the Act subject to its conditions. The agreement was thus enforceable.

Nor was the contract void for uncertainty. It was clear from judicial decisions that a reference to "force majeure" means the saving of the performing party from the consequence of factors beyond his control. The condition in respect of "force majeure" did not, therefore, make the contract vague. Further, the use of the word " usual '' made it clear that the clause could be made certain by evidence and so it was protected by s. 29 of the Contract Act.

Lebeaupin v. Crispin, [1920] 2 K.B. 714, referred to.

British Industries v. Patley Pressing, [1953] l All E.R. 94 and Scammell (G) and Nephew Ltd. v. Ouston (H. C. and]. G.) [1941] A.C. 251, distinguished.

Bishop 6- Baxter Ld. v. Anglo-Eastern Trading & Industrial Co. Ld., [1944] l K.B. 12, Shamrock S.S. Co. v. Storey, (1899) 5 Com. Cas. 21, Hi/las & Co. v. Arcos Ltd., [1932] All E.R. 494 and Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1959] A.C. 133, relied on.

Although by s. 46 of the Arbitration Act, the Bye-laws, if inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, must prevail, it was not correct to say that their application made the Court functus officio under s. 20 of the Act. It must not be overlooked that although the present was a case of statutory arbitration governed by its own rules, the court under s. 20(4) of the Arbitration Act had two distinct powers,

(1) of judicially considering whether or not the arbitration agreement should be filed in court and

(2) whether there should be a reference to the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the parties or selected by it. Since in the instant case the parties had by their agreement empowered the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., to select the arbitrator or arbitrators, the court could send the agreement to him to be dealt with under the procedure laid by the said Bye-laws.

Gobindram

v; M/s. Shamji KaHdas & Co.

z96z Whether the law of the country where the contract is made or of the country where it is to be performed should apply is M /s. Dhanrajamal sometimes a matter of presumption. But the declared intention Gobindram of the parties overrides such presumption. Where there is no v. such declaration, the intention may be inferred from the terms M/s. Shamji and nature of the contract and the general circumstances of the Kalidas & Co. case.

In the instant case, since the parties agreed that in case of dispute the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction and the 1 arbitration clause indicated arbitration in India, there could be no doubt that the Indian law was to apply.

N. V. Kwick Who Tong v. James Finlay & Co., [1927] A.C. 604, Hamlyn & Co. v. Tallisker Distillery, [1894] A.C. 202 and Spurrier v. La Cloche, [1902] A.C. 446 (P.C.), referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 73 of 1961.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 23, 1961, of the Bombay High Court, in Appeal No. 5 of 1960.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Purshottam Tricumdas, F. S. Nariman, Buresh D. Parekh and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.

M. K. Nambiar, K. S. Cooper, Anil Dewan, Ramesh A. Shroff, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar • Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.

1961. February 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hidayatu/lah ].

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal (with certificate) by Messrs. Dhanrajamal Gobindram against a judgment of the Divisional Bench of the High Court of Bombay, by which a petition under s. 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act was held to be maintainable and the decision of the learned Judge (Original Side) who held otherwise, was reversed. The respondents are Messrs. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (a registered firm), who were the petitioners in the High Court.

The facts of the case are as follows : On October 24, 1957, Messrs. Dhanrajamal Gobindram (referred to as buyers, hereafter) entered into an agreement with Messrs. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (referred to as sellers, ... hereafter), for purchase of 500 bales of African raw cotton. The contract was in the form of a letter

written by the sellers and confirmed by the buyers. z96z The material portions of the letter, which bears No. Ml Dk . 1 s. anra; ama SK/Bom/13/2014 and was stamped as an agreement, Gobindram a.re as follows : v. "We confirm having sold to you African raw M/s. Shamji cotton on the following terms and conditions subject Kalidas o;. Co. to the usual Force Majeure Clause: Description: ARBP 52 F. A. Q. Crop/58.

Quality 500 (Five Hundred) bales.

Price at Rs. 1,401 nett per candy CIF

Bombay.

Payment Against shipping documents in Bombay.

Packing ' 420 lbs. approximately per bale.

Shipment February /March 1958.

Remarks: The terms and conditions on the reverse form part 0£ the contract. This contra.ct is subject to the Bye.Jaws of Kast India Cotton Association, Ltd., Bombay, other than the bye-law 35 for arbitration on Quality in case of East African cotton. • • • Terms and Conditions •

1. The shipment is subject to any cause beyond seller's or seller's shipper's control and is also subject to availability of freight.

5. This contract is subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay.

6. It will be the duty of the buyers to obtain the import licence and to communicate the number thereof to the sellers immediately on the same being obtained but in any event, not later than 20th February, 1958, and in the event of their failure to do so for any reasons whatsoever including the reason that the Government of India. may not allow the imports of the contracted goods, the sellers shall be entitled a.t their discretion either to carry over the goods, in which event the buyers shall pay to the seller all carry over charges in addition to the contracted price or to call upon the buyers to pay for the contracted goods and take immediate ile!ivery thereof in British East Africa. and upon

H idayatullah J.

the buyers failing to do so, to sell the contracted goods at Kampala or Mombasa at the ratffi prevalent Mjs. Dhanrajamal Gobindram there in convenient lots and as and when it may be v.

M /s. Shtrmji Kalidas & Co.

H idayatuUah J.

practicable to do so at the risk and account of the buyers and to claim from them any deficit that arise between the contracted price and such re-sale price aud also all expense incidental thereto. 7.

Even ifthe Government of India may announce the import policy of the contracted goods in such manner that only the consumers would be entitled to obtain the licence~, it will be the duty of the buyers to see that necessary import licences for the contracted goods are obtained in the consumers' name or in the joint names of themselves and those of the consumers the intention being that in all eventualities it is the duty of the buyers to obtain licences under any policy that may be followed by the Government of India for the import of the contracted goods and to communicate the number thereof to the sellers within the time as specified hereinabove and on the buyer's failure to do so all the eventualities contemplated under clause 6 shall operate." By a letter dated November 30, 1957, the contract was later amended by the parties as follows :

"With reference to the above mentioned contracts we hereby confirm tha.t, if necessary, we shall carry over the contracted goods for two months, namely, March and April and you will pay as the carry over charges for the same. The interest payable under such carry over charges will be at the rate prevalent in Mombasa.

The other terms and conditions remain unaltered ... "

The contract was not pe, rformed. The sellers wrote as many as five letters between March 1, 1958, and May 26, 1958, before they received a reply from the buyers dated June 3, 1958. By that time, the sellers had carried forward the contract, . and also invoked their right of re-sale after giving notice, and claimed Rs. 34,103. 15 nP. for which a debit note had been issued. This note was returned by, the buyers with a Jetter of June 3, 1958, stating that the contra.ct was

" void and/or illegal", that they were not obliged to z96z perform it, that there was no right of any sale on their M D- . account and/or on their behalf, and that the alleged 1'Gob::;;:;::m•I sale was not binding upon them. [Ex. "D" (Colly) v.

No. 6.] Mfs. Shamji Th'e sellers then invoked the arbitration clause of Kalidas & Co. the agreement and Bye-law 38-A of the Bye-laws of the East India Co&ton Association, Ltd., Bombay, Hid•yalullaA J. and moved the Bombay High Court, on the Origin8.l Side, under s. 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, requesting that the agreement be filed in Court and the dispute referred to arbitration. The buyrs appeared, and resisted the petition on grounds which they set forth in affidavits filed from time to time. By their first affidavit dated July 31, 1958, the buyers contended that els. 6 and 7, quoted above, were unlawful, as the liability created under them amounted to a contravention " of the import policy of Government of India" and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and the Rules made thereunder. They contended that, in vitiw of the invalidity of the contract as a whole, the arbitration clause in the agreement was not binding, and that the agreement could not be filed. In the second affidavit which was filed on February. 4, 1959, they added the reason that the words "subject to the usual Force Majeure Clause" were vague and uncertain, and made the contract void ab initio, as there was no consensus oiJ idem between the parties. They contended that the contract being void, the arbitration clause was also void.

By yet another affidavit filed on February 27, 1959, they averred that the letter dated November 30, 1957, was void, being in contravention of the Import Trade Control Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Rules made under the two Acts, inasmuch as the consideration was one forbidden by law and was likely to defeat the provisions of law.

They also stated that the words " if necessary " in that letter rendered the contract void ab initio for vagueness and uncertainty. . The case was heard by K. T. Desai, , J. (as he then was). On March 3, 1959, the learned Judge dismissed

' 96' the petition as not maintainable on the ground that M/s. Dhanrajama1the dispute was about the legality or validity of the

Gobindram contract including the agreement about arbitration, v. and that such a dispute could only be considered M/s. Shamji under ss. 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act by the Kalidas '"' Co. Court and not by the arbitrator in a. reference under

Hidayatullah 1. s. 20 of the Act. He declined to consider the question under the former sections, because the petition had not asked for that relief, observing that if by a proper petition the question were raised, it would be decided.

Against the order of the learned Judge (0. S.), an .appeal was filed by the sellers. This appeal was heard by Chainani, C. J. and S. T. Desai, J. on April 28,

1959. The learned Judges held that a claim was made by the sellers and was denied by the buyers; that there was thus a dispute arising out of or in re]a. tion to a contract as contemplated by Bye-law 38-A; that in showing cause against the petition under s. 20, the buyers had averred that the contract was illegal and void; and that such a question could be decided by the Court before making the reference. The learned Judges pointed out that a petition under ss. 32 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act questioning the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement was not to be expected from one making a claim under a. contract, that the plea was always likely to be raised by one resisting the petition, and that when such a plea was raised, the Court must decide it, even though the proceedings be under s. 20 of the Act for making a reference. The case was, therefore, remanded with the following direction:

"As the respondents have challenged the validity of this agreement, the Court will have to 9.ecide

this question before passing further orders in the matter. Accordingly we set aside the order passed by Mr. Justice K. T. Desai, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioners, and remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the objections, raised by the respondent under sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Act, to the arbitration agreement being filed in Court, and then disposing of the matter in accordance with law."

When the case went back for retrial, the buyers filed z96z their fourth affidavit on November 16, 1959. They M D-h . 1 t d . h t ffid . b B 1

3 A . /s. an, a1ama s ate m t a a av1t t at yeaw 8was a Gobind, am statutory Bye-law of the East India Cotton Associav. tion, Ltd., Bombay, a recognised Institution under M/s. Shamji the Forward Contracts Regulation Act, No. 74 of Kalidas & Co. 1952, and thats. 46 of the Arbitration Act was ap- Hidayatullah]. plicable. They contended that inasmuch as the Bye-laws of the Association prescribed a different machinery inconsistent with and repugnant to s. 20 of the Arbitration Act, the latter section was inapplicable, and that the petition was incompetent. By bis order dated November 26 and 27, 1959, K. T. Desai, J. held that the petition did not disclose sufficient • materials, and that the sellers were not entitled to have the agreement of reference filed, or to have an order of reference made. Though be held that the Bye-laws of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd. were statutory, and that ss. 46 and 47 of the Arbitration Act applied, he was of opinion that s. 20 could not be invoked, because no action under sub-s. (4) of s. 20 could be taken. The reason given by the learned • Judge was that under that sub-section the Court had to appoint an arbitrator, if the parties failed to agree, and that sub-section was not applicable, because the machinery of Bye-law 38-A left no power of action to the Court. He also felt that there was no averment in the petition that the parties had not agreed. On the rest of the points raised by the buyers in their affidavits, the lea.rued Judge held against them. He held that, in view of ss. 21(2) and 21(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, there was no infringement of that Act by the agreement entered into, though he expressed a doubt if the words " legal proceedings" in s. 21(3) were wide enough to include an arbitration.

He aslo held that cl. 7 of the conditions under which the contract was to be performed was, at least in part and under certain circumstances, not a contravention of the Import and Export Control Act, 1947, or the Import Trade Control Order issued under ss. 3 and 4-A of that Act, and thus not wholly void.

He held lastly that the contract was not void for vague11ess or

ISi

1961 uncertainty either on account of the reference to "the

Ml D-;:;:;; ajamal usual Force Majeure Clause", or because of the words 'cobind; am "if necessary" in the letter of November 30, 1957. v.

The sellers appealed aginst the dismissal of the M/s. Shamji petition, and the buyers cross-objected against the Kalidas & Co. adverse findings and the disallowance of costs. The

Hidayalullah 1. appeal was heard by Tarkunde and Chita!P, J, J., and by separate but concurring judgments, the appeal was allowed and the cross-objection dismissed, and the buyers were ordered to pay costs throughout. The Divisional Bench agreed with K. T. Desai, J. on all the points decided by him against the buyers. They left open the question whether "legal proceedings" in s. 21(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act were wide enough to include an arbitration for the decision of the arbitrators to be appointed, and addressing themselves to the question raised about s. 20, held that the petition was maintainable. They were of opinion that the Court could order the arbitration agreement to be filed and also to refer . the dispute to arbitrators to be chosen in accordance with Bye-law 38-A, though they felt that if the latter action could not be taken, at least the first could be, because the procedural part could not destroy the power conferred to file the agreement.

In this appeal, all the. arguments which had failed before the High Court were urged before us. Shortly stated, they .are: that the contract was void (a) for illegality and (b) for uncertainty and vagueness on two grounds; that the petition under s. 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act was incompetent, as that section was inapplicable; and that the law governing the parties was not the Indian law but the law of British East Africa. We shall now deal with these contentions.

The first contention is that cl. 7 of the agreement involves a breach of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.. Reliance is placed upon s. 5 of the Act, which reads as follows :

"(5) Restrictions on payments.-(!) Save as may be provided in and in accordance with ariy general or special exemption from the provisions of this sub-

ection which may be granted conditionally or

unconditionally by the Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in, British India shall- • •·

(e) make any payment to or for the credit of any person as consideration for or in association with-

(i) the receipt by any person of a payment or the acquisition by any person of property outside India;

(ii) the creation or transfer in favour of any person of a right whether actual or contingent to receive a payment or acquire property outside India:" It is contended that the agreement envisaged (a) payments for goods in Africa against shipping documents, (b) payment in Africa of carrying over charges, and (c) in the event of re-sale, payment of deficit also in Africa. It is also contended that the two clauses (6 and 7) contemplate acquisition of property in Africa. The clauses, it is submitted, also involved acquisition of foreign exchange, if the goods were resold in Africa and credit for the price was given to the buyers. This, it is argued, was a breach of s. 5, unless there was a general or special exemption granted by the Reserve Bank in connection with this contract, and that no such exemption was in existence when the contract was made.

In this connection, s. 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act may be read. It provides :-

" 21. Oontract.3 in evasion of this Act.-(l) No person shall enter into any contract or agreement which would directly or indirectly evade or avoid in any way the operation of any provision of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder.

(2) Any provision of, or having effect under, this Act that a thing shall not be done without the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, shall not render invalid auy agreement by any person to do that thing, if it is a term of the agreement that that thing shall not be done unless permission is granted by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be; and it shall be an implied term of every contract governed

M fs. Dhan1ajama1

Gobindtam

M/s. Shamji Kalidas & Co.

Hidayatullak ].

M /s. Dhanrajamal

Gobindram

MJs. Shamji Kalidas & Go.

HidoyolullaA ] •

i030 StJPREME COtJRT REPORTS [1961]

by the law of any part of British India. that anything agreed to be done by any term of that con. tract which is prohibited to be done by or under a.ny of the provisions of this Act except with the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, shall not be done unless such permission is granted.

(3) Neither the provisions of this Act nor any term (whether expressed or implied) contained in any contract that anything for which the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank is required by the said provisions shall not be done without that. permission, shall prevent legal proceedings being brought in British India to recover any sum which, apart from the said provisions and any such term, would be due, whether as a debt, damages or otherwise, but-

(a) the said provisions shall apply to sums required to be paid by any judgment or order of any Court as they apply in relation to other sums; a.nd

(b) no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of a.ny sum to which the said provisions apply except a.s respects so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case ma.y be, ma.y permit to be paid ; and

(c) for the purpose of considering whether or not to grant such permission, the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be, may require the person entitled to the benefit of the judgment or order and the debtor under the judgment or order, to produce such documents and to give such information as may be specified in the requirement." No doubt, sub-s. (1) prohibits contracts in contravention or evasion, directly or indirectly, of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and if there was n0thing more, then the argument would be understandable. But, sub-s. (2) provides that the condition that a thing shall not be done without the permission of the Reserve Bank shall not render an agreement

invalid, if it is a term of the agreement that the thing i96r shall not be done unless permission is granted by the M. D-;;- . """ Central Government or the Reserve Bank and further 'Gobi:r,;,:

that it shall be an implied term of every contract v. governed by the law of any part of India that any- Mfs. Sh•mft Kalidas & Co. thing agreed to be done by any term of that contra.ct, which cannot be done except with the permission of HidayatullahJ. the Reserve Bank, shall not be done, unless permission is granted. Sub-section (3) allows legal proceedings to be brought to recover sum due as a debt, damages or otherwise, but no steps shall be taken to enforce the judgment, etc.,. except to the extent permitted by the Reserve Bank.

The effect of these provisions is to prevent the very thing which is claimed here, namely, that the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act arms persons against performance of their contracts by setting up the shield of illegality. An implied term is engrafted upon the contra.ct of parties by the second pa.rt of sub-s. (2), and by sub-s. (3), the responsibility of obtaining the permission of the Reserve Bank before enforcing judgment, decree or order of Court, is transferred to the decree-holder. The section is perfectly plain, though perhaps it might have been worded better for which a. model existed in England.

It is contended thats. 21 uses the word " permission", while s. 5 speaks of an exemption, and that l!S. 21(2) and 21(3) do not cover the prohibition in s. 5.

The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, no doubt, uses diverse words like, "authorise'', "exempt" and "rermission" in different parts. The word" e:rempt" shows that a person is put beyond the application of law, while "permission" shows that he is granted leave to act in a particular way. But the word " permission " is a word of wide import. " Permission" in this section means only leave to do some a.ct

which but for the leave would be illegal. In this sense, exemption is just one way of giving leave. If one went only by the word and searched for those sections where the word "permission" is expressly used, ss. 21(2) and (3) a.re likely to prove a dead letter.

This could not ha. ve been intended, and the very

z96I elaborate provisions in those sub-sections show that Ml D-;:- . 1 those matters were contemplated which are the subject '(;06;::;:!.:m• of prohibition in s. 5. In our opinion, the argument v. is without foundation.

M/s. Shamji The contention, that on resale the price would have Kalidas .s. Co. accrued to the buyers in the first insta11cr, as the

Hidayalullah J. sellers would be acting as the agents of the buyers, is also incorrect. It has been rightly pointed out by K. T. Desai, J. that the right of resale given by ss. 54(2) and (4) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act is exercised by the seller for himself and not as an agent of the buyer, when the latter is given a notice of sale.

This is indeed clear from the fact that the buyer is not entitled to the profit on resale in that contingency, though liable for damages. The position is different when no notice is so sent. Then the profits go to the buyer. Perhaps, in that event it may be possible to say that the seller acted as an agent. But, in the case of resale with prior notice, there is no payment to the buyer and no contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

The contention that the contract involved an actual or, at least, a contingent right to or acquisition of property abroad is not correct. Even if it were so, the contract is saved by s. 21, as already explained. In our opinion, the contract was not void for illegality.

The agreement is said to be void because of vagueness and uncertainty arising from the use of the phrase "subject to the usual force majeure clause".

The argument is that there was no consensus ad idem, and that the parties had not specified which force majeure clause they had in mind. We were taken through the Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents and shown a number of force majeure clauses, which were different. We were also ta.ken through a number of rulings, in which the expression "force majeure "

had been expounded, to show tha, t there is no consistent or definite meaning. The contention thus is, that there being no consensus ad idem, the contract , must fail for vagueness or uncertainty. The argument; on the other side, is that this may be regarded as a surplusage, and, if meaningless, ignored.

It is

contended by the respondents that the addition ofthe 1961 word "usual" shows that. there was some clause Mis. Dh••raj•m•I which used to be included m such agreements. The Gobfodram respondents also refer to s. 29 of the Indian Contract v.

Aot, which provides: Mts. Sham;; "Agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, Kalidas"" Co. or capable of being made certain, are void," Hiday•lull•h 1. and emphasise the words "capable of being made certain'', and contend that the clause was capable of being made certain, and ex facie, the agreement was not void.

McCardie J. in Lebeaupin v. Crispin(') has given an account of what is meant by "force majeure " with reference to its history. The expression "force majeure " is not a mere French version of the Latin expression " vis major ". It is undoubtedly a term of wider import. Difficulties have arisen in the past as to what could legitimately be included in "force majeure ". Judges have agreed that strikes, breakdown of machinery, which, though normally not included in " vis major " are included in "force majeure ". An analysis of rulings on the Bl' bject into which it is not necessary in this case to go, shows that where reference is made to "force majwre ", the intention is to save the performing party from the consequences of anything over which he has no control. This is the widflst meaning that can be given

to" force majeure ", and even if this be the meaning, it is obvious that the condition about "force majeure" in the agreement was not vague. The use of the word "usual" makes all the difference, and the meaning of the condition may be made certain by evidence about a force majeure clause, which was in contemplation of parties.

Learned counsel for the appellants relies strongly on a decision of McNair, J. in British Industries v. Patley Pressings('). There, the expression used was "subject to force maje.ure conditions". The learned Judge held that by "conditions" was meant clauses and not contingencies or circumstances, and that there being

a variety off orce majeure clauses in the trade, there

( 1) [1 .. 20] ' K.B. 7 '4.

(2) [1953] 1 All E.R. 94.

i96i was no concluded agreement. The case is distinguish-

M 1,. Dhanrajamal able, because the reference. o force majeure clauses

Gobindram was left at large. The add1t10n of the word "usual" v. makes it clear that here some specific clause was in MJs. Shamji the minds of the parties. Learned counsel also relies Kalidas &- Co. upon a decision of the House of Lords in Scammell (G.)

Hidayatull•h J. and Nephew Ltd. v. Oustrm (H.C. and J.G.) (1), where the reference to " on hire purchase terms" was held to be too vague to constitute a. concluded contra.ct. It will appear from the decision of the Home of Lords that the clause was held to be vague, because no precise meaning could be attributed to it, there being a variety of hire purchase clauses. The use of the word "usual" here, enables evidence to be led to make certain which clause was, in fa.ct, meant. The case of the House of Lords does not,· therefore, apply. Both the cases to which we have referred were decided after parties had entered on evidence, which is not the case here.

Our case is more analogous to the decision referred to in Bishop&: Baxter Ld. v. Anglo-Eastern Trading &: Industrial Co. Ld. (•), namely, Shamrock S. S. Co. v.

Storey (3). In speaking of the condition there, Lord Goddard observed as follows:

" Abbreviated references in a. commercial instrument are, in spite of brevity, often self-explanatory or susceptible of definite application in the light of the circumstances, a.s, for instance, where the refer. ence is to a term, clause, or document of a. well. known import like c.i.f. or which prevails in common use in a particular place of performance as ma.y be indicated by the addition of the epithet 'usual' : see Shamrock S. S. Co. v. Storey(•), where' usual colli.ery guarantee ' was referred to in a charter-party in order to define loading obligations." The addition of the word " usual " refers to something which is invariably to be found in contracts of a particular type. Commercial documents a.re sometjmes expressed in language which does not, on its face, bear a. clear meaning. The effort of Courts is to give a meaning, if possible. This wa.s laid down by the

{i) (1941] A.C. 251.

(2) (1944] 1 K.B. n,

(3) (1899) 5 Com. Cas. 21,

I ,.

House of Lords in Hillas & Co. v. Arcos Ltd. '• and the observations of Lord Wright have become classic, and M/s. Dh•nraj•,..I have been quoted with approval both by the Judicial Gobindr•m Committee and the House of Lords ever since. The v. latest case of the House of Lords is Adamastos SIJ, ip- M /s. Shamji Kalidas & Co. ping Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd.('). There, the clause was "This bill of lading", whereas the Hidayatullah J. document, to which it referred was a charter-party.

Viscount Simonds summarised all the rules applicable to construction of commercial documents, and laid down that effort should always be made to construe commercial agreements broadly and one must not be astute to find defects in them, or reject them as meaningless.

Applying these tests to the present case and in the light of the provisions of s. 29 of the Indian Contract Act, it is clear that the clause impugned is capable of being madE1 certain and definite by proof that between the parties or in the trade or in dealings with parties in British East Africa, there was invariably included a force majeure clause of a particular kind.

In our opinion, the contract was not void for vagueness or uncertainty by reason of the reference in the terms stated, to theforcemajeure clause. Mr. Daphtary posed the question as to on whom was the burden of proving the usual force majeure clause. In our opinion, if the agreement is not void for uncertainty, that question would be a matter for the decision of the arbitrators. It is too early to say by what evidence and by whom the usual force majeure clause must be established.

The next ground on which it is said that the agreement was void for uncertainty has reference to the employment of the words " if necessary " in the letter of November 30, 1957. The effect of that letter is to make an alteration in cl. 6 of the agreement, which has been quoted already. U oder that clause, the buyers were to obtain the import licence and to commnicate the number thereof to the sellers not later than February 20, 1958, and in the event of their failure to do so for any reason whatsoever, the selleru

(1) [1932] All E.R. <94

\•) [1959) A.C. 133, 15,,

1961 were entitled "at their discretion " either to carry M/s. Dh•nrajam•l over the goods or to ask the buyers to pay for the

Gobindram contracted goods and take delivery in British East v.

Africa. By that letter, the sellers confirmed that "if M/s. Shamji necessary" they would carry over the cont.racted Kalidas & Co. goods for two months, namely, March and April, sub.

Hidayatullahf. ject to payment of charges. It is contended that the

words" if necessary" are entirely vagueaud do not show, necessary for whom, when and why. In our opinion, this argument has no force whatever. Under

cl. 6, the sellers had an absolute discretion either to carry over the goods or to insist on delivery being taken. By this letter, they have said that, if necessary, that is to say, if the buyers find it difficult to supply the number of the import licence, the contract would be carried over to March and April. By this amendment, the sellers surrendered to a certain extent their absolute discretion. The clause means that the contract was not extended to March and April, <Jut that the sellers would extend it to that period, if occasion demanded. Since both the parties agreed to this letter and the buyers confirmed it, it cannot be said that there was no consensus ad idem, or that the whole agreemnt is void for uncertainty.

We shall now consider the next argument, which was very earnestly urged before us. It is that s. 20 of the Arbitration Act cannot be made applicable to this case at all. We have already quoted extracts from the agreement which include the clause by which the Bye-laws of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay, were applied to this contract, except Bye. law 35, which deals with arbitration on quality in case of East African cotton. Bye.law l(B) relates to East African cotton, and it says that Bye-laws 1 to 46 inclusive (with certain exceptions) shall apply to contracts in respect of East African cotton. It wa.P conceded before the High Court and also before us that the Bye-laws are statutory. The buyers were members of the Association but not the sellers; but the Bye-laws on arbitration, with which we are concerned, include arbitrations between a member ii, nd a

non-member. We are concerned directly with Bye-law

I'6I 38-A. Bye-law 38-A in its opening portion, rfla.ds: M/s. Dhanrajamal "All unpaid claims, whether admitted or not, and GoJ>indram all disputes (other than those relating to quality) v. arising out of or in relation to ... contracts (whether M/s. Shamji i: d h h b b Kalidas <!> Co. iorward or rea y and w et er etween mem ers or between a member and a non-member) made subject HidayamUah 1. to these Bye-laws ... shall .be referred to the arbitration of two disinterested persons one to be chosen by each party. The arbitrators sLall have power to appoint an umpire and shall do so if and when they differ as to their a ward." Then follow certain provisions, which were stressed but which need not be quoted in extenso. Shortly stated, they are that the arbitrators must make their award in 15 days, unlees time be extended by the Chairman. The umpire is to be appointed within 15 days or Ruch extended period as may be fixed by the Chairman and the umpire is to make his award within 10 days, unless time be extended by the Chairman.

In case of disagreement or failure of a party to appoint an &rbitra.tor, the Chairman may appoint an

arbitrator, and similarly the Chairman is to appoint the umpire and he may even appoint himself. Other powers a.re confeITed on the Chairman, who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Ea.Rt India.

Cotton Association Ltd.

The contention is that arbitrations under the Arbitration Act, like those under Sch. II of the Code of Civil Procedure, are of three kinds described by Lord Ma.cnaghten in Ghulam Jilani v. Muhamma.d

Hassan('), and that this belongs to the second category there described, in which •all further proceedings a.re under the supervision of the Court ". It is argued th' " :.i; t.he application of the Bye-laws. the Court is left. no powers under s. 20 which is being invoked, and that s. 20 cannot thus apply. Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, in so far as it is material to this point, is as follows :

" 20.

Application to file in Court arbitration agreement.-( I) Where any persons have entered into an

(I) (1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 51, 56, 57

/' i

M; s~ Dbn?ajamal

GolJindram

.. arbitration agreement before the institution of any

suit with respect.to the subject-matter of theagreement or any.part of it, and where a. difference has . arisen to which-the agreement applies, they or any VH Mfs. s1ta .. ji of them, instead . of proceeding under • .Clta.pt.er...lI, may apply. to a Court having jurisdiction in the . matter to , which the agreement relates, that the . agreement be filed in Court. ·

. Kalida< .S- Co. -.

- ·----- . . ; .

:.. (3f On. such application being made, the. Court shall direct notice thereof to be given to all parties to the agreement other than the applicants; .requir- . ing the~ to shqw cause within the time specified in the notice why the agreement should not be filed •. ·

 (4) Where no sufficient cause is shown, the Court shall order the agreement to be filed and shall make , an .. order of reference to. the arbitrator a. ppointed by , the parties, whether in the agreement.or otherwise,

 or where the. parties cannot, agree upon an arbitrator, to an arbitrator. appointed by the Court. ·

(5) Thereafter the arbitration shall. proceed in . accordance with, . and shall be governed by, the other provisions of this Act so. far as. they . can be: made applicable." . , • . . , . . " ..

The sellers rely upon cl. (5), which enjoins the appli- . cation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, so far as they can be made applicable. Reference isthen made to provisions of Chap. II and.the Schedule of the Act laying down the, powers of the Court, and . they are contrasted with the provisions of the Bye-. . laws to show that if the latter prevail, no residuum of power is left to the Court, :and that after filing the agreement,, the Court must abdicate in favour of the Chairman. and, the Act, -in terms, ceases to apply.' Reference is .also made to s. 47 of the 'Arbitration.

Act, which 'provides: ,. · '' ' "Subject. to, the provisions of section 45, and .. save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law, . for the time being in force, the provisions of this ·

Actshall apply to all arbitrations and to all pro- .ceedings thereunder:" (Proviso omitted)• ·- '

;,. '

The opening words of s. 47 takes us t.o s. 46, which '961

may be read at this stage. It provides : M '" Dh•nrajamal "The provisions of this Act, except sub.section (1) Gabindr••• of section 6 and sections 7, 12, 36 and 37, shall "" apply to every arbitration under any other enact- M/,, Shamfi ment for the time being in force, as if the arbitra- Kalidas Ca. tion were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and Hidayatulli1k J. as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder." Section 46 makes the provisions of any other enactment or any rules made thereunder to prevail over the Arbitration Act, if inconsistent with the latter. In view of these several provisions, it is clear that the Arbitration Act applies to all arbitrations and Chap. III makes it applicable also to arbitrations, in which the arbitration agreement is asked to be filed in Court under s. 20, subject, however, to this that the provisions of any other enactment or rules made there, under, if inconsistent with the Arbitration Act, are to prevail.

Learned counsel for the buyers contends that nothing is saved of the Act. This is not correct. To begin with, questions as to the existence or validity of the agreement are saved from decisions by arbitrators or umpires, however appointed. Since such a plea can only be raised in bar of an application by persons seeking a reference to arbitration, at least that portion of the Act still applies, and that power can only be exercised by the Court. Other provisions of Chap. II, like ss. 15 and 16, still remain applicable. We need not give a list of all the provisions which may be saved, because that will involve an examination side by side, of the sections of the Act and the provisieons of the Bye-laws. So long as something is saved, it cannot be said that the Court after receiving the agreement and ordering that it be filed, becomes completely f unctus officio.

But the crux of the argument is that the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 20 read with sub-s.(l), ibid., cannot apply, and the Court, after filing the agreement, will have

I96I to do nothing more With it, acrtliis shO; S that S. 20 J//s. Diusi.rajamal is not ap~Iicable~ ·· Th, is argme.nt overlooks the fa:ct

Go!ift<lr•m that this is.a statutory arb1.tration governed by its ... own rules, and that the powers and duties of the 1.1/s. Slusmji Court in sub-s. (4) of s. 20 are of two distinct kinds.

Kalidas & Co. The first is the judicial function to .consider whether the arbitration agreement shoul. d be filed in Court or Hi<Jayatullah /- not. That may involve dealing with objections to the existence and validity of the agreement itself . .. Once that is done; and the Court has decided that the agreement must be filed, the first p; i.rt of its powers and duties is ovet. . It is significant that an appeal under s. 39 lies only . against the decision on this part of sub-s. (4). Then >follows a ministerial act of reference to arbitrator . or . arbitrators appointed by the . parties. That also' was perfectly possible in this case, if the parties appointed the arbitrator or arbitrators. If tho parties do not agree, the Court.may be.required t.o make a decision as to who should be selected as an arbitrtor; and that. may be a function either judicial, or procedural, or even· ministerial; but it is unnecessary to dec!de which it is. In the present case, the parties by, their agreement have placed the power of selecting an arbitrator. or arbitrators (in which we include. also the umpire) .in the hands of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton. Association, Ltd., and the Court can certainly perform the ministerial act of sending the agreement to him to be dealt with by him. Once the agreement filed in Court is sent to the Chairman, the Bye.Jaws lay down the procedure for. the Chairman and the appointed arbitrator or arbitrators to follow, and.that procedure, if iv .; sistent with the Arbitation Act, prevails. In our opinion, there is no impediment to action being take!! under s. 20(4) oft.he Arbitration Act. , , \Ve may dispose of hnre a supplementary argument. that the diapute till now is about the legal existence . of the agreement including the arbitration clause, and that this is not a dispute arising out of, or in relation to a. cotton, transaction. Reference. was made to certain observations in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (1). In

(1) [1942) A.C. 356.

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COUHT REPORTS 1041

1961 our opinion, the words of the Bye-law "arising out of or in relation to contracts" are sufficiently wide to M/s. Dh•nr•j•m•icomprehend matters, which can legitimately arise Gobindr•m under s. 20.

The argument is that, when a party v. questions the very existence of a contract, no dispute M/s. Shamji can be said to arise out of it. We think that this is K•lidas °" Co. not correct, and even if it were, the further words Hid•y•Mlah J. "in relation to" are sufficiently wide to comprehend even such a case. In our opinion, this argument must also fail.

It was contended lastly that the law applicable to the case is the lex loci solutionis, that is to say, the law of British East Africa. Reference was made to a passage from Pollock and Mulla's Contract Act, Eighth Edn., p. 11, where it is observed as follows:

"In ordinary circumstances the proper law of a contract (to use Mr. Dicey's convenient expression) will be the law of the country where it is made. But, where a contract is made in one country and to be performed wholly or in part in another, the proper law may be presumed to be the law of the country where it is to be performed." (Auckland Corporation v. Alliance Assurance Co.) (1) The learned authors observe, on the same page, further:

" But these rulee are only in the nature of presumptions, and subject to the intention of the parties, whether expressly declared or inferred from the terms and nature of the contract and the circumstances of the case." Reliance was also placed on Chitty's Law of Contract and Rule 148, sub-r. (3), Second Presumption, in Dicey's Conflict of Laws, Seventh Edn., p. 738, on which the statement of the law in Pollock and Mulla is based.

Whether the proper law is the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis is a matter of presumption ; but there are accepted rules for determining which of them is applicable. Where the parties have expressed themselves, the intention so expressed overrides any presumption. Where there is no expressed intention,

(I) (1937] A.C, 587.

rg6r then the rule to apply is to infer the intention from M/s. Dha.r•jamal the terms and nature of the contract and from the

Gobinar•m general circumstances of the case. In the present case,

v. two such circumstances are decisive. The first is that M/s. Shmji the parties have agreed that in case of diRpute the K alidas 6- Co. Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction, and an Hidayat,.l/•h J. old legal proverb says, "Qui eligit judicem eligit jus."

If Courts of a particular country are chosen, it is expected, unless there be either expressed intention or evidence, that they would apply their own law to the case. See N. V. Kwick Who Tang v. James Finlay & Oo. (1 ). The second circumstance is that the arbitration clause indicated an arbitration in India. Of such arbitration clauses in agreements, it has been said on more than onE) occasion that they lead to an • inference that the parties have adopted the law of the country in which arbitration is to he made. See Hamlyn & Oo. v. Tallisker Distillery ('), and Spurrier

v. La Oloche ('). This inference, it was said in the last case, can be drawn even in a case where the arbitration clause is void according to the law of the country where the contract is made and to be performed. In our opinion, in this case, the circum- , stances clearly establish that the proper law to be applied is the Indian Law.

In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

(1) [1927] A.C. 604.

(2) [1894] A.C. 202.

(31 ~1902] A.C. 446 (P.C.).

M/S. DHANRAJAMAL GOBINDRAM

M/S. SHAMJI KALIDAS AND CO

L. KAPUR

M. HIDAYATULLAH

C. SHAH, JJ.

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act

ss. 5

Bombay High Court

Clause 6

Government of India

British East Africa

Clause 7

cl. 6

East India Cotton Association Ltd.

s. 20

Africa

s. 5

s. 20

India

Dhanrajamal Held

s. 21

s. 5

s. 21

s. 29

s. 46

s. 20

s. 20(4)

East India Cotton Association, Ltd.

Gobindram

Shamji KaHdas & Co.

Kalidas & Co.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

C. K. Daphtary

Purshottam Tricumdas

F. S. Nariman

Buresh D. Parekh

I. N. Shroff

M. K. Nambiar

K. S. Cooper

Anil Dewan

Ramesh A. Shroff

S. N. Andley

J.B. Dadachanji

Rameshwar • Nath

P. L. Vohra

HIDAYATULLAH

Dhanrajamal Gobindram

s. 20

Shamji Kalidas & Co.

October 24, 1957

Dhanrajamal Gobindram

Shamji Kalidas & Co.

Gobindram

High Court of Bombay

20th February, 1958

H idayatullah

Kampala

Mombasa

Shtrmji Kalidas & Co.

H idayatuUah J.

clause 6

November 30, 1957

March 1, 1958

May 26, 1958

June 3, 1958

s. 20

July 31, 1958

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947

February. 4, 1959

February 27, 1959

K. T. Desai

March 3, 1959

ss. 32 and 33

Hidayatullah

s. 20

Chainani

S. T. Desai

April 28,

1959

s. 20

ss. 32 and 33

s. 20

section 20

November 16, 1959

s. 20

November 26 and 27, 1959

ss. 46 and 47

s. 20

s. 20

ss. 21(2) and 21(3)

s. 21(3)

cl. 7

Import and Export Control Act, 1947

ss. 3 and 4

Hidayalullah

Tarkunde

Chita!P,

s. 21(3)

s. 20

s. 20

cl. 7

s. 5

British India

s. 5

s. 21

Central Government

Shamji Kalidas & Co.

Hidayatullak

Dhanrajamal

Gobindram

Shamji Kalidas

HidayatullahJ.

England

s. 5

S. 21(2) and 21(3)

s. 5

ss. 21(2)

s. 5

Shamji The

Hidayalullah

ss. 54(2)

Sale of Goods Act

s. 21

s. 29

McCardie

McNair

Dhanrajamal

Kalidas &- Co.

Goddard

Wright

Adamastos SIJ

Hidayatullah

Viscount Simonds

s. 29

Indian Contract Act

Daphtary

cl. 6

February 20, 1958

cl. 6

s. 20

the Code of Civil Procedure

Ma.cnaghten

s. 20

s. 20

Section 20

(1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 51

s. 47

section 45

s. 47

s. 46

section 6

sections 7, 12, 36 and 37

Section 46

s. 20

ss. 15 and 16

s. 20

S. 20

s. 20

s. 39

East India Cotton. Association, Ltd.

s. 20(4)

s. 20

Pollock

Mulla

Dicey

Chitty

Law of Contract and Rule


3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 351

TULSIDAS KILACHAND v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,

BOMBAY CITY I. [And connected appeals]

(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)

Income Tax-Holder of shares becoming trustee for the benefit of wife-Liability to tax of such shareholder-" Adequate consideration", meaning of-Indian Income-tax Act, I9Z2 (II of 1922),

SS. I6(I)(c), I6{J)(a)(iii), l6(J)(b).

By a deed dated March s. 1951, the appellant made a declaration of trust in favour of his wife as follows: "I.. ....... hereby declare that I hold 244 shares ............ upon trust to pay the income thereof to my wife ......... for a period of seven years from the date hereof or her death (whichever event may be earlier) and I hereby declare that this trust shall not be revocable". In the year of account, 1951, a sum of Rs. 30,404 was received as dividend income on those shares and the appellant claimed before the income-tax authorities that this sum was not liable to be included in his total income in view of the third proviso to

s~ r6(r)(c) of the Indian-Income-tax Act, 1922, but this claim was rejected on the ground that th~ case was covered either by s. 16(3)(a)(iii) or by s. r6(3)lb) of the Act. The appellant's con tention was that under the deed of trust there was no transfer of assets either to the wife or to any person for the benefit of the wife but merely a creation of a trust in respect of the shares, the dividends from which were payable to the wife, that even if it be held that there was such a transfer, it was for ade~

quate consideration being for love and affection which was a good consideration, and that thus s. 16(3)(a){iii) or s. 16(3)(b) was not applicable.

Held, that on a true construction of the deed dated March 15, 1951, there was a transfer of the shares by the husband to himself as a trustee for the benefit of the wife and that even though .the husband was the same individual, in his capacity .. as a trustee he must be regarded as a person distinct from the

. transferor.

 Held, further, that the words "adequate consideration" in s. r6(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, denoted considera- +tion other than mere love and affection, which, in the case.of a

wife; may be presumed.

Accordingly, the present case fell within s. r6(3}{b) of the Act and not within the third proviso to s. I6(r)(c).

Povat Kuma~ Mitter v. Commissioner ' of Income-tax, [rg6r] 3 S.C.R. 37, distinguished. . " ·

January J.

. '

I !l

! .

! \ : I

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1961]

:r96r CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 134 to 137 of 1959.

Tt<lidas • l l f h .

Kilachand Appeals by spema eave rom t e Judgment and v. order dated September 20, 1957, of the Bombay High Commissiouer of Court in Income Tax Reference No. 14 of 1957.

Income-la:o N ..

R. J. Kolah, S. . Andley, J. B. DadachanJt, Ramesh-

Hsdayatrrllals ].

war Nath and P. L. Voltra, for the appellants.

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent.

1961. January 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-Tbis judgment governs the disposal of Civil Appeals N'os. 134 to 137 of 1959.

They have been filed by four assessees with special leave, and adse out of similar facts, and it is not necessary to refer to more than one case to consider the point in question.

The assessment year under con,; idoratlon is 1952-53, and the previous year, the Calendar yea.r, 1951. In that year, k Tulsidas Kilachand, one of the four

appellant~, made a dPclaration of trust in favour of his wife, a portion of which may be quoted here:

" .......•. I, Tuh; idas Kilacho.nd ......... hereby declare that I hold 244 shares of Kesa.r Corporation Ltd. and 120 shares of Kilachand Dovchand & Co.,

Ltd .......... upon trust to pay the income thereof to my wife Vimla. for a period of seven years from the date hereof or he.r death (whichever event may be earlier) and I hereby declare that this trust shall

not be revocable." In the year of account, a. sum of Rs. 30,404 was received a8 dividend income on thmm Hharos, and the t\sscs see contended that thiK income, after being grossed up, was not liable to be included in hiK total income, in viow of tho third proviso to 8. IG(l)(c) of tho Indin.u

Income-tax Act.

The Incomo-ta.x: Officer diJ not acct>pt thiR contt-ntion, and though the assessment order is not before us, we gather from the sta.teroeut of tho case that the reason he gave was that the income had accrued to or had arisen in the hands of

--·~---- ··-·-·. .-. -. -. -.

3 S.C.R.

SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 353

.Mr. Tulsidas Kilacha.nd and had been pn.id by him to

his wife. The Income-tax Officer held that the words of the proviso "income arising to any person by virtue

?fa settlement or disposition" did not apply to this mcome.

On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the case was governed by s~ 16(3){b), and need not be considered under the third proviso to s. 16(l)(c) of the Act. It appears to have been conceded before him that if the former provision <.1tpplied, the proviso would not save the income from being assessed in the hands of Mr. T'dsidas Kilachand. The appeal was dismissed. .

In the appeal before the Tribunal, lVIr. Tulsidas Kilachand again relied upon the third proviso to s. l6(l)(c). and contended tha.b the case wa.s no~ governed by s. 16(3)(b) and that the dividend income cotlld not be included in his assessment.

The Tribuna.} came to the conclusion t.hat the case was covered either by s. 16(3)(a)(iii) or by s. 16(3)(b ), and th<l.t the . income from the shares was, therefore, liable to be included in the income of Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand.

The Tribunal, however, raised and referred the following question under s. 66(1) of the Act to the High Court of Bombay:

"Whether on a true construction of the deed of declaration of trust dated 5th March, 1951, the net dividend income of Rs. 30,404 on 120 shares of Kilachand Devchand & Co., Ltd. and 244 shares of K.esar. Corporation Ltd. held under trust by the assessee for the benefit of his wife was income liable to be incJuded in the total income of the assessee?" 'l'he High Court came to the conclusion that, tliough s. 16(l)(c) was not satisfied in view of the third proviso, s. 16(3)(b) was applicable the . case, and answered the question in the a.ffirmativ; e.. ·!

In the appeal before us, the case for the Department was based both on s. 16(3)(a)(iii) and s. 16(3)(b), while the appellants contended that this disposition fell within the third proviso to s. 16(l)(c). The relevant provisions a.re:

rulsidas

Ki."ahand

Commissioner o;

I nconut(~"

Flidayatullah J

rulsidas f(ilachand

Commi.>sim1er of

lllcMnt-lax

Hidayntullah ].

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

''16 .. Exemptions and exclusions in determining the total mcome.- ( 1) In computing the total incon; w of an assessee-

• ••• • •••••••• •• ' •• ' ••• • •••••••••• ••• •••••• ' ' •••• • • •••• f •••••••••••

(c) all income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement qr disposition whether revocable or not, and wh(; lther effected before or after the commencement of the Indiu.n Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 {7 of 1939), from assets remaining the property of the settlor or disponer, shall be deemed to be income of the settlor or disponer, and all income arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be income of the transferor: ' Provided ..................................................... .

Provided further ..................................... ... .. .. . ,. Provided further that this clause shall not apply to any income arising to any person by virtue of a

settlement or disposition which is not revocable for a period exceeding six years or during the lifetime of the person .and from which income the settlor or disponer derives no direct or indirect benefit but that the settlor shall be liable to be assessed on the

~:; aid income as and when: the power to revoke arises h~. . .

(2) , ................. ......... : .... :· ............. .. ... (omitted)

(3) In computing the ·tal income of any individual for the purpoRe of assessment, there shall be included- (a)· so much of the, income of a V..-ife or minor child of such individual as arises directly . or indlrectly- . ·(i) ......... ........... : ...................... : ....... ........... ~. (ii) · ......... ... ............. .. :i: ............ ;., .... ' .. .. ... .

(iii) from assets transftwTed ' directly .or indirctly to the wife by the husband otherwise thanfor ade- . quate considz:ation or> in :connection with an !l'gree- . ment to live apart; oi' ' . · · • •• •• ; ••• ••• • : .... ... ..... ..... :~ •• : •••• ' •• ; .... . ..... ••• • £ , .•••• ••••

(b) so much bfthe income o'f-any person or associa-· tion of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or

I I

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 355

association by such individual for the lJtndit of his 196: wife or a minor child or both." 1ulsida.1 The object of framing s. 16 can almost be taken Kilachand from the observations of Lord Macmillan in Chamberv. lain v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1), where he Commissitmer of stated as follows: blcome-lax "This legislation ... (is) designed to overtake and 1 a .-11 h 1 . . d th t f t II a}atu a , Circumvent a growmg ten ency on e par o ax. payers to endeavour to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements. Stated quite generally, the method consisted in the dispoal by the taxpayer of part of his property in such a way that the income should no longer be receivable by him, while at the same time he rtaiued certain powers over, or interests in, the property or its income. The legislature's

counter was to declare that the income of which the taxpayer had thus sought to disembarrass himself

should, notwithtanding, be treated as still his income and taxed in his hands accordingly.)) These observations a.pply also to the section under consideration, and the Indian provision is enacted with the same intent and for the same purpose. Section 16 thus lays down certain exemptions and exclusions in determining the total income of an assessee.

Some of the provisions lay down the conditions for inclusion of certain income, while others lay down the condi, tions for exclusion of other income. We are concerned with the income accruing in case of settlements and the conditions under which income of a wife is treated as the income of the settlor or disponer or as the , income of the husband. We have to see if the provisions. for exclusion or inclusion apply to this case.

Section 16(l)(c) provides that income from assets remaining the property of the settlor or disponer or arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets sha.ll be deemed to be the income of the transferor. what cl. (c) means. was decided by . .i)lis Court in Provat Kunw,?' Mitter v. Commissioner of:1ncorn:e.tax ( 2 )~ . There, Provat.· Kumar Mitter had assigned\ the dividends only, and, hd not transferred the

rele.~nt {f; lhares .. ,_It was hed by this _Cout that this

(1) (l943} 25 T. C. 317, 329. l2) [z¢oj 3 S.C.R. 37•

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

I96I was a case of application of one's own income and not

Tulsidas assignment of the source from which the income

I<ilaclzand was deriyed, \vhich alone saved the income from

v. tax, subject, however, to provisions likes. 16(l)(c) and Commissioner of s. 16(3). The deed in favour of the wife in that case

Inca"te-tax grove. Ol]ly a right to the dividends, and not being a transfer of an existing property of the assessee, llidayatullah ] . s. 16(l)(c) and the third proviso were not attracted.

That case thus has no application to t.he facts of the present. case, where the disposition is differently made.

rhe disposition here is for a period of seven years or the life of the settlee, whichever is shorter. During that I period or the life of the settlee, Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand has bound himself upon trust to pay the dividends to his wife and not to revoke the settlement. The intention is obviously to put this case within the third proviso to s. 16(l)(c), because cl. (c) does not apply to any income a.rising to any other person provided the disponer derives no direct or indirect benefit, even though the assets remain his property. If it were only a question of the application of the provhw, this disposition would be exempt. But by the deed of trust., the settlor holds the shares in trust,; the shares do not remain the property of t.he settlor. Section 16(l)(c) has, therefore, no application, and the proviso is not attracted.

The section goes on to deal with. other situations and to provide for them specially. Sub-section (3) provides specially for assets transferred to the wife or minor child. Income from assets transferred to the wife is still to be included in the total income of the husband, (a) if the assets have been transferred directly or indiroctly to tho wife by the husband otherwise thP.:n for adequate consideration [vide sub-s. (3)( a.)(iii)], or (b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as ttrises from assets transferred otherwise than for ade(tna, te consideration to the person or association by such indiviclnal for the benefit of his wife [vide sub-s. (3)(L )]. · ' The first question is whether there cim be said to he transfer of assets to the wife or to 'any person' for the benefit of the wife. The second question is whether there was adequate consideration for the transfer, if

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 357

there was one. The contention of the assessee is that 1 961 there was no transfer of any assets at all. It is con-

'Fllsidas tended that the ownership of shares involves a bundle Kilachand of rights, arid that they are, generally speaking, (a) v. right to vote, (b) right to participate in the distribu- Commissionlr of tion of assets on dissolution, and (c) right to partici- Income-tax pate jn the profits, e. g., dividends which might be . -~~ ,. 1 declared. It is pointed out t.hat none of these rights Hrdayatrr a' · was transferred to the wife, because transfer of assets connotes a creation of a right in the assets in praesenti. It is urged that there was no t, ransfer of assets either to the wife or to any person for the benefit of tho wife but merely a creation of a trust in respeet of the shares, the dividends from which were payaiJle to the wife, and that thus s. 16(3)(a)(iii) or s. 16(3)(b) 'vas

not applicable. It is lastly contended t.hat even if it be held that there was such a transfer, it was for adequate consideration, being for love and affection, which is a good consideration.

The comcntion that there was no transfer at all in th1s case is not sound. The shares were previously held by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand for himself. Aft.er the declaration of trust by him, they were held by him not in his personal capacity but as a trustee. No doubt, under ss. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trnst is himself the trnstee also, there is no need that he must transfor the property to himself as trustee; bnt the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacit.y as trustee are different, and after the declaration of tmst, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of

Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. ln our opinion, there was, in this case, a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though thPre was no formal transfer.

The assessee also stresses tho words "any verson or association of persons" in s. 16(3 )(b), and cont.ends that such a person must be other than the husband, who transfers. The word "any person" is wide

SUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1961]

z961 enough to include the husband, when he tranfers pro.

Perty to himself in another capacity. The change of 1'ulsidas Kilachand capacity makes him answer he description "any perv. sonn. This deed must be _regarded as involving a Commissionet of transfer by the husband to a trustee, and even though

Income-tu the husband is the same individual, in his capacity - as a trustee he must be regarded as a person distinct Hidayatullah J. from the transferor.· In our opinion, s. 16(3)(b) covers the case.

It remains to consider whether there was adequate consideration for the transfer. Reliance has been placed only upon love and affection. The words "adequate considration" denote consideration other than mere love and affection, which, in the case of a wife, may be presumed. When the la.w insists that

there should be "adequate consideration'' and not ugood consideration", it excludes mere love and affection. They may be good consideration to support a contract; but adequate conideration to avoid tax is quite a different thing.

TQ insist on the other meaning is really to say that consideration must only be looked for, when love and affection cease to exi~; t.

In our opinion, this case' falls within the special rules concerning wife and minor child, laid down in s. 16(3)(b) and not within the third proviRo to

s . .I6(l)(c). It must thus be held that there was a "tra:hsi'er o.f the assets o the husband-frustee for the benefit of •the wife, 1, he answer given by the High Court was thus correct.

The appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.

Appeals dismissed.

351

TULSIDAS KILACHAND

L. KAPUR

M. HIDAYATULLAH

C. SHAH, JJ.

Indian Income-tax Act

s. 1951

Indian-Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 16(3)(a)(iii)

s. 16(3)(a)

s. 16(3)(b)

March 15, 1951

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

R. J. Kolah

S. . Andley

B. DadachanJt

war Nath

P. L. Voltra

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri

D. Gupta

HIDAYATULLAH

Tulsidas Kilachand

Kesa.r Corporation Ltd.

Kilachand Dovchand & Co.

Vimla

Income-tax Act

Tulsidas Kilacha.nd

s. 16(l)(c)

T'dsidas Kilachand

s. 16(3)(b)

s. 16(3)(a)(iii)

s. 16(3)(b )

Tulsidas Kilachand

s. 66(1)

High Court of Bombay

5th March, 1951

Kilachand Devchand & Co., Ltd.

K.esar. Corporation Ltd.

s. 16(l)(c)

s. 16(3)(b)

s. 16(3)(a)(iii)

s. 16(3)(b)

s. 16(l)(c)

s. 16

Macmillan

Section 16

Section 16(l)(c)

Provat Kunw

Provat.· Kumar Mitter

s. 16(3)

s. 16(l)(c)

s. 16(l)(c)

Section 16(l)(c)

s. 16(3)(a)(iii)

s. 16(3)(b)

ss. 5 and 6

Indian Trusts Act

s. 16(3 )(b)

Hidayatullah

s. 16(3)(b)

s. 16(3)(b)